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CONSTANCE MUI
Loyola University
In 1973, Margery Collins and Christine Pierce became the first critics
to take issue with Sartre's philosophy on charges of blatant sexism. Their
article, entitled "Holes and Slime: Sexism in Sartre's Psychoanalysis," has
been reprinted in many reputable anthologies on women, gaining
considerable recognition in the feminist community. Michele le Doeuff,
for example, reinforced its thesis by extending it to her own unfavorable
reevaluation of Simone de Beauvoir's philosophy, which is founded on
Sartre's ontology. Interestingly, whether it is due to indifference or
uncritical acceptance, for some fifteen years since the article, Collins and
Pierce have not received any public response from the Sartrean
community. This rather long and unexpected silence means that they
have put in the first and last word on an important and timely subject
which deserves an open dialogue. Indeed, because of the value of Sartrean
ontology for important feminist writings such as The Second Sex, it is time
to reassess the authors' thesis so as to generate some much needed
discussion on the issue.
To be sure, Collins and Pierce are on the right track in pointing out the
unmistakably sexist language in Sartre's discussions of the slimy and the
hole, which he associates with the breast and the vagina, organs that are
distinctively female. What clearly comes through in the analogies is the
utter repugnance that Sartre feels toward the female body-for-others (i.e.,
the female body as an object). There is no question that behind the
unapologically sexist language lies a grumbling misogynist. The more
fundamental question, however, is whether his personal distaste for
woman negatively affects the position of woman in his overall ontology.
Such an inquiry will shed some light on whether we should reject the
philosophy, and not just the philosopher, as sexist and hence defective.
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This paper will argue that Sartre, in spite of himself, has set up a
system which ironically committed him to giving woman an at least equal,
if not more primordial, ontological status as man. This argument seeks to
qualify Collins* and Pierce's original thesis by situating it within the
broader context of Sartrean ontology. One cannot infer from the sexist
analogies of slime and holes the claim that woman occupies an inferior
ontological status. To do so would be to overlook the delightful irony in his
ontology: in spite of his ill feelings toward woman, woman nevertheless
prevails as a full-fledged consciousness in that ontology.
Collins and Pierce were careful to identify sexism only in Sartre's
psychoanalysis. They charged that
Sartre's existential psychoanalysis... offer(s) instances in which the Initself is associated with distinctly feminine, or female, qualities,
thereby implying that a typical female nature does exist and function.
Moreover, this female essence is invested with an utterly negative
value, making Sartre guilty of blatant sexism.
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consclousness-of-something is sustained.
Furthermore, because consciousness, as pure nothingness, Is
thoroughly translucent, pour-soi is in no position to posit the being of the
substantial object of which it is conscious. Hence, the object must exist, as
brute being, independent of and prior to its encounter with consciousness.
It must have been already-there before the burst of consciousness onto it,
objectifying it in the process. But for the same reason that consciousness
cannot found the being of its objects, pour-soi desires being. It seeks to
escape from Its own nothingness and contingency by acquiring, without
compromising its own consciousness, the substantiality and full positivity
of en-soi. In short, it seeks in vain to preserve within itself the opposing
characteristics of both pour-soi and en-soi, viz., God.
Even though this fundamental desire can never be fulfilled, pour-soi
nevertheless engages in patterns of bad faith by acting in ways that
symbolically place itself as the foundation of en-soi. A common pattern is
appropriation, in which I attempt to completely possess the object so that
it may become a part of me. Possession is therefore symbolic of the
impossible union of pour-soi and en-soi. It is through this fundamental
choice of being God that pour-sol identifies with the absolute positivity of
en-soi and deceptively justifies its existence as the source of en-sol. In
view of this choice, the primary relation between pour-soi and en-soi is one
of appropriation.
This subject-to-object relation of appropriation provides the
indispensable ontological context in which to assess both Sartre's
psychoanalysis and Collins' and Pierce's critique of it. For Sartre, the aim
of psychoanalysis is to comprehend the truth of human behavior by
analyzing the person's particular choice of being. Every behavior, every
action, presupposes a concrete choice. Such everyday choices, says Sartre,
often manifest the person's fundamental desire "to have", which amounts
to a hopeless project to be God.
This fundamental desire to appropriate objects is reflected not only in
our actions but also in our "gut feelings" toward things. Our attitude
toward a given object-e.g., whether we feel exhilaration or disgustdepends on whether or not it exhibits for us any possessable quality.
Sartre notes that the things we find most revolting are those that offer the
strongest resistance toward us. Such are objects with a "slimy" quality.
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Collins and Pierce noted that "the sugary" thus "poses an ultimate threat"
to pour-soi, one of nihilation or nothingness. What emerges from Sartre's
description, they charged,
is a traditional concept of the feminine, a sweet, clinging, dependent
threat to male freedom. Like... Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, Sartre
identifies his concept of femininity with female and rails against these
qualities in women as if they were natural characteristics, evidence of
a given nature.
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consideration of some relevant points will bring out the difficulties in each
of them.
Regarding the first inference, we must, to be fair to Sartre, bear in
mind that in the passage cited, he is referring to honey as an example of
the slimy. Hence, it is the honey, not the feminine, that is described as
sugary, sweet, clinging, soft and sticky. Twice Sartre interjects the word
'feminine' to specify that it is a stickiness and a sickly-sweetness of the
feminine kind. This makes the reverse of Collins'and Pierce's first
inference more plausible: Sartre is not defining the feminine in a
traditional manner as soft, sweet, clinging, etc., but the soft, sweet, and
clinging as feminine. This juxtaposition makes it clear that Sartre has not
committed himself to any universal claim about femininity itself. Notice
that we are not merely fussing with semantics here. If I say that apples are
red, I am making no universal claim about redness, only about apples. I
have not said anything about redness that could be taken to apply to all
things red. Similarly, Sartre's description of softness as feminine follows
the same linguistic and logical principle. There, whatever is implied about
the feminine can in no way be applied universally, such that femininity is
necessarily clinging and soft, which, for Sartre, amounts to being slimy and
repugnant. The fallacy of such application can be detected more
poignantly if we turn Sartre's description into an argument form:
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3.
4.
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SARTRE'S SEXISM R E C O N S I D E R E D
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What immediately comes to mind is that the woman's breasts are neither
the most obvious nor the most appropriate example of slimy substances.
If the slimy is that ambiguous quality between water and solid, and if it
represents a threat to consciousness much like the Other's body is a
threat, then what can be a better example than the semen produced by
man's body? Indeed, semen captures the slimy most symbolically: like
consciousness, it bursts out in an explosion onto its object, but at the same
time it represents en-soi by negating the very essence of consciousness as
absolute lucidity. By avoiding this very obvious example Sartre is anything
but objective, since objectivity would require that he employs this example
for its effectiveness regardless of his own disposition.
In the analysis of holes, we see that, like the slimy, holes also offer a
strong resistance to our fundamental project of appropriation. When we
attempt to possess it by plugging it up, it devours us-we lose ourselves in it
and become its object. To illustrate the horror in our confrontation with
holes, Sartre refers to the vagina, corresponding obviously to heterosexual
intercourse whereby the man is the subject and the woman the object of
such horror. But this amounts to a male-oriented, hetero-centric account
of consciousness and its ontological fear of holes, which does not exhaust
the whole panorama of human sexual experience, both female and male,
homosexual and heterosexual. For instance, there are sexual acts in which
the object plugged up is not the female vagina but the anus or the mouth
of either sex.
These considerations show that, in both cases, an example of the male
anatomy taken from a female perspective should have been used Instead
of or in addition to the ones Sartre employed. Far from being
Indispensible, the sexist examples in Sartre's psychoanalysis are not even
the most representative or effective ones that could be used. Sartre has
chosen those examples for at least two reasons: his subjective repulsion
toward woman, and the traditional male model adopted throughout his
discussion. This model of the healthy, privileged adult male has been
used uncritically and often unconsciously in the history of thought. And so
it is not surprising that, in a male-centered analysis of appropriation,
woman would be associated with the appropriated object, i.e., the slimy
and holes.
Here the question arises as to how this traditional male model might
affect woman's status in an ontology that isfoundedon the Cartesian split
between subject and object. Is woman forever locked into the position of
object/Other? The unacceptable implication of this position, Collins and
Pierce cautioned us, is that woman "becomes...the personification of the
In-itselF. Michele le Doeuff argues further that Sartre
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But these assessments are premature. First, the fact that woman is
consistently treated as the object does not entail that she is in fact an
object. The status of woman in the traditional male model is simply that of
pour-soi becoming the being who is looked at in the mode of en-soi. All it
takes to reverse this (male) subject-to-(female) object relation is a shift in
our vantage point from the masculine to the feminine. Second, there
cannot be a gender hierarchy in Sartrean ontology because, even as the
object/Other, woman must nonetheless be a conscious pour-soi given
Sartre's important revision of the traditional theory of intersubjectivity.
The tradition has long insisted on the primacy of the subject-to-object
relation whereby the subject becomes aware of the Other through the
Other's body. Sartre criticized this position for failing to uncover an even
more primary relation: my subject-to-object relation to the Other is itself
founded on the Other's turning me into an object through her "look". In
other words, my making an object of the Other lies subsequent to her
making an object of me (or my awareness that she could have made an
object of me). I become aware of the Other not through her body, but my
own awareness that / have a body which is being looked-at.
Not surprisingly, Sartre analyzes this phenomenon of the look in
terms of pour-soi's fundamental project of appropriation. He maintains
that the look represents a threat to consciousness in that it immediately
makes me aware of two simultaneous conditions: 1) there is a dimension
of my being that is "out there" and in danger of being captured, in short a
"being-for-others" that is neither accessible to nor controlled by me; 2) the
Other has seized my being-for-others and turned it into an object of
possession. Sartre claims that it is this terrifying awareness that motivates
me to retaliate by turning the Other into a mere thing, a possession
existing at my disposal (I can treat it as a slimy hole, etc.). This is done via
the same mechanism: I look back at the look. This would not only make
me a subject once again (specifically a subject before the Other-turnedobject), but like any attempt at appropriation, it would also satisfy my
desire to found the being of an object/Other which, as seen earlier,
amounts to my desire to be God.
This description of appropriation through the look makes it clear that
Sartre is not at liberty to relegate the Other to the ontological status of ensoi. By his own admission, it is because the Other is a subject, a pour-soi,
who has initially turned me into an object that appropriation of the Other
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LeDoeuff,p.51.
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becomes for me a desirable attitude. In it I attempt to deny the objectness which the Other has conferred upon me. As Sartre notes,
The Other is in no way given to us as an object. The objectivation
of the Other would be the collapse of...(her) being-as-a-look... (It) is a
defense on the part of my being which, precisely by conferring on the
Other a being-for-me, frees me from my being-for-the-Other. In the
phenomenon of the look, the Other is in principle that which can not
be an object.
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Sartre, p. 268.
Ibid.,p.271.
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