DEFINING MOMENTS

The Truman Doctrine

and Soviet Expansion

COMPLETE LESSON AND ACTIVITY GUIDES

Stimulating lessons that bring two of the most powerful and
engaging research tools to the classroom: the analysis of primary 
documents and the revealing speculation of alternative history.

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COVER PHOTO: President Harry Truman addresses Congress in March 1947, introducing a new
policy (which will become known as the Truman Doctrine) of providing economic and military aid
to Turkey and Greece. Inspired by fears that the war-torn nations were vulnerable to communist
takeover, Truman created a policy that encompassed support for anti-communist efforts
around the world. This legislation was the cornerstone of early Cold War communist
containment strategy.

ii

Contents

About the Development Team

Series Introduction
Introduction

Need to Know
Timeline

What If?

2
3

Handout A

14

Handout B

15

Activity 2

Defining Moment

Activity 1

iv

16

Ready Reference

20

National Standards Correlations

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22

iii

About the Development Team

LEE W. EYSTURLID
ILLINOIS MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE ACADEMY
Lee W. Eysturlid is a history/social science instructor at Illinois Mathematics and
Science Academy. Dr. Eysturlid has a PhD in history from Purdue University and
is a member of the Citadel Historical Association. He has published on
numerous military history topics and is an ABC-CLIO History Fellow.

JEREMY GYPTON
EMPIRE HIGH SCHOOL
Jeremy Gypton is a history/government teacher at Empire High School in
Tucson, Arizona. Gypton received his Masters from American Military
University and Bachelors from the University of Arizona. He was named
Arizonas Outstanding American History Teacher by the Daughters of the
American Revolution, and is an ABC-CLIO Fellow.

CHRIS MULLIN
SANTA YNEZ VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL
Chris Mullin graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with a
degree in classical Greek and Latin and received his Masters degree in education
from the University of California at Santa Barbara. Chris teaches Latin,
Advanced Placement European history, and Advanced Placement United States
history. In 2003, Chris was named California Teacher of the Year for his
passionate and innovative approaches to teaching history.

BRETT PIERSMA
SANTA YNEZ VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL
Brett Piersma received his BA in History and his Masters of Education and
teaching credential at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He teaches AP
European History, AP American Government, and College Preparatory World
Cultures. He has facilitated the California HistorySocial Science Project at
UCSB twice and is a MetLife Fellow for the Teachers Network Leadership
Institute.

Portions of this workbook were drawn from ABC-CLIO's Turning PointsActual and Alternate Histories series, edited by
Rodney P. Carlisle and Geoffrey Golson. For ordering information, please visit www.abc-clio.com

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iv

Series Introduction

This packet is part of a 34-part series of primary sourcebased lessons for high school American History
courses. Each packet focuses on one defining moment in our history, with specific background information
and key concepts to help teachers become more knowledgeable in the history they are charged with teaching.
To help with classroom lessons, two activities are included in the packet: one based on the real history, the
other on a counterfactualalternatehistory. Both activities are rooted in student analysis of primary
source material, and both will help teachers meet standards-based requirements through varied and stimulating
teaching methods.
Every packet is arranged in the same manner. Teachers need to read the Introduction, which provides a big
picture survey of the period of history in question. The Defining Moment is a short passage that focuses on
a single, key event that was a turning point in historya fork in the road after which the behaviors and fortunes of individuals, peoples, and places changed. The Need to Know section provides a more detailed discussion of the events leading up to and including the Defining Moment; this is followed by a short Timeline
of events. These first several pages are concerned entirely with history as it actually happened. The What If?
section supposes what might or could have taken place if events within the Defining Moment turned out differently.
The final components are the two Activities, each based on primary source documents. Activity 1 is based
on the real history and is intended to help students learn the facts and understand the conceptsenabling
teachers to meet the requirements of standards-based lessons. Activity 2 is based on the counterfactual history.
Both lessons require creative, analytical thinking and include work across the spectrum of Blooms Taxonomy.
To help teachers, each lesson also includes explicit lesson objectives, materials needed, and specific instructions.

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Introduction

Introduction
At the end of World War II in August of 1945, the dual threat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had been
resoundingly defeated. What emerged were two powers, soon to be titled superpowers: the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In conjunction with Great Britain, these three had coordinated a generally unified war effort, but it was an effort driven by a fear of a common enemy. Once the ideological threat of Fascism had been beaten, the reason for mutual assistance quickly evaporated.
The United States represented, to a greater degree, the leader of the capitalist, democratic states in the
world. It had combined tremendous resources and industrial power with unparalleled organizational and governmental focus in its successful war effort. The result was the most powerful state on the world scene in 1945
and the only one equipped with atomic weapons. Conversely, the USSR, while also emerging triumphant, had
suffered terrible physical and human lossesat least 12 million deadand while it had proven its ability to
produce, it had achieved this at immense cost. Its command economy had survived, but barely, and as the second of world powers, the Soviets, and their dictator Josef Stalin, were keenly aware of it.
The inability of the two powers, which represented clear ideological and geopolitical differences, to get
along in the years immediately following World War II resulted in the old alliance collapsing. In its place there
would be, by 1953 at the latest, a new conflict, one without conventional fighting, but one in which ideological opponents would face each other armed with nuclear weapons.

British prime minister Clement Atlee, U.S. president Harry Truman, and Soviet prime minister Joseph Stalin at the
Potsdam Conference on August 1, 1945. Atlee replaced Winston Churchill, the previous prime minister, mid-conference,
when Churchill lost in an election. (Library of Congress)

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Defining Moment

Defining Moment
The year and a half immediately following the end of World War II marked a real change in the paradigm of
the U.S.USSR relationship. Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his representative in Moscow, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, the United States had looked to a policy of compromised arrangements with
the Soviets. In the aftermath of the war, with Harry S. Truman as president and the harsh reality of Stalins foreign policy, this would end. Because of the Russian war effort and the sacrifices that the USSR had made, most
of the United States leadership and the public were hopeful that some sort of peaceful coexistence would
emerge.
Through the year 1946, U.S. policy would undergo a reorientation concerning the Soviet Union. In early
1946, Secretary Byrnes returned from a three-month meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow. He was pleased
that the Russians had agreed to the American plan for a United Nationsrun Atomic Energy Commission,
but Byrnes could get nothing from the Soviets over their occupation of northern Iran. Byrnes quickly came
under attack from Congressional Republicans and members of the Truman administration for his approach
to the Russians. It had been assumed by Truman and Byrnes that Stalin had been acting strictly from the concern of guaranteeing Russian security; therefore, the opportunity for a friendly resolution of disputes might
still exist. However, at this time, a growing number of American officials were coming to feel that they had misjudged the Kremlins policy, and that the Soviets actions in Eastern Europe in 1945, combined with changes
in tactics employed by international communist movements, convinced them that they had misjudged the
Kremlin. The Soviets were now seen not merely as seeking security but also as launching a program of unlimited expansion that would threaten the United States and its Western allies. The relationship between the
two would move from estranged ally to potential enemy as key events and ideas would come to the fore in January and February of 1946.
Two schools of thought would now come into conflict in the United States. The first group, soon to be the
driver of policy, was made up of men like the secretaries of war and navy, the military chief of staff, as well as
men at the State Department such as George Kennan. They looked to Soviet actions and the lack of American
response as akin to appeasement. Truman quickly moved to this side
in reaction to Russian policies. Truman would also have to
appeasement: The discredited
strengthen his stance as midterm elections approached and the Repolicy of pandering to Hitler,
publicans, lead by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, demanded action.
as adopted by England and
Kennan put all the concerns into focus with his now famous Long
France in the late 1930s.
Telegram. Kennan, the charge daffaires in Moscow, would define in
some 8000 words what he saw as Soviet rationale. He posited that
Soviet actions were based not on analysis of the outside world but on the need to maintain power in Russia.
Therefore, no matter how well-intentioned U.S. actions might be, they would not diminish Soviet hostility to
the West. If this was the case, the ideological split between the democratic-capitalist West and the totalitariancommunist USSR could not simply be papered over. Rather, the United States must look to resist, as much as
possible, internal and external Soviet efforts to overthrow Western institutions. This selected resistance would
await the time when internal changes in the USSR would bring about real policy change.
The second group was represented by old FDR men such as Byrnes and liberals such as Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace (once vice president). Although Byrnes would quickly move to Trumans position, men
such as Wallace would look with concern and apprehension about the growing split between the two powers.
In a speech to left-wing groups given at Madison Square Garden September 12, Wallace openly criticized
British imperial policy, stating: We should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of
Eastern Europe then Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States.

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Need to Know

Wallaces criticism of Moscow for teaching that its form of communism would triumph, by force if necessary,
over capitalism, elicited hisses and boos from the gathered crowd. While hopes among Americas Left for reconciliation between the two would remain, it would be pushed further into the background.
The other marking event in this change of policy, and change in American attitude toward the USSR, can
be seen with Winston Churchills Iron Curtain speech, given in Fulton, Missouri, in March. It opened what
would become over the next several months an effort by Truman and his administration to try to sway public opinion for the need to resist Soviet encroachment in places like Iran and later Greece. Truman would now
use the term of getting tough with the Russians, his belief and that of those around him that only a firm
stance would have any impact in diplomacy. The real test would come with the withdrawal of the British from
their support for the Greeks. Would the United States move from getting tough to containment?

Need to Know
While U.S. policy toward the USSR had already begun to take on elements of containment before Kennan, his
telegram ignited opinion in Washington, D.C. Those who saw concessions to the Russians as appeasement
locked onto the work as further justification of their own views. Actual policy started to come into being in
1947. The first public use of the strategy came in March of 1947 in reaction to the Communist insurgency
and perceived instability in Turkey. Both states were seen as Soviet targets, and both were considered strategically critical due to their access to the Dardanelles and the Aegean. In an address to a joint meeting of Congress, President Truman requested money and military aid for both states. The need to assist the Greeks was
especially keen because the British, the prior backer
of the anticommunist forces there, was bankrupt
and had announced it would no longer offer assistance. Truman stated that the United States must
support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. The point made would become known as the
Truman Doctrine. The statement seems to dedicate
the United States to the assistance of all peoples in
resistance to any form of communism, and criticism
of the expanse of such a plan poured in. In reply,
Kennan, Truman, and his administration would
deny the idea that the doctrine was all-inclusive but
rather that it intended to be selective, a strong
point defense rather than a perimeter-based one.
The support given to the Greeks and Turks, although not terribly popular with the Republican
dominated Congress, quickly bore fruit in that it
preserved both states from takeover. In June 1947 Bread and butter were the most urgent needs in the Europe
came the announcement by Secretary of State of 1948. By the end of 1951, one and a half billion dollars
George Marshall of the Economic Recovery Plan for worth of bread grains had been sent to Western Europe.
Europe. To help gain its approval in Congress, Tru- Here a Marshall Plan shipment of corn meal is unloaded off
the M.S. Godafoss in the harbor of Reykjavik, capital of
man allowed Marshall to push the plan because he Iceland. (United States Agency for International
was well respected; the plan thereafter would be Development)

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Need to Know

called the Marshall Plan. The given intention of the

plan was to provide large loans and grants to any
country to speed economic reconstruction caused
by World War II. The opportunity was offered to all
European states, although those under Soviet control were forbidden from applying by Stalin. The U.S.
purpose was twofold: to alleviate suffering and to rebuild the economies of Europe. The hope was that
functional economies in countries like Germany,
Italy, France, and several others would stave off collapse and suffering, which American planners felt
opened the door to communism. In the case of the
Marshall Plan, the United States would contain the
USSR and its ideas with money and goods rather
than force of arms.
In November of 1948, Truman approved a top
secret memo for the new National Security Council
(NSC) that made containment of international SoSecretary of State Dean Acheson signs the North Atlantic
viet influence or control a key pillar in the underTreaty on behalf of the United States on April 4, 1949.
(NATO Photos)
pinning of future American foreign policy. The
formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in April 1949 was a part of this idea. By creating NATO, which was primarily a military alliance, the
United States was looking to make Western Europeans more capable of defending themselves. It also meant
that for the first time the United States entered into a long-term defensive alliance, with troops stationed overseas, with a European power. NATO was also a clear message to the USSR that if it moved against the West, the
West would fight. In reaction, the Soviets forced the creation of a
similar alliance among the Eastern European states known as the
NATO: Initially comprised of
Warsaw Pact (1955).
mainly Western European
Until 1950, containment had been mostly limited to economic
countries, this defense
and institutional means. However, the Korean War (19501953),
alliance now includes some
would change all that. In April 1950 the NSC produced a key report,
former Soviet states and is
NSC-68, which acted as a proverbial call-to-arms. It argued that the
currently undergoing
weak level of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional,
significant changes in focus,
left America open to a catastrophic attack by the USSR. The only way
mission, and organization.
to avoid this scenario, posited NSC-68, was to undertake a large-scale,
peacetime rearmament program. Truman did not attempt to act on
the document because he knew the vast expense of such a program would be immensely unpopular. The coming of the war in Korea changed the political climate quickly. In September 1950, Truman approved the program,
and the United States undertook a substantial increase in mobilization and construction.
Containment produced a relatively large, permanent military establishment and ever-expanding nuclear
arsenal, something new in U.S. history. Its existence, combined with an expanding notion of what containment
meant, or could hope to achieve, informed policy into the 1960s and 1970s. Another key idea at this time was
the notion that if any one state, especially in a strategic area, would fall to a communist insurgency, then the
other states in the immediate area where likely to fall as well. This idea became known as the domino theory
and it fit neatly with the idea of containment. If the United States could contain communist (Russian or

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Timeline

Chinese) influence, then these less-stable, smaller states, could be

dtente: Used to describe an
kept within American influence. The most famous domino would
easing of tension between
later be Vietnam, but the term was used with situations in Africa, the
opposing parties, particularly
Middle East, and South and Central America.
in international relations; from
By the mid-1970s, fresh from a grinding war in Vietnam, the
the French word meaning
United States looked to a period of dtente, or an effort to move
loosening.
away from low-level conflict and proxy wars and into a period of cooperation. This bore some success with the effort to limit nuclear
weapons in the SALT I and SALT II treaties. However, the vestiges of containment and ideas of dtente died
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the election of U.S. president Ronald Reagan in 1980.

TIMELINE

1945, February: Yalta Conference decides borders of postwar Europe and the fates of millions
of Eastern Europeans.
1945, May: War in Europe ends with Allied victory over Germany.
1945, September: Japan formally surrenders, unconditionally, after the two atomic bomb
attacks the month before.
1946, January: Chinese civil war resumes between Nationalists and Communists.
1946, February: George Kennan writes the now-famous Long Telegram, analyzing the motives
and goals of the USSR.
1946, March: Greek civil war reignites between Communists and Conservative forces; Winston
Churchill warns of an iron curtain falling across Europe.
1947, March: President Truman announces the Truman Doctrine, committing the United States
to containing communism.
1947, June: U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshal outlines a massive economic aid
package, later known as the Marshal Plan.
1948, April: President Truman signs the Marshal Plan into law.
1948, June: Soviet dictator Josef Stalin orders the Berlin Blockade; American and British forces
respond with life-saving aid to Berliners.
1949, October: Mao Zedong declares the creation of the Peoples Republic of China.
1950, June: North Korea invades South Korea, with Soviet and Chinese military assistance.

What if?
When reading about those first few years that set the stage for what would become known as the Cold War, the
sequence of events appear almost inevitable: Stalin would make greater demands and take greater license in
creating a Soviet sphere of influence. Germany would not be reunified but broken in half and remain at the
center of the conflict. The United States would come to see the USSR, and communism in general, as an ideologically implacable enemy that had to be contained. These historical realities could very well have changed,
especially if things had gone differently in the fluid world of American and Western European politics. More
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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION What If?

predictable are the actions and reactions, when constructing a counterfactual setting, of totalitarian
leaders like Stalin and Mao Zedong. What if the
American setting had been different? What might
have happened?
In choosing a vice president in 1944, the U.S.
president Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was in rapidly
declining health, was pressured to change his current
vice president, Henry A. Wallace. While initially open
to the idea, FDR could have changed his mind, fearful that the removal of Wallace, who had served
throughout the war, would alienate the liberals in the
Democratic Party. Therefore, when Roosevelt defeated Dewey for his fourth term, Wallace could have
been at his side. Shortly before the end of the war,
on returning from the Yalta meeting in the Crimea
with the Soviets and the United Kingdom, Roosevelt
died. Wallace, a prolabor progressive and pro-Soviet,
albeit not communist, member of FDRs administration, came into power.
Wallace intended to follow FDRs hope of workDuring his two decades in national politics, Henry A.
ing with Stalin and the USSR, as well as establishing Wallace served as President Franklin D. Roosevelts
the United Nations as a significant broker in inter- secretary of agriculture and vice president and President
national relations. With the end of World War II and Harry Trumans secretary of commerce. (Library of
Congress)
the elimination of the Axis threat, many Americans
were keen to see a sizable and immediate peace dividend. Most of the public had been unwilling to join the war until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After
that war ended, few Americans outside the administration viewed the USSR as any sort of threat, especially because the United States possessed atomic weapons and the Russians did not. Furthermore, the Soviets had
been our ally, and American propaganda had effectively sold them as just that. With this in mind, Wallace now
looked to his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, to make the peace permanent.
Wallace quickly made two things clear. The first was that he did not intend to engage the Soviets concerning the notion of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. He felt that the United States did not have the right
or the ability to attempt to direct what Stalin saw as a strategic necessity for the USSR. Therefore immediately
following the war, at the Potsdam conference and later, Wallace made it clear to Stalin that although he really
wanted to see free elections in Poland and Czechoslovakia, he was not willing to press the issue. Furthermore,
Wallace also pressed for the USSR to withdraw from northern Iran, as agreed from an early conference. Walking away from the meeting, Stalin would famously quote, Now I have found a capitalist that I can do business with.
By February of 1946 the Sovietsusing local communist parties, infiltrating agents, and the open force of
occupying Russian troopshad brought governments friendly to the USSR into being in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. While Stalin was not concerned that these states should be doctrinaire
in their communism, and non-Stalinist communists were shot alongside noncommunists, he did insist on
one-party totalitarian governments. The United States sent Byrnes along with the British ambassador to

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION What If?

Moscow to protest the lack of free and fair elections, but they were greeted only with platitudes. It became
clear that Stalin was testing how far he might go before there would be resistance.
With concern for the 1946 midterm elections, which it seemed that the Republicans were going to win, Wallace was also not willing to push the Russians about Iran. Much to his surprise, however, Stalin guaranteed that
the Russian troops would be gone by the late summera brilliant ploy in the face of an American public that
wanted to demobilize. In the midterm elections, the Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress
and Wallace realized he would need to make concessions to sustain many New Deal programs. The president
began a large-scale demobilization of army and naval forces, which pleased the isolationist Republicans. When
approached by Kennan concerning the creation of some sort of economic plan for Europe, Wallace was unwilling to bring it before Congress. He felt, with some justification, that it would be unpopular in the United
States and that it would directly offend the USSR. Further, Wallace was unwilling to give money to any European state that still maintained imperial possessions, removing most of the Western powers from the list.
The year 1947 proved pivotal. When the British notified the United States that they would no longer be able
to assist the Greeks in their fight against a communist insurgency, they were politely received but no action was
taken. Wallace and Byrnes felt that assisting these states, along with Turkey, directly would provoke either the
USSR or Yugoslavia. Furthermore, extensive demobilization and costcutting made it impossible to now provide large sums in assistance. It was also becoming clear as early as 1947 that the new, radically downsized
U.S. military would be no match in Europe in a fight with Russia. By late in the year, the Greek government
would succeed in defeating the insurgency, but only by buying off the Yugoslavs under Tito with the succession of Macedonia.
Following the near defeat in Greece, the rest of the Western European economies, lacking any real reserves
and resources, slid into first recession and then in 1948 into depression. With the German economy, the largest
before the war, in ruins and with no hope of recovery, inflation and unemployment ran rampant. Powerful
communist parties, supported with funds from Moscow, quickly emerged in Germany, France, Holland, and
Italy. By March of 1948, a new communist-dominated government in Italy had signed an independent economic treaty with the USSR, followed later by France. With few U.S. troops in Germany and economic considerations at a head, Wallace offered to turn the administration of the entire state over to the Russians. He felt
that having gotten rid of the last of Americans European problems and with almost all American forces home,
he would have a better chance in the upcoming presidential election.
Through the summer of 1948 it became clear to Stalin, or at least he saw it as such, that he could get what
he wanted through diplomacy and modest pressure, as opposed to force. As the United States approached the
1948 elections, with Wallace as the Democratic candidate and Thomas E Dewey running for Republicans, the
future of U.S.-Soviet relations seemed decided. Stalin had absolute control in all of Eastern Europe, his efforts
in North Korea with the dictator Kim Il Sung were paying off, and he had gained the occupation of Germany.
For the Soviet dictator, rightly or wrongly, he had solved the puzzle of Russian strategic security. Whether a new
American president might challenge that in 1949 remained to be seen.

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 1

Activity 1
OBJECTIVE:

Students will explore the economic, political, and military situation of postWorld War II Europe and the
need for United States intervention by reading excerpts from key documents and viewing images from the
1940s and categorizing them according to threat to the United States and its interests, or the USSR and its
interests. Then student groups will negotiate a series of compromises from military and economic aid to the
structures of governments in Eastern Europe.
OVERVIEW :

Students will be divided into two teams: The United States and the USSR. Each team will analyze and
discuss various threats to its existence and establish a list of priorities to negotiate against with the opposing
team.
MATERIALS NEEDED:

Copies of Handout APostwar Threats (one per student)

Copies of Handout BPostwar Compromises
Copies of Documents (one set per group)
TEACHER DIRECTIONS:

Explain to the class that the postwar era was fraught with difficulties and challenges related to recovery and
the growing tension between the remaining superpowers. Describe the conflict inherent between the United
States and the USSR and how each country viewed the challenges from their own perspective. Now divide
the class into two teams (United States and USSR) and instruct students to sit with their team in one half of
the room. Then further divide each team into smaller groups of four or five so there are an equal number of
United States as USSR teams. Tell students that each of them will receive a handout to complete but will be
working with other members of their group to organize and interpret documents through their countrys
perspective. Provide copies of the documents to each group and a copy of Handout APostwar Threats to
each student and read the instructions as a class. Allow teams to work. Once finished, cluster each U.S.
group with a USSR group and provide them with one copy of Handout BPostwar Compromises.
Instruct these large student groups to use their rankings on Handout A to work together to achieve a
satisfactory conclusion to each event or condition. Explain that each country might have to compromise a
bit on one event to gain its goals on the next.

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 1

DOCUMENT AGEORGE C. MARSHALLS SPEECH DECLARING MARSHALL AID

Excerpt from George C. Marshalls Speech June 5, 1947, Harvard University

I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. . . . The people of this country are
distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent
reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection
with our efforts to promote peace in the world. . . . In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been
severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. But even
given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than bad been foreseen. . . .
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy
is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal
basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide
a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find
full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers
to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will
encounter the opposition of the United States.
Marshall, George C. Commencement address, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, June 5, 1947.

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 1

DOCUMENT BBERLIN BLOCKADE ORDERED BY STALIN, U.S. AIRLIFT

Rows of C-47 Skytrain airplanes line up on a runway for use during the Berlin airlift. After the Soviet Union closed the
borders of West Berlin in June 1949, Great Britain and the United States administered the aid program to supply 2
million residents of the U.S. and British sectors with food and other essential goods. (U.S. Air Force)

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 1

DOCUMENT CGREEK CIVIL WAR

The Greek army fires on Profiti Helia during the Greek Civil War. The war ended when British troops liberated Greece
again, this time from itself, by order of Winston Churchill. Many military strategists speculate that the communists
would have won had it not been for the intervention of the Western powers. In 1947, the United States replaced the
British as the chief supporter of the monarchy. (Library of Congress)

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 1

DOCUMENT DTRUMAN SIGNS NATO ALLIANCE

Harry S. Truman holds the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) treaty he signed on July 25, 1949.
(Library of Congress)

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 1

DOCUMENT EMARSHALL PLAN PROPAGANDA

A worker shovels rubble during the rebuilding of West Berlin

in front of a building adorned with a sign supporting the
Marshall Plan. Introduced by the United States in 1947, the
massive financial aid program allowed Germany not only to
rebuild, but to surpass its prewar industrial production
level. (National Archives)

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Handout A

Handout APostwar Threats

Imagine that your team represents a high-level advisory panel responsible for guiding your governments
foreign policy in the immediate post-war era. For every event or condition in Europe, you must respond
with a policy that protects your nation (either US or USSR). Working as a team, read and view all
documents provided to you. Each document represents one of these events or conditions. For each
document, describe what you see or read, then explain how this might represent a threat to your country
(US or USSR). Then, rank the threats according to what you believe to be the 1st priority, 2nd priority, and so
on for your nation to deal with. Finally, write your ideas on how this situation should be resolved or what
your nations response should be. Some documents will indicate an action by your own country. For these
you should devise a policy for what to do next. You might recommend no action or continue present
policy for some events.

Team USA / USSR (Circle One)

Describe the Document and explain how the
event represents a threat to your country.

Threat
rank.

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Detailed explanation of how

your nation should respond.

ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Handout B

Handout BPostwar Compromises

Crisis

Compromises
U.S.

USSR

U.S.

USSR

U.S.

USSR

U.S.

USSR

U.S.

USSR

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 2

Activity 2
OBJECTIVE:

Using selections from a primary source document, students will create a series of alternate histories based
on the What If? background materials from this packet. By conjecturing about possible alternate outcomes,
students will demonstrate understanding of Americas early Cold War Containment policy.
OVERVIEW :

Working in small groups, students will study passages from George Kennans Long Telegram, the document
that was instrumental in President Trumans decision to contain communism. After answering several key
questions about the passage, students will create an alternate history of one of several early Cold War events,
imagining that the United States never sought to contain communism as it did.
MATERIALS NEEDED:

Defining Moment and What If? sections of this packet, one copy per student
Long Telegram passages and questions, one copy per group
TEACHER DIRECTIONS:

This activity would work best at the end of a unit about the early Cold War in either World History or
American History, or a Global Studies/International Relations course. Students will get the most out of it if
they already have a basic understanding of what the Cold War was, why it happened, and know of some
examples of the first events that comprised it. Regardless, separate the class into groups of three to four
students, and provide each group with their handouts. After students have read both passages from this
packet, pass out copies of the Long Telegram passages and questions. Have each group work together to read
and understand the passages and answer the questions.
After a group has finished with the questions, assign one of the following Cold War events to each group.
Their task is to create an alternate history of how America might have responded to this event if the United
States did not pursue a policy of containment. Have each group create a presentationan alternate history
briefing, if youd likedescribing the event, and how and why America would have reacted in this alternate
history. Each group should be able to field questions about their reasoning, and should be able to
demonstrate understanding of the real events, as well.
COLD WAR EVENTS:

Berlin Blockade
Greek Civil War
Triumph of Communists in China
North Koreas Invasion of South Korea
Frances War against the Viet Minh in Indochina
Soviet Invasion of Hungary
Cuban Revolution

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 2

LONG TELEGRAM EXCERPTS:

Part 1: Basic Features of Postwar Soviet Outlook as Put Forward by Official Soviet Propaganda Machine,
Are as Follows (This is the official line put forth by the Soviet Union as of 1946)
(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic capitalist encirclement with which in the long run there can be no
permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers: In
course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world
significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a
capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these
two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in
entire world.
(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These
conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England
and US.
(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds:
intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states and wars of intervention against socialist world.
Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.
(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause
renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.
(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold
out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily
powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.
...
So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:
(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society.
Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as
individually, of capitalist powers.
(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russias friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and
exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an
imperialist war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist
countries.
(c) Democratic-progressive elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear
on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.
(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.
Part 5. [Practical Deductions from Standpoint of U.S. Policy] (This is Kennans analysis of the situation)
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with U.S. there can be
no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if
Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of
worlds greatest peoples and resources of worlds richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and
powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far-flung apparatus for
exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by
people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history.
Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 2

objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being
tested and reformed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously
to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to
cope with this force [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will
ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present
juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major
strategic problem in war and, if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to
suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to
solveand that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there
are certain observations for a more encouraging nature I should like to make.
...
(2) Gauged against Western world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success
will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western world can muster. And
this is factor which it is within our power to influence.
...
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should
therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
...
For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia.
As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following
comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with
which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same
determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly
and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot overemphasize
importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is
necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need
not be deterred by [ugliness] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical antiSovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people.
There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal
more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American
relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to
face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country,
even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is
remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens
to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake likes in what we hope rather than what
we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is
enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact
basis.
...
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive
picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to
urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at
least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Activity 2

in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than
Russians to give them this. And, unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of
human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet
communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
Kennan, George F. Telegram. U.S. Department of State files, 861.00/22246. National Archives, College Park,
Maryland.
LONG TELEGRAM QUESTIONS:

1. Is Kennans approach rational or irrational? That is, is it hysterical anticommunism, or grounded in

practical reality as he sees it?

2. In Kennans opinion, how much of the USSRs actions are driven by the party or by Stalin?

3. What are his ideas for a response, and how do they fit what actually happens?

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Ready Reference

Ready Reference:
George Kennan: U.S. diplomat, Soviet expert, historian, and ambassador, George Kennan was born in Wisconsin in 1904. Kennan attended Princeton University and joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1926.
As one of the State Departments small coterie of Soviet experts, Kennan spent five years in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, returning there in 1944 as minister-counselor. His influential February 1946 Long
Telegram argued that the internal dynamics of Soviet communism made genuine Soviet-Western understanding unattainable.
From 1947 to 1949, Kennan headed the State Departments Policy Planning Staff, exercising his greatest immediate impact on U.S. foreign policy by enunciating the containment doctrine that became the basis of U.S.
Cold War strategy toward the Soviet Union. Kennan later suggested that fellow U.S. officials misinterpreted his
original version of containment, overemphasizing the military aspects that he regarded as secondary.
Kennan soon found himself increasingly out of sympathy with the broad thrust of U.S. Cold War policies.
In the late 1940s, and again during the 1950s, he called for the neutralization and unification of Germany, opposing the creation in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security alliance. Although on
leave, Kennan initially supported U.S. intervention in the Korean War but regretted the decision to carry the
war into North Korea. In 1951, he took part in unofficial negotiations with Soviet diplomats that led to the
opening of armistice talks. In 1952, Kennan was briefly ambassador to the Soviet Union, but his outspoken criticism of Soviet leader Josef Stalins regime quickly brought his expulsion. Kennan then began a lengthy career
as a historian and influential political commentator.
In 1960, Kennan advised Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Keen to encourage polycentrism within the communist world, Kennan welcomed his appointment as ambassador to Yugoslavia, where
he remained until 1963.
NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a mutual defense alliance of nations from Europe
and North America. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 by Great Britain, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. NATO
was organized to defend member nations from the possible aggression of the Soviet Union and the nations of
Eastern Europe, which formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization six years later. Originating as an anticommunist alliance during the Cold War, NATO has recently sought to redefine its role as East-West tensions have
eased.
NATO membership expanded in 1952 to include Greece and Turkey. West Germany entered in 1955, and
Spain in 1982. U.S. general Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed the first supreme allied commander in 1950.
In addition to a system of collective defense, NATO members pledged to work toward reaching agreement
with Warsaw Pact countries on equitable and verifiable arms reduction and to cooperate within the alliance
in economic, scientific, and cultural areas.
Differences between the U.S. government and its European allies have sometimes caused problems for the
alliance. U.S. arms were necessary at the end of World War II when European economies were shattered, and
the United States assumed leadership of the alliance. As the European nations recovered, however, some envisioned different arrangements. In the 1960s, for example, French President Charles de Gaulle resisted military
integration, withdrawing French forces from NATO and demanding that all allied troops quit French soil.
Europe and the United States have often approached the deployment of arms with different goals. In the
1970s, the U.S. government requested that the European members increase their defense spending. That request was well received but not carried out due to economic recession and the growing antinuclear movement
in Europe.

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ABC-CLIO, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOVIET EXPANSION Ready Reference

George C. Marshall: If not Americas greatest soldier, General of the Army George Marshall was one of the nations most capable military leaders and certainly one of the most influential figures of the 20th century. Marshall was born in Pennsylvania in 1880 and graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1901. After the
United States entered World War I, Marshall went to France with the American Expeditionary Forces as training officer to the 1st Division in June 1917. After working on occupation plans for Germany Marshall became
aide to Gen. John J. Pershing, who was named chief of staff of the army in 1921.
In 1938, Marshall became head of the War Plans Division in Washington, then deputy chief of staff with
promotion to major general that July. President Franklin D. Roosevelt advanced Marshall over many more
senior officers to appoint him chief of staff of the army as a temporary general on September 1, 1939, the day
that German armies invaded Poland. As war began in Europe, Marshall worked to revitalize the American defense establishment. Assisted by pro-Allied civilians such as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, he instituted
and lobbied for programs to recruit and train new troops; expedite munitions production; assist Great Britain,
China, and the Soviet Union in resisting the Axis powers; and coordinate British and American strategy.
Marshall was a strong supporter of opening a second front in Europe, a campaign ultimately deferred until
June 1944. Marshall was the first to be promoted to the newly authorized five-star rank of General of the Army
in December 1944. Roosevelt and the other wartime chiefs wanted him to remain in Washington, and Marshall bowed to their wishes. He was a major supporter of the Army Air Forces, and in 1945, he advocated use
of the atomic bomb against Japan.
On the urging of President Harry S. Truman, Marshall agreed to serve as special envoy to China (1945
1947). As secretary of state (19471949), he advanced the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and he then served
as president of the American Red Cross (19491950). Truman persuaded him to return to government service as secretary of defense in September 1950.

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National Standards Correlations

EDSTD1642842380: Challenge arguments of historical inevitability by formulating examples of historical contingency, of how different choices could have led to different consequences.
EDSTD1642842420: Formulate historical questions from encounters with historical documents, eyewitness accounts, letters, diaries, artifacts, photos, historical sites, art, architecture, and other records from the past.
EDSTD2097113460: United States History: Era 9 Postwar United States (1945 to early 1970s): How the Cold
War and conflicts in Korea and Vietnam influenced domestic and international politics: The student understands the international origins and domestic consequences of the Cold War. (NCSS)
EDSTD1635028280: Explain the origins of the Cold War and the advent of nuclear politics. (Hold interpretations of history as tentative).
EDSTD1642821770: Explain the rationale, implementation, and effectiveness of the U.S. containment policy.
(Evaluate the implementation of a decision).
EDSTD1642821790: Analyze the change from confrontation to coexistence between the Soviet Union and the
United States. (Analyze cause-and-effect relationships).

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