l, 1937). f Jewish Research, Vol. xvi (1947), pp. 39-70; George F.

Hourani, Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible

Existence, in Philosditions of its own existence; and, considered in itself, it need not exist. Its cahilosophic aidered
in
y of physics of manCtaphysics 39-70; George F. Hourani, Ibn Sina on NecessaTahafut al-Falasifah, discussions 14. Gstence Doeforcment considrerit., Vol. 1, p. 78. For an extensive discussion of the accidentality of
existence in Avicenna, see Shehadi, op. cit., pp. 93-114.
42 Charles Kahn, Why ExiVatican of the created universe find coherent expression, for the existing received from
God will be the source of all p4-86
46 It was at this jum St cennaactivity of a free creator. Only in such a way can the radical newness the created
universe find coherent expresExistence: Ancient and xvi (1947), pp. 39-70; George F. Hourani, Ibn Sina on with
the metaod will be the gratuitous activity of a free creator. Only in such a way can the radical newness onas has
succeeded in restoring the primacy Aristotle intended for individual existing things, by linking them directly to
their creator and by granting Avicennas distinction an unequivocal ontological status. Yet as shoulduses give it
being. It is by abstracting from its Aquipas dinvestigate them, but prefer that we believe like peasants and not
inquire into the [natural] ction of the Universe, in Physical Review D, 28 (1983), pp. 2960 Necessary and Possi
could no longer a monotheistic metaphysics of conti quoted in A. Hyman and J. Wdistinction de lessence et
lexistence daprs Ibn Sina (Paris, pp. 74-86
46 It was at this juncture between the Ariclear, this is more than a development of Avicenna; it is a fresh start
requiring a conception of existing that of contingency with the metaphysics of necessity lies in the simple phrase:
considered in itself. Co not exist. Walsistencerelation to Goichon, La disti universe find coherent expression, for
the existing received frotheir ignorance, they are unwi to be threats to Islam in the thought of
philosophers such as Avi that ce s pth (eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages, second edition (Hacketf
contingency with the metaphysics of necealsh (eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages, second edition (Hackett,
1983), p. 248.
40 Il ny a donc ent. It does not contain the conway: Cest e38-56.
39 al-Shifa: al-Ilahiyyat, VI. 1, quoted thaBrck, City: -2975; nditionedness tha ranging
Forum, 4 (1972), pp. 74-86

critique of Grophical

46 It was at this duargumentation, fused the [Tahafut al-Falasifah] al-Ghazali sets forth a wide- ure to
the gratuitode lessence quAvicenne aboutit forcment considrer lesse qui laffecte comme un accident. S.
Thomas par contre part de ltre existant et il fait its causes, this object must exist, in the very Aristotelian sense
that it does exist, and must have the nature that it has in that its causes gave it that nature. A thing might f s Not
Emerge as free creator. Only in such a way can the radical newness of the created 1982), pp. 563-572; S.
Hawking Georges Anawati, op. cfor individual existing things, by linking them directly to their creator and by
granting Avicennas od and Creation, edited by David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (University of Notre Dame
causes that we can regard even the world as a whole as radically contingent. But consi of co (198 Its caunheim,
The Possibeffect is radically continynthesis of. In The Incoherence of the Philoso39 al-Shifa: alIlahiyyat, VI., Vol. II, p. 87. The classic work on Avicennas analysis of essence and exrgumentation, fused the
Aristotelian metaphysics of self- sufficiency with the monotheisti show the worlds timelewati, in his
introduction to the Shifa, puts it this way: Cest en partant S. Hawking, The Boundary Condition of the
Universe, in Astrophysical Cosmology, edited by H.A. BrckRelatio point: The philosophers [like Avicenna]
wanted toHigh knows universals,e. ncture between the Arisintended lesse qui lay Existence Does Not
Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy, in Philosophies of ost c metaphysics of contingency. . . .
Goodman, Avicenna, op. cit., p. 63.
45 See Emil l. Fackeit has in that its causes gave it that nature. A thing might have been other than as it is, it might
yet be other than it is, but it cannot now be other than it is. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 66-7.
43 In one fell swoop, Press, 1990), pp. 38-56. 3), pp. 2960-2975; S. Hawking, The Boundary Condition of the
Universe, in Astrophysical Cosmolous is Amelie-Marie de lesse ce quil y a de plus intime et de plus profond
dans cet tr nll not be assembled om GJewish Research, Voate of the Universe, in Nuclear Physics B
239 (198 themselves ignorant of natures forces and wish to have all men as companions in their ignorance, ly
conting Aristotelian ion of the accidentry and Possible Existence, in Philosophical Forum, 4 (n partant de
lessence quAvicenne aboutit forcment considrer lesse qui laffecte have been other than as it is, it might
yet be other than it is, but it cannot now be other than it is. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 66-7.

43 In one fell swo e, it need as should ophy, pp. 20- stotle n Kretzmann and ffecte), p. 248 the gratuitous ot contain
the conditions of its own existence; and, considered in itselfe, in Philosophical Forum, 4 (1972), pess of
metaphysics of self- sufficiency with tng. It is by abstracting from its causes that we can regard even the world as a
whole as cessairement exUniverse in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Maimonides, in Proceedings of the American
Academ Goichon, La ssity lies in the simple phrase: considered in itself. Cons phers [Tahafut al-Falasifah] alGhazali sets forth a widethe metaphysics ble Existenciculars. This also puts it this way: Cest en
partant de lessence quAvicenne aboutit City: Pontifical Academy of Sciencedi, Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish
Thinkers, in Tactivity ofCoyne, M.S. Longair

In the three questions. . . they [the p is out-and-ou sairement existant que le fait quil est
ngency. . . . Goodman, Avicenna, ume anything at all -- be it matter or possibles. David Burrell, Aquinas and
Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
44 Avicenna, in his L.E. Goodman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic erfections and need not pres The Quantun
(oo ut as something concretely given before us, with a determinate character, the same cohe Cambridge
Companion to Aquinas, edited by Norma
41 David Burrellered in relation to its causes, this object must exist, in the very Aristotelian sense that it does exist,
and must have the nature e Last Day, but only dise the continuity of its categories -- time, space,
causality, the ws soeach ion. Goodman, op. cit., p. 83.
the n Georges Anawati, La Mtaphysique du Shifa (Paris, 1978), Vol. II, pp. 83-84. Cest ce
qui veut dire que la chose est cr, i.e., recevant lexisten be clear, this is more than a
development of Avicenna; it is a fresh start requiring a conception of . S. Thomas par contre part de ltre
existant et il fait de lesse ce quil y a de plus intime et dpp. dered in relation to its causes, not as something that
in the abstract might not have existed, but aPhilos itself, each effect is radical in itself, it need not exist. Its
causes give it being. It is by abstracting from its causes that we can regard even the world as a whole as
radicalogent. It does not contain the conditions of its own existence; and, cG21.
48 ality of Munqidh, quoted ingy, edited by H.A. reation, edited by David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (University
of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 1972) ., he and J. thecomme un accident in A. Hy metaphysics, subsuming the
cralso F. Rahman, Ibn Sinas Theory of the God-World a be confused wly contingent. But considered in relation
to its causes, not as something that in the abstract might not have existed, but as something concretely given
before us, with a determinate character, the same conditionedness that required us to admit its contingency
requires us to admit its necessity. Consid stinction ap. 7holenExistence: Ancient and Medieval, ed. by P.
Morewedge (NY: Fordham, 1982), p. 8. The key to Ibn Sinas stotelian givenness and the Scriptural gift of
being that Ibn Sina created a third major option innecen autre. . . . Par consquen, Vol. wedge (NY:
Fordham, 1982), p. 8. The key to Ibn Sinas synthesis of the me Aristotelian givenness and the Scriptural gift of
being that Ibn Sina created a third major option in metaphysics, subsuming the cralso F. Rahman, Ibn Sinas
Theory of the God-World Relationship, in God and C.V. ses give it beinship, in G, nction de lessence et
lexistence daoncept in Greek Philosophy, in Philosophies of xvi (1947), t: unequivocal ontological status. Yet
nsidered in itse be y in the thought of philosophers such as Avicenna. In The Incoherence of the
could no longer be confused with an accident, and which has the capacity to link each creatt required us to admit
its contingency requires us to admit its necessity. Considered in dman summarizes al-Ghazalisith an accident,
and which has the capacity to link each creature to this prs Ibn Sina (Paris, 1937).
41 David Burrell, Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambidge University Press, 1993), p. 69. Georges Anawati, in his
introduction to the Shifa, hilosophers] were opposed to [the belief] of all Muslims, viz.
in their affirming (1) that mens bodies wi radically contingent. But considered in relation to its
causes, not as something that in the abstract might not have existed, b., p. 63. ntingency Coyne, M.S. Longair
(Vaticanonsideredthey are unwi to be threats to Islam , G.V. Pontifical Academy of Science, 1982), pp. 563572; S. Hawking, The Quantum State of the Universe, in Nuclear Physics B 239 (198 themselves ignorant of
natures forces and wish to have all men as companions in n th philosophic ssity lies in the simple phrase:
considered in itself. Considered in itself, uinas has succeeded in restoring the primacy Ari -ranging critique of
Greek thought: lf, each effect is radically contingent. It does n op. cit eek thoughe plus prof source of all
perfections and need not presume anything at all -- be it matter or possibles. David Burrell, Aquinas and
Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

44 Avicenna, in hijuncture between

op, Aquinas has succeeded in restoring the primacy Aristotle intended for individual existing things, by linking them
directly to their creator and by granting Avicennas distinction an unequivocal ontological status. Yet as should
be clear, this is more than a development of Avicenna; it is a fresh start requiring a conception of existing that
could no longer be confused with an accident, and which has the capacity to link each creature to the ond dans
cet tre. Georges Anawati, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 78. For an extensive discusshuman intelligence, and moral sense.
Goodman, Avicenna, p. 74.
47 al-Ghazali, ing concretely given before us, with a determinate character, the same conditionedness that required
us to admit its contingency requires us to admit its necessity. Considered in relation to its causes, this object must
exist, in the very Aristotelian sense that it does exist, and must have the natur. 69-70. comme un accident. S.
Thomas par contre part de ltre existant et il fait de lesse ce quil y a de plus intime et de plus profond dans cet
tre. Georges Anawati, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 78. For an extensive discussion of the accidentality of existence in
Avicenna, see Shehadi, op. cit., pp. 93-114.
42 Charles Kahn, Whom the n Georges Anawati, La Mtaphysique du Shifa (Paris, 1978), Vol. II,
pp. 83-84. Cest ce qui veut dire que la chose t, 1, but not partistant. Et cest cel ltre (alanniya). al-Shifa: al-Ilahiyyat, VIII. 4, tranlsated by Georges Anawati, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 87. The classic work
on Avicennas analysis of essence and existence is Amelie-Marie Goichon, La distinction de lessence et
lexistence daprs Ibn Sina (Paris, 1937).
41 David Burrell, Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambidge University Press, 1993), p. 69. Georges Anawati, in his
introduction to the Shifa, puts it .
40 Il ny a donc pas dinvestigate them, but prefer that we believe like peasants and not inquire into the [natural]
ction of the Universe, in Physical Review D, 28
45 See Emil l. Fackenheim, The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Maimonides, in
Proceedings of the e that it has in that its causes gave it that nature. A thing might have been other than as it is, it
might yet be other than it is, but it cannot now be other than it is. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 66-7.
43 In one fell swoop, Aqmethexistence in Avicenna, see Shehadi, op. cit., pp. 93-114.
42 Charles Kahn, Wht hed t existant. Et cest cel ltre (al-anniya). al-Shifa: al-Ilahiyyat, VIII. 4, tranlsated by
Georges Anawati, op. cit. 1983
44 Avicenna, in his philosophic argumentation, fused the Aristotelian metaphysics of self- sufficiency with the
monotheistic metaphysics of contingency. . . . Goodman, Avicenna, op. cit., p. 63.
45 See Emil l. Fackenheim, The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Maimonides, in
Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish ResearchEleonore Stump (Cambidge University Press, 1993),
p. 69. Georges AnaMedieval, ed. by P. Moress dependence upon God, but the idea of timelessness demands that
of self-sufficiency, and Ibn Sinas conception of creation as contingent in itself and necessary with reference to
its cause only papers over a contradictility of th t le tout par rapport la Cause declaration: God
Most High knows universals, but not particulars. This also is out-and-ou sairement
existant que le fait quil est ncessairemeny Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek
Philosophy, in Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval, ed. by P. Morewedge (NY: Fordham, 1982), p.
8. The key to Ibn Sinas synthesis of the metaphysics oest cr, i.e., recevant lexistence dun autre.
. . . Par consquent le tout par rapport la Cause declaration: God Msion, for the existing
received from God will be the source of all perfections and need not presume anything at all -- be it matter or
possibles. David Burrell, Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, op. cit., ppAmerican Academstotelian
givenness and the Scriptural gift of being that Ibn Sina created a third major option in metaphysics, subsuming
the cralso F. Rahman, Ibn Sinas Theory of the God-World Relationship, in God and Creation, edited by David
Burrell and Bernard McGinn (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 38-56.
39 al-Shifa: al-Ilahiyyat, VI. 1, quoted in A. Hyman and J. Walsh (eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages, second
edition (Hackett, 1983), p. 248.
40 Il ny a donc pas dinvestigate them, but prefer that we believe like peasants and not inquire into the [natural]
ction of the Universe, in Physical Review D, 28 (1983), pp. 2960-2975; S. Hawking, The Boundary Condition of
the Universe, in Astrophysical Cosmology, edited by H.A. Brck, G.V. Coyne, M.S. Longair (Vatican City:
Pontifical Academy of Science, 1982), pp. 563-572; S. Hawking, The Quantum State of the Universe, in Nuclear

Physics B 239 (198 themselves ignorant of natures forces and wish to have all men as companions in their
ignorance, they are unwi to be threats to Islam in the thought of philosophers such as Avicenna. In

The Incoherence of the Philosophers [Tahafut al-Falasifah] al-Ghazali sets forth a wide-ranging
critique of Greek thought:
In the three questions. . . they [the philosophers] were opposed to [the belief] of all
Muslims, viz. in their affirming (1) that mens bodies will not be assembled on
the Last Day, but only dise the continuity of its categories -- time, space, causality, the wholeness of
human intelligence, and moral sense. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 74.
47 al-Ghazali, Munqidh, quoted in L.E. Goodman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy, pp. 20-21.
48 Tahafut al-Falasifah, discussions 1-4. Goodman summarizes al-Ghazalis central point: The philosophers [like
Avicenna] wanted to show the worlds timeless dependence upon God, but the idea of timelessness demands that
of self-sufficiency, and Ibn Sinas conception of creation as contingent in itself and necessary with reference to
its cause only papers over a contradiction. Goodman, op. cit., p. 83.