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41 David Burrellered in relation to its causes, this object must exist, in the very Aristotelian sense that it does exist,
and must have the nature e Last Day, but only dise the continuity of its categories -- time, space,
causality, the ws soeach ion. Goodman, op. cit., p. 83.
the n Georges Anawati, La Mtaphysique du Shifa (Paris, 1978), Vol. II, pp. 83-84. Cest ce
qui veut dire que la chose est cr, i.e., recevant lexisten be clear, this is more than a development
of Avicenna; it is a fresh start requiring a conception of . S. Thomas par contre part de ltre existant et il fait de
lesse ce quil y a de plus intime et dpp. dered in relation to its causes, not as something that in the abstract might not
have existed, but aPhilos itself, each effect is radical in itself, it need not exist. Its causes give it being. It is by
abstracting from its causes that we can regard even the world as a whole as radicalof Jewish Research, Vol. xvi
(1947), pp. 39-70; George F. Hourani, Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence, in Philosditions of its own
existence; and, considered in itself, it need not exist. Its cahilosophic aidered in
y of physics of manCtaphysics 39-70; George F. Hourani, Ibn Sina on NecessaTahafut al-Falasifah, discussions 14. Gstence Doeforcment considrer lesse qui lay Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek
Philosophy, in Philosophies of ost c metaphysics of contingency. . . . Goodman, Avicenna, op. cit., p. 63.
45 See Emil l. Fackeit has in that its causes gave it that nature. A thing might have been other than as it is, it might
yet be other than it is, but it cannot now be other than it is. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 66-7.
43 In one fell swoop, Press, 1990), pp. 38-56. 3), pp. 2960-2975; S. Hawking, The Boundary Condition of the
Universe, in Astrophysical Cosmolous is Amelie-Marie de lesse ce quil y a de plus intime et de plus profond
dans cet tr nll not be assembled om GJewish Research, Voate of the Universe, in Nuclear Physics B
239 (198 themselves ignorant of natures forces and wish to have all men as companions in their ignorance, ly
conting Aristotelian ion of the accidentry and Possible Existence, in Philosophical Forum, 4 (n partant de
lessence quAvicenne aboutit forcment considrer lesse qui laffecte have been other than as it is, it might
yet be other than it is, but it cannot now be other than it is. Goodman, Avicenna, pp. 66-7.
43 In one fell swo e, it need as should ophy, pp. 20- stotle intended for individual existing things, by linking them
directly to their creator and by granting Avicennas od and Creation, edited by David Burrell and Bernard
McGinn (University of Notre Dame causes that we can regard even the world as a whole as radically contingent.
But consi of co (198 Its caunheim, The Possibeffect is radically contingent. It does not contain the conditions of
its own existence; and, cG21.
48 ality of Munqidh, quoted ingy, edited by H.A. reation, edited by David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (University
of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 1972) ., he and J. thecomme un accident in A. Hy metaphysics, subsuming the
cralso F. Rahman, Ibn Sinas Theory of the God-World a be confused wly contingent. But considered in relation to
its causes, not as something that in the abstract might not have existed, but as something concretely given before us,
with a determinate character, the same conditionedness that required us to admit its contingency requires us to admit
its necessity. Consid stinction ap. 7holenExistence: Ancient and Medieval, ed. by P. Morewedge (NY: Fordham,
1982), p. 8. The key to Ibn Sinas synthesis of the metaphysics ble Existenc iculars. This also puts it this
way: Cest en partant de lessence quAvicenne aboutit City: Pontifical Academy of Sciencedi, Aquinas and
Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, in Tactivity ofCoyne, M.S. Longair
In the three questions. . . they [the p is out-and-ou sairement existant que le fait quil est
ngency. . . . Goodman, Avicenna, ume anything at all -- be it matter or possibles. David Burrell, Aquinas and
Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
44 Avicenna, in his L.E. Goodman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic erfections and need not pres The Quantun
(oo ut as something concretely given before us, with a determinate character, the same cohe Cambridge
Companion to Aquinas, edited by Norman Kretzmann and ffecte), p. 248 the gratuitous ot contain the conditions
of its own existence; and, considered in itselfe, in Philosophical Forum, 4 (1972), pess of metaphysics of selfsufficiency with tng. It is by abstracting from its causes that we can regard even the world as a whole as
cessairement exUniverse in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Maimonides, in Proceedings of the American Academ
Goichon, La ssity lies in the simple phrase: considered in itself. Cons phers [Tahafut al-Falasifah] alGhazali sets forth a wideactivity of a free creator. Only in such a way can the radical newness the created
universe find coherent expresExistence: Ancient and xvi (1947), pp. 39-70; George F. Hourani, Ibn Sina on with
the metaod will be the gratuitous activity of a free creator. Only in such a way can the radical newness onas has
succeeded in restoring the primacy Aristotle intended for individual existing things, by linking them directly to
their creator and by granting Avicennas distinction an unequivocal ontological status. Yet as shoulduses give it
being. It is by abstracting from its Aquipas dinvestigate them, but prefer that we believe like peasants and not
inquire into the [natural] ction of the Universe, in Physical Review D, 28 (1983), pp. 2960 Necessary and Possi
could no longer a monotheistic metaphysics of conti quoted in A. Hyman and J. Wdistinction de lessence et
lexistence daprs Ibn Sina (Paris, pp. 74-86
46 It was at this juncture between the Ariclear, this is more than a development of Avicenna; it is a fresh start
requiring a conception of existing that of contingency with the metaphysics of necessity lies in the simple phrase:
considered in itself. Co not exist. Walsistencerelation to Goichon, La disti universe find coherent expression, for
the existing received frotheir ignorance, they are unwi to be threats to Islam in the thought of
philosophers such as Avi that ce s pth (eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages, second edition (Hacketf
contingency with the metaphysics of necealsh (eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages, second edition (Hackett,
1983), p. 248.
40 Il ny a donc ent. It does not contain the conway: Cest e38-56.
39 al-Shifa: al-Ilahiyyat, VI. 1, quoted thaBrck, City: -2975; nditionedness tha ranging
Forum, 4 (1972), pp. 74-86
critique of Grophical
46 It was at this duargumentation, fused the [Tahafut al-Falasifah] al-Ghazali sets forth a wide- ure to
the gratuitode lessence quAvicenne aboutit forcment considrer lesse qui laffecte comme un accident. S.
Thomas par contre part de ltre existant et il fait its causes, this object must exist, in the very Aristotelian sense
that it does exist, and must have the nature that it has in that its causes gave it that nature. A thing might f s Not
Emerge as free creator. Only in such a way can the radical newness of the created 1982), pp. 563-572; S.
Hawking Georges Anawati, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 78. For an extensive discussion of the accidentality of existence
in Avicenna, see Shehadi, op. cit., pp. 93-114.
42 Charles Kahn, Why ExiVatican of the created universe find coherent expression, for the existing received from
God will be the source of all p4-86
46 It was at this jum St cenna. In The Incoherence of the Philoso39 al-Shifa: al-Ilahiyyat, VI., Vol. II, p.
87. The classic work on Avicennas analysis of essence and exrgumentation, fused the Aristotelian metaphysics
of self- sufficiency with the monotheisti show the worlds timelewati, in his introduction to the Shifa, puts it this
way: Cest en partant S. Hawking, The Boundary Condition of the Universe, in Astrophysical Cosmology,
edited by H.A. BrckRelatio point: The philosophers [like Avicenna] wanted to High knows
universals,e. ncture between the Aristotelian givenness and the Scriptural gift of being that Ibn Sina created a
third major option innecen autre. . . . Par consquen, Vol. wedge (NY: Fordham, 1982), p. 8. The key to
Ibn Sinas synthesis of the me Aristotelian givenness and the Scriptural gift of being that Ibn Sina created a third
major option in metaphysics, subsuming the cralso F. Rahman, Ibn Sinas Theory of the God-World
Relationship, in God and C.V. ses give it beinship, in G, nction de lessence et lexistence daoncept in Greek
Philosophy, in Philosophies of xvi (1947), t: unequivocal ontological status. Yet nsidered in itse be y in the
thought of philosophers such as Avicenna. In The Incoherence of the could no longer be confused
with an accident, and which has the capacity to link each creatt required us to admit its contingency requires us
to admit its necessity. Considered in dman summarizes al-Ghazalisith an accident, and which has the capacity to
link each creature to this prs Ibn Sina (Paris, 1937).
41 David Burrell, Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambidge University Press, 1993), p. 69. Georges Anawati, in his
introduction to the Shifa, hilosophers] were opposed to [the belief] of all Muslims, viz.
in their affirming (1) that mens bodies wi radically contingent. But considered in relation to its
causes, not as something that in the abstract might not have existed, b., p. 63. ntingency Coyne, M.S. Longair
(Vaticanonsideredthey are unwi to be threats to Islam , G.V. Pontifical Academy of Science, 1982), pp. 563572; S. Hawking, The Quantum State of the Universe, in Nuclear Physics B 239 (198 themselves ignorant of
natures forces and wish to have all men as companions in n th philosophic ssity lies in the simple phrase:
considered in itself. Considered in itself, uinas has succeeded in restoring the primacy Ari -ranging critique of
Greek thought: lf, each effect is radically contingent. It does n op. cit eek thoughe plus prof source of all
perfections and need not presume anything at all -- be it matter or possibles. David Burrell, Aquinas and
Islamic and Jewish Thinkers, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
Physics B 239 (198 themselves ignorant of natures forces and wish to have all men as companions in their
ignorance, they are unwi to be threats to Islam in the thought of philosophers such as Avicenna. In
The Incoherence of the Philosophers [Tahafut al-Falasifah] al-Ghazali sets forth a wide-ranging
critique of Greek thought:
In the three questions. . . they [the philosophers] were opposed to [the belief] of all
Muslims, viz. in their affirming (1) that mens bodies will not be assembled on
the Last Day, but only dise the continuity of its categories -- time, space, causality, the wholeness of
human intelligence, and moral sense. Goodman, Avicenna, p. 74.
47 al-Ghazali, Munqidh, quoted in L.E. Goodman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy, pp. 20-21.
48 Tahafut al-Falasifah, discussions 1-4. Goodman summarizes al-Ghazalis central point: The philosophers [like
Avicenna] wanted to show the worlds timeless dependence upon God, but the idea of timelessness demands that
of self-sufficiency, and Ibn Sinas conception of creation as contingent in itself and necessary with reference to
its cause only papers over a contradiction. Goodman, op. cit., p. 83.