A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601.

August 11, 2005

MERCEDES G. DUDUACO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Kabacan, North Cotabato, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
On March 4, 2002, complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco charged1 respondent
Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum2 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Kabacan-Carmen, North Cotabato with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial
office and/or gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2001, respondent brought her vehicle to
the Toyota Service Center in Davao City (Toyota-Davao) for repairs and
replacement of parts that were damaged due to a vehicular mishap.
Upon being advised that her vehicle is ready for pick-up, respondent went to
Toyota-Davao on June 23, 2001 at around 11:00 a.m. She was met by Jeson
M. Garao, a service advisor, who told her that the vehicle would be released
upon payment of deductible franchise. Respondent allegedly refused to pay
insisting that the same will be paid by the insurance company. She then asked
to speak with the manager, herein complainant, but the latter was in a
meeting.
At 3:00 p.m., respondent was referred to Randy A. Saragoza, Toyota-Davaos
Administration and Marketing Head. Saragoza claimed that he tried to explain
to respondent that the payment of the deductible franchise was upon
instruction of the insurance company but the latter got angry and raised her
voice while demanding to see the manager.
She was eventually referred to Vicente U. Yez,3 Service Department
Manager, who alleged that respondent heatedly disagreed with him and
shouted that she was a judge and insisted on seeing the manager. Upon
being told that complainant was in a meeting, respondent furiously replied that
she should be given preferential treatment over said meeting.4
At this point, respondent asked for a demand letter and upon presentation
thereof, she paid the amount stated therein under protest.

Thereafter, Saragoza required respondent to sign the Release of Claim with

Subrogation but she again refused. She allegedly became enraged and said
that as a judge, she knew better than to sign a blank form. Yez offered to fill
in the blanks but respondent curtly informed him that she will not sign just the
same.
Judge Laquindanum left the service center without the car. On July 4, 2001,
she filed a case for Replevin, Damages and Attorneys Fees, with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Replevin.5
In her Comment,6 respondent denied that she threw her weight around and
abused her judicial authority. She claimed that upon being informed by Garao
about the deductible franchise, she instructed the latter to communicate with
her insurer. After the lapse of two (2) hours, Garao told her that he could not
contact the insurers office because it was closed on Saturdays. She was
referred to Saragoza and Yez but when no agreement was reached, she
suggested that they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise
before she would pay.
She eventually paid7 the deductible franchise under protest. She averred that
she requested for the execution of a demand letter8 to serve as proof of her
claim for refund. Thereafter, Garao brought out the vehicle and gave the key
to her driver, who inspected the car to make sure that everything is in order.
She then directed Salvador Caducoy to transfer her belongings from another
vehicle.9
When respondent and her party were about to leave, Garao ran after them
and told her that she needed to sign a release form.10 She was given a blank
Release of Claim with Subrogation11 form which she refused to sign. When
Saragoza advised her that the vehicle will not be released, she retorted that
she will only sign if the form has been properly filled up. The parties were at
an impasse when Yez angrily said "di fill up-an!", then took back the form
and went to his office but did not return.12
It was already 6:50 p.m. and respondent was still at the Toyota-Davao
premises. She wrote a letter13 to complainant detailing her ordeal. The letter
was received by a lady employee who gave her another demand
letter14 stating that in addition to the payment of deductible franchise, she is
also required to sign a release form which she refused because some portions
were blank. She left Toyota-Davao without her car.

On July 19, 2001, Yez, Saragoza together with complainant and Joe Linaza
(Linaza) from FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance, Co., came to see respondent in
her sala to apologize.15
In his report, the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals
recommended16 the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of
evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed that respondents refusal to pay
the deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. No fault can be
attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. Had respondent
grossly humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or Saragoza, they would not have
gone to her office, together with complainant and Linaza, to apologize.
The OCA adopted the Investigating Justices recommendation with
modification that complainant Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00
for filing this baseless harassment suit. The OCA opined that complainants
insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated charges despite lack of personal
knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent but also of
the Investigating Justice and this Court.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA.
In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints.17 Administrative
proceedings against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to
be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges should thus be more
substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.18
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only
be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty and corruption.19 On the other hand, misconduct is any
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the
cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.20
Respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her
insistence that the demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to
affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to grave misconduct,
abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising
her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed

to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for
refund.
We agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for
filing this unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the
exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good
faith.21
During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the
event transpired on June 23, 2001,22 which means that she has no personal
and direct knowledge of the incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the
complaint, she claimed that all the allegations therein were true and correct of
her own knowledge and belief.23 Significantly, she also went to respondents
office and apologized.
Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by
the aggrieved with zeal. Yet, it appears that it was more than eight (8) months
after the incident that complainant and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint
against an alleged "erring" member of the bench. Verily, the delay militates
against the veracity of their allegations.
Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case after ToyotaDavao lost possession of the vehicle in favor of respondent and after she
refused to settle the replevin suit she filed against them. More specifically, the
instant complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002 or about eight (8) months
after respondent filed the replevin case and secured the writ on July 4, 2001.
As the Investigating Justice fittingly observed, "the timing couldnt be worse."24
The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. In
complainants letter dated January 21, 2002,25 she informed this Court about a
similar complaint filed before the Judicial and Bar Council "for the purpose of
objecting to (respondents) application for appointment as Regional Trial Court
in Midsayap, North Cotabato or elsewhere". Clearly, this administrative case
was filed not for the purpose of obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons,
however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of degrading
respondents reputation and exposing her to public ridicule. This should not be
countenanced.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,26 this Court penalized respondent-lawyer for filing a
groundless suit against a former client in order to harass and embarrass her
by suspending him from the practice of law for six (6) months.

In Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. v. Bondad,27 we affirmed the award of

moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses
imposed against petitioner for filing an unfounded suit in bad faith.
The fine of P10,000.00, as recommended by OCA, is commensurate under
the circumstances.
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon
erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should
not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court could not
be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of the
bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum, now Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato City, Branch 24, is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco is FINED in the amount of
P10,000.00 for having filed this baseless and unfounded suit.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575

January 31, 2005

YOLANDA S. REYES, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARVIN B. MANGINO, Municipal Trial Court, Tarlac, Tarlac,
Branch 1, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Yolanda S. Reyes filed a verified
Affidavit-Complaint dated January 16, 1998 charging Judge Marvin B.
Mangino with gross ignorance of the law, extortion, graft and corruption, fraud
and deception, relative to Criminal Case No. 200-97 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Spouses Felix and Yolanda Reyes," for other deceits punishable
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The complainant averred that she was one of the accused in the said case.
Upon receipt of the criminal complaint and after the filing of an exparte motion for the conduct of preliminary investigation, the respondent
Judge issued a warrant of arrest and a writ of preliminary attachment. No
preliminary investigation was, however, conducted. This prompted the
complainant to post a cash bond, to file an ex-parte motion for the lifting of the
preliminary attachment and to request the court to conduct a preliminary
investigation. The respondent Judge merely directed the private prosecutor to
oppose or comment on the motion, instead of setting the case for preliminary
investigation as required under Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent Judge convinced her and
her husband not to pursue the issue of the absence of preliminary
investigation and the lack of jurisdiction of the court, on the assurance that he
would dismiss the case after their arraignment; double jeopardy would then
set in, to their advantage.
The complainant further narrated that at 11:00 a.m. of September 18, 1997,
the respondent and two unidentified companions went to their residence in
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Only their secretary, Chona Guzman, happened to be
there. She entertained and gave the visitors some snacks. Chona Guzman
contacted her through radio. The complainant was apparently in Manila
attending a conference at the Department of Public Works and Highways, and
Ms. Guzman informed her that the respondent Judge and his two companions
were waiting for her. The respondent then spoke to the complainant and told

her that he wanted to see her regarding the case, and suggested that they
meet at the lobby of the Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m. The complainant
acquiesced, and immediately contacted her lawyer, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia at
his office in Intramuros, Manila, to inform him of the impending meeting with
the respondent Judge. The complainant narrated the succeeding events that
transpired as follows:
19. That at the scheduled place and time, I came together with my
counsel Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia. I also instructed my Liaison Officer
Nida Diokno to proceed at the said place to bring some money for
expenses. At the Manila Hotel lobby, we met Judge Marvin Mangino,
who came ahead of us and seated at the sofa with an unidentified male
companion. He again assured us of his commitment to dismiss the case
in our favor and this will happen immediately after the prosecution had
rested their case. He further advised my counsel to file immediately a
Demurrer to Evidence which will be his legal basis for dismissing the
case. He further told us that in order not to detect his biases in our
favor, he proposed that the Demurrer to Evidence will be dismissed first,
and after that he advised us not to present our evidence or defense
anymore and let the case be submitted for early decision on the basis of
demurrer to evidence on file.
20. That with Judge Marvin Manginos personal commitment and
assurances done in the presence of my counsel, my Liaison Officer
Nida Diokno, who all saw and heard Judge Marvin Mangino of his
promises and assurances, Judge Mangino whispered to me for a "little
representation" that he needs, considering that he is on an official
business for three (3) days to attend the conference of judges at Subic
and he just beg (sic) off that day so that he could see and talk to me
personally about our case.
21. That I agreed to give him that "little representation" in the amount
of P20,000.00, which I placed inside a white envelope in P1,000.00
peso bill denomination. This matter of giving money happened at
around 3:00 p.m. after we had taken our snacks at the coffee shop of
the Manila Hotel, as witnessed by our counsel and Ms. Diokno.
22. Thereafter, the prosecution finished the presentation of their
evidence and rested their case. My counsel, Atty. Garcia, then
submitted his Demurrer to Evidence which, after submission, Judge
Marvin Mangino ordered the denial of the same on the ground of
prohibited pleadings or motions. Such order of the court is actually

erroneous, because the rules on summary procedure do not include

Demurrer to Evidence as one of those prohibitive pleadings. Such order
by Judge Marvin Mangino will show his gross ignorance of the law.
Copy of the said Order dated October 20, 1997 is hereto attached as
Annex "L" and copy of the Demurrer to Evidence as Annexes "M," "M-1"
to "M-5."
23. That relying in good faith on Judge Marvin Manginos assurances
and promises that he would eventually dismiss the case on the
arguments raised at the Demurrer to Evidence, and this was coupled by
the fact that Judge Marvin Mangino even called me at our residence in
Bulacan to convey his assurances of the dismissal of the case. He even
suggested not to appear anymore and just file the manifestation of not
presenting anymore our defense evidence pursuant to the proposed
strategy he laid out. Then my counsel submitted the said Manifestation
dated October 29, 1997. Copy of the said Manifestation is hereto
attached as Annex "N."
24. That on October 29, 1997, the court issued an order noting the
absence of the accused and the manifestation filed by our counsel of
not filing any defense evidence other than the Demurrer to Evidence,
Motion to Dismiss and our respective Counter-Affidavits as our defense
evidences. Copy of the said Court Order is hereto attached as Annex
"O."
25. That prior to that, there is an earlier order of the court dated October
27, 1997, stating that both accused and counsel failed to appear.
Whereupon, the prosecution moved that this case be deemed submitted
for decision based on the evidence obtained. Which order will show that
we were made to believe that Judge Marvin Mangino is following to the
letter his proposal that we dont have to appear and have the case
submitted for decision without any presentation of defense evidence.
Copy of said Order is hereto attached as Annex "P."
26. That on November 12, 1997, a Notice of Promulgation of Judgment
was sent by Judge Marvin Mangino to my counsel Atty. Garcia and
Private Prosecutor Atty. Teddy Macapagal, setting the promulgation on
November 24, 1997 at 1:30 p.m. Copy of the said notice is hereto
attached as Annex "Q."
27. That again on November 24, 1997, Judge Marvin Mangino called up
and relayed to us not to appear anymore, as he would be waiting for an

additional sum of money in the amount of P40,000.00 in cash, as part of

the "goodwill money" for the favor that he would be giving to us.
28. That on November 27, 1997, heeding the advice of Judge Marvin
Mangino to bring the P40,000.00 cash, I sent the same through Mr.
Ruel de Castro, my counsels liaison officer, who delivered the money at
Judge Marvin Manginos chamber office. Upon receipt of the money, he
promised Mr. de Castro that he would just send the copy of the decision
through mail, as it is no longer practical that he should promulgate the
decision in open court. The matter of giving the P40,000.00 is contained
in the affidavit of Mr. Ruel de Castro, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annexes "R" to "R-1."
29. That having received the amount of P40,000.00 plus the P20,000.00
initially requested when he visited our residence in Norzagaray,
Bulacan, my husband and I waited for the promulgation of judgment
through mail as promised by Judge Marvin Mangino.
30. That on December 23, 1997, surprise of all surprises, I received a
copy of the Decision through mail, stating that my husband and I were
found guilty of the crime of Other Deceits and liable to pay the civil
liability of P7,969,033.62. These were totally contrary to the promises
and sweet words of Judge Marvin Mangino who has deceived, tricked
and fooled us to get our trust and money with the total amount
of P60,000.00.
The complainant averred that the promulgation of judgment in the said case
was a direct violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which requires the promulgation of judgment to be read in the
presence of the accused. Moreover, the order of conviction was bereft of truth,
factual and legal basis, and was issued in violation of their right to due
process.
The respondent Judge denied the complainants allegations in his
Comment1 dated April 16, 1998. Contrary to the allegations of the
complainant, due process of law was applied in the instant case. The
respondent explained that there was a valid criminal complaint and
preliminary examination considering that there was an application for a writ of
attachment, a supersedeas bond for the said writ, as well as for the accused.
There was, likewise, an arraignment, a pre-trial conference, and, thereafter,
trial on the merits, where the accused had the opportunity to cross-examine

the witnesses for the prosecution. While hearing was set for the accusedcomplainant to present her evidence, she failed to do so.
The respondent Judge, however, admitted that on the promulgation date of
the decision, only the prosecutor, the complainant, the private prosecutor and
the counsel for the accused appeared, and agreed among themselves that
they would just receive copies of the decision. The respondent stressed that
the accused filed an appeal, which was given due course, and the records,
thereafter, forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac for review.
The respondent insisted that he only had the opportunity to talk with the
parties and their respective counsels at the scheduled pre-trial conference. He
claimed that the complainants allegations were false, considering that even
the latters counsel would know that the practice of making "assurances" to a
party is a breach of professional ethics and worse, a contemptuous one.2
The administrative matter was referred to Executive Judge Arsenio P.
Adriano, Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Tarlac, for investigation, report and
recommendation.3
The Executive Judge, thereafter, submitted a Report dated February 14, 2001
and made the following findings:
With respect to the charge of gross ignorance, the judgment of conviction by
Judge Mangino was appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63,
presided by the undersigned. The undersigned rendered a decision acquitting
the spouses Felix and Yolanda Reyes. A copy of the decision is attached with
the records (Pages 122 to 125). This decision therefore contains the findings
of fact and conclusions of law of the undersigned which need not be repeated
herein.
With respect to the charge of extortion, graft and corruption, complainant
Yolanda Reyes alleged that Judge Marvin Mangino received from
her P60,000.00 in consideration of a favorable decision or acquittal.
Judge Mangino went to her house at Norzagaray, Bulacan on September 18,
1997 but since she was in Manila, they agreed to meet at the Manila Hotel, at
2:00 p.m. of the same day. Judge Mangino received the P20,000.00 while at
the Manila Hotel.
Judge Mangino also received the sum of P40,000.00 from Ruel de Castro, the
liaison officer of Atty. Wilfredo Garcia, then the lawyer of complainant.

To disprove the charge, Judge Mangino alleged that he could not be at the
Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m. of September 18, 1997 because he solemnized two
marriages at 10:00 a.m. of that day. He could not have reached Manila Hotel
by 2:00 p.m. since he has to travel from Tarlac City to Manila after the
solemnization of the marriages. The marriage contracts were submitted as
pages 65 and 66 of the records.
The undersigned set the hearing on February 5 and 12, 2001 but only
respondent appeared. The complainant did not appear although her lawyer,
Atty. Wilfredo Garcia received the notice personally on January 18, 2001, as
shown by his signature on the face of the notice.
The undersigned also wrote letters to the contracting parties appearing in the
marriage contracts namely:
1.-Ricky Quinto
Dulce David
San Manuel, Tarlac City
2.-Vicente Lagadi, Jr.
Balete, Tarlac City
It is the intention of the undersigned to verify from them as to whether or not
their marriages were solemnized by the respondent Judge on September 18,
1997.
Since they have not appeared before the undersigned as of February 12,
2001, the undersigned personally went to see them at their residences.
The undersigned learned startling revelations. Spouses Ricky Quinto and
Dulce David affirmed before the undersigned that they were married
on September 4, 1997 solemnized by the respondent Judge and not on
September 18, 1997. They were positive that it was not on September 18,
1997 but on September 4, 1997 that was why they were wondering why when
they received the copy of the marriage contract, which was given to them
sometime after September 4, 1997. Dulce David even invited the attention of
her co-teachers on the error. She thought it was a mere typographical error.
1awphi1.nt

Vicente Lagadi, Jr. and his mother Carmen Gabriel told the undersigned that
the date of the marriage of Vicente Jr. and Eliza Bustamante is August 27,
1997 because this is the birthday of Eliza Bustamante. It is not September 18,
1997 as stated in the marriage contract. Vicente Jr. noticed the error because
they received a copy of the marriage contract sometime after the marriage. He
also thought that it was a mere typographical error. Vicente Jr. also showed
me the birth certificate of his daughter and the date of his marriage with Eliza
Bustamante as appearing therein is August 27, 1997.
The undersigned already received derogatory informations about Judge
Mangino. It is known that he solemnizes marriages even before the licenses
are issued. Probably in this case, he placed the date of the marriages as
September 18, 1997 because that was the time he went to Manila and
received the P20,000.00 from the complainant. He did this to provide him with
a ready alibi because he expected to be sued by complainant as he never
really intended to acquit her.
With these informations gathered personally by the undersigned, it is not
therefore true that Judge Mangino solemnized two marriages on September
18, 1997 because he went to Manila to meet the complainant and to receive
the P20,000.00.
Further, the presence of Judge Mangino at the Manila Hotel on September 18,
1997 was affirmed by Atty. Wilfredo Garcia and one who is a lawyer will not
easily attest to it if it is not true. The law office of Atty. Wilfredo Garcia is near
the Manila Hotel and he came there upon the request of complainant.
No transcript of the testimonies of Ricky Quinto, Dulce David and Vicente
Lagadi, Jr. was taken because they were hesitant to talk. Only after the
undersigned assured them that whatever they will tell will be treated with
utmost confidentiality that they started to talk.4
The Executive Judge then recommended that the respondent Judge be
dismissed from the service.
In a Resolution dated March 28, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the said
report to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for recommendation. The
OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, opined that
considering the gravity of the offense charged, the Executive Judge should
have exerted earnest efforts to compel the attendance of the complainant and
the witnesses during the scheduled hearings.5 Pursuant to his

recommendation, the case was referred back to Executive Judge Adriano for
a more thorough investigation.6
In his Report filed with the OCA on September 10, 2001, the Executive Judge
made the following findings:
The undersigned set the investigation to August 20 and 27, 2001 both at
10:00 a.m., so that notice was sent to Mrs. Yolanda Reyes, Atty. Wilfredo
Garcia and Judge Marvin Mangino. On August 20, 2001, only Judge Mangino
appeared. He stated that since he already submitted a counter-affidavit, he
has nothing more to add to it. At the expense of the undersigned, the process
server of the Court was requested to serve the notice to the complainant. It
was revealed that the complainant did not receive the previous notices sent to
her because the municipal officials of Norzagaray, Bulacan are her political
opponents.
1awphi 1.nt

The undersigned sent another notice to Judge Mangino because of the

assurance of Mrs. Reyes that she will attend the setting of August 27, 2001.
Judge Mangino did not appear on said date. Only Mrs. Yolanda Reyes and
Atty. Wilfredo Garcia appeared. The undersigned conducted clarificatory
questioning on said date and the transcript of stenographic notes is attached
herewith.
FINDINGS:
In view of the previous report submitted by the undersigned dated February
14, 2001, and the detailed findings of the Honorable Court Administrator dated
May 11, 2001, in his Memorandum addressed to Hon. Jose A.R. Melo,
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, there is nothing more that the
undersigned could add.
The undersigned is now more convinced that the respondent Judge Mangino,
indeed, demanded and received money from the complainant. Mrs. Yolanda
Reyes has no reason to proceed with this administrative case considering that
she was already acquitted of the charge before the respondent judge
(Decision, pages 122 to 125 of the Records). She was only motivated by the
truth of her charge. In the same manner, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia, has no sinister
motive to testify for the complainant, being a brother in the law profession. His
testimony that he was at the Manila Hotel on September 18, 1997 and he saw
the respondent Judge received the money from the complainant is worthy of
belief.

The undersigned complied with the instruction of Honorable Deputy Court

Administrator Jose Perez that the investigation be private and confidential. To
repeat, the undersigned did not reduce the testimonies of Ricky Quinto, Dulce
David. Said spouses were assured of the confidentiality of the investigation.
The other party whose marriage was solemnized allegedly by Judge Mangino
on September 18, 1997, Mr. Vicente Lagadi, Jr. also was reluctant to narrate
the truth that the date of his marriage was August 27, 1997 and not
September 18, 1997.
Also, Mrs. Reyes said something that respondent Judge attended on that
date, September 18, 1997. It could be the conference for Municipal Trial Court
Judges but the undersigned has no way of verifying this. Probably, the Court
Administrator has a record of that conference and the names of the Judges
who attended the said conference. This will corroborate the claim of the
complainant that Judge Mangino was in Manila on said date and he even
attended the conference for MTC judges elsewhere.
The Executive Judge reiterated his previous recommendation that the
respondent be dismissed from the service.
We do not agree. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of
proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the
complainant.7 Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr .,8 a case involving a lawyer accused of
blackmail and extortion who was exonerated of the charges against him for
lack of evidence, is instructive on this point. The Court ruled therein that it is
enough for the respondent to deny complicity in the alleged blackmail or
extortion, without more, for he is not under obligation to prove his negative
averment, much less disprove what has not been proven by the complainant.
Thus, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases
his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.9Expounding further, the Court stressed
It is all too obvious from the foregoing that there is a dearth of evidence which
would in any way prove the commission of blackmail and extortion, much less
incriminate respondent for those offenses. Even the baseless postulations in
the affidavits would certainly not carry the day for complainants in view of their
lack of evidentiary value. It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the
affidavits; hence, it is imperative that their truthfulness and veracity be tested
in the crucible of thorough examination. The hornbook doctrine is that unless
the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their

affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from the proceedings for being
inadmissible and hearsay, as in this case.10
Indeed, considering that an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove, the complainant must present a panoply of evidence in
support of such an accusation.11 Inasmuch as what is imputed against the
respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would
entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.12
In this case, the complainant could have easily gathered enough extrinsic
evidence, such as testimonies of waiters, restaurant employees, or other
disinterested witnesses, to prove the alleged meeting with the respondent
Judge. She did not even present a receipt of the expenses she incurred when
she and the respondent judge took "snacks" at the coffee shop near the lobby
of the Manila Hotel to at least prove that she had been there on September
18, 1997. Moreover, if the respondent had, indeed, made corrupt overtures
and blatantly demanded money from the complainant, good sense would
dictate that the matter be immediately reported to the authorities to set up
entrapment operations against the culprit.13 The Court further notes that the
complainant even failed to present her liaison officer Nida Diokno, her
secretary Chona Guzman, or her counsels liaison officer Ruel de Castro to
testify as to the particulars of the alleged extortion incident.
As a member of the bar, the complainants counsel should know that even in
administrative cases, the Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to
which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members
could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, since the charge
is penal in character.14Thus, the ground for the removal of a judicial officer
should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of
evidence in criminal trials apply.15
Anent the conviction of the complainant and her husband in Criminal Case
No. 200-97, the rule is that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty,
gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned.16 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in

the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.17 As we

held in Balsamo v. Suan:18
l^vvphi1.net

[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,

the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action
even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability
civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but
to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. The Court
has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness
or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.19
Hence, the respondent cannot be held administratively liable on that ground.
However, the Court finds that the respondent Judge is liable for gross
ignorance of the law in not requiring the presence of the accused during the
promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case No. 200-97, as admitted by him
in his Comment on the complaint.
There are two instances when judgment may be promulgated even without
the personal presence of the accused: (1) when the judgment is for a light
offense, in which case, the counsel for the accused or a representative may
stand for him; and (2) in cases where despite due notice to the accused or his
bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed to appear at the
promulgation of the decision. The evident purpose of this latter exception is to
afford the offended party the opportunity to enforce the award of civil
indemnity which could not otherwise be effected if the decision cannot be
pronounced on account of the absence of the accused.20 Criminal Case No.
200-97 does not fall under any of the exceptions, since the accused therein
were charged and convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is a less grave felony, the imposable penalty being arresto
mayor.
It bears stressing the importance of the promulgation of decisions in criminal
cases, considering that a judgment or sentence does not become a judgment
or sentence in law until the same has been read or announced to the

defendant or has become part of the record of the court.21 Parenthetically,

when there is no valid promulgation of judgment, no right to appeal accrues.22
Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is expected to be
"the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence" to maintain
public confidence in the legal system. He should so behave at all times as to
promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.23 When
questionable orders are issued by a magistrate of law, casting doubt as to his
integrity and impartiality, the erring judge must be sanctioned therefor,
keeping in mind that the irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes
public confidence in the judiciary, and, as such, must avoid all impropriety and
the appearance thereof,24 in accordance with Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Marvin B.
Mangino is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157221

March 30, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CESAR GALVEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30, 2001, which affirmed the Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Isabela, Basilan finding the accused-appellant
Cesar Galvez (Galvez), guilty of Murder, but modifying the penalty of the RTC
from a sentence of "seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as
minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum" to reclusion perpetua.
The facts are as follows:
At around 11 oclock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo Perez, Rosalio
Enojarda, Noel Cugal, Ricardo Francisco and Wilfredo Rellios, took a break
from making copra to eat leftover dinner inside the copra kiln in the farm of
Perez in Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up from the
circle where they were eating to drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell
to the ground shouting "Dan ya tupa comigo" (Dan, I am hit). The rest of the
group took cover, crawling to different directions. After the attack, Rellios
reported the incident to the barangay captain and they brought Enojardas
dead body to his family.3
On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) for Murder, which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, viz. at Matarling, Municipality of Lantawan, Province of
Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, armed with an M16 armalite
rifle, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one
Rosalio Enojarda with the said M16 armalite rifle, thereby inflicting gunshot
wound on the body of the latter which caused his death.4
The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Enojarda fell, the rest
of the group took cover and Rellios while in a crawling position, saw Galvez

about 5 meters away holding an armalite rifle and firing at their direction;
Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize them as
well as the firearms they carried because they were approximately nine
meters away;5 Perez, also crawled and hid in the bushes about 5 meters
away; when the firing stopped, one of the attackers passed by about two
meters from where Perez was hiding and because the moon was bright, he
recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was wearing a fatigue uniform and armed
with an armalite rifle; he also saw that Galvez had three armed companions
but did not recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying because they
were about nine meters from Galvez.6
Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified that he was
staying at his father-in-laws house on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around
10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. He went home and slept with his wife soon
after.7 To corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo Ramillano, a
visitor at his father-in-laws house and Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store
owner. 8 He also presented Athena Elisa Anderson, Document Examiner and
Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Region 9, Zamboanga City,
who testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his hands showed that
there was no nitrate present;9 and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic
Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the scene of the crime were
not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.10
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27, 1995 with the
following findings:
From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this case, this Court
finds the following facts to be undisputable, to wit:
1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio Enojarda, while
making copra in the coconut land of Danilo Perez at Matarling,
Lantawan, Basilan, was shot to death by one of the four (4) men. How
many gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of his body was hit by
the gunfire, the evidence is found wanting.
2) That a day before the incident and on the date of the incident which
was July 27, 1991, the accused Cesar Galvez has not fired any
firearms.
xxx

3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite rifleallegedly found by

Barangay Captain Inocente Manicap from the scene of the crime and
later turned over to PFC Samuel Omoso, the Police Investigator of this
case, did not come from the M16 armalite rifle with Serial No. 117460,
the gun issued to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations omitted).11
Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Rellios and Perez, were credible and trustworthy as there was no motive to
perjure themselves; that the testimony of defense witness SPO2 Ramillano
was full of loopholes; and that the testimony of the store owner was
insufficient to disprove the presence of the accused at the scene of the
crime.12
The RTC concluded:
xxx since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired his M16 armalite rifle on
that night of July 27, 1991, and those five (5) empty shells were not fired from
his armalite, then xxx the bullet that hit and instantly killed Rosalio
Enojarda on that night of July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo Perez
came from the gun fired by any of the three (3) unidentified persons who
were the companions of the accused, Cesar Galvez at the night of the
incident xxx.13(emphasis supplied)
Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege conspiracy and the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still
convicted Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since Galvez was seen by
two witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his
unidentified armed companions.14 The trial court also held that the offer of
Galvez to have the case settled out of court is an indication of his guilt.15
The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial matters surrounding the
commission of the crime, being carefully and meticulously examined and
studied, this Court finds the accused SPO2 Cesar Galvez, a member of the
Philippine National Police GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
committing the crime of Murder as alleged in the Information and which crime
is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, but
considering his good military records after the commission of the crime,
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to TWENTY
(20) YEARS as maximum, which is the minimum period of Reclusion

Temporal in its maximum period to death. And to indemnify the heirs of the
late Rosalio Enojarda, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to
pay the Court the amount of P500.00 as judicial costs and other accessory
penalties attached to the penalty of Reclusion Temporal.
And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the military ranks he now
hold [sic] in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused shall immediately be
committed to the Provincial Jail where the Provincial Warden is directed to
immediately transfer him to the National Penitentiary at San Ramon Penal
Colony at Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.
And the property bail bond he has posted for his provisional liberty is hereby
ordered cancelled and its pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the
bondsman.16
Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18255,
which rendered its Decision on March 30, 2001 affirming his guilt but
modifying the penalty to be imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CESAR GALVEZ is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.17
The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally liable based on
conspiracy when such fact was not alleged in the Information. However, it still
found Galvez guilty of Murder.18 The CA reasoned that: the negative results of
the paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that Galvez used
another gun in shooting the victim; the eyewitnesses of the prosecution
identified Galvez as the perpetrator if not one of the perpetrators of the crime;
alibi, which was offered by Galvez, is the weakest of all defenses and cannot
prevail over positive identification; the offer of Galvez to the wife of the victim
to have the case settled is also a strong indication of Galvezs culpability; and
treachery was adequately established as the attack was sudden, unexpected
and did not accord the victim an opportunity to defend himself.19 The CA
further held that since there was no mitigating circumstance, the proper
penalty should be reclusion perpetua.20
Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated August 21, 2001, stating that it was a mere rehash of the
arguments already addressed in the decision.22

The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the
Court issued a Resolution23 accepting the case; committing the accused to the
Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the accused and the Solicitor
General that they may file additional briefs with this Court.24
In his Appellants Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court erred:
I
IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR
MURDER FOR THE DEATH OF ROSALIO ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991
DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDINGS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID
NOT FIRE HIS RIFLE ON THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE BULLET
THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO ENOJARDA COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED
FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES BELONGING TO ANY OF THE
THREE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WHO WERE NOT CHARGED NOR
INDICTED TOGETHER WITH THE ACCUSED IN THE SAME CRIMINAL
INFORMATION IN QUESTION.
II
IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO RELLIOS, WHILE
IN CRAWLING POSITION WHOSE CHESTS WERE ALMOST TOUCHING
THE GROUND AND UNDER CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD
SEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH M16 ARMALITE RIFLE
IN THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991 DESPITE DANILO PEREZ [sic]
POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN
COURT IN THE MANNER AND CIRCUMSTANCE NARRATED BY HIM.25
In his Supplemental Appellants Brief, Galvez further claims that it was
seriously erroneous:
I.
TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE OTHER MALEFACTORS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
II.

TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN

THE INFORMATION, MORE SO THE THEORY OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THERE BEING NO OTHER PERSONS CHARGED
IN THE PRESENT CASE.
III.
TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE INFORMATION, IN
EFFECT DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANT [THE] RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM.
IV.
TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO ALLEGED
EYE WITNESSES WHOSE DECLARATIONS WERE CLEARLY BELIED
DURING THEIR CROSS EXAMINATION.
V.
NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
VI.
TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED, BASELESS PRESUMPTIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED IS PRESUMED.26
Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental Appellants Brief adding that:
VII
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN AND BALLISTIC
TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOT THE
DECEASED USING AN M16 RIFLE OTHER THAN THE ONE ISSUED TO
HIM.27
Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt because an accused is always presumed to be

innocent unless proven otherwise;28 when circumstances yield two or more

inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and
the other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must side with that
which will acquit the accused; in this case, the RTC found undisputed the fact
that he did not shoot the victim on the night of July 27, 1991 and the firearm
that was used in killing the victim was owned and possessed by another man,
as shown by the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests; the
statement of Danilo Perez that he saw the accused on the night of July 27,
1991 is not credible since Perez was in a crawling position with his chest
almost touching the ground at the time he allegedly saw the accused; Judge
Memoracion, who penned the decision could not have assessed the
demeanor of the prosecution witnesses while testifying as it was another
judge who heard and received their testimonies;29 the two defense witnesses,
who corroborated his (Galvezs) alibi are unbiased and unrelated to him; while
alibi is the weakest defense, it is the only defense if it is the truth and it
assumes importance where the prosecution evidence is weak; the statement
of the trial court that the offer of the accused to have the case extra-judicially
settled is a tacit admission of guilt is also unsubstantiated as there is nothing
in the records that shows that the accused made an offer to settle the case
out of court.30
For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General argued that: the paraffin test
and the ballistic examination are not conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a
gun during the incident; in this case, the paraffin test was conducted on
Galvez two days from the date of the incident; Galvez was also positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of four armed men who
attacked them during the incident; Perez clarified that while he was in a
crawling position, he was looking upward, thus, he was able to identify
Galvez; between Galvezs alibi and the positive declarations of witnesses
whose testimonies have not been assailed nor discredited by improper
motive, the latter deserves greater credence; the trial court correctly convicted
Galvez of murder as there was treachery since the victim was not in a position
to defend himself from the attack of the accused; the proper penalty should
be reclusion perpetua under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as there was
no mitigating circumstance;31 Galvez is also liable for temperate damages
of P25,000.00 since pecuniary loss has been suffered although its exact
amount could not be determined, and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 due
to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be awarded to the heirs of the
victim together with the P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court for moral
damages.32

After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court resolves to acquit
Galvez.
Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may
be held liable for the acts of his co-accused. In the absence of any averment
of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be made liable for the
acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and
not collective.33
As explained in People v. Tampis,34
The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the
information. Absence of a particular statement in the accusatory portion of the
charge sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy renders the
indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts of his
co-accused. Thus, each of them would be held accountable only for their
respective participation in the commission of the offense.35
The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v. Quitlong, the
Court explained:
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court,
evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and respond to
all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has
been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing
substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable
for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is
likewise explicit in procedural rules. x x x
xxx
x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would
impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and
extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of

secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily,
an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as
well.36
Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is
imperative that the prosecution prove Galvezs direct participation in the killing
of the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do.
The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses Rellios and Perez that they saw Galvez fire an
armalite rifle in their direction on the night in question. The positive
identification of these witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests.37
We disagree.
The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. While
this Court does not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the lower courts on
the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appears on the records,
however, facts and circumstances of real weight which might have been
overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to render
the law and apply justice.38
During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows:
Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00 oclock in the evening
on July 27, 1991 what happened?
A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine where it came
from and one of our companion was hit.
Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who was hit?
A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.
xxx
Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion Rosalio Enojarda,
what did you do?
A: I dropped and crawled, sir.

xxx
Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself among the grasses?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you were already hiding
among the grasses?
A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where I was hiding about
two meters from me.
Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by where you were
hiding, who was that culprit?
A: Cesar Galvez, sir.
xxx
COURT:
After you heard the shots how long after you saw him passed by?
xxx
Q: Was it 30 minutes after?
xxx
A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.
Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused) passed by together
with his companions around 20 to 25 minutes after you heard the shots, is that
what you want to impress this Court?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
Q: Did you see him really shoot?
A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied)

During his cross-examination, Perez further testified:

Q: So, when you said the explosions came from different directions, was not
true?
A: We heard shots but we do not know where it came from, what we did
was to drop and crawl.
COURT: (To the witness)
You did not see the one firing?
Yes, your Honor, because I crawled.
Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings you saw this accused and
companions pass by?
A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time but I think it has about 20 to
25 minutes.40
xxx
Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at Mr. Enojarda?
A: No sir.41 (Emphasis supplied).
Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination the following:
Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr. Enojarda?
A: No sir.
COURT: (To the witness)
In other words you were only presuming that it was him.
A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.
ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing)
Did you understand the question when you were asked by the Court.
Since you did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at the victim, and

reportedly you saw him only five minutes thereafter, you only presume
Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. Enojarda?
A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above testimonies, the following circumstances appear to have
been established: (1) at around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their
two companions were eating merienda near the copra kiln when they were
sprayed with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the ground; (3)
Rellios, Perez and their two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover;
(4) about five minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez, armed with an
M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing at Rellios, Perez and their two companions
as well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5) about 20 to 25 minutes
after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue uniform
and carrying an M16 armalite rifle along with three armed companions, after
which, their group left the scene of the crime.
However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish the guilt of
Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be observed in
assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence:
x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must
be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every
other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish
with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt
that he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial
evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is
appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more
like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to
the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.43
as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must
establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of
the accused;44 and that every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of
the accused must be duly taken into account.45
The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are mainly based on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said

testimonies reveals, however, other circumstances that should be appreciated

in favor of Galvez, to wit:
(a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez with three
other armed companions minutes after Enojarda was shot but they did
not testify that they saw him in the vicinity before the shooting of
Enojarda.46
(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.47
(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at Enojarda and that
he merely assumed that Galvez was the one who shot the victim when
the latter passed by him.48 Rellios testified that he only presumed that
Galvez shot at Enojarda.49
(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with Galvez50 and
that he does not know any motive why Enojarda was killed.51
In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances for or against
Galvez, the following must always be borne in mind: that the Information
charged Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime of Murder; that the three
other armed men were not included as John Does; and that there was no
allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Galvez
was the sole author of the shot that killed Enojarda. The "incriminating
circumstances" do not point to Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime.
The presence of the three armed men raises the probability that any one of
those men inflicted the fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution
witnesses merely presumed that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.
Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after Enojarda was shot
does not sufficiently establish that Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda.
There is no evidence that Galvez was seen or was together with the three
other armed men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that
precludes the Court from concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.52 It
cannot be said therefore that there was positive identification of Galvez
through circumstantial evidence.
In People v. Comendador,53 the Court held:

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial

evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.54(Emphasis
supplied)
And in Dela Cruz v. People,55 the Court stressed, thus:
To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt,
which simply means that the prosecutions evidence was not sufficient to
sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond the point of moral certainty
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those
who are to act upon it. It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping
in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable
hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal based on
reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accuseds innocence
may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction, and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be
considered.56 (Emphasis supplied).
And when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely
circumstantial or inconclusive, motive is vital. As held inCrisostomo v.
Sandiganbayan,57
Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the
crime. However, motive becomes important when the evidence on the
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. Motive is
thus vital in this case.58
In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that he did not know of any
motive on the part of Galvez to kill Enojarda.59This is a circumstance that
should be taken in favor of Galvez.

In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v. People,60 to wit:

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the
constitutional presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by
contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt one which requires moral certainty,
a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those
who are to act upon it. As we have so stated in the past
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt,
the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the
most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the
judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that
the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under
such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken
into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.61(Emphasis
supplied)
There could not be any doubt that the facts, as established by the
circumstantial evidence, failed to exclude the possibility that another person
shot Enojarda. There were three other armed men, any one of whom could be
the culprit.
When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can
be no conviction even if the commission of the crime is established.62 Indeed,
the State, aside from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden of
correctly identifying the author of such crime.63 Both facts must be proved by
the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without
solace from the weakness of the defense.64
Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental brief before this Court that it
was erroneous for the CA to have affirmed the RTC ruling that Galvezs offer
to the victims wife to settle the case is a tacit admission of guilt.65
While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt,66 such
principle is not applicable in this case.

The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made on offer of
compromise,67 is the March 3, 1993 Order of the RTC which reads as follows:
Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G.
Martin appeared in Court together with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the
victim, and manifested that there is a possibility of understanding and
settlement between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for
new assignment.68
Galvezs supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted
as evidence during the trial. The victims widow or any prosecution witness did
not testify on any offer of compromise made by Galvez. We have held that
when the evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is amorphous, the
same shall not benefit the prosecution in its case against the accused.69
The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of
compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v.
Godoy,70 the Court pronounced that:
In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as
evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may
be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however,
that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would
justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in
truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.71 (Emphasis
supplied).
As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not
shown that Galvez indeed made such an offer under the consciousness of
guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that it was given for
some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of
guilt or an attempt to avoid its legal consequences.
In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged
implied admission of guilt. In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the accused,
explained that:

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are

involved. Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate
the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is
necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what
logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which
should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the
other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating his guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence,
or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence by proving the defendants guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the defendants guilt is shown in this manner, the
presumption of innocence continues.72
xxx
The presumption of innocence, x x x is founded upon the first principles of
justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not
overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant
committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its
purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the
resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the
authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and
set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is in
consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the
theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do
so.73
Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in favor of Galvez, there could
not be a moral certainty as to the guilt of Galvez. The prosecution has not
proven the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
It may be pointed out that the following circumstances support the conviction
of Galvez as charged:
(a) the negative findings of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not prove
that Galvez did not fire a gun;
(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at
the scene of the crime with a lawful purpose, yet he put up alibi which is
inherently weak;

(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to
corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in question;
and
(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating
police officer.
These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the discharge of its duty
to prove the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that
one has not fired a gun, as held by this Court in People v. Pagal74 and People
v. Teehankee75 which were cited by the CA in its Decision, since it is possible
for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as
when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.76 Such
principle, however, has no bearing in the present case. In
the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court concluded that a negative finding
does not prove that the accused therein had not fired a gun because the
accused were positively identified by witnesses as having shot their victims,
unlike in the case at hand where Galvez is not positively identified by direct or
circumstantial evidence that he shot Enojarda. If the principle should be given
any weight at all, it should be in favor of Galvez, that is, considering that he is
not positively identified, then, the negative results of the paraffin test bolster
his claim that he did not shoot Enojarda, and not the other way around.
The argument that the negative result of the ballistic examination does not
prove that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident as it was possible that
he used another gun, should also be struck down. It is the prosecution which
has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other than the one
issued to him and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the one that
killed the victim. It is not for Galvez to prove the opposite of the possibility
adverted to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his innocence.
Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests
do not conclusively prove that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same
negative results cannot be used as circumstantial evidence against Galvez to
prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the basic precepts
of criminal law which presumes the innocence of the accused. Every
circumstance favoring an accuseds innocence must be duly taken into
account, the proof against him must survive the test of reason, and the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.77

That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the
scene of the crime with a lawful purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is
inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as
witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in
question, pertain to the weakness of Galvezs alibi which may cast doubt on
his innocence. However, these circumstances do not prove beyond
reasonable doubt Galvezs guilt. Although an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the prosecution to
prove the accuseds guilt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence
of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.78 Courts must judge the guilt or
innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures,
presumptions, or suspicions.79
That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police
officer is a prerogative given to the accused and should not be given
evidentiary value to establish his guilt. In People v. Saavedra,80 the Court held
that an accused has the right to remain silent and his silence should not be
construed as an admission of guilt.
Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution failed to discharge the
onus of his identity and culpability.81 Conviction must be based on the strength
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation
is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and
not the accused to prove his innocence.82 The prosecutions job is to prove
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.83 Thus, when the
evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be
rejected and the accused absolved and released at once.84
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal of our criminal
law and procedure is not to send people to jail but to render justice.85 Under
our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.86
It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the Prosecution, justice
could not be rendered in this case for the untimely death of Enojarda. Justice,
however, would also not be served with the conviction of the herein accused.
It is well to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:

In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but
justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much
we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice
to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of
Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of
race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion whether privileged or
less privileged to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused
deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to
disprove what the prosecution has not proved.87 (Emphasis supplied)
As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its burden of proving
Galvezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no choice but to acquit
him.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Basilan,
Branch 1 in Criminal Case No. 1816 dated February 2, 1995 and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30, 2001
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant Cesar Galvez is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
cause the immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless he is being lawfully held
for another crime and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days
from notice.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 141644

May 27, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO PINEDA y MANALO, CELSO SISON y LLOREN (at large),
VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET alias "VICTOR COLET"
(acquitted), TOTIE JACOB alias "TOTIE" (at large), JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE (at large), accused,
ROLANDO PINEDA y MANALO, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On automatic review is the Decision1 dated 21 January 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, National Capital Judicial Region
("trial court") in Criminal Case No. C-53860 (98). The trial court found
appellant Rolando Pineda ("appellant") guilty of robbery with homicide,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of commission by a band. The trial
court sentenced appellant to suffer the death penalty and to pay the legal
heirs of the victim SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida ("Fuensalida") civil indemnity and
damages.
The Charge
The Information2 charged appellant, along with Celso Sison y
Lloren3 ("Sison"), Victor Emmanuel Colet ("Colet"), Totie Jacob ("Jacob"),
John Doe and Peter Doe, with the crime of Highway Robbery resulting in
Homicide, as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997, in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping each other, with intent to gain and posing as passengers of an
AIRCONDITIONED BUS "DREAMLINE AIRCON BUS" then cruising
along Quirino Highway, Malaria, Caloocan City with more or less sixty
(60) passengers, said accused by means of violence and intimidation
upon all passengers as well as the bus driver and conductor, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stage a HOLD-UP by
pulling out their respective firearms and poke the same against

everybody especially against the bus driver and conductor and they
started to take and rob cash and personal belongings of all and on the
occasion of said robbery in order to instill more fear among passengers,
said accused in pursuit of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill shot in different parts of his
body one SPO1 ARNEL FUENSALIDA Y INCINARES, PNP, who as a
consequence of the wounds died shortly thereafter to the damage and
prejudice of all passengers, bus driver, conductor and the family of
deceased SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida y Incinares.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The police arrested appellant on 5 September 1998 and detained him on 8
September 1998 in the Caloocan City Jail for other criminal cases. The police
arrested appellant for Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and 546515 before Branch
131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.6
Arraignment and Plea
Appellant pleaded not guilty on his arraignment on 24 May 1999. After
appellant had rested his case, the police arrested Colet. Colet pleaded not
guilty during his arraignment on 27 September 1999. When the trial court
rendered its decision, the other accused remained at large.
The Trial
The Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented six witnesses: (1) the victims wife Amalia
Fuensalida; (2) bus driver Camilo Ferrer ("Ferrer"); (3) conductor Jimmy
Ramos ("Ramos"); (4) PO3 Napoleon Andaya; (5) PO3 Celerino Susano; and
(6) Philippine National Police ("PNP") Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina
Freyra.
The trial court summarized the prosecutions evidence thus:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 15 October 1997 while bus driver Camilo Ferrer
(Ferrer for short) was driving his assigned passenger bus, the
"Dreamline Aircon Bus" bearing Plate No. PWZ-208 with around fifty
(50) passengers on board and heading for Tungko, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, accused Rolando Pineda (Accused Pineda for short) and his
five (5) companions boarded the bus along Quirino Highway near Lagro.

Thence after the bus conductor Jimmy Ramos (Ramos for short) had
collected the passengers individual fares, he posted himself at the front
door of the bus when suddenly accused Pineda who was seated behind
Ramos rose from his seat, prompting Ramos to turn his head and look
at Pineda. Forthwith the latter held driver Ferrer by the neck while
poking a gun at his nape and shouted to his companion: "TOTIE, IKUHA
MO AKO NG SAPATOS DIYAN PARA MAUMPISAHAN NA ANG
LARO," and then announced a hold-up. While Ferrer was looking at
accused Pineda through the rear-view mirror in front of the drivers seat,
Pineda warned the former, "AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO KUNG
AYAW MONG MAMATAY" with additional warning to maintain the same
speed as the vehicles preceding them. Thence accused Pineda
instructed his companions to close all the windows and bus curtains and
commanded the passengers to bow down their heads. Irked by Ferrers
act of stepping on the brake too often accused Pineda pressed the gun
on his nape telling him "PUTANG INA MO KUNG GUSTO MONG
MABUHAY AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO MO" and then followed
by another instruction to his cohorts: "SAMSAMIN NINYO LAHAT ANG
MASASAMSAM NINYO DIYAN" or words of similar import. At this
juncture, Ramos, who was at a distance of one-half (1/2) meter from
accused Pineda was ordered by the latter to surrender to him his
collections which out of fear he readily obeyed by handing over to
Pineda the days earnings of P5,700. It was at that point while Ramos
was giving the money to Pineda when he took a glance at the left side
of Pinedas face. Thence while his cohorts were divesting the
passengers of their cash and valuables accused Pineda was
continuously poking his gun at Ferrers neck and would press it harder
whenever he stepped on the brake. Thence after Ferrer was divested by
the robbers of his wallet containing his drivers license and cash in the
amount of P1,000 which incidentally he borrowed earlier from a loan
shark in EDSA and while the bus was somewhere in Malaria, Caloocan
City, a commotion ensued inside the bus when one passenger later
identified as Victim SPO1 Arnel Fuensalida grappled with one of the
hold-uppers for the possession of his clutch bag containing his service
firearm. In the course thereof the concerned malefactor shouted: "BOSS
INAGAW ANG BARIL KO" prompting accused Pineda to shout back
"TIRAHIN NA, PATAYIN NA, PAG LUMABAN, PATAYIN NA."
Immediately thereafter and while the bus was in Pangarap Village,
Caloocan City, six (6) shots rang out. Apparently fearing that the gunfire
would catch the attention of the highway patrol, accused Pineda
commanded his cohorts to check through the window if any patrol car

was following them and uttered: "HUWAG KAYONG

MAGPAPAPUTOK." Not long afterwards accused Pineda remarked:
"MALAPIT NA TAYO" and again ordered Ferrer: "DIRETSO MO LANG."
As directed, Ferrer kept on driving until accused Pineda ordered him to
stop the bus upon reaching Sampaguita Street, Caloocan City where all
the malefactors alighted with their loot including victim Fuensalidas
service firearm i.e. a caliber .38 Smith and Wesson revolver bearing
Serial No. 47840. Thereafter the passengers started crying and some
even lost consciousness. As suggested by one passenger, they all
alighted at the Tungko Police Station, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan
where a lady passenger screamed: "PATAY NA, PATAY NA," referring
to the victim whose body was lying face down on the bus flooring.
However for lack of jurisdiction the police officers thereat referred
Ferrer, Ramos and the crying lady to Malaria Police Station, Caloocan
City. The police officers after looking at the victims cadaver and
conducting an initial investigation referred them to the Urduja Police
Station. At the Urduja Police Station, police investigators PO3 Celerino
Susano and SPO1 Ernesto Mandanas of the Investigation Section were
dispatched to Malaria, Caloocan City where subject bus bearing Plate
No. PWZ-208 and body no. 2657 was found parked in front of the
Kababayan Center. An ocular inspection of the bus disclosed the
lifeless body of victim lying facedown on the flooring. Recovered inside
the bus were two (2) slugs (Exhs. "I" and "I-1") and two (2) empty shells
(Exhs. "J" and "J-1"). Thereafter the body was brought to El Ruaro
Funeral Parlor where the same was subsequently identified by victims
widow Mrs. Amalia Fuensalida. Meanwhile the police investigators took
down on the same day the sworn statements of Ferrer (Exh. "E") and
Ramos ("Exh. "H" with submarkings "H-1" and "H-2") as well as that of
the private complainant Amalia Fuensalida (Private Complainant for
short) (Exh. "B" with submarking "B-1").
It came to pass that P/Supt. Benjamin Cabiltes, Chief of Urduja Police
Sub-Station 4, Camarin Road, Caloocan City assigned the team of
SPO1 Carlito Alas, PO3 Napoleon Andaya, Sgt. De Guzman and other
operatives of the Special Operations Group to conduct follow-up
investigation of the case. Initially the team repaired to the police station
in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where the bus was first brought and
based from [sic] information furnished by an unidentified bus passenger
to the effect that the robber called for one "Totie" in the course of the
robbery, an inquiry was accordingly made as to whether they know
persons by that name to which the San Jose del Monte police identified

the man as Totie Jacob, a member of the gang of accused Rolando

Pineda who with another companion named Celso Sison was said to be
detained at the Municipal Jail of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan for
another case of robbery. Proceeding to the said place the team found
out that the duo were already out on bail. Thence, after the pictures of
accused Pineda (Exh. "B") and Sison (Exh. "C") from the file of said
Municipal Jail were shown by the Team to Ferrer, the latter positively
identified the duo as two of the six (6) malefactors involved in the
robbery with homicide in question (Karagdagang Salaysay dated 6 Nov.
1997 Exh. "E-1").
With the above findings together with the sworn statements of witnesses
and the Joint Affidavits of SPO1 Carlito Alas and PO3 Napoleon Andaya
(Exh. "D" with submarkings "D-1" and "D-2"), as well as Affidavit of PO3
Celerino Susano (Exh. "F" with submarkings "F-1" and "F-2"), and other
pertinent documents such as the Death Certificate of victim (Exh. "P"
with submarkings "P-1" and "P-2"), the case against accused Rolando
Pineda, Celso Sison, Victor Colet, Totie Jacob, and two "Does," "John"
and "Peter," were referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor, Caloocan
City for appropriate action by P/Supt. Cabiltes per referral slip dated 10
November 1997 (Exh. "G" with submarking "G-1") which resulted in the
filing of instant charge against the aforenamed accused after a
preliminary investigation conducted by Asst. City Prosecutor Sancho G.
Lomadilla.
Per the record, the cadaver of the victim was autopsied on 16 October
1997 by Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Services, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, per Request for
Laboratory Examination of the Caloocan City Police Station (Exh. "K")
and the Certification of Identification and Consent for Autopsy (Exh. "L")
signed by the Private Complainant. Dr. Freyras findings was [sic]
embodied in her Medico Legal Report No. M-1509-97 (Exh. "M" with
submarkings "M-1," "M-2" and "M-3") with its annexes, i.e. sketches of
Human Head and Body (Exh. "N" with submarkings "N-1" to "N-4" and
Exh. "O" with submarkings "O-1" and "O-2," respectively), which
disclosed the following findings and conclusion:
"FINDINGS:
Fairly nourished, fairly developed, male cadaver in rigor mortis with post
mortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body. The conjunctiva
are pale. The lips and nailbeds are cyanotic.

"HEAD, TRUNK, EXTREMITY:

(1) Gunshot wound, left parietal region, measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm
just left of the midsagittal line, 167.5 cm from the heel, with an
abraded collar measuring 0.1 cm uniformly, directed
posteriorwards, downwards and medialwards, fracturing the left
parietal and left sphenoid bone, lacerating both left cerebral
hemisphere, with subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages. A
deformed slug recovered embedded at the left sphenoid bone.
(2) Gunshot wound, left post auricular region, measuring 0.8 x 0.7
cm, 11 cm from the posterior midline, 156.5 cm from the heel, with
an abraded collar measuring 0.1 cm uniformly, directed
anteriorwards, downwards and medialwards, fracturing left
temporal and left sphenoid bone, lacerating the left cerebral
hemisphere, with subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages. A
deformed slug recovered embedded at the left sphenoid bone.
(3) Contusion, left supraorbital region, measuring 4 x 3 cm, 4 cm
from the anterior midline.
(4) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 8 x 3 cm, 9 cm from the
anterior midline.
(5) Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry, right
submanibular region measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, 7 cm from the
anterior midline, 146 cm from the heel, with an abraded collar,
measuring 0.1 cm uniformly, an area of smudging measuring 4.5
x 2, 2.5 cm, 146 cm from the heel, directed posteriorwards,
upwards and to the left fracturing the left mandible, lacerating the
larynx, making a point of exit at the left preauricular region,
measuring 1.5 x 1 cm, 14 cm from the anterior midline, 154 cm
from the heel.
(6) Gunshot wound thru and thru, point of entry, epigastric region,
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, 2 cm left of the anterior midline, 115 cm
from the heel with an abraded collar, measuring 0.1 cm uniformly,
directed posteriorwards, downwards and lateralwards, passing
thru the 4th left intercostal space, lacerating the left dome of the
diaphragm, stomach and the spleen, making a point of exit at the
left posterior costal region, measuring 1.5 x 1.2 cm, 10 cm from
the posterior midline, 109 cm from the heel.

(7) Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry, vertebral region,
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, just left of the posterior midline, 122 cm
from the heel, with an abraded collar, measuring 0.2 cm inferiorly,
0.1 cm superiorly, medially and laterally, directed anteriorwards,
upwards and lateralwards, fracturing the 9th left thoracic rib,
lacerating both lobes of the left lung, making a point of exit at the
left anterior axillary region, measuring 1.5 x 1.2 cm, 14 cm from
the anterior midline, 126 cm from the heel.
(8) Gunshot wound, right shoulder, measuring 0.9 x 0.7 cm, 4 cm
from the posterior midline, 144 cm from the heel, with an abraded
collar, measuring 0.5 cm laterally, 0.2 cm superiorly, 0.1 cm
inferiorly and medially, directed anteriorwards, downwards and
lateralwards. A deformed slug recovered embedded thereat.
There is about 800 cc of blood in the abdominal cavity.
The stomach is full of partially digested food particles, negative for
alcoholic odor.
The rest of the visceral organs are grossly unremarkable.
"CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds,
head and trunk."
Elucidating on her medical findings, Dr. Freyra testified that she found
six (6) gunshot wounds in the victims body, one abrasion and one
contusion. Gunshot wounds designated in the Medico Legal report as
Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 were fatal; that judging from the nature of the
wounds, wherein the six (6) gunshots had the same points of entries all
measuring 0.8 x 0.7 cm, the fatal weapon was possibly a .38 cal.
revolver; however, she could not form any opinion as to the number of
assailant[s]; that the contusion on the left eye was brought about by the
blood in the head owing to several fractures in the skull while the
abrasion could have been brought about by the rubbing of the affected
area with a rough surface. On the relative position of the victim with the
assailant/s it is possible that when gunshot wounds nos. 1, 2 and 6 were
inflicted, the assailant was somewhere at the extreme left of the victim
who could be in a lying or sitting position or at a lower level than the
assailant with the muzzle of the gun pointed downward. Gunshot wound

no. 5 was inflicted at close range. Gunshot wound no. 7 which was
located at victims back could have been sustained while victim was in
any of the three aforecited positions as nos. 1, 2 and 6 while the
trajectory of gunshot wound no. 8 was also going downward toward the
lateral side of the body.
Dr. Freyra went on to add that some of the gunshot wounds had points
of entries and exits while others did not have any exit wound thus this
explains her extraction of the deformed slugs (Exhs. "Q-1," "Q-2" and
"Q-3") from the victims body and the recovery of police of slugs at the
crime scene.
On the hearing of 16 July 1999 the Defense Counsel agreed to stipulate
that the private complainant incurred the total amount of P60,000
representing the funeral and other related expenses for the deceased.
Testifying on the civil aspect of the case the private complainant alleged
that as Senior Police Officer I, victim was receiving the monthly salary
of P9,277.50; that as a result of the death of her husband she suffered
mental block, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and was very sad
thinking of what would be in store for their three small children.7
The Version of the Defense
The defense presented four witnesses: (1) appellant; (2) his contractor Lillian
Tan ("Tan"); (3) his acquaintance Efren Quiton ("Quiton"); and (4) his coaccused Colet. The trial court summarized appellants bid for an acquittal in
this wise:
On that day of 15 October 1997 from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., accused
was in the house of one VICTOR "INTING" VILLENA in Gumamela St.,
Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City where he installed the electrical wiring per
contract with contractor LILLIAN TAN. He never left his said place of
work on that particular day and as a matter of fact LILLIAN TAN even
served him lunch and snacks in the morning and afternoon. After
finishing his work he was paid P500 by his contractor and at 5:00 p.m.
he went home which is only one hundred meters away or a five minutes
[sic] walk from VICTOR VILLENAS house. Upon arriving home he
rested for 5 minutes then took a bath and at around 6:00 p.m. he went
to the nearby house of his contractor LILLIAN TAN where he talked with
her and drunk [sic] some beer until 9:00 p.m. when he went home and
ate dinner then retired to bed at around 10:00 p.m.; that he does not

know anything about the shooting incident in question; that his house in
Gumamela St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City is about 30 to 45 minutes
ride to or from Lagro, Quezon City and a distance of around 4 to 5
kilometers to Quirino Highway, Malaria, this City where according to
prosecution witnesses CAMILO FERRER and JIMMY RAMOS the
shooting incident in question occurred; that he had no previous
encounter or quarrel with these FERRER and RAMOS and did not know
them prior to the incident; and that he saw for the first time police
investigator PO3 CELERINO SUSANO in court; that [the] instant charge
against him was fabricated as he was just implicated by his co-accused
VICTOR COLET, who is a brother of a policeman, and CELSO SISON
@ BOYET TARTARO, an asset of the police which arose from the
rivalry over a woman he had with CELSO SISON who is a good friend
of VICTOR COLET; that the duo who managed to elude arrest, were
heard to say that he would rot in jail; that CELSO SISON was also
instrumental for [sic] his arrest by SPO2 ABRAHAM FERNANDEZ and
SPO1 LEOPOLDO DAVID for alleged violation of P.D. 1866 filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan which was
however subsequently dismissed after he posted the required bailbond
on 5 August 1999 (Exh. "1"); that his picture shown by the Caloocan
City Police to the witnesses in the instant case must have been secured
by them from the Courts file; that he was again framed-up by the police
on 15 November 1999 when he was arrested by elements of the
Caloocan City Police Station, Sub-Station 6, Bagong Silang for allegedly
concealing a deadly weapon and assault which was referred for inquest
by Sub-Station Commander Capt. VALDEZ to Inquest Prosecutor
ACUA who however ordered his release as no evidence was
confiscated from his person, thus, he was released from detention on 18
November 1997; that his alleged involvement in the instant case which
occurred on 15 October 1997 was not even brought up by the SubStation 6 operatives during his custodial investigation before Prosecutor
ACUA; that in furtherance of the police efforts to file trump-up [sic]
charge against him the Caloocan City Police Station, Sub-Station 6,
Bagong Silang implicated him for alleged Violation of P.D. 1866 and
Robbery which allegedly happened on 5 September 1997 despite the
fact that he was detained as early as 5 August 1998 [sic] at the
Caloocan City Jail and ironically this resulted in the filing of two
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 54650 and 54651, respectively,
against him now pending before RTC Branch 131, this City (Exhs. "2"
and "3" with submarkings "2-A" and "3-A", respectively); that while in jail
he met fellow inmate EFREN QUITON from Bulacan who expressed

surprise on why he was implicated in the instant case as he claimed to

know what really happened and the persons really involved in this case
and volunteered to testify for him in Court.
On 1 September 1999, the Defense Counsel recalled Accused PINEDA
(TSN 1 September 1999) to the witness stand who testified that he
remembered an event which occurred on 15 August 1997 when he
figured in a rumble and the unnamed male person who was seriously
wounded as a result of his punches turned out to be the nephew of
police officer TITO ALAS who was the one who arrested him in
connection with instant case and whose house was a distance of
around 300 meters away from his house; that subsequently his sister
informed him that after he stepped out of the house, police officer TITO
ALAS came looking for him and had he found him then he could have
been killed.
The defense presented Miss LILLIAN TAN who corroborated the alibi
defense of the Accused, further professing lack of knowledge about the
incident in question and maintained that except that of a contractorworker relationship, no other relation exist [sic] between her and
Accused PINEDA.
The other defense witness EFREN QUITON corroborated the testimony
of the Accused relative to his getting acquainted with him at the City Jail
and his knowledge about the offense for which he (accused) was being
implicated. He testified in this wise:
He (EFREN QUITON) was a resident of Grotto, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan prior to his detention and is detained at the Caloocan City Jail
on charge of illegal possession of shabu during pot session which
occurred on 10 June 1999; that while thus under detention he came to
know his fellow inmate ROLANDO PINEDA and on "10 June 1996" (p.
3, TSN of 31 August 1999 QUITON) the latter intimated to him about
his (Accuseds) case to which he expressed surprise considering that
sometime on 16 October 1997, SPO4 MARIO LARENAS approached
him inquiring on whether he saw BOYET TARTARO, VICTOR COLET
and one TITO who were said to be the suspects in the bus hold-up
incident wherein one policeman was killed and that the name of the
Accused PINEDA was never mentioned as among those he suspected;
that he knows very well this BOYET TARTARO, a police aide, who used
to handle the traffic at the crossroad of Tungkong Mangga, San Jose
del Monte and a certain COLET because both were often seen together.

While SPO4 LARENAS had mentioned to him that the incident for which
the aforenamed trio were the suspects [in the robbery with homicide
case that] happened in Caloocan City, however, no mention was made
to him with reference to its date of occurrence.
As records have it, after the defense was deemed to have rested its
case following the admission of its formal offer of evidence, a "Motion
To Reopen Trial" was filed on 17 September 1999 by Defense Counsel,
for the purpose of admitting newly discovered evidence brought about
by the arrest of accused VICTOR EMMANUEL COLET who was
committed to the BJMP Caloocan City on 10 September 1999 in
connection with another case involving Violation of Section 16, Art. III,
R.A. 6425. Aforecited Motion was given due course by this Court in its
Order of 24 September 1999 and the case was thus set anew for the
reception of Accused PINEDAs additional evidence which consists
solely of the testimony of co-accused COLET to corroborate his
(Accused PINEDAs) defense of alibi. In the course of Accused
COLETs testimony he gave his true name as VICTOR EMMANUEL
GONZALES COLET hence upon motion of the Trial Prosecutor, the
Information was accordingly amended to reflect his alleged true name.
As synthesized by the Court the following were Accused COLETs
declarations:
He, Accused VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET, aka
"PINOCCHIO" x x x is a resident of 686 Quirino Highway, Bankers
Village II, this City which is one-half to one kilometer away from accused
PINEDAs place at Barracks II, Bukid Area, District I, this City. The first
time he saw Accused Pineda was in 1996 in Bukid Area and
subsequently he used to see him passed-by [sic] the house of the
woman he (Accused COLET) was courting in Barracks II.
On that fateful day at about 7:15 p.m. of 15 October 1997, Accused
COLET boarded subject air-conditioned bus in Lagro, Quezon City
purposely to go home and had himself seated at the bus right side, third
seat from the last. At that juncture he noted the presence of CELSO
SISON, SPENCER and TOTIE JACOB inside the bus. When the bus
was approaching Grotto, Guandanoville Subdivision, between Amparo
and Pangarap Village, this City Accused TOTIE JACOB, a neighbor of
his in Bankers Village II, who was armed with a handgun then seated
on the first seat, right side of the bus, suddenly stood up and declared a
hold-up shouting: "WALANG KIKILOS, HOLDAP ITO, HOLDAP ITO,

PARE UMPISAHAN NA NATIN." Simultaneously, TOTIEs companion

who was holding a grenade, stood up and ordered the passengers to
bow down by saying: "YUMUKO KAYONG LAHAT." And while the
passengers bowed down their heads, TOTIEs four (4) other
companions who were all armed, started divesting the passengers of
their cash and valuables which the passengers dropped in a black duffel
bag upon instruction of the hold-uppers. Accused COLET claimed that
his co-accused PINEDA was neither a passenger of the bus, nor one of
the six hold-uppers and that he did not see PINEDA at anytime on that
evening of 15 October 1997.
On cross-examination, COLET explained that while stooping down, he
managed to peep surreptitiously and saw ROBERTO SISON @ BOYET
TARTARO @ CELSO SISON shooting the policeman victim who was
then in seating position with his .38 caliber handgun; that it was
SPENCER then sporting a barbers cut at the sides with curly and wavy
hair on top, who was pointing his gun at the driver; that the hold-uppers
were armed as follows: CELSO SISON @ BOYET TARTARO aka
ROBERTO SISON, a .38 gun; "BAROK," a knife; EDISON PALMARIO,
a hand grenade; SPENCER, a .38 caliber handgun; TOTIE JACOB, a
.45 caliber handgun; and the sixth unidentified robber, a knife. Accused
COLET is familiar with TOTIE JACOB since he used to hear the latters
name in 1994, it was this TOTIE JACOB whom he (Accused COLET)
saw divesting the bus conductor of his money; that he used to see
EDISON PALMARIO at Phase I, Pangarap Village, this City, whenever
he went around their place on board his scooter. In 1976, he used to
see alias BAROK, a jeepney "barker," while he was yet a student at the
Novaliches Elementary School. Prior to his arrest, he was jobless since
he was the one taking care of his father who suffered a stroke. In 1997,
he was a volunteer confidential agent of the San Jose del Monte Police.
He received no salary therefor except certain personal doleout from
Major TINIO. He was arrested in 8 September 1999 for illegal
possession of shabu and he learned that he was implicated in this case
three days after his detention at the City Jail and on the following day he
learned that PINEDA is one of his co-accused.
Accused COLET further stated that although he was one of the
passengers of the bus, nothing was taken from him as not all
passengers were victims of robbery; that soon after he alighted at
Pleasant Hill he immediately contacted and reported the incident to
SPO1 TITO ALAS of Sub-Station 4, Bukid Area, this City telling him that

they could still catch up with the hold-uppers since they just alighted at
Sampaguita St., Malaria Caloocan City and SPO1 ALAS gave words
[sic] that he would take care of the matter. The latter also asked him if
he knew PINEDA who was once detained at the San Jose del Monte
Jail to which he answered in the affirmative. He assured SPO1 ALAS
that he will testify in this case once the suspects are apprehended.8
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that contrary to the offense designated in the information,
the proper charge against appellant is robbery with homicide under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code9 and not highway robbery resulting in homicide
under P.D. No. 532. The trial court declared that the situation covered by P.D.
No. 532 contemplates acts of brigandage against any prospective victim
anywhere on the highway.10 The trial court found the testimonies of Ferrer and
Ramos "positive, spontaneous and forthright" and observed that they
"remained steadfast and convincing despite the rigid cross-examination by
defense counsel and the clarificatory questions"11 of the trial court judge. After
evaluating the evidence, the trial court convicted appellant and acquitted
Colet, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having
established beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of Accused ROLANDO
PINEDA Y MANALO of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined
and penalized under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659 and considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of, by a band, sans any mitigating circumstance to offset
it, which per Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code called for the imposition
of the greater penalty, this Court hereby sentences said Accused to
suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the legal heirs of the
deceased, SPO1 ARNEL FUENSALIDA, the civil indemnity of P50,000;
and to pay the private complainant AMALIA FUENSALIDA the following:
a. stipulated actual damages of P60,000;
b. moral damages of P40,000;
c. exemplary damages of P60,000;
d. compensatory damages of P167,872.50

as well as to return the loot in the amount of P1,000 and P5,700 to

driver FERRER and conductor RAMOS, respectively; to restore thru this
Court, for its proper disposition, the service firearm of victim SPO1
FUENSALIDA described as .38 cal. revolver Smith & Wesson with serial
no. 47840; and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Court, let the entire records hereof including the complete set of the
transcript of stenographic notes be forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for automatic review within 30 days but not earlier than
15 days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any
motion for new trial or reconsideration.
With respect to Accused VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET,
the prosecution having failed to overcome with the required quantum of
proof his constitutional presumption of innocense his motion to dismiss
by way of Demurrer to Evidence, is granted. Correspondingly a
judgment of ACQUITTAL is hereby entered in his favor.
Accused COLETs release from detention is in order unless he is being
detained further for other lawful cause/s.
Let an alias order of arrest issue forthwith against Accused CELSO
SISON Y LLOREN @ BOYET TARTARO and TOTIE JACOB @ TOTIE
and thereafter let the case as against them be archived without
prejudice to its revival once they be arrested later on.
SO ORDERED.12
Errors Assigned
Appellant states that the trial court gravely erred to the point of abusing its
discretion in the following matters:
1. Holding that the prosecution witnesses have positively identified
appellant.
2. Giving probative weight and value to the testimonies of Camilo Ferrer
and Jimmy Ramos despite being inconsistent on material and relevant
points and being untruthful to the court.

3. Not giving probative weight and credibility to the testimony of accused

Victor Emmanuel Gonzales Colet that appellant was not one of those
who held-up the bus and killed the victim.
4. Ruling out the defense of alibi appellant interposed.13
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is meritorious. In overturning the ruling of the trial court, we follow
the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question, including one not raised by the parties.14
The findings of a trial court, given its vantage point to assess the credibility of
witnesses, are entitled to full faith and credit. On appeal, reviewing courts do
not disturb such findings of the trial court. However, the reviewing court may
overturn the trial courts findings when there is a showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance, which, if considered, could materially affect the result of the
case.15 This Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial courts
appreciation of evidence must bow to the superior rule that the prosecution
must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The law
presumes an accused innocent, and this presumption must prevail unless
overturned by competent and credible proof.16
A conviction for a crime rests on two bases: (1) credible and convincing
testimony establishes the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime; and (2) the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that all
elements of the crime are attributable to the accused.17 The trial courts
conviction of appellant fails in both bases.
Identity of the Perpetrator
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the prosecution
witnesses positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Ferrer gave a statement at Sub-station 4 of the Caloocan City Police Station
on the night of the incident. In his statement dated 15 October 1997, Ferrer
describes appellant thus:
12. T:

Sa anim na kataong nangholdap may natatandaan ka

ba sa Kanila?

S: Ang natatandaan ko ay ang taong tumutok sa akin ng

baril na .45 sa ulo at ang kanyang itsura ay
balinkinitan ang katawan, 25-30 taong gulang, may
hati sa gitna ang buhok, walang bigote, kayumanggi,
nakasuot ng polo shirt [na kulay] berde, nakamaong
na kupas, salitang tagalog.18
On 6 November 1998, the police invited Ferrer to identify the perpetrators of
the crime from photographs the police showed to him. Ferrer gave a
subsequent statement on the identity of the perpetrators as follows:
4. T: Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto sa tanggapan na
ito at nagbibigay ng isang salaysay?
S: Upang alamin ko kung aking makikilala ang taong
nangholdap sa pampasaherong Bus na aking
minamaneho.
5. T: Paano mo makikilala ang mga holdaper?
S: Nabalitaan ko lang po na may litrato dito sa presinto
na pinaghihinalaan na nangholdap sa bus.
6. T: Natatandaan mo pa ba ang mukha ng holdaper?
S: Kung sakali ko pong makita ang litrato.
7. T: May ipakikita akong mga litrato, tingnan mong mabuti
kung mayroon tao na kasama sa mga nangholdap sa
pampasaherong bus?
S: Iyan po sir ang isa at isa pa po ito sir na nangholdap
sa Bus na aking minamaneho. (When the Investigator
on case presented couples of picture [sic] to the affiant
he positively identified two pictures who were
responsible in a Bus Hold-up who were identified as
(Number 1) Rolando Pineda y Manalo @ Lando, 36
years old, married, jobless, native of Valenzuela and
with last known address at Phase 3, Bgy. San Rafael
IV, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, and/or Gumamela
St., Malaria, Caloocan City and (Number 2) Celso
Sison y Lloren @ Boyet @ Boyet Tartaro with last
known address at Gumamela St., Malaria, Caloocan
City.19 (Emphasis supplied)

Like Ferrer, Ramos also gave a statement at Sub-station 4 of the Caloocan

City Police Station on 15 October 1997, the night of the incident. However,
unlike Ferrer, Ramos candidly admitted that he could not identify any of the
perpetrators.
9. T: Sinabi mo kanina na anim yong hold-uppers na
pawang armado ano ba mga dala nilang baril at may
mamumukhaan ka ba sa kanilang sakaling muli mo
silang makita?
S: Armado po sila ng kalibre .45 at .38 revolver. Hindi ko
sila mamumukhaan dahil agad po ako nilang
pinayuko.20 (Emphasis supplied)
The police later arrested appellant based on an out-of-court identification by
Ferrer. Ferrer first identified appellant and Sison through mug shots the police
presented to them. Although he testified against Colet, SPO1 Carlito Alas
("SPO1 Alas"), the investigating police officer, admitted that there were only
two photographs presented to Ferrer. The police showed Ferrer only the
photographs of appellant and his co-accused Sison.21
In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors: (1) the witness opportunity to view the perpetrator of the
crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at the time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty shown by the
witness of his identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.22
Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established methods of
identifying criminals,23 the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. The
first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of
photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect.24 The second
rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their
arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures
pertains to the suspect.25Thus:
[W] here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any
subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be based not
upon the witnesss recollection of the features of the guilty party, but
upon his recollection of the photograph. Thus, although a witness
who is asked to attempt a corporeal identification of a person

whose photograph he previously identified may say, "Thats the

man that did it," what he may actually mean is, "Thats the man
whose photograph I identified."
xxx
A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the
conclusion that where a witness has made a photographic identification
of a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of that same person
is somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in
light of the fact that he first saw a photograph.26(Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, there was impermissible suggestion because the
photographs were only of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two
accused.27 The police obviously suggested the identity of the accused by
showing only appellant and Sisons photographs to Ferrer and Ramos.
The testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos show that their identification of appellant
fails the totality of circumstances test. The out-of-court identification of
appellant casts doubt on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos in court.
In its decision, the trial court relied on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos to
prove that appellant is one of the perpetrators. On closer examination,
however, we see that Ferrer and Ramos failed to establish that what they saw
of the perpetrators is sufficient to produce an accurate memory of the incident.
During direct examination, Ferrer testified that one of the perpetrators, who
poked a gun at his nape, did not allow him to turn back his head. There was
limited opportunity for Ferrer, while driving the bus, to see the perpetrators.
Thus:
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q Did you hear that utterance made, "Umpisahan na ang laro"?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you heard that, was your bus in motion?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next?

A Someone held me at my neck while poking a gun at my nape, sir.

xxx
Q What other utterance was made?
A I saw one of the bus passengers grappling of [sic] one of the hold
uppers who was trying to retrieve from [sic] his clutch bag, sir.
Q Did you see that person with the clutch bag and the other person
who was trying to grapple the clutch bag?
A No, I was not allowed to turn my head back, sir.
xxx
Q After you heard the shots what happened?
A The one who poked a gun at me said "deretso mo lang."
Q He never leave you at [sic] your place?
A "Hindi po."
Q How many shots did you hear?
A Six (6) shots, sir.
Q After those six (6) shots what happened?
A I could not turn my head to see whether the person who was
shot was dead, sir.28
xxx
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q After the words which someone uttered, you felt somebody held
you by the nape and poked a gun at your head, is that correct?
A Yes, he jumped from one of the front seats, sir.
xxx

Q Is this two seater seat where the person who poked a gun at your
nape seated located somewhere to your right?
A Yes, sir.
Q This seat and the drivers seat, are they parallel line or side by side or
abreast with the drivers seat?
A Slightly slanted from the drivers seat, sir.
Q In other words, this seat is situated somewhere to your back side?
A "Parang tagiliran po."
Q How far from your shoulder?
A (Witness pointing more than a meter.)
Q In other words, you would not see the person sitting on that
particular seat not unless you turn over your head to the right,
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that time you were concentrated in driving, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a driver, its not your business to look around and check on the
passengers, its the duty of the conductor, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so sensing that no untoward incident that might happen, you just
continued driving peacefully until that very moment when somebody
shouted "umpisahan na ang laro," correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then immediately after that, someone approached you from your
behind and poked you something at your nape which you later felt to be
a gun, correct?

A Yes, sir.
Q And he told you to concentrate in your driving, if you want to live,
correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q For fear that something might happen to you if you disobey the
instruction of that person at your back, you just concentrated in
your driving not even trying to turn your head to look around,
correct?
A Yes, sir.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Ferrer insisted that he saw what was happening through the rearview mirror.
Although Ferrer felt the presence and heard the voice of the perpetrator at his
back, it is not clear if he saw the perpetrators face or only his back.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q At the time you heard the gunshots, the person at your back was still
there pointing a gun at your nape?
A Yes, he never left, sir.
Q So you could not turn your head to check what was going on at
the back of the bus for fear that the man at your back will shoot
you?
A "Hindi po ako lumilingon pero nakikita ko sa salamin dahil
mayroon po akong rear [view] mirror sa harap."
COURT: (butts in)
Q How big is that mirror?
A (Witness demonstrating with hands for about a foot long and 8 inches
in width.)
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:

Q Where is that mirror installed or positioned?

A In front of the driver, sir.
Q When you looked in the mirror you could see the back portion of the
bus?
A Yes, sir.30 (Emphasis supplied)
During cross-examination, Ramos remembered that he saw part of the
perpetrators face.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q And you were apprehensive even lifting your head to try to take a look
at the suspect because it could be very noticeable [and] you might be
shot?
A Yes sir.
Q That is why when that suspect demanded money from you your head
[was] vowed [sic] down?
A Yes sir. But when I handed the money I took a look at his face
particularly the left portion.31 (Emphasis supplied)
The relative positions of Ferrer, Ramos, and the perpetrator who poked a gun
at Ferrers nape, is as follows: Ferrer on the left (drivers) side of the bus and
facing the windshield, Ramos on the second step of the running board at the
right side of the bus and facing the road,32 and the perpetrator somewhere in
between them, on a level higher than Ramos.33 Based on Ramos testimony,
Ferrer could not have seen the perpetrators face by looking at the rearview
mirror. Ramos testified that he saw the left side of the perpetrators face. This
meant that the perpetrator was facing the passengers and not the windshield.
Thus, if Ferrer while driving could see the perpetrator who was situated at his
back, the most he could see through the rearview mirror was the back of the
perpetrator who was facing the passengers.
Ferrer, however, is certain that he took a fleeting glance of the perpetrators
face, even as he concentrated on his driving. Obviously, this view of the
perpetrators face did not come from glancing at the rearview mirror. Ferrer
claimed to have seen the perpetrators face before the robbery started, thus:

ATTY. CRISOSTOMO:
Q Were you able to [lift your head to look at the rear view mirror] despite
the fact that the person who was at your back was poking the gun at
your nape and telling you not to make any wrong move because he will
shoot you?
A "Bago po nag-umpisa, nakita ko na iyong mukha niya dahil
napalingon ako noong nag-umpisa ang laro."34 (Emphasis supplied)
Ferrers identification of the perpetrator is inconsistent on how he saw the
perpetrator, through the rearview mirror or by looking back at him.
Ramos testified that he saw how appellant and his companions robbed the
passengers and killed Fuensalida. However, even if during trial Ramos
pointed to appellant as the perpetrator, an examination of Ramos testimony
shows that he did not actually see, much less remember, the faces of the
perpetrators. Thus:
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q Those persons whom you saw who sat near the driver if you can see
him will you be able to identify him?
A I cannot point to him because when he said those words we were
made to vow [sic] our head [sic] down and whenever I made a moved
[sic] I was kicked.
xxx
Q You said you cannot identify the persons who sat by the driver of the
bus. How about the five other companions [of] that person if you see
them again will you be able to identify them?
A Hindi po.
Q Were you able to see the face x x x of that person who sat near the
driver [at any instance]?
A I only see [sic] the back of the head because when he turned
sidewards I was only able to see the back of his head.
Q How about the side view of his face. Were you able to see?

A Opo.
Q Now, look around the courtroom and point to anyone and look at their
[sic] side view of these persons one by one and tell us if any of them
resembles that person whom you saw?
A (Witness pointing to the person who identified his name as Rolando
Pineda).
COURT:
Q How were you able to identify?
A Iyong haba ng konti ng buhok, side view.
Q Was he sporting the same kind of hair?
A Medyo maigsi po.35 (Emphasis supplied)
A well-known authority36 in eyewitness identification made a list of 12 danger
signals that exist independently of the identification procedures investigators
use. These signals give warning that the identification may be erroneous even
though the method used is proper. The list is not exhaustive. The facts of a
particular case may contain a warning not in the list. The list is as follows:
(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made
no accusation against him when questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original
description and the actual description of the accused;
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously
identified some other person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited
opportunity to see the accused;

(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the
witness was unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the
criminal and his identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.
Three of these danger signals apply to the prosecution witnesses
identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Ramos originally
stated that he could not identify any of the perpetrators. Ferrer had a limited
opportunity to see the perpetrators before the robbery started. When he first
saw appellant, Ferrer had no inkling that appellant would rob them.
The more important duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the
perpetrator and not to establish the existence of the crime. For even if the
commission of the crime is established, without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the trial court cannot convict any
one.37 Ferrer and Ramos mental conception of the incident, the resulting
inaccuracy in their narration, and the suggestiveness of the pictures presented
to them for identification cast doubt on their testimonies that appellant is one
of the perpetrators of the crime.
Denial and Alibi as a Defense
The defense of denial and alibi is futile in the face of positive identification of
the accused. Courts look with disfavor on the defense of alibi. However, we
explained in Tuason v. Court of Appeals:38
Judges seem disposed more readily to credit the veracity and reliability
of eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf
of the accused, whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or
other testimony. They are unmindful that in some cases the emotional
balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by her experience that her
powers of perception become distorted and her identification frequently
most untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other motives, not
necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally the desire

to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support, consciously or

unconsciously, an identification already made by another.
The defense of alibi assumes importance where the evidence for the
prosecution is weak and there is no positive identification of the accused,39 as
in this case. The rule that the accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was
never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases. Otherwise, we
will have the absurdity of the accused being put to a greater burden if the
prosecutions evidence is weak than if it were strong.40
While it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the
crime, corroboration of his alibi comes from three separate sources: Tan,
Quiton, and Colet. Tan corroborated appellants testimony on his whereabouts
at the time of the crime. Quiton testified that a day after the crime, he was
asked by SPO4 Mario Larenas ("SPO4 Larenas") of the San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan police force if he had knowledge of the whereabouts of "Boyet
Tartaro, Kulit and Tito." SPO4 Larenas approached Quiton because he knew
that Quiton was acquainted with the three. SPO4 Larenas did not mention
appellants name as one of the suspects.41
Colet, on the other hand, claimed to have knowledge of the crime and the
perpetrators as he was a bus passenger at the time of the crime. Thus:
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Q When you boarded that bus where did you take your seat?
A Right side of the bus, third seat from the last seat.
xxx
Q When Totie Jacob declared a hold-up as you say, what did he say?
A While standing Totie Jacob declared a hold-up and said "Walang
kikilos. Holdap ito, holdap ito. Pare, umpasahan [sic] na natin" and his
companions stood up and said "Yumuko kayong lahat" and then his
companion who stood up holding a grenade and told them to vow [sic]
down.
xxx

Q How about the passengers? What did they do when they [were]
ordered to bowed-down [sic]?
A They all bowed down.
Q How about you? What did you do?
A I also bowed my head down but I was peeping clandestinely at them
because I did not expect that I would be in that situation and looking at
what they are doing.
xxx
Q What did the hold-uppers do when all the passengers were no longer
looking at them because their heads were bowed down?
A The other hold-uppers nearest to the passengers ordered the
passengers to put their things down in a black duffel bag ("parang supot
ni Hudas").42
Colet testified that appellant was not a perpetrator in the crime and absolved
him from liability.
ATTY. BAUTISTA:
Q You said that there were six hold-uppers all in all?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said you have taken a good look at these hold-uppers?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda was one of those six holduppers that you have seen?
A Wala po, hindi po.
Q Will you kindly tell us also if Rolando Pineda was one of the
passengers of the bus, if you know?
A Hindi rin po, wala rin po.

Q Will you kindly tell us or if you likewise see [sic] Rolando Pineda at
any time of the night of October 15, 1997?
A Wala rin po.
Q You said that you know Rolando Pineda having met you and seen
him for several times. If you will see Rolando Pineda again will you be
able to recognized [sic] him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell us if Rolando Pineda is inside this courtroom now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly point to us the person of Rolando Pineda?
A (Witness correctly pointing to accused Rolando Pineda.)
xxx
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q What was the position of the policeman who [was] shot at the bus at
the time accused Celso Sison shot him?
A The person who shot the policeman was at the policemans back.
xxx
Q When you saw Celso Sison shot [sic] the victim inside the bus were
you standing then?
A I was still stooping down and at the same time peeping.43
Colet knows the names and faces of the perpetrators of the crime, as they all
live near each other. Colet asserted that he was an eyewitness and that he
remembers the perpetrators and even the weapons used.
PROSECUTOR SISON:
Q You said you saw the person who shot [the policeman]? Who was
that person who shot [the policeman] inside the bus?

A Roberto Sison alyas Boyet Tartaro.

xxx
Q And who was that hold-upper who was near the driver of the bus?
A Ang nasa likod po ng driver ay si Spencer.
Q Who is Spencer?
A Iyon lang po ang pagkakakilala sa taong iyon. Malapit din po sila sa
amin nakatira.
xxx
Q You also saw Totie Jacob, right?
A In front of the door.
xxx
Q x x x Do you know the three others?
A Maam iyong dalawa, iyong isa hindi ko po kilala.
Q Who were the other two?
A Edison Palmario, the one holding the hand grenade, and alias Barok.
xxx
Q x x x [W]hich came first, the shooting of the police officer or the taking
of personal belongings of the passengers?
A Sabay po.
Q And the hold-upper also took away the collection of the bus
conductor. Did you see that?
A I saw Totie Jacob commander the bus conductor.
xxx

Q Tell us again what were those weapons used by them?

A Celso Sison alias Tartaro .38 gun, Barok a knife, Palmario a hand
grenade, Spencer a .38 gun, Totie Jacob a .45 gun and the 6th one a
knife.44
The prosecution asks this Court to ignore Colets testimony that appellant was
not at the crime scene and did not participate in the criminal act. The
prosecution considers Colets testimony as polluted, coming from a coaccused. The flaw in this argument is that Colet is not a discharged coaccused.45 The trial court acquitted Colet when it granted his Demurrer to
Evidence, which the prosecution did not even oppose.46 The defense
presented Colet who testified that neither he nor appellant participated in the
crime. Colets testimony corroborates those of Ferrer and Ramos on the
number of perpetrators and the manner of commission of the crime. Colet
gave his testimony in an unhesitating and straightforward manner.
Appellant even believed that Colet falsely implicated him in the crime at the
beginning. Appellant and Colet had a previous rivalry over a woman and Colet
is known in their area as someone with influence, being a police informer.
Unless he simply wanted to tell the truth, Colet was unlikely to testify on
appellants innocence when he himself is charged with the same crime and
was present at the crime scene. Appellant also attributes the motive of
revenge to SPO1 Alas, as appellant previously beat up SPO1 Alas nephew
during a brawl.47 The prosecution did not present evidence to rebut this
statement.
In its attempt to pin the crime on appellant, the prosecution dug up other
criminal cases filed against appellant. Appellant was previously charged with
robbery and illegal possession of a deadly weapon, concealing a deadly
weapon, and assault, for which he was released after posting bond. Section
34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is instructive on this point:
SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
Evidence is not admissible when it shows, or tends to show, that the accused
in a criminal case has committed a crime independent from the offense for

which he is on trial. A man may be a notorious criminal, and may have

committed many crimes, and still be innocent of the crime charged on trial.48
Section 14, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved." An accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden of proof. We hold that appellant is entitled to a mandatory acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the trial court
is REVERSED. Appellant Rolando Pineda y Manalo is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. His immediate release is ordered, unless there are other
valid causes for his continued detention.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this
Decision and report to this Court immediately the action taken not later than
five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119739 June 18, 1998

ARISTON A. ABAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Death struck like the proverbial thief in the night, but was the accusedappellant the perpetrator thereof?
In the early morning of October 28, 1986, Ana Paulin was in bed at her house
in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, when she was suddenly awakened by the
cries of "Inay, inay, inay." Startled, she bolted up, looked out of the window
and saw a man alighting form the jeep parked in front of her house. She yelled
at the man who looked up at her then ran away. When she opened the front
door downstairs, she found her son, Roberto Pineda, sprawled on the
doorstep. He had been repeatedly stabbed in the chest and back.
With the help of neighbors, she rushed Roberto to the Midtown General
Hospital in San Pedro but was refused admittance due to the lack of medical
facilities therein. Her son expired on the way to another hospital. At about 3:30
a.m., she reported the incident to the San Pedro police. It was only before
noon of that same day, however, when she submitted a "Salaysay" identifying
accused-appellant Ariston A. Abad as the man she had seen running away
from her house moment before she discovered her son's bloody condition.
She further stated that accused-appellant and Roberto had been enemies
ever since her daughter-in-law, Susan, left the latter for accused-appellant,
who was then married to a certain Evelyn Tagle. On the other hand, at the
time of the incident, Roberto was cohabiting with a certain Mary Grace
Pineda.
On that very day, accused-appellant was invited by their barangay captain to
shed light on the incident and was subsequently detained, as a complaint
against him had been filed.
On June 28, 1987, accused-appellant was formally charged in an information,
reading as follows:

That on or about October 28, 1986, in the Municipality of San

Pedro, Province of Laguna, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused ARISTON A.
ABAD, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and treachery, being then conveniently armed
with a deadly bladed weapon, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab therewith one
ROBERTO PINEDA Y PAULIN, who as a result thereof, sustained
stab wounds on vital parts of his body which directly caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That the crime was committed with the generic aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation and the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior and treachery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was assigned to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna. Upon his arraignment on September 8, 1987, accusedappellant entered a plea of "not guilty." At the trial, the prosecution presented
three witnesses, namely, Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., Mary Grace Pineda, and Ana
Paulin; the defense presented the accused-appellant and Evelyn Tagle.
Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., the medico-legal officer who autopsied the body of the
victim, testified that the deceased suffered fifteen stab wounds and seven
multiple wounds, consequently dying of shock due to severe intra-thoracic
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds at the chest and back.
Mary Grace Pineda testified that three days before the incident, accusedappellant had an altercation with Roberto over the child of the latter with
Susan Paulin. The victim allegedly wanted to recover his child from Susan,
which accused-appellant opposed. The two even came to blows over the
matter, with mutual threats to kill each other.
On the other hand, accused-appellant denied the truth of Ana Paulin's
narrative, saying that on the evening of October 27, 1986, after selling
sampaguita flowers at Pasay City, he went home to San Pedro at around
12:00 midnight, and that, he was already sleeping at the time the alleged
stabbing incident occurred. His alibi was corroborated by his wife, Evelyn.

In its judgment rendered on November 27, 1991, the San Pedro RTC found
accused-appellant guilty of homicide. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and taking
into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance to
offset each other, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of 8 years 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together
with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify
the heirs of Roberto Pineda in the sum of P50,000.00 as
damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court,
hence the present recourse.
Accused-appellant assails his conviction by the lower court, maintaining that
he could not be considered guilty beyond reasonable doubt and that the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution lacked proof and facts to sustain his
conviction.
We find accused-appellant's arguments worthy of merit.
The most glaring feature of the present case is the lack of an eyewitness to
the actual killing. No one saw accused-appellant stab the victim, nor was the
murder weapon ever found. The only thing that links accused-appellant to the
crime is his presence at the scene of the incident, thus, the reliance of the trial
court on circumstantial evidence to convict accused-appellant.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 3 Thus,
for circumstantial evidence to suffice for conviction, the following requisites
must concur: (i) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (ii)
facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (iii) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances established must constitute an

unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused as the guilty person, to the exclusion of all others. In the present
case, the Court is of the view that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the
prosecution do not show beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
perpetrated the crime for which he stands charged.
From a careful perusal of the records, it becomes clear that the court a
quo affirmed accused-appellant's conviction on the basis of the following
pieces of circumstantial evidence:
First. Accused-appellant was seen at the scene of the crime from which he
later hastily fled.
Second. Accused-appellant had a motive to kill victim, having had an
altercation with the latter three days before.
The above circumstances, in the absence of other corroborative evidence, do
not point with moral certainty to the guilt of accused-appellant.
We have consistently held that the mere presence of accused-appellant at
the locus criminis cannot be solely interpreted to mean that he committed the
killing. 4 The mere presence of accused-appellant at the crime scene, without
more, is inadequate to support the conclusion that, indeed, he committed the
crime. In fact, the only certain conclusion that can be drawn from the
testimony of prosecution witness Ana Paulin is the fact that accused-appellant
alighted from a parked jeep in front of her house and not that he killed the
victim. This is clear from her testimony:
Q. Now, after you hear the word "Inay" about three
times, what did you do next if any?
A. I stood up "bumalikwas," sir.
Q. Why did you stand up, why did you "bumalikwas"?
A. I was surprised, startled, sir.
Q. After standing up what did you do next?
A. I look(ed) out through the window, sir.

Q. What windows is that?

A. The window in front of our house, sir.
Q. Why did you look out through that window in front
of your house?
A. Because I heard the shout came from that
direction, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you see anything unusual when you look(ed)
out the window?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Court what is that unusual
thing that you saw?
A. I saw a person alighted (sic) from the jeep, sir.
Q. But where is that jeep that you have just
mentioned?
A. In front of our window, sir.
Q. And when you said you saw a person came down
the jeep, what did you do next?
A. I shouted at him, sir.
Q. What did you should at him?
A. I said "Hoy" and asked "Ano yan," sir.
Q. When you said that, what did that man do?
A. Look(ed) at me and run (sic) away, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, you said after looking up to you and suddenly

he run away, what did you do next?
A. I go (sic) downstairs, sir.
Q. Where downstairs did you go, what portion?
A. Outside our door, sir.
Q. After going outside your door, what did you see, if
any?
A. I saw my son lying (sic) prostrate outside our door, sir.

On cross-examination, Ana Paulin's testimony reveals:

Q. Mrs. Witness, you did not actually saw (sic) the
stabbing?
A. No, sir.

Furthermore, Ana Paulin's testimony fails to state whether the man she saw
was carrying a weapon , or whether he was bloodied or not. Indeed, there is
an absence of positive proof that accused-appellant assaulted the victim.
Likewise, Dr. Jose Lopez, Jr., the medico-legal officer who performed the
autopsy, testified:
Q. Doctor, you said that the wounds found on the
body of the victim Roberto Pineda are (sic) cause(d)
by a sharp bladed instrument?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But it is also possible that the wounds could have
been caused by more than one sharp bladed
instrument?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, it is also possible that there were (sic) more
than one assailant?

Atty. Paler. Incompetent, your honor.

Court. The doctor said that it could be possible that
the wounds could have been also caused by more
than one instrument.
Atty. Agosila. Yes, your Honor, and my next question
is whether it is also possible that there were (sic)
more than one assailant?
Court. Witness may answer.
A. Yes, sir.

This admission raises serious doubts as to the credibility of the prosecution's

theory that accused-appellant was the victim's sole assailant.
As to accused-appellant's motive, it is true that the latter did have a motive to
kill Roberto Pineda. Yet, in order to support a conviction, motive must be
coupled with evidence from which it may be reasonably deduced that the
accused-appellant was the malefactor. 8 Given the paucity of evidence in the
instant case, to conclude that the killing arose from the previous altercation
between accused-appellant and the victim would be more speculative than
factual. The court cannot rely on mere presumptions and conjectures to
convict the accused-appellant. While his alibi is rather weak, this is no reason
for us to sustain his conviction, as the burden of proof still lies the prosecution
to establish that accused-appellant killed the victim. Thus, this Court, in Peo
vs. Manansala 9 held that:
Trial court must keep in mind that the prosecution must be able to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond a
reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The
prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
In the instant case, the totality of evidence adduced by the prosecution cannot
be considered as constituting an unbroken chain leading to the fair and
reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
The circumstances proffered by the prosecution only or so far as to create a
suspicion that the accused probably perpetrated the crime charged. But
suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof
beyond reasonable doubt. We quote, with emphasis, the saying that "The sea

of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass." 10
In sum, if a life is taken, justice demands that the wrong be redressed, but this
justice that calls for retribution cannot be the same one that would convict
accused-appellant at bar whose guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. 11
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 12565 dated March 31, 1995, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Ariston A. Abad is hereby ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, let the accused be immediately
released from his place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him
further for any other legal or valid cause. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184926

April 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the
commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit.
Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for rape with homicide
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 128, in Caloocan City based on
circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction
with modification on February 22, 2007.1
The victim was Marita,2 a girl who was born on October 29, 1994 based on her
certificate of live birth.3 When her very young life was snuffed out by
strangulation on July 2, 1999, she was only four years and eight months
old.4 She had been playing at the rear of their residence in Bagong Silang,
Caloocan City in the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia, her mother, first
noticed her missing from home.5 By noontime, because Marita had not turned
up, Julia called her husband Manito at his workplace in Pasig City, and told
him about Marita being missing.6 Manito rushed home and arrived there at
about 2 pm,7 and immediately he and Julia went in search of their daughter
until 11 pm, inquiring from house to house in the vicinity. They did not find
her.8 At 6 am of the next day, Manito reported to the police that Marita was
missing.9 In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant (manghuhula) in an
adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita might be found only five
houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction, they found
Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack10 inside the comfort
room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own
house.11 Her face was black and blue, and bloody.12 She had been tortured
and strangled till death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and
Jovy Solidum, who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had
raped and killed Marita.13 The police thus arrested Villaflores at around 5 pm
of July 3, 1999 just as he was alighting from a vehicle.14

On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the
information charging Villaflores with rape with homicide committed as
follows:15
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed
upon the person of one Marita, a minor of five (5) years old, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with said
Marita, against the latters will and without her consent, and thereafter with
deliberate intent to kill beat the minor and choked her with nylon cord which
caused the latters death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.16
The CA summarized the evidence of the State in its decision, viz:
After pre-trial was terminated, the trial proceeded with the prosecution
presenting witnesses namely, Aldrin Bautista, Jovie Solidum, Manito, Dr. Jose
Arnel Marquez, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, PO3 Rodelio
Ortiz, PO Harold Blanco and PO Sonny Boy Tepase.
From their testimonies, it is gathered that in the afternoon of July 3, 1999, the
lifeless body of a 5-year old child, Marita (hereinafter Marita) born on October
21, 1994, (see Certificate of Live Birth marked as Exhibit K) was discovered
by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito) beside a toilet bowl at an
unoccupied house about 5 houses away from their residence in Phase 9,
Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day before at about noon time his wife
called him up at his work place informing him that their daughter was missing,
prompting Jessie to hie home and search for the child. He went around
possible places, inquiring from neighbors but no one could provide any lead
until the following morning when his wife in desperation, consulted a
"manghuhula" at a nearby barangay. According to the "manghuhula" his
daughter was just at the 5th house from his house. And that was how he
tracked down his daughter in exact location. She was covered with a blue
sack with her face bloodied and her body soaked to the skin. He found a
yellow sack under her head and a white rope around her neck about 2 and a
half feet long and the diameter, about the size of his middle finger. There were
onlookers around when the NBI and policemen from Sub-station 6 arrived at

the scene. The SOCO Team took pictures of Marita. Jessie was investigated
and his statements were marked Exhibits C, D and D-1. He incurred funeral
expenses in the total amount of P52,000.00 marked as Exhibit L and submarkings. (See other expenses marked as Exhibit M and sub-markings).
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward and
narrated that at about 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, they saw
Edmundo Villaflores, known in the neighborhood by his Batman tag and a
neighbor of the [victims family], leading Marita by the hand ("umakay sa
bata"). At about noon time they were at Batmans house where they used
shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie are drug users. Aldrin sports a
"sputnik" tattoo mark on his body while Jovie belongs to the T.C.G. ("through
crusher gangster"). While in Batmans place, although he did not see Marita,
Jovie presumed that Batman was hiding the child at the back of the house.
Jovie related that about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he
heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Batman ("Narinig ko pong
umiiyak ang batang babae at umuungol"). At about 7:00 oclock in the
evening, Jovie saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant
house. He thought that the child must have been in the sack because it
appeared heavy. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of a child was
found was SPO2 PROTACIO MAGTAJAS, investigator at Sub-station 6
Bagong Silang, Caloocan City who was dispatched by Police Chief Inspector
Alfredo Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis called the SOCO Team and on
different vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang, Phase 9 arriving there at
about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999. They saw the body of the
child at the back portion of an abandoned house where he himself recovered
pieces of evidence such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack
inside the comfort room. The child appeared black and blue, (kawawa yong
bata wasak ang mukha"). He saw blood stains on her lips and when he
removed the sack covering her body, he also saw blood stains in her vagina.
The yellow sack that he was referring to when brought out in court had
already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was no longer in the same
condition when recovered, saying, when asked by the Court: "medyo buo pa,
hindi pa ho ganyang sira-sira." There was another sack, colored blue, which
was used to cover the face of the child while the yellow sack was at the back
of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack when SOCO Team arrived
because they were the ones who brought the body to the funeral parlor. He
had already interviewed some person when the SOCO Team arrived
composed of Inspector Abraham Pelotin, their team leader, and 2 other

members. He was the one who took the statement of the wife of Edmundo
Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over the pieces of evidence to Police Officer
SPO2 Arsenio Nacis who placed a tag to mark the items. When the SOCO
Team arrived, a separate investigation was conducted by Inspector Pelotin.
PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ, assigned at Station 1, Caloocan City Police Station,
as a police investigator, took the sworn statement of Aldrin Bautista upon
instruction of his chief, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, asked Aldrin to read his
statement after which he signed the document then gave it to investigator,
SPO2 Protacio Magtajas. During the investigation, he caused the
confrontation between Aldrin Bautista and Edmundo Villaflores. Aldrin went
closer to the detention cell from where he identified and pointed to Villaflores
as the one who abducted the child. Villaflores appeared angry.
SPO2 ARSENIO NACIS participation was to supervise the preparation of the
documents to be submitted for inquest to the fiscal. He asked the investigator
to prepare the affidavit of the victims father and the statement of the two
witnesses and also asked the investigator to prepare the referral slip and
other documents needed in the investigation. He ordered the evidence
custodian, PO3 Alex Baruga to secure all the physical evidence recovered
from the scene of the crime composed of 2 sacks. In the afternoon of July 3,
the suspect, Edmundo Villaflores was arrested by PO3 Harold Blanco, SPO1
Antonio Alfredo, NUP Antonio Chan and the members of Bantay Bayan in
Bagong Silang.
PO1 HAROLD BLANCO of the Sangandaan Police Station, Caloocan City, as
follow-up operative, was in the office at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of
July 3, 1999, together with PO3 Alfredo Antonio and Police Officer Martin
Interia, when Police Inspector Corpuz, as leader formed a team for them to go
to the scene of the crime. They immediately proceeded to Phase 9. Inspector
Corpuz entered the premises while he stayed with his companions and
guarded the place. SPO3 Magtajas was already investigating the case. They
were informed that the group of Aldrin could shed light on the incident. Blanco
and the other police officers returned to the crime scene and asked the people
around, who kept mum and were elusively afraid to talk. When he went with
SPO1 Antonio Chan accompanied by councilman Leda to the house of
Batman, it was already padlocked. They went to the place of SPO1 Alfredo
Antonio nearby to avoid detection and asked a child to look out for Villaflores.
Soon enough, a jeep from Phase 1 arrived and a commotion ensued as
people started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted from the said jeep.
The officers took him in custody and brought him to Sub-station 6 and SPO3
Nacis instructed them to fetch his wife. He was with police officer Antonio

Chan and they waited for the arrival of the wife of Villaflores from the market.
When she arrived, it was already night time. They informed her that her
husband was at Sub-station 6 being a suspect in the killing of a child. There
was no reaction on her part. She was with her 3 minor children in the house.
She went with them to the precinct. When Sgt. Nacis asked Mrs. Villaflores if
she knew anything about what happened on the night of July 2, initially, she
denied but in the course of the questioning she broke down and cried and said
that she saw her husband place some sacks under their house. He
remembered the wife saying, "noong gabing nakita niya si Villaflores, may
sako sa silong ng bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos niya yong
sako at nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko, tapos tinanong niya si
Villaflores, ano yon? Sabi niya, wala yon, wala yon." The wife was crying and
she said that her husband was also on drugs and even used it in front of their
children. She said that she was willing to give a statement against her
husband. Their house is a "kubo" the floor is made of wood and there is space
of about 2 feet between the floor and the ground. She saw the sack filled with
something but when she asked her husband, he said it was nothing. She
related that before she went outside, she again took a look at the sack and
she saw a protruding elbow inside the sack. She went inside the house and
went out again to check the sack and saw the child. It was Sgt. Nacis who
typed the statement of Erlinda Villaflores which she signed. He identified the
sworn statement marked as Exhibit X and sub-markings.
PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE assigned at the NPD Crime Laboratory, SOCO,
Caloocan City Police Station also went to the crime scene on July 3, 1999 at
about 2:50 in the afternoon with Team Leader Abraham Pelotin, at the vacant
lot of Block 57, Lot 12, Phase 9, Caloocan City. He cordoned the area and
saw the dead child at the back of the uninhabited house. She was covered
with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied around her neck. There was another
yellow sack at the back of her head. He identified the nylon cord (Exhibit N)
and the yellow sack. He does not know where the blue sack is, but he knew
that it was in the possession of the officer on case. The blue sack appears in
the picture marked as Exhibits S, T, and R, and was marked Exhibits T-3-A,
S-1 and R-2-A. Thereafter they marked the initial report as Exhibit U and submarkings. They also prepared a rough sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO
report 047-99 marked as
Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99
marked as Exhibit W.
DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
with office at Caloocan City Police Station conducted the autopsy on the body

of Marita upon request of Chief Inspector Corpus. The certificate of

identification and consent for autopsy executed by the father of the victim was
marked as Exhibit G. He opined that the victim was already dead for 24 hours
when he conducted the examination on July 3, 1999 at about 8 oclock in the
evening. The postmortem examination disclosed the following:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female child cadaver in secondary stage of
flaccidity with postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body.
Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic.
HEAD, NECK AND TRUNK
1) Hematoma, right periorbital region, measuring 4 x 3.5 cm; 3.5 cm
from the anterior midline.
2) Area of multiple abrasions, right zygomatic region, measuring 4 x 2.2
cm, from the anterior midline.
3) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 1.7 x 0.8 cm, 3 cm from the anterior
midline.
4) Area of multiple abrasions, upper lip, measuring 4 x 1 cm, bisected
by the anterior midline.
5) Contusion, frontal region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 6.5 cm left of the
anterior midline.
6) Punctured wound, left pre-auricular region, measuring 9.2 x 0.1 cm,
11.5 cm from the anterior midline.
7) Ligature mark, neck, measuring 24 x 0.5 cm, bisected by the anterior
midline.
8) Abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 0.7 x 0.4 cm, 6 cm from
the Posterior midline.
9) Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 1.2 x 0.8 cm, 6.5 cm from
the posterior midline.

There are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. The vestibule is
abraded and markedly congested, while the posterior fourchette is likewise
lacerated and marked congested.
The lining mucosa of the larynx, trachea and esophagus are markedly
congested with scattered petecchial hemorrhages.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles mostly rice.
Cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation."
There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the vestibule was
abraded and markedly congested while the posterior fourchette was likewise
lacerated and markedly congested, too. It could have been caused by an
insertion of blunt object like a human penis. The cause of death was asphyxia
by strangulation, in laymans term, "sinakal sa pamamagitan ng tali." The
external injuries could have been caused by contact with a blunt object like a
piece of wood. The abrasion could have also been caused by a hard and
rough surface. He prepared the Medico Legal Report No. M-250-99 of the
victim, Marita _____ marked as Exhibit H and sub-markings. He issued the
death certificate marked as Exhibit E. The anatomical sketch representing the
body of the victim was marked as Exhibit I and sub-markings. The sketch of
the head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The injuries on the head could
have been caused by hard and blunt object while other injuries were caused
by coming in contact with a hard or rough surface. There were also punctured
wounds which could have been caused by a barbecue stick or anything
pointed. The ligature mark was congested and depressed.
On cross-examination, among others, he explained the stages of flaccidity
which is the softening of the body of a dead person. The first 3 hours after
death is the primary stage of flaccidity and after the third hour, the body will be
in rigor mortis and after the 24 hours, it is the secondary stage. The victim
could have been dead at least 9 oclock in the morning on July 2. As regards
the multiple lacerations of the hymen, it is possible that two or more persons
could have caused it.
The CA similarly summed up the evidence of Villaflores, as follows:
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES, testifying in his behalf, denied the charge of
raping and killing the child saying he did not see the child at anytime on July
2, 1999. At around 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, he was at the
market place at Phase 10 to get some plywood for his Aunt Maring. His Aunt

called him at 8:30 in the morning and stayed there for about 5 hours and
arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon. His Aunt was residing at Phase
10 which is about a kilometer from his place. His residence is some 5 houses
away from the place of the child. He knows the child because sometimes he
was asked by the wife of Manito to fix their electrical connection. He corrected
himself by saying he does not know Marita but only her father, Manito. He
denied carrying a sack and throwing it at the vacant lot. He was arrested on
July 3, 1999 and does not know of any reason why he was charged. He has
witnesses like Maring, Sherwin, Pareng Bong and Frankie to prove that he
had no participation in the killing.
On cross-examination, among others, he admitted being called "Batman" in
their place and that Aldrin and Jovie are his friends. They go to his house at
Package 5, Phase 9, Lot 32 in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. They are his
close friends being his neighbors and they usually went to his house where
they used shabu ("gumagamit ng bato"). At 42, he is older than Aldrin and
Jovie. He knew Marita who sometimes called him to his house to fix electrical
wiring. He also knew his wife, but does not know their children. On the night of
July 2, Aldrin and Jovie went to his house. He was arrested on July 3 in a
street near the precinct while walking with his wife. They came from Bayan.
His wife works in a sidewalk restaurant. Two of his children were in Phase 3,
the other two were in his house and two more were left with his siblings. When
he was arrested, he was carrying some food items which they brought in
Bayan. They did not tell him why he was being arrested. He saw his wife once
at Police Station 1 before he was brought to the city jail. Aldrin and Jovie
harbored ill feelings against him because the last time they went to his house
he did not allow them to use shabu. He admitted using shabu everytime his
friends went to his house. He is not legally married to his wife. She visited him
for the last time on July 19, 1999. He denied that the door of his house had a
sack covering neither was it locked by a piece of string. He has not talked with
the father or mother of the child nor did he ask his wife for help. He just waited
for his mother and she told him, they will fight it out in court, "ilalaban sa
husgado."
On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and out of his house.
His bathroom is in front of his house.
SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor of Edmundo
Villaflores told the court that the charges against Villaflores were not true, the
truth being, that on the night of July 2, 1999 he saw Aldrin and Jovie at the
back of his house holding a sack containing something which he did not know.
They were talking to Batman and offering a dog contained in the sack and

then they left the sack near the comfort room outside the door of the house of
Batman. They came back and took the yellow sack. He followed them up to
the other pathwalk and then he went home. The following day he learned that
Villaflores was being charged with the killing of Marita. At first, he just kept
quiet because he thought Villaflores should be taught a lesson for being a
drug user, but later when he had a drinking spree with his father and uncle, he
told them what he knew because he could not trust any policeman in their
place. He told them what really happened and they advised him to report the
matter to the barangay. So he went to the purok and made a statement in an
affidavit form. He executed the "Salaysay" in the presence of their Purok
secretary and barangay tanod. It was the Purok secretary who gave him the
form. He saw Aldrin and Jovie about midnight of July 2, 1999. There was also
another person with them, one Jose Pitallana, who is the eldest in the group
and considered their "Amo-amo". In his affidavit, he said: "Ako ay lumabas ng
bahay at sinundan ko siya at nakita ko si Jose na tinalian ng nylon and bata.
Tapos po ay may narinig po akong kung sino man ang titistego sa akin ay
papatayin ko, basta kayo ang saksi sa ginawa in Batman." He said he was
sure that the sack contained the child because he saw the head of the child, it
seemed like she was staring at him and asking his help. He executed the
statement after the arrest of the accused. He did not go to the police station to
narrate his story. He made his statement not in the barangay hall but only at
their purok.
On cross-examination, among others, he said that on July 2, 1999 he left the
house at about 11:00 oclock in the morning to go to school in PMI at Sta.
Cruz, Manila. He did not see Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie about noon time of
July 2. He arrived home at about 8:00 oclock in the evening because he
passed by the Susano Market in Novaliches to see his mother who was a
vendor there. They closed the store at about 6:30, then they bought some
food stuffs to bring home. He was not sure of the date when Batman was
arrested. He admitted that Batman is his uncle being the brother of his
mother. His uncle is a known drug addict in the area. He usually saw him
using shabu in the company of Jose Pitallana, his wife, Aldrin and Jovie. After
he was informed that his uncle was arrested, he did not do anything because
he was busy reviewing for his exam. He did not also visit him in jail. After he
made his statement, he showed it to their Purok Leader, Melencio Yambao
and Purok Secretary, Reynaldo Mapa. They read his statement and recorded
it in the logbook. It was not notarized. He had no occasion to talk with Aldrin
and Jovie. Jose Pitallana is no longer residing in their place. He did not even
know that Aldrin and Jovie testified against his uncle. He never went to the
police to tell the truth about the incident.

As earlier stated, on May 27, 2004, the RTC convicted Villaflores of rape with
homicide, holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion
but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt.17 The RTC decreed:
Wherefore, the Court finds accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping and killing "Marita" and hereby sentences him to
the Supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P75,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and to pay the cost if this suit, to be paid
to the heirs if the victim.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused
to the National Penitentiary upon receipt hereof after the promulgation of the
decision.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.
SO ORDERED.
On intermediate review, the CA affirmed the conviction,18 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 128 finding the
accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide is affirmed with modification in the sense that (a) the death
penalty imposed by the trial court is commuted to reclusion perpetua and the
judgment on the civil liability is modified by ordering the appellant to pay the
amount of P100,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages
and P52,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because the State did
not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact and
circumstance constituting the crime charged.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt of
Villaflores for rape with homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt
through circumstantial evidence.

Ruling
We sustain Villaflores conviction.
I
Nature of rape with homicide
as a composite crime, explained
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime,
also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes
that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the
product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a
complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a
composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex
or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but
generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the
necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for
the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound
crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite
crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a
complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstance mentioned above be
present.
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
xxx
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the composite
crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide. In both
composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of
rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is punished with a
single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death, and the latter with
death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are crucial
in determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex or
compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the
notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally
designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The
indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear
and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the phrase on the occasion
of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To understand what homicide
may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of the rape, a resort to the
meaning the framers of the law intended to convey thereby is helpful. Indeed,
during the floor deliberations of the Senate on Republic Act No. 8353, the

legislative intent on the import of the phrase on the occasion of the rape to
refer to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the
commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of
the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as
the killing is linked to the rape, became evident, viz:
Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the meaning of the
phrase appearing in line 24, "or on the occasion"?
When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is committed by
reason of the rape, I would understand that. But what is the meaning of the
phrase "on the occasion of rape"? How far in time must the commission of the
homicide be considered a homicide "on the occasion" of the rape? Will it be, if
the rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are drunk and they killed
somebody along the way, would there be a link between that homicide and
the rape? Will it be "on the occasion" of the rape?
Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape itself, and the
homicide is committed with a very short time lapse.
Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr. President: If the
rapist enters a house, kills a maid, and rapes somebody inside the house, I
would probably consider that as a rape "on the occasion of". Or if the rapists
finished committing the crime of rape, and upon leaving, saw somebody, let
us say, a potential witness inside the house and kills him, that is probably
clear. But suppose the man happens to kill somebody, will there be a link
between these? What is the intent of the phrase "on the occasion of rape"? x
xx
xxx
Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of course, is rape,
and homicide is a result of the circumstances surrounding the rape.
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from Cagayan
where, let us say, the offender is fleeing the place or is apprehended by the
police and he commits homicide, I think would be examples where the phrase
"on the occasion thereof" would apply. But the principal intent, Mr. President,
is rape.19

II
The State discharged its burden of
proving the rape with homicide
beyond reasonable doubt
As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the burden of proving all
the elements of rape and homicide beyond reasonable doubt in order to
warrant the conviction of Villaflores for the rape with homicide charged in the
information.20The State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts,
namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he
consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c)
that he killed Marita by reason of the rape.
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the accused has
carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly
called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of
giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth
(Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her
age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the commission of
the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her by Villaflores
would constitute statutory rape.
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when
only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The
difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide,
because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself
killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of
Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the
crime as well as the identity of the culprit.21 Direct evidence proves a fact in
issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of
the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in
issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence.22 To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be
resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a
felon free.23
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred;
hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is

circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.24 Nor has
the quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to
be reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus,
the Court said in People v. Modesto:25
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial
evidence is well set out in the following passage from People vs.
Ludday:26 "No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt."
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered
several circumstances, which when "appreciated together and not piece by
piece," according to the CA,27 were seen as "strands which create a pattern
when interwoven," and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable
conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with
homicide.
We concur with the RTC and the CA.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following.
Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the
hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,28 leading the child
through the alley going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses
away from the victims house.29 Secondly, Marita went missing after that and

remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on the following
day.30 Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July
2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from
inside.31 Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores
coming from his house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and
going towards the abandoned house where the childs lifeless body was later
found.32Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the
same yellow sack that covered the head of his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo)
at the time he discovered her body;33 Manito also mentioned that a blue sack
covered her body.34Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the abandoned
house where Maritas body was found and Villaflores house, because his
house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without
having to pass any other houses.35 This indicated Villaflores familiarity and
access to the abandoned house. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence
recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the victims
neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the
same rope tied to the door of his house,36 and the yellow sack was a wallcovering for his toilet.37 Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita
had died from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was
consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries
including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly,
Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood
from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body
tested positive for spermatozoa.38 And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already
in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at 8
pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of
flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the
latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has
brought to us a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.
As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal
lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medico-legal officer who
had conducted the autopsy of her cadaver on July 3, 1999, attributed to the
insertion of a blunt object like a human penis. The fact that the vaginal and
periurethral smears taken from Marita tested positive for spermatozoa
confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As to the homicide,
her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and the time
of death as determined by the medico-legal findings was consistent with the
recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going towards the abandoned
house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying the yellow sack that was later

on found to cover Maritas head. Anent the identification of Villaflores as the

culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and Bautista attesting to Villaflores as the
person they had seen holding Marita by the hand going towards the
abandoned house before the victim went missing, the hearing by Solidum of
moaning and crying of a child from within Villaflores house, and the tracing to
Villaflores of the yellow sack and the white rope found at the crime scene
sufficiently linked Villaflores to the crime.
We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating testimony of
Borcillo. They justifiably did so. For one, after he stated during direct
examination that Villaflores was only his neighbor,39 it soon came to be
revealed during his cross-examination that he was really a son of Villaflores
own sister.40 Borcillo might have concealed their close blood relationship to
bolster the credibility of his testimony favoring his uncle, but we cannot
tolerate his blatant attempt to mislead the courts about a fact relevant to the
correct adjudication of guilt or innocence. Borcillo deserved no credence as a
witness. Also, Borcillos implicating Solidum and Bautista in the crime, and
exculpating his uncle were justly met with skepticism. Had Borcillos
incrimination of Solidum and Bautista been factually true, Villaflores could
have easily validated his alibi of having run an errand for an aunt about a
kilometer away from the place of the crime on that morning of July 2, 1999.
Yet, the alibi could not stand, both because the alleged aunt did not even
come forward to substantiate the alibi, and because the Defense did not
demonstrate the physical impossibility for Villaflores to be at the place where
the crime was committed at the time it was committed.
1wphi1

The CA reduced the penalty of death prescribed by the RTC to reclusion

perpetua in consideration of the intervening enactment on June 24,
2006 of Republic Act No. 9346.41 Nonetheless, we have also to specify in the
judgment that Villaflores shall not be eligible for parole, considering that
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly holds persons "whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act" not
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as
amended.
The awards of damages allowed by the CA are proper. However, we add
exemplary damages to take into account the fact that Marita was below seven
years of age at the time of the commission of the rape with homicide. Article
266-B, Revised Penal Code has expressly declared such tender age of the
victim as an aggravating circumstance in rape, to wit:

Article 266-B. Penalties. xxx.

xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxx
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
xxx
Pursuant to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal
case as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances."42 The Civil Code permits such award "by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."43Granting exemplary
damages is not dependent on whether the aggravating circumstance is
actually appreciated or not to increase the penalty. As such, the Court
recognizes the entitlement of the heirs of Marita to exemplary damages as a
way of correction for the public good. For the purpose,
P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,44 for a lesser
amount would not serve genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on February 22, 2007 finding and pronouncing EDMUNDO
VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of rape with homicide, subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS, namely: (a) that he shall suffer reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as
amended; (b) that he shall pay to the heirs of the victim the sum
of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the damages awarded by
the Court of Appeals; and (c) that all the awards for damages shall bear
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.