PREFACE

Wittgensteins philosophical project is remarkable for many reasons, but two of

them are especially striking. First, in the preface of the PI he recognizes grave mistakes
in his first book, the T, which is not just any book, but a classic, one of the most
important and influential books of the 20th century. Second, the PI embodies a
reconsideration of his philosophy as a whole. Both books have received a lot of attention
in the literature. However, comparatively, little effort has been made to unravel the
thoughts underlying Wittgensteins recognition and reconsideration. Those thoughts must
be found in his philosophical development. My effort in coming to terms with it is
presented in this book.
Years ago, I became puzzled by Wittgensteins philosophy in the T. The options of
interpretation of the book, so went the mantra, were either to take it as an obvious failure
in which interesting views about logic are introduced, or to take it as a kind of mystical
plot conveying the most preposterous metaphysical theses, like realistic solipsism. One
might call this the traditional reading. I was about to give up on my intention of
studying the T when Diamonds work indicated a new direction in the research. 1 In her
work, a correct reading of the PI seemed to be united with a plausible, not self-defeating,
reading of the T. After some years studying Wittgensteins philosophy, however, I had the
growing feeling that the resolute reading of the T did not account for the changes that
took place in the middle period (1929-37). It could well be that the traditional reading
was mistaken, as Diamond had argued; the resolute reading, however, did not seem to
fit Wittgensteins development.
At the time of my PhD, interested in the controversies surrounding the T and
prompted by the interest in understanding Wittgensteins philosophical development, I
decided to come to terms with his middle period writings. I decided to study not-quitefinished-books, lectures, testimonies, related philosophers, and to scrutinize the
manuscripts of the Nachlass according to the order in which they were written. Now I am
1

The resolute reading of the T (The New Wittgenstein) has been the focus of many scholars for the last
20 years. The reading is consolidated in Diamonds papers published in The Realistic Spirit. Many defenses
and attacks followed; for instance: Diamond (2004), Conant (2000, 2006), Conant and Diamond (2004)
Ricketts (1996), Goldfarb (1997), Hacker (1999), Floyd (2000), Kremer (2001), Williams (2004), Sullivan
(2004), McGinn (2006), Mulhall (2007), Kuusela (2008).

convinced that the study of the period might lead us to a new approach to Wittgensteins
work, one that might bring us beyond the now already old resoluteness-debate
concerning the T that has dominated Wittgenstein studies in the last decades.
In spite of all their differences, I think, traditional and resolute readers share a
noticeable trait: they do not pay sufficient attention to Wittgensteins philosophical
development after the T. As a consequence, they miss three important things. First, they
miss a way of getting clearer about Wittgensteins two masterpieces. His slow and intense
struggle with his old and newly developed points of view sheds light on his early and
later works, for the one is criticized and adapted, and the other, constructed. Second, they
miss the philosophies that Wittgenstein developed after the T and before the PI (in SRLF,
PR, BT, and the BB); philosophies that are original and important contributions in
themselves. Third, they miss the very adventure of Wittgensteins development: the
internal dialectic that brought him to his later philosophy.