Intuition as a Philosophical Method in India

Author(s): P. T. Raju
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Oct., 1952), pp. 187-207
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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P. T. RAJU

Intuition
as a Philosophical
inIndia
Method
as a philosophical
Intuition
methodis an
intricate
andintriguing
arenotagreedas to
becausephilosophers
problem,
whatintuition
and philosophical
methodare.The sameproblem
precisely
withreference
to classicalIndianphilosophies
is further
complicated
by
certain
notions
aboutIndianphilosophies
preconceived
amongsomeWestern
of thesubject.Duringsomeof thelectures
whichthewriter
students
gave
in theWest,questions
like"Atwhatagedo youbegintogivea childtrainand"IfI go toIndia,howlongwillittaketogetcomplete
inginintuition?"
in
wereputtohim.Suchquestions
intuition?"
reveal,in theminds
training
ofthequestioner,
thatintuition
is a mysterious
thefeeling
withthe
faculty
helpof whichalmosteveryIndianis able to see God or ultimate
reality.
of lifeis concerned,
a senseof
Indeed,theyshowalso,so faras philosophy
withthe purelogicalism
of mostof the
frustration
and disappointment
trends
of theWest.Butin thisattitude
toward
contemporary
philosophical
a
that
divorce
is
the
between
intellect
there
danger
complete
philosophy
and the academicphilosopher
and intuition
mightsay,
maybe assumed,
are notto be
withProfessor
that,if reasonand intellect
Cunningham,'
whichimpliesthatphilosophies
hisplacecannotbe in a university,
trusted,
not
on
baseduponintuition
reason)have no place in universities,
(and
of critical
and thevalidity
ofmany
are centers
sinceuniversities
thinking,
to testtheirvalidity
will
is notbeyonddoubtand anycriterion
intuitions
havetobe logical.
whichphilosophers
tendto draw,
Thereis anotherwrongconclusion
cultures
to
the
of whichare
thinkers
that
belonging
philosophies
namely,
of
intuitive
are
thestrainof
to
be
inherently
incapable standing
supposed
This conclusion
makesmanyassumptions
thinking.
logicaland scientific
it assumesthatthere
whichit is notpossibleto discusshere.Forinstance,
andphilosophies,
theintellectual
andtheintuitive,
aretwokindsofcultures
in Understanding,"
"How Far to theLandof Yoga? An Experiment
'G. WattsCunningham,
The Philosophical
Review,LVII (November,1948).
187

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188

P. T. RAJOI

and thatpeople belongingto theone are bynaturepsychologically

different
fromthosebelongingto the other.But one mightretortby sayingthatthe
truedifference
is thatbetweenthe progressive
and the backward,and that
it is one of degreebut not of kind.The backward,therefore,
do not insist
thattheirculturalandphilosophicalachievements,
obtainedbyfitsand starts,
shouldcontinueto be improvedby onlythe same intuitive
methodsand by
fitsand starts.
about Indian philosophy,namely,
There is a further
misunderstanding
thatit is a singleschoolor systemof thought.
It is almostas correctto speak
ofWesternphilosophy
as to speakofIndianphilosophy
as a singlephilosophy
or
as one. If one important
schoolholdsstrongviewson thedependability
to all theothers.Again,
of intellect,
thesameis wronglyattributed
otherwise
the termIndian philosophyis made to referto the ancientsystemsalone,
It is
weresomething
ancientlike Greekphilosophy.
as if Indianphilosophy
truethatIndia is betterknownforher ancientphilosophiesthan forany
in India have not been
new systems,
but manycontemporary
philosophers
of ancientthoughtand have shown inclinations
satisfiedwith everything
has made intuition
towardnew ideas. And none of the new philosophers
his philosophicalmethod,thoughalmosteveryone has admittedthe truth
of intellect.
of intuitionand the shortcomings
II
themeaningof thewordintuition
Beforeproceedingwiththediscussion,
needsto be clarified.Intuitionmeansimmediateor unmediated
knowledge.
it means "lookinginto,"thatis, it is knowledgeobtained
Etymologically,
not by lookingoutsideone's self-whateverthe word self means,and its
meaningmaynot be discussedforthepresent-butby lookinginsideone's
self.
unmediated?This is a conNow, is lookinginto one's self necessarily
troversial
question;and the answerdependson how theprocessof "looking
into" and the natureof the selfare understood.If the "lookinginto" also
needsan instrument
(karana), thentheprocessis mediated,and knowledge
so obtainedis notimmediate
knowledge.First,even if someinstrumentality
is needed,iftheselfis understood
to be identicalwiththemind (manas)-as it is in Westernphilosophyand psychology
in general-then it is its
own instrument,
and theresulting
as unmediated
knowledgemaybe regarded
in the sense of being not mediatedby somethingotherthan the agentof
that cognition.However,even in Westernpsychology,
therehas been a
growingfeelingthatthereis a coreto be called the selfin our experience,

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INTUITION

AS A PHILOSOPHICAL

METHOD

IN INDIA

189

was more
whichis notexhaustedby the mentalprocesses.2This distinction
Even when thisdistincclearlymade by the ancientIndian philosophers.3
tionis accepted,the selfmaybe regardedas beingcapable of lookinginto
itselfin some way,withoutthe help of the mind; and as the instrument
and the agentwould herebe identical,the resulting
knowledgecan be said
to be unmediatedand therefore
intuitive.The presentcase, whichis the
fromthe mind,
second,is the self'sknowledgeof itself,whenit is different
whilethepreviouscase is one in whichtheselfis regardedas identicalwith
the mind. We may nexthave a thirdsituation,in whichthe self is confromthe mindand yet,throughthe instrumentality
sideredto be different
it cognizessuch
(karanatva) of the mind,thatis, throughintrospection,
mentalprocessesas emotions,feelings,and sentiments.In thiscase, as the
fromthe self,the agent,knowledgecannotbe said
instrument
is different
to be unmediated.Then we have a fourthsituation:Some cognitions
of the mind,but also thatof the senses
need not only the instrumentality
(indriyas),forinstance,theperceptualcognitionof the treein frontof me.
And whetherthe self,as agent,is regardedas identicalwiththe mindor
not, perceptualcognitionis mediatedand not unmediated.Quite often
treatperceptionas directand immediateknowledge.
Westernphilosophers
Even the Sanskritwordaparoksam(not beyondsenses) impliesthatview.
But if we are to be thoroughin our applicationof the idea of immediacy,
we have to say that even sense perceptionis mediated. But, in all the
cases mentionedso far, mediationis not voluntary:it is spontaneous
nervoussystem.And forthe reason
like the workingsof our involuntary
thatknowledgeis not deliberately
mediated,we say thatperceptionin all
theabovecasesis direct.But in thefifth
situation,
namely,thatof inference,
the resultingcognitionis voluntarilymediatedand is acceptedby all as
mediatedknowledge.
III
the wordsused formediateand immediateknowlIn Indianphilosophy,
and
na
are
edge
aparoksajfiana.As indicatedabove, the words
paroksajfi
mean
"knowledgebeyondsenses" and "knowledgenot beyond
literally
and
senses."But later,thesecondwordcameto meanbothsenseperception
the highestintuition,which is that of the Brahman,the Absolute,and
as
largelycorrespondsto the intellectualintuitionof Kant, particularly
2
See Leon Litwinski,"Towards a Reinstatementof the Concept of Self," The BritishJournal
of Psychology,General Section,August,1951 .
SSelf (atman) does not mean the same as soul (jiva) for any Indian philosophersexcept the
Jainas.

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P. T. RAJU

190

however,themeaning
interpreted
byCaird. The secondwordstillretained,
of mediatedcognitionsuchas syllogistic
inference(anumina) and analogy
.
na)
(upamrr
intuiIt will be asked,perhaps,whetherKant's conceptionof intellectual
even by Caird, has anythingto do with the highest
tion, as interpreted
as understoodby the Advaita
intuitionin Indian philosophy,
particularly
of Safikara;forintellectualintuitioncontainsmediationas a moment,but
the highestintuition,
accordingto the Advaita,has no such momentand
is pure immediacy.But the objectorhas behindhis objectionthe feeling
can be onlysensuousimmediacy.What the Advaitarefers
thatimmediacy
to hereis theimmediacy
of,and to,consciousness.
Indeed,theAdvaitindoes
and
the
not call it the immediacy
of,
to,
intellect,whichthe firstposition
in SectionII involves.At thatlevel of immediacy,
sensesand mind (manas
into self (itman) or disand buddhi,intellect,included) are transformed
appearin it. Indeed,even accordingto Kant, if God possessedintellectual
his intellectwould be intuitiveand his intuitionintellectual;and
intuition,
we have to saythatbothintellectand intuition
in theirordinary
sensemust
in his experience.
have been transformed
Again, not all schoolsof Indian philosophyacceptthe Advaitaview of
the highestintuition(aparoksnubhz~ti).The Advaitaof Safikarais nondualistic. There are two otherimportantVeddnticschools,the qualified
of Rdmdnujaand thedualismof Madhva. These philosophical
non-dualism
differences
are found among both the Vaisnavas and the Saivas. There
are otherschoolsoccupyingintermediate
positionsbetweenthe three. Accordingto the Advaita,the Brahmanis the same in essenceas the Atman
(Self) and is of the natureof consciousness
(jiina).4 In otherwords,the
of
the
Brahman
is
consciousness.
But as the Brahmanhas
substance
very
it knowsitselfonly. Here knowledge,
no otherto itself,as consciousness
its subject,and its objectare one and the same. This knowledgeis a form
in thehighestsense.ButRdmdnuja
ofexperience(anubhzfti)and is intuition
thatknowledgeis self-revealing,
the
view
and Madhva,thoughtheyaccept
do not believein the absenceof distinctions.
But thereare schoolsthatdo not hold thatknowledge(jina) is selfmaintainsthat
revealing.5Kumdrila,a followerof the Piirva-Mim-riasa,
not
that
is
but
its
existence
is
known
self-revealing,
knowledge
onlythrough
anotherfollowerof the same school,however,coninference.Prabhdkara,
' The essenceof theBrahmanand theAtmanis said to be not onlyconsciousness
(cit) but
also existence(sat) and bliss (dnanda).
" The intricate
forand againstthepositionmaybe seen in Madhusudana,
logicalarguments
Advaitasiddhi
Press,1917), pp. 768-784.
(Bombay:Nirnayasagar

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

191

tendsthatknowledgeis self-revealing.
But, while forKumdrila7tmanis
of the natureof consciousness,
forPrabhdkarait is not. The Sa-iikhyaand
Yoga schoolsacceptKumdrila'sposition,and so the highestintuitionwe
are speakingof is possibleaccordingto them. Ordinarycognitionis not
but revealedby atman,forordinarycognitionis a modificaself-revealing
tion of buddhi (reason understoodin a substantive
sense), a productof
is
which
unconscious.
nature),
(matter,
prakrti
Accordingto theNyayaand
the Vailesika,dtmanis by natureunconscious,
and cognitionariseswhenit
butis revealed
comesintocontactwithmind. No cognitionis self-revealing
that
The
believe
another
Jainas
knowledgeis
cognition
(adhyavasdya).
by
also
in
the
of
the
and, therefore,
highestintuition.
possibility
self-revealing
a
kind
of experience
of
the
The Buddhists,
Mahayana,accept
particularly
(anubhz~ti)above discursivereasoning;and thoughtheydo not acceptan
eternaldtman,theVijfinavSdinsamongthemcontendthatthehigheststage
of nirvanais consciousness
(vijOadna).6
These fewdetailsare givenonlyto showthe wide varietyof viewsheld
thehighestrealization.For some,itis an experience(anubhfti);
concerning
for others(the Nyiya and the Vaidesika),it is not, as therecan be no
experienceat all at thatlevel. For some,again,knowledgeis self-revealing,
and so thisintuitionis involvedin all kindsof experience.The Advaitins
insiston thispoint. For others,knowledgeis not selfwould particularly
a
revealing,though few of these,again, acceptthe view thatthe highest
is trueand is a distinct
intuition
notnecessarily
involvedin other
experience,
kindsofexperience.Forthese,intuition
is a mysterious
notrationally
faculty,
understandable.
There are differences
of view as to whetherthisintuition
is a facultyof the mindas distinctfromthe self. On the whole,Safikara
holdsthedoctrineof the self-luminosity
of consciousness
to the
consistently
end and establisheshis doctrineof unmediatedknowledge(aparoksanubhz~ti)of the Brahman;Riminuja takesa middlecourse,for,whilehe ache insistson the distinctions
betweenthe
ceptsknowledgeas self-revealing,
knower,the known,and knowledgeeven at the highestlevel. Otherstake
a moreextremecourse.Amongthenon-Vedintic
schools,includingJainism
and Buddhism,a similarvarietyof viewsis to be found.

IV
The above pointsrefermainlyto intuitionas the directand unmediated
knowledgeof the Brahman,Atman,and Nirvana. But the wordintuition
is used also in the sense of the knowledgeof physicalobjectsand other
SSee Mahayana-satrila4i
karaI. 12,SylvainLevi,ed. (Paris: LibrarieHonor6Champion,
1907).

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P. T. RAJU

192

minds,unmediatedby the senses. This is a mysterious

power obtained
It
and other
to
throughyogicdiscipline. corresponds telepathy,
clairvoyance,
kinds of extra-sensory
perception.Accordingto Patafijali,the authorof
the Yoga-sutras,
this abilityis a power acquiredthroughcertaintypesof
yogicpractices.The Nydyacalls it an extraordinary
perception(alaukika).
to
this
it
is
of
two
school,
kinds,completeand incomplete(yukta
According
and yuniiJna).In the former,one knows all thingsat all times;in the
latter,one knowsan objectonlywhen one makesan effort.
V
Can theabovetypesof intuition
be mademethodsof philosophy?Indeed,
no schoolin India makesuse of intuitionalone as a philosophicalmethod.
The Nydyaschool,for instance,while discussingthe two formsof yogic
perception,
saysonly thattheyare propoundedby the Vedas and Purdnas
at no place appealsto intuition
to establishitsdoctrines.'All
and
(Epics),
the schools,exceptthe Cdrvdka,give a highplace to thistypeof intuition,
fortheyogin,thoughtheywarnhimnotto be
forit is a greatachievement
at theempirical
and temptedbyit. It is an extraordinary
attracted
perception
of
it
is
not
the
level, though
highesttype intuition,
namely,the intuition
of God or the Brahmanor Nirvanza.This highertypeof intuitionis also
acceptedby all exceptthe Cdrviikas.Both typesare cognitionwithoutthe
and media of knowledge.And thoughboth typesare
usual instruments
neitheris madeuse of as a philosophical
and attainable,
acceptedas truthful
method,onlybecauseit cannotbe so used.
VI
For,what is philosophicalmethod?ClassicalIndianphilosophydid not
betweenthe methodsof the special sciences,on
know of any distinction
on the other. And so, the
the one hand,and thator thoseof philosophy,
was or was not the same
method
the
as
to
whether
philosophical
question
of thetime. For them,
was notmootedby thephilosophers
as thescientific
philosophywas knowledgein thewidestsense;thewordsused by themare
dariana (perception,view), mata (opinion,doctrine),siddhanta(theory,
doctrine),etc. Quiteoften,sincetheworddarianais usedto meana system
meantfortheIndianphilosophers
or school,it is contendedthatphilosophy
of reality,
the perception
which,formanyof the Veddntinsat least,means
withthe whole
perceptionof the Brahman.Their view is oftenidentified
butit is to be repeatedthattheviewof thisone school
of Indianphilosophy,
HaridasGupta,
Mukthvali,etc. (Benares:Jaikrishnadas
7Karikavali with the commentary,
1951), p. 209.

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

193

is not the whole of Indian philosophy.Accordingto the Nydyaand the

Vai'esika schools,perceptionof the Brahmanor EIvara (God) is not the
same as perceptionof reality,for thesetwo schoolsaccept the eternality
of atoms,space,time,and atman (self), whichare therefore
separatefrom
the Brahmanor ihvaraand are as real as it or he. But the moreimportant
pointis that,at the stageof liberation(mukti), at whichatmanregainsits
sinceit is by natureunconscious.
pure state,it does not perceiveanything,
Thus, thereis no scope forany darJana(perception),even if by dariana
is meantthe unpollutedperceptionof the originalreality.So, the word
dariana has to be understoodas is the word view,whichmeans not only
theview I have of the streetor scenerybeforeme but also theview I hold
of the natureof mind,matter,etc. Such an interpretation
is necessitated
by
of theworddarjanain the senseof philosophy,
the synonyms
suchas mata
(opinion, doctrine) and siddhanta(doctrine,theory). For instance,the
Saiva philosophyis called not only SaivadarJanabut also Saivasiddhinta.
Anotherreasongiven for the opinionthat the methodof Indian phiis thatphilosophyin India is also calledmoksasJstra,
the
losophyis intuitive
scienceof salvationor liberation.Indian philosophyaims, it is said, at
pointingout the path to liberation;and, as the stateof liberation,which
is the originalpure stateof one's self,is knownonly throughintuition
and notthroughintellect,
it is thoughtthatthemethodof Indianphilosophy
mustbe intuitiveand not logical. Almostall the Indian systemsspeak of
moksa (liberation) as the aim of philosophicalactivity.Therefore,they
mustdiscussthe natureof moksa,themethodor way (mirga) of attaining
moksa,and the natureof reality,both phenomenaland noumenal,with
to whichmoksahas to be explained.But,it mustbe pointedout,
reference
none of the problemsconnectedwiththesetopicscan be solvedby means
of intuitionalone. Neitherhumannaturenor the natureof the physical
world can be explainedmerelythroughintuition.Indeed,reasoncannot
or axiomsarbitrarily
workin a vacuumand withmereassumptions
accepted,
if it is to explain any existentfact. Therefore,
it is based upon intuition
in the widestsenseof directexperience,
whethersensuousor non-sensuous.
of
truths
intuition
are
into
The
integrated a systemby reason.8The nature
of moksacannotbe explained,therefore,
withoutthe help of reason,and
of
consists
this
philosophy
explanation.Hence, even forthosesystemsfor
whichmoksais the ultimateaim of philosophy,
philosophicalmethodconsistsnot merelyin intuitionbut also in rationallyintegrating
the intuited
withintuitive
understanding
bysomeWestern
8In thissense,evenhumanbeingsareaccredited
whileKant thoughtthatGod alone mightpossessit. See W. H. Walsh,Reasonand
thinkers,
(Oxford:Clarendon
Press,1947), pp. 57 ff.
Experience

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P. T. RAJU

194

truths.Furthermore,
it shouldnot be forgotten
thatforthoseschoolsfor
whichthe originalpure stateof self (dtman) is not conscious,thatis, the
of moksa. Its natureis
Ny~yaand the Vaisesika,therecan be no intuition
with
of
for
inferred
the
reason.
those
schoolsforwhich
only
help
Again,
the Brahmanis not the only reality,intuitionof the Brahmandoes not
explainthe natureof the otherrealities.Explanationof theserealitiesand
is the work of reasonand not merelyof
theirmutualinterrelationships
intuition.For instance,the existenceof atomsis logicallyprovedby the
Vai'esikas,and mostof the followersof thisschool do not claim to have
themintuitively;
and thisintuition,
theysay,is heardof in the
experienced
Vedas and the Purdnas.The Sirhkhyaand theYoga, thoughtheysay that
fromprakrti(nature);
atman is by natureconscious,treatit as different
and so, intuitionof the formerdoes not explainthe natureof the latter.
of selvesand theirdifference
fromnature
The
provestheplurality
Sa~mikhya
with the help of reason. Further,most schools do not accept moksa
(liberation)and thestateof theindividualduringliberationmerelyon the
basis of intuition.They prove the truthof both withthe help of logic,
withphenomenalexperienceas the startingpoint.
Anotherimportant
reasonforthe view thatIndian philosophydepends
on intuition
as itsmethodmaybe thereliancebymanyschoolson scripture
aboutthe experiences
(iruti). The iruticonsistsof a numberof utterances
of innertruths,whichare therefore
intuitions.But
of severaldiscoverers
on intuithoughtheVedic seersmaybe said to have basedtheirstatements
who
their
views
did not
followers
and
commentators
their
tions,
expounded
fortheirargument.In thediscussions
use intuition
they
amongthemselves,
for
and
of
the
verbal
etymology
interpretation
dependedupon grammar
of ideas.
and uponperception
and inference
fortheinterpretation
statements,
not
all
the
Indian
schools
the
fruti
as
The
Buddhists
Again,
authority.
accept
and the Jainas,in theircontroversies
withthe followersof theVedic tradition,dependedexclusivelyupon perceptionand inferencefor establishing
with
theirconclusions,
as did also theVedic followersin theircontroversies
the Buddhistsand the Jainas. Yet, all theseschoolsacceptedintuitionin
the sense of suprarational,
non-discursive
knowledge,which is directexof
the
ultimate
whateverthatbe. Indeed,
perience(aparoksnubhbiti)
reality,
intuitionin the sense of directperceptionor sensationis acceptedby all
schools,thoughmanyof themare aware of the defectsof perceptionas a
formof knowledge.Someof thelaterCarvikas,e.g.,Jayar~ii,
theauthorof
BuddhistslikeNMgarjuna,
theauthorof M3dhyamikaTattvopaplavasirhha;
kirikis; and Advaitinslike Sriharsa,the authorof
Khand.ana-khandakhaya,

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

195

not only of inferencebut also of perception.

point out the shortcomings
the
of
Indian
most
the
accepttwo kindsof perception,
Again,
philosophers
sense
is
Indeterminate
indeterminate.
and the
determinate
perception pure
whichis relational.
entersdeterminate
awareness;butdiscursion
perception,
betweensubjectand predicateis a
It is knowledgein whichthe distinction
moment.It is alwaysof the form,"That is an X." Some schools,e.g.,the
perceptionas knowledgeat all, for
Nydya,do not accept indeterminate
or
and
the
is
true
either
false,
questionof truthand falsityis not
knowledge
relevantto indeterminate
perception.Others,however,e.g., the Buddhists,
as a formof knowledge.But now,forschools
treatindeterminate
perception
in the senseof non-discursive
like the Nydya,intuition,
knowledge,cannot
be a philosophicalmethodat all, forthesimplereasonthatit can be neither
has to be eithertrueor false.
truenorfalse. Butphilosophy
doctrineto be referred
to in thisconnectionis that
Anotherimportant
controversies
of pramanya,the natureof truth.Veryinteresting
have been
carriedon bytheseveralschoolsaboutthequestionas to whethera cognition
is trueby itselfor made trueby anothercognition.This is not the same
or not. For the highest
questionas whethercognitionis self-revelatory
intuition,
namely,the intuitionof the Brahman,if one has it,therecan be
no othercognitioneitherto proveor disproveit. In the case of myperception of the book in frontof me, I may know thatI know the book, but
thisknowledgethatI knowthe book does not make myknowledgeof the
character
book eithertrueor false. So, even if we acceptthe self-revelatory
of knowlof knowledgeat the empiricallevel,the self-revelatory
character
edge is not the same as the truthof thatcognition.Now, the Naiydyikas
(followersof theNydya) maintainthatno cognitionby itselfis eithertrue
or false,but is made so by anothercognition.9If everycognitionhas to
referbeyonditselfto anothercognitionin orderto be trueor false,then
non-discursive
knowledgecannotbe true;and in orderto be trueknowledge
of theNydya,intuition
mustbe discursive.So, accordingto theepistemology
truenorfalse.
can
be
neither
non-discursive
as immediate
knowledge
everycognitionis falsebyitself,butis made
Accordingto someBuddhists,
thesecondcognitionherebeingthecognitionthat
truebyanothercognition,
the object cognizedservesthe purposefor which it is meant. This is a
pragmaticconceptionof truth.But it means that,so far as the empirical
worldis concerned,
pureintuition
byitself,evenas indeterminate
perception
cannot
be
unless
made
so by anothercogni(nirvikalpakapratyaksa),
true,
tion. Hence, knowledgeat the empiricallevel mustbe discursive.
*
is givento thedoctrines
oftheotherschoolsalso. See theauthor's
Thisinterpretation
Thought
and Reality(London: GeorgeAllenand Unwin,Ltd.,1937), PartIII, chap.VIII.

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P. T. RAJU

196

and the Advaitaof Sahkara,everycognition

Accordingto the
Mimamrzsi
is truebyitself,butmay
be rendered
falsebyanothercognition.Sometimes
thistheoryis interpreted"
as meaningthatthe truthof a cognitionis selfrevealed,whereasthefalsityof a cognitionis revealedbyanothercognition.
Only the upholdersof this doctrineaccept intuitionas a philosophical
method.But theadmissionthatfalsityis revealedby anothercognitionand
of an empiricalcognition'sbeingfalseis alwayspresent
thatthepossibility
makesdiscursiveknowledgea necessarycomplementto the intuitiveuntil
is removed;and it is removedonly at the highestlevel of
thispossibility
betweensubjectand objectand subjectand
wherethedistinctions
intuition,
vanish.
predicate
A significant
pointto be notedis thatthe truthof the higherintuition
itselfneedsproof,sinceit is notcommonly
possessedbyall men. As already
of valid
the
and
the
mentioned, Nydya
Vai'esika acceptit as an instrument
of the Vedas and the Purtnas. The Nydya,for
cognitionon the authority
instance,acceptsfour sourcesof valid cognition: perception,inference,
analogy,and the iruti.Intuitionin the senseof telepathyand otherextraordinaryformsof perceptionis includedin perception.And this school
in establishingits conclusions.In fact,
makes verylittleuse of scripture
on the
neitherthe Nydyanor the Vai'esika could furnisha commentary
to sysof Bddardyana,
whichattempted
Vedanta-siftras
(or Brahma-sftras)
tematizethe Upanisadicstatements.The Vaisesika,again, did not treat
butsaid thatit couldbe included
sourceof knowledge,
as a distinct
scripture
The
and
in perception
or inference. Sarihkhya Yoga schoolsacceptedpercepas valid sourcesof knowledge,but accepted
and scripture
tion,inference,
arrivedat through
to
their
conclusionsindependently
scripture
only support
theothermeansof cognition.In fact,theysaythatonlythoseentitieswhich
sourcesof knowledgeshouldbe
cannotbe establishedthroughthe ordinary
of theabove fourschools
That thedoctrines
established
throughscripture.1x
of
is
wereestablished
independently scripture supported
bythefactthatthey
on theVedanta-sftras.
a commentary
wrote
couldnotfurnish
Vijfianabhiksu
of
view
the
fromthe Sarhikhya
fifteenth
a commentary
point
only during
werepropoundedand criticized
long afterthedoctrines
bytherival
century,
schools. The name of Kapila, the founderof the S~rhkhyasystem,occurs
era."
in the SvettivataraUpanisad,which belongs to the pre-Christian
a
is
to
orthodox
and
a
considered
be
to
school
Indian
tradition,
According
0oSee igwarakrishna,
SamkhyakirikisVI.
" It is difficultto fix the date of the Upanisads. See S. Radbakrishnan,Indian Philosophy
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), Vol. I, p. 141. Also S. K. Belvalkarand R. D.
Ranade, The CreativePeriod (Poona: Bilvakunja PublishingHouse, 1927), p. 89.

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

197

followerof the Vedic traditiononly if it has been able to furnisha comon the Veddnta-sfitras.
This showsthatneithertheNydyaand the
mentary
northeSirihkhya
and theYoga startedtheirphilosophicalactivity
as elaborationsand interpretations
of the Upanisadicintuitivestatements.
Vai.esika
of intuiting
To be sure,theyacceptedthepossibility
empiricaland noumenal
realities,but theydid not use intuitioneitherin expoundingtheirdoctrines
or in controverting
thoseof theirrivals.
It is onlytheVedinticschoolsthatstartedas expounders,
and
interpreters,
of the Upanisadicstatements.The Vedinta-sztras
systematizers
composed
for
the
statements
and
by Badardyana systematizing Upanisadic
removing
werelaterfoundinadequateforthepurpose.As controversies
contradictions
aroseamongtheVeddnticfollowersthemselves
and betweentheVedantins
clarification
and theirrivals,need was feltforfurther
and developmentof
and commentaries
the ideas. And so, commentaries
upon commentaries
and thiskindof workcontinuedwithmoreor less vigor
had to be written,
untilaboutthe fifteenth
century.BesidestheVedas,therewereotherkinds
such as the Agamas of the Saivas and the Vaisnavas,which
of scriptures,
also wereregardedby someas of equal authority.And in orderto remove
conflictbetweenthemand the Upanisads,commentaries
the
reinterpreting
Veddnta-sftras
and the Upanisadswerewritten.Thus, clear-cutdifferences
developedamongthe Veddnticschools.
of writingcommentaries
The activity
will perhapsbe
upon commentaries
as
based
intuition
as
a
method.
It may
interpreted being
upon
philosophical
be contendedthattherewas an originalintuitionand the restwas merely
itselaboration.Even ifthecontention
weretrue,elaborationand interpretation were not intuitively
done. It was withthe help of logic and reason
thatthe whole superstructure
of a systemwas raisedon an idea accepted
on the authority
of some scripture.And the scripture
was nothingmore
thana revelationto one or moreseekersof truth,and was lateracceptedas
truthby his or theirfollowerson authority.
us in sayingthat,
Now, doesthisacceptanceof an originalintuition
justify
for Indian philosophy,
the philosophicalmethodis intuition?First,many
schools did not follow the methodof writingcommentaries
upon comon the intuitive
mentaries
wisdomof the Upanisadsand the Veddnta-sitras
fordevelopingand expoundingtheirsystems.Second,different
schoolsand
of the Veddntaunderstood
sub-schools
and interpreted
theseoriginalintuitionsin quitedifferent
theirunderstanding
and
ways,and in orderto justify

interpretationthey used logic and reason. Their method was to show that
rival interpretations
were illogical and contraryto fact. Anyone who goes
the
commentaries
of
through
Safikaraand Riminuja on the Vedmnta-sdtras

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P. T. RAJU

198

can see howtheytriedto refuterivaldoctrines.Also,acceptanceofscriptural

does notconstitute
theuse of intuition
as a philosophicalmethod,
authority
unlessthe personwho acceptsit uses intuitionat everystep and saysthat
it confirms
or contradicts
the doctrinein question.
the developmentof Indian philosophyhas had its own
Furthermore,
to
it has beena philosophy
of life,inquiringinto
peculiarity.
Up thepresent,
the natureand aims of humanlife. It was wont,therefore,
to probeinto
the deepertruthsof our innerbeingand adopteda markedlyinwardattitruthsitdiscovered
werediscovered
tude. The significant
throughmeditative
and
Even
were varieties
there
so,
contemplation disciplinedintrospection.
and controversies.
of expressionand of opinionwhichresultedin conflicts
not onlyto removecontradictions
within
It was foundnecessary,
therefore,
fromtheattacksof others.
butalso to defendthattradition
a singletradition
Here is thesphereof reasonand logic. Moreover,notonlywas it necessary
witheach otherbutalso thatthey
thattheseinnertruthsbe madeconsistent
withthe truthsof theouterworld. Now, thereare two
be madeconsistent
of
accomplishingthis task: the approachmay be made fromthe
ways
as to appear coninnerto the outer,and the outertruthsso interpreted
sistentwiththe inner;or the approachmaybe made fromthe outerto the
withthe
as to appear consistent
inner,and the innertruthsso interpreted
witheach otheris
outer. That the innerand the outermustbe consistent
and often
buteach assumesa different
pattern,
acceptedbybothapproaches,
as
the inneror the outertruths,
or overemphasizes
eitherunderemphasizes
Adof
the
of
the case maybe. Some sub-schools the Vedinta,particularly
vaita,are so engrossedwiththe innerthattheydo not give due attention
to the outertruths.Theywould acceptanytheoryof the outerworld,providedit did notdenytheinnertruths.Hence,theircosmologiesare meager
and weak,and some of themdo not even care to develop such doctrines
at all. The Nydyaand the Vai'esika are,indeed,exceptions;but,comparatively,theirphilosophiesof the innerlife are meager. However,because
of the generalemphasison the importanceof the innerlife in Indian
philosophy,thereis the beliefthat it dependson intuitionmainlyas its
method.
philosophical
But just as logic cannotwork withoutsome data intuitively
accepted
forintuitive
truths)aboutthe
(modernlogicwould substitute
assumptions
outerworld,so, with regardto the truthsof the innerworld also, logic
obtainedtruths.Theyare the data to startwith.
muststartwithintuitively
them. Only to
Logic stepsin when we attemptto clarifyand interrelate
in the realm of innertruthsor who come
thosewho are not interested

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

199

suddenlyto realize,as if it werestrange,thatthereis such a realm,would

the innertruthsappearto be merelyintuitive
and a philosophyconcerning
themto be usingonlyintuitionas its method.There can be no philosophy
withoutthe use of intellect,just as therecan be no logic withoutdata
in the widestsenseof the term.If philosophyis to be
obtainedintuitively
of
bothintuitionand intellectare equallynecessary
philosophy experience,
forits development.
Stillanotheraspectofphilosophical
in Indiashouldbe noted.
development
Indian philosophystartedwithprimaryemphasison, and interestin, inner
truthsand began its interpretation
of the outwardin consonancewithits
of
the
inner.
But
this
understanding
aspectbelongsonly to the Vedantic
not
and
to
the
and Yoga among the
schools,
Nydya,Vaidesika,Sdrhkhya,
orthodoxor to the heterodoxschoolsof Jainism,Buddhism,and Carvaka,
withwhichall theorthodoxschoolshad to contend.In thesecontroversies,
theVed-nticschoolshad notonlyto reformulate
theirdoctrines
aboutouter
truthsin accordancewithfacts,but also to provethe realityof innertruths
themselves.The CGrvikas,who werematerialists
and neitheracknowledged
the authorityof scripturenor acceptedthe realityof the self (dtman),
to say nothingof God, actedas a checkupon anytendency
to accepttruths
the
of
The
of
even
inner
truths
upon
authority scripture. necessity
expounded
by the Upanisads,withwhichthe orthodoxschoolsstarted,had laterto be
provedwiththe help of the methodof postulation(arthapatti). Some of
the orthodoxschools did not accept postulationas a distinctmeans of
cognition,but turnedit intoa formof syllogism.In any case,theyhad to
which
provetheinnertruthsbesidesacceptingthemon scriptural
authority,
lattermethodmay be identified
with intuition.In fact,as the C-irvakas
did notat firstacceptthevalidityof inference
and latereven thatof perception,the otherschoolshad to provethe validityof both. Thus, the forms
whichthe systems
finallytookhave the appearanceof logicallyformulated
ratherthancollatedintuitive
truths,
systems
thoughtheVedanticschoolsin
the formof commentaries
on commentaries
on the Vedinta-st~tras,
which
are themselves
of theUpanisadictruths,
systematizations
appearto be reconciliationsand systematizations
of the Upanisadicintuitions.
VII
Providedwe do not forgetthat Indian philosophyhas been primarily
concernedwiththe innerlife of man and with the place of man in the
universeand his destiny,
we may say thatit is neithermore intuitivenor
lessintellectual
in itsmethodsthanWesternphilosophy.Takingintofurther

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200

P. T. RAJU

consideration
thefactthatIndianphilosophy
has had no significant
developmentsinceaboutthe fifteenth
and therefore
cannotshow as many
century
ramifications
and as muchprogressas modernand contemporary
Western
cenfifteenth
we
to
the
with
can,
that,up
philosophy
justification
maysay
of
as
Indian
could
a
showed
as
tury,
philosophy
vigorous development logic
and logical
be expected.The elaboratedefinitions,
themethodsof definition,
of
the
us
and
the
which
analysis concepts
practiceof which
Neo-Nydyagave
was lateradoptedby the otherschoolswould leave no doubtin the minds
of any seriousstudentabout the intellectualism
of the methodsof the
that
But
if
we
of
time.
consider
philosophers
philosophyas interpretation
of experience
and experience
as bothinnerand outer,and as primarily
direct,
we have to acceptalso theview thatno philosophycan dispensewithintuito as the Dark
tion. Quite often,the Middle Ages of Europeare referred
as
the
and
medieval
of
Ages,
period Europeanphilosophy havingno philosophybut onlytheology;and it is also said thatthe periodtoleratedno
freedomof inquiryand put arbitrary
limitson reason. But Whiteheadsays
thatit was a periodof reason.'2 The Schoolmenarguedand argued,even
aboutthe numberof angelsthatcoulddanceon thepointof a needle. It is
the modernperiod,he says,thatturnedits attentionto history,
fact,and
It
is
an
now
from
method
to
start
accepted
argue
experience.
experience,
about it,and testour arguments
again by experience.That is, we use both
intuitionand intellect.When it is said thattheMiddleAges wereopposed
to thefreeuse of reason,it is meantthattheywereopposedto thatfreedom
of inquirywhichis not merelyarguingbut also discovery.And discovery
includesdirectexperience.Intellectcannotworkwithoutintuition,
and intuitionneedsintellectforitsdevelopment
and as a check.
So muchis admittedeven byWesternphilosophers.Professor
Montague
writesthatthe "theorythattruthcan be attainedby a supra-rational
and
is
of
intuition
He
further:
"Intuition
faculty
supersensuous
mysticism."13 says
touchedwithconviction,
but also
mightbe definednotonlyas imagination
inductionor deduction.'"14
And intuition
as the outcomeof sub-conscious
is thesamewhetherit occursin the scientist
touchedwithconviction
or the
This
is
that
function
of mindwhichformshypotheses.
imagination
poet.15
it
is
the
of
function
and psychologically
it is
Logically
forming
hypotheses,
Professor
writes:
"It
is
latter
the
business
of
Montague
imagination.Again,
of imagination
withthe established
comparingthe newlybornhypotheses
12
Scienceand theModernWorld(New York: The New American
A. N. Whitehead,
Library
in contemporary
of WorldLiterature,
Inc., 1949), p. 39. Certaintendencies
logicalpositivism
of "unbridled
rationalism."
maybe calledtendencies
' W. P. Montague,
WaysofKnowing(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,Ltd.,1948), p. 55.
' Ibid., 64.
p.
1 Ibid.,p. 66.

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

201

of olderprincipleswhichconstitutes
theworkof reason.""lBut
community
is not the formingof hypotheses
the workof reasonalso? That is, at this
for the
point it is difficult
clearlyto demarcatereasonfromimagination,
a
facts
of
function
as
well.
is
of
reason
we
have
Thus,
framing hypotheses
them
relations
reason
and
and
directly
experienced,
interrelating bypositing
in thesenseof directexperience,
newfactsandprinciples.Withoutintuition
reasoncannotwork,and what we call the intuitionof the mysticsis experienceat a levelat whichreasonceasesto function.And,whenthemystics
say thatreasoncannotgrasptheirhighestreality,theymean that at that
or
level thereis no scopefortheworkof reason,as thereare no differences
to be interrelated.
distinctions
As Professor
Montaguecomplains,some of the mysticsadopta negative
relationto theworldand maintainthattheworldis notreal. As theworld
is notreal,as thehighestrealityis theonlyreal,and as thework
of plurality
or
intellectis confinedto the realm of plurality,theysay that
reason
of
reasonor intellectcannotgraspreality.But even thesemysticsdo not use
intuitionas a philosophicalmethod.Philosophyis alwaysdiscursive
knowlof the natureof the universe.What these
edge, logical understanding
is
to
do
generally
mystics
disprove,withthe help of reason,all thepositive
conclusionsabout the world arrivedat by the same reason in rival philosophies. Their philosophiesgenerallyappear to be destructive(vitanznot constructive.
Theirpositivecontribution
to philosophylies in
.d~uvdas),
thatthereis a kindof knowledgewhichis intuitive
theircontention
but not
discursiveand thatthroughit alone can realitybe known. But intuition
itselfgives themno philosophy,for thereis nothingto thinkabout and
thoughtas suchceasesto existin thatintuition.
One important
seem to overpointwhichthesenegativistic
philosophers
look is that,if the truthof intuitionand of theirrealityis based on, and
derivedfrom,considerations
of empiricalfact,eitherthroughinference
or
the
latter
must
also
true
if
be
as
the
former
are
true.
regarded
postulation,
This objectionwas raised,in fact,by the realisticVedintinsin India, for,
theysaid,ifthedataare false,theconclusioncannotbe true.The importance
of this objectionwas noticedby the laterfollowersof the extremist
subschoolsof even the Advaitaof Sahikara,
who said,therefore,
thatthe world
is neitherunrealnor real. The truthof the worldis a relativetruth;only
the truthof the Absoluteis absolutelytrue. And the distinction
between
therelativeand absolutetruthsturnsout to be thedistinction
betweenwhat
is trueto the human intellectand what is trueto the highestintuition.Some,
" Ibid., 65.
p.

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P. T. RAJU

202

like the followersof Safikara,say thatwhatis truefromone pointof view

and falsefromanothercan be neithertruenor false. Otherssay thatit is
bothtrueand false. But all thiselaborationof theideasof truthand falsity
is the workof intellect,not of intuition.
Taking Bergson,forinstance,shouldwe say thathe used intuitionas a
againstintellectand
philosophicalmethod? In spiteof all his strictures
that
he
it
was
with
their
attemptedto show theirshorthelp
logic,
only
comings.All thathe succeededin provingwas thatthereis such a form
of cognitionas intuitionand thatit is withits help thatwe can cognize
timeor duration.But is the experienceof space the same as the concept
as theexperience
of space? The experienceof space is as muchan intuition
of time. Kant said as much,beforeBergson,in calling space and time
formsof intuition;even as formsof intuition,
theyare as much intuited.
is notspace. We neednotherediscuss
is nottime,simultaneity
If succession
the questionof whethertimeor space is or is not spiritual.But thereare
manythingsin the worldwhichwe know throughintuitionin the sense
ofdirectexperience.And so longas we arepreparedto leavethemunrelated
witheach other,reasondoes not enterthe scene. But
and unco-ordinated
to co-ordinate
and relatethemand disprovefalseintuitions
whenwe attempt
the true,we need the workof reason. Bergson,forexample,
and confirm
had to use reasonforrelatingtimewithspaceand otherobjectsof experience
and in developingprinciplesof thisinterrelating.
of intuition,
whenhe saidthat,without
thenecessity
Bradleyalso admitted
cannot
the
the "This" in immediateexperience,
work; otherwise,
thought
fairytale withoutrelevanceto
workingsof thoughtwould be a consistent
somewhattacitlythe truth
Walsh
that
admits
Mr.
Bradley
actuality."
says
whichKant thoughtbelongsonly
in our experience,
of intellectual
intuition
cannot
the immediacyof feelto God's experience."8
Thought
incorporate
until
"an
the
end
and
therefore
remains
balletof
sense
and
unearthly
ing
In
bloodlesscategories"and a "spectralwoof of impalpableabstractions."
orderto succeedin itsworkand attainitsobjective,thoughtmustpass into
otherand higher.And thishigher,whichis to retainthemediacy
something
of feelingand sense,can be nothingother
of thoughtand the immediacy
than intellectualintuition,which createssensationsaccordingto its conceptions.
" F. H.
Bradley,The Principlesof Logic (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1922), Vol. II,
p. 660. See also Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,
n.d.), p. 12. Justas Bradleysays thatreason cannot determinewhethera propositionis factually
true or not withoutimmediateexperience,Carnap admits that semanticscannot determinethe
same withoutdirectobservation.

' Reasonand Experience,

p. 62.

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INTUITION

AS A PHILOSOPHICAL

METHOD

IN INDIA

203

VIII
It maybe interesting
and usefulforcomparative
purposesto knowsome
of themeaningsin whichthephraseintellectual
intuition
is usedin Western
givesfourimportant
philosophy.Walsh,in hisbookReasonand Experience,
meanings.First,intellectualintuitionin the full Kantiansense is a hypoto God, whichsimultaneously
theticalcognitivefaculty,
attributed
intuitsthe
and
thinks
is
intellectual
intuition
the
particulars
apprethem.19Second,
hension of self-evidenttruths. "Intuition of the self-evident...

lies at the

basis of all knowledge.We have onlyto supplementthiswiththe theory

of Descartesthatinference
itselfreducesat its bestto intuitionto reachthe
rationalistdoctrineof scientific
form."20In the
knowledgein its strongest
thirdplace, intellectualintuitionis the intuitionof universals.Aristotle
believedthatthe universalsare perceivedin the particulars
and existin the
in re. So, theyare directlyperceived.But theyare not sensed
particulars,
or intuitedwiththehelp of thesenses.Therefore,
theymustbe intuitedby
or
all
forms
intellect.
are
intuited.In thefourth
Thus,
thought
intellectually
has
an
inference
element
of intuition.Murewrites:"Had Kant
place,every
to the natureof inference
he mighthave foundit less
paid moreattention
to
to
native
its
of
moment
intuition.The discursive
easy
deny thought
factorin thoughtis revealednot onlyin thedispersionof an identicalconof sensuousintuitions
whichinstantiate
it, but
cept througha multiplicity
also in the movementof inference
frompremisesto conclusion;and in the
factorof intellectualintuitionis
graspingof a conclusiona complementary
not
as
act
from
discursion
butas there-immediation
manifest,
plainly
separate
of the discursivemediatory
Dr. Ewing identifies
the insight
movement."21
thatthepremisesnecessitate
theconclusionwithintellectual
intuition.Here
we are remindedof Bradley'sview thatin inference
we synthesize
the data
and intuitthe conclusionin an integrated
whole.22
of thesedocNow, withoutgoingintodetailedexplanationand criticism
"' Some interpreters
equate intuitingthe particularswith creatingthe sensationsthataccordwith
the categories.
0 Here we are remindedof the view of the Mimiahsakas,namely,thatamong the gradesof the
universals all universalsexcept the highest and the lowest are both universal and particular,
because each universal,as differentfrom the othersof the same grade, is a particularcoming
under a higher universal,and, as comprehendingthe species coming under itself,is a universal.
The lowest in the gradationmust be a pure particularand the highesta pure universal. Now,
at least those universalsthatare particularsmustbe intuitedalso, besides being conceived. Again,
as individualentities,all universalsmust be intuited.Thus, not only sense but also intellectmust
have the power to intuit;which means cognitionas such must be an intuitionas well.
to Hegel, p. 96, quoted by Walsh in Reason and Experience,
21G. R. G. Mure, An Introduction
pp. 56-57.
'*Bradley,The Principlesof Logic, Vol. I, p. 258: "We firstdo a certainwork on our data;
and this work is the construction.We then by inspectiondiscover and select a new relation,
and this intuitionis the conclusion."

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204

P. T. RAJU

wemaysaythatinWestern
ofintuition
trines,
too,thepresence
philosophy,
is admitted
notonlyat thelevelof sensation
and perception,
butalso at
thatofintellect
orthought.
Intuition
is thegrasping
ofan objectas a solid
It is present,
notonlywhenpurequalities
therefore,
unityor integrality.
like colorsand smellsare graspedbutalso whenindividual
objectslike
or
universals
likehumanity
andredness,
andtheAbsolute
pensandpencils,
a pen
Brahmanat thesuprarational
levelare cognized.WhenI perceive
as a combination
ofqualities
likecolorsandtouch,
as a penandnotmerely
I havean intuition.
as a pen andnotalwaysas
Thatthepen is perceived
ofa pencil
a groupofqualities
is shownwhen,in theerroneous
perception
is
a
as a pen,we makethecontradicting
"It
judgment,
penciland nota
thisorthatquality,
but
pen." We do notsaythatwe didnotreallyperceive
thisor thatobject.The knowledge
thatwe did
thatwe did notperceive
thisor thatqualityis a resultof lateranalysisof our
notreallyperceive
a colorlikered,we haveintuition,
Andevenwhenwe perceive
experience.
becausetheobjectis seenas a solidunity.A qualityis a qualityonlywhen
to itssubstance.
it is seenin relation
to
ofuniversals,
therearetwoviews: according
thecognition
Regarding
to
butnotperceived,
whereas,
Plato,theyare onlyremembered
according
in theparticulars.
ButAristotle
Aristotle,
saysthatthey
theyareperceived
andnotsensuously.
intuited
areonlyintellectually
AmongtheIndianphiare
universals
that
intuited.
the
Now,
say
sensuously
losophers, Naiydyikas
an object,do we remember
whenwe remember
eventakingPlato'sdoctrine,
of interrelated
elements?
it as a solidunityor as a groupor combination
ofintuition,
thereis an element
an objectas a solidunity,
In remembering
the
AndPlatotreats
theobjectis a physical
whether
objector a universal.
are solidunitiesandwhichshowsthattheuniversals
Ideasas substances,
thatthecognition
the
view
notmeregroupings
ofelements.
So,ifwe accept
atthelevel
ofanysolidunity
involves
thentheremustbe intuition
intuition,
ofthought
also.
what
involvesintuition,
likeperception,
One maynowask: If thought,
and
saidto be discursive
thetwo? Is notthought
between
is thedifference
of
If
the
be
asked:
it
In
non-discursive?
answer, may
perception
perception
of
the
form
not
and
a
"It
is
a bookis oftheform
"book,"is
book"
merely
knowlitselfbecomesrelational
also discursive?
notperception
Perception
there
hold
that
We
"book."
and
between
with
relation
the
"It"
may
edge
is of thesimpleform"book."
at whichcognition
is a stagein perception
or bringit to thelevelof
ButwhenI wishto communicate
myknowledge
at
which
I
can relateitto otherbits
to
that
level
or
even
communicability
of myown knowledge,it would be of the form"It is a book" and would

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

205

be relational.For all thesestages,philosophers

have used thewordperception. Even if we believethatperceptionis originallyof the form"book"
and is intuitive,
it is potentiallyrelationaland discursive,
becauseit later
assumesthe form"It is a book." "It" and "book" thenbecomeelementsof
the originalperception"book." But the elementsnow remainintuitions;
retainsan intuitive
and again theawarenessof thewhole,thoughdiscursive,
background.
At the level of thinking,
we pass beyonddemonstrative
reference.But
even when we make a judgmentlike "Man is mortal,"we have two solid
formalunities,"man" and "mortal,"distinctly
entertained
by thoughtand
relatedby it. These solid unitiesare intuitions.If so, even at the level of
we have intuition.
thoughtor understanding,
The above discussionshowsthat,exceptat the highest(that is, of the
Absoluteand of the mystic)and the lowestlevels of cognition,thought
cannotworkwithoutintuitions
and intuitions
cannotbe understood
without
and
that
the distinction
betweenthoughtand intuitioncannotbe
thought,
clear-cut.If thoughtis relationaland relationsneed termsto relate,then,
in the sameprocessof cognition,
the cognitionof thetermsis intuitive
and
the act of relatingis discursive.This meansthatthoughtis permeatedby
intuition.And even in perception,
at thatlevel at whichit is
particularly
intuitionis permeatedby thought.If philosophyis a comcommunicable,
municablesystemof knowledge,intuition
byitselfcannotbe itsmethod.If
a communicable
thenintuisystemof knowledgeis one basedon intuitions,
tionmustbe one of the methodsof philosophy,
whetherin the East or the
West.
intuitionand concepts,sayingthatintuitions(percepts)
Kant contrasted
withoutconceptsare blind and conceptswithoutintuitions
are empty.He
used the wordintuitionin the meaningof sensationonly. But later,even
as unitary
formsoftheunderstanding,
wereregardedas intuitions.
categories,
used and intuitively
known,and conferunitaryform
They are intuitively
on the manifoldof sensations.If intuition
is the awarenessof solid unities,
then it applies as much to categoriesas to sensations.We have already
referredto Bradley'sview, accordingto which we inspector intuitthe
conclusionin a synthesized
whole comprising
thedata. His view is justified
if
the
conclusion
means
the
only intuiting
perception(not a sensuousperof
of
the
formal
of
ception, course)
unity the whole. So, wheneverthere
is perceptionof a unity,whetherformalor material,we have intuition.
And the self-sameprocessof cognitionis discursivealso if it is aware of
the relationalaspect,too. This awarenessmay be of threekinds: subconsciousand voluntary,
subconscious
and involuntary
(spontaneous),and

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206

P. T. RAJU

consciousand voluntary.The subconscious

and voluntary
typemaybe found

in thosecasesin whichwe drawconclusions

without
thatwe are
knowing
is subconscious
our awareness
and indoingso; in theuse of categories,
in
the
of
is
awareness
relational
inference
voluntary;
only explicit
activity
conscious
andvoluntary.
Thislatterconsideration
showsthattheopposition
intuition
between
and
is
not
the
as
the
same
between
intuition
and
discursive
concepts
opposition
If toperceive
a sensation
is notregarded
as discursive,
thensimply
thought.
to cognizea universal
Discursive
is also notdiscursive.
comes
knowledge
in whenwe beginto be awareof relations.If it is saidthatno concept
withtheparticulars
its relations
can be cognizedwithoutcognizing
and
as muchcan be
of a conceptis therefore
thatcognition
alwaysrelational,
of evena colorlikered,forevenherecognition
saidaboutthecognition
involves
a relation
between
"It"and
"It
is
red"
and
therefore
is oftheform
"red." If it is said thattheremusthavebeena cognitive
stageat which
"It" and"red"is notdrawn,
we maysaythatthere
between
thedistinction
to itsparwithout
relation
musthavebeena stageat whicheveryconcept
andfixed,
but
is grasped.Indeed,neither
ticulars
stagecanbe demonstrated
of
or
From
the
communicable
knowledge of
standpoint
onlypostulated.
and
that
can
be
used
and
related,
puresensation
everykindof knowledge
areequallyhypotheses.
concepts

IX
The abovediscussion
mighthavewarnedus that,in orderto answerthe
as a whole,or one or moreof its
Indianphilosophy
questionwhether
or
withreason,as a philoeither
uses
solely conjointly
systems, intuition,
ofthewordintuiaboutthemeaning
onemustbe careful
sophicalmethod,
to whichintuition
is claimedto
tionand abouttheobjectwithreference
or extraIntuition
be thepropermethodof cognition.
maybe ordinary
and
the
of
are
the
intuition
etc.,
Clairvoyance,
telepathy,
mystics
ordinary.
All of us maypossessthesepowersbut to sucha degree
extraordinary.
in theordinary
Butintuition
senseof directawareness
as to be negligible.
is usedbyall ofus,andwe areeither
forms
orunitary
ofsolidunities
aware
it if it is subconscious
or spontaneous.
of its use or acknowledge
Both
it
use
as
of
and
Indian
one
methods.
Western
their
philosophy
philosophy
method
Butintuition
alonecanneverbe a philosophical
andis notso used
even by Indianphilosophers.
does notlie
The real difference
betweenIndianand Westernphilosophies
in theiruse or avoidanceof intuitionas a philosophicalmethod,but in the

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INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD IN INDIA

207

spheresof theirprimaryinterestand theirattitudes.Indianphilosophyhas

untilnow morein the innerlife of man and has adopted
been interested
in
a more inwardattitude,while Westernphilosophyhas been interested
more
in
the
of
outer
life
man
an
and
has
outward
attitude.23
general
adopted
Becauseof thisdifference,
it is wronglythoughtthatIndianphilosophyhas
used intuitionalone as its method,while Westernphilosophyhas used
reason. The formeralso has used reasonas its method,but primarily
for
the clarification
and elaborationof innertruths.
We mayconcludeby sayingthat (1) manyclassicalIndianphilosophers
maintainedthatexperience
of thehighestreality,theBrahman(Absolute),
Atman(Self), or Purusa(Self), is possibleonlythrough
knowlunmediated
thatevenat thatlevelourexperience
edgeor intuition;(2) somemaintained
cannotbe unmediated;(3) eventheformer
with
group,in itscontroversies
its rivals,had to prove,with the help of reason,not only the realityof
the Brahmanor the Atmanbut also the validityand even the possibility
of the highestintuitionas unmediated
cognitiveexperience;(4) almostall
of them acceptedthe extraordinary
formsof empiricalknowledgelike
and telepathy;(5) mostof themheldthatall empiricalknowlclairvoyance
claims
truthis discursive;and (6) all of themused reasonto
that
edge
not only the different
formsof valid knowledgebut also the
interrelate
formsor levelsof realitywhichtheyaccepted.
different
andobjective
We shouldnotusetheterms
attitude
attitude
todenotethisdifference,
subjective
forwe may adoptan objectiveattitudeeven in the studyof our innerlife and a subjective
in thestudyoftheouter.
attitude

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