AlfredSchutz

FirstpublishedTueOct29,2002;substantiverevisionThuMar13,2014
AlfredSchutz,morethananyotherphenomenologist,attemptedtorelatethethoughtofEdmund
Husserltothesocialworldandthesocialsciences.HisPhenomenologyoftheSocialWorldsupplied
philosophicalfoundationsforMaxWeber'ssociologyandforeconomics,withwhichhewasfamiliar
throughcontactswithcolleaguesoftheAustrianschool.WhenSchutzfledHitler'sAnschlussof
AustriaandimmigratedtotheUnitedStatesin1939,hedevelopedhisthoughtfurtherinrelationshipto
thesocialsciences,Americanpragmatism,logicalempiricism,andtovariousotherfieldsofendeavor
suchasmusicandliterature.Hisworkhasbeeninfluentialonnewmovementsinsociologicalthought
suchasethnomethodologyandconversationanalysis.
1.LifeandInfluence
2.ThePhenomenologyoftheSocialWorld
3.Extensions
o 3.1TheBergsonWritings
o 3.2TheSocialSciences
o 3.3OtherPhilosophies
o 3.4Applications
o 3.5Phenomenology
Bibliography
o WorksbySchutz
o SecondaryLiterature
AcademicTools
OtherInternetResources
RelatedEntries

1.LifeandInfluence
ViennabornAlfredSchutz(18991959)joinedtheartillerydivisionoftheAustrianarmyduringWorld
WarIandservedontheItalianfrontbeforereturningtopursuestudiesattheUniversityofVienna.
ThereSchutzstudiedlaw,socialscience,andbusinesswithrenownedfiguressuchasHansKelsenand
LudwigvonMises,buthismostsignificanteducationalexperienceoccurredwhilehewasamemberof
theMisesCircle,oneofmanyViennesecircles,ofwhichtheSchlickCirclewasthemostfamous.In
theinterdisciplinaryMisesCircle,Schutzformedfriendshipsthatwouldcontinuethroughoutthe
cataclysmicdecadesofthe1930sand1940sandthatincluded,amongothers,economistsGottfriedvon
Haberler,FriedrichA.vonHayek,FritzMachlup,OskarMorgenstern,philosopherFelixKaufmann,
andpoliticalscientistEricVoegelin.Whilecontinuingtopursuehisacademicinterests,in1927Schutz
wasnamedexecutiveofficerofReitlerandCompany,aleadingViennesebankingfirmwith
internationalbusinessrelations,andthushecommencedalifelongpatternthatledEdmundHusserlto
describehimasabankerbydayandaphilosopherbynight.
Fromthebeginning,SchutzhadbeentakenwiththemethodologicalwritingsofMaxWeber,whohad
lecturedinViennainthesummerof1918andwhoseworkwasimmenselypopularamongViennese
intellectuals.However,SchutzfeltthatWeber'sworkrestedontacit,unexaminedpresuppositions
resultingfromhislackofinterestinfundamentalepistemologicalproblemsthathadnodirectbearing
onhisspecialsociologicalproblems.In19251927,SchutzturnedtoHenriBergson'sphilosophyof
consciousnessandinnertimeinordertoclarifynotionssuchasmeaning,action,andintersubjectivity,
andhisresultshavebeencollectedinmanuscriptspublishedasLifeFormsandMeaningStructure.
Dissatisfied,though,withhisanalysesoftemporalitytotheextentthatheneverpublishedthemand
promptedbycommentsofFelixKaufmann,hediscoveredtherelevanceofthephenomenologyofthe
consciousnessofinnertimeofEdmundHusserl(18591938).Hethenwentontoproducehismajor
life'swork,ThePhenomenologyoftheSocialWorld(1932),aworkforwhichHusserlpraisedhimas
anearnestandprofoundphenomenologist.Hespenttherestofthe1930sauthoringbriefessays
showinghowhisphenomenologyofthesocialworldcouldcometotermswiththeeconomicthought
ofMisesandHayek.Also,beforeanydirectencounterwithAmericanpragmatism,hedevelopeda
manuscriptonpersonalityinthesocialworldthatstressedthepragmaticelementsoftheeveryday
socialworld.

Schutz'scareer,academicandbusiness,wasthoroughlyconvulsedwhenAdolfHitlerimplementedthe
annexation(Anschluss)ofAustriabyGermanyonMarch13,1938,especiallysincehe,onabusiness
tripinParis,wasseparatedforthreemonthsfromhisownfamily,whoseemigrationtoParishefinally
arranged.Asaninternationallawyerandbusinessperson,hewasabletoassistnumerousintellectualsto
escapeAustria,butthewestwardmovementoftheNazijuggernauteventuallycompelledhimto
immigratewithhisfamilytotheUnitedStatesonJuly14,1939.
IntheUnitedStates,hecontinuedassistingimmigrantsandworkingwithReitlerandCompanyin
reestablishingitsbusiness,andhesupportedtheUnitedStateswareffortbyreportingonGermanand
AustrianeconomicmattersfortheBoardofEconomicWarfare.HealsocooperatedwithMarvinFarber
infoundingtheInternationalPhenomenologicalSociety,whoseinitialturfbattlesheoftenmediated,
andininstitutingandeditingPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch.In1943,Schutzbegan
teachingsociologyandphilosophycoursesonTheGraduateFacultyofTheNewSchoolforSocial
Research,andhisreponsibilitiesincludedpresentingpapersintheschoolwideGeneralSeminar,
supervisingdissertations,andservingaschairofthePhilosophyDepartmentfrom19521956.Inspite
ofhismanyactivities,hemanagedtocarryonanextensivephilosophicalcorrespondencewithFarber,
AronGurwitsch,FritzMachlup,EricVoegelin,andMauriceNatanson,hisgraduatestudentfrom1951
to1953.However,todate,onlythecorrespondencewithGurwitschhasbeenpublishedas
PhilosophersinExile:TheCorrespondenceofAlfredSchutzandAronGurwitsch,19391959.While
intheUnitedStates,Schutzpublishedacollectionofarticlesonawidevarietyoftopics,explaining
andcriticizingHusserl'sthought;examiningtheworksofAmericanphilosopherssuchasWilliam
JamesorGeorgeSantanyana;engagingcontinentalphilosopherssuchasMaxSchelerorJeanPaul
Sartre;developinghisownphilosophicalpositionsonthesocialsciences,temporality,language,
multiplerealities,responsibility,andsymbolism;addressingsociopoliticalquestionsdealingwith
strangers,homecomers,wellinformedcitizens,andequality;andtreatingthemesinliteratureand
music.
SeveralthinkershavecontinuedSchutz'straditioninphilosophyandsociology,suchasMaurice
Natansonwhoemphasizedthetensionbetweenindividual,existentialandsocial,anonymizing
dimensionsofeverydaylifeexperience.ThomasLuckmann,whoservedascoauthorforthe
posthumouspublicationofSchutz'sTheStructuresoftheLifeWorld,developedthesociologyof
knowledgeimplicationsofSchutz'sthoughtandstressedthedifferencesbetweenscienceandthelife
worldaswellastheimportanceoflanguage,symbolism,andthemoralorderofsociety.WhileJohn
O'NeillhasfusedSchutz'sthoughtwiththatofMerleauPontybyfocusingonthelived,communicative
body,RichardGrathoffhasinvestigatedtheexperienceofnormalitywithintheboundedandsituated
contextofamilieu.IljaSrubardevelopedthepragmaticdimensionsofSchutz'sthoughtandseveralof
itseconomicandpoliticalimplications,LesterEmbreeclarifiedhistypologyofthesciences,andFred
Kerstenhasexpandedhisaestheticinsights.DrawingonSchutz'sthought,HaroldGarfinkellaunched
ethnomethodology,andGeorgePsathas,acommentatoronethnomethodology,playedakeyrole
initiatingthenewdisciplineofconversationanalysis.Severalotherscholarsworldwidehavededicated
themselvestoSchutz'sworkandtothedevelopmentofhisinsights,andGermany,Japan,andthe
UnitedStatesarehometoarchivescontainingSchutz'sworkandcorrespondence.

2.ThePhenomenologyoftheSocialWorld
Inhisprincipalwork,Schutzplacedthreechaptersofphilosophicaldiscussionbetweenintroductory
andconcludingchaptersthatdiscussedthesocialscientificpositionshisphilosophyattemptedto
engage.IntheinitialchapterSchutzpraisedMaxWeber'sviewsonvaluefreedominsocialscienceand
theautonomyofsciencevisvisotheractivities(e.g.politics),andhecommendedWeber's
methodologicalindividualismandidealtypemethodology.Inaddition,heapplaudedWeber'srefusal
toreducethesocialsciencestothenaturalsciences,whileallowingtheiridealtypicalresultstobe
testableforadequacy.However,SchutzalsosupplementedWeber,pointingouthowinterpretationwas
involvedeveninselectinganexperienceoutofone'sstreamofexperienceandhighlightinghowthe
meaningofanactiontoanactordependedupontheprojectguidingtheextendedtemporalprocessof
thesubactsleadingtoitsrealization.
TheseinitialcriticismsofWeberrequiredSchutztodevelophisowntheoryofmeaningandaction,
beginningwithHusserl'sstudyoftheconsciousnessofinternaltime,inparticularconsciousness's
capacitytocapturereflectivelyanddistinguishlivedexperiences,whichatfirstappearasundefined
phasesmeltingintoeachother.Schutzhadappropriatedthisnotionofflowingconsciousness,or
duration,fromBergson,onwhomhehadreliedinthemanuscriptslaterpublishedasLifeFormsand

MeaningStructure.Thosemanuscripts,foranalyticpurposes,splittheego,indivisibleinitslived
experience,intoidealtypicalconstructsofvariouslifeforms,thatincludedtheIlivinginduration,
remembering,acting,thinking,andrelatingtoaThou.ThoughSchutznevermadeexplicithis
reasonsfornotpublishingthoseearliermanuscripts,HelmutWagnerrightlyspeculatedthathewasill
ateasesinceonecouldonlyhaveaccesstodurationthroughactsofmemory,which,ofcourse,
constitutedalifeformentirelyseparatefromdurationitself.Asaresultofthismethodologyrelyingon
distinctidealtypes,durationbegantoappearasaninaccessibleDingansich.Husserl'saccountofthe
consciousnessofinnertimeremediedjustthisproblembycarefullydescribinghowthestreamof
durationwaschangedateverymomentintoarememberedhavingjustbeenthus,astheprimal
impressionpassedintointoprimaryremembrance,orretention.Thecontinuumextendingbackward
fromthenowoftheprimalimpressionthroughitsretentionsformedaspeciouspresent,towhichthe
reflectiveactsofsecondaryremembrance,thatis,recollectionorreproduction,turned,differentiating
oneexperiencefromanother.Insum,Husserl'sphenomenologicaldescriptionofexperienceuncovered
theprocessofretentionthatbridgedtheduration/(reflective)memorygapthathadbedeviledSchutz's
earliereffortsinsofarashehadreliedonanidealtypicalmethodology,whichpreventedinsightinto
whatgoesonwithinconsciousprocessesthemselves.
Schutz,though,turnedtheHusserlianaccountoftemporalityinthedirectionofanactiontheory,
demarcatinglevelsofpassiveexperience(e.g.bodilyreflexes),spontaneousactivitywithoutaguiding
project(e.g.,actsofnoticingenvironmentalstimuli),anddeliberatelyplannedandprojectedactivity,
knowntechnicallyasaction(e.g.,writingabook).Inplanninganactiontoberealizedinthefuture,
onereliesonreflectiveactsofprojection,likethosefoundinreflectivememory,onlynoworiented
inafutureasopposedtopastdirection.Throughsuchreflectivity,oneimaginesaprojectascompleted
infutureperfecttense,thatis,whatwillhavebeenrealizedafterone'sacting,andthisproject,alsoof
centralimportanceforMartinHeideggerandthepragmatisttradition,establishestheinorderto
motiveofone'saction.Bycontrast,one'sbecausemotivesconsistintheenvironmental,historical
factorsthatinfluencedthe(nowpast)decisiontoembarkupontheprojectandthatcanonlybe
discoveredbyinvestigatinginthepluperfecttense,thatis,exploringthosepastfactorsthatpreceded
thatpastdecision.
Schutz'sdistinctionsherearerelevanttocontemporarydebatesaboutwhetherfreedomiscompatible
withdeterminismsincefromtheperspectiveofthelivedinordertomotive,oneexperiencesoneselfas
freeandmorallyresponsible,butfromtheperspectiveofexaminingone'sbecausemotivesafter
completingone'saction,onecorrelates,asanobserverofoneself,thechoiceoftheprojectwithits
historicaldeterminants.Ofcourse,Schutz,workingwithintheparametersofHusserl'snonnaturalistic
accountofconsciousness,wouldhaveconceivedsuchdeterminantsnotsomuchasempirico
mechanicalcausesbutratherasinfluencesdiscoverablethroughaninterpretiveprocess,associating
earliereventswiththelateronestheyseemtohaveinfluenced.Schutz'spositioncomesclosesttothe
roughlycompatibilistoutlooksofP.F.StrawsonandThomasNagel,whodistinguishbetweenthe
participantandobserverattitudespriortotheoreticaldiscussionsandwhoaligntheparticipantattitude
withfreedomandtheobserverattitudewithdeterminism.Schutz,however,contributestheunique
insightthattheseattitudestakeplacewithindistinctivetemporalframeworks,orientedtowardthe
futureorthepast.
Schutz'saccountofthetemporalframeworkofmotivationpermittedcriticismofWeber'sviewthatone
couldorientone'sactiontothepastbehaviorofothers,since,whilesuchbehaviormighthaveservedas
thebecausemotiveofanaction,onecouldnotaimataffectinganother'salreadycompletedaction.
Similarly,failuretoappreciatetemporalityoftenleadstomisinterpretationsofaction,aswhenone
assumesthattheoutcomeofanactmayhavebeenitsmotivewithoutconsideringtheactor'sinorderto
motive,whichduetounforeseeneventsmayhavebeenadjustedormayhaveledtoresultscontraryto
thoseintended.Likewise,onecaninterpretaneconomicactionafterthefactaslessthanrational
withouttakingsufficientaccountofthelimitedinformationthatwasavailabletotheactoratthetime
ofdecidingtoactandthatmightmakeheractionseemperfectlyrational.Moreover,thefactthatone's
owntemporalstreamofconsciousnessnevercompletelycoincideswiththatofanother,whose
sequenceofeventsandintensityofexperienceinevitablydiffersfromone'sown,placeslimitsonone's
understandingofanother.Asaconsequence,theobjectivemeaningsoflanguage,definedin
dictionariesasinvariantregardlessofusers,alsobearsubjectiveconnotationsforlanguageusersdueto
theiruniquehistoriesoflinguisticexperience,eventhoughforpracticalpurposesofcommunication
theyareabletosetasidesuchdifferences.Forinstance,onewouldhavetoconsiderindepthGoethe's
worksasawholetounderstandwhathemeantbydemonic.Schutz'sbasicpointinalltheseexamples

involvesgettingbehindconstitutedmeaningstothetemporalprocessesbywhichactorsbuildupthe
meaningoftheirownactionsameaningfulbuildupaccentuatedbytheGermantitleofhis
PhenomenologyoftheSocialWorld(DersinnhafteAufbaudersozialenWelt).
Inadditiontothisaccountofconsciousness,motivation,andaction,heexaminedthestructureofthe
socialworld,includingConsociateswhosharethesametimeandspatialaccesstoeachother'sbodies,
Contemporarieswithwhomonesharesonlythesametime,andPredecessorsandSuccessorswith
whomonedoesnotsharethesametimeandtowhoselivedbodiesonelacksaccess.Consociates,
presenttoeachotherphysically,partakeofeachother'sinnertime,thatis,theonrollinglifeofthe
other,graspthebuildingupoftheother'sexperience,andliveinaWerelationshipthatentails
growingoldertogether.WhileConsociatesrevisetheirtypesofeachotherimmediately,onemust
proceedmoreinferentiallywithContemporaries,Predecessors,andSuccessors,constructingideal
typesbasedonlettersorreportsandrunninggreaterrisksofmisunderstanding,dependingonthe
degreeofanonymityofthepersontobeunderstood.Onecouldsay,then,thatWeber'smethodofideal
typeconstruction,illustratedinhissociologicalaccountoftheProtestantattheoriginsofcapitalism,is
notreallythatforeigntotheeverydaylifeworldinwhichactorsbeyondtheConsociatelevel
continuallyrelatetoeachotherviasuchtypeconstruction.Humanactorsineverydaylifealreadyadopt
towardeachothertheattitudesofsocialscientists.
Schutzconceivedhisworkasdevelopingaphenomenologicalpsychologyofinnerexperienceand
focusingontheinvariantfeaturesofthelifeworldtowardwhichtheoreticians,includingsocial
scientists,turnreflectively.AlthoughJrgenHabermascriticizesSchutz'saccountofthelifeworldfor
beingabridgedinaculturalisticfashionandnotaddressinginstitutionalordersandpersonality
structures(Habermas1987,2:126132),itwouldseemthatSchutzhimselfdelimitshisownworkin
justthisfashion.Accordingtohim,socialscientistsdevelopconstructs,idealtypes,ofthemeaning
contextsoflifeworldactors,andtheytestthesetypestodetermineiftheyarecausallyadequate,thatis
conformingtopastexperience,andmeaningadequate,thatis,consistentwithwhateverelseisknown
abouttheactor.RespondingtoMises'scritiquethatWeber'sidealtypesaretoohistoricallyspecific,
SchutzsuggestedthatthelaterWeber'sidealtypesinEconomyandSocietyattainagenerality
comparabletothatofMises'owneconomictheory,whichitselfcouldbeinterpretedaspresenting
idealtypicaldescriptionsofthebehaviorofeconomicagents.ThelaterWeber'stypesdepictthe
invariantsubjectiveexperiencesofanyonewhoactswithintheeconomicframeworkasdefinedbythe
principleofmarginalutility,thatis,choosingtomaximizesatisfaction.

3.Extensions
3.1TheBergsonWritings
Schutz'smanuscriptsonBergson,producedfrom1925to1927andfinallypublishedinEnglishin
1982,illuminatehissubsequentworks,withwhichtheysharethegeneralpurposeofthegroundingof
thesocialsciencesintheThouexperience.(Schutz1982,34)Inreactiontopositivisticapproachesof
theSchlickCircle(inwhichFelixKaufmannparticipated)thatreducedexperiencetowhatthemethod
ofnaturalscientificobservationfoundtolerable,Schutzsoughttogiveanaccountofthelifeformof
prescientificexperienceprecedingconceptualcategoricalcomprehension,thehighestandmost
powerfullifeform(Schutz1982,53).Ofcourse,bymovinginthisdirection,heencounteredthe
problem,facedbyGeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,WilfridSellars,JohnMcDowell,RobertBrandom,
andothers,namely,howitispossibletoaccessthepreconceptualwithoutconceptualizingit.Hence,
heacknowledgedthathisworkisinconflictwithitsmaterialsinceitisforcedtoresortto
conceptualformulations(Schutz1982,70).Thisproblemparallelstheproblemofreachingthelife
formofthepresentunfoldingofexperience(duration)sinceonecanonlyspeakofitbyarrestingits
flow,distinguishingitsmoments,andthusrememberingwhathaslapsedbutthenoneisinthenew
lifeformofmemory.Althoughthisgapbetweenpresentdurationandmemorypromptedhisturnto
Husserlianphenomenology,theproblematicitselfhighlightedforhimthepervasivenessand
hiddennessofinterpretiveactivityasonemovesbetweeninterpretiveframeworksaprincipaltheme
ofallhislaterwork.Hetooknoticeofthisthemewhenhefrequentlypointedouthowone's
reconstitutionofapastexperienceinmemoryvariedaccordingtotheinterestsofthepresentfrom
whichonerememberedthepast.IndeedafavoriteexamplefromBergson'sworkinvolvedanactor
reflectinguponapriorprocessofchoosingandinterpretingitasifithadbeenachoicebetweentwo
clearlydefinedpossibilities,whereasinfacttheprocessoftenoscillatedbetweenseveraloptions,
retaining,reproducing,comparing,andmodifyingtheminsuccession.Ingeneral,Schutzconcurred
withBergsononsuchnotionssuchasattentiontolife,planesofconsciousness,thebodyasthe

intersectionofouterandinnertemporality,musicasthemodelofduration,andmultipletypesof
ordering,butrejectedhisbioevolutionarytheory,vitalism,andtheideaofasuprapersonaleln.

3.2TheSocialSciences
AlthoughSchutzdefendedWeberagainstMises,heagreedwithmanybasicpremisesofMisesandthe
Austriantraditionthatfocusedonthesubjectivepreferencesofthepurchaserconferringvalueon
objectsinsteadofexplainingvalueastheresultofobjectiveprocessessuchasproductioncostsorlabor
timeinvested.HealsosharedMises'ssuppositionsaboutvaluefreedomineconomicscience,theneed
todescriberatherthanevaluatepreferences,andtheinstrumentaltaskofscience,namely,ofshowing
howtoachieveendsratherthanassessingtheirvalue.SinceMisesconsideredallactingeconomic
insofarasanyconsumerchoiceinvolvedmaximizingsatisfactioninthewidestsense,heopposedthe
narrowtypeofthehomoeconomicus,modeledonthebusinesspersondrivensolelybyeconomic
motivesattheexpenseofallothers.Schutz,however,positedthelifeworldwithitswidediversityof
motivationsatthebaseofeconomictheory.Heconceivedsuchtheoryasadoptingareflective
perspectivegovernedbytheprincipleofmarginalutility,namely,thatidealtypesoughttobe
constructedasifallactorshadorientedtheirlifeplanstorealizethegreatestutilitywithminimal
cost.(Schutz1964,87)Besidesthusresuscitatingaversionofhomoeconomicus,Schutzinsistedthat
economistsstudypurposiverationalactions,which,inWeber'ssense,involvedareflectivecomparison
ofalternativeprojectsbeforeadoptingoneasaninordertomotive.Inaddition,heclassifiedthesense
ofuneasinessthatMisesdescribedaspromptingthesearchforsatisfactionunderthecategoryof
becausemotives;onefirstadoptsanrationallydeterminedeconomicprojectandinretrospectdiscovers
theprecedingdissatisfaction.Tounderstandthedifferencebetweenconceivingallactionaseconomic
andconceivingeconomicactionasonetypeofactionwithinanmoreencompassinglifeworld,one
mightcompareMiseswithSchutzwithreferencetoaproblemraisedwithincontemporarydiscussions
ofcollectiveaction,namely,howtraditionalnoneconomicvalues(e.g.,thoseofpoliticsorethics)
oughttointersectthemarket.Miseswouldcountenanceeconomicagentsregisteringtheirvalues
economically,thatis,bydecidingtopurchaseornot(e.g.asaprotestagainstpollutingcompanies),
therebyconvertingallvaluesintoeconomicones,whereasSchutzwouldcallforaprocessnegotiating
theboundariesbetweendifferentlifeworldvaluedomains.
InConceptandTheoryFormationintheSocialSciences,Schutzaddressedthebroaderissueofthe
relationshipbetweenphilosophyandthesocialsciencesingeneral.Inthatessay,Schutzrespondedto
ErnestNagel'spositivisticviewthatthesocialsciencesshouldmakeuseofnaturalscientificmethods,
identifyingevidencewithsensoryobservabledataandcriticizingtheWeberianmethodof
understandingasappealingtouncontrollableandunverifiableintrospection.Schutzagreedwith
Nagelonseveralcounts,namelythatsocialscientistsneededtovalidatetheoreticalbeliefs,thatlackof
predictabilityinthesocialsciencesdidnotdisqualifytheirscientificcharacter,andthatWeberwould
havebeenwrongifhismethodofsubjectiveinterpretationimpliedempathywithunobservable,
introspectivestates.Theproblemwas,though,thatthenaturalscientificapproachtothesocial
sciences,insofarasitseparatedverifiableobservablebehaviorfromunverifiableinnerstates(purposes,
emotions),seemedtoplayonthemapdrawnbyDescarteswhodivorcedbodyfrommindandallowed
onlystatementsabouttheformertobescientificallyverifiable.Further,thenaturalscientificapproach
dependedonabasicpresuppositionsincewithoutfirstexaminingtheobjectofsocialsciencesocial
reality,inSchutz'stermsonewouldbesimplypresupposingthatthemethodsofthenaturalsciences
wereappropriatetoitsstudy.Therefore,Schutzattemptedfirsttoclarifysocialreality,describedin
depthbyhisownphenomenologyofthesocialworld,andtoindicatehowactorssustainthatrealityby
understandingeachother'sinordertomotivesintypicalterms(e.g.,goingtoschool,makinga
purchase,marrying).Suchmutualunderstandingtakesplacewithouteithersomehoworother
penetratingintotheother'sprivate,innersanctum,orreducingtheothertothestatusofanimal
organismrespondingtostimuli.Giventhisaccountofsocialreality,inwhichactorsgivemeaningto
theirworld,asopposedtophysicalrealitywhoseobjects(e.g.,electrons,quarks)donotinterprettheir
world,Schutzarguedthattheappropriatesocialscientificmethodinvolveddevelopingconstructsof
everydayactor'sconstructs.Socialscientificconstructs,idealtypesinWeber'ssense,aimedat
capturingthesubjectivemeaningoftheactor,thatis,accordingtoWeber'sintentions,themeaningof
theactorasopposedtothesocialscientistandnotsomeintrospectiveinnerprocess.Schutzconceived
statisticalandotherformulationsofsocialscientificlawsasalegitimatekindofintellectualshorthand,
alwayspresupposingthemeaningfulactivityoftheindividualsocialactor,theforgottenmanofthe
socialsciences(Schutz1964,67).ToensurethekindofvalidationthatNagelsought,mistakenly
though,byrestrictinghimselftosensoryobservabledata,Schutzproposedthatsocialscientists

displacetheireverydaypracticalinterestsinfavorofaguidinginterestinaccuratescientificdescription
andobservepostulatesoflogicalconsistencyandadequacytotheexperiencesdescribed.
Inordertoelucidatethemeaningofrationalaction,Schutzhypothesizedwhatarationalactorwould
havetoknow,eventhoughsuchcompletelyrationalactionsmightneverberealizedineverydaylife.
Suchanactorwouldhavetoknow:anend'srelationshipwithotherends,theconsequencesandby
productsofrealizinganend,themeanssuitablefortheend,theinteractionofsuchmeanswithother
endsandmeans,andtheaccessibilityofthosemeans.Inaddition,therationalactorwouldneedto
understand:herinteractors'understandingofallthepreviousfactors,theinterpretationofheractby
others,thereactionsofotherpeopleandtheirmotivation,andtheusefulcategoriesshehadalready
discoveredinthesocialworld.Althoughsocialscientistsmightusesuchmodelsofcompletelyrational
actiontoassesstherationalityofeverydayactors,Schutzcautionedsocialscientiststhatiftheirtask
weretodescribelifeworldactors,theyalsoneededtobewaryofreplacingtheviewpointofeveryday
actorswithafictional,nonexistingworldconstructedbyscientificobservers.Infact,acentralpointof
discussioninthepublishedcorrespondencebetweenSchutzandTalcottParsonsconcernedthe
subjectiveviewpointoftheactor,whosesubacts,forexample,couldnotbeadequatelyunderstood
withoutcomprehendingtheactor'soverarchingproject,whosetemporalspanisatfirstaccessibleonly
tothatactor.Finally,itshouldbenotedthatSchutzhimselfproducedtwopiecesofappliedresearchin
whichheconstructedidealtypesoftheStrangerandtheHomecomer,takingaccountofwhattheir
experiencesmeanttotheminsteadofwhatsocialscientistsorothersmightthinktheymeant.

3.3OtherPhilosophies

Althoughreferencestophilosophersinthepragmatisttradition,suchasJohnDeweyandGeorge
HerbertMeadarescatteredthroughSchutz'swritings,itwastoWilliamJamesthathedevotedhisfirst
fulllengthessayafterarrivingintheUnitedStates.Brieflyalludingtothemethodologicaldifferences
betweenHusserlandJames,heemphasizedtwopointswherethegreatmastersconverged:the
streamofthoughtandthetheoryoffringes.Boththinkersstressedthatpersonalconsciousnessinvolves
nomultiplicityofelementsneedingtobereunited,butratheraunityfromwhichoneseparatesout
components,andtheyeachexaminedthemodificationsthatreflectionintroducesintothelivedstream,
convertinganIintoaMeoruncoveringtheworkingsofintentionality.Further,Husserl'sideathat
thekernelofmeaningdistinguishinganobjectstoodoutagainsttheunthematizednetworkof
relationshipsthatmakesupitshorizonparallelledJames'sbeliefthattopicshavetheirfringes.Such
fringesconnectatopicwithotherexperiences,suchthat,forinstance,onedoesnothearmerely
thunder,butthunderbreakinginuponsilenceandcontrastingwithit.Similarly,theJamesian
ideaaboutgraspingasaunitywhatmustbelearnedthroughamanysteppedprocesses,suchasthe
Pythagoreantheorem,couldbetranslatedintotheHusserlianterminologyregardingthemonothetical
graspingofpolytheticprocesses.Likewise,James'sdiscussionoffocusingonanobjectwithina
broadertopicresembledHusserl'sviewthatonecoulddiscernanoema,thatis,aperspectivalaspect
throughwhichathingconstitutedofmanysuchaspectspresenteditself.
AnotherAmericanphilosophertowhomSchutzdedicatedanentireessaywasGeorgeSantayana,
whoseDominationsandPowershereviewed.Whilemostoftheessaywasexpository,Schutzpraised
Santayana'sefforttobasepoliticsonaphilosophicalanthropologyandhisinsightsintotheenslaving
potentialoftechnology.However,Schutz,nodoubtconvincedbyMises'spositiveassessmentof
economicactivity,resistedSantayana'sreductionofittodomination.Likewise,asaphenomenologist
opposedtoaSantayana'snaturalisticfoundingofspiritonthephysicalorderofnature,Schutz
dissentedfromaconvictionderivedfromthisnaturalism,namely,thatdemocracycouldsolveit
problemsonlybyreturningtothegenerativeorderofagriculture.
BesidestheseinterchangeswithAmericanphilosophers,Schutz(laterinhiscareer)interpretedthe
workofMaxSchelerand(earlier)engagedthoroughlyhistreatmentofintersubjectivity,atopicthat
Schutzinsistedwastobetreatedwithinthenaturalattitude,inwhichoneneverdoubtedtheexistence
ofothers.SchutzagreedwithScheler'sbeliefthattheWeisgivenpriortotheIapositionthat
thelatterdefendedonthebasisofthepsychologyofchildrenandcultureslessaccustomedtoself
reflection.Schutzsupportedthispriority,howeverhedidsoonthegroundsthatwhilelivinginone's
actsinthenaturalattitudeandlivingalsointheother'spresentexperienceasitunfolds,oneatfirst
doesnotclearlydistinguishone'sownthoughtsfromothers'.Nevertheless,assoonasonereflectson
hisownstreamofconsciousnessandchildrenandculturesmaydevelopthiscapacityforself
reflectionlaterhebecomesawarethathisexperiencesarehisown.SchutzfoundplausibleScheler's
beliefintheinner(indubitable)perceptionoftheother,ifinnerperceptionreferstoanything
connectedwithmentallifeorifonelocatestheexperienceoflivinginthevividsimultaneityofthe

Wewithinhisownconsciousstream,asSchutzbelievedpossible.Howevermuchinthatvivid
simultaneityonemightbeunabletodoubttheother'sexistence,onecouldstillbemistakenabout
specificthoughtsoftheothers,sincebybelongingtotheother'sstreamofconsciousnessthesethoughts
sharethedubitabilitycharacterizingouterperceptions,likewisetranscendenttoone'sstreamof
experience.
Anotherfigure,moreorlesswithinthephenomenologicaltradition,whoseviewsonintersubjectivity
Schutzexaminedandcriticized,wasJeanPaulSartre,particularlytheSartreofBeingandNothingness.
InSartre'sTheoryoftheAlterEgo,SchutzelucidatedSartre'sattempttodevelopanextraempirical,
realcommunicationwiththeotherthatavoidstheextremesofanempiricistintersubjectivitybeginning
withtheother'sbodyandanidealistreductionoftheothertoaseriesofpresentations.Afterexplaining
Sartre'sdifferencesregardingintersubjectivitywithHusserl,Hegel,andHeidegger,Schutzlaidout
Sartre'sexistentialaccountofhowtheotherisgivenasasubjectthroughtheLookandhowonecanin
turnobjectifytheotherbyreturningthegaze.AlthoughSartrehadintendedtodescribehowone'sbody
isgiventotheother,heinsteadportrayedhowtheother'sbodyisgiventooneself,assumingthatsuch
descriptionswerereversible.Schutz,whodidnotbelievethattheproblemofintersubjectivitycouldbe
addressedadequatelywithinthetranscendentalsphere,applaudedSartre'srejectionofofHusserl's
transcendentalapproachtointersubjectivity;however,Sartre'semphasisontheotherasacenterof
activityreflectedacontinuingHusserlianinfluence.Themainproblem,though,withSartre'sdoctrine
wasthatitsstartingpointinamutuallooking,bywhicheachsubjectreducestheothertoanobject,
precludedanypossibilityofarelationshipbetweentheIsubjectandothersubject.Further,Schutz
wonderedhowSartrewouldknowthattheother'sbodywasgiventohiminthesamewaythathisbody
wastotheotheriftheother'ssubjectivityescapedhisI.Moreover,Schutzacknowledgedthatthe
other'sinterestsmightnotcoincidewithhisown,buthefailedtoseehowthisfactentailedthateither
theotherorhereduceeachothertoautensil.Instead,hepointedtothemutualtuningintobefound
inmakingmusictogetherandinlanguageasproofthatsubjectsinteractascoperforming
subjectivitiesandthatmutualinteractioninfreedombetterdescribesintersubjectivitythanSartre's
practicalsolipsism.

3.4Applications

In1945,Schutzpublishedanessay,OnMultipleRealities,thatextendedthetheoryofThe
PhenomenologyoftheSocialWorldandanticipatedlateressaysapplyingthattheory.Whilehe
reiteratedearlierviewsaboutlevelsofactivity,Bergsoniantensionsofconsciousness,andthestructure
ofthesocialworld,hisworktookadecidedlypragmatictwist,emphasizingworking(Wirken)as
involvingbodilymovementsasopposedtothecovertperformancesofmerethinking.Inmanuscriptsin
the1930sandafterThePhenomenologyoftheSocialWorld,Schutzhadalreadyturnedinthis
pragmaticdirection.InOnMultipleRealities,heenlargedupontheworldofworkingby
demonstratinghowreflectiondissolvestheselfunifiedinlivedactionintopartial,roletakingselves
andbyexpandingMead'sideaofthemanipulatoryspheretoincludeworldswithinpotentialreach,
eitherrestorable(fromthepast)orattainable(inthefuture).Thisworldofworkingconstitutesthe
paramountreality,organizedinitsinterestsinthefaceofthefundamentalanxietythatderives,asitdid
forHeidegger,fromtheinescapabilityofone'sowndeath.FollowingHusserl'sviewsonhow
consciousnesscanmodifyitsstancestowardrealityanddeontologizingJames'ssubuniversesof
reality,Schutzdevelopedthenotionofvariousfiniteprovincesofmeaning.Oneentersanyofthese
provinces,suchasthoseofphantasms,dreams,thetheater,religiousexperience,ortheoretical
contemplation,byundergoingdifferenttypesofepoch,analogoustothephenomenologicalprotoype,
aswhenoneslipsintoadaydream,fallsasleep,watchestheatercurtainsopen,commencesaritual,or
assumesthescientist'srole.Eachprovincecontainsitsdistinctivelogical,temporal,corporal,and
socialdimensions,andmovementbetweentheprovincesonlybecomesparadoxical(e.g.,askinghow
phenomenologistsareabletocommunicatetheirprivatefindingspublicly)ifoneconceivesthe
provincesasontologicalstaticrealmstowhichonetransmigratesasasoultoanotherworld.Ratherthe
provincesarepermeable,andoneadoptstheattitudesofscientistorreligiousbelieverwithintheworld
ofworkingasifitwereseenthroughbyanotherviewpoint,allthewhilethatitscommunicative
activitiessubtendtheseotherprovinces.Thereissomethingparadoxical,though,aboutdescribingone's
dreamsortheorizingaboutreligiousexperiencesincetogiveanaccountonemustabsentoneselffrom
theprovinceforwhichoneaccounts,andKierkegaard'snotionofindirectcommunicationandvarious
postmoderncritiquesoftheoryaddressthemselvestojustsuchparadoxes.
TheessayonmultiplerealitiesunderpinsSchutz'stheoryofsignsandsymbolsinSymbol,Reality,
andSociety,publishedalmosttenyearslater.Synthesizingthenotionofpotentialreachfromthe

earlieressaywithHusserl'sconceptofappresensation,namelythatoneelementofapairrefersto
anothernotdirectlygiveninexperience,Schutzdescribeshowagentsovercomewhatevertranscends
them.Hencetheyleavemarkstobringwithinreachwhattheyleavebehind(e.g.,breakingatwigto
remindoneselftoturnwhenonereturns)orfollowindications,thatis,regularconnectionsnotoftheir
making(e.g.smokeindicatinganotyetvisiblefire),tobringwithintheirknowledgewhatliesbeyond
it.Signs,however,appresentinanintersubjectivesettingthemeaningsofonepersontoanother,butan
insuperabletranscendencestillremainsinsofarastheeachone'sstreamofconsciousnessandtherefore
meaningsareneveridenticalwithanother's.Finally,throughsymbols,developedwithingroups,
somethinggivenwithineverydayrealityappresentsarealitybelongingtoaentirelydifferentprovince
ofmeaning,anultimatetranscendence(e.g.,thestonewhereJacobdreamedofaladdertoheaven
memorializesGod,accessiblewithinthereligiousprovinceofmeaning).
Schutzdealtwiththisthemeoflanguageinothercontexts,comparingHusserl'sdistinctionbetween
prepredicative(prepropositional)andpredicativelevelswithKurtGoldstein'sseparation,basedon
studiesofbrainlesions,ofaconcreteattituderelyingonautomaticspeechassociationsfromanabstract
attitudeformingpropositionsandutilizingrationallanguage.Husserl'sprepredicative/predicative
differentiationplaysakeyroleinSchutz'sessayTypeandEidosinHusserl'sLatePhilosophy,in
whichheshowsagradualdevelopmentfromempiricaltypespassivelyconstitutedwithinthe
prepredicativespheretopresumptiveuniversalsspontaneouslyformedinthepredicativesphere.Atthe
predicativelevel,scientificreflectionfurthertransformsnonessentialtypes(e.g.,thatwhalesarefish)
intoessentialones(whalesaremammals),andphilosophyseekseideticuniversals.Attheendofthis
essay,SchutzspeculateswhethertheHusserlianmethodoffreelyvaryingexamplestodeterminethe
essentialfeaturesthatsurvivethroughsuchvariationsisnotconstrainedbybothontologicalstructure
(e.g.,soundsarenotcolors)andthesociallyshaped,naturalattitudeexperienceoftypes.Inhisessay
Tiresias,orourKnowledgeofFutureEvents,producedcontemporaneouslywiththetypeessay,
Schutzexplainshowknowledgebasedonnaturalattitudetypesfunctionsincontrasttothemythical
Tiresias'knowledgeofthefuture,whichisprivateanddetachedfromhispresentorpastexperience.
Thesetypes,basedonpastexperiencesorsociallytransmitted,aimatfutureoccurrencesnotintheir
uniquenessbutwithanemptinessthatfutureeventswillfillin,suchthatonlyinretrospect,afteran
eventoccurs,isoneabletodeterminehowmuchthateventwasexpectedorunexpected.Finally,there
arefutureeventslyingbeyondone'sinfluencethatoneexpectsonlytoconformwithpastexperience
andthereareindeterminateprojectsthatprovidedirectionnottootightly,thoughasonegives
shapetowhatiswithinone'spower.
Schutz,himselfatrainedpianistandwidelyreadmusicologist,integratedhisphenomenologywithhis
understandingofmusic.Music,differingfromlanguageinbeingnonrepresentative,lendsitselfto
phenomenologicalanalysisinthemeaningitcarriesbeyonditsmerephysicalnatureassoundwaves
andinitscharacterasanidealobjectthatmustbeconstitutedthroughitsunfoldingstages,i.e.,
polythetically.Furthermusicisboundtoinnertemporality,anditsthemes,eventhoughtheirnote
sequencesarethesame,varyaccordingtocontext,requirereflectionfortheirrecognition,andemerge
throughaninterplaybetweenmusicalelementsandthelistener'sattentionandinterest.Schutzfound
musicinstructiveinregardtosocialrelationshipsinsofaras,priortoanycommunication,partiesto
musicalperformancesestablishanonlinguistic,nonconceptualmutualtuninginrelationship.This
tuningin,thissharingofanother'sfluxofexperienceininnertimealreadydescribedinhis
Phenomenology,isveryclearlyexhibitedwheneveralistenertoamusicalperformanceparticipatesin
quasisimultaneityinthecomposer'sstreamofconsciousnessorwhencoperformersorientthemselves
toeachother,thecomposer,andtheaudience.Hence,SchutzdisagreedwithMauriceHalbwachswho
positedmusicalnotationasthebasisofsocialrelationshipsbetweenperformers,wheninfactitis
merelyatechnicaldeviceaccidentaltotheirrelationship.Inanotheressay,SchutzdepictedMozartasa
socialscientist,presentingasuccessionofsituationsthatdifferentcharactersinterpret,andSchutz
showedhoworchestralrepresentationsofcharactersandtheirmoodsinmelodymadepossiblea
simultaneityoffluxesofinnertimethatthenonoperatic,nonmusicaldramatistcouldonlyunfold
successively.Withoutselfconsciouslyphilosophizing,Mozartconveyedinmusicandbetterthanmost
philosophersintheirownmedium,howhumanbeingsmeeteachotherasaWe.
FredKerstendiscoversinSchutz'smusicalwritingsimportantphilosophicalinsights.Forinstance,
musicandinnertimeunfoldpolytheticallyandcannotbegraspedmonothetically;thatis,onemustlive
throughtheunfoldingofasymphonyorinnerexperience,andanyconceptualsummaryoftheir
contentsinevitablyfailstodojusticetotheirmeaning.However,sinceallconceptualizationconsistsin
amonotheticalgraspingofpolytheticstages,Schutzisactuallyrealizingthatcertaindimensionsof

consciousnesseludeconceptualizationandthusdemarcatingthelimitsofrationalization,justashehad
pointedouthowcertainprovincesofmeaning(e.g.dreams)evadetheoreticcomprehensionorduration
eludesmemory.AccordingtoKersten,Schutzhasseenclearlythatthepassiveassociationsoflistening
(e.g.recognizingtheappearanceofsymphonictheme)differfromthoseofsight(e.g.,apprehendingan
objectlikeahouse)andthatlisteningdoesnotidentifynumericallydistinctitemsbutproducesan
illusionofidentification.Schutz'sconclusionthatsamenessinmusicinvolvesnotnumericalunitybut
recurrentlikenesschallengesthefundamentalHusserlianthesisthatthesynthesisofpassive
identificationisuniversal,atthebasisoftheconstitutionoftheworld.
Schutzwasalsoamasterofliterature,acarefulstudentoftheworksofGoethe,andauthorofanarticle
thatanalyzedMigueldeCervantes'sDonQuixotethroughtheprismofthetheoryofmultiplerealities.
CervantesrepeatedlybringsQuixote'sworldofchivalryanorderofrealitywithitsargumentsfor
itsownreality,itsstockofknowledge,modesofsocialreinforcement,andviewsaboutspace,time,
andcausalityintoconflictwiththeworldsofdrama,commonsense,andscience.AlthoughQuixote
iscapableofconstructingadefenseofhisownchivalrousworldfromwithinthatworld,thefactthat
thisphantasiedworldcontainsanenclaveofdreams(atthecaveofMontesinos)endsupundermining
itbyraisingthepossibilitythatititselfisbutadream.Quixote'swithdrawaloftheaccentofreality
fromhisprivateprovinceofmeaningrevealsforSchutztheimportanceoftheparamountrealityof
everydaylifeandthevalueofSanchoPanzawhoremainsdeeplyrootedintheheritageofcommon
sense.(Schutz1964,158)
Schutzalsobroughthisphenomenologytobearonpoliticalissuessuchascitizenshiporracialequality.
HisessayTheWellInformedCitizen,dealingnotonlywithcitizenshipbutalsothesociologyof
knowledgeundertherubricofthesocialdistributionofknowledge,constructsidealtypesoftheexpert,
themanonthestreet,andthewellinformedcitizen(towhomitfallstodeterminewhichexpertsare
competent).Schutzdelineatesvariouszonesofinterests,orrelevances,extendingfromthosewithin
reachtothoseabsolutelyirrelevant,commentsontheconstantchangeabilityofrelevance
configurations,anddifferentiatesbetweenrelevancesintrinsictoatheme,whichonechooses,and
thoseimposed.Paradoxically,asmodernity'srationalizationprocessesheightenanonymity,modern
technologyalsobringseveryonewithinreach,asthenucleararmsracedemonstrates,andSchutz
suggestsasasolutionthatcitizensbecomebroadlyinformedratherthansuccumbtothenarrow
dogmatismofthemanonthestreetortheshortsightedspecializationofexperts.Inbecomingwell
informed,onedependsonknowledgesociallyderivedthroughtheconsultationofeyewitnesses,
insiders,analysts,andcommentators,dependingontheiraccesstofactsandgoverningrelevances,
muchasAlvinGoldman'ssocialepistemologyinvolvesappraisingtheveritisticvalueofassorted
agents'claimsandpractices.Schutz,usuallythevaluefreedescriberofsocialreality,inhisconclusion
endorsesanormativenotionofdemocracyinwhichitisadutyandaprivilege,frequentlynotavailable
innondemocraticsocieties,forwellinformedcitizenstoexpressanddefendopinionsthatoften
conflictwiththeuninformedopinionsofthemaninthestreet.
SchutzcomposedEqualityandtheMeaningStructureoftheSocialWorldatthetimeofthelegal
decisionofBrownv.BoardofEducationthatendedraciallysegregatededucationintheUnitedStates.
Withtypicaldispassion,Schutzexplainshowthemeaningofthetermequalitydependsonthe
domainofrelevancestowhichitpertains(e.g.,economicequality,equalityofcivilrights,etc.)andon
theingrouporoutgrouputilizingitandhereheconceivesinterpretationintermsofgroupsrather
thanindividuals.Hespendsmostoftheessaycontrastingsubjectiveandobjectiveinterpretationsof
groupmembership,equality,andequalityofopportunity,construingsubjectiveandobjectivein
termsofingroupandoutgroupinterpretations.Asregardsgroupmembership,heillustratesthatthe
merecategorizationofanotherasamemberofagroupneednotbediscriminatory,butdependsupon
anappropriateevaluationofthecategoryfromtheviewpointofthecategorizedindividual.Ingroups
andoutgroupsdifferinwhethertheyunderstandequalitymerelyasformal,i.e.,as
nondiscrimination,orreal,callingforspecialrightsandservices.Similarlygroupsthinkofequality
ofopportunityfromanoutgroupperspectiveasthecareeropentoallwithoutappreciatinghowin
groupmembersmightsubjectivelyexperienceinsuperableobstaclesintryingtoavailthemselvesof
opportunitiessupposedlyobjectivelyequal.Inthisessay,Schutzisconcernednottopresentafinal
definitionofequality,buttohighlightthedifferencesbetweeningroupandoutgroupunderstandings
thatserveasthepreconditionsofanydiscussionaboutit.
SomerecentlypublishedtextsthatSchutzauthoredduringanethicsinstitutein1956makepossiblean
evenricherawarenessofhisviewsonpolitics.Inthesedocuments,herecognizesthecomplex,
unforeseenconsequencesresultingfromsocialchange,urgesactiveengagementwithothersascrucial

fordevelopingsocialandciviljudgment,andexaminesthebarrierstosoundciviljudgmentcreatedby
government,politicalparties,pressureorganizations,massmedia,andeducational,familial,religious,
andprofessionalinstitutions.Atonepoint,heevencriticizesviewsthatlimitdemocracytomere
majoritarianruleinsofarastheyneglecttheimportanceofthesingleindividual'sabilitytomakehis
personalopinionbeheardandappreciated,preferablyinsmallerpublics,suchasfamilies,schools,
localcommunities(citedinL.Embree1999,271).OnecouldtakeSchutz'sthoughtsheretoconverge
withpoliticaltheoriesfavoringwhatistodayknownasdeliberativedemocracy.Moroever,his
normativejudgmentagainstimplementationsofdemocracythatincreasetheanonymityofcitizens
suggeststhataparallelnormative,evenethical,dimensioninformshismanytheoreticendeavorsto
retrievefromanonymitytheneglectedsubjectiveviewpointofactors,whetherstrangers,homecomers,
victimsofdiscrimination,ortheforgottenmanofsocialsciences.

3.5Phenomenology

Schutz'sphilosophicaltargetingofthesocialworldhaditsrepercussionsuponphenomenology,
particularlyinhiscritiqueneartheendofhiscareerofHusserl'saccount(alsoreferredtoasa
transcendentalconstitution)ofhowtheotherpersoncomestoappearanceinconsciousness.InThe
ProblemofTranscendentalIntersubjectivityinHusserl,SchutzfirstobjectedwhenHusserlinhisFifth
CartesianMediationpreparedthegroundfortheother'sappearanceinconsciousnessbythe
methodologyofscreeningoffeverythingthatreferredtootherminds.HusserlhadbeguntheCartesian
Meditationsbyreflectivelyabstainingfrombelievingintheexistenceofwhatappearedinexperience
inordertorefrainfromanydogmaticsuppositions,butsincethisfirstepoch,orphenomenological
reduction,stillleftmeaningswithintersubjectivereferences,thescreeningoffmethodology,orsecond
epoch,becamenecessary.ForHusserl,one'sactualorpotentialexperiencesofcorrelatesthatwerenot
properlyoftheegostillwouldbelongtoone'ssphereofownness,butonehadtoseektoexcludeany
referencethosecorrelates,asproductsofthesensedeterminingofothersubjectivities,mighthaveto
thoseothersubjectivities.ForSchutz,however,insofarasthoseexperiencesofwhatwasnotproperly
oftheego,supposedlyconfinedwithinthesphereofownness,hadtheiroriginintheintersubjective
worldofeverydaylifethathigherlevelphenomenologicalreflectionpresupposed,itseemeddifficultto
seehowonecouldexcludefromsuchcorrelatesanyreferencetothesensedetermininingofother
subjectivities.ItwasasthoughHusserlwasstrivingforatheoreticaldetachmentthattheontological
originsoftheorywouldnotallow.Inaddition,forSchutztheveryconsciousnessofanotherinevitably
institutedarelationshipwithher.Husserl'sargumentintheFifthMeditationcontinuedbyaffirming
thatanonratiocinativepairingoccurredthroughwhichonetransferredthesenseanotherliving
bodytoanother.Onecouldthenverifythattheother'slivingbodywaslikeone'sownifitcontinued
manifestingbehaviorcongruentwithwhatonewouldexpectofalivingbody.Schutzchallengedthis
sensetransfer,however,sinceoneexperiencedtheother'sbodyfromtheoutside,unlikeone'sown,
whichwasgiveninteriorily(butmightthesimilaritiessufficeforthetransfer?),andhesuggestedthat
verificationthroughwhatwascongruentbehaviordrewonsocialworldpresuppositionsofhow
bodiesoughttobehave.Finally,hequestionedwhetherthephilosopher,refrainingfrombeliefinthe
existenceoftheworldorothersandenteringintoacertainreflectivesolitude,couldeverexperience
thetranscendentalcommunityofwhichHusserlspoke,sincesheonlyconstitutedtheworldforherself
andnotforallothertranscendentalegos.Intersubjectivity,Schutzconcluded,wasamatterofeveryday
lifetobesimplydescribedandnottobeconstitutedwithinthetranscendentalsphereofaselfreflective
consciousnessgivinganaccountofhowtheothercomestoappearance.JustasSchutzhadarguedthat
thesocialworlddictatedthemethodsforitsownsocialscientificinvestigation,sohereitseemedto
prescribetophenomenologytheapproachappropriatetoitsdescription.
Inthelastthirteenyearsofhislife,Schutzwaspreparingacomprehensivephenomenologyofthe
naturalattitude,andonemanuscript,editedbyRichardZaner,wasposthumouslypublishedas
ReflectionsontheProblemofRelevance,andanother,coauthoredbyThomasLuckmann,appearedas
TheStructuresoftheLifeWorld.Theformerbookdistinguishesdifferentsetsofinterests,or
relevances:topical(whichfocusattentiononthemes),interpretive(whichconfermeaningson
experiencesorobjects),andmotivational.Suchrelevancesofteninvolveasubject,withmoreorless
systematicinterests,orrelevances,interactingwiththeworld,andfromthisinteractionbetweensubject
andworld,itbecomesevidentwhatisofrelevancetoanactor.Theserelevances,interdependenton
eachotherandconjoinedwithone'ssystemoftypesorcategories,constituteastockofknowledge,
whichSchutzexaminesintermsofitsgenesisandstructure.Hefurtherexploresthemeaningofone's
biographicalsituation,includingtypesandrelevances,one'sbody,andtheontologicalconstraintsof

spaceandtimethat,forinstance,preventonefrombeingatcertainplacesatcertaintimesorcompel
onetowait(forsalttodissolveinwater).
TheStructuresoftheLifeWorldrepresentsamostcomplexandthoroughrestatementofmanyofthe
themesSchutzaddressedthroughouthislife.Afteramoregeneralaccountofthelifeworldandits
relationtothesciences,thebooktakesupitsvariousstratifications,suchasprovincesofmeaning,
temporalandspatialzonesofreach,andsocialstructure.SchutzandLuckmannthencommentonthe
componentsofone'sstockofknowledge,includinglearnedandnonlearnedelements,relevancesand
types,andtracethebuildupofsuchastock.Theauthorsstudythesocialconditioningofone's
subjectivestockofknowledgeandinquireaboutthesocialstockofknowledgeofagroupanddifferent
possiblecombinationsofknowledgedistribution(generalizedandspecialized).Theyconsiderhow
subjectiveknowledgebecomesembodiedinasocialstockofknowledgeandhowthelatterinfluences
theformer.Inaddition,theauthorspursuesuchissuesasthestructuresofconsciousnessandaction,the
choosingofprojects,rationalaction,andformsofsocialaction,whethersuchactionbeunilateralor
reciprocal,immediateormediate.Afinalsectionanalyzestheboundariesofexperience,different
degreesoftranscendencies(fromsimplybringinganobjectwithinreachtotheexperienceofdeath),
andthemechanismsforcrossingboundaries(e.g.symbols).

Bibliography
WorksbySchutz

1932,DersinnhafteAufbaudersozialenWelt:EineEinleitungindieverstehendenSoziologie,
Vienna:Springer(alsoin1960)andFrankfurt:Suhrkamp,1974;Englishtranslation:The
PhenomenologyoftheSocialWorld,trans.G.WalshandF.Lehnert,Evanston:Northwestern
UniversityPress,1967.
1962,CollectedPapersI:TheProblemofSocialReality,ed.MauriceNatanson,TheHague:
MartinusNijhoff.
1964,CollectedPapersII:StudiesinSocialTheory,ed.ArvidBrodersen,TheHague:
MartinusNijhoff.
1966,CollectedPapersIII:StudiesinPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,ed.I.Schutz,The
Hague:MartinusNijhoff.
1970,OnPhenomenologyandSocialRelations:SelectedWritings,ed.H.Wagner,Chicago:
UniversityofChicagoPress.
1971,ReflectionsontheProblemofRelevance,ed.R.M.Zaner,NewHaven:YaleUniversity
Press.
1972,ChoiceandtheSocialSciences,inLesterEmbree,ed.LifeWorldandConsciousness,
Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,565596.
1973,(withT.Luckmann),TheStructuresoftheLifeWorld,trans.R.M.ZanerandT.
Engelhardt,Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,andLondon:Heinemann;German
edition:StrukturenderLebenswelt,vol.1,Neuwied:Luchterhand,1975;vol.2:The
StructuresoftheLifeWorld,trans.R.M.ZanerandDavidJ.Parent,Evanston:Northwestern
UniversityPress,1983;Germanedition:StrukturenderLebenswelt,vol.2,Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp,1984.
1976,FragmentsonthePhenomenologyofMusicinInSearchofMusicalMethod,ed.F.J.
Smith,London,NewYork,andParis:GordonandBreachSciencePublishers,2371.
1978,(withT.Parsons),TheTheoryofSocialAction:TheCorrespondenceofAlfredSchutz
andTalcottParsons,ed.R.Grathoff,BloomingtonandLondon:IndianaUniversityPress;
Germanedition:ZurTheoriesozialenHandelns:Briefwechsel/AlfredSchutz,TalcottParsons,
Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1977.
1982,LifeFormsandMeaningStructure,trans.,ed.H.Wagner,London:Routledgeand
KeganPaul;Germanedition:TheoriederLebensformen,ed.,I.Srubar,Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,
1981.
1989,(withA.Gurwitsch),PhilosophersinExile:TheCorrespondenceofAlfredSchutzand
AronGurwitsch,19391959,ed.,R.Grathoff,trans.,J.C.Evans,Bloomingtonand
Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress.
1996,CollectedPapersIV,ed.H.WagnerandG.Psathas,incollaborationwithF.Kersten,
Dordrecht,Boston,London:KluwerAcademicPublishers.

1997,PositivisticPhilosophyandtheActualApproachofInterpretativeSocialScience:An
IneditumofAlfredSchutzfromSpring1953,ed.L.Embree,HusserlStudies,14:123149.
1999,SomeConsiderationsconcerningThinkinginTermsofBarriers,Memorandum(to
DoctorHaroldLasswell),ReportontheDiscussionsofBarriertoEqualityofOpportunity
fortheDevelopmentofPowerofSocialandCivilJudgment,LetterofAlfredSchutzto
ClarenceH.Faust,TheFundfortheAdvancementofEducation,allinL.Embree,The
EthicalPoliticalSideofSchutz:HisContributionsatthe1956InstituteonEthicsconcerned
withBarrierstoEqualityofOpportunity,inSchutzianSocialScience,ed.L.Embree,
Dordrecht,Boston,London:KluwerAcademicPublishing,235318.
2003,TheoriederLebenswelt1:DiepragmatischeSchichtungderLebenswelt,ed.M.
EndressandI.Srubar,vol.5,1:AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.Soeffner,
andI.Srubar,Redaction,M.Endress,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2003,TheoriederLebenswelt2:DiekommunikativeOrdnungderLebenswelt,ed.H.
Knoblauch,R.Kurt,andHG.Soeffner,vol.5,2:AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,
HG.Soeffner,andI.Srubar;Redaction,M.Endress,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2004,(withEricVoegelin),EineFreundschaft,dieeinLebenausgehaltenhat:Briefwechsel
19381959,ed.G.WagnerandG.Weiss,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2004,DersinnhafteAufbaudersozialenWelt:EineEinleitungindieverstehendeSoziologie,
ed.M.EndressandJ.Renn,vol2:AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.
Soeffner,andI.Srubar;Redaction,M.Endress,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2004,RelevanzundHandeln1:ZurPhnomenologiedesAlltagswissens,ed.E.List,vol.6,1:
AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.Soeffner,andI.Srubar;Redaction,M.
Endress,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2005,PhilosophischphnomenologischeSchriften2:StudienzuScheler,James,undSartre,
ed.H.KellnerundJ.Renn,vol.3,2:AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.
Soeffner,andI.Srubar;Redaction,M.Endress,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2006,SinnundZeit:FrheWienerStudien,ed.M.Michailow,vol.1:AlfredSchtz
Werkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.Soeffner,andI.Srubar;Redaction,M.Endress/G.
Sebald,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2009,PhilosophischphnomenologischeSchriften1:ZurKritikderPhnomenologie
EdmundHusserls,ed.G.SebaldincollaborationwithR.GrathoffandT.Michael;Redaction,
G.Sebald,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2009,PrivateFamilyJournalofFirstTriptotheUnitedStatesofAmerica,trans.EvelynS.
Lang,SchutzianResearch,1:245271.
2009,Understanding,Selfreflection,andEquality:AlfredSchutz'sParticipationinthe1955
ConferenceonScience,Philosophy,andReligion,ed.MichaelBarber,SchutzianResearch,
1:273291.
2009,PhilosophischphnomenologischeSchriften1:ZurKritikderPhnomenologie
EdmundHusserls,ed.GerdSebaldbasedonpreliminaryworkbyRichardGrathoffand
MichaelThomas,vol.3,1:AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.Soeffner,andI.
Srubar,Redaction,M.Endress,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2010,ZurMethodologiederSozialwissenschaften,ed.ThomasS.Eberle,JochenDreherand
GerdSebald,Vol4:AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.Soeffner,andI.
Srubar,Redaction,M.Endress,Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2010,TheProblemofTranscendentalIntersubjectivityinHusserl(withCommentsofDorion
CairnsandEugenFink),trans.FredKersten,SchutzianResearch,2:951.
2010,ProblemsofaSociologyofLanguage(FallSemester,1958),ed.FredKersten,
SchutzianResearch,2:53105.
2011,RelevanzundHandeln2:Fremdheit,GesellschaftlichesWissen,Politik,ed.Andreas
Gttlich,GerdSebaldandJanWeyand,Vol.6(2):AlfredSchtzWerkausgabe,ed.R.
Grathoff,HG.Soeffner,andI.Srubar,Redaction,M.Endress,Konstanz:UVK
Vergesellschaft,mbH.
2011,CollectedPapersV.PhenomenologyandtheSocialSciences,ed.LesterE.Embree,
Dordrecht:Springer.
2011,InterviewwithDr.AlfredSchutz,(November20,1958NewYorkCity),Interviewed
BettinaBienGreaves,SchutzianResearch,3:2330.

2012,CollectedPapersVI.LiteraryRealityandRelationships,ed.MichaelD.Barber,
Dordrecht:Springer.
2013,SchriftenzurLiteratur,ed.MichaelD.BarberandJochenDreher,Vol.8:AlfredSchtz
Werkausgabe,ed.R.Grathoff,HG.Soeffner,andI.Srubar,Redaction,M.Endress,
Konstanz:UVKVergesellschaft,mbH.
2013,FragmentofaPhenomenologyofRhythm,transcription,ed.&trans.GerdSebaldand
JasminSchreyer,SchutzianResearch,5:1122.

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