GERMANYS ROLE IN CAUSING WORLD WAR I

Britain fought the First World War essentially to uphold the balance of power, 21 and to keep Belgium, long regarded as the
outer fortification of Fortress Britannia, from German occupation. Any assessment of Britain's decision to go to war must begin
with a survey of the state of the debate on the origins of the conflict. In Forgotten Victory I argued that the notorious 'War Guilt'
clause (Article 231 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles) was essentially correct in blaming the war on 'the aggression of Germany
and her allies' .22 Nothing that I have read since has caused me to change that view. There is a consensus among historians that
the primary responsibility for bringing about war rests with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The work of the distinguished
German historian Stig Forster 'stresses that no serious historian today could be an apologist for German policy prior to August
1914' .23 However, as Annika Mombauer has recently commented, 'there are still commentators who refuse to acknowledge
Germany's large share of responsibility for the events that led to war' .24
It is clear that Austria-Hungary's aggression against Serbia 'plunged Europe into war'. Following the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Vienna wanted a limited war in the Balkans, but was prepared to run the risk of a general war; the
Austrian elite was astoundingly myopic as to the possible reaction of Russia. Germany's culpability is equally clear. On 5-6 July
1914, the Kaiser, in consultation with Bethmann Hollweg, his Chancellor, issued what became known as the 'blank cheque' of
support for Austria-Hungary's military actions. Now, with German support, the Austrians could initiate military action. Without
it, Vienna would have had to try another tack, 'something less punitive'. The German decision was taken in full knowledge of
the possible consequences. In short, the German elite was prepared to risk war. Some, like General Moltke the Younger, had
been urging war for some time. 25
Why was this decision arrived at? Some apologists for German actions in 1914 point to the emerging threat of Russia. After
the defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-05, the Russian armed forces were in a state of disarray. The Great Programme of
October 1913 was intended to rebuild Russian forces, possibly to deter German action against Russia's ally, France. In August
1914 completion of the programme was some years off, and even when finished would not have placed Russia in a position of
military superiority. 26 There is little doubt that the implications of Russian rearmament alarmed Berlin and Vienna, and led to
the view that war might be better' sooner rather than later' . 27 This is not much of a defence for German policy in July-August
1914. How Russia would have behaved if the Great Programme had been completed in peacetime is, of course, unknowable,
while the moral and political dilemmas involved in a pre-emptive conflict have been thrown into sharp focus in our own time.
During the July crisis, memory of German and Austrian 'coercion' during the Bosnian crisis of 1908 influenced Russian
policy. Militarily weak, the Russian elite believed that if they stood by and allowed Austria a free hand over Serbia, Russia
'would no longer be seen as a great power'. Russia's policy in 1914 was essentially defensive in the face of Austro-German
aggression. Although the fact that Russia mobilised first allowed the Germans to portray the war as a defensive one, that
mobilisation did not equate to a declaration of war, as Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, repeatedly informed the German
ambassador. The Russians needed up to 16 weeks to put their forces in a position to fight, and this period, they believed, could
be used for diplomacy. As far as culpability for the outbreak of the war goes, one inescapable fact is that 'Russia mobilized;
Germany declared war' .28
Famously, Fritz Fischer claimed that Germany went to war in 1914 to achieve world power. In particular, he argued that at a
War Council on 8 December 1912 the Kaiser and senior advisers decided to go to war about 18 months hence. Historians still
debate the meaning of this meeting, but at the very least the War Council provides powerful evidence of the willingness of the
German elite to contemplate aggressive war. Some argue that Berlin seized on the Serbian crisis to create conditions for a war
of conquest. In contrast, it has been argued that German decision-making during the July 1914 crisis was characterised by
'chaos and confusion rather than direction and design', and was concerned with the immediate crisis, rather than a Fischerite
deliberate bid for world power. 29 Even so Bethmann Hollweg, supported, as we have seen, by the Kaiser, took the 'calculated
risk' of seeking to split the Russian-French-British entente, without war if possible, but with war if necessary. Whether one sees
Germany as deliberately starting (or risking) war in a bid for European hegemony and world power, or for some lesser stake,
the finger of guilt points firmly at Berlin.
Jeremy Black has stressed that 'chance played a central role' in Britain entering the war in 1914. Britain no longer regarded
France and Russia as threatening, in part because of Russian defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905, thus leaving its ally, France,
open to German diplomatic pressure. A few years earlier Germany had seemed a natural ally of the British. 30 This view has
much to commend it, but one should not underestimate the extent to which the Germans made the weather. German behaviour
helped to create the conditions in which the three colonial powers formed an entente. In 1870-1 Prussia/Germany had defeated
France, and Britain had been able to live with the consequences. Germany's aims were essentially limited and German troops
stayed out of Belgium. The old balance of power was destroyed, but a new one was created and while Bismarck remained

Chancellor Germany lived within it. In 1914, pace (despite the views of) John Charmley,31 things were very different, thanks to
a decade and a half of German sabre-rattling, an unlimited approach to war and an attack on Belgium.
One historian has recently described the notion as 'very optimistic' that a victorious Germany would have proved to be a benign
influence. Rather, 'A continental hegemony exercised by a Hohenzollern supreme warlord flush with easy victory would
probably have had little room for liberalism, democracy, or British trade.' Moreover, if he had chosen to expand German power
beyond Europe, 'who could then have checked him?' 32 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson also locate Britain's entry into the war in
terms of the most simple national interest: 'survival as an independent, self-respecting state'. It had to prevent an enemy from
controlling continental Europe, seizing the Channel ports and mounting a serious challenge to the Royal Navy's domination of
the seas. By 1914, the importance of overseas trade to the British economy, and the problems of feeding Britain's population
from domestic produce meant that the German threat' came to surpass any menace it had confronted in the times of Philip II,
Louis XIV or Napoleon' .33
Still, Ferguson's argument remains attractive. We know, of course, that the war that broke out in August 1914 lasted until
November 1918, cost millions of lives and jerked world history into a groove that led to Stalin, Hitler and the threat of nuclear
annihilation. Anything, some say, would have been better than that. That seems to be the thinking behind Richard Schweitzer's
argument in his recent book The Cross and the Trenches. He accepts the 'compelling case' made in Forgotten Victory that
'Britain's vital national security interests were at stake in August 1914' in the Low Countries. Nevertheless, he goes on partially
to espouse Niall Ferguson's argument 'that Germany may have evolved into a benign hegemon ... the subsequent humanitarian
disasters in Russia and Germany, suggest that an early German victory in the war, may, depending on one's vantage point, have
been preferable' .34
All of this seems to turn on the ability of the Hohenzollern leopard to change his spots. The historical record - of the German
army's atrocities against civilians in 1914, a consequence of a 'Clausewitzian commitment to using the most ruthless means
necessary to win victory'; 35 the harsh treatment meted out to occupied territories in France, Belgium and Poland; the ruthless
exploitation of captured resources, including the use of forced labour; the emergence of the Hindenburg/Ludendorff military
dictatorship - none of this inspires confidence in the evolution of imperial Germany into a 'benign hegemon'. The British
decision-makers in August 1914 were not dealing with fantasies. They had to deal with Realpolitik, in the form of the gravest of
threats to national survival. To imagine that Britain could stay out of the war in the face of Germany's drive to the west in 1914
is wishful thinking. As Colin S. Gray has written in a direct rebuttal of Ferguson' s thesis:
Britain had no prudent choice other than to join the anti-German coalition in 1914. Had Britain stood aside,
Germany would have defeated France and Russia. Britain would then have been deservedly friendless, facing a
hegemonic Germany with an undamaged - indeed probably augmented - High Seas Fleet. 36
This situation would have been similar to the bleak prospect Britain had to face after Dunkirk, except that in 1940 the saving
grace was the severe damage to the Kriegsmarine in the Norway campaign. In Gray's all too plausible scenario, Britain would
have faced a Germany dominant on land and powerful at sea, and in the certain Anglo-German conflict that would have
followed Britain's worst strategic nightmare would have come true. The reputation of imperial Germany has benefited from
what came after. Hitler's regime was certainly worse than the Kaiser's, but the latter regime was decidedly unpleasant and
dangerous. The First World War took on the character of a struggle between liberal democracies (for all their faults, and
notwithstanding an alliance with Czarist Russia) and an anti-democratic, illiberal, militarist autocracy. This was the first of
three such challenges in the 20th century, the others being Nazi Germany and Marxist-Leninism during the Cold War. In
choosing to go to war in August 1914 Britain made a decision that, even in full knowledge of the ensuing carnage and suffering,
remains the correct one.
Gary Sheffield, Britain and the Empire at War: Reflections on a Forgotten Victory in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon (ed)
New Zealands Great War, Exisle Publishing, 2007, Pg 34-38

TASK: In this extract, Gary Sheffield argues that it was correct for Britain to declare war on Germany. What reasons does he
provide about Germanys actions and intentions in support of this argument?
Based on what you have learned, do you think Sheffields argument is convincing? Explain your conclusion.