G.R. No.

157984

July 8, 2004

MOISES SIMANGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11971 and its
Resolution denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
The petitioner Moises Simangan and Loreto Bergado were charged with murder in an Information filed with the
Circuit Criminal Court in Cagayan, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about February 10, 1980, in the municipality of Solana, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Moises Simangan y Trinidad and Loreto Bergado y Rigor
alias Boy, together with Bening Gomabong (sic), who is still at large and not yet apprehended, and two (2) John
Does, who were not identified, armed with guns and knives, conspiring together and helping one another, with
intent to kill; with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one Ernesto Flores, inflicting upon him several wounds on his body which caused his
death.
Contrary to law.[2]
The accused, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Case for the Prosecution
At 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, the petitioner, Loreto Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two other male
persons arrived at the store of the spouses Ernesto Flores and Sofronia Saquing in Barangay Maasin, Solana,
Cagayan. The Flores Spouses, along with fifteen-year-old Lorna Saquing, Sofronias niece, were then having
dinner. The five men were in fatigue uniforms and were armed with long firearms. When they knocked on the
door, Lorna responded and inquired what they wanted, and she was told that they wanted to buy
cigarettes. Ernesto and Sofronia entertained the men, two of whom were their neighbors, Loreto Bergado and
Bening Gumabong.
Momentarily, the petitioner asked Ernesto to go with them to serve as a guide. In response, Ernesto invited the
men to sleep at their house, but the latter refused. Ernesto then agreed to accompany the visitors. The
petitioner warned Ernesto and Sofronia not to tell anyone that they had been to the store. As they were leaving,
Romeo Galano, the couples helper at the store, arrived. Ernesto ordered Romeo to go with him, and the latter
did as he was told. However, at about 9:00 p.m., Romeo returned to the store and told Sofronia that Ernesto had
sent him back to get money, matches and cigarettes. He also told Sofronia that he and Ernesto were seated as
they conversed with each other. Sofronia gave P50.00, a box of matches and a ream of Hope
cigarettes. Romeo left the store at about 9:30 p.m.[3] Ernesto did not return that evening.[4]

The next morning, Romeo Balunggaya arrived at Sofronias house and told her that Ernesto was dead, and that
his body had been found about three hundred (300) meters away. Sofronia and Lorna rushed to the place, and
found Ernestos body near the creek.[5] Ernesto was lying on the ground, face down, with his hands tied behind his
back. Police investigators Pagulayan and Caronan arrived, along with a photographer. Pictures of the victim
were taken.[6]
Dr. Anastacia Taguba, the Municipal Health Officer, performed an autopsy of the cadaver and found that the
victim sustained multiple stabwounds. She concluded that the victim died because of shock due to massive
internal and external hemorrhage from multiple stab wounds. [7] She also signed the Certificate of Death of
Ernesto.[8]
On February 18, 1980, Fernando Saquing attended his classes in civil engineering at the St. Louis University in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. He noticed his seatmate and close friend, petitioner Moises Simangan, writing on a piece
of paper. He grabbed the paper, read it, and saw that the petitioner had written the following: Andres
Buena alias Ka Ren, Cely Pea alias Ka Laarni, Moises Simangan alias Ka Ronie Ledesma. The petitioner
warned Fernando not to divulge his secret to anybody.[9]
On February 24, 1980, Fernando and the petitioner were on their way home from their ROTC classes at the St.
Louis University. The petitioner then narrated to Fernando that at about 7:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, after
buying cigarettes from a store, the store-owner agreed to go with him and his four companions. The petitioner
revealed that they brought the victim over to the place where twenty of his other comrades were waiting. He also
told Fernando that he and his companions stabbed the victim over and over again, and tasted the latters blood
so that they would not get sick. The petitioner warned that if Fernando divulged to anyone what he had just
revealed, he (the petitioner), would drink his blood, too. [10]
The petitioner did not know that Fernando was the first cousin of Sofronia, the widow of Ernesto Flores, who was,
in turn, the store-owner referred to by Moises. [11] Fernando immediately told Sofronia what the petitioner had told
him.
On March 21, 24 and 25, 1980, Sofronia, Fernando and Lorna gave their respective statements [12] to Sgt. Quirino
Espiritu of the Philippine Constabulary in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in which they identified Moises as one of
Ernestos assailants.
The Case for the Defense
The petitioner denied any involvement in the killing of Ernesto. He testified that on the day that Ernesto was
killed, he was in his boarding house in Tuguegarao. He was the classmate of Fernando at the St. Louis University
in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where they were enrolled in the civil engineering course. [13] Sometime in February 1980,
Fernando asked him about Andres Balbuena who was from Solana, Cagayan. A week later, he was arrested on
suspicions that he had something to do with the death of Ernesto. [14] Fernando, who was in the PC barracks,
pointed to him as one of the assailants of Ernesto. He was surprised at Fernandos accusation.[15]
The petitioner also denied knowing Loreto Bergado, claiming that he only met the latter at the provincial jail. [16] He
had not been to Barangay Maasin, Solana.

The accused Loreto Bergado also denied killing Ernesto. He testified that he did not know Ernesto and the
latters wife, Sofronia. On February 10, 1980, he was in his house at Nangalasauan, Amulung, Cagayan. After
waking up the next day, he went to his farm. [17]
To corroborate his testimony, Bergado presented his neighbor, Feliciano Trinidad, who testified that after his
classes on February 10, 1980, he went out of their house at Barangay Nangalasauan, Amulung, Cagayan, to get
a breath of fresh air. He then saw Bergado and spoke with him until 9:00 p.m. [18]
Cornelia Trinidad corroborated the testimony of the petitioner that she boarded in the house of Rosendo Tuddao
in February 1980.
The defense also presented Leona Balunggaya, who testified that between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. on February 11,
1980, Sofronia and Leon Rigor arrived at their house, crying. Sofronia inquired if Ernesto had passed by,
because her husband had not slept in their house. Balunggaya replied in the negative. When Balunggaya asked
Sofronia if she recognized the armed men who were with her husband, Sofronia replied that she did not because
their faces were new to her.[19]Aside from their house, there were no other houses in the vicinity of Sofronias
place. Right after Sofronia and Leon had left, she and her husband Romeo went to their farm to drive away the
birds and saw the cadaver of Ernesto, about three hundred (300) meters away.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Moises Simangan y Trinidad and Loreto Bergado y Rigor having been found by the
Court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal code, and considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances, are hereby sentenced
each to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the
victim Ernesto Flores the sum of P30,000.00, proportionately and to pay costs pro rata.
SO ORDERED.[20]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it rendered judgment, affirming with modification, the decision of the trial
court. It found the testimonies of Sofronia, Lorna, and Fernando, credible and entitled to full probative weight.
The Present Petition
Petitioner Moises Simangan filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, asserting that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND DISREGARDING THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE.[21]
The petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to adduce circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove his guilt
of the crime of homicide beyond reasonable doubt. He asserts that Sofronia and Lorna pointed to and identified
him only upon the prodding of Fernando, who told Sofronia that he (the petitioner) had admitted to stabbing and
killing the victim together with twenty of his other companions. The petitioner contends that the testimony of
Fernando is hearsay, as he had no personal knowledge that he was one of those who killed the victim.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals declared in its assailed decision that the array of circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution constitutes proof beyond cavil that the petitioner was one of those who killed the
victim. As catalogued by the appellate court:
(1) at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of February 10, 1980, accused Moises Simangan, Loreto Bergado,
Bening Gumabong and two unidentified companions each of whom were armed with long rifles, went to the store
of the victim Ernesto Flores at Sitio Masin (sic), Iraga, Solana and bought cigarettes;
(2) that Moises Simangan asked Ernesto Flores to guide Simangan, Bergado, Gumabong and their two
companions on their way to the road;
(3) that Simangan, Bergado and their two companions, together with Ernesto Flores and Romeo Galano, were
out of the house;
(4) that Simangan warned Sofronia and Lorna not to tell anybody that he and his companions went to the house;
(5) that five days after the death of Ernesto, Simangan became worried when told by his classmate Fernando
Saquing that several persons were arrested at Nangalasauan, Amulung, for the death of Ernesto;
(6) that two weeks after the death of the victim, Simangan admitted to Fernando that he and twenty others had
just killed a person in Masin, (sic) Iraga, Solana, after the victim accompanied them to show them the way;
(7) and that Fernando was warned not to relate it to any other person with the threat that if it will be known by
others, Simangan will drink his blood.[22]
The Ruling of the Court
We find the contention of the petitioner to be unmeritorious. Sofronia narrated in detail how the petitioner and his
companions, armed with long firearms, managed to convince Ernesto to go with them and be their guide on the
road. Sofronia pointed to and identified the petitioner in open court. Thus:
Q

On February 10, 1980, at 8:00, do you recall where you were?

Yes, Sir.

Where were you?

We were at home, Sir.

And you mentioned . . . and who were your companions at that time?

My husband, my sister Lorna Saquing, my daughter, Sir.

What is the name of your daughter?

Jannet, Sir.

How old was she at that time?

Two (2) years old, Sir.

What is the name of your sister?

Lorna, Sir.

And your husband?

Ernesto Flores, Sir.

What were you doing at that time?

Eating, Sir.

Where is your house located?

Masim (sic), Solana, Cagayan, Sir.

Q Do you recall of anything unusual that happened on February 10, 1980, when you were actually eating with
your family, if any?
A On February 10, 1980, while we were actually taking our supper, there was a person who went to buy
cigarette in our store and it was my sister Lorna who went to open the store and saw five persons holding
gun (sic), Sir.
Q

Where is your store located?

In Masim (sic), Solana, Cagayan, Sir.

Is your store also a part of your house where you live-in (sic)?

Yes, Sir.

Q When these five persons came to your house and Lorna Saquing, your sister, was the one who opened the
door, what happened next?

A When those five persons entered our store, Lorna came to us in the kitchen and called for us and the three
of us proceeded to the store and looked to those five persons, Sir.
Q

And what happened next when you went to see those five persons?

We saw five persons with long firearms, Sir.

Do you know the names of those five persons whom you saw?

I know the three of them only, Sir.

What are the names of these three persons whom you know?

Moises Simangan, Boy Bergado and Bening Bungabong (sic), Sir.

This Bening Bungabong (sic), if he is in court, can you point him out?

No, he is not here in court, Sir.

Yes, but this Loreto Bergado, if you can see him in the courtroom, can you point him out?

Yes, Sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to that person in brown t-shirt who identified himself to be Loreto Bergado y Rigor when he was
pointed to by the witness.
Q How about this person by the name of Moises Simangan, will you look around the courtroom and see if he is
here?
A

He is there, Sir.

INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person seated in the courtroom who stood up when he was pointed to by the witness and
identified himself to be Moises Simangan y Trinidad. [23]
The petitioner even warned Sofronia and Ernesto not to tell anyone that he and his companions had been in their
house:
Q And when Moises Simangan came to know that your barangay captain in Iraga was Mr. Mario Marsan, what
happened next, if any?
A Then Moises Simangan requested my husband to accompany them to the road because Moises Simangan
is new in our place, Sir.

And what did your husband say, if any?

Then my husband told them if it will be alright for them, they may sleep in the house, Sir.

And what did he say?

A Then Moises Simangan answered my husband that: we cannot sleep in your place because we might be
late tomorrow, Sir.
Q

And what happened next?

And then Moises Simangan told us not to tell anybody about their going to our store, Sir.

Q And when Moises Simangan warned you not to tell anybody about their presence in your place, what
happened next, if any?
A

Then my husband told me that he would accompany them to the road, Sir.

And when your husband told you that he would bring them to the road, what happened next, if any?

A And then Moises Simangan and his companions took my husband to the road and not long afterwards, my
boy by the name of Romeo Galano, went back to the store and told me that my husband told him to go back to
get money and cigarette and also [a] match, Sir.
Q

And what time did they take away your husband from your house?

8:00 oclock in the evening, Sir.

Was it exactly 8:00 oclock or past 8:00?

Past 8:00, it could be past 8:00 oclock already, Sir.[24]

Lorna also testified that when she attended to the petitioner and his companions, she saw their faces:
Q Now, while at about that time on February 10, 1980, do you remember any unusual incident that happened in
the house of your sister?
A

Yes, Sir.

What was that incident that happened?

A On that evening, Sir, while we were eating I heard a voice calling outside or I heard someone calling outside
with the word Diyos Apo and when I finished eating, I went inside the house and asked who was that, and
nobody answered, and so, what I did was to open the door and I was surprised there were five armed men at our
door who went inside our house.

Q You said that these five men who entered the house were armed, will you please tell this Honorable Court
what were their arms?
A

All the five men who entered our house were armed with long rifle each of them (sic).

Now, do you know the identity of these five armed men who entered the house where you were staying?

ATTY. VELASCO:
The question is vague, Your Honor.
Whether he refers to the present or at that time of the incident.
COURT:
Reformed. (sic)
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q At the time of the incident, of these five armed men who entered the house of your sister upon your opening
the door, do you know the identity of these five armed men or any of them?
A

Yes, Sir, I know them.

Will you please tell this Honorable Court who were they?

Moises Simangan, Boy Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two others whom I do not know.

Q You said that at the time you opened the door and these five men entered, you already knew three of them,
namely Moises Simangan, Bening Gumabong and Boy Bergado, why do you know them?
A

I was able to recognize them, Sir, through their faces.

Why were they familiar to you?

When I opened the door, Sir, and the five armed men entered our house, I stared at their faces.

Q Will you please answer my question, why were you able or why were you familiar with the faces of these
men when they entered the house of your sister that evening of February 10, 1980?
ATTY. SORIANO:
She answered, I saw their faces.
COURT:
Witness may answer.

These Boy Bergado and Bening Gumabong were my barcada in Maasim, Solana, Cagayan.

FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q

What do you mean by saying that Gumabong and Bergado were your barcada?

They were my companions, Sir.

For how long were they your barcada before the incident?

Three years, Sir.

Q Now, with respect to Moises Simangan, why do you say that his face is familiar to you at the time of the
incident?
A

I stared at his face because he was new in our place. [25]

It was only when Fernando told his cousin Sofronia that the petitioner had admitted to being one of those who
inveigled Ernesto into going with them, and thereafter killed the victim, that she and Lorna heard the petitioners
name for the first time.
Q Now, do you know, I withdraw that question, Your Honor. How about Moises Simangan, did you know him
already before February 10, 1980?
A

No, Sir.

Why do you know his name then?

A I came to know his name when Moises Simangan informed Fernando, my cousin, about those things that
they have done to my husband, but Fernando did not mention to him that I am his cousin and it was Fernando,
my cousin, who informed me about his name, Sir.[26]
The testimony of Fernando, that the petitioner admitted to him that he was one of the victims killers, is not
hearsay. The testimony of Fernando was offered to prove the petitioners extrajudicial admission of his
involvement in the killing of Ernesto. Such admission is an admission against personal interest, and is
admissible against the petitioner.[27]
We note that the petitioner admitted during trial that he and Fernando were classmates in a civil engineering
subject at St. Louis University, and in the ROTC training. The petitioner also admitted that he and Fernando
were friends. Hence, it was not impossible for the petitioner to have revealed his involvement in the killing to
Fernando. The petitioner did not hesitate to inform Fernando that he and his companions had killed Ernesto
because an informer had told them that Ernesto was bad. The testimony of Fernando reads, viz:
Q

What else did he tell you?

ATTY. SORIANO:

May we ask the witness that he be directed to speak louder.

COURT:
You speak louder.
A

There, Sir.

FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q

And what was that?

A He informed me that they had just killed a person in Maasim (sic), Solana, Cagayan and we threw him
beside a creek. And I asked Moises Simangan, How come that that person is bad, and he answered me, We
had an informer who is their neighbor.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q Now, you said that there were some companions of Moises Simangan because he used the word WE, were
you able to find out from him how many persons were those who perpetrated the crime in Maasim (sic), Solana,
Cagayan, as you stated recently?
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we request that witness should stop.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
That is the narration, Your Honor.
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we request that the narration should be in a question and answer (sic).
COURT:
Continue.
A What Moises Simangan narrated to me, Sir, is We were five persons who went to the store of that person
and (sic) to buy cigarette. At the time the persons were waiting in the store and after we bought the cigarette, we
let the person accompany us on our way because we do not know the way and then Moises Simangan brought
the person to the place where there were twenty persons waiting who were their companions and then they
stabbed the person and in stabbing, each person tasted the blood (sic) that, according to Moises Simangan, they
will not get sick.
FISCAL HERNANDO:

Did you or did you not ask him what time of the day or night was that?

A No, Sir. When they visited the house of the victim to buy cigarette I was informed by Moises Simangan that
it was 7:30 in the evening.
Q Now, after having revealed to you all these things, do you remember if Moises Simangan told you anything
else?
A

Yes, Sir.

What did he tell you?

A He told me that Nanding, I now warn you, and you know me, once they know these, I am going to drink your
blood.[28]
The petitioners alibi and denial of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward
identification made by Lorna and Sofronia that he was one of the armed men who left with Ernesto, coupled with
the petitioners own admission that he was one of the victims assailants. We note that there is no evidence, nor
any showing of any ill-motive on the part of Lorna, Sofronia and Fernando to prevaricate. In fact, the petitioner
and Fernando were close friends. Thus, the presumption is that the said witness acted in good faith; hence, their
testimonies must be accorded credence and full probative weight.
The three witnesses cannot be faulted, and their credibility denigrated for giving their statements to Sgt. Espiritu
of the Philippine Constabulary only on March 21 to 25, 1980. As copiously explained by the Court of Appeals:
Appellants attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of [the] positive identification made by Sofronia and Lorna that
they were among those five (5) armed persons who took along the victim Ernesto Flores on the pretext that
appellant Simangan being new to the place would need said victim to guide him on the road. Both Lorna and
Sofronia knew personally appellant Bergado and Gumabong being Lornas former friends and Sofronias
neighbors. On the other hand, the delay in revealing the identities of appellants Bergado and Simangan had
been sufficiently explained. It must be recalled that appellant Simangan had made a stern warning before they
left that Sofronia and Lorna should not tell anybody about their presence in the place that night. Those men
being then armed and determined to take along with them the victim out on the road, even threatening Sofronia
and Lorna not to divulge the incident to others, there was strong reason for said witnesses to keep mum on the
identities of appellants even when the police investigators arrived the following morning and asked them about
the names of the five (5) persons or at least any of them they had recognized. It is understandable when a
witness does not immediately report the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence, more so when he is
related to the victim as this makes it all the more traumatic. It is, likewise, understandable for a witness to fear for
his safety especially when town mates are involved in the commission of the crime. Even if the principal
witnesses, Lorna and Sofronia, did not witness the actual killing of Ernesto Flores, the circumstances that the
latter was last seen alive together with the appellants and Gumabong, along with two (2) other unidentified
companions that night who were armed with guns, that he was never to return home that night, and his dead
body discovered in a nearby field, lying face down on the ground, both his arms tied at his back with multiple stab
wounds on his neck and back the combination of these circumstances leave no doubt on their minds that those
five (5) persons were responsible for Ernestos gruesome death and such conviction was enough to temporarily

silence them from revealing immediately to the police investigators the identities of appellant Bergado and
Gumabong, and subsequently, Simangan.[29]
In sum, then, we find and so rule that the appellate court correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court
convicting the petitioner of homicide. However, the appellate court erred in appreciating against the petitioner the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty and nighttime. In the first place, such circumstances were not alleged in the
Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. [30] Although the
petitioner committed the crime before the effectivity date of said Rules, the same should be applied retroactively
as it is favorable to him.[31]
Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of
which were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in
inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the
victim.[32] The number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty.
Consequently, then, the penalty imposed by the trial court on the petitioner must be modified. There being no
modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from
the medium period of the imposable penalty of homicide which is reclusion temporal. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty lower by one degree for reclusion
temporal, which is prision mayor.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11971 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is hereby sentenced an
indeterminate penalty of from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

A.M. No. RTJ-95-1326 July 8, 1998

ANNABELLE R. GUTIERREZ, complainant, vs. HON. RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, respondent.

Complainant Annabelle R. Gutierrez was convicted by respondent Judge Rodolfo G. Pallatao of Branch 33, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, for Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) and for Estafa under Article 315 (2)(d)
of the Revised Penal Code. Aggrieved by what she perceived as a wrongful conviction, she filed this administrative case
against respondent for Serious Misconduct, Graft and Corruption, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Decision, Falsification of
Public Document, and Gross Ignorance of the Law. She averred that, since the checks that were the bases of the
informations against her were not presented in evidence by the prosecution, her conviction was erroneous and the
respondent should be held administratively liable therefor.
The material facts, based on the pleadings, are as follows:
Complainant borrowed the sum of Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000) from one Ligaya V. Santos, for
which she issued five (5) checks as guarantee for the loan, to wit:
Santos deposited these checks in her account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Upon presentment by PNB of said
checks to the drawee United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), they were dishonored, for the reason: "closed account".
Thereafter, Santos made several verbal and written demands for Gutierrez to pay the amounts covered by the checks, but
the latter allegedly refused to make good her obligation to pay. Hence, Santos filed five (5) criminal complaints for the
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and one complaint for Estafa against Gutierrez. After preliminary investigation, the
corresponding informations were filed in court and the cases were raffled to respondent Judge's sala.
On November 15, 1993, while the said informations were pending in court, Santos executed the following letter in her own
handwriting:
Nov. 15, 1993
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I am dropping my charges against Annabelle Rama and that she already change (sic)
the bouncing checks with a (sic) new ones.
I hope for your kind understanding on this case.
(Sgd.) Ligaya V. Santos
Lions Road Arroceros
On the same day, Gutierrez also executed the following document in her own handwriting:
I Annabelle Rama Gutierrez certify that I received all my old checks from Mrs. Ligaya Santos in exchange to
(sic) the new ones I gave her.
In agreement, Mrs. Santos agreed to dropped (sic) her case against me.
(Sgd.) Annabelle Gutierrez
41 Derby, White Plains, Q.C.
The foregoing documents were executed by Santos and Gutierrez after the latter replaced the five (5) checks subject of the
informations. The replacement checks were subsequently honored except Check No. SRD-043939 dated May 10, 1994, in
the amount of P50,000.00, drawn against the UCPB. This check was allegedly dishonored by the UCPB upon presentment
by PNB, Santos' depository bank, for the reason: "stop payment".
The evidence for the prosecution was summarized by respondent Judge in his Decision as follows:
To prove these cases against the accused, the Fiscal called to the witness stand Ligaya V. Santos, the herein
complainant who identified herself as a widow, businesswoman and who resides at Lion's Rd., Arroceros St., Ermita,

Manila. In the course of her testimony, the following exhibits were marked in evidence: Exhibit A letter dated
November 15, 1993, Exhibit A-1 Signature of Ligaya V. Santos, Exhibit B Check No. SRD-043979 for
P50,000.00, Exhibit B-1 Notice of dishonor, Exhibit C letter of demand and Exhibit C-1 signature of
complainant. . . . . 1
On the basis of the above evidence proffered by the prosecution, respondent Judge convicted the accused in the
aforestated five criminal cases for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and in one for Estafa. She was sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. In Criminal Case No. 93-128841, accused Annabelle R. Gutierrez is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
one (1) year and to pay a fine of P120,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In Criminal
Case No. 93-128842, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a fine of
P60,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. For Criminal Case No. 93-128843, accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a fine of P60,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. For Criminal Case No. 128844, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a fine of P60,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
And for Criminal Case No. 93-128845, she is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year and to pay a
fine of P70,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. No pronouncement as to civil liability as
the same was already paid. Since the last check covered by Check No. SRD043939 in the amount of P50,000.00
was dishonored by the drawee bank, accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party the said amount of
P50,000.00.
For violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, accused is found guilty for the crime of Estafa defined and
punished under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and in the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances and applying the indeterminate sentence law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. No pronouncement
as to civil liability as the same was already paid. The bailbond posted by herein accused for her provisional liberty is
hereby ordered cancelled.
Dissatisfied and aggrieved, she filed before us, this Administrative Complaint anchored on the following grounds:
1. That respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the criminal cases for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because the
imposable penalty therefor, which is imprisonment of not more than one (1) year or a fine not exceeding
P200,000.00 or both, is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) as provided for
by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691, otherwise known as the Law on the Expanded Jurisdiction of the MTC.
2. That the venue and time of the commission of the offenses charged were not established in violation of the
petitioner's right to due process.
3. That the original checks in question were never offered in evidence, hence, the decision is not supported by
evidence of corpus delicti.
4. That the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporalwas arbitrarily and
unjustly imposed.
5. That the decision was antedated and promulgated in a rush in violation of procedural rules.
6. That the cancellation of petitioner's bail is whimsical and arbitrary, constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.
To refute these grounds for the complaint, respondent Judge submitted specific arguments in his Supplemental Comment
dated July 7, 1995, which could be summarized as follows: 2
(1) The alleged lack of jurisdiction is based on Section 2 of RA 7961 which was approved on March 25, 1994. This law,
however, is inapplicable to complainant's case because it did not provide for any retroactive effect as to cover pending
criminal cases. The retroactivity therein applies only to civil cases which did not reach the pre-trial stage (Section 7, R.A.
No. 7691).

The cases against complainant were filed on November 5, 1993, five (5) months before the approval of the law on March
25, 1994. The law became effective 15 days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation (Section 8, R.A. No. 7691).
(2) Concerning the alleged defect of the Informations in not specifying the exact place and time of the commission of the
crime, a perusal of the informations filed by the City Prosecutor shows that the situs (Manila) and date (first week of March,
1993) of the commission of the offenses charged were sufficiently alleged. The specific place in Manila and the precise time
need not be stated, because they are not essential elements of the offense charged. If the stand of the complainant is that
the charges in the Informations did not constitute offenses, her remedy would have been the timely filing of a motion to
quash before the trial and not to raise the issue collaterally after the decision had been rendered. After the decision, the
complainant's remedy is to appeal, which she availed of by filing a notice of appeal.
(3) Regarding the prosecution's failure to offer in evidence the original checks issued by Gutierrez, respondent Judge
commented that the same is of no moment because while the original checks were not presented anymore, there is an
admission that accused Gutierrez got back the bouncing checks from Ligaya Santos. This document was presented as an
exhibit by the prosecution and was not denied by the accused.
(4) Anent the charge that the penalty of twelve (12) years of Reclusion Temporal was arbitrarily and unjustly imposed, the
respondent argued that the penalty is based on the amount subject of the fraud which is P370,000.00. Under Art. 315 (1st
par.), the penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its maximum period toprision mayor in its minimum period if the amount
is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If there is an excess, for every P10,000.00 excess, there is an
additional penalty of one year. If computed totally, the excess would amount to 34.8 years. But under the same Article, the
maximum shall only be 20 years. In imposing the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, respondent Judge merely exercised his discretion as the penalty was within the
range fixed by law.
(5) On the charge that respondent's decision was antedated and promulgated in a rush, respondent stated that this charge
is unfair, unjust and baseless because it was made to appear wrongly that the respondent Judge falsified his own decision
and promulgated it without notice at all.
According to respondent, the records will show that as early as October 25, 1994, he already set the promulgation of the
decision at 8:30 A.M. on November 24, 1994. During the interim, the complainant filed a Petition forCertiorari with the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 35373) questioning the Order denying her "Demurrer to Evidence", resulting in the cancellation
of the promulgation set on November 24, 1994 which was reset to December 6, 1994. On said date, the decision was not
promulgated because of a Restraining Order issued by the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the promulgation was reset to
February 21, 1995, which was "intransferable" in character. But since, the respondent was still waiting for developments in
the Court of Appeals, the promulgation was reset for the fourth time to March 23, 1995, and then for the 5th time to April 18,
1995. Prior to April 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the certiorari case, dismissing the same but
allowing Gutierrez to present her evidence.
Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the cases were set for reception of accused's evidence on three (3) dates:
May 16, 23 and 25, 1995. On May 16, 1995, complainant asked for postponement. On May 23, 1995, she asked for another
postponement. On May 25, 1995, when the accused still failed to present evidence, so as not to frustrate the wheels of
justice and make a mockery of the solemn judicial system, the respondent was left without any recourse but to exercise the
coercive power of the court by promulgating the decision which was supposed to have been promulgated way back
December 6, 1994. To conform with the actual date of promulgation, the respondent Judge, who found no justifiable basis to
change his disposition of the case, simply crossed out the previous date, December 2, 1994, on the last page and
superimposed the current date May 25, 1995.
Contrary therefore to the complainant's charge, the promulgation of the Decision, in respondent's view was not precipitate.
As a matter of fact, in obedience to the Court of Appeals, the promulgation was deferred several times.
According to respondent there was no basis to change his mind, as the accused did not present witnesses in her defense
despite ample opportunities granted her. After her counsel's manifestation in court that if Fiscal Velasco were around, he
would be presented to testify to the effect that it was before him that the Affidavit of Desistance of Ligaya Santos was sworn
to, and to which the public prosecutor offered no objection and even admitted the tenor of the offer, there was nothing more
to be done. This was the only "evidence" offered by the accused. The public prosecutor moved for the submission of the
case, which was granted. Hence, according to the respondent, there was no reason to re-write the whole decision where
there was no reason for the respondent Judge to change his disposition. He added, this was not antedating. There would be

antedating, if the decision were made on May 25, 1995 but backdated December 2, 1994. Neither was it pre-judgment, he
said. Rather, it was a judgment promulgated belatedly because of the Court of Appeals' restraining order, which order
eventually "self-destructed" after the lapse of twenty (20) days. The accused was fully aware of the developments in the
cases, particularly the deferred promulgation of the decision for several months, said the respondent.
(6) Lastly, respondent averred that the cancellation of complainant's bail bond was not whimsical nor arbitrary. After the
promulgation of the Decision convicting the accused for a penalty higher than six (6) years, under Circular No. 12-94, the
accused must be ordered committed in jail. The respondent could not question the wisdom of the Circular, he was under
obligation to implement it.
Considering carefully the complainant's charges and the respondent Judge's Comments thereon, We find that except for
one issue, the aforementioned charges have been sufficiently and satisfactorily refuted by respondent. However, with
respect to the prosecution's failure to present in evidence the original checks subject of the informations filed against the
accused Gutierrez, We are not in accord with respondent Judge's conclusion that same is inconsequential for her
conviction.
For, it is not disputed that the five (5) checks subject of the five (5) informations for Violation of B.P., Blg. 22 and the
information for Estafa, are UCPB checks with Nos. SRD022496, SRD022513, PTU031796, PTU031797, and PTU031798. It
is also not disputed that all these five (5) checks were not presented and formally offered in evidence. Rather, the evidence
of the prosecution consisted of the replacement check drawn against UCPB, namely, Check No. SRD043939, the return
deposit slip issued by the PNB indicating that this replacement check was dishonored by the UCPB for the reason, "stop
payment", and the testimony of the PNB representative, one Hernando Balmores, Jr. to the effect that this replacement
check was indeed returned by the UCPB for the reason aforestated. This was very explicit from the Order of
respondentJudge 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration from the denial of her Demurrer to Evidence to wit:
. . . On the matter of the failure of the prosecution to mark in evidence the checks as alleged in the information, the
prosecuting fiscal alleged that what was marked is a document executed by the accused to the effect that said
checks were in her possession and that the same were replaced with other checks. Now, as to the matter of the
representative of the bank not coming from the drawee bank, the Court considers this testimony of the witness as
only a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
Undoubtedly, respondent Judge based the judgment of conviction, not on the checks themselves, as these were not
proffered in evidence, but on petitioner's written statement, dated November 15, 1995, which respondent judge considered
as admission on the part of the petitioner that, she had indeed, issued the bouncing checks subject of the informations but
that she had replaced them with new checks.
Evidently, respondent Judge misconstrued and misapplied the rule with regard to admissions in criminal cases.
The issue of whether or not an admission in criminal cases is adequate to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission
of the crime charged has been settled in the case of People vs. Solayao 4 where this Court made the following
pronouncements:
. . . By its very nature, an "admission is the mere acknowledgement of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt
may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." In other words, it
is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or
circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." From the above principles,
this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime charged. 5
By itself, herein complainant's letter dated November 15, 1995, which respondent Judge construed as an admission that
she indeed issued the checks subject of the Informations filed against her and that she was replacing them with new ones,
does not prove beyond reasonable doubt her culpability under B.P. 22 and Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. To
establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the checks she issued for which she was subsequently charged, be offered in
evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of knowingly issuing a check with insufficient
funds. 6 Clearly, it was error to convict complainant on the basis of her letter alone.
Nevertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule on evidence, we do not find the same as sufficiently constitutive
of the charges of gross ignorance of the law and of knowingly rendering an unjust decision. Rather, it is at most an error in

judgement, for which, as a general rule, he cannot be held administratively liable. In this regard, we reiterate the prevailing
rule in our jurisdiction as established by current jurisprudence:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or
decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with
gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. . .
Moreover, it must be stressed that in the case of De la Cruz vs. Concepcion 8 this Court declared that:
Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or
bad faith, or of knowing rendition of an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding
against him. No one, called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice, can be
infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and
impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on the issues presented, and on the
basis of the conclusions he finds established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to guide him,
adjudicate the case accordingly. 9
In this case, the record is bereft of any evidence to conclusively show that the respondent Judge's actuations were tainted
with malice and bad faith, hence the administrative charges against him must fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint for Serious Misconduct, Graft and Corruption, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Decision, Falsification of Public Document, and Gross Ignorance of the Law against respondent Judge Rodolfo G. Palattao
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

[G.R. NO. 146111. February 23, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee, v. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or DODO,Appellant.
There can be no greater violation of a persons right to feel safe and secure than the crime of rape. When one commits such a
horrible act on another, he degrades not only that persons body; more importantly, he defiles that persons mind. When the
victim is a little child, the act and the perpetrator himself assume a bestiality beyond the comprehension of normal human
beings. Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the most salacious ruffian.
Before us is the Decision1 dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, finding
appellant Rolendo Gaudia2 guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him the penalty of death, and ordering him to pay to
private complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:

rbl r l l lbrr

That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor,
against her will to her damage and prejudice.
The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia testified that on 24 March 1997,
she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)

and Kimberly (1 year old) 4 at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del

Sur to gather pigs food at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the
afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask
about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out
Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipilipil trees.5 Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their
house.6 She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang(walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on
her body.Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and
washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns private organ. 7

rll

The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for
treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the appellant. 8 The quack doctor
found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being
(sic)raped.9 At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her
house and take Remelyn.10 At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just
settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.11 Police officers came and
brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for investigation.Amalias
statement was taken.12

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On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr. Patricio Hernane, the
municipal health officer,13 conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and made the following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:

rbl r l l lbrr

rbl r l l lbrr

Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I) .No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried blood are (sic) noted on the
labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10 oclock (sic) are noted with fresh vaginal laceration noted at
the posterior commissure but not extending to the perineum. No lacerations were noted at the anal opening.

Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child cry. (sic)
CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.14

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The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object, such as the penis of a
man.15

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On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. 16 Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had told her Buang Lendoy
iya kong lugos.17 (Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two
weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees.18

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The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that on 24
March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were
in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms. 19 He identified the little girl as
Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.20

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The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn had been raped. He proceeded
to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn for examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had
been raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant committed the crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud 21and the
other tanods of the incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant.They passed to the police the information that
appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took appellant for investigation. 22

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The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he
went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections. With him was Totong Loyola, the brotherin-law of Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellants aunt, to ask
for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild
of Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they brought her with them as they proceeded to the place where
Catalina was collecting tuba (fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen. 23 They reached Catalinas place
after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and appellants parents were in the house. At
around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after partaking of the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning
(25 March 1997), appellant and Dodo Malon went to the river to fish.At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of
his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and investigated.24 He claimed that it was
Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying.
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex Totong Loyola. Totong testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m.,
they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they went home to appellants house, but again left to get vinegar
from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for their kinilaw. In Catalinas house, they found her drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter,
and her 3-year old grandchild Daylen. 25 Catalinas daughter directed them to the place where she was gathering tuba. As
Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to Catalina. It was then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished
gathering tuba, the four of them appellant, Totong, Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalinas house for the
vinegar. Appellant and Totong returned to appellants house where they spent the night. 26 Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m. the
following day, and left appellants house. Totong came to know of appellants arrest the following day.27

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Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellants story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she was gathering tuba, at a place
around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her house. 28 At about
5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish gatheringtuba until
6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the formers house, had a drinking spree, and then parted ways at about 6:30 p.m.
That night, according to Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the premises near the house. Mik was looking for Remelyn. At

that time, appellant was already at the house of Catalinas younger sister, which is located across the river, about 4 kilometers
away.29

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After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime of rape with
the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to
indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
In his Brief30 to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic) GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS
GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT
STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH
CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION.
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided three
requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case
law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 31

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The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on
24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her house.32 As
a neighbor and relative of Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he
could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn emerged naked from the
same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs spread far
apart. Remelyns private organ was bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like substance. 33

rll

The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyns statement to her mother that it was appellant who had
brought her to the ipil-ipilgrove34 and forced her to do something against her will. 35

rll

There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal Health Officer of
Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal lacerations.
From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned circumstances have
been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability
of the appellant to discredit their veracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant contends, first, that Tulon
Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the husband of Amalia. 36 He also questions the credibility of Mik
because of his failure to confront appellant when he saw him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he
saw when Amalia was looking for Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he
stresses the fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that he sexually molested her. Third, he maintains that

the accusation of flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents as tendered to
Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him,37 while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalias husband, as
relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being hearsay.38 Finally, he submits that
inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano should not be counted against him on the ground that any finding
of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
We reject appellants arguments.
First, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by affinity of Amalia
Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship to one of the parties, without a showing of any other
improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of the witness. 39 In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute
any ill motive for Mik to testify adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he assails Mik for failing to inform
Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the inadvertence. He said his own child was down with a fever, and
he and his wife were hurrying home.40 For this same reason, he revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn
toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyns fate. But thereafter, he lost no time in reporting the matter to the
barangay chairman.41 As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in the pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay
Mahayahay.42 These subsequent actions strengthen Miks credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Miks narration of the events over the testimonies of Cabano and Loyola.It is a
cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are
accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood
which could alter the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the assessment of
evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Miks testimony. Given the direct opportunity to observe the
witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine if he was telling the
truth or not.43 The trial court found Miks testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We have no
reason to reverse its findings.
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he sexually molested her. This is a
specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, Crazy Lendoy forced me. 44 Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At
such an infantile age, she could not be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that children,
particularly very young children, make the perfect victims. They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization
process teaches children that adults are to be respected.The childs age and developmental level will govern how much she
comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has
happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children
have more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not understand everything they experience. They do not
have enough life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel.
Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary.45 The fact that Remelyn called appellant Buang or crazy shows that he did
something which she knew was not right or proper.By saying iya kong lugos, Remelyn clearly conveyed that he forced her to
do something bad. With her limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been
sexually abused. Finally, it must also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word rape in Visayan parlance.
Appellants charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not pivotal to his guilt. There
are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither will it affect the penalty or the award of damages
rendered against him.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by
the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not

exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay
evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer,46 and she was not a party to the
conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on
his personal knowledge or perception.47 The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may have
been the subject of testimony48 of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,49 the
actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that
he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence
against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
Appellants defense hardly impresses.It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses claim that it was at around 5:00
p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother Catalina at the place where she was gathering tuba.Mik
testified thatit was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter
distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola, appellant could have easily taken
Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past
4:00 p.m., he could then have returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office to
register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The discrepancies in the witnesses
narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where Catalina was gathering tuba, his time of arrival at his own
house, and the time when Loyola and appellant actually parted ways, are not mere trivial details which could be forgotten by
witnesses because of the passage of time. To make matters worse, the appellants testimony was, at times, contradicted by his
own witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between appellants statement that Totong had already left his house on the
night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and Catalinas own averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellants house. These
contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellants tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information states that appellant, by
means of force and intimidationwillfully, unlawfully and feloniously (had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola,
a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.50 (emphasis ours) The Information did not allege that Remelyn was
below seven years old when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659
introduced seven new attendant circumstances, which when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable by
death. We again stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to justify the
imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime for which the accused
stands charged and for which he must be tried. 51 The main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the
information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be
convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting
in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. 52

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We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that when there is a finding that rape
had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delictois mandatory.53 If the death penalty has been imposed, the
indemnity should be P75,000.00; otherwise the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for each count of rape.54 Thus, the appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola. 55

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We affirm the award of moral damages.This is automatically awarded in rape cases without need of further proof other than
the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. 56

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We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant as proper because
complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense against her was committed with the aggravating
circumstance57 of age. However, the amount awarded must be reduced to P25,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 58

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WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos, Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No.
213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay to complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnityex
delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.