Table of Contents

General Introduction
Introduction
Goals
State of the Art
Possible Table of Contents
Activities
Methodology
Bibliography

General Introduction

This project is a general plan designed to help the student guide his research and
to expose to the teachers the overall idea of the future masters dissertation. However, it
must only be viewed as a wide-ranging proposal, and not as a strict and static set of
rules and strategys. If it was otherwise, not only it would be an exaggerated optimistic
plan, but it will also serve as a limitation of the role played in the dissertation of
possible hypothesis, methods and conclusions not as yet know to the student. To put it
differently, although some of the questions that will eventually arise wont be addressed
on the dissertation (or even be addressed at all, resting, thus, unanswered), this kind of
plan conception leaves some room for their study.
In the first place, it should be noted that there is a wide variety of definitions of
the concept of culture and, also, an extensive use of the concept in some diferent areas.
Then, it is important to realize that even the most perfect definition or theory concerning
culture may not be used by social scientists, researchers from cultural studies, etc.; the
student believes that this point is often overlooked by theorists and philosophers. Then
again, the pratical implications of some theory have almost in no case any consequences
concerning the truthfulness of the statements produced by that theory. It follows, thus,
that although it is possible for a theory to have no practical applications for a variety of
reasons, those should not stop the theorys own conception and research procedures
concerning it, and, also, that the pratical implications of a theory are not, with certainty,
the conditions that make it true, being, at most, marks of its truthfulness.
While accepting that fact, it is believed by the student that a more rigorous
approach between analytic philosophy and cultural sciences is necessary. This
proposition is justified, in his view, by the results of analytic philosophy in some areas,
results which cannot be ignored within areas that employ concepts or methodologies
that have clear connections to those. Upon the present time, there are a small collection
of cultural theorists that connect their theories with concepts borrowed from philosophy,
and, in the students opinion, bridging that gap would give cultural sciences a more
rigorous and scientific look.
Therefore, this project will be directed at the explanation of the main topic of the
masters dissertation and its goals; meanwhile, there will be also exposed the state of the

art of the fields that will, in one way or another, studied among this enterprise; finally,
there will be described the expected students activitys and the methodology that will
be used within this research frame.

Ter alguns erros, e est um pouco incompleta, mas no ir fugir muito

disto.

Introduction
There is a withstanding question among philosophy of social sciences
concerning the nature of society and the methods of sociological explanation. Among
the field, this question is called, most of the times, the question of methodological
individualism (even if, admittedly, some confusions can arise from this classification, as
it will be see further in this project). The debate surrounding methodological
individualism is usually divided in two different problems: are there any social entities?
How should social phenomena be explained/described? While the former question gives
rise to ontological theses, the latter produces proper methodological ones. Those thesis
are, from a simplistic perspective, either individualist or holist: in the first case, social
entities doesnt exist per se and social explanations should be given without appealing
to them; on the other hand, social entities exist per se and social scientists may use them
in their explanations of social phenomena.
The relation between these problems and culture is an obvious one. In the first
place, it is possible to argue that culture is an entity on its own right; this position is
clearly in opposition with ontological individualists theories. On the other side of the
debate, explanations of cultural phenomena usually appeal to concepts like cultural
heritage, cultural barriers, among others; does those concepts have a proper ontological
reference, and, if so, is it correct to employ them in explanations?
Methodological individualism is, consequently, a debate which can be linked to
cultural sciences. ()

Tem bastantes erros esta introduo, acabei de fazer, revejo depois do estado
da arte para ficar mais completa.

State of the Art

The individualism/holism debate
1.1 Introduction, Classifications and Historical examples.
The debate amid individualists and holists in the philosophy of social science is, at
the present time, a lively one, a fact that is confirmed by a significant number of papers,
books, chapters and essay collections, published in recent years, devoted to that
particular question. Examples of this statement content are Brian Epstein researches,
like his book chapters from 2011 or 2014, his 2008 and 2009 articles, or his forthcoming
book The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences (2015); another
proficient writer has been Elder-Vass, with two books (2010, 2012a) and two papers
(2011, 2012b) in the last five years; a very important and recent book, edited by Julie
Zahle and Finn Collin (2014), presents the reader with fourteen chapters whose only
focus is to analyse some actual theses and positions among the debate. Many other
recent investigations will be made accessible to the reader as he advances through this
survey.
It should also be made clear that the individualism/holism dispute is, not just actual,
but also relevant and interdisciplinary. This point is illustrated brilliantly by Harold
Kincaid, in a passage from one of his book edited in the nineties:
In one sense, the individualism-holism dispute is a small technical issue in the
philosophy of the social sciences. Even the broader reductionist program may seem
merely an issue in the philosophy of science. Yet lurking behind these apparently
narrow questions lie much bigger issues. They run the gamut from pratical questions
about the practice of science to moral and political disputes about the nature of
freedom and responsibility to large philosophical debates about rationality and
knowledge (Kincaid 1997: 1-2).

In a passage by a different author:

The reason for the heat that usually accompanies this debate is probably that it
touches upon our most deep-seated beliefs about the nature of the individual and of
society, our knowledge about these, and no doubt, also our ideals of the good society
(Udehn 2002: 479).

The relevancy of this debate is made obvious by the already mentioned number of
publications, but also by its own contents, which will be explained in a following

paragraph. On the other hand, its interdisciplinary character is two dimensional: first,
theories that are formulated to resolve problems in this area rely, the vast majority of the
time, on concepts borrowed from other domains (with supervenience being the most
striking example); secondly, the conclusions reached within this area have or should
have implications in other fields as well (in a clear example, the debate around
multiculturalist practices, in politic philosophy, shouldve recognize and even use the
theses achieved by holist/individualist researchers, since those have a deep impact in
some of the multiculturalist theorists presuppositions).
Looking at another topic, an helpful review of the field is provided by Julie Zahle, in
two papers where she is the only author (Zahle 2007, Zahle 2013), and in an
introductory book chapter which was written in collaboration with Finn Collin (Zahle &
Collin 2014). In a different piece, Mark Risjord (2014) offers a brief but insightful
analysis of the most important questions of the debate. Epstein (2009) provides a
classification similar to Zahle and Collins; in spite of that, this last authors
categorization differs from those in the terminology;
In her first paper, Zahle divides the debate around two main areas, namely,
ontological individualism/holism and methodological individualism/holism:
The individualism/holism debate has both an ontological and a methodological
dimension. The ontological dispute revolves around two questions: first, do social
wholes exist sui generis? Second, what is the constitution of social wholes? The
methodological disagreement focuses mainly on the question of whether
explanations should be provided in terms of individuals, their actions, and so on, or
rather in terms of social wholes, their actions, and so on (Zahle 2007: 311).

So, according to Zahle, the first dimension of the confrontation between individualism
and holism is articulated between two questions: the first of those concerns the
existence of social wholes; the second is related to the constitution of those social holes.
On the other hand, the second dimension consists in a disagreement between the focus
of the explanations (and, thus, is a methodological problem) of social science theories.
This formulation can be compared with the one present in her and Collins article:
The individualism-holism debate has first and foremost revolved around two issues:
- What is the ontological status of social phenomena and, as part of this, their
relationship to individuals? To what extent may, and should, social scientific
explanations focus on individuals and social phenomena respectively? The second
question, in particular, has received a lot of attention. The methodological
individualism-holism debate refers to the discussion of this issue, whereas the
ontological individualism-holism issue denotes disputes relating to the first question.

As part of these discussions, a number of other topics have been addressed 1 too
relating to meaning, confirmation, research heuristics, ethics, and the like.
Accordingly, it is also possible to distinguish between individualism-holism debates
on meaning, confirmation, research heuristics, and so on (Zahle & Collins 2014: 2).

In this second case, the authors summarize the debate in two questions, namely, the
ontological status of social phenomena and its relation to individuals and, furthermore,
the focus of the social scientific explanations.
Although the soundness of the last two conceptions is undeniable, it should also
be noted that there are different proposes which review the debate in distinct schemas.
In his introductory book, Mark Risjord summarizes the questions concerning the
opposition between individualism and holism in the following manner:
() we can discern three different points of contrast between an individualist and a
holist position: Theoretical: individualists hold that the theories of the social
sciences can be derived from theories of psychology, while holists hold that social
scientific theories are logically independent of lower-level theories. Ontological:
individualists hold that only human agents and their properties exist, while holists
hold that social entities and properties also exist. Explanatory: individualists hold
that explanations in the social sciences must make reference to individual actions,
while holists also accept social-level explanations (Risjord 2014: 123).

Thus, in the words of Risjord, individualists and holists tend to disagree regarding three
different points: a theoretical, where there is a disagreement about the dependence
relation between theories designed in the social sciences and theories advanced by other
areas; a ontological, where there is an existential problem to be settled by denying or
asserting the existence of social entities and social properties; an explanatory, where
individualists defend that theories should make reference to individual actions, whereas
holists disagree.
The theoretical point could be, in the students opinion, subsumed under the two other
points; it is possible for one to assume that the relation between theories is the
conjunction or disjunction of an ontological relation and an explanatory one. Therefore,
1 As Kincaid noted in the nineties: In one sense, the individualism-holism dispute is a
small technical issue in the philosophy of the social sciences. Even the broader
reductionist program may seem merely an issue in the philosophy of science. Yet
lurking behind these apparently narrow questions lie much bigger issues. They run the
gamut from pratical questions about the practice of science to moral and political
disputes about the nature of freedom and responsibility to large philosophical debates
about rationality and knowledge (Kincaid 1997: 1-2).

if the relation between theories from two different areas is, on the one hand, an
ontological relation (e.g. eliminating the existence of mind as non-identical entity with
brain as a cause to eliminating the impossibility of individual human agency phenomena
to be, prima facie, studied by natural sciences). Then, generally speaking, classifying
the holism-individualism debate in two areas should not be a mistake (at least, not a big
one).
A second example of a different terminology in categorizing the debate is advanced by
Brian Epstein:
The thesis of methodological individualism in social science is commonly divided
into two different claims a controversial claim about explanation, and an
innocuous claim about ontology. Explanatory individualism asserts that explanations
in the social sciences can or ought to be provided in terms of individuals and their
properties. It is often associated with projects in reducing or providing
microfoundations for social theories. Ontological individualism is a thesis about the
determination of social properties or facts (Epstein 2009: 188).

According to this author, methodological individualism is a term that covers what Zahle
and Collin named ontological and methodological individualism. Hence, the term
methodological, in those two researchers, is substituted, in Epsteins view, by the
word explanatory, even though the two concepts are clearly identical.
In conclusion, a categorization similar to Zahle and Collins is, in the students
view, the simplest, while not lacking any of the broadness of any other classification.
Little (1998), identifies the ontological question with reductionism. Van Bowel
(2014) mostra algumas questes.

No tem o mesmo nome do ndice previsto (tenho que mudar), e dever

ter erros. Falta meter alguns autores, mas penso que numa parte
introdutria do tema devo utilizar algumas referncias tipo survey.

Some overviews of the debate around methodological individualism are

provided by Zahle (2007) and Risjord (2014). Collin & Zahle (2014) is a collection of
essays which have some historical insights besides their obvious theoretical importance.
Udehn (2000, 2001) gives an historical explanation of some of the most important
positions of the debate. Van Bowel (2014), Pettit (2014) and Epstein may also be helpful
tracing some of the most recent positions and problems.
The first explicit formulation of an ontological individualist position was made
by economists of the Austrian School of Economics. Among those famous authors, von
Mises (1963) and Hayek (1948, 1955) defended the view that there is nothing more to
society than individuals and their relations, mental states and actions; this view may be
called psychologist.
In the views of Karl R. Popper methodological individualism is built around two
basic notions (Udehn 2001): first, according to him, social explanations should be given
in terms of individuals while being nominalist, something which he called institutional
logic; second, those explanations should be provided by a conjunction of
institutionalism (Popper 1945, 1957). This thesis may as well be said to be a response to
psychologism.
As Udehn (2002) argues, the followers of Popper split in two trends: on one
hand, there were researchers who developed a view called psychologist individualism;
on the other hand, there were also proponents of institutional individualism. One of the
most famous defender of the former position was J. W. N. Watkins (1952, 1953, 1955a,
1957b, 1959a, 1976a); this philosopher argued, among other things, that all social

phenomena are created by human dispositions, beliefs, and relations between

individuals and, also, that social phenomena may be reduced to mental phenomena. On
the latter trend, Joseph Agassi (1960, 1975), defended that, while they dont have aims
like individuals, institutions affect their behavior. Before him, Ian Jarvie (1959, 1961)
had first contended that statements about social entities can be reduced to statements
concerning individuals; according to him, only individuals have causal powers, and,
thus, is position may be said to be individualistic concerning ontology and psychologist
in respect to methodology. Despite that, he later changed his view, supporting, instead, a
form of institutional individualism (1964a) and refusing a reductionist version of
methodological individualism (1972). Lastly, John Wisdom (1970) argued in favour of
what he called

situational individualism, holding that institutions produce

consequences, although those are resultant of individuals intentions; therefore,

intentions and individuals build institutions; he also argued that it is possible for social
wholes to be reduced to individuals.
Regardless of the influence of Poppers and his disciples views, there were also
some papers and books that provided criticism of their thesis. In an important article,
May Brodbeck (1954) argues that collective concepts have as reference the relation
among individuals that compose them; therefore, even though individualist explanations
may be desirable in some sense, holist explanations are possible and, also, simpler and
more useful, since holist concepts are just relations among individuals. On another
paper, Maurice Mandelbaum (1955) reasons against reduction in the social sciences,
defending that societal facts are vital to explanation in the social sciences, while being
irreducible to psychological or individual facts; besides that, he stated the impossibility
of translation of social facts into individual facts. Another researcher, Leon Goldstein
(1956, 1958, 1959) heavily criticized Watkins views, arguing for a moderate
methodological holism that didnt include appeals to deterministic laws, while accepting
Watkins views on ontology. In his work, Ernest Gellner (1956, 1968) maintained that
social entities are external to individuals; for this reason, he said that individuals cannot
be isolated from their social contexts. Finally, Steven Lukes (1968) criticized
ontological individualism, contending that social entities are observable and that
assertions concerning social phenomena have truth values, which in turn makes them
existent per se; he also stated that explanations about certain social phenomena cannot
be given in purely individualistic terms.

Among the theorists whove studied microfoundations, it is undeniable the

influential role of James S. Coleman (1986, 1987, 1990), who argued in favour of
methodological individualism in association with theory of action, criticizing the
invariance of macro concepts such as capitalist, the inexistence of explanations to
whether one relation obtains instead of another in relations between macro concepts,
and the epistemological assertion of a starting society. Amid the researchers of
microfoundations connected with Marxism, it is important to highlight the work of three
authors:

John Roemer (1981, 1982, 1986), who advanced a view defending

microfoundations and deductive method to analyse Marxism theory; following him,

Jon Elster (1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1989a, 1989b, 1998) argued for methodological
individualism associated with rational choice theory and game theory as a tool of
Marxist explanations; finally, Daniel Little (1986, 1991, 1998), insisted on the need of
mechanisms as basis for microfoundations and explanations applied to Marxist theory.
Concerning reduction in the domain of social sciences, Brown (1973) studied the
nature of laws within social scientific enquiry, relating them to reduction; at the same
time, he didnt reject methodological holism as a building block of theories. In his
famous book, Michael Lessnoff (1974), argued in favour of methodological
individualism, considering his position a special form of psychologism, while
contending that explanations of social facts should account for the states of mind of
individuals. Laird Addis (1975), defended the mainstream view of ontological
individualism, denying that social objects have properties and, therefore, favouring
reduction. In the beginning of the eighties, Macdonald and Pettit (1981), accepted that
society is only constituted of individuals and that events that doesnt relate individuals
become significant just in case they affect them; they also granted institutions (e.g.
groups and practices) a role in their ontology, giving them ontological autonomy from
individuals, and, consequently, favouring a moderate version of methodological holism.
Susan James (1984) argued that the holism/individualism debate was fruitless as it
stand, and that questions of reduction should be bypassed in the philosophy of social
sciences; theyve defended, besides that, a form of methodological holism in which
individual autonomy and action was accepted among social context and social
regularities. Arthur Stinchcombe (1991) favoured a moderate methodological holism
which relied on mechanisms for explanations at individual and group levels. Rajeev
Bhargava (1992), hold that predicates that designate individual properties cannot be
isolated from their social context and, for that reason, explanations in the social sciences

cannot be reduced. Harold Kincaid (1996) defended that, although social wholes cannot
act independently from their parts, macro theories who were formulated just with
appeals to wholes can explain social phenomena and that, most of the times, those are
irreducible to micro explanations; he advanced an holist and naturalistic view of
explanations in social science; in a latter book (1997) he argued against methodological
individualism, considering the arguments of multiple realizations, context sensitivity
and social presuppositions. Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998) favoured a moderate
methodological individualism which stand on mechanisms for explanations. A similar
position, which related the need of causality in explanations with social mechanisms,
was provided by Boudon (1998).
Although microfoundations and mechanistic theories are, even today, important
in this debate, the dispute around the notions of supervenience, emergence and the
debate

about

social

and

individual

properties

became

mainstream in

the

individualism/holism debate around the beginning of the eighties. Among the authors
whove used those notions to formulate a thesis concerning the debate, criticizing some
individualist positions, were McDonald and Pettit (1981), Currie (1984), Ruben (1985),
Kincaid (1986), Little (1991), Bhargava (1992), Bohman (1993), Fedor (1994), Pettit
(2003), Sawyer (2002, 2003). Important discussions of some of those positions may be
found in Tuomella (1989), Zahle (2003, 2007) and Epstein (2009, 2011 2014). Hindriks
(2011, 2013) provides a view about the location of social wholes. Epstein (2009, 2014)
argues against supervenience and booth ontological individualism and ontological
holism, defending a view that he calls anchor individualism. A critique of the use and
weight of metaphysics and ontology on the individualism/holism debate is provided by
Van Bowel (2004, 2014). Ylikoski (2014) argues against the modelling of the debate
around notions imported from philosophy of mind. Elder-Vass (2005, 2010, 2012, 2014)
proposes a rejection of ontological and methodological individualism based on causality
and emergence.
Other important positions that may affect the debate are what is called critical
realism. Some examples of this position may be found in Bhaskar (2000), Archer (1995,
2003), Sayer (1992, 2000).

In a survey paper, van Riel and Van Gulick (2014), Sarkar (1992), Udehn (2001) list
different models of scientific reduction. Nagel (1949),

(), falta os individualistas que esto na ltima frase, alguns holistas

da dcada de 50/60 (Mandelbaum e.g.), a introduo da supervenincia
no debate nos anos 80, e por a adiante. So as partes mais difceis do
projeto e do estado da arte.
J agora, devo fazer o estado da Arte desta forma ou da forma do
captulo anterior? Assim mais rpido, mas no exponho
detalhadamente coisa nenhuma. Mas dado que h muitas referncias e
no tenho acesso a algumas, talvez seja melhor assim. Decida a
Professora.

Possible Table of Contents

I Framing the debate (State of the Art)
1 Culture
1.1 A short history of the concept
1.2 Some philosophical questions about culture
2 - Individualism and Holism
2.1 Introductory remarks
2.2 A short history of the ontological debate
2.3 A short history of the methodological debate

II Concepts
1 Facts, States of Affairs
2 Properties
3 Truth
III Topics on Holism and Individualism
1 - Reduction
2 Microfoundations
3 Rational Choice Theory
4 Supervenience
5 Realism
6 Collective Intentionality
IV Holism and Individualism between Philosophy and Culture
1 Facts and Culture.

1.1 Are there any cultural facts?

1.2 Truthmaking and cultural facts
Properties and Culture.
2.1 Are there any cultural properties?
2.2 Does cultural properties supervene on individual or social
properties?
Truth and Culture.
3.1 Cultural statements and vagueness.
3.2 Can cultural sets be vague?

Alguns pontos devem ser revistos, mas s possvel faz-lo aps o

estado da arte, por razes bvias. Mas no fugir muito disto. Estou na
dvida em relao parte I. Posso identifica-la com o estado da arte,
uma

vez

que

os

captulos

sobre

cultura

sobre

individualismo/holismo tero de certeza algumas descries da histria

do debate. Ao mesmo tempo, penso que devia debater alguns
argumentos, mas talvez o faa na terceira parte

Btw, conselhos? Sugestes? Thanks.