Henrich, D - The Proof Structure of The Transcendental Deduction

The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction
Author(s): Dieter Henrich

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Jun., 1969), pp. 640-659
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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THE PROOF-STRUCTURE
OF KANTS TRANSCENDENTALDEDUCTION
DIETERHENRICH
JL he
transcendental
DEDUCTION of the categories
is the very
It contains
of the Critique of Pure Reason.
the two principal
the possibility
of a sys
proofs of the book, the one demonstrating
and the other the impossibility
of experience
tematic knowledge
the limits of experience.
con
of knowledge
Kant himself
beyond
new
sidered
and extremely
this theory completely
complicated;
moreover
that he had great difficulty
in working
he conceded
out
a satisfactory
one
his
It
two
of
is
of
the
exposition
theory.
chapters
heart
which
he
rewrote
not
for the second edition.

completely
that this deduction
has preoccupied
Thus
it is
surprising
interpreters
than any other text in the history
of philosophy.
In only
are
which
from
their
context,
pages,
thirty-five
easily separated
the
and presented
Kant has formulated his most profound
thoughts
more
for his theory of knowledge.

Whoever
under
a key to the understanding
and
pages possesses
text is so complex
But Kant's
of the entire work.
evaluation
and
to follow the line of argument
elusive that it is difficult
and to
it the structure of a proof which
could support the
perceive within
In
view
of
this it has been
of
critical
whole
system
philosophy.
on
to
focus
the
their
attacks
deduction.
Kant's
for
critics
easy
By
decisive
stands
foundation
these
who wish
the same token it has been just as easy for philosophers
to their own position,
to read
to make use of Kant as testimony
no one has been
Until now, however,
their thoughts
into his.
text.
which
able to offer an interpretation
agrees fully with Kant's
over
ver
two
of
the
is
there
still
which
Hence,
controversy
of the deduction
deserves priority
and whether
indeed any
can
distinction
them
between
be maintained
that would
go beyond
of presentation
and involve the structure
of the proof
questions
sions
itself.
alone
Schopenhauer
fully expresses
as well as many
self,
in the method
and Heidegger
Kant's
held
that
the first
while
unique philosophy,
other Kantians,
have only seen
of presentation.
edition
Kant him
a difference

KANTS TRANSCENDENTALDEDUCTION
641
an attempt will be made to settle this conflict

In the following,
the
shall advocate
more
than 150 years.1 We
has
which
persisted
a
tenable
edition
second
the
thesis that only
argument
develops
in this version corresponds more adequately
and that the argument
than does
the specific structure of Kant's thought as a whole,
with
im
most
the
contradicts
This position
that of the first edition.
to re
moreover
it proposes
of Kant;
interpretations
portant
in a
its reception
and to guide
of his work
the meaning
evaluate
other than that of speculative
direction
Idealism, Neo-Kantianism,
or Existential
Philosophy.
I
which,
compared with
controversy
is
two
the
of
the value
the debate
editions,
only of minor
as
leads
it
insofar
is relevant here
ultimately
yet which
importance,
the
it to be answered:
and allows
back to this question
namely,
in the second
of the proof
the structure
concerning
controversy
edition.
seems to be
of the deduction
the conclusion
In this edition
treat first
will
We
another
over
It is the task
different passages.
drawn twice in two completely
the
that
to
demonstrate
a
deduction
transcendental
of
categories
of ap
are qualified
to provide knowledge
of our understanding
a
of
us
of
to
the
in
as they are given
synthesis
unity
pearances,
"Conse
20
reads:
of section
The conclusion
(B 123).
experience
a given intuition
is necessarily
in
manifold
the
subject to
quently,
does not seem to differ
This conclusion
the categories"
(B 143).
to which
"the cate
from the result of section 26, according
. . . are . . . valid a
of
all
for
experience"
objects
priori
gories
(B 161).
to see two proofs of the same proposition
into direct
That leads, however,
edition.
in section 21, which
conflict with Kant's unequivocal
explication
are involved
rather than two proofs,
states that tAvo arguments,
one
is tempted
in the text of the second
Thus
In
scendental
ed
in
the
of the Tran
the proof-structure
discuss
only
involv
and the problems
of its premisses
analysis
in another
be given
will
its conclusion
paper.
this paper
Deduction.
I shall
application
of
An

642
DIETERHENRICH
that
and
the proof of
these together
constitute
a beginning
in the above proposition
is made
"Thus
of
will
the
pure
. . . ."
concepts
"In what
follows,
the
deduction.
of a deduction
'something
further'
. . . ."
of the a priori
"Only thus, by demonstration
in
our
of
the
of
senses, will
validity
respect of all objects
categories
the purpose of the deduction
be fully attained"
We can
(B 145).
now formulate
a criterion
for a successful
of the
interpretation
text of the deduction
whole
in this way:
the interpretation
must
show that, contrary to the initial impression
that the two conclu
on the contrary,
define
sec
sions merely
the same proposition,
be shown
tions 20
two
and 26 offer
with
different
significantly
a
yield
single proof of the transcen
call this task the problem
of the
arguments
results, and that these together

We
shall
dental deduction.
two-steps-in-one-proof.
In previous
this problem
commentaries
has been either pro
or
over
nounced
else passed
insoluble
in silence.2
The better
assurance
claim that Kant's
commentaries
that his deduction
pre
sents two steps in one proof cannot be taken seriously,
and that we
to read the text as two distinct and complete proofs.
on the basis of this
double-proof
theory merit
We
shall call them the interpretation
to
according
4
and
the
to
Adickes/Paton
interpretation
according
Erdmann/
5
and shall examine them in that order.
de Vleeschauwer
are compelled
Two proposals
our attention.3
In the preface
1.
himself
made
distinguished
for instance,
of Pure Reason
on Kant's
Commentary
3
In recent
English
Cf.,
Critique
of
discussion
of view
in
the
4
which
first
Erich
Norman
(London,
Critique
Kemp
1918),
of Pure
publications
Bennett
problem.
on it.
does not
focus
this
edition
Adickes,
Herbert
of
on
and
Wolff
Smith,
on Kant's
Commentary
and A. C. Ewing,
A Short
120.
1967),
p.
(Chicago,
one does
not
a
find
Critique
A
p. 289;
Reason
the
are writing
from a point
almost
exclusively
Strawson
is interested
the Deduction.
Kants
James
Kritik
Paton,
der
Kant's
reinen
Vernunft
(Berlin,
1889),
(Lon
vol.
I, p. 501.
1936),
5
Kants
Benno
Kritizismus
in der 1. und
2. Auflage
der
Erdmann,
der reinen
Kritik
Herman
de Vleeschauwer,
"La
1878);
Vernunft
(Leipzig,
l' uvre
de Kant,"
in Werken
d?duction
transcendentale
dans
uitgegeven
en Letteren
door de Faculten
der Wijsbegeerte
vol. 3, pp. 24
1937),
(Ghent,
pp.
139-140;
to the first edition of the Critique,

Kant
an objective
and a subjective
side of the
Metaphysic
of Experience
don,
et seq.

643
side makes
the validity of the
The objective
the
their relation
to
categories
intelligible,
subjective
investigates
the cognitive
faculties
in us which must
be presupposed
if these
deduction
(A XVI).
are
categories
to
be
used.
to
According
can
one
Kant
also
dis
as the demonstration
two
that the cate

aspects
and
the
how
have
demonstration
gories
validity,
they attain
Adickes
and
Paton
this
that
distinction
be
propose
validity.
to
in
order
understand
of
the
division
the
deduction
into
employed
two arguments:
section 20 completes
the proof of objective valid
tinguish
these
ity, section
26 demonstrates
the
conditions
subjective
of applica
tion.
This
of being able to invoke in its

proposal has the advantage
statements
fundamental
certain
Kantian
about the deduc
support
tion?but
there is no further evidence
for it. For it is clear that
cannot be applied to the structure of the second ver
the proposal
In section 21 Kant clearly stated that the
of
the validity of the categories would
demonstration
be completed
in section 26 (B 145).
The title and conclusion
of this section
can be read in no other way.
no
And the text itself contains
of our cognitive
reflections
about the interconnection
faculties.
sion of the deduction.
can indicate the distinction

between
"how," which
a
and an epistemological
investigation,
subjective
and an objective
In this
deduction,
only appears
incidentally.
we
see
must
shall
that
it
be
understood
context,
however,
quite
The little word

a psychological
differently.
2.
The proposal
to understand
attempts
deduction
time
of Erdmann
the
second
and de Yleeschauwer
version
of the
likewise
transcendental
with
the help of another

observation
of Kant's?this
of a distinction
in the first version of the deduction.
made
In two corresponding
trains of thought,
Kant here elaborates
the
can be developed
between
relation
the categories,
which
from
and
sensible
the
He
self-consciousness,
given
representations.
them as the demonstration
distinguishes
"from below."
In this way he implies
faculties,
the highest
sensibility?extremes
a relation
establishes
the two proofs
move
of which
between
"from
above"
a hierarchy
is the understanding
which
the faculty
of possible
coordination,
in opposite
directions.
and
that
of cognitive
and the lowest
of imagination
and between which

DIETERHENRICH
644
It seems
of
pretation
de Yleeschauwer
to apply this distinction

to the
And
indeed
edition.
Erdmann
that section
20 be understood
quite natural
the second
propose
deduction
"from
deduction
"from
above,"
below."
while
section
26
is to be regarded
inter
and
as a
as a
is in better agreement
with
the text of sec
This proposal
has supplied
tion 26, which
the decisive
the
arguments
against
of
Adickes
and
Paton.
For
here
Kant
interpretation
actually
the achievement
of the faculty
intuition, mentions
and comes then to speak of the unity in the forms
can be reached only through
and
of intuition, which
the categories
a
the
in
virtue
the
unification
of
manifold
consciousness
of
by
the two parts of the deduction
remain
Nevertheless
(B 160).
reason:
this
for
the
struc
the
following
unexplained
proposal
by
from
proceeds
of imagination,
ture of the first argument

in section 20 can in no way be con
as a deduction
"from above"?and
thus as a process which
of section 26 insofar as its proof must
differs from the argument
In section 20, just as
in the opposite
be constructed
sequence.
intuition
in section 26, the manifold
of a sensible
is mentioned
can assume the charac
Then it is shown that the manifold
first.
ceived
ter of a unitary representation

only if it is subject to the categories.
that a given
intuition can become
Thus both arguments
establish
a unitary
of
the intellectual
functions
representation
only when
are applied
or not
to it. Now as to whether
the understanding
as a deduction
can properly
be understood
"from
this argument
to
it possible
in no way make
below" : the forms of these proofs
distinction
between
the considerations
of the
draw a meaningful
two
sections.
of the only proposed

interpretations?not
assurance
that there is one
only
they depart from Kant's
two
to find two dis
and
instead
in
steps
attempt
proof presented
can
their arguments
because
tinct proofs, but also and primarily
no
two
of
the
between
the distinction
useful
offer
explanation
Hence
the failure
because
proofs.
We
should
must
avoid
understanding
the
port,
search
of these
of
the proof
two-steps-in-one-proof
as do the proposals
of the text.
It
interpretation
as far as possible
and seek an
of the deduction
that would
require
for another
errors
both
thesis.
Moreover,
just discussed,
it cannot
from Kant's
derive
sup
observations

645
about the structure

of the proof of the deduction,
for they are
valid only in the context of the first edition.
Kant always allowed
somany different trains of thought
to influence him in formulating
never
is
it
to employ his com
his central arguments
that
possible
related them to the passage
of the
ments
unless he has explicitly
text
in question.
II
But now, from the propositions

a proposal which will
can develop
Its plausibility
steps-in-one-proof.
20, 21, and 26, we

of the two
the problem
stems from the fact that it
of sections
solve
of the text which must

be
many
peculiarities
intelligible
all
other
neglected
by
proposals.
to the fact that the result
Kant obviously
attached importance
a restriction:
he established
of the proof in section 20 contains
makes
are subject to the categories

insofar as they, as intui
He
indicates
this restriction
tions, already possess unity
(B 143).
in
the
"in
indefinite
the
article
very clearly by writing
expression
an intuition"
Einer
with
the
letter
first
(in
Anschauung)
capitaliz
that intuitions
the translator,
has misunderstood
this
Smith,
that Kant wanted
to imply that some single
intuition was subject to the categories.
This interpretation,
how
in the course of the proof.
ever, leads to no meaningful
emphasis
in German
the indefinite
article
Unlike
(ein) and the
English,
same
root.
the
This
word unity
made
it possible
have
(Einheit)
ed.
Norman
He
hint.6
Kemp
believes
to express through the capital letter not the distinctness

as opposed
to others
intuition
any arbitrary
(singularity),
rather its inner unity.
for Kant
of
but
The result
of the proof in section 20 is therefore valid only for

those intuitions which
That is: wherever
already contain unity.
can be thought
there is a relation which
there is unity,
according
to the categories.
does not yet clarify
This statement,
however,
can be found.
for us the range ivithin which
intuitions
unitary
The
restriction
that part of section

6
mentator,
Cf.
160
p.
he could
of
not
of the proof in section 20 is then discussed

in
21 which makes
reference to section 26.
Here
his
find
which
also
shows
translation,
that,
sense
text (cf. note 2 above).
in Kant's

as
com
DIETERHENRICH
646
in section 20 will be
it is announced
that the restriction
just made
overcome
of section 26, i.e., the second part of
in the paragraphs
are valid for all objects
the deduction will show that the categories
And
this
is
what
of our senses
takes place.
(B 161).
actually
The deduction
reason
is carried out with
the help of the following
we find unity,
this unity is itself made possible
by
and determined
in relation to them.
In our repre
ing: wherever
the categories
we have intuitions which
of space and time, however,
sentations
at the same time include everything
that
contain unity and which
can be present
to our senses.
of
For indeed the representations
our
time
have
their
in
forms
and
of
the
space
origin
sensibility,
no representations
of which
therefore be sure that every given
subject to the categories.
outside
can be given to us. We

can
manifold
without
is
exception
this point the aim of the proof of the deduction

has been
as
to
the
deduction
seeks
the un
insofar
demonstrate
attained,
can be
the
for
restricted
of
which
categories
validity
everything
At
to experience.
which
arise
Perceptions,
cannot
to
be
and which
determinate
erratically
repeated according
a coherent and systematic knowl
rules, would not make
intelligible
The only conceivable
result
of a limited
edge of experience.
a
our
be
diffuse
and dis
for
sense-data
would
ordering
capacity
related
meaningfully
sequence of perceptions.
It is certainly
extraordinary
continuous
conscious
making
and
thereby
to claim
unifying
our
that
own
our
capacity
sensuous
for
repre
its conceiv
should perhaps only be limited.
However,
result of the fundamental
of the
is an immediate
argument
our
consciousness
the
It
that
is
has
Critique.
implied
sentations
ability
whole
of being
"empty."
peculiarity
must
become
become
conscious
which
do not
Everything
accessible
of which
Ave can
to us
through media
on this consciousness.
Accord
depend
immediately
must be under
ing to Kant, it is for this reason that consciousness
neces
whose
thus always a mafciru/-conscious
stood as an activity,
us
name
causes
to
the
it
this
"I."
inner
But
sary
give
activity
unity
that something
is present
in the first place
always presupposes
can be
is to be made
Thus our consciousness
conscious.
which
a "passive,"
only together with
and
in
certain
distinct
respects opposed
it can encounter
intuitions
sciousness;
found
is
receptive
faculty, which
to the spontaneity
of con
"before all
only as given

consciousness."
the task of the transcendental
reformulates
Kant
647
to this very distinction:

it must demon
reference
are capable of taking up something
strate that categories
given
into the unity of consciousness.
very well be
"Appearances might
so constituted
should not find them to be in
that the understanding
with
deduction
accordance
If that is
of its unity"
the conditions
(B 123).
such a disproportion
it can also be asked whether
can be excluded
and givenness
for all or
consciousness
with
then
possible,
between
The difference
between
only for part of the given appearances.
between
also defines
the difference
the
these two possibilities
result of the proof of the first and that of the second step of the
deduction.7
Ill
need not recur at every level in the analysis of
This question
of our knowledge.
It could be that considerations
the conditions
are possible
establish
that the alter
such as would
rather quickly
deduction
has to deal are
the transcendental
natives with which
:
not three-termed
but rather only two-termed
that therefore either
no
sensuous
or
representations
else
all
sensuous
are
representations
familiar
by the categories.
Anyone
capable of being determined
with Kant's work will suspect that Kant had good reason to assert
this.
But this amounts to saying that Kant also had an alternative
the proof of the transcendental
of constructing
deduction,
way
he actually used in the second edition.
other than the one which
he takes into account the possibility
of a
For in this construction
merely partial ability of the understanding
He excluded
sensible representations.
because
unity
we
in the
do
in
on the Transcendental
was
a thesis
Deduction
by Friedrich
never
came
to the con
which
close
1944)
(Marburg,
published,
of this
di Kant
Pietro
La Deduzione
section.
Chiodi,
nell'Opera
an attempt
to bring
the problem
of
1961),
pp. 245 et seq. makes
There
Tenbruck
clusion
(Torino,
the "how"
connection
(section
so that
cannot
that of the "that"

(section
20) into a necessary
one
one
But
of arguments.
chain
they build
on
two problems.
sections
the basis
of these
account
of Kant's
formal
and
intention
is highly
26) with
together
the two
distinguish
Chiodi's
moreover,
cannot
abstract
and
be
And
Deduction
to establish
it only
expressed
in
the
language
of
the
Transcendental
itself.

648
DIETERHENRICH
of space and time and therefore

fact have unitary
representations
can also
of sense.
all
representations
unify
we
can
that Kant himself was actually
demonstrate
Fortunately
could also
conscious
of the fact that the transcendental
deduction
His pupil Johann
quite differently.
Sigismund
in the year 1793 to publish a selection from Kant's
On the title page he was able to announce
that this was
writings.8
own advice.
Kant was interested
in making
being done on Kant's
a competent
which
could
used for
also
be
available
commentary
be
constructed
Beck undertook
But when Beck published

the third part of his selections
lectures.
a funda
to undertake
in the year 1796, he considered
it necessary
in
to
from
mental
order
which
the
standpoint
investigation
specify
was
come
to the
to
He had
be evaluated.
Kant's Critique
actually
a false estimate of
that the structure of the book promoted
opinion
to begin with
it would
be necessary
the
to
in
order
the
the
avoid
understanding,
productive
activity
to speak of "given con
that Kant really wanted
misunderstanding
of
which
In
us."
and
affect
Beck's opinion all this
"objects
cepts"
an
to
talk was
traditional
and
accommodation
doctrine
only
Kant's
doctrine.
Thus
of
concessions
for the purpose of an introduc
preliminary
With
the
this
Beck approached,
tion into
system.
interpretation,
Fichte's
conviction.
somewhat
philosophical
belatedly,
constituted
to approve this.
But
Naturally Kant could not bring himself
in Beck and in the effect of his writings,
since he was interested
he
to consider
was more willing
alteration
Beck's
of
the
proposed
cases.
in comparable
In a letter to
than was his custom
Critique
Tief trunk, he tried to show approximately
what
Beck's colleague
assume
an
in
the
form
altered presentation.9
Thus
Critique might
an alternative
we see that Kant himself at one time proposed
to the
deduction
transcendental
of the
second
edition.
as rules
of the categories
the doctrine
begin with
of a possible universal
consciousness?corresponding
It must
the unity
8
1793);
Erlaeuternder
Auszug
aus
Kants
kritischen
Schriften,
vol.
for
to
(Riga,
vol. 3 (Riga, 1796).
der Wissen
Kants
ed. Preussische
Akademie
Schriften,
gesammelte
to Tieftrunk
llth
1797 and
the
vol.
Dec.
Briefwechsel,
3, letter
schaften,
of this letter
in vol. 4, pp. 468 et seq.
first sketch
5 of Kants
in the
Further
in vol.
Nachlass
evidence
handschriftlicher
same
edition,
reflections
6353
and
6358.

649
16-18 of the second edition.

Then it must
demonstrate
a priori are
order
in
that intuitions
that
the
categories
presupposed
can be applied at all to given sensuous
intuitions.
This becomes
one considers
can only be con
that the categories
evident, when
as
can
under
Without
which
be
ceived
operators
they
applied.
an
a
such
of application
essential moment
of their mean
possibility
of a priori concepts
The meaning
such as the
ing is missing.
sections
a priori.
can only be accessible
But the only possibility
categories
a priori for the categories
of securing ameaning
is their application
a
to a form of sensible intuition?the
is
only
priori element which
of their application
in the domain
to sensible given
conceivable
ness.
If there is no a priori intuition,
then there is no employment
can only be applied
at all. Now the categories
of the categories
as they grasp
this form itself as a
are
For
else but forms
categories
unitary representation.
nothing
And by virtue of this, the application
of synthesizing
into a unity.
to all sensuous
is also assured.
of the categories
representations
can be given independently
For no sensible intuitions
of the forms
a priori
to
intuition
of sensibility,
which,
insofar
in turn,
are completely
subordinate
to the
categories.
By reasoning
result Kant attains
it is possible
in this way
in section 26 on the basis
to maintain
of the mere
that
the
fact of the
time can be
of unitary
of space and
givenness
representations
condition
of every employment
derived as a necessary
of the cate
In
with
transcendental
accordance
the
deduction
this,
gories.
can no longer be carried through
in terms of those two steps of
are characteristic
of the second version.
the proof which
In the same context,
the proof
Kant also indicated

the reasons
however,
of the second edition:
construction
this
use of the synthetic method,
on
it
the
i.e.,
proceeds
are initially
of the Critique
of the fact that two doctrines
for retaining
proof makes
basis
of one another?the
developed
independently
as functions
of unity in self-consciousness
gories
of space and time as given representations.
to the synthetic method
the proof according
as to facts.
If it were
results of the Aesthetic
doctrine
of the cate
and the doctrine

The
has
second
recourse
step of
to the
conducted
according
then the necessity
of the forms of intuitions
to analytical method,
This would
then be followed by
would
first have to be justified.
we
an Aesthetic
forms
showing which
really have at our disposal.

DIETERHENRICH
650
be completed.
But Kant was of the
"did not have the clarity and facility"
of the synthetic method.10
And this is the reason
to consider Beck's proposed
him unable
construction
then could
Only
that
opinion
characteristic
the deduction
this method
which made
as an improvement.
to make his
always had the tendency
and,
consequences
by virtue of its theoretical
theory convincing
as far as possible,
to reduce
to a
of its foundations
analysis
He was
intent upon changing
the entire method
minimum.
of
Kant
instruction
and upon securing
of his
the convictions
philosophical
and
the
He
not
did
age against
against
dogmatists
skepticism.
for application
he would
this pressure
foresee that through
disillu
minds
and drive
sion the best speculative
his students
among
to other
them
paths.
IV
The
papers documenting
for a transcendental
Kant's
reflections
or
the other method,

on the basis
deduction
ten years.
on
the different
edition
postdate
course
to
Of
it
almost
is
of the Critique
by
possible
to
for a deduction
the
show that all the ideas necessary
according
to him when
he
available
had been already
analytical method
mean
not
But
this
the
does
the first edition of
Critique.
published
as he composed
the second edition,
the
that he had in mind,
one
a
to
of
deduction
and
according
advantages
disadvantages
methods
that he
and
the synthetic
chose
expressly
a comparison.
text of the
The
for such an interpretation.
Within
such
of
method
the second
Critique
provides no support
Avhich Kant
the structure
a
of
construction
advantages
his book,
the
given
to the synthetic method
according
to
him
construction
allowed
This
had
already
in any case obvious.

the
of critical philosophy,
the two fundamental
positions
ground
in knowl
sensible a priori and the active role of the understanding
of a single
then to unite them by means
edge, separately?and
were
argument.
But
the proof
into two
there were
still other
of the deduction
steps.
10
Briefwechsel,
Besides
vol.
reasons which
induced
him
to argue
and to divide it accordingly

synthetically
the objective
the task of proving
validity
4, p.
471.

651
to the deduction
the task of
also assigned
to
of
the
the
relating
understanding
possibility
intelligible
making
must
not
with
the
other
of
task
be
confused
This
sensibility.11
to the Critique, when
he
Kant speaks in the first preface
which
from
of
the
side
the
deduc
the
objective
subjective
distinguishes
is an
deduction
There he says that the subjective
tion (A XVI).
of the categories,
Kant
the possibility
of those cognitive
faculties upon which
investigation
means
rests.
the
of a functional
of
understanding
knowledge
by
of
than the explanation
strives for more
Such an investigation
of knowl
the whole
It seeks to elucidate
apparatus
possibility.
a
The
of
if
in
summary.
explanation
possibility
only
edge,
a difficulty which
to remove
arises out of the
proposes merely
itself: it assumes
of critical philosophy
pure categories
problem
are originally
that these categories
and then declares,
however,
intuition.
Given
the accepted
related to sensible
essentially
seems mysterious
and
this relation
idea of an a priori concept,
of
be shown that the meaning
And thus it must
inconceivable.
can be so stipulated
an a priori concept
that it refers necessarily
and
to intuition.
sent
the fact that
concepts.
another
intuition
to
And
one
This
form.
shown
one
how
intuition
the given
even
cannot
can repre
on such
depends
essentially
can
in
of possibility
also be given
as well
as
to show that categories
be
further
explanation
It has then
another.
of a relation
it must
be
thought
Moreover,
the
independently
demonstration
of their
of
the
relation
necessity
them can provide an answer to the problem

of their relations.
the possibility
concerning
to
in the second edition
known
that Kant sought
between
atical question
It is well
But
of the so-called
deduction.
subjective
for an explana
that he neglected
the demand
To
to intuitions.
the categories
of relating
tion of the possibility
to distinguish
the two
between
be sure, Kant used the same words
in the proof of the validity of the categories:
involved
questions
are subject to
is a proof that the intuitions
deduction
the objective
and the ex
both the subjective
deduction
while
the categories,
the problems
that does not mean
avoid
are investigations
of how they do this.
of possibility
planation
Adickes
and Paton
But they are still two distinct
investigations.
For this reason they were oblig
have overlooked
this distinction.
11
159:
"We
have
now
to explain
the
possibility
. . . ."

652
DIETER HENRICH
the second step of the proof to be something
which
a subjective
not:
deduction.
At the same time,
one may very well
as an ex
read the whole
deduction
ed to consider
it clearly was
however,
to intuition.
of relating
the categories
of the possibility
planation
Such an explanation,
like the proof of validity,
First it must be shown what
steps of explanation.
a category
is, given
actually
to a synthesis
time related
that such categories
shown
the fact that

of intuition.
can exercise
two
requires
the nature of
it is always at the same

And
it must
then be
in
functions
synthetic
can be given
These two parts of the explanation
intuition
itself.
at the same time with
the two steps of the validity proof, according
are valid without
to which
in
One
limitation.
general
categories
the two investigations.
For
cannot blame Kant for not separating
that the proof of the validity of the categories
it is easily shown
of the possibility
enter into the explanation
of their relation
to intuition.
Kant
At the only place where
the two
separates
was
one
a
to
from
he
another,
propose
compelled
investigations
12
to
to
of
which
fails
strict
has
demands:
he
proof
satisfy
validity
that we are in possession
proceed at this point from the assumption
a priori judgments
of synthetic
all objects of sensibility
concerning
must
stand beyond all doubt in virtue of their

judgments
But this was
natural
sciences.
the
in mathematical
employment
And it is
which Hume called into question.
very presupposition
and that these
to have answered
of Hume's
assault
the radicalism
merit
a correspondingly
For this
radical founding
of knowledge.
that
did not incorporate
into the Critique
he ultimately
reason,
form of a deduction which
of possibility.
avoids every explanation
Kant's
with
is a proof of the validity of the

of the
is at one and the same time an explanation
categories which
a
to
their
relation
which
avoids
of
sensibility,
proof
possibility
of an analysis of the cognitive
faculties.
taking up the problems
And this is equally true of both steps of the deduction?not
merely
Adickes and Paton regard as a subjective
of its second part, which
WTiat we
in the second
find
edition
deduction.
12
Cf.
of Science.
fact, which
introduction
and
the note
the
is,
into
may
to
note
Like
the
introduction
the Prolegomena
to the
according
the
be
Critique.
ignored
to Kant's
it starts
from
Prolegomena,
differences
The
Metaphysical
as
science
legitimate
between
Foundations
an
indubitable
only within
the Prolegomena
here.

an
653
of the
functions
text, both
of
the
But
the
deduction
validity
proof
for a deduction.
remains
fundamental
of the categories
always
the restric
in section 26, overcomes
The second step of the proof,
effort is required
But considerable
tion still in effect in section 20.
For it is not presented
to recognize
this second step.
separately
an understanding
must be borne
For
the
of
in mind.
of possibility,
and Kant
part of the explanation
the argument when
adds to the difficulty of understanding
that the unity in the representa
he declares, with great emphasis,
can
none
is
be
other than that which
tions of space and time
the second
from
himself
is
the categories.13
This statement,
however,
through
thought
20
of
an
of
and
the
conclusion
section
of
the
result
application
only
a step of the proof nor a sup
It contains neither
of section 26.
to
It is simply misleading
of
explanation
possibility.
plementary
an
so
stress
the
of
an
actual
conclusion
much
that
give
application
is lost sight of.
argument
V
it has still not been
all these considerations
never
the actual structure
clarified
Kant
why
presented
sufficiently
or never even indicated
it un
of his proof
in a clearer manner
a
to
reconstruct
been
it
from
We
have
able
only
equivocally.
But
even with
text which
them
other elements
and at times gives
reason
can
A
be given
for this
further
emphasis.
a
about
leads into
fundamental
which
consideration
undue
circumstance
the
second
Already
the proof
involves
constantly
to the first.
of the deduction
and its relation
seems to suggest that he has completed
are
that all sensible
the deduction
representations
version
in section
of
16 Kant
Kant's
subject to the categories.
use of an analysis of the meaning
is my representation.
representation
argument
at this point makes

I say that a
when
expressed
The unity
of apperception
is
to me."
of the meaning
of "belongs
definition
For
the original
All
"I" or "I think."
this unity is indicated by the expressions
are therefore mine
as they are bound
insofar
representations
But Kant now extends
in the unity of self-consciousness.
together
of "mine"
the meaning
13
161:
"This
further,
synthetic
unity
to include
namely,
can
be
no
other
than
all representa
. . . ."

DIETERHENRICH
654
can be united
tions which
grounds
tions ours
this
for
extension.
in self-consciousness.
For we do actually
call
in virtue of the fact that we can become

And there is no better criticism
to us.
they belong
a consciousness
with
tion of representations
than
can
experience
This
as
them
extension
to the more
extensive
its
own
of
sensibility
conscious
potentially
a being
representa
that
conscious
for the associa

the fact
that
it
representations.
For
is equivocal
nevertheless.
thesis that all representations
in the
are good
There
are
to
that
degree
it leads
which
also
easily
arise
already
because
every
representations.
Precisely
one is
to Kant, a sensibility,
consciousness
presupposes,
according
to describe
this sensibility
itself as "his" sensibility
and
tempted
must
then further to assume that all given sensible representations
This would mean
that they are to be
also to that extent be "his."
as possible contents of his consciousness.
And, by proceed
be completed
this
deduction would
in
the transcendental
way,
ing
as a result of a simple semantic
of
how
word
"mine"
the
analysis
sense
are
in
the
"mine"
For if all given representations
is used.
defined
that they can be taken up into

then that means precisely
indicated,
in accordance with
the categories.
the unity of consciousness
to the prob
be an astonishingly
That would
simple solution
as the deepest
tran
in the whole
lem which Kant had announced
on a shift
it rests, as is obvious,
Actually
philosophy.
distinct
from
is
"mine."
in the expression
Sensibility
me
can
to
I
if
And
if
self-consciousness.
something
belongs
only
as
as
it
is
then
available
take it up into consciousness,
long
only
scendental
of meaning
but only
it is not at all "mine";
to be taken up into consciousness,
this relation
It makes no difference whether
"in relation to me."
If the limits of my consciousness'
is public or private.
capacity
its entering my
to take something
consciousness,
up precludes
"mine" in the strict sense of the word.
it Avould also never become
Kant was
certainly
from
he refrains
point
all Avhich would
that
remain
aware of this distinction.

that
saying
inaccessible
this
would
there
could
At an important
at
be no intuition
He
to consciousness.
then
affirms
for me"
be
"nothing
representation
that Kant did not seriously
also be noted
But it must
(B 132).
not merely
assume that there could be such representations?and
it be construed
whether
in virtue of the proof of the deduction,
only
according
to the analytical
or the
synthetic
method.
He

did not
see with
655
of the word
"mine" in
the homonymy
was
to assert
He
thus
able
representations.
sufficient
clarity
talk about
"my"
the result of the proof of the deduc
which
anticipate
propositions
on the
the deduction
tion and at the same time make
dependent
of
"I am conscious
mere
"mine":
semantic
analysis of the word
of representations
the self as identical with respect to the manifold
I call them one and
because
that are given to me in an intuition,
one
them as constituting
and so apprehend
all my representations,
a priori
to saying that I am conscious
This amounts
intuition.
of
a necessary
synthesis
of
representations?to
be
entitled
the
all repre
which
original
synthetic unity of apperception?under
In the
stand . . ." (B 135).
that are given to me must
sentations
in order
first edition Kant made use of an even poorer argument
In the second
the same conclusion
to make
(A 120).
convincing
that he could not free himself
recognize
he does not rely upon them
also
but
that
from such arguments,
reason
stated that
he never expressly
And for this
confidently.
Instead he assures
the deduction
already takes place in section 16.
one
edition
us
clearly
both
it requires
And they make
that
(B 145).
the
can
we have analyzed
of the steps which
no use at all of the semantic analysis of
"mine."
word
One
could
show
that
it was
of this word.
by the ambiguity
one takes his doctrine
that Kant was upset

occurs if
inevitably
difficulty
as a point of departure.
Its
no accident
The
of consciousness
cannot be examined
here.
features, however,
to see that this
it ismore
For the present discussion
important
tAvo editions
in
the
to
different
led
consequences
difficulty
entirely
for
This difficulty
is at least partly responsible
of the Critique.
distinctive
giving
the second
edition
deduction
an external
is con
form which
we
If we
can,
take the necessary
fusing and misleading.
pains,
is convincing
in the
find an argument
there which
nevertheless
there
context of Kant's philosophy.
In the first version, however,
can dispense with the misleading
from
is no proof which
argument
the double meaning
of "mine."
One can easily see this if one
tries to rediscover
in the first
is indis
that thought which
second edition's
into two
of the proof
division
pensable
of space and time them
steps: the idea that the representations
a synthesis which
selves presuppose
that is
includes
everything
over
in
them.
To
be
took
Kant
from
the
this
idea
sure,
given
edition
for the

656
DIETER HENRICH
edition, but
function.
There
first
at the same
(A 99,
time he gave it an entirely different

to the proof
only in the introduction
It seeks to clarify the fact that our cognitive
it occured
107).
101/2,
more
in something
consists
than empirical
and
powers
of combination
which
could only be investigated
principles
by
An a priori
is also involved.
association-psychology.
synthesis
process
of this is given in our representations

of space and time,
a priori synthesis.
be understood without
And this
kind of synthesis
leads to the philosophical
question
concerning
the conditions
of this argument Kant
of its possibility.
By means
Evidence
cannot
which
in the first edition

in terms of
those principles
introduces
a
is to be given.
which
transcendental
In the second
deduction
itself.
edition it has become an essential part of the deduction
difference
between
the proofs of
Thus there is a substantial
thus
in the manner
and not merely
of
and the second editions,
can understand
as Kant himself believed.
We
why
presentation,
to see this distinction.
For even in the
he himself was unable
second edition he did not yet altogether
give up the inadequate
the first
for the proof of

that had been absolutely
indispensable
argument
still
But as long as incompatible
the first edition.
proof-strategies
to affect Kant's conception
of the argument,
he was not
continued
of
of the actual structure
able to give an unequivocal
presentation
the proof and to distinguish
a transcendental
tions which
A careful
the same time.
it clearly from the many related inten

has to take into account at
deduction
stylistic analysis of the second edition

his language
in section 20 and that
reveals that Kant has modified
the
first
the
for
reaches
time
he
paths of the deduction
thereby
which was to offer a cogent
argument.
VI
We
has
have noted
the advantage
it is better suited
that the proof of the second edition

previously
over a possible
that
line of argument
analytical
to the structure
it has
of the Critique.
Now
with
the proof of the first
that, in comparison
apparent
more
of being a for
it also has the
edition,
significant
advantage
But these are not the only reasons for believ
mally correct proof.
is more
in the
that
Kant's
thinking
expressed
appropriately
ing
become

second
a
of the deduction.
version
far more
An analysis
657
of the proofs
yields
conclusion.
general
recom
if it were only the structure of the book which
one could, with
the proof of the second edition,
Beck,
an
alternative
for
and
external
the
thus
suggest
shape
Critique
a change
in the form of its central argument.
In point of fact,
the second deduction
not only
is in complete
however,
agreement
Now
mends
the structure
with
of the book
idea
philosophical
about
but
also with
the methodology
Kant's
fundamental
a
of
philosophical
system.14
Kant
based
this system on the unifying

of the unity
principle
All its propositions
must be deducible
from
But the method
of this derivation
does not consist
of self-consciousness.
this principle.
in developing
from
the
of self
concept
of the
presuppositions
of self-consciousness.
this
of the existence
possibility
By using
one can come to a knowledge
of conditions
al
method,
which,
are
not
in
the
structure
of
self-conscious
though they
already given
ness itself, must precisely
in virtue of this structure be presupposed
consciousness.
analytical
Instead
if a self-consciousness
is
implications
it specifies
to
become
the
actual.
This manner
of argument
is distinctively
It com
Kantian.
bines two propositions
which may be regarded as the two formal
tenets of the Kantian
be a unifying
there must
system:
principle
in terms of which knowledge
can be understood;
yet this principle
must not entail amonistic
exclusion
of all other principles
; it must
take into account
the discovery
of the essential difference
in the
roots of our knowledge
a raisonnement
and make possible
which
their underivable
presupposes
synthesis.
method
This
of argumentation
is just as distinct
from
as
of
it
is
from
those
doctrines
empiricism
faculty-psychology
the
of
the universal
of the Ego which

transformed
Kant's
implications
into that of speculative
idealism.
lacked
any
Empiricism
position
The form of idealism which was historically

no concept
of an essential
unity of originally
distinct
elements.
transcendental
deduction?but
Kant's
only in
its second version?contains
such a concept,
it
is not
although
of unity.
principle
so influential
had
14
D.
Henrich,
physik, Festschrift
"Zu Kants
Begriff
f?r Heinz Heimsoeth
der Philosophie,"
in Kritik
und
Meta
(Berlin, 1966), pp. 40 et seq.

658
DIETERHENRICH
It proceeds,
to a
albeit with difficulty,
fully developed.
according
which
method
of proof
is oriented
by this concept.
a clear
If one succeeds
in reaching
of this
understanding
one possesses
the key to an understanding
of Kant which
method,
is independent
of his specific formulations.
But what
is more
one
to
will
able
be
those
understand
important,
problems which
: the struc
remained
insoluble for Kant as well as for his successors
of
ture
of moral
consciousness,
and
knowledge,
of
temporal
experience.
It was
Kant worked
only very late in his philosophical

out a balance between
the two
that
development
elements
of such a
First he realized the necessity

of assuming
distinct prin
of
whose
interrelation
is
Later he
knowledge
necessary.
ciples
the unitary principle
in terms of which
discovered
such relations
must be interpreted.
Under the influence of this discovery,
how
method.
for more
than a decade plans for a deduction

the capacity of the unifying
and which
principle
his
him
into
contradiction
with
earlier
Thus,
brought
discovery.
one can show that his moral
was
freed
for example,
philosophy
from self-consciousness
extensive claims of a deduction
from more
ever, he maintained
which
transcended
form only shortly before the appearance

its ultimate
Practical
the
Reason.15
The change
in the concep
of
of
Critique
a
deduction
tion of
transcendental
fully to this develop
corresponds
con
ment.
is certainly not the weakest
And this correspondence
and assumed
firmation
of the proposed
interpretation.
did not reach a clear understanding
of the nature
Kant himself
And
of these
from his
he withheld
the clarity
changes.
he actually did possess for strategic reasons.
Thus one can
the coherence
of his
not blame his successors
if, unable to discover
readers
which
to seek the spirit of critical philosophy

in that
they began
a philosophic
him
of
Kant
nature
of
the
which
system
conception
In any case they were
dismissed.
self had just recently
right
texts,
15
This
is
im
et
spekulativen
in
various
Einsicht
und
shown
der sittlichen
Begriff
in: Die
Gegenwart
and
pp. 77 et seq.;
der
Griechen
im
"Das
Problem
der
Idealismus"
in
of
articles
Kants
Sein
mine,
among
vom Faktum
Lehre
neueren
Denken
Grundlegung
und
Ethos
der
them:
der
"Der
Vernunft"
1960),
(T?bingen,
und
Ethik
bei Kant
(Mainz,
1963),
seq.

pp.
350
insofar
closed
as the peculiar
by autonomous
content
of critical
philosophical
But the solution
today.
of the transcendental
interpretation
effort has to be directed.
completed
659
is only dis
philosophy
This task is still un
of the enigma
involved
in an
effort.
deduction
University
shows
where
this
of Heidelberg.


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The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction

Author(s): Dieter Henrich

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for the second edition.

for his theory of knowledge.

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an attempt will be made to settle this conflict

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results, and that these together

to the first edition of the Critique,

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that the cate

of being able to invoke in its

can indicate the distinction

The little word

the help of another

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to apply this distinction

ture of the first argument

ter of a unitary representation

of the only proposed

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about the structure

But now, from the propositions

20, 21, and 26, we

of the text which must

are subject to the categories

to express through the capital letter not the distinctness

of the proof in section 20 is therefore valid only for

that part of section

of the proof in section 20 is then discussed

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can be given to us. We

this point the aim of the proof of the deduction

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the task of the transcendental

to this very distinction:

that of the "that"

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of space and time and therefore

But when Beck published

vol. 3 (Riga, 1796).

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16-18 of the second edition.

Kant also indicated

and the doctrine

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the other method,

in any case obvious.

and to divide it accordingly

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the fact that

them can provide an answer to the problem

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the fact that

it is always at the same

stand beyond all doubt in virtue of their

is a proof of the validity of the

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at this point makes

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in virtue of the fact that we can become

for the associa