4.2.

SOBRE LA TEORA DE LA IDENTIDAD TIPO

- Papineau, D. 2000, The Rise of Physicalism, en M.W.F. Stone & J. Wolff (eds.), The
Proper Ambition of Science.London: Routledge.
- Smart, J.J.C. 1959, Sensations and Brain Processes, Philosophical Review, 68, pp.
141-156.
- Lewis, D. 1966, An Argument for the Identity Theory, Journal of Philosophy, 63, pp.
17-25. Reimpreso en sus Philosophical Papers, Vol.I. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1983. (http://people.ucsc.edu/~jbowin/Ancient/lewis1966.pdf)
- Armstrong, D.M. 1977, The Causal Theory of Mind. Reimpreso en D. Rosenthal,
(ed.) 1991, The Nature of Mind.
- Lewis, D. 1994, Reduction of Mind, en S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the
Philosophy of Mind. Reimpreso en D. Lewis. Papers in Metaphysics and
Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Una cuestin a dilucidar respecto de la teora de la identidad tipo es si es posible
sostener que los estados mentales se realizan de manera mltiple o variable en
criaturas con diferentes naturalezas fsicas.
- Putnam, H. 1979, The Nature of Mental States, en Mind Language and Reality.
Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reimpreso en N.
Block, (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol.I y en W. Lycan, ed. Mind
and Cognition.
- Lewis, D. (1980), Review of Putnam, en N. Block, ed. Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology, Vol.I.
- Jackson, F. 1995, Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 95, pp. 253-68.
(Vase tambin los captulos correspondientes en Braddon-Mitchell y Jackson, The
Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.)
- Kim, J. 1998, Mind in a Physical World: an Essay on the Mind-body Problem and
Mental Causation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Cap. 4.
Kripke ha criticado la teora de la identidad tipo recurriendo a sus ya conocidos
argumentos sobre la necesidad de la identidad.
- Kripke, S. 1971, Identity and Necessity, in Identity and Individuation, ed., M.
Munitz. New York: New York University Press. Reimpreso en Honderich y Burnyeat,
(eds.), Philosophy as it is. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979; y en N. Block,
(ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 2 Vols.
- 1980: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Vese especiamente Lecture 3,
reimpreso en D. Rosenthal, (ed.) The Nature of Mind.

- McGinn, C. 1977, Anomalous Monism and Kripkes Cartesian

Intuitions, Analysis, 37, pp. 78-80. Reimpreso en N. Block, ed. Readings in the
Philosophy of Psychology, Vol.I.
4.3.

SOBRE

LA

TEORA

DE

LA

IDENTIDAD

CASO

- Davidson, D. 1980, Mental Events, en sus Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Reimpreso en N. Block, ed. Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology, 2 Vols y en D. Rosenthal, (ed.) The Nature of Mind.
Para un buen comentario sobre Davidson vase:
- Evnine, S. 1991, Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Polity. Cap. 4.
- McGinn, C. 1991/1982. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of
Mind, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cap. 2.
- Peacocke, C. 1979, Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. Cap. III, 2, 3.