Collateral facts matters other than facts in issue and which

are offered as a basis merely for inference as to the existence or

non-existence of the facts in issue

EVIDENCE - (Part VIII of IX)

Evidence (Rule 128-133)
A.

Real evidence evidence furnished by the things themselves,

or view or inspection as distinguished from a description by
them of a witness; that which is addressed directly to the senses
of the court without the intervention of a witness

General Provisions
1.

Definitions

Rule 128, Sec. 1.

Evidence defined. - Evidence is
the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in
a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact. (1)
Evidence the means, sanctioned by these rules, of
ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact.
Relevant evidence evidence which has a relation to the fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence;
evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue
Material evidence evidence which is directed to prove a fact
in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and
pleadings; evidence of such quality of substantial importance to
the particular issue, apart from its relevance
Escolin: The terms relevant and material are practically the
same. They are used interchangeably by the SC. They differ in
effect. Material evidence has substantial effect.
Competent evidence evidence which is not excluded by the
law or by the Rules of Court

Rebuttal evidence evidence which is given to explain, repel,

counteract or disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse
party
Positive evidence when a witness affirms that a fact did or
did not occur
Negative evidence when a witness states that he did not see
or know the occurrence of a fact
2.

Distinguish

Admissibility of evidence
Pertains to the ability of the
evidence to be allowed and
accepted
subject
to
its
relevancy and competence

Pertains to the
evidence admitted

Substantive
essence
or
characteristic
feature
of
evidence as would make it
worthy of consideration by the
court before its admission

The
probative
value
of
evidence which the court may
give to admit after complying
with the rules of relevancy and
competency

Proof

Evidence

Direct evidence evidence which proves a fact in dispute

without the aid of any inference or presumption
Circumstantial evidence proof of facts from which, taken
collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute may
be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence

Weight of evidence

Effect and result of evidence

Medium of proof

End Result

Means to the end

effect

of

Expert evidence testimony of a witness regarding a question

of science, art or trade, when he is skilled therein
Prima facie evidence evidence which suffices for the proof
of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other
evidence

3.

Conclusive evidence evidence which is incontrovertible and

which the law does not allow to be contradicted

Sec. 2. Scope. - The rules of evidence shall be the

same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except
as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)

Cumulative evidence evidence of the same kind and

character as that already given and tends to prove the same
proposition
Corroborative evidence evidence of a different kind and
character tending to prove the same point
Best evidence evidence which affords the greatest certainty
of the fact in question
Secondary evidence evidence which is necessarily inferior to
primary/best evidence and shows on its fact that better
evidence exists
Factum probans the evidentiary fact by which the factum
probandum is to be established; material evidencing the
proposition, existent, and offered for the consideration of the
tribunal
Factum probandum the ultimate fact sought to be
established; proposition to be established, hypothetical, and
that which one party affirms and the other denies
Factum probandum

Factum Probans

Proposition to be established

Material
proposition

evidencing

the

Conceived
of
as
hypothetical; that which one
party affirms and the other
denies

Conceived
of
for
practical
purposes as existent, and is
offered
as
such
for
the
consideration of the court

Scope
a.

b.

Rule 128 2

Cases

Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992)

The Rules of Court, and its rules on Evidence, are not even
suppletorily applicable to agrarian cases. Special law allows
affidavits to be admitted in evidence in agrarian courts, even
without the witness testifying nor subject to cross-examination.
Escolin: Note that in Reyes, what was presented were affidavits.
Ordinarily, affidavits are not admissible before the regular courts
because there is no opportunity for the other party to crossexamine. Depositions are admissible because there was an
opportunity for the adverse party to cross-examine.
Pp v. Turco 337scra714 (2000)
Subject: Failure to qualify the doctor who conducted the medical
exam as an expert witness. In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the
court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate
issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the
latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records
(under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an
opinion of one who must first be established as an expert
witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor
who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications.
We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of
evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is
competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its
relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair

of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to

such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence
laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible,
it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely,
evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be
inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception
(Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p.
550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to
the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely
on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen
rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling
discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to
rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the
testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even
without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs.
Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a
medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of
rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999;
People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable,
supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal
officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs.
Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces
the court that conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In
the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and
sufficient to convict.
Famador: medical certificate can be used by the defense when:
1.
2.

the lacerations have already healed or that the lacerations

are already old.
the admission of more fingers into the vagina would prove
the sweetheart defense
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 217 SCRA 237
(1993)

The unverified position paper is a mere procedural infirmity

which does not affect the merits of the case. Procedural
technicalities do not strictly apply to proceedings before the LA.
The rules of evidence does not apply to
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6

probation board
CTA
SEC
Immigration cases
LA/NLRC
CAR

B.

Admissibility of Evidence

Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is

admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Requisites for admissibility
.1
.2

relevant
competent

1. Relevancy
a.

Rule 128 4

Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence

must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence
on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it
tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)
Relevance relation to the facts in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence
Evidence on collateral matters allowed only when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of
the fact in issue.
b.

Cases

Bautista v. Aparece, 51 OG 805 (1954)

Nicolas Aasco sold 3 parcels of land to Valentin Justiniani, who
in turn sold the same to Claudio Justiniani.
Claudio executed public instrument, whereby he sold same
property to Apolonio Aparece. Hermogenes Bautista illegally
entered portions III & IV and took possession thereof, prompting
Aparece to file complaint with guerilla forces.
Upon hearing this, Bautista executed public
recognizing Apareces ownership of the property.

instrument

Possession was restored to Aparece.

Bautista filed complaint vs. Aparece for allegedly usurping
portion of his land.
Apareces special defense: portion of land referred to in the
complaint was acquired by him from Claudio Justiniani and
prayed for dismissal of the case.
TC decision: Defendant Aparece is the owner of portions III & IV.
Bautista appealed alleging that TC erred in admitting in
evidence the document relinquishing plaintiffs ownership &
possession as embodied in exhibit I. Bautista argued that the
document was executed under duress, force, intimidation and
that guerilla officer has no jurisdiction over the matter.
SC: Test of admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document
is WON it is relevant, material or competent.
Relevant Evidence one that has any value in reason as tending
to prove any matter provable in an action.

Evidence is material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue

as determined by the rules of substantive law & pleadings.

Art. III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to

be a witness against himself.

Competent Evidence one that is not excluded by law in a

particular case.

Absolutely inadmissible evidence obtained

The mere fact that the document in question was executed

before a guerilla officer does not make the same irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent to the main issue raised in the
pleading.
Lopez v. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448 (1961)
Both prosecution and defense presented their respective expert
witnesses. The testimonies were naturally in contradiction with
each other.
GR: Expert evidence is not conclusive upon the court. The court
is not bound to accept said evidence. The court may use it as
an aid.
Exception: when the court is not knowledgeable or completely
ignorant on the subject, the court should admit the expert
evidence.
State of Missouri v. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960)

2.

Competence
a.

Rule 128 3

Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is

admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Competence not excluded by the law or the RoC
b.

Constitutional rules of exclusion

1)

Art. III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication

and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
Art. III, Sec. 12

from unreasonable searches and seizures, or

in violation of the right of privacy of communication and
correspondence

Relatively inadmissible (inadmissible only against the person

whose rights are violated, admissible for other purposes)
evidence obtained
.1
.2
.3

in violation of the right be informed of the right to remain

silent and to have competent and independent counsel
from means which vitiate the free will
in violation of the right against self-incrimination
c.

Statutory rules of exclusion

1)

NIRC, 201, as amended by RA 8424

Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable

Document. An instrument, document or paper which is
required by law to be stamped and which has been
signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being
duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any
copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be
admitted or used in evidence in any court until the
requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer authorized to
administer oaths shall add his jurat or acknowledgment
to any document subject to documentary stamp tax
unless the proper documentary stamps are affixed
thereto and cancelled.
Failure to stamp a document required by law to be stamped
shall render the document inadmissible in any court until the
requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and
cancelled (201 NIRC). This is an absolute inadmissibility.
2)

Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3

Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

2)

.1
.2

General Banking Act of 2000, RA

8791, 55.1 (b)

Sec. 55. Prohibited Transactions. 55.1. No director, officer, employee, or agent of any
bank shall
(b) Without order of a court of competent
jurisdiction, disclose to any unauthorized person any
information relative to the funds or properties in the
custody of the bank belonging to private individuals,
corporations, or any other entity: Provided, That with
respect to bank deposits, the provisions of existing laws
shall prevail;
Elements of the exclusion
.1
.2
.3
.4

director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank

disclosure to unauthorized person
information relative to the funds or properties in the
custody of the bank belonging to private individuals,
corporations, or any other entity
without a court order

Art. III, Section 12. (1) Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

de Leon: Note that this provision covers only property in the

custody of the bank other than bank deposits. For bank
deposits, RA 1405 governs. Note also that the provision does not
state the nature of the inadmissibility. I submit that it is a rule of
absolute inadmissibility.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,

or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or

banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines,
its
political
subdivisions
and
its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office, except upon written permission
of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon
order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where
the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation

of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
XXX
3)

Art. III, Sec. 17

3)

RA 1405: Law on Secrecy of Bank

Deposits

GR: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking

institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds
issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as
of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office.
Exceptions
.1
.2
.3
.4

written permission of the depositor

impeachment, or
order of a competent court in cases of
.a bribery or
.b dereliction of duty of public officials, or
where the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation.

de Leon: I submit that this is a rule of absolute inadmissibility.

4)

RA 4200: Wire-tapping

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being

authorized
by
all
the
parties
to
any
private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a
participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or
to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
Unlawful acts

.1

any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any

private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or dectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of

treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case
of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised
Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No.
616, punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security: Provided, That such written order shall
only be issued or granted upon written application and
the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove
has been committed or is being committed or is about to
be committed: Provided, however, That in cases
involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to
sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior
proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may
be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence
will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person
for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of
such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means
readily available for obtaining such evidence.
xxx
Conditions for valid wiretapping
.1

any peace officer

.2

authorized by a written order of the Court

.3

in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage,

provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny
in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy
to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping,
espionage and other offenses against national security:

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the

existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Information obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping act is
absolutely inadmissible.
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)

.2

any person to knowingly possess any tape record, wire

record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured in
the manner prohibited by this law; or

.3

any person to replay the same for any other person or

persons

Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)

.4

any person to communicate the contents thereof, either

verbally or in writing, or

Salcedo Ortaez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)

.5

any person to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether

complete or partial, to any other person:

The use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any

civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or
who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who
violates the provisions of the following section or of any
order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such
violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished xxx.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall
render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer,
who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the

Even a person privy to a communication who records his private

conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
violates the anti-wiretapping act. The recording is inadmissible
in evidence.

C. What Need NOT be Proved:

3 things that need not be proved
.1
.2
.3

matters of mandatory judicial notice

matters of discretionary judicial notice
judicial admissions
1.

Judicial notice
a.

Mandatory (Rule 129 1)

Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court

shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial

departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the

measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)
Mandatory Judicial Notice
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8

existence and territorial extent of states, their political

history, forms of government and symbols of nationality
the law of nations
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals
the political constitution and history of the Philippines
the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines
the laws of nature
the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions
Sermonia v. CA, 233 SCRA 155 (1994)

In determining prescription in a prosecution for bigamy, the

reckoning point is actual discovery of the subsequent marriage
by the offended party, not from the registration of the marriage
contract. The doctrine of constructive knowledge does not
apply, even if it is more favorable to the accused.
b.

Discretionary Judicial Notice matters which are

of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions
c.

When hearing required (Rule 129 3)

Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal,
the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive
of a material issue in the case.(n)
When court takes judicial notice
.1

During trial, on any matter allow the parties to be heard

thereon

.2

After trial, and before judgment or on appeal any matter

and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case

Hearing is necessary when

.1

People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) 115908-09

BPI-Family Bank v. CA 330scra507 (2000) 122480

2.

Judicial admissions
a.

Rule 129 4

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or

written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (2a)
Requisites for judicial admission
.1
.2
.3

made by a party
in the course of the proceedings
in the same case

de Leon: If the admission was made in outside the proceedings

or in another case, it is also admissible under admissions of a
party (Rule 130, Sec. 26).
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
.1
.2

it was made through palpable mistake or

no such admission was made
b.

Instances of Judicial admissions

Instances of Judicial admissions

.1

the genuineness and due execution of an actionable

document copied or attached to a pleading, when the other
party fails to specifically deny under oath (Rule 8 8)

.2

material allegations in the complaint, when the other party

fails to specifically deny it (Rule 8 11)

.3

admissions in superseded pleadings, when offered in

evidence (Rule 10 8)

.4

act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact

(Rule 130 26)

.5

implied admission of guilt in an offer of compromise by the

accused in criminal cases, except quasi-offenses and those
allowed by law to be compromised (Rule 130 27)

.6

admission by silence (Rule 130 32)

During the trial, the court

.a
.b
.2

As a general rule courts are not authorized to take judicial

notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard
or are actually pending before the same judge. However, an
exception is when in the absence of objection, and as a matter
of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as
read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of
the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the
archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of
the case then pending.

Discretionary (Rule 129 2)

Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court

may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge,
or
are
capable
of
unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. (1a)

.1
.2
.3

Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)

L55960
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) 85423

motu propio, on request of a party

announces its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter

After trial
.a

before judgment or on appeal

.b

motu propio, on request of a party

takes judicial notice of any matter, and
if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case

.c
.d

c.

Hence, the court can take judicial notice of any matter during
the trial as long as there is a hearing. If trial is already over, the
court can take judicial notice only of matters decisive of a
material issue in the case as long as there is a hearing (p. 88,
Francisco).

Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48 (1914) 8200

Torres v. CA, 131 SCRA 24 (1984) L37420
Bitong v. CA 292scra503 (1998) 123553

de Leon: Why on earth would a court take judicial notice of a

matter which is not decisive of a material issue in a case?
City of Manila v. Garcia, 19scra413 (1967) L26053
Baguio v. Vda. de Jalagat , 42 SCRA 337 (1971)
L28100
Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965) L17885
Ozaeta Romulo etc. , 92 SCRA 1 (1979) x

Cases

D.

Object and Documentary Evidence

1.

Rule 130 1-2

Sec. 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are

those addressed to the senses of the court. When an
object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited
to, examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
Object Evidence evidence addressed to the senses of the court
Ocular inspection qualifies as object evidence.
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as
evidence consist of writings or any material containing
letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes
of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.
(n)

Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d 800 (1948)

BER only applies if the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document; such an inquiry need not be the main issue
People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959) L14257
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 F.2d 1504 (1986)
US BER or their equivalents vs. Philippine BER other modes of
written expression; is a disputed work in an infringement case
object or documentary?
US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910) 5791
Fiscal v. Reyes, 55 Phil 905 (1931)
05aug31

Documentary evidence any material containing modes of

written expressions offered as proof of their contents
2.

Cases

People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 (1980) L29271

Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) 108280-83
Adamczuk v. Holloway, 13 A.2d 2 (1940)
State v. Tatum, 360 P. 2d 754 (1961)

E.

Best Evidence Rule

1.

Rule 130 3-4

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced,

exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts
or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. (2a)
Best Evidence Rule When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself
Exceptions: When the original

.1

has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,

without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

.2

is in the custody or under the control of the party against

whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;

.3

consists of numerous accounts or other documents which

cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and

.4

the original is a public record in the custody of a public

officer or is recorded in a public office
2.

Cases

People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990) 80505

The best evidence rule does not apply to the marked money in a
buy bust operation because the inquiry is not on the contents of
the marked bill, but merely its existence.
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
L21438

35366

Sec. 4. Original of document.

(a) The original of a document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course
of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals. (3a)
Original documents
.1

one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.

.2

When a document is in two or more copies executed at or

about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.

.3

When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business,

one being copied from another at or near the time of the
transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as
originals
F.

Secondary Evidence
1.

Rule 130 5-8

Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable.

When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's
custody or control. If the document is in the custody or
under the control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and
after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document
is a public record. When the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
cf Rule 132 25-27
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. (26 a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. - Any public record, an
official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be
removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order
of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to
the just determination of a pending case. (27 a)

Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. - An authorized

public record of a private document may be proved by the
original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that
such officer has the custody. (28a)

In case of loss of the original of a document, the order of proof is

as follows; 1) existence of the original, 2) its due execution, 3)
loss, and 4) its contents. Failure to prove loss of all the originals
without fault of the offeror renders secondary evidence
inadmissible.

To prove loss, get affidavits of loss from all the people who
possibly has a copy of the original, e.g. Notarized Deed of Sale

Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco, (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262

(1963)

.1
.2
.3
.4
.5

Vendor
vendee
notary public
clerk of the court which gave the notary public commission
Bureau of Archives

Requisites for admission of secondary evidence,

according to grounds
.1 the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court
.a prove execution or existence
.b prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the
offeror
.c proof of contents in the following order
)1
copy
)2
recital of its contents in
)a
some authentic document, or
)b
testimony of witnesses
.2

the original is in the custody or under the control of the

adverse party

.a
.b
.c
.d

adverse party had reasonable notice to produce the

original (Subpoena duces tecum)
proof of the originals existence
adverse party fails to produce the original
proof of contents in the following order
)1
copy
)2
recital of its contents in
)a
some authentic document, or
)b
testimony of witnesses

.3

the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and

.4

the original is a public record in the custody of a public

officer or is recorded in a public office contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof
.a

Rule 132 25: What attestation of copy must state

)1 the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof
)2 under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having
a seal, under the seal of such court

.b

Rule 132 27: Public record of a private document may be proved by

)1
)2

2.

the original record, or

by a copy thereof
)a

attested by the legal custodian of the

record

)b

with an appropriate certificate that such

officer has the custody

Cases

Municipality of Victorias v. CA , 149scra32 (1987)

L31189 31mar87
Facts: In action to recover land, a party failed to produce the
deed of sale, but presented only a Certificate from the Archives
Division of the Bureau of Records Management of an entry in a
notarial register.
Held: Certificate is admissible. Where the original has been lost
or destroyed, the offeror may prove its contents by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document or by testimony of
witnesses. The Certificate is one such authentic document.
de Vera v Aguilar, 218scra602 (1993) 83377 09feb

When the existence of a document is proven or admitted by

both parties, the court should allow the lost document to be
proven by parole; testimony of a witness regarding the contents
of the document need not be verbatim or perfect.
Compaia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union , 77
SCRA 24 (1977) L28999 24may77
Voluminous character of accounts must be established, and it
must be made available to the adverse party before parole;
audit made by or testimony of private auditor is inadmissible as
proof of original record or books of accounts; auditors opinion
not admissible; best evidence on cost of equipment are sales
invoices not testimony of an auditor
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer , 25scra845 (1968)
L23893 29oct68
It is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce copy to prove
that original is in actual possession of adverse party as long as it
is under his control; adverse party need not admit that it is in his
possession before a copy may be introduced.
Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez , 33 Phil. 87 (1915)
10824 24dec15
To prove a lost document, must prove due execution, delivery (if
required), and the fact of lost or destruction; it is important to
have qualified witnesses.
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not, bound to
offer it. - A party who calls for the production of a
document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it
as evidence. (6a)
G.

Parol Evidence Rule

1.

Rule 130 9

Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the

terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The terms "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
Parol Evidence Rule:
When the terms of an, agreement have been reduced to writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
Exceptions:
a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading

.1

An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the

written agreement

.2

failure of the written agreement to express the true intent

and agreement of the parties

.3

validity of the written agreement; or

.4

The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or

their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement

Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds,

referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are ratified by the
failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to
prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefit under
them.
Statute of Frauds: (Art1403 NCC)

If the ground is subsequently-agreed terms, the subsequentlyagreed terms must also be put in issue in the pleadings.
The rule applies only to the terms of an agreement. If the
evidence sought to be admitted refers to matters other than the
terms of the agreement (e.g. statement of facts), then the PER
does not apply, such evidence is admissible.

If the following agreements are not in writing and subscribed, it

is unenforceable and evidence thereof is inadmissible

.1

not to be performed within a year from the making thereof

.2

special promise to answer

miscarriage of another;

.3

agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than

a mutual promise to marry;

.4

agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in

action, at a price not less than P500, unless the buyer
accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay
at the time some part of the purchase money;

.5

lease for more than 1 year, or sale of real property or of

an interest therein;

.6

representation as to the credit of a 3rd person.

PER applies only to the parties to the agreement. It does

not apply where PER is invoked against a litigant who is a
stranger to the agreement.

for the debt, default, or

Requisites for mistake as exception to PER

.1

mutual between the parties

.2

of fact, not of law

.3

alleged and put in issue in the pleadings

.4

proved by clear and convincing, not merely preponderance

of, evidence

Escolin: Note that the rule on self-defense also requires that the
circumstances of self-defense be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.

Exceptions (Art1405 NCC)

.1

failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence, or

.2

acceptance of benefit under the agreement

2. Art.

1403 and 1405 Civil Code (Statute of

Frauds)

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable,

unless they are ratified:
xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of
Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases
an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum,
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or
things in action, at a price not less than five hundred
pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of
such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some
of them, of such things in action or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is
made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer
in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the
amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale,
price, names of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third
person.

3. Parol Evidence Rule vs. Best Evidence Rule

Parol Evidence Rule

Best Evidence Rule

No issue as to the contents of a

writing

Issue is contents of a writing

Parol evidence is offered

Secondary
offered

Presupposes that original is in

court

Applies when the original is

not available

Effect is: cannot add, subtract,

or explain the contents

Effect is: cannot present any

evidence on the contents
other than the original

Invoked only if the controversy

is between parties to the
agreement

Invoked by anybody, whether

a party to the instrument or
not

Applies only to agreements and

wills

Applies to all kinds of writing

4.

evidence

is

Cases

Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 (1990) 79962

Facts: Conrado Salonga (respondent) filed a complaint for
collection and damages vs. petitioner Lucio Cruz in Lucena RTC
alleging that in the course of their business, Cruz borrowed from
him 35T as evidenced by a receipt. Cruz admitted having

received the 35T not as a loan but as consideration for their fish
pakyaw purchase and sublease agreement. RTC ruled in favor of
Cruz and found that the transactions were indeed pakyaw and
sublease agreements. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling.
CA ruled that the receipts are clear in its language and its tenor
must not be clouded by any parol evidence introduced by Cruz
such as self-serving testimonies.
Held: PER does not apply to receipts because it is not an
agreement. It is proof only of delivery of money. Furthermore,
the parole evidence bars only evidence as to the terms, it does
not bar evidence as to statement of facts. The receipt of money
is merely a statement of fact. Lastly, failure of the adverse party
to object renders parole evidence admissible.
Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank v. CA, 226 SCRA 740
(1993) 105419 27sep93

Held: The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic

evidence to alter, vary contradict a written instrument does not
apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an
agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into
subsequent to the time when the written instrument was
executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect
of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating
the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the
parol evidence does not in any way deny that the original
agreement of the parties was but merely goes to show that the
parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the
same, or to make a new and independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the
written contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact
subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved
and enforced.

Facts: Pioneer execute an DoAS of a car in favor of Michael

Santos. Pioneer claims that the car was merely a security for the
time deposit placements of Santos relatives. Since Santos
relatives have recovered their placements, Pioneer sued for
recovery of the car.

Parol evidence may be introduced to prove subsequent

agreement regardless of how soon such agreement was made.

Held: Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal

agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While parol evidence
is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating
into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which
are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been
fraud or mistake. Pioneer failed to produce any instrument or
written document which would prove that the deed of sale in
question was only a security for the time deposit placements of
Santos' relatives in Pioneer. The 2 main witnesses for Pioneer,
were not mere employees of the bank. They were bank officers;
one being a lawyer and supposed to be steeped in legal and
banking knowledge and practices. They were expected to know
the consequences of their act of signing a document which
outrightly transferred ownership over the subject vehicle in
favor of Santos. They could have incorporated in the deed of
sale (if such was the intention or agreement of the parties) a
stipulation that transfer of ownership and registration of the
vehicle in Santos' name were conditioned on the failure of his
relatives to recover their time deposit placements in petitioner
bank. No such stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale
which was an outright and unconditional transfer of ownership
of the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.

Facts: Yu Tek & Gonzales had a written contract where Gonzales

will deliver sugar to Yu Tek. Gonzales received 3T in advance.
The contract stipulated that in the event there is no delivery of
sugar, Gonzales will return the 3T and pay 1.2T in damages.
Sugar was not delivered, 3T was not returned and 1.2T was not
paid. Judgment was rendered on the 3T only. Both parties
appealed. Gonzales alleges that the court erred in refusing to
permit parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the
sugar was to be secured from the crop which Gonzales raised in
his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the contract due
to total failure of his crop.

de Leon: Note that the PER exceptions of other term agreed by

the parties refer to those agreed after, not before, the execution
of the agreement. Pioneer should have invoked the exception
that the agreement did not express their true intent and
agreement.
Enriquez v. Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962) L18077
29sep62
Facts: In a foreclosure of REM case, plaintiff invokes the
registered mortgage agreement. Defendant answers that the
contract did not express the true agreement of the parties
because it did not include the undertaking of plaintiff to
construct roads on the land. Furthermore, defendant argues that
the ordinance that requires the construction of such roads in the
subdivision before the lots could be sold is deemed included in
the contract.
Held: Since the answer alleged that the contract did not express
the true intention of the parties, it has therefore been put in
issue in the pleadings. The same may therefore be subject of
parole evidence.
Canuto v. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840 (1918) 11346 21mar

Facts: Canuto executed a DoS with 1-year right to repurchase of

a parcel of land to Mariano. Redemption period elapsed so
Mariano set up a claim of absolute ownership despite the
insistent demand of Canuto that she be permitted to exercise
said right in accordance with an alleged oral agreement for the
extension of the redemption period.
Canuto presented
witnesses to corroborate her testimony on the oral agreement.
Mariano contends that Canuto should not be permitted to alter,
vary, or contradict the terms of the written instrument by the
introduction of oral evidence. Manila CFI ruled in favor of
Canuto.

Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales , 29 Phil. 384 (1915) 9935

01feb

Held: Parol evidence inadmissible to incorporate additional

contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
the writing, unless there is fraud or mistake.
Land Settlement & Development Corp. v. Garcia
Plantation, 7 SCRA 750 (1963) L17820 24apr
Facts: LSDC sued Garcia Plantation for specific performance of
contract and for payment of unpaid balance of the purchase
price of 2 tractors. Salud Garcia was made a co-defendant
because of 2 IOU notes executed by her. Defendants admitted
the execution of the IOU notes but contended that the same had
been novated by a subsequent agreement in a letter giving
them an extension to pay the account. LSDC in their reply and
answer to the counterclaim, admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the letter but contended that the same did not
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, thereby
placing the fact in issue, in the pleadings.
At the trial, LSDC presented Atty. Guinto to testify on the true
agreement and intention of the parties at the time of the letters
execution. Upon Garcias objection, the lower court ruled out
said testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence
under the parol evidence rule.
LSDC intended to present
Kintanar (the writer of the letter) to testify but in view of the
courts ruling, LSDC rested its case.
The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto
and Kintanar, to the effect that in view of the plea of defendant
Vicente B. Garcia to give the defendants an extension of time to
pay their accounts, Atty. Kintanar gave the defendants up to
May 31, 1957, to coincide with their ramie harvest "provided
that they will make a substantial down payment immediately,
with the understanding that upon non-payment of the
substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as not
granted and the LASADECO shall feel free to seek redress in
court". That there was such condition precedent is manifested
by the second paragraph of the letter.
Lower court dismissed the case stating that the action was
premature due to the agreed extension. LSDC appealed to CA.
CA certified case to SC.
Held: Exception to PER may be put in issue in answer to
counterclaim; when operation of contract made to depend upon
occurrence of an event, which for that reason is a condition
precedent, such may be established by parol evidence, since if it
is proven, there will be no contract. PER does not apply to
condition precedent because such condition is part of the
terms of the contract. It does not modify, alter, or vary
the terms or tenor of the contract.

Had the trial court permitted, as it should, LSDC to prove the

condition precedent to the extension of the payment, LSDC
would have been able to show that because the defendants had
failed to pay a substantial down payment, the agreement was
breached and the contract contained in Exhibit "L", never
became effective and the extension should be considered as not
having been given at all. So that, although the complaint was
filed on February 20, 1957, three months before the deadline of
the extension on May 31, 1957, there would be no premature
institution of the case. The lower court, therefore, erred in
dismissing the case. The decision appealed from is reversed,
and case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 8844 16dec
Facts: Maulini brought an action upon the contract of
indorsement alleged to have been made in his favor by Serrano
on a IOU note executed by Padern, Moreno & Co with Serrano as
payee. The indorsement did not indicate without recourse.
Maker failed to pay the note upon presentation for payment.
Maulini opted to collect from Serrano as indorser.
Manila CFI although it received parol evidence on the subject
provisionally, held that such evidence was inadmissible to alter,
vary, modify or contradict the terms of the contract of
indorsement.
Thus this tended to show that, by verbal
agreement between Maulini and Serrano, Serrano, in making the
indorsement, was acting as agent for the indorsee, as a mere
vehicle for the transfer of title and that his indorsement was w/o
consideration.
It seems that according to the parol evidence, Serrano was a
broker doing business of looking up and ascertaining persons
who had money to loan as well as those who desired to borrow
money and acting as a middleman, negotiate a loan between
the two.
Issue: WON Serrano may show by parol evidence that the
indorsement was w/o consideration and that in making it,
Serrano acted as agent for Maulini as a mere vehicle of transfer
of the naked title from Padern to Maulini for which he received
no consideration.
Held: CFI erred in ruling as so. Consideration of a negotiable
IOU note is, between the immediate parties to the contract,
open to attack, under proper circumstances, for the purpose of
showing an absolute lack or failure of consideration.
PER does not apply where the purpose of parol evidence is to
show that no written contract ever existed.
CFI ruling is
REVERSED.
FAMADOR: I agree with dissenting opinion.
PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952) L4388 13aug

PNB argues that the verbal assurances given by Seeto to the

employees of the bank that he was ready to refund the amount
if the check should be dishonored by PBCom is a collateral
agreement, separate and distinct from the indorsement, by
virtue of which PNB was induced to cash the check, and,
therefore, admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule.
Held: Assurances made by an indorser that the drawer has
funds, which assurances induced bank to cash the check, are
admissible in evidence. We find, however, that the supposed
assurances of refund in case of dishonor of the check are
precisely the ordinary obligations of an indorser, and these
obligations are, under the law, considered discharged by an
unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for
payment.
There was no express obligation assumed by the respondent
herein that the drawer would always have funds, or that he (the
indorser) would refund the amount of the check even if there
was delay in its presentation, so that while the CA may have
committed an error in disregarding the evidence submitted by
petitioner at the trial of the assurances made by respondent
herein at the time of the negotiation of the check, such error
was without prejudice, because the supposed assurances given
were part of his obligations as an indorser, which were
discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the
check for payment. The judgment appealed from is, therefore,
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Woodhouse v. Halili, 93Phil526 (1953) L4811 31jul
Inducement by fraud may be proved by parol (drafts of the
agreement as in this present case) because it goes into the
validity of the agreement.
Robles v. Lizarraga
26173 13jul

Hermanos , 50Phil387

(1927)

Facts: Robles was a co-heir and at the same time a lessee of

Hacienda Nahalinan. Lizarraga Hermanos wanted to buy the
hacienda 2yrs before the expiry of Robles lease.
Held: Parol may be received regardless of whether the written
agreement contains any reference to the collateral agreement
and whether the action is at law or in equity even if it deals with
related matters
Lechugas v. CA, 143scra335 (1986) L39972 06aug
PER not applicable where suit is between one of the parties to
the document and 3rd persons; PER does not apply and may not
be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other,
where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or privy
to the written agreement and does not base a claim on the
instrument; both parties to the agreement must be parties to
the suit

Facts: Seeto went to PNB Surigao and presented a 5T check

dated 10Mar pay to cash/bearer drawn by Gan Yek Kiao against
PBCom Cebu. After consultation with PNB employees, Seeto
made a general and unqualified indorsement of the check and
PNB accepted it and paid Seeto. Check was mailed to PNB Cebu
20Mar and was presented to PBCom 09Apr but the check was
dishonored for ISF. PNB demanded refund of the check but
Seeto refused claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the
check the drawer had sufficient funds and that had PNB
forwarded the check earlier, it would have been paid.

PER does not specify that the agreement be a public document;

need not be in any particular form or signed by the parties;
fraud must be corroborated

PNB filed a complaint with Surigao CFI alleging that Seeto gave
assurances that the drawer of the check had sufficient funds
and that upon these assurances PNB delivered the 5T to Seeto
after the latter had made a general and unqualified
indorsement.
Seeto denied having made the alleged
assurances. PNB presented 2 witnesses who testified that it was
not the practice of PNB to cash out of town checks and that
check was cashed because of Seetos assurances. CFI found
that Seeto made an undertaking to refund the check in the
event of dishonor and that there was no unreasonable delay in
the presentation of the check.

Said due date expired without the promissors having paid

their obligation. Both obligors did not respond to the demands
made, private respondent filed a complaint for collection of the
sum of P50,000.00 against the three obligors.

CA held that PNB was guilty of unreasonable retaining and

withholding the check and that the delay in the presentment for
payment was inexcusable, so that Seeto was discharged from
liability. It also held that parol evidence is incompetent to show
that one signing a check as indorser is merely a surety or
guarantor, rejecting the evidence adduced at the CFI about
Seetos assurances and promise to refund. CA reversed CFI
ruling. PNB appealed to SC.

Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 96405 26jun

Facts: Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in

the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C. Naybe
and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding
themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent
Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City
branch.

Petitioner alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory

note were brought to him by Campos at his office. He affixed his
signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound
himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by
trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable
for the amount of P50,000.00.
The lower court ruled in favor of the bank. The petitioner
appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may overcome the
contents of a promissory note.

10

Held: Petitioner asserts that since the promissory note "is not a
public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but . . . a
mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of . . .
attesting witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the
contents of the promissory note. The first paragraph of the parol
evidence rule states:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written
agreement be a public document.
What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule
is in fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is
so much more certain and accurate than that which rests
in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when
parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to
admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to
show that the parties intended a different contract from that
expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus, for the parol
evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in
any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a
general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a
similar nature are not subject to be varied or
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
Ortaez v. CA 266scra561 23Jan97
Contemporaneous conditions not referred to in the contract can
not be proven by parol; merely alleging that the contract is
subject to conditions does not put the exception in issue in
the pleadings
Facts: On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to
petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a
consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.
Private respondents received the payments for the abovementioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On
April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery
of said titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the
ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of
another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the
other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific
performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim
private respondents merely alleged the existence of the
following oral conditions which were never reflected in the
deeds of sale:
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains
with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff
(petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements
have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way
amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan
for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between .
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former
judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above
conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in
the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the
ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred
by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless,
admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well
as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the court a quo.
Held: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible.
First, private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged
conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the
outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory,
is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken
words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract
which speaks of a uniform language.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely
on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia

Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a

contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the
material facts of that case are different from this case. In the
former, the contract sought to be enforced expressly stated that
it is subject to an agreement containing the conditionsprecedent which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas,
the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any preconditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated
as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would
vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or
mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that
their parol evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided
by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to
express the true intent of the parties. In this case, the deeds of
sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection,
much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED
H.

Interpretation of Documents
1.

Rule 130 10-19

Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its

legal meaning. The language of a writing is to be
interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in
the place of its execution, unless the parties intended
otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to
all provisions. In the construction of an instrument
where there are several provisions or particulars. such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention;
general and particular provisions. In the construction of
an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be
pursued; and when a general and a particular provision
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former.
So a particular intent will control a general one that is
inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances.
For the proper construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was made, including the
situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it,
may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those whose language he is to interpret. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The terms
of a writing are presumed to have been used in their
primary and general acceptation, but evidence is
admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and
understood in the particular instance, in which case the
agreement must be construed accordingly.(12)
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. When an
instrument consists partly of written words and partly of
a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former
controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in
explaining certain writings. When the characters in
which an instrument is written are difficult to be
deciphered, or the language is not understood by the
court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the
characters, or who understand the language, is
admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of
the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred.
When the terms of an agreement have been intended in
a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense
is to prevail against either party in which he supposed
the
other
understood
it,
and
when
different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally

11

proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to

the party in whose favor the provision was made. (15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right.
When an instrument is equally susceptible of two
interpretations, one is favor of natural right and the
other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. An
instrument may be construed according to usage, in
order to determine its true character. (17)
Rules of interpretation of documents
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5

Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning in

the place of execution
Instrument construed so as to give effect to more provisions
Interpretation according to intention of the parties
particular over general
Interpretation according to circumstances of the parties and
the subject

Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle

doubts by the rules established in the preceding articles,
and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and
interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the
doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity
of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the
contract in such a way that it cannot be known what may
have been the intention or will of the parties, the
contract shall be null and void.
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be observed
in the construction of contracts.
Statutory rules of interpretation
.1

If the terms are clear, the literal meaning shall control.

.2

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention

of the parties, the intention shall prevail

.3

In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties,

their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.

.6

Terms presumed to be used in primary and general

acceptation, evidence of local, technical, or peculiar
signification use admissible

.7

Written words control printed

.8

When the characters are difficult to decipher, or the

language is foreign, the evidence of experts and
interpreters is admissible

.4

terms of a contract shall not be understood to comprehend

things that are distinct and cases that are different from
those upon which the parties intended to agree

When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a

different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to
prevail against either party in which he supposed the other
understood it

.5

If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several

meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import
which is most adequate to render it effectual.

.6

The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted

together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly.

.7

Words which may have different significations shall be

understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature
and object of the contract.

.8

The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in

the interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall
fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily
established.

.9

The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a

contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.

.9

.10 When different constructions of a provision are otherwise

equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most
favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was
made
.11 preference for natural right
.12 usage may be considered
2.

Arts. 1370-1379 Civil Code

Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and

leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the
former.

.10 When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the

rules established in the preceding articles
.a

Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the

contracting
parties,
their
contemporaneous
and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different from
those upon which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should
admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to render it
effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall
be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly.
Art. 1375. Words which may have different
significations shall be understood in that which is most
in keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be
borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of
a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations
which are ordinarily established.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity.

.b

the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of

)1

a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of

rights and interests shall prevail

)2

an onerous contract, the doubt shall be settled

in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests

If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the

contract in such a way that it cannot be known what
may have been the intention or will of the parties, the
contract shall be null and void.

.11 The principles of interpretation stated in the Rules of Court

shall likewise be observed

3.

Cases

Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. 588 (1914)

If from the words the meaning is plain, contract should be
enforced according to the words
Facts: Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co.,
engaged in the retail book and stationery business, found itself
in such condition financially that its creditors, including the
plaintiff and the defendant, together with many others, agreed
to take over the business, incorporate it and accept stock
therein in payment of their respective credits. This was done,
the plaintiff and the defendant becoming the two largest

12

stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar & Co.,

Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was completed
plaintiff and defendant entered into the following agreement:
Therefore, the undersigned mutually and reciprocally
agree not to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any part
of their present holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co.
Inc., till after one year from the date hereof.
Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the
other the sum of one thousand (P1,000) pesos as liquidated
damages, unless previous consent in writing to such sale,
transfer, or other disposition be obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October
19, 1911, sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C.
McCullough of the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a
strong competitor of the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc.
The trial court in dismissing the case, decided favor of the
defendant upon the ground that the intention of the parties as it
appeared from the contract in question was to the effect that
the agreement should be good and continue only until the
corporation reached a sound financial basis.chuva chu chu.
Issue: Whether or not interpretation is needed in enforcing the
contract.
Held: Contracts should be enforced as they read. The first duty
of courts in enforcing contracts is to give attention to the words
thereof. If from the words the meaning is plain, the contract
should be enforced according to its words.
The intention of parties to a contract must be determined,
in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It is to
be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak
plain English. Interpretation and construction should by the
instruments last resorted to by a court in determining what the
parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is
plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and,
if used, result in making a contract for the parties. (Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504.)
In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the
contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that
it shall last only nine months. Whatever the object was in
specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract
should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that
their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. What
reason can give for refusing to follow the plain words of the men
who made the contract? We see none.

On the strength of the agreement of the parties in the Civil

Case wherein it is agreed among others, that if after the sale of
all the said properties, the judment shall not have been fully
satisfied, then plaintiff may file as separate civil action against
the defendants-spouses, Esteban M. Sadang and Maria Lachica,
the other indemnitors, but at the same time dismissed the case
against the herein defendants without prejudice.
Two executions were issued by the court for the
enforcement of the above-mentioned decision in Civil Case No.
30061 and after applying the proceeds of the sale of the
properties in public auction there is still a deficiency in the
amount of P14,456.44 which, in view of the failure of the herein
dependants to pay in spite of plaintiff's repeated demands, had
to become the subject of this instant case.
The trial court rendered judgment on April 20, 1961 (pp. 93101, Record on Appeal) ordering defendants to pay to plaintiff
only, the amount of P300.00.
Issue: Which among the two interpretations is correct?
Held: To point on which the parties disagree is the
interpretation of the following stipulation in the mortgage
contract executed by defendants-appellees:
This mortgage is constituted to indemnify the mortgagee for any
damage, cost, expenses and charges of whatever kind and
nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having
acted as surety on the bond referred to above, and or its
substitution, modification, alteration, change and/or renewals.
That liability secured by the above properties is limited to the
first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond issued in
favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc.
Appellant lays stress on the general statement of appellees'
liability as it appears in the contract, to wit; "to indemnify the
mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of
whatever kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a
consequence of having acted as surety or the bond.
Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on
condition that he would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the
total P42,000.00 bond," and that "the moment the first
P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases
my responsibility to them." The trial court found the said
testimony to be uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as
actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous, the
doubt must be resolved against appellant, whose lawyer
prepared the document, and in accordance with the real
intention of the parties as explained by defendantsappellees.

Capital Insurance v. Sadang , 21 SCRA 1183

(1967)
Doubt resolved against one who prepared the document
Facts: Plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., subscribed
to a bond in behalf of Mateo Pinto and in favor of the Macondray
Farms, Inc., the purpose of which was to guarantee the payment
of rentals of the fishpond and other obligations of Mateo Pinto.
To protect the interest of plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety
Co., Inc. from any liability that may arise from the abovementioned bond, Mateo Pinto and the defendants in this case,
Esteban M. Sadang and Maria Lachica, executed an idemnity
agreement and a deed of real of real estate mortage on the
property of the defendants.
Mateo Pinto failed to pay the rentals of the leased fishpond
to Macondray Farms, Inc.
Because of the failure of Mateo Pinto to pay the said
amount to Macondray Farms, Inc., plaintiff in the instant case as
surety had to pay, as it did pay Macondray Farms, Inc., to settle
the obligation of Mateo Pinto with the said Macondray Farms,
Inc.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, Mateo Pinto and his
indemnitors including herein defendants failed to reimburse the
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., the the said amount.
Because of such failure to make reimbursement, the Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., filed Civil Case against Mateo Pinto
and his indemnitors including the defendants in this instant case
for the collection.

I.

Rule 130 20: Qualifications of Witnesses

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as

provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome
of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification. (18 a)
Qualifications of witnesses

13

.1

can perceive

.2

perceiving

.3

can make known their perception to others

NOT ground for disqualification

.1

Religious belief

.2

political belief

.3

interest in the outcome of the case, or

.4

conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, e.g.

.a

A state witness must not have been convicted of any

crime involving moral turpitude [Rule 119, Sec. 17 (e)]

.b

A person who has been convicted of falsification of a

document, perjury or false testimony is disqualified
from being a witness to a will (Art. 821 NCC)
1.

Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

a.

Rule 130 21

Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental

incapacity or immaturity. The following persons cannot
be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others;

Facts: Clara Mina, an unmarried woman of 28, lived with her

parents. Clara Mina, however, is feeble-minded. She is unable
to comb her hair, bathe herself and wash her clothes. Because
of her mental condition, she just stayed in the house, doing no
household chores
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year old farmer, who
lived in the house of his sister some 15 meters away from the
victim's house, knew of Clara's mental infirmity, and has often
seen her left alone in the house.
While home alone, Clara Mina was seated on top of a trunk
when Rogelio de Jesus suddenly entered the house, carried her
in his arms and laid her on the floor. Objecting to what was
being done to her, Clara gave an outcry "Madi! Madi!" ( or
SHODI! SHODI! which translated means "I don't like! I don't
like!") Rogelio, ignoring her cries, removed her panties as well
as his own trousers. He lay on top of her, inserted his penis into
her vagina and performed the sexual act. Otherwise stated,
BOMBA NA SHO!
Pastora Simon, Clara Minas mother caught Rogelio doing
The Nasty. Rogelio sensed the mother and ran away shouting:
ADTO NA MI NANG!
Returning from the barrio captain's house, Pastora Simon
investigated Clara, who revealed to her that she was carried
away from the trunk where she was seated, then forcibly laid on
the floor to have sexual intercourse with Rogelio.
Medical examination conducted the following day revealed
the following:
(1) hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock, 8 o'clock and 11
o'clock.
(2) vagina admits one finger with ease. Two fingers with
difficulty.
(3) fresh perineal abrasion.
(4) smear, not done due to lack of microscope.
(5) contusion left temporal area. Lesions to heal within
one week.

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to

render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
(19a)
For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be
mentally capable at the time of production, even if he was not
so at the time of perception. A child must be mentally mature
both at the time of perception and at the time of production.
With regards to the subject matter of the testimony, we must
make a distinction between absolute disqualifications and
relative disqualifications. Objections based on absolute
disqualifications may be raised upon the calling of the
disqualified
witness.
Objections
based
on
relative
disqualifications may be raised when it becomes apparent that
the subject matter of the testimony covers inadmissible matters.
Absolutely disqualified witnesses
1.
2.
3.
4.

cant perceive
not perceiving
cant make known their perception to others
whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, render them incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others
5. whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable
of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and relating them truthfully
6. marital disqualification
7. parental and filial privilege
Relative disqualifications
1.
2.
3.
4.

dead mans statute

marital communication privilege
attorney-client privilege
an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity
5. Physician-Patient Privilege
6. Priest-Penitent Privilege
7. State Secrets
b.

Cases

People v. de Jesus, 129 SCRA 4 (1984)

Even though feeble minded, there is no showing that she could
not convey her ideas by words or signs competent; even if she
had difficulty comprehending the questions.

LOVERBOY(Rogelio) was later surrendered by his brother-inlaw.

The trial court found LOVERBOY guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Rape
Issue: Whether or not a feeble-minded person (naay teriring)
may be a competent witness.
Held: That the complainant was feeble-minded and had
displayed difficulty in comprehending the questions propounded
on her is an undisputed fact. However, there is no showing
that she could not convey her Ideas by words or signs. It
appears in the records that complainant gave sufficiently
intelligent answers to the questions propounded by the
court and the counsels. The court is satisfied that the
complainant can perceive and transmit in her own way
her own perceptions to others. She is a competent
witness.
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 402 (1993)
Being mental retardate is not per se a disqualification; although
speech was slurred, testimony was positive, clear, plain and
unambiguous.
Facts: While Sylvia Soria, a 20-year old mental retardate, was
walking along the Maharlika Highway at Casabahan, Gandara,
Samar, Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were
apparently waiting for her, accosted her and forcibly took her to
the ricefield some ten meters away. There she was raped by
Salomon with Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met
her brother Senecio, to whom she related her ordeal. The two of
them reported her rape to their father. That same night, the
family walked the three-kilometer distance to the police station,
where Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the rape of his
daughter by Salomon and Conge. Sylvia was medically
examined at the Gandara General Hospital by Dr. Susan
Tanseco, who issued the following certificate:
A physical examination has been done on Miss Sylvia
Soria, 20 years of age, a resident of Brgy. Casab-ahan,
Gandara, Samar. P.E. showed a single, linear, laceration
on the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock position. There are
isolated erythematous areas on both thighs. There is
also the presence of sandy particles on the genital

14

area.
Speculum exam, however, showed negative
findings.
Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be
found. It was only after a four-month search that they were
arrested in Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where, after being
detained there for one month, they were taken back to Samar.
Following a protracted investigation, an information for rape was
filed against them with the RTC.

mouth and then tied her up. However, the witness did not
answer succeeding questions which sought to elicit what
happened thereafter, although he kept on looking at his father
throughout this period. He later revealed that he saw matches
and kerosene in their house. He likewise declared that his
mother was now in heaven because she was dead. During his
rebuttal testimony, Paul Michael categorically declared that it
was his father who "burned" his mother.
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of
eyewitness Paul Michael and ruled against the accused. The
appeal was likewise unfavorable to the accused.

The principal witness for the prosecution was Sylvia Soria

herself, who recounted in detail the manner of her ravishment
by Salomon with the help of his co-accused Conge. She
described how she was dragged to the ricefield by the two
accused and there undressed against her will. As Conge spread
and pinned her legs, Salomon mounted and penetrated her,
although with difficulty because she was still a virgin. She felt
pain in her vagina and "something slippery." She could not cry
out or repel the attack because the two were stronger than she
and Conge was holding a bolo. After her rape, Salomon sucked
and twisted her nipples and demanded that he suck his penis.
Her low mentality was demonstrated in her angry testimony of
her refusal: "The devil with him, it is not an icedrop."
The trial court found respondents guilty.
Issue: Whether or not a mentally retarded person is qualified to
testify.
Held: A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified
from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses,
acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and
credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and
the manner he can make them known to the court. Thus, in
People v. Gerones, the Court accepted the testimony of a rape
victim notwithstanding that she had the mentality of a nine or
ten-year old "because she was able to communicate her
ordeal... clearly and consistently." In the case of People vs.
Rondina, this Court declared:
The testimony of the offended party herself was
especially telling and credible despite the fact that she
was somewhat mentally deficient, as the trial court
noticed. Although she was really of limited intelligence,
the complainant nevertheless did not forget the
harrowing experience she suffered during that frightful
night in the bushes when the three men seared her
memory with the lust they forced upon her. The tale
she narrated in court was not woven out of sheer
imagination but born in anguish and remembered with
pain and as plain an unembellished as the simple life
she led. If she spoke in forthright language at the trial,
it was because she was speaking the truth of that
horrible ravishment she could not push out of her mind.
In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's
speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask her
leading questions, "her testimony was positive, clear, plain,
coherent and credible." Her mental condition did not vitiate her
credibility. We also believe, as we have observed often enough
in many cases that a woman will not expose herself to the
humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant publicity and the
morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly
wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.

People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, Feb. 2, 1996

Issue: The competence of the five-year old witness.

Held: Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness
if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his
perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting
which he is examined.
The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness
are the:
(a) capacity of observation,
(b) capacity of recollection, and
(c) capacity of communication.
And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient
intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled
that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.
As held in United States vs. Buncad, quoting from Wheeler vs.
United States, and reiterated in People vs. Raptus and People
vs. Libungan:
The decision of this question rests primarily with
the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices
his manner, his apparent possession or lack of
intelligence, and may resort to any examination which
will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as
well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath.
As many of these matters cannot be photographed into
the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be
disturbed on review unless from that which is
preserved it is clear that it was erroneous.
The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent to
testify. We agree. A close and careful examination of the
testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the time he testified, he
could be deemed a child of above average intelligence, i.e.,
capable of giving responsive answers to the questions asked of
him by the trial judge, as well as recalling events and relating
them to such recollections.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

2.

Marriage
a.

Rule 130 22: Marital

Rule

Disqualification

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.

During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Requisites for marital disqualification rule

Any child, regardless of age, can be a witness as long as he

meets the qualifications for competency: observation,
recollection, and communication.

.1
.2
.3
.4

Facts: Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young

children, was put to fire in her home. She suffered extensive
second to fourth degree burns and died of hypostatic
pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns on 30 November
1989. Her husband, accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza, was
charged with the crime of parricide.

GR: During their marriage, spouses may not testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse

As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old Paul

Michael could testify thereon.

.1
.2

In his testimony during the presentation of the evidence in

chief on 18 February 1991, Paul Michael declared that one
evening inside their house, his father boxed his mother on her

marriage subsists
a spouse is a litigant
no consent from the spouse-litigant
not a civil case by one against the other, or a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants.

Exceptions:
in a civil case by one spouse against the other spouse, or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one spouse
against

.a

the other spouse or;

15

.b

the other spouses direct descendants or ascendants

The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or

not communicated by one spouse to the other. It applies only
during the existence of the marriage. It can be invoked only if
one spouse is a party to the action. It is an absolute
disqualification and can be invoked the moment that one spouse
is called to testify.
This is a testimonial disqualification, as opposed to the
testimonial privilege of ascendants and descendants (Rule 130
25). Hence, the witness has no say whether the objection is to
be raised or not. The holder of the privilege is the spouselitigant. When the spouse-litigant consents to the testimony, the
spouse-witness must testify whether he wants to or not.
cf Rule 130 24 (a), Marital Communications
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage,
cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants;

Marital Disqualification

Marital Communications

Covers all matters regardless

of source

Covers
only
those
communicated by one spouse
to another

Applies during the marriage

Applies during and after the

marriage

A spouse must be a litigant

A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a spouse is

called to testify

Invoked when the

appears to cover
matters

testimony
privileged

Note that the exceptions under the marital disqualification and

marital communications rule are the same.
b.

Cases

Ordoo v. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270 (1975) L-39012

jan31
The wife can therefore testify against her husband in such a
case for rape against her daughter because it is considered a
crime against the wife. When an offense directly attacks, or
directly impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception to the marital disqualification rule.
de Leon: Note that when this case was decided, a crime by a
spouse against the others descendant was not yet an express
exception to the marital disqualification rule.
Facts: Avelino Ordoo was charged in the municipal court of
San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter, Leonora,
on 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was
signed by the twenty four year old victim.

trial of Avelino Ordoo for the rape committed against Rosa

Ordoo.
The defense counsel objected to the wifes competency. He
invoked the marital disqualification rule.
The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of
Avelino Ordoo's motion for the reconsideration of the adverse
ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether the rape committed by the husband against his
daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife within
the meaning of the exception found in the marital
disqualification rule.
Held: Under the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130
of the Rules of Court providing that the husband or wife cannot
be a witness for or against the other, ". . . except in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other." the wife
is competent to testify against her husband in a case of
rape committed by the husband against their daughter,
In the law of evidence, the rape of a daughter is a crime
committed by the husband against his wife within the
meaning of the exception.
The phrase "in a tribunal case for a crime committed by one
against the other," an exception to the marital disqualification
rule, should be interpreted to refer to an offense which
directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the
conjugal relations.
In Wilkinson vs. People, 282 Pac. 257, it was held that the wife
was a competent witness against the husband in a prosecution
for rape committed by the husband against his stepdaughter,
who is the wife's natural daughter because the crime was "an
outrage upon nature in its dearest and tenderest relations as
well as a crime against humanity itself." The court adopted the
interpretation the "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other" may refer to a crime where
the wife is the individual partially and directly injured or affected
by the crime for which the husband is being prosecuted."
In State vs. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W. 1090, it was held
under the statutory provision the husband or wife shall in no
case be a witness for or against the other, except in a criminal
proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, that
the wife was competent to testify against the other, that the
wife was competent to testify against the husband in a case
where he was prosecuted for incest committed against his
stepdaughter.
In State vs. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158 N.W. 539, it was held that
the wife may testify against the husband in a case where he was
prosecuted for incest committed against their eleven-year old
daughter because incest is a "crime committed against the
wife."
People v. Castaeda, 88 SCRA 562 (1979) L46306 feb27
The wife can testify against the husband in a case for
falsification of the wifes signature (marital consent) in public
documents to sell share of wife in conjugal property because it
is a crime committed by the husband against the wife.
Facts: The above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, forged the
signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale
executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot
belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse in favor of
Ponciano Lacsamana, thereby making it appear that his spouse
Victoria M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to said sale when
in fact and in truth she did not.

In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the

mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she
disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had
apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed
because Avelino Ordoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina
(his daughter and wife, respectively) if they reported the crime
to the police.

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the

witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a
witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement further revealed that

her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa, on
March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that
offense.

Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the

motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or
against her husband. A motion for reconsideration petition was
filed but was denied by respondent Judge.

The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground

that the case falls under the exception to the rule.

Catalina Ordoo said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoo

against Leonora was mentioned during the investigation and

16

Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public

Document committed by a husband against his wife, an
exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held: We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an
exception to the marital disqualification rule.
A criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed
against the husbandwho allegedly forged the signature of
his wife in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the
latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot
belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth
she did not may be considered as a criminal case for a
crime committed by a husband against his wife, and,
therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it
is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to
make the necessary complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal
case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule,
therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is to advance
a conclusion which completely disregards the factual
antecedents of the instant case.
In Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein
the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong
upon the other spouse is too narrow; and the rule that any
offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN
OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND
VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES
WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not
be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case
where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be
directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but
the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act complained of
had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation.
Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that
the wife should not be disqualified from testifying against her
husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the
Solicitor General," to espouse the contrary view would
spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband
committing as many falsifications against his wife as he
could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital
privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret
all with unabashed and complete impunity.
Lezama v Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) L25643 jun27
Wife who is a co-defendant of her husband in a case of collusive
fraud, where their interests are not separate, can not be
examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party.
Facts: Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant
& Cold Storage Co., together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo
Gurrea, filed an action for the annulment of a judgment
rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant. Named as defendants
were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered,
and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The
complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the
Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership
of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership,
Marciano C. Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant
in the Court for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had
supposedly lent to it; that summons was served not on the
receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama;
and that, through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able
to obtain judgment by default against the company. It was
claimed that, because the summons was served on Jose Manuel
Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of
Manila acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and
that, therefore, the decision of that court was void.
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners),
while admitting that the company was placed under
receivership, maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless

remained president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he

had authority to receive in behalf of the company the court
summons in civil case 39827. They denied entering into
collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest
Roque's claim because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation
which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution
of its board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the
hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita
Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in
accordance with the Rules of Court." The request was granted
over the objection of the petitioners.
Issue: Whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in
an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse
party under section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, without
infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her
husband under section 20 (b) of Rule 130.
Held: The reason for the privilege of husband and wife not
to testify against each other is the natural repugnance in every
fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the
means of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit
to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his
intimate life partner.
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what
actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked
questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in
the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will
turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest,
the inevitable result would be to pit her against her
husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case
are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's
own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive
fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon
their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is
the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her
own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a
manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the
husband.
In a suit charging fraud against the spouses, the wife cannot
be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness
concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without
violating section 20(b) of Rule 130, where as in this case,
the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a
third person, and the evident purpose of examination of the wife
is to prove that charge. Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow
one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party
as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the action,
either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or
the spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal
party.
People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) L-568
jul16
When the husband imputes crime against wife, he waives the
marital disqualification rule.
Facts: On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously
arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as detention
prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date
he requested permission from the chief of police, and he was
allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed
to guard him. Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant
allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a
room of said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of
the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a
woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out
of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding.
Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his
little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast.
Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly
while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child
dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital
penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on: (1) the affidavit,
Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C-1), which is a virtual confession
of the accused; (2) Exhibit D, which is the record made by the
justice of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the
defendant upon which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and (3)
the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of the
appellant.

17

Issue: Whether or not the rebuttal testimony of the wife of the

appellant violates the rule on disqualification by reason of
marriage.
Held: "The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why
neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other have been stated thus:

First, identity of interests;

second, the consequent danger of perjury;

third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary

to guard the security and confidences of private life
even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and
which rejects such evidence because its admission
would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and,

fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility

exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other." (70 C. J., 119.)

The rule that the husband and wife cannot testify for or against
each other, as all other general rules, has its own exceptions,
both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases
for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule
itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the
excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule.
For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity
of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the
law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
The defendant, who was accused of killing his son, testifying in
his own behalf, not only limited himself to denying that he was
the killer, but went further and added what was really a new
matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife.
Held: That in giving such testimony, the husband must, in all
fairness, be held to have intended all its natural and necessary
consequences. by his said act, the husband--himself exercising
the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground
of their marital relations must be taken to have waived all
objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even
considering that such objection would have been
available at the outset.
As above modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with
costs against appellant. So ordered.

prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or

other representative of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.
(20a)
Requisites for dead mans statute
.1

the witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff

.2

Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased

person, or the person of unsound mind is the defendant

.3

upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased

person or against such person of unsound mind

.4

as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such

deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind.

.5

[no counterclaim is filed]

b.

Cases

Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) GR#74306

16mar
The dead mans statute does not apply where the case is filed
by the estate. Besides, cross-examination of the witness is a
waiver of the privilege.
Facts: In his complaint, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that
defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., et. Al. be ordered to
deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of
the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer
for an order to restrain the defendants from disposing of the
said shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment vs.
properties of defendants having possession of shares of stock
and for receivership of the properties of defendant
corporation . . .
In their answer, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock
in the name of stockholders of record of the corporation were
fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject
to the agreement between defendants and incorporators; that
the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the
possession of Razon. Appellees also allegedthat neither the
late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid any amount
whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate
court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's
statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable
to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as
plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding
the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually
vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the
same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross
examination regarding such testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the Dead mans statute is applicable in
the case at bar.

3.

Dead Mans Statute

a.

Rule 130 23

Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or

insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is

Held: In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the

appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the
effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private
respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of
Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan
Chuidian that the 1,5000 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are
actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan
Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The
case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly
owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the
testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the
rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of
the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the
estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent
never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as

18

regards the true nature of his transaction with the late

elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to
cross-examination by the private respondents' counsel. Hence,
granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition
of Section 20 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private
respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
Reyes v. Wells, 54 Phil 102 (1929)
If the witness sought to be disqualified is not the plaintiff (e.g.
disinterested 3rd party), the dead mans statute is not applicable.
Guerrero v. St. Clares Realty, 124 SCRA 553
(1983) L58164 02sep
Mere witnesses not parties to the case are not disqualified by
the dead mans statute. Furthermore, the rule requires that the
defendant must be the estate. It does not apply where the heirs
are being sued in their individual capacities. Representatives
are only those who, like the executor, one sued in their
representative, not personal, capacity.
Facts: During their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and
Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed
property, which is a parcel of land. The spouses had six children,
named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all
surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero.
Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained
that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres
Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children
having been assigned other lots. Accordingly, upon the death of
Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the lot
and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez. Shortly
after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero
entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed
her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner's
share in the harvests. The arrangement between brother and
sister was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the
cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner's share in the
produce for as long as she needed the property. Dominador
Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of
Andres Guerrero. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died
survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their
children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero
continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.
The land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in
the name of Andres Guerrer. Sometime during the latter part of
1971 certain people who introduced themselves as agents or
buyers of the land approached some of the plaintiffs in order to
secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs
were informed that the land was titled in the name of their
cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and
discovered the following: that Manuel Guerrero was able to have
the lot titled in his name on the basis of a 'Deed of Sale of Land'
purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel
Guerrero, assisted by Felicisimo Guerrero, father of the
defendants Guerreros, filed an application for registration of
land; that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina
Guerrero, the court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot;
that despite oppositors' appeal to a higher court, the Register of
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title to the applicant; that
on there was filed with the Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of
Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in
favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds
gave due course to the registration of that deed; that on the
same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants
Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of
St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as
partners; that on September 28, 1971, the defendants Guerreros
sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to the St.
Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the Register
of Deeds issued TCT in the name of said realty company.
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her
mother, Cristina Guerrero, had been sick for a long time before
she died at the age of 80 years in 1948; and that her mother
could walk only inside their house in Paraaque; that the money
spent for the illness of her mother came from Manuel Guerrero;
and that, through her children, Cristina Guerrero could ask
money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres
Guerrero had lent to her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the
defendants Guerreros objected to the line of questioning on the
ground that the said witness was testifying "on matters which
are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court."

The defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to

disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section
20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court. The motion was
opposed by the plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973, the trial court
granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose
Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly situated, are
disqualified to testify in the case.
The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case
and their testimonies excluded.
Held: Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully
persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals were made in error.
The present case is not a claim or demand against the
estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants
Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or
representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of dead man's rule. "
It has been held that statutes providing that a party in
interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is
dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their
express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the
word 'against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person.' It should be noted that
after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or
other representative follows, which means that the word
'representative' includes only those who, like the executor or
administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal,
capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words
'against the estate of such deceased persons,' which convey the
idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time
the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights
that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the
person representing him, not the personal rights of such
representative." (Moran, ibid., pp. 169-171)
The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose
Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and
neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are mere
witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to
establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero,
who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to
Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but
merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero
Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 (1962)
L16741 31jan
A cross-examination of the disqualified witness is a waiver of the
dead mans privilege, even if there was a continuing objection.
Facts: Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham,
Sr. and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter
promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest. The note
was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the
creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof
as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand
was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay.
On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the
other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23, 1952
leaving the note still unpaid.
In Special Proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Juan Ysmael, Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham, together
with her sons, filed a pleading entitled "Reclamation"
demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. As
soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the
claimants reproduced their "Reclamation" before the lower court
and the same was finally set for hearing. The counsel for the
administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to
the testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the
provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
However, after the claimant had testified, he lengthily crossexamined her on the very matters against which he interposed a
general objection.
The trial court issued in Order-Decree allowing the claim
against the intestate estate of Juan C. Ysmael

19

The appellate court concluded that "the lower court erred in

finding that the claimants have established a just and valid
claim.
Issue: Whether or not the wife of the deceased was disqualified
from testifying.
Held: There was a waiver of the prohibition contained in
Section 26(c), Rules 123 of the Rules of Court, when the
counsel for the administratrix extensively crossexamined the witness on the very matters subject of the
prohibition. The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant
cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his examination of
a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of
two courses which he may pursue, he has no right, after he
discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and
after he has put the opposite party to the expense, and has
consumed the time of courts in a trial of the case in accordance
with the course selected, to change his position and make
another and different selection. Such course would be unfair
both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be
countenanced in any court of justice (IV Francisco, Rules of
Court, 876, 877, citing the case of Comstock's Adm'r vs. Jacobs,
89 VT. 133, 94 A. 497, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 465).

matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased

person.
Held: Officers and directors of corporations are not considered
to be parties within the meaning of the law. (City Savings Bank
vs. Enos)
Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court
disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, the
officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not
disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation
which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person.
Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 (1927) 27498
20sep
Action must be brought against the estate, not by the estate, to
be covered under the dead mans statute
Escolin: The dead mans rule does not apply in cadastral cases.
Escolin: If there is no instrument evidencing the claim, it would
be difficult to prove the claim in the estate proceeding because
of the dead mans statute. However, if there is such an
instrument, it is not barred by the dead mans statute (Neibert
v. Neibert)

Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949)

L2016 23aug
This in effect ruled that the Dead Mans statute can not be
invoked against a plaintiff-corporation. Interest no longer
disqualifies a witness. Officers/stockholder of corporation may
testify in a case filed against the estate of a deceased by the
corporation
Escolin: In an action where the administrator is the plaintiff, the
defendant may testify on facts occurring prior to the death of
the decedent.
Facts: Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the
largest stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of
Manila when the Pacific war broke out. He held 1,000 shares of
stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for
which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the
company. In 1941 the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his
favor on account of the purchase price of the said 545 share of
stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled
from the company. Under his agreements with the company
dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having
fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its
option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by
returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in
favor of his estate the corresponding number of the company's
shares of stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a
share.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944 and special
proceeding was subsequently instituted for the settlement of his
estate.
In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate
of Richard T. Fitzsimmons. In his answer to the amended claim
the administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of the
deceased to the claimant.
It is admitted that all the prewar books and records of the
company were completely destroyed or lost during the war so
testimonies of witnesses were admitted.
The claimant called as witnesses Mr. Henry J. Belden and Mr.
Samuel Garmezy, vice-president-treasurer and president,
respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on the status of
the personal account of the deceased Fitzsimmons with the
company; but upon objection of the administrator the trial court
refused to admit their testimony on that point on the ground
that said witnesses were incompetent under section 26(c) of
Rule 123, they being not only large stockholders and members
of the board of directors but also vice-president-treasurer and
president, respectively, of the claimant company.
Issue: Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a
party to an action against an executor or administrator of a
deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any

Facts: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted

marriage on July 5, 1894. Marcelino died leaving Anastacia as
his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was
named administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly
before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he had presented claims
in a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain
properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of
himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these
lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not
long after his death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began action when she
presented a motion for a revision of certain decrees within the
one-year period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue
was joined by the administratrix of the estate. A decision was
rendered by ordered that in lieu of the issued decrees, new
decrees and certificates of title be issued as the exclusive
properties of Anastacia Vianzon. Sometime later, a motion for a
new trial was presented with accumulated affidavits by counsel
for the losing party (administratrix). This motion was denied by
the trial judge.
The administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia
Vianzon for the recovery of specified property and for damages.
The court renders judgment absolving the defendant from the
complaint. The motion for a new trial was denied by His Honor,
the trial judge.
From both of the judgments hereinbefore mentioned, the
administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco had appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the widow should be
discarded.
Held: Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the
object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction is
question on the part of the surviving party. He has, however,
neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed
to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress
the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions
were not brought "against" the administratrix of the
estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the
estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the
administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the
second case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim
was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one
sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant.
Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse
party undertook to cross-examine the interested person
with respect to the prohibited matters.
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim
against the estate of the deceased or his properties were
allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him

20

(deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute

statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer
deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or
rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose
of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of
the surviving party."

(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the

marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;

We are of the opinion that the witness was competent.

Requisites for Marital Communications Rule

Goi v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986)

Heirs of a deceased are representatives within the ambit of
the dead mans statute; waived by defendant if he files
counterclaim against plaintiff; adverse party may testify to
transactions or communications with deceased which were
made with an agent of such person if the agents is still alive and
can testify as long as it is confined to the transactions

J.

Privileged Communications

Privileged Communications
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5

marital
attorney-client
physician-patient
priest-penitent
state secrets

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
This is a rule of relative disqualification.
Each of those
enumerated is disqualified to testify as to specific matters only.
It does not disqualify them from testifying on matters not
privileged. Hence, it is improper to object to their testimony
upon mere subpoena. One must wait until it becomes apparent
that their testimony covers matters that are privileged (e.g.
upon asking of a question that covers privileged matters; when
the purpose of their testimony as admitted by the offeror covers
privileged matters) before one may properly object.
Though a relative disqualification, it is nevertheless a
testimonial disqualification, as opposed to the testimonial
privilege of ascendants and descendants (Rule 130 25). [careful
not to be confused in the multiple meanings of the word
privilege] Hence, the witness has no say whether the
objection is to be raised or not. When the holder of the privilege
(not necessarily the opposing party) consents to the testimony,
the witness must testify.
Note that the wording of the law is to the effect that (someone)
may not be examined without the consent of (another). The law
does not say that one can not testify or be examined over the
objection of another. The wording of the law is to the effect that
an objection of the other party in the privileged communication
is not necessary for the privilege to hold. Consent of the other
party in the privileged communication is an act that needs to be
proved for the testimony to be admitted. This is not to say that
failure of a such a party to object will never render such
testimony admissible. This is to say that where the other party
to the privileged communication is not a litigant in the case, and
privileged communication is offered in evidence without the
consent of such party, the litigant against whom the testimony
is offered may object to its admission on the ground of
privileged communication. Where the other party in the
privileged communication is a litigant, then his failure to object
will be taken as a consent to the testimony or a waiver of a
privilege.
The communication that is privileged need not be in any form. It
can be oral or written.
The communication ceases to be privileged if knowingly
communicated in the presence of 3rd persons. In such a case,
the privilege may not be invoked at all. However, if the
privileged communication was within the surreptitious
observation of a 3rd person, then the communication can be
invoked if either the communicator or communicatee called to
testify. However, the privilege can not be invoked if the 3 rd
person is called to testify.
1.

Marital Communications
a.

.1

communication received
.a from the spouse
.b in confidence
.c during the marriage

.2

without the consent of the spouse

Note that the marital communication rule applies even after the
marriage. It applies only to matters communicated by one
spouse to another in confidence. It does not cover knowledge of
matters that a spouse obtains from a source other than other
spouse. It can be invoked even if neither spouse is a party to
the action. It is a relative disqualification and can be invoked
only when it is apparent that the testimony would cover
privileged matters.
The exceptions to the rule are:
.1

in a civil case by one against the other, or

.2

in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the

other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants

cf Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification Rule

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During
their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in
a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or
communicated by one spouse to the other. It applies only during
the existence of the marriage. It can be invoked only if one
spouse is a party to the action. It is an absolute disqualification
and can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to
testify.

Marital Disqualification (Rule

130, Sec. 22)

Marital Communications (Rule

130, Sec. 24 [a])

Covers all matters regardless

of source

Covers
only
matters
communicated by one spouse
to
another,
during
the
marriage

Applies during the marriage

Applies during and after the

marriage

A spouse must be a litigant

A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a
called to testify

spouse

is

Invoked when the testimony

appears to cover privileged
matters

MEMORIZE!
b.

Cases

People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925) L22948

17mar

Rule 130 24 (a)

21

Where the privilege communication from one spouse to the

other comes into the hands of a 3 rd party, without collusion or
voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, not privilege;
illegality of seizure must be raised by motion before trial for
return of letter; unanswered letter inadmissible
Facts: It appears from the evidence that the victim of the
alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, performed a surgical
operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain
other ailments. After her release therefrom she was required to
go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of
dressing the wounds caused by the operation. On these
occasions she was accompanied by her husband, the defendant.
The defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent
him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while
defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the
wife. The defendant further states that his wife informed him of
the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic.
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again went to the
office of the deceased and found him there alone. According to
the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without
any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased
with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an
effort to escape but the defendant pursued him and overtaking
him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon
him and as a consequence of the three wounds he died within a
few minutes. The defendants made his escape but surrendered
himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening
of the following.
The court below found that the crime was committed with
premeditation and therefore constituted murder. This finding can
only be sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L, a letter
written to the defendant by his wife and seized by the police in
searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated two
days before the commission of the crime and shows that the
writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to
physical violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter
was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in
evidence.
Issue: Whether
communication.

or

not

the

letter

was

privileged

Held: The letter in question was obtained through a search for

which no warrant appears to have been issued.
The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for
reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the
wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the
letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony,
but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was
therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by
answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but
such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his
possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his
part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its
admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the
defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses
for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine
them. In this respect there can be no difference between an
ordinary communication and one originally privileged.
The question is radically different from that of the admissibility
of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a
husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that
character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a
conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further
ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer
a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his
silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement
is contained in an unanswered letter.
2.

Attorney-Client Privilege
a.

Rule 130 24 (b)

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his

client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk
be examined, without the consent of the client and his

employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which

has been acquired in such capacity;
Requisites for attorney-client privilege
.1

existence of an attorney-client relationship

.2

witness is an attorney

.3

as to communication made by the client to him, or his

advice given thereon

.4

the communication was made in confidence

.5

communication was made in the course of, or with a view to

professional employment

The privilege extends to the attorney's secretary, stenographer,

or clerk concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity. The difference being consent of only
the client is needed for the attorney to testify. However, the
consent of both the attorney and the client is necessary for the
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk to testify.
The attorney-client privilege does not apply if the attorney was
sued by his client.
b.

Cases

Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915) L-9231

06jan
Communication made by client to attorney for purpose of being
communicated to others not privileged, e.g. compromise
agreement.
Facts: The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two
insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. It
appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which
time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy
Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and
continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." Sometime
before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's
interest in the business and continued to carry on the business
under the father's name. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was
heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the
estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these
proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of
insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised
with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or
P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by
the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that
the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the
estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound
by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's
estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that the
plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of the policies,
and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the
plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the
administrator with the understanding that such a compromise
was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the
witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's
testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to
which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then
called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff
formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff
and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground
that it was privileged. Counsel, on this appeal, base their
argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's
privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted upon
Issue: Was the testimony in question privileged?
Held: It is evident that a communication made by a client to his
attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a
third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his
instructions be delivering the communication to the third person
for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot,
by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It
is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for
whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the
client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies
the role of intermediary or agent.

22

AS to whether a waiver of the client's privilege personally made

in open court can be withdrawn before acted upon, quaere.
(consider whether it is correct).
Regala v. Sandiganbayan , 262 SCRA 124 (1996)
105938 20sep

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of

the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

Prosecution can not use attorneys as leverage to compel them

to name their clients; clients identity is protected when there is
a strong probability exists that revealing clients name would
implicate him in the very activity for which he sought advice.
Facts: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the
institution of the Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by the
RP, through the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one
of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
corporations.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which
included, among others, the organization and acquisition of
business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative
and incidental services where its members acted as
incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in
the performance of these services, the members of the law firm
delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's
equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name,
and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said
shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the
members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners
and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in
the organization and acquisition of the companies included in
Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice,
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
The PCGG alleged that ACCRA law firm was involved in setting
up financial and corporate framework and structures through
the use of coco levy funds. In their answer, ACCRA said that the
acts were made the course of rendering professional and legal
services to clients.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the
disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship;
and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings.
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated
the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with
the conditions required by respondent PCGG
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above
resolution but the same was denied by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer may refuse in giving the identity
of his client.
Held: Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG
as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their
clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
"bigger fish" as they say in street parlance.
The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United
States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse
to divulge the name or identity of this client.
Reasons:
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Exceptions:
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his
identity is privileged.
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the
identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege
when the client's name itself has an independent significance,
such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation
of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition
by the prosecution.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case
falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case,
which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be not attorney-client relationship).
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to
their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of
their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate
fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is
the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . .
crime."
The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as
much "communication" as information revealed directly about
the transaction in question itself, a communication which is
clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such
communication without exposing himself to charges of violating
a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.
Boss Joel manifestation: it is premature to apply the rules on
evidence for there is no case yet, hence, there is no compulsion
on the part of the lawyer to disclose the identity of there client.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co. , 46
Phil. 938 (1924) L-21237 22mar
Letter from client to attorney obtained by adverse party,
admitted authentic in court, not privileged regardless whether
legally or illegally obtained (what about constitutional rule of
exclusion on evidence obtained in violation of the right to
privacy of communication and correspondence?); one who
overhears the communication with or without clients knowledge
is not privileged.
Facts: The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident in
the City of Manila, while the defendant is a corporation

23

organized under the law of the Philippine Islands with its

principal office in the City of Cebu. Said company appears to be
the owner by a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and
other asphalt products, located in Leyte and known as the Lucio
mine. William Anderson, as president and general manager of
the defendant company, addressed a letter to the plaintiff
Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio
mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon
a scale of prices indicated in said letter.
Plaintiff alleges that during the life of the agency indicated in
Exhibit B, he rendered services to the defendant company in the
way of advertising and demonstrating the products of the
defendant and expended large sums of money in visiting various
parts of the world for the purpose of carrying on said advertising
and demonstrations, in shipping to various parts of the world
samples of the products of the defendant, and in otherwise
carrying on advertising work.
Anderson wrote the plaintiff, to the effect that the company was
behind with construction and was not then able to handle big
contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On March 12, Anderson was in Manila and
the two had an interview, in the course of which the plaintiff
informed Anderson of the San Francisco order. Anderson
thereupon said that, owing to lack of capital, adequate facilities
had not been provided by the company for filling large orders
and suggested that the plaintiff had better hold up in the matter
of taking orders. The plaintiff expressed surprise at this and told
Anderson that he had not only the San Francisco order (which he
says he exhibited to Anderson) but other orders for large
quantities of bituminous limestone to be shipped to Australia
and Shanghai. In another interview on the same Anderson
definitely informed the plaintiff that the contracts which be
claimed to have procured would not be filled.
Barton sued for specific performance. In the course of the trial,
the defendant offered in evidence a carbon copy of a letter
written by the plaintiff to his attorney in which plaintiff states,
among other things, that his profit from the San Francisco
contract would have been at the rate of eigthy-five cents (gold)
per ton. The authenticity of this city document is admitted, and
when it was offered in evidence by the attorney for the
defendant the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no
objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if
counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was
secured. Upon this the attorney for the defendant informed the
court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of
the defendant without explanation of the manner in which the
document had come into their possession. Upon this the
attorney for the plaintiff made this announcement: "We hereby
give notice at this time that unless such an explanation is made,
explaining fully how this carbon copy came into the possession
of the defendant company, or any one representing it, we
propose to object to its admission on the ground that it is a
confidential communication between client and lawyer." No
further information was then given by the attorney for the
defendant as to the manner in which the letter had come to his
hands and the trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on
the ground that it was a privileged communication between
client and attorney.
Issue: Whether or not the letter should be considered as
privileged communication bet. Atty & client.
Held: We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for
even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which
protects communications between attorney and client, this
privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the
adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary
acquired possession. The law protects the client from the effect
of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of
the legal relation, but when such a document, containing
admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and
reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. In this
connection Mr. Wigmore says:
The law provides subjective freedom for the client by
assuring him of exemption from its processes of
disclosure against himself or the attorney or their
agents of communication. This much, but not a whit
more, is necessary for the maintenance of the
privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the client's hands, and
since the privilege is a derogation from the general
testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it
would be improper to extend its prohibition to third
persons who obtain knowledge of the communications.
One who overhears the communication, whether with

or without the client's knowledge, is not within the

protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to
apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains
possession of a document in original or copy.
Orient Insurance v. Revilla , 54 Phil. 919 (1930)
34098 17sep
Introduction in evidence of a part of a paper by one party waives
privilege as to other parts of the same writing; when a party
invokes BER, it is the party who produces the original who is
deemed to have introduced it in evidence; contract for
attorneys fees is not privileged; there is no partial waiver of
privilege.
Facts: The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil
action instituted in the CFI of Manila for the purpose of
recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by the Orient
Insurance Company, upon merchandise destroyed by a fire. In
one of the clauses of the policies sued upon is a stipulation to
the effect that all benefit under the policy would be forfeited if,
in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and
action or suit should not be commenced within three months
after such rejection. In the answer of the Orient Insurance
Company, interposed in the case mentioned, it is alleged, by
way of defense, that the company rejected the claim on April 15,
1929, that notice of such rejection was given to the plaintiff by
letter on the same day, and that suit was not instituted on the
policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than three months
after the rejection of the claim.
In the Course of the trial the witness E. M. Bachrach, president
of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., while being examined in chief by the
attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the circumstances
surrounding the institution of the action, said that he had
reported certain conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he
added: he waited for about a week longer and not having heard
anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of July, he
(Bachrach) received a letter from their attorneys urging him to
file these cases. The attorney for the defendant, Orient
Insurance Company, thereupon interposed, asking that the
witness be required to produce the letter referred to from Mr.
Guevara, or else his answer be stricken out. The witness replied
that he had the letter with him and that he had no objection to
show that part of the letter in which Guevara urged him to
proceed with the cases. Upon being asked about the other part
of the letter, the witness said that the other part contained
private matter, "between the attorney and ourselves. Thereupon
the attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance Company, said
he would like to see the letter, inquiring as to its date. The
witness replied that it bore date of July 13, 1929; and upon the
court inquiring whether the witness had any objection to the
reading of the letter by the attorney for the defendant, the
witness replied that he wished to consult with his attorney. Upon
this the attorney for the adversary party, the Orient Insurance
Company, suggested that he would like to have the letter
marked without his reading it and it was accordingly marked as
Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In view of the production of
the letter, I withdraw the objection to the statement of the
witness as to its contents," and he added: "I now ask the
permission of the court to read the letter for my information."
The court thereupon inquired of the attorney for the Teal Motor
Co., Inc., whether he had any objection, and the attorney
observed that he would have no objection to the disclosing of
that part of the letter which referred exactly to the point of the
urging of the filing of the complaints, and he added:
"Unfortunately, the other part of the letter being a
communication between a client and attorney, I don't think, if
your Honor please, it can be disclosed without the consent of
both."
Issue: Whether or not a communication may be presented only
in part, excluding other parts for being privileged
communication.
Held: The introduction in evidence of part of a paper writing
by one party waives privilege as to other parts of the same
writing.
When part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one
litigant, his adversary is entitled to use other parts of the same
writing, so far as relevant to the issues in the case; and to this
end the attorney of the latter has a right to inspect the writing
and to require its production in court.
A witness for the plaintiff made an oral statement as to the
substance of part of a letter which had been received by the
plaintiff from its attorney, and when the fact was revealed that

24

the communication had been made by letter, the attorney for

the defendant requested that the witness be required to
produce the letter in court, and if not, that his answer should be
stricken out. This in legal effect was a demand for the
production of "the best evidence," it being a well-known rule of
law that a witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as
to the contents of a paper writing which can be produced in
court. In response to this request that portion of the letter to
which the witness had supposedly referred was read into the
record.

The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting

en banc, held that the requested matters were not privileged.
The court then decreed that the tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as
counsel and agent for the tug owners forthwith 'Answer
Plaintiff's 38th interrogatory and supplemental interrogatories.
Upon their refusal, the court adjudged them in contempt and
ordered them imprisoned until they complied.

It was stated in the court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in

opposing the introduction of other portions of the letter in proof,
that the other parts were privileged, because they related to the
terms of employment between attorney and client, or to the fee
to be paid to the attorney. With respect to this point it is difficult
to see how a contract for fees could be considered privileged.
Irrelevant it might, under certain circumstances, certainly be,
but not privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys and
clients are inherently personal and private matters, but they are
a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are
essentially not of privileged nature. Privilege primarily refers to
communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course
includes communications from attorney to client relative to
privileged matters.

Issue: Whether or not any pre-trial device at the disposal of

either counsel be used to inquire into materials collected by an
adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible
litigation.

But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and
withheld from the inspection of the adversary was originally of a
privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction
in evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of
the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration,
conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in
evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged
matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize
any exception.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)
Privilege does not extend to information gathered by an
attorney from witnesses; Work-Product of atty can not be
secured without sufficient justification.
Facts: On February 7, 1943, the tug 'J. M. Taylor' sank while
engaged in helping to tow a car float of the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The accident
was apparently unusual in nature, the cause of it still being
unknown. Five of the nine crew members were drowned. Three
days later the tug owners and the underwriters employed a law
firm, of which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend
them against potential suits by representatives of the deceased
crew members and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, also sitting en banc, reversed

the judgment of the District Court.

Held: In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials

secured and prepared by Fortenbaugh, petitioner emphasizes
that the deposition- discovery portions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are designed to enable the parties to discover
the true facts and to compel their disclosure wherever they may
be found. It is said that inquiry may be made under these rules,
epitomized by Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which is not
privileged; and since the discovery provisions are to be applied
as broadly and liberally as possible, the privilege limitation must
be restricted to its narrowest bounds. On the premise that the
attorney-client privilege is the one involved in this case,
petitioner argues that it must be strictly confined to confidential
communications made by a client to his attorney. And since the
materials here in issue were secured by Fortenbaugh
from third persons rather than from his clients, the tug
owners, the conclusion is reached that these materials
are proper subjects for discovery under Rule 26.
We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental
impressions in issue in this case fall outside the scope of
the attorney-client privilege and hence are not protected
from discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate
the content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the
federal courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the
protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to
information which an attorney secures from a witness
while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor
does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs,
communications and other writings prepared by counsel
for his own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it is
equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Upjohn Company v. US, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)

A public hearing was held on March 4, 1943, before the United

States Steamboat Inspectors, at which the four survivors were
examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to
all interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately
interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with
an eye toward the anticipated litigation; the survivors signed
these statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh
also
interviewed other persons believed to have some
information relating to the accident and in some cases
he made memoranda of what they told him. At the time
when Fortenbaugh secured the statements of the survivors,
representatives of two of the deceased crew members had been
in communication with him. The fifth claimant, petitioner herein,
brought suit in a federal court under the Jones Act on November
26, 1943, naming as defendants the two tug owners,
individually and as partners, and the railroad.
One year later, petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the
tug owners. The 38th interrogatory read: 'State whether
any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs
'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel
were taken in connection with the towing of the car float
and the sinking of the Tug 'John M. Taylor'.
The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the
interrogatories except No. 38 and the supplemental ones just
described. While admitting that statements of the survivors had
been taken, they declined to summarize or set forth the
contents. They did so on the ground that such requests called
'for privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation' and
constituted 'an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private
files.' It was claimed that answering these requests 'would
involve practically turning over not only the complete files, but
also the telephone records and, almost, the thoughts of
counsel.'

Privilege extends to information given

corporate communications not to facts.

by

employees

to

Facts: Certain foreign subsidiaries of the parties, made

questionable payments to foreign govts to secure business. The
main offices directed their counsel to interview those employees
and advise them on acceptable courses of conduct. The
corporation thereafter voluntarily submitted a report to the SEC
disclosing the questionable payments, which in turn transmitted
a copy of that report to the IRS. The IRS was given a list of all
those interviewed, but the attys refused to produce their notes
and memorandum.
Issue:
Whether
atty-client
privilege
is
available
to
communications between corporate officers and employees and
attys for corporation
Held: The communications by petitioner's employees to counsel
are covered by the attorney-client privilege
If an employee making the communication, of whatever rank, is
in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon
the advice of the atty, then he is (or personifies), the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply. The privilege exists to protect not only
the giving of professional advice, but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
informed advice, because the lawyer must be fully informed in
order for his client to obtain full advantage of the legal system.
The ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the
confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full
development of facts essential to proper representation of the
client, but also encourages laymen to seek early legal
assistance (Hickman v. Taylor). The privilege only protects

25

disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of

the underlying facts by those who communicated with the atty.
The protection of the privilege extends only to communications
and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication
concerning a fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot
be compelled to answer the question >What did you say or write
to the atty?= but may not refuse to disclose any relevant
fact . . . merely because he incorporated a statement of such
fact into his communication to his atty.

Waivers of the physician-patient privilege, cf Rule 28, Sec. 3 and

4
Sec. 3. Report of findings. If requested by the party
examined, the party causing the examination to be made
shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the
examining physician setting out his findings and
conclusions. After such request and delivery, the party
causing the examination to be made shall be entitled upon
request to receive from the party examined a like report of
any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the
same mental or physical condition. If the party examined
refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion and
notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms
as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a
report the court may exclude his testimony if offered at the
trial. (3a)

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732 F.2d 447

(1983)
The general rule is the identity of a client is not protected; legal
advice exception may be defeated through prima facie showing
that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of
present or intended continuing illegality, as where the
representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy; it is the link
between the client and the communication, not the link between
client and possibility of potential criminal prosecution which is
protected; last link exception is abandoned; disclosure might
possibly implicate client in criminal activity not an exception

Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. By requesting and obtaining a

report of the examination so ordered or by taking the
deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any
privilege he may have in that action or any other involving
the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every
other person who has examined or may thereafter examine
him in respect of the same mental or physical examination.
(4)

US v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)

Statement made by co-defendant to an investigator acting for
defendants counsel protected; communication by client to
attorney remain privileged when attorney shares them with codefendant for a common defense

Requisites for physician-client privilege

.1

civil case

.2

witness is a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery

or obstetrics

.3

as to any advice or treatment given by him or any

information which he may have acquired in attending such
patient in a professional capacity

.4

the information was necessary to enable him to act in that

capacity

.5

the information would blacken the reputation of the patient

US v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975)

Protection does not extend to the communication regarding an
intended crime; communication divulged to strangers not
protected
US v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975)
Facts: During respondents federal criminal trial, which resulted
in a conviction, defense counsel sought to impeach the
credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a
defense investigator regarding statements previously obtained
from the witnesses by the investigator. When the investigator
was called as a witness, the District Court stated that a copy of
the investigators report would have to be submitted to the
prosecution for inspection at the completion of the investigators
testimony. Defense counsel said he did not intend to produce
the report, the court ruled that the investigator could not testify
about his interviews with the witnesses. CA, considering such
ruling to be a reversible error, held that both the Fifth
Amendment and Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 16 prohibited
the disclosure condition imposed.
Held: Work-Product Doctrine waived when client presents
investigator as witness.
Statements made by 3 rd persons
gathered by investigation not covered by the privilege.
People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)

Escolin: The old rule used the word character (what the person
actually is). The new rules use the word reputation (what
people think of the person).
Note that the patient need not be the source of the information.
Only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics are covered by the privilege. Hence, nurses, midwives
and other people who attend to the ill can be called to testify as
to any matter.
The privilege does not cover expert opinion as long as the
witness does not testify to matters specifically referring to the
patient.
There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.

Facts:

de Leon: What about civil cases impliedly instituted with criminal

cases?

1)

Cases

Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) 91114 25sep

The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting
physician to give expert testimony regarding hypothetical facts.

3.

Physician-Patient Privilege
a.

Rule 130 24 (c)

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery

or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent
of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may
have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;

Facts: Petitioner Nelly Lim and private respondent Juan Lim are
lawfully married to each other. Private respondent filed a
petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that
petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness
called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and
until the present."
Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking
the witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. Private
respondent's counsel announced that he would present as his
next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who
specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr.
Acampado to testify. Petitioner's counsel opposed the

26

motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be

elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter
had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was
issued.

.2 This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full

and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties;

Petitioner's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the

subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of
the motion.

.4 The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure

of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.

Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the court heard
this urgent motion. Movant argued that having seen and
examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr.
Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the
confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Counsel
for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado
would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify
on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in
a professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge,
denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify.

SCOPE. The physician may be considered to be acting in his

professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere
fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated
is not stated."

Petitioner filed with the public respondent CA a petition for

certiorari and prohibition to annul the aforesaid order of
respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and
to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr.
Acampado's testimony.
CA denied the petition because the petitioner failed to establish
the confidential nature of the testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony is covered by the
disqualification by reason of privileged. (doctor-patient)
Held: We are of the opinion that they do not fall within the
realm of a privileged communication because the information
were not obtained from the patient while attending her in her
professional capacity and neither were the information
necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment
to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither does the information
obtained from the physician tend to blacken the character of the
patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado
is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge of the Female Service of
the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine
Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board
of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert
witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. This rule on the physicianpatient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all
facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician
may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is
for the general interest of the community.
SUBJECT TO WAIVER. Since the object of the privilege is to
protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is
made to the physician's testimony.
REQUISITES. In order that the privilege may be successfully
claimed, the following requisites must concur:
.1 the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
.2 the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
.3 such person acquired the information while he was attending
to the patient in his professional capacity;
.4 the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and
.5 the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
CONDITIONS. These requisites conform with the four (4)
fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a
privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:
.1 The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed;

.3 The relation must be one which in the opinion of the

community ought to be sedulously fostered;

Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) 108854 14june

Non-physician testimony on a medical psychologists report is
not covered by the physician-patient privilege. This is hearsay
(because the other party could not cross examine the doctor
who prepared the report) but there was no objection.
Facts: Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married.
The relationship between the couple developed into a stormy
one.
Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing
purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The
effort however proved futile. They finally separated in fact.
Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by
Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. Presenting
the report among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion")
from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila
nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of
"incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter."
The decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite."
Later, voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership was
ordered by the CFI of Pasig.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of
his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition,
he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma.
Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or
irrelevant."
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness
stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was
objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient.
The trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court
of Appeals which denied the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony is covered by the
disqualification by reason of privileged. (doctor-patient)
Held: Petitioner's
misplaced.

discourse

while

exhaustive

is

however

Lim v. Court of Appeals (214 SCRA 273 [1992]) clearly lays down
the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity;

27

(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in

that capacity; and
(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed,
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
the patient."
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly
and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition.
Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and
effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report.

4.

Rule 130 24(d): Priest-Penitent Privilege

(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent

of the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to or any advice given by him in his
professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs;
Requisites for Priest-Penitent Privilege
.1

witness is a minister or priest

.2

as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in

his professional character

.3

in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which

the minister or priest belongs

5.

State Secrets
a.

Rule 130 24(e)

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his

term of office or afterwards, as to communications made
to him in official confidence, when the court finds that
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
Requisites for the State Secrets rule
.1

witness is a public officer

.2

as to communications made to him in official confidence

.3

the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure
b.

Cases

US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)

Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or
sensitive national security secrets, executive privilege can not
prevail over due process.
Facts: A grand jury returned indictments against seven of
President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair.
The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the
defendants sought audio tapes of conversations
recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he
was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege,"
which is the right to withhold information from other
government branches to preserve confidential communications
within the executive branch or to secure the national interest.
Issue: Is the President's right to safeguard certain information,
using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely
immune from judicial review?
Held: No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation
of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute,

unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there

was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or
diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and
produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after
the release of the tapes.
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523
(1986) 70054 08july
Confidential information is not necessarily privileged; no public
interest is prejudiced by disclosure, thus not protected; is there
a need for a law to declare it confidential?
Facts: Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce
Documents" is the Order of RTC, Makati, granting the motion of
the petitioner herein, based on Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules
of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain
papers and records which are claimed as needed by the
Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments, objections,
and exceptions to the Conservator's report dated and Receiver's
Report.
The documents now asked to be produced, inspected, and
copied are the following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB)
deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr.
Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central Bank Governor Jose
Fernandez; ..etc, etc, etc.
The RTC considered the documents not privileged
because these constitute or contain evidence material to
the issues into by the Court. These materials are said to
comprise of records of the administrative proceedings
conducted by respondent's officials and representatives from
the inception of and preparation of the challenged reports and
the resolution placing petitioner under receivership and
thereafter under liquidation as it is the regularity and
impartiality of these administrative proceedings which are being
assailed by the petitioner, the trial court saw no reason why said
documents should be thus concealed from it.
The grounds recited in support of their petition are the following:
(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board
deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of
the Central Bank Act.
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. .
Sec. 15. Responsibility. Any member wilfully violates this
Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his
duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the
Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. Similar
responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any information of
a confidential nature about the discussion or resolutions of the
Monetary Board, except as required in Section 13 of this Act, or
about the operations of the Bank, and to the use of such
information for personal gain or to the detriment of the
Government, the Bank or third parties. (As amended by
Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).
Issue: Whether or not the said documents are privileged.
Held: We accept the view taken by the court below that the
documents are not privileged and that these constitute or
contain evidence material to the issues being inquired into by
the Court.
The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily
absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the
Central Bank Act, even in Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which
prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on
said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a
matter subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure is here
not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the
government, to the bank or to third parties. Significantly, it is
the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it
considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it
to support its position in the matter being inquired to by the
court below.

28

This privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the

protection of public officers but for the protection of public
interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no
public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will
not be applicable.
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that
public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and
documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner
bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure
of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this
time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it
trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets.
Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of
production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public
officials acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of
their duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke
fear of disclosure
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the
disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its
employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are
entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid
and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be
well to consider that
Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it
means something in which the public, the community
at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their
legal rights or liabilities are affected (State vs. Crocket,
206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p.
229).

order of a competent court in cases of bribery or

dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where
the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation.
Note that the privilege applies only to bank deposits. As to other
property being held by a bank, bank personnel may be
examined upon order of a court (Sec. 55.1 [d], RA 8791, General
Banking Act of 2000).
K.

Parental and Filial Privilege

1.

Rule 130 25

Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may

be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
There is no distinction between legitimate or illegitimate
relations.
Note that this is a testimonial privilege, not a testimonial
disqualification, found in 22-24 of Rule 130 [careful not to be
confused in the multiple use of the word privilege]. Here, the
witness is the holder of the privilege and has the power to
invoke or waive the privilege. The relative against whom he is
testifying can not invoke nor waive the privilege. However this
must be construed in the light of Art. 215 of the Family Code
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal
case, to testify against his parents and grandparents,
except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime
against the descendant or by one parent against the other.
(315a)
Hence, a descendant may be compelled to testify in a criminal
case where

6.

Newsmans Privilege
a.

RA 53 as amended by RA 1477

Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the

civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or
duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to
reveal the source of any news-report or information
appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless
the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that
such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
Requisites of newsmans privilege
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5

publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter

of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation
cannot be compelled to reveal
as to the source of any news report or information
appearing in said publication
related in confidence

Exception: Court, a House or committee of Congress finds that

such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
b.

Cases

Matter of Farber (A.B.), 394 A. 2d 330 (1978)

Constitution prevails over shield law, but entitled to hearing to
prove relevance.
7.

Bank Deposits (RA 1405)

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or

banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines,
its
political
subdivisions
and
its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office, except upon written permission
of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon

.1

the descendant-witness himself is the victim, or

.2

the descendant-witnesss parent commits a crime against

the descendant-witnesss other parent.

Note that an ascendant may not be compelled to testify even if

it is a crime by the descendant against the ascendant-witness.
The ascendant-witness may testify voluntarily though.
2.

Case

People v. Publico, 7 CAR (2s) 703 (1972)

Information given by child to 3rd person is protected
L.

Admissions

Admissions that are admissible against a party

.1
.2
.3

.4

Admissions against interest

Compromises
Exceptions to Res Inter Alios Acta
.a Partners/Agents admissions
.b Co-conspirators statements
.c Admission by Privies
Admissions by silence
1.

Admissions against interest

a.

Rule 130, 26

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration

or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him. (22)
The general rule is evidence as to extra-judicial acts, omissions,
and declarations (AODs) of a party is admissible. These
evidences can either be favorable or unfavorable to a party. Rule
130, 26 expressly allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the
AODer. However, an objection may be raised as to the
admissibility of AODs favorable to the AODer on the grounds of
that these are self-serving AODs. The argument is Rule 130 26
only allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer.
However, 26 is only a rule of admissibility. It allows evidence of
AODs prejudicial to the AODer, but does not prohibit evidence on
AODs favorable to AODer. There being no express prohibition,
any evidence on AODs favorable to the AODer falls under the
general rule that evidence not excluded by law or the Rules is
admissible (Rule 128 3). Any doubt as to such evidence refers
to its weight or probative value and not to its admissibility.

29

Self-serving statements = hearsay? Declaration against interest

as an exception to the hearsay rule only applies if the declarant
is deceased or unable to testify. Self-defeating statements can
not be excluded by the hearsay rule because it is expressly
admissible by the rules.
Is personal knowledge on the part of the AODer required?
b.

Cases

Keller & Co. v. COB L-68097 jan86

Presidents admission binds corporation.
Facts: Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Mktg,
Inc. as exclusive distributor of its household products, Brite and
Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in the sales agreement.
Under that agreement Keller sold on credit its products to COB
Group Marketing.
As security for COB Group Mktg's credit purchases up to the
amount of P35,000, one Asuncion Manahan mortgaged her land
to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB Group Mktg the
faithful performance of all the terms and conditions of the sales
agreement.
On May 20, COB Group Mktg, through Jose Bax (president & GM)
executed two second chattel mortgages over its 12 trucks
(already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as security for its
obligation to Keller amounting to P179,185.16 as of April 30,
1971. However, the second mortgages did not become effective
because the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not give its
consent. But the second mortgages served the purpose of being
admissions of the liability COB Group Marketing to Keller.
The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and
Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a letter dated July 24, 1971 to Keller's
counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971
and thereafter every thirtieth day of the month for three years
until COB Group Marketing's mortgage obligation had been fully
satisfied. They also proposed to substitute the Manahan
mortgage with a mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City (Exh. L).
On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented
his own reconciliation statements wherein he showed that COB
Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72 (Exh. 7 and 8). He
claimed overpayment although in his answer he did not allege
at all that there was an overpayment to Keller.
These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove
the liability of COB Group Marketing and to justify the
foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and
Lorenzo.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Keller to pay
COB the overpayment. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not there was Admission on the part of COB
group.
Held: We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the
admissions of liability made in 1971 by Bax as president and
general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving
credence to the alleged overpayment computed by Bax.
The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions
as to the liability of COB Group Marketing but they also
erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount of its
supposed overpayment in the sum of P100,596.72 in spite of the
fact that COB Group Marketing was declared in default and did
not file any counterclaim for the supposed overpayment.
The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary
evidence. It is noteworthy that all the invoices, with delivery
receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, together with a
tabulation thereof covering the period from October 15, 1969 to
January 22, 1971. Victor A. Mayo, Keller's finance manager,
submitted a statement of account showing that COB Group
Marketing owed Keller P184,509.60 as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ).
That amount is reflected in the customer's ledger, Exhibit M.
Bax in that discussion did not present his reconciliation
statements to show overpayment. His Exhibits 7 and 8 were an
afterthought. He presented them long after the case was filed.
The petitioner regards them as "fabricated",

Viacrusis v. CA

L-29831 mar72

Facts: It appears that the land of about 4 hectares involved in

this case is part of a bigger lot of about 14.6303 hectares,
covered Title in the name of Pedro Sanchez; that, on June 8,
1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit B, selling said lot of
14.6303 hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said Exhibit B was, on
1936, filed with the RD, and recorded in the memorandum of
incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243; that, on July 7, 1941,
or about 5 yrs later Sanchez executed another deed, Exhibit 10,
conveying the disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to Balentin
Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on 1945, to Guillermo Viacrucis
(Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959, Anastacio Orais who
claimed to have made oral demands formally demanded from
Viacrucis that he vacate said portion and surrender its
possession to him (Orais) that this demand was not heeded by
Viacrucis who, instead, executed, on March 19, 1959, the deed,
Exhibit 9, confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly made by
him, on January 12, 1954, in favor of his brother-in-law Claros
Marquez; and that the deeds of sale, Exhibits 10, 11 and 9, in
favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, respectively, have not
been registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.
The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs
therein respondent herein.
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs.
Marquez, said decision, against them and in favor of Mr. and
Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not there was admission by silence on the
part of Orais.
Held: It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs.
Castelo and this recognition by the now deceased Pelagio
Castelo which were confirmed by the public document Exh. G
constitute a declaration of Mr. and Mrs. Castelo adverse to
their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to
section 32 of said Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason
whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of
said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than
five (5) years before their (petitioners) predecessor in interest,
Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and
Castelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object
of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such
admission "may be received in evidence," not only
against the party who made it "or his successors in
interest," but, also, "against third persons."
As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the
bank refused to accept OCT No. 243 as collateral for the loan
applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land covered by
said certificate of title was not his property, there is no
competent evidence on whether or not Orais had said anything
in response to said statement. Moreover, OCT No. 243 was in
the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by
the latter to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in
question as security for said loan, unless and until OCT No. 243
shall have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title
issued to Orais. This, however, could not take place before the
filing of his loan application, because the owner's duplicate of
said certificate of title admittedly delivered by Sanchez to
Orais had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel,
to whom he (Orais) had turned it over in connection with a given
criminal case.

2.

Compromises
a.

Rule 130, 27

Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil

cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving quasioffenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted
offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not

30

admissible in evidence against the accused who made

the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital
or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not
admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal
liability for the injury. (24a)
Note that the offer of compromise in civil cases is not
admissible only as evidence of liability. If the offer of
compromise is offered as evidence on other matters (e.g.
amount of liability), then the evidence is admissible.
In civil cases, an offer of compromise is inadmissible regardless
of the cause of action. In criminal cases, the general rule is an
offer of compromise is admissible. However, it is inadmissible
under the following cases:
.1

quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)

.2

cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can

compromise tax cases)

.3

plea of guilty later withdrawn

.4

unaccepted offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense

.5

offer to pay or payment of expenses occasioned by an

injury

.6

[the offer is made only to avoid the consequences of

litigation]

Further note that an offer to pay for expenses other than those
occasioned by an injury is inadmissible in civil cases. Though the
3rd paragraph of 27 excludes in civil cases offers to pay only for
expenses occasioned by an injury, offers to pay for other
expenses fall under the general rule that an offer to compromise
in civil cases is not admissible. The exclusion in civil cases of
offers to pay for expenses occasioned by an injury is merely a
superfluity. Even if the exclusion was expressly applied to only
criminal cases, an offer to pay for expenses occasioned by an
injury is in the nature of an offer to compromise which is
undoubtedly admissible in civil cases. The bottomline is: an
offer to pay for any expense in civil cases is inadmissible.

Case at bench:
Here, there was no denial of liability and the only question
discussed was the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted
should not be more than P8,070.12.
Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations,
we are of the opinion that the reasonable value of the repairs
performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by the
Insular Lumber Company, was something less than P8,000. We
fix the sum definitely at P7,700.
US v. Torres, 34 Phil. 994 (20aug1915) L-10566

Facts: Walker(secret service agents of the Cebu Customhouse)

testified that he had received information that on the night of
20Jan1914, Regino Torres would go to the house of the widow of
one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that evening they
stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house
stood, and a short while afterwards saw the two defendants
come out of the door of the garage on the premises; that
Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker
went in pursuit of him and on passing by Samson and Torres saw
two tins of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to halt,
and, as the latter continued to run, after he had thrown one tin
over a fence; that, after the arrest of both defendants, Walker
and Samson set out with lights to search for the tins and found
the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and the other two
tins, about a meter from the place where Samson had been
holding Torres.
That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony.
He added, however, when questioned by the defense as to
whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his
pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did say that he saw Regino Torres
throw away two tins and that he was looking for them. He was
also asked by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the
defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a compromise, to
which he replied that he had not, but that, on the contrary, it
was the defendants who made this offer.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible in
evidence.

Cases

Veradero v. Insular
(15sep1924) 21911

The rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations does not apply

where there is no denial expressed or implied of liability, and the
only questions discussed relate to the amount to be paid.

Offer of compromise in criminal cases inadmissible when

accused shows that it was made not under a consciousness of
guilt, but merely to avoid inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason; in this case, the law allowed compromise,
thus the offer to compromise is not admitted.

Note that the inadmissible offer to pay refers only to expenses

occasioned by an injury. It does not include offers to pay other
expenses. Ergo, an offer to pay for damages to property is
admissible in criminal cases.

b.

Where, however, the amount named in the offer to accept a

certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as a
fair estimate of value, it is relevant.

Lumber ,

46

Phil.

176

Evidence on an offer to compromise is admissible even in civil

cases if it is to prove amount of a liability and not the liability
itself.
Facts: El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain
repairs on the lighter Tatlo, the property of the Insular Lumber
Company. The work was performed pursuant to no express
agreement, but with the implicit understanding that the price
would be as low as, or lower than, what could be secured from
any other company.
The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill
as presented by El Varadero de Manila was grossly exorbitant
they proposed compromise. During the course of the abortive
negotiations, however, the defendant expressed a willingness to
pay the plaintiff P8,070.12. Having failed of realization, the
matter was taken to court with the result that in the CFI of
Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff, secured judgment
against the Insular Lumber Company, the defendant, in the
amount of P5,310.70. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff has appealed
to this court and here as asked us to increase the amount of the
judgment to P12,412.62.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise was admissible.
Held: The general rule is that an offer of compromise is
inadmissible.

Held: An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is

not admissible in evidence (Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 346). In a
criminal case for theft (U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this
court said that the weight both of authority and reason sustains
the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in
criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers
were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer
to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.
It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases
of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which
directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance
and private interests are concerned, no compromise whatever
may be entered into as regards the penal action, however it may
be with respect to the civil liability.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (06dec1995)
115908-09
Offer to compromise made by a person other than the accused
is inadmissible if the accused repudiated the actions of such
person by raising the trial courts admission of evidence of such
offer as an error.
Facts:

31

Complainants version: According to complainant Mia Taha,

17yrs old, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to
the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot
Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School
(PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw
that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the
kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was
nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody
suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her
by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie
down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and
through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was
her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty
with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand,
opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private
organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain
because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout
her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened
because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could
not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because
he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was
threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and
her family would be killed.
The following morning, complainant went home to her parents'
house. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident
for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around
3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant
could accompany him to solicit funds because she was a
candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she
was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want
her parents to get into trouble.
The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion,
Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a
room where they stayed for three days. During the entire
duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was
not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked.
She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious.
Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because
the latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her
to the house of his friend where she was raped by him three
times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room
and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, they left the
place because appellant came to know that complainant had
been reported and indicated as a missing person in the police
blotter. They went to see a certain Naem, an imam, from whom
appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but
only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District
Hospital at Brooke's Point where she was examined by Dr.
Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative,
walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and
nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly
developed labia majora and minora, hymenal opening
stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2
cm. length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape,
laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2 fingers
with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix
closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers
with slight resistance, presence of laceration,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2
cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an average
size penis in erection with laceration.
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was
in stellate shape and that there was a laceration, which shows

that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the

basis of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock
position, he could not say that there was force applied because
there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old
laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no
sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was
raped.
Accuseds version: They were sweethearts
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and
offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part,
her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of
them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of
appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha
subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal
Case for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office,. Helen
Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that
was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the
school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two
months later, supposedly because of what happened.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise offered by the accuseds
wife was an implied admission of guilt.
Held: The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made
by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This
inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an
offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against
the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the
matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest,
no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the
penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases
the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made
under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which
would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to
compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the
defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the
offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not
come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain
Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise
informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so
he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer
was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that
he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know,
not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid
P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's
own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the
negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's
mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said
meetings.
It has been held that where the accused was not present
at the time the offer for monetary consideration was
made, such offer of compromise would not save the day
for the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no
implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to
arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and
the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the
established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and
traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of
the relations between the parties.
People v. de Guzman, 265 SCRA 228 (02dec1996)
117217
The offer to compromise made by a person other than the
accused was admitted in evidence because the accused failed to
repudiate such acts by raising the trial courts admission of
evidence on such offer as an error.
Facts: Homeward bound from where she worked as a sales
clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray was waiting for a tricycle ride
toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When
she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the
guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some
questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The
complainant recognized the accused very well because it was
summertime and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit.

32

After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle,

followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed. While
on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a
different route. The accused would once in a while stop the
tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. When
they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an
unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push
the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00,
which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she
had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from
behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried
to shout but the accused threatened her. The accused then
dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished
house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill
her if she made noise. She fought to free herself from his hold,
but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to raise her Tshirt while holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded
her to raise her T-shirt, which she obligingly followed because of
fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted
"Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako!," but the accused covered her
mouth and again held her neck that she could hardly breathe.
He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He
unzipped her pants and pulled it down her knees. She struggled
to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused then tried to
insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she
struggled and fought back, then slapped him while covering her
vagina with her hand. When she tried to stand, he pushed her
down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her
pants and underwear. She pleaded to him to have mercy on her
and told him that she had two children. He warned her: "Huwag
kang sisigaw, papatayin kita!" The accused again tried to insert
his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing so. The
accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff.
As Gilda became too weak to struggle against the accused's
sexual advances, the accused was able to finally consummate
his dastardly desire. He then pulled out his penis and "fingered"
her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned
Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all
members of her family. He told her that she was his third victim
but the two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked
up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home,
without looking back.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband,
Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was raped by the accused.
Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed
upon not to by Gilda's mother.
Gilda Ambray was medically examined by a medico legal officer
from the NBI and found the following:
III. Conclusions:
1. The above physical injuries were noted on the body of
the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual intercourse
with man on or about the alleged date of examination.
IV. Remarks:
Laboratory Report S-92-94 shows positive result for the
presence of human spermatozoa.
"Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused,
asked the help of Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accused's
kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the accused's sake.
The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused's
parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's house. Gilda
met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she told them "that
should not be tolerated."
Accuseds defense: Alibi, tricycle broke down.
Issue: Whether or not the plea for forgiveness by the accuseds
family is equivalent to an attempt to compromise and therefore
an admission of guilt.
Held: Any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the
accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of his
parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for
forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts,
which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub
Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their
testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by
the trial court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts
of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of
the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise,"

the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an

error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon.
Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to
seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek
for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the
act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for
forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed
by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to
pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong
committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon an
offender.
People v. Yparriguirre , 268 SCRA 35 (10feb1997)
117702
Whether a complaint has been filed or not is irrelevant as to the
admissibility of an offer to compromise.
Facts: Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his
wife; that on or about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the
spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge
for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the
other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work
and found the two children asleep. He approached Rosita and
gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her
skin disease. Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and
stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of the
children. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15)
tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all the
tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down.
Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the
spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her
down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He
ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Then he
removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face,
breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita
cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After
satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in
the stomach. She lost consciousness.
Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued
serving the Yparraguirres for one month before leaving them to
return to her mother's house. Her mother found Rosita in a
state of shock. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer
by her mother for examination. The Health officer found that:
Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration
found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic]
psychiatrist.
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined
at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and
treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and
revealed that she was raped by appellant.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise by the
appellants wife was admissible in evidence (and should be
considered as admission of guilt).
Held: Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother,
Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to
dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused,
Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by
appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the
compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident
was already known to appellant's wife.
Mary Ann herself
testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the
day when Mary Ann first offered the money. An offer to
compromise does not require that a criminal complaint
be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence
against the offeror. What is required is that after
committing the crime, the accused or his representative
makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.

33

NB: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses

(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
People v. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (14mar1914) L-8931
Facts: The appellant in this case was convicted in the court
below of the theft of the caraballa and her calf, and sentenced
to imprisonment.
Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in
giving probative value in accepting proof as to certain
extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made by the
accused, including an offer to compromise the case by the
payment of a sum of money.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of compromise can be construed
as admission or confession of guilt.
Held: The weight of authority and reason sustains the rule
which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal
cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason
which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to
compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.
The record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements
were made in the course of offers to compromise and that they
were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these
offers to compromise were made in the hope that it accepted he
would escape prosecution.
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused, but we are opinion that in imposing the penalty the
trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance the manifest lack of "instruction and education" of
the offender.
Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as
evidence against the accused, but if made merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness
of guilt, it is not evidence. (US vs. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C. C., 317.)
In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had
sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix is inadmissible, if
such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt.
(Wilson vs. State, 73 Ala., 527.)
On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a
married woman, evidence is admissible on behalf of the
prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to
the father of the prosecutrix to ascertain if the case could be
compromised. (Barr vs. People, 113 Ill., 471.)
In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that
defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it could be settled, in
reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would
be prosecuted for damages, and a solicitation to settle. (Frain
vs. State, 40 Ga., 530.)
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that
defendant paid a sum of money in settlement of a civil action
brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen.
(State vs. Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.)

3.

Res Inter Alios Acta

a.

Rule 130, 28

Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a

party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
(25a)
The general rule is extra-judicial acts of a person other than a
party are inadmissible against such party. However, the rules
also provide for exceptions:

An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused,

without threat or promise, and the reply thereto, are admissible
in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State vs. Bruce, 33 La.
Ann., 186.)

.1
.2
.3

Partners admissions;

An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the

prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an admission of guilt,
or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject
of the burglary and larceny charged in the indictment. (State vs.
Rodriguez, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)

.4

Co-conspirators statements;
Admission by privies.

.5

agents admissions;
admissions by a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party;

Is personal knowledge required for these exceptions to apply?

b.

Cases

People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992)

Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the
basis of an extra-judicial confession of another admitting his
participation in the offense.

34

Held: This is not a co-conspirators statement because there

was no evidence of conspiracy independent of the extra-judicial
confession. Furthermore, the confession was executed long after
the supposed conspiracy had ended.
Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and
pointed to his co-accused, the testimony would have been
admissible. In this case, what was presented was a merely his
affidavit.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
Absent independent evidence of conspiracy, extra-judicial
confession of the accused is not admissible against others.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster,
57 years old, whose body was found strangled in her bathroom
inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd., Ignacio St., Pasay City,
in the early morning of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in
"shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, &
some personal garments, handbags & papers were scattered on
the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in
one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's
house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for investigation in
connection with the case, but was later released that same day
for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was
apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a
bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In
explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of
jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery
of Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the
police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966. In this
statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio
Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok," Jesus Medalla, Mario
Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one "Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the
Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed
an extrajudicial confession on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to
before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966.
In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation
in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso"
Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the
declarant went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, & identified them.
Based on this, they were charged for Robbery with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented
nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the
actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in
the decision under review was based principally and mainly on
the EJ confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime
were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement."
The only
evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and
Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the
Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of
compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel when he was investigated by the police.
The lower
court nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of
Cudillan (now deceased) against appellants; in concluding from
the alleged "silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by
Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an
admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and
Medalla are hereby ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of
which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio
Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as
evidence and are not competent proof against appellants
Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,"
there being no
independent evidence of conspiracy.
As a general rule, the
extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately
made, is not admissible and does not have probative value
against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as
the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in

the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such

exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants
to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or
failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio
Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando
Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal
cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken
as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an
incriminating question. It has also been held that while an
accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as
evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his
silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against
him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996)
Extra-judicial confession of accused can not be used to implicate
co-accused unless repeated in open court.
FACTS: At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito Gambalan, Jr.
attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen
and was surprised to find heavily armed men declaring a holdup and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her
husband dead while a man took her husband's gun and left
hurriedly.
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside
their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. George
Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the
incident to the police. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters
from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. He
was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police
station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that
appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of
the crime and that they may be found in their residence.
However, the police failed to find them there since appellants
fled immediately after the shooting incident. Appellants were
later on apprehended on different occasions.
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense.
Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, he left Paatan,
Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan,
Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the
wife of his deceased brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and
Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4.
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he
was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him that he
was going to Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest
palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also
asked his permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was
going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986,
several policemen came over to his house, looking for his two
(2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even
accompanied them to Tunggol where they arrested his son
Valeriano.
T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga,
testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd
Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan
City. Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty
on July 4, 1986.
On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset,
rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them
accordingly.
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal
wherein they manifested that they were appealing the decision
to the CA which forwarded it to the SC in view of the penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting
accused Sabas and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged,
despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the
perpetrators of the crime?
HELD: Acquitted Sabas. TC reversed.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify
the assailants of her husband. The identity of the Raquels as

35

the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of

accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of
the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail
before he could testify in court and he has been at large since
then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused
implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the
latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the
accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his coaccused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary
that the same are hearsay as against said accused.
A
distinction should be made between extrajudicial & judicial
confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the
opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter
his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and
rebuttal.

.4

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and
is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule
is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence
against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would
not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that
a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.

Facts: After a partner died, the remaining partner sought to

recover his share in the partnership.

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential

exceptions, those exceptions do not however apply to the
present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado
Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to
the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato
that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic
of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente,
was negated by Dr. Anulao.
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as
prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was
unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S.
Pangato.
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial
investigation w/o the assistance of counsel are inadmissible &
cant be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the
right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with
the assistance of counsel.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty of guilt. Without the positive identification of
appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights to them. It would not even have been necessary to
stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be
resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the
instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor
were the standards therefor fulfilled.
c.

Exceptions

Note that all the exceptions to res inter alios acta require that
the relationship be proven by evidence independent of the act
or declaration sought to be admitted.
1)

Partners/Agents admissions
a)

Rule 130, 29

Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act

or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within
the scope of his authority and during the existence of
the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence
against such party after the partnership or agency is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint
owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party. (26a)
Requisites for admission by co-partner or agent
.1
.2
.3

act or declaration of a partner, agent, or person jointly

interested with the party
within the scope of authority
made during the existence of the partnership, agency or
joint interest

the partnership, agency, or joint interest is shown by

evidence other than such act or declaration

b)

Cases

Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil 194 (1909)

Discharge of a debt given by a managing partner, 2 years after
the partnership had been dissolved does not qualify as a
partners admission and can not prejudice or bind the other
partners.
Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, 46 Phil 193 (1924)

Held: The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence

of his co-partner, are not competent to prove the existence of a
partnership, between them as against such other partner. The
existence of a partnership cannot be established by general
reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival , 588 F.2d 626
(8th Cir. 198)
The jurisdiction in which this case is decided has a law which
explicitly declared that an act of a party or his agent is not
hearsay; agent need not have personal knowledge of his
statement as long as it is within the scope of his authority, may
be used against him and his principal
2)

Co-conspirators statements
a)

Rule 130, 30

Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or

declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act of declaration. (27)
Requisites for co-conspirators statements
.1
.2
.3
.4

act or declaration of a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy
made during its existence
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of
declaration.

b)

Cases

People v. Cabrera , 57 SCRA 715 (28june1974) L37398

Facts: Accused was convicted based on the extra-judicial
confession of his co-accused.
Held: The statement was made after, not during, the conspiracy,
hence it was inadmissible.
Facts: At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Sgt.
Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan, while on a patrol duty received
an instruction to proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who was
found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds.
This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de
la Cruz. In the ante-mortem statement the deceased named
defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep but
did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and
took his money and jeep.
The next morning (01/18), defendant Cabrera was arrested by
the police. Two days later, she executed an extra-judicial
confession. In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to
appellant Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She
merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the
robbery and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant
and his two unidentified companions.
Lt. Palomares of the Valenzuela PD who took the extra-judicial
confession of defendant Cabrera testified to identify and to read
the contents of the said extra-judicial confession over the
continuing objection of appellant's counsel. Appellant reiterated

36

his objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being

offered in evidence.
The only evidence that would support the judgment of
conviction of appellant Villanueva was the extra-judicial
confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read
into the record over the continuing objection of appellant's
counsel. Appellant reiterated his objection when the said extrajudicial confession was being offered in evidence.

conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior

evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the
confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked
that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not
reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court
has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.
People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127 (1968)

Counsel for the People, joining appellant's counsel, ask for the
reversal of appellant's conviction and his acquittal.
Issue: Whether or not the admission by the co-conspirator was
admissible in evidence.
Held: Said admission is inadmissible against appellant who
made timely objection thereto. (Said statement could be used
against Cabrera if there is corpus delicti. There is no question
that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during
the investigation conducted by the Valenzuela police on January
20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question.
For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not
made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy
between her and appellant, but after said supposed
conspiracy had already ceased and when she was
already in the hands of the authorities.
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (28nov1955) L-9181
Confession regarding conspiracy may be used against confessor
(multiple admissibility); confession regarding conspiracy should
be conditionally admitted until conspiracy is proved; statements
must be made during the conpiracy and in furtherance of its
object to be admissible.
Facts: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of
Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso
Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were
charged with having conspired together in the murder of one
Jose Ramos. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955,
while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty.
Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in
connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession
(allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the
witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore
incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The
Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to,
but on an altogether different ground : that the prosecution
could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of
defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove
conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy
by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
The prosecution then moved in writing for reconsideration of the
order of exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore,
this petition for certiorari.
Issues: Whether or not the admission of a co-conspirator is
admissible against his co-conspirator.
Whether or not the
admission should be completely excluded.
Held: Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even
if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his coaccused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being
established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji
was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the
declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as
such.
Sec. 30 of Rule 130 refers to statements made by one
conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its
object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after
the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred
confessions was not made on the basis of the objection
interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether
different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio.
Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as
evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the
ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court,
instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to
the confessions that it could not be admitted to prove

Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than

the confession; reiterated in furtherance.
Facts: Alvarez was charged with the murder of Hector
Crisostomo. During the investigation he made a tape-recorded
statement
admitting
his
participation
in
the
crime.
Subsequently, he made a handwritten statement also admitting
his participation but implicated Chaw Yaw Shun as the one who
ordered him to kill Crisostomo. Shun surrendered after which he
was investigated. Believing that Shun was not telling the truth,
because he would not admit participation in the crime, the
investigator destroyed the statement. In view of such denial,
Shun was investigated again and made a written confession that
he ordered the killing of Crisostomo. While Shun was detained,
he gave a statement that the written confession was obtained
thru force, threat and intimidation.
The TC, finding conspiracy, convicted Alvarez and Shun for
murder.
Issue: WON the statements made by Alvarez and Shun are
admissible to establish conspiracy?
Held: The SC held that the confession made by Shun is
inadmissible as evidence because it was induced, extorted by
means of torture, abuse or by personal violence.
Moreover, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence
other than the confession. The admissibility of a confession by
one accused against the other must relate to statements made
by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprise. In this case, the conflicting confession of Alvarez are
not binding on Shun for being hearsay, aside from having been
repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial.
There is,
therefore no locking confession so to say, for there being no
independent evidence establishing an overt act of Shun
connected to the crime.
People v. Serrano , 105 Phil. 531 (27apr1959) L7973
Requirement that conspiracy must be shown 1st other than
confession applies only to extra-judicial confessions not to
testimony in open court.
Facts: In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and
9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Piping Serrano, Domingo
Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes
then gathered at the sala of the house of the first, that Pablo
Navarro had been including and prompting people to call on
Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu
massacre, and for that reason he manifested to them his desire
and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed
them to wait for Navarro in the town of Bacolor, lure him to go
with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. They tried to
execute the plan for three days but failed. Finally, on the forth
day they succeeded in executing the said plan when Navarro,
together with Manguera, agreed to join them in a drinking
session. Navarro and Manguera were killed that same day.
Appellants defense: Alibi & under fear of greater evil. Cadiang
at the farm working with palay; Cenzon at the market, hauled
lumber, gas up; Yumul worked as laborer removing railroad
tracks.
The defendants were found guilty based on a testimony made
by Anastacio Reyes.
The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony
of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his coconspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other
than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed
and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a
privy to the conspiracy.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of Reyes can be used
against the appellants.

37

Held: The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at
the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of
accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave
suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and
should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined,
it is nevertheless admissible and competent.
The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of
sufficient number of votes to impose the death penalty, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate
costs against the appellants.

appeal to the SC on November 20, 1914. On December 3, 1914,

the contract of sale was acknowledged before a notary public.
And on April 12, 1915, an execution was issued upon the
judgment in the collection case and the property in question was
levied upon as property of Llenos. Despite Alpuertos objection
on the ground that he owned the property, the sheriff proceeded
with the public sale and the property was sold to Pastor.
Issue: Who is entitled to the property in question? Was the sale
from Llenos to Alpuerto fraudulent?
Held: Article 1297 of the Civil Code says that a transfer of
property made by one against whom a condemnatory judgment
has been pronounced is to be presumed fraudulent.
The
cardinal question in the case therefore is: Was the transfer in
question made after a judgment had been entered against
Llenos? This in turn depends upon whether the contract of sale
shall be considered effective as from the date upon which it
purports to have been executed (July 3, 1912) or from the date
when it was acknowledged before a notary public (December 3,
1914), for in the interval between these two dates final
judgment had been rendered against Llenos both in the CFI and
in the SC.
According to Article 1225 of the Civil Code, a private document
legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who signed it
and their privies (causahabientes), the same force as a public
instrument.
The expression legally recognized means recognized or
acknowledged by the person or persons executing the
document.

3)

Admission by Privies
a)

Rule 130, 31

Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives

title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation
to the property, is evidence against the former. (211)
Requisites for admission by privies
.1
.2
.3
.4

a party derives title to property from another

act, declaration, or omission of the transferor
made while holding the title
in relation to the property

Tequillo: Does this not violate the Property Registration Decree,

that says 3rd parties are not bound unless the encumbrance is
registered?

b)

Cases

Alpuerto v. Pastor, 38 Phil. 785 (1918)

Privies denotes any act whereby the successor is substituted
in the place of the predecessor in interest; purchaser at
execution sale is a privy of the execution debtor; 3 rd parties
are persons who have not intervened in the execution of the
instrument either as principals or witnesses.
Facts: The three parcels of land involved in this case formerly
belonged to Juan Llenos. Plaintiff Eladio Alpuerto petitioned the
lower court to make a declaration against the defendant Jose
Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner of the
said lands by virtue of a contract of sale with right of repurchase
executed by Llenosin his (plaintiffs) favor. Defendant Pastor
alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought
because the transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have
acquired title was simulated and fictitious and that the supposed
conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the
defendant as creditor of Llenos.
It appears that at the time of the supposed sale to Alpuerto,
there had been pending for nearly two years in the CFI an action
for collection of a considerable sum of money, in which pastor
was plaintiff and Llenos was defendant. On July 3, 1912, the
contract of sale with right of repurchase was executed (not
notarized) by the parties, Llenos and Alpuerto. This document
was signed by the contracting parties and was altered by two
subscribing witnesses. On January 27, 1913, or about six months
after the sale took place, judgment in the collection case was
rendered in favor of Pastor. This judgment was affirmed upon

Concerning the meaning of the expression privies, Manresa

has this to say:
The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only
by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also
that of succession by singular title, derived from acts
intervivos and for special purposes; hence, an assignee
of a credit, and one subrogated to it, et., will be privies;
in short, he, who, by succession is placed in the
position of one of those who contracted the juridical
relation and executed the private document and
appears to be substituting him in his personal rights
and obligations, is a privy.
Thus, Pastor, the purchaser at public sale must be considered a
privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor and is
bound by the instrument which conveyed the property to
Alpuerto- and this from the date of the execution of that
instrument as a private document.
Nevertheless, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos
to Alpuerto was one in fraud of creditors; the deed of sale with
right of repurchase must therefore be annulled and the property
delivered to defendant.
Judgment reversed.
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905)
Admission must be made while one holds title.
Facts: The City of Manila wanted to recover two lots in Calle
Clavel and Barcelona. The witnesses gave different answers as
to whether or not the lots were owned by the City. It appears
that what actually happened was that Lorenzo del Rosario
acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and later on sold it to
Jacinto del Rosario. The City of Manila wanted to make use of
two documents made by Lorenzo, one of which contained an
offer to buy the land from the City of Manila (Lorenzo mistakenly
thought that the City owned the land) and the other was a letter
to the Municipal Board of Manila (the President of the Board
advised Lorenzo to write this to avoid litigation with the City).
Issue: May these two letters be used in evidence against Jacinto
del Rosario (the present owner)?
Held: No. Lorenzo signed the first document before he acquired
the land from Cipriano Roco and the second one was signed by
him after he had transferred the land to Jacinto del Rosario. This
being the case, the statements contained in the documents are
not binding on Jacinto as they were made when Lorenzo no
longer had title to the lands.
4.

Admissions by silence

38

a.

Rule 130 32

Sec. 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration

made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when
the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and
possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence
against him. (23a)
Requisites for admission by silence
.1

The act or declaration is made in the presence and within

the hearing or observation of a party

.2

The party does or says nothing

.3

The act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment

if not true

.4

Such action or comment is proper and possible on the part

of the party.
b.

Cases

People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978)

Failure by a supposed rape victim to rebut sweetheart defense
based on testimonial evidence may be taken against her.
Requirements for admission by silence: 1) heard and
understood, 2) at liberty to deny, 3) affects his rights, 4) within
his knowledge, and 5) material to the issue.
Facts: This case involves a review of the CAs conviction of the
accused for rape and its imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The accused Bienvenido Paragsa was charged and
convicted for allegedly raping complainant Mirasol Magallanes,
who is 12 yrs. old. Mirasol alleges that while she was alone in
her hosue, Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered and
managed to rape her. On the other hand, Paragsa admits
having sexual intercourse with her but denies that he used force
and intimidation against her.
He claims that they were
sweethearts, that Mirasol invited him to her house that day and
that it was already their 3rd intercourse. This was corroborated
by 2 other witnesses, Batosbatosan and Ducay.
Issue: WON Paragsa should be convicted for rape?
Held: No, he should be acquitted. The prosecutions evidence is
weak and unsatisfactory to satisfy a conviction.
1.

2.

3.

Force and intimidation was not proven. Mirasol did not

make any outcry or resist the accused.
She did not
immediately tell her aunt, who happened to have passed by
at the time of the alleged incident, what had happened nor
did she tell her parents about it.
Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the
accused which was corroborated by 2 other witnesses to
the effect that she and the accused were sweethearts. The
rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied
admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his
presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the
silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is
said, it must appear:
o

that he heard and understood the statement

that he was at liberty to interpose a denial

that the statement was in respect to some matter

affecting his rights or in which he was then interested
and calling, naturally, for an answer

that the facts were within his knowledge

that the fact admitted or inference to be drawn from his

silence would be material to the issue.

These requisites are all present in this case. Hence, the

silence of Mirasol on the facts alleged by the accused and
his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of
the truth of such assertion.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)

Silence of accused in custody during investigation can not be

used as evidence against him.
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster,
57 years old, whose body was found strangled in her bathroom
inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd., Ignacio St., Pasay City,
in the early morning of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in
"shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, &
some personal garments, handbags & papers were scattered on
the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in
one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's
house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for investigation in
connection with the case, but was later released that same day
for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was
apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a
bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In
explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of
jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery
of Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the
police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966. In this
statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio
Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok," Jesus Medalla, Mario
Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one "Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the
Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed
an extrajudicial confession on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to
before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966.
In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation
in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso"
Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the
declarant went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, & identified them.
Based on this, they were charged for Robbery with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented
nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the
actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in
the decision under review was based principally and mainly on
the EJ confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime
were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement."
The only
evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and
Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the
Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of
compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel when he was investigated by the police.
The lower
court nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of
Cudillan (now deceased) against appellants; in concluding from
the alleged "silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by
Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an
admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and
Medalla are hereby ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of
which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio
Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as
evidence and are not competent proof against appellants
Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet," there being no
independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule,
the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have
probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.
While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and
circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within
the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore,
linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit
admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime
made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal
confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal
cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken
as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an
incriminating question. It has also been held that while an
accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken

39

as evidence against him as he has a right to remain

silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as
evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence
would be illusory.
Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 853 (1965)
Court may not comment on accuseds failure to testify regarding
facts within his knowledge.
Facts: Griffin was convicted of murder in the first degree. He
did not testify at the trial on the issue of his guilt but he testified
at the separate trial (California penal laws provide separate
trials if the case has two issues) on the issue of penalty.
Pursuant to the California Constitution (Art. I, sec 13 of the
California Constitution provides in part: in any criminal case,
whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or
deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against
him may be commented upon by the court and counsel, and
may be considered by the court or jury.), the trial court
instructed the jury on the issue of his guilt and reminded its
members that Griffin had a constitutional right not to testify. It
declared that the failure of the defendant to deny or explain the
evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a
presumption of guilt nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt. It
commented further:
As to evidence or facts against him which defendant
can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because
of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or
explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure
into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of
such evidence and as indicating that among the
inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom
those unfavorable to the defendant are the more
probable.

offense necessarily included therein, may be given in

evidence against him. (29a)
This rule is applicable only in criminal cases.
A confession need not be in writing in order to be admissible in
evidence.
If it is in writing, it is NOT required to be under oath.
Escolin: However, if it is not in writing, the prosecution may find
difficulty in proving it.
2.

Art. III, 12 and 17, 1987 Constitution

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for

the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
inadmissible in evidence against him.

in
be

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a

witness against himself.

The prosecutor had this to say:

The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had
this beat up appearance at the time he left the
apartment and went down the alley with herWhat
kind of man is that would want to have sex with a
woman that beat up at the time he leftHe would
know how she got down the alley. He would know how
the blood got on the bottom of the stepsHe would
know whether he beat her or mistreated herHe would
know whether he walked away from that place cool as
a cucumberbecause he was conscious of his won
guiltThese things he has not seen fit to take the
stand and deny or explain. And in the whole world, if
anybody would know, this defendant would know. Essie
Mae is dead, she cant tell you her side of the story. The
defendant wont. (underscoring supplied)
Griffin was sentenced to death. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether comment on the failure to testify violated the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution.
Held: The Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the
federal government and its bearing on states by provision of the
Fourteenth amendment, forbids either comment by the
prosecution of the accuseds silence or instructions by the court
that such silence is evidence of guilt. The principle behind the
rule that a defendant may be a competent witness, but that his
failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption
against him, was designed to bar the prosecutors counsel from
commenting on the defendants refusal to testify. Thus, the
state constitutional provision allowing comment by the court or
counsel directly contravenes the Constitution. The decision of
the lower court was reversed.

M. Confessions
1.

Rule 130, 33

Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused

acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any

3.

Rule 115 (e)

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at trial. xxx

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a
witness against himself.
4.

Cases

People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252 (1987)

A confession, to be admissible, must have been executed in the
presence of counsel. Waiver of right to counsel must be with the
assistance of counsel.
People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994)
Where the confession was made even before the accused was
under custodial investigation, it is admissible even if he was not
assisted by counsel. Custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. Only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is
taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the accused is said to be under custodial
investigation.
People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 (1976)
Where the extra-judicial confessions of the accused are
consistent in many material details and manifest amazing
consistency and accuracy in the narration of events and of facts
which could not have been known to the police investigators if
the same were not voluntarily given by the accused, such
statements are admissible against the accused on the doctrine
of interlocking confessions.
de Leon: The value of the doctrine of interlocking confessions is
when a confession is inadmissible against one accused (e.g.
obtained without counsel), but it is nevertheless admissible
against the other co-accused. The confession of one may be
used against another to produce evidence of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)

40

FACTS: On 23 October 1987, midnight, MJ Furnitures located

along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which also served
as the dwelling of the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay was robbed.
The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the
window grills they detached on the second floor where the
bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers placed
the 2 maids into the bathroom while Mary was caught, tied and
gagged in the bedroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other
furniture store along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz.
The bedroom was ransacked and they took some P35,000 in
cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of
the housemaids herded into the bathroom, heard Manuel
agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor.
After noticing that the two (2) men guarding them had already
left, the helpers dashed out of the bathroom and proceeded to
the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2)
maids untied her hands and took out the towel from her mouth.
They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel
sprawled on the floor among the pieces of furniture which were
in disarray. He succumbed to 13 stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture
worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the WPD that just
before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend Linda
Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures,
he saw his co-workers Compil, Mabini and Jacale go to the back
of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information of
Bartolome to the police.
On 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay,
brother of the deceased, where able to arrest Compil in Tayabas,
Quezon. Upon being arrested, Compil readily admitted his guilt
and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist
from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister.
Compil was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he
was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was
again questioned.
He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987
he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He said he was
only a lookout for which he received P1,000 He did not go inside
the furniture shop since he would be recognized. Compil said
that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated
that after the robbery, they all met in Bangkal, Makati, in the
house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio
Pakit, where they shared the loot and drank beer until 4:30 a.m.
They all left for Quezon and agreed that from there they would
all go home to their respective provinces.
From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with
accused Compil proceeded to the house of Pablo Pakit who
confirmed this narration of Compil.
On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, Compil after
conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz executed a sworn
statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his
participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6)
other perpetrators of the crime as Jacale, Mabini, Alvos, Pakit, a
certain "Erning" and one "Lando," and asserted that he was
merely forced to join the group by Jacale and Mabini who were
the masterminds.
Meanwhile WPD agents failed to apprehend the cohorts of
Compil.
On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide
was filed against Marlo Compil. Assisted by a counsel de oficio
he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the
prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de
parte instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
On 2 June 1988 the RTC of Mla. denied the demurrer and found
the accused guilty of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused Compils confessions were
admissible in evidence?
HELD: THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION IS INADMISSIBLE.
Citing Gamboa v. Cruz, the SC held that "[t]he right to counsel
attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the

investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information

and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the
offense."
The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or
by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Here, Compil was immediately subjected to an interrogation
upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon.
He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was
further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the
arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all
three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime
and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he
was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO
lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the
investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from Compil. The operative act, it has been stressed,
is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry
out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of
his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Although
the
extrajudicial
confession
is
inadmissible,
nevertheless, the accused had been found by the SC to be guilty
of the crime. The guilt of the accused may be established
through circumstantial evidence.
The circumstances as
gleaned from the factual findings of the trial court in case at bar
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of
the crime. Hence even disregarding Compils oral and written
confessions, as we do, still the prosecution was able to show
that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with homicide.
Although, the arrest, search and seizure were made without the
benefit of a warrant, Compil is now estopped from questioning
this defect after failing to move for the quashing of the
information before the trial court.
Thus any irregularity
attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of
"not guilty" and by participating in the trial. Compils argument
the TC should have convicted the arresting police officers of
arbitrary detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained
persons, is misplaced, since, the law enforcers who arrested him
are not being charged and prosecuted in the case at bench.
Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of Compil that
granting that he had participated in the commission of the
crime, he should be considered only as an accomplice.
Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by reason of his
failure to adduce evidence in his behalf, the SC had considered
only the evidence of the prosecution which shows that the
perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. Direct proof is not
essential to prove conspiracy which may be inferred from the
acts of the accused during and after the commission of the
crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest. Thus, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to prove conspiracy. And where conspiracy exists, the
act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the same
degree of liability as the others.
People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182
(1996)
FACTS: The eleven (11) accused, namely, Wong Chuen Ming
and Au Wing Cheung (British nationals), Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok
Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong
Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun (all
Malaysian nationals) arrived in Manila from Hong Kong on board
a PAL flight. All accused arrived in Manila as a tour group
arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Wing Cheung,
an employee of Select Tours acted as their tour guide.
After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration
officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim
area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They
placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane

41

5 which at the time was manned by customs examiner Danilo

Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed to Gomez the tour group's
passenger's manifest, their baggage declarations and their
passports.
Upon inspection, Gomez allowed two of the group to pass but
after finding a number of Alpen Cereal boxes in each of the
baggages of the accused, he became suspicious and opened
one of them with a cutter. It was found to contain a white
crystalline substance which was later found to be shabu.
The tour group was ordered to proceed to the district collector's
office. Inside the collector's office, Gomez continued to examine
the baggages of the other members of the tour group. He
allegedly found a total of thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals
containing white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered
from the baggages of the eleven (11) accused. As Gomez pulled
out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said
boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them
over to Bonifacio.
Upon receipt of these bundled boxes,
Bonifacio called out the names of accused as listed in the
passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking
tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their
respective baggages. Also present at this time were Capt.
Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of Customs
and several news reporters. A few minutes later, District
Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and
then NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison.
Capt. Francisco
testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were
recovered, he conducted a field test on a sample of the white
crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was
indeed "shabu." Capt. Francisco immediately informed the
eleven (11) accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all
accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed
inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame.
At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures
on the boxes and after having identified them, they were again
made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. The
examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame,
confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered from
accused was "shabu." The total weight of "shabu" recovered
was placed at 34.45 kilograms.
For their part, the. defense interposed by all accused was
basically anchored on the testimony of their co-accused Lim
Chan Fatt, a technician and self-confessed "call boy", who
admitted being responsible for bringing the boxes of Alpen
Cereals into the country although he denied any knowledge that
they contained "shabu." Lim Chan Fatt testified that except for
Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, all other accused were
unknown or complete strangers to him until their trip to the
Philippines on 7 September 1991. With respect to Chin Kong
Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, Lim Chan Fatt allegedly met them at his
boarding house in Hongkong where the two (2) temporarily lived
a few days before said trip. According to Lim Chan Fatt, prior to
their departure date, a certain Ah Hong, a co-boarder and a
Hongkong businessman, approached him and asked him if he
could kindly bring with him boxes of cereals to the Philippines.
Ah Hong promised Lim Chan Fatt that a certain Ah Sing will get
these boxes from him at the Philippine airport and for this
trouble, Ah Sing will see to it that Lim Chan Fatt will have a good
time in the Philippines. Ah Hong allegedly even opened one (1)
box to show that it really contained cereals. Lim Chan Fatt
acceded to Ah Hong's request as he allegedly found nothing
wrong with it. Consequently, Ah Hong delivered to Lim Chan Fatt
thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals. Since his baggage could not
accommodate all thirty (30) boxes, Lim Chan Fatt requested
Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun to accommodate some of the
boxes in their baggages. Lim Chan Fatt claimed that he
entrusted five (5) boxes to Chin Kong Song and another five (5)
to Lim Nyuk Sun. He allegedly placed four (4) boxes inside a
hand carried plastic bag while the rest were put inside his
baggage. On the basis of this testimony, the defense
endeavored to show that only Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kong Song
and Lim Nyuk Sun were responsible for bringing boxes of Alpen
Cereals into the country and even then they cannot be held
liable for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, as they allegedly had no knowledge that these boxes
contained "shabu.
Accused Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun' and accusedappellants Au Wing Cheung and Wong Chuen Ming. Accusedappellants denied that boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered
from their baggages. They claimed that they affixed their
signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened by

police authorities who were present during the examination

inside the collector's office. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung
maintained that he was a bona fide employee of Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. and that he had no prior knowledge that
the tour group he was supposed to accompany to the Philippines
brought boxes containing "shabu."
For his part, accusedappellant Wong Chuen Ming tried to dissociate himself from the
other accused by testifying that he was not a part of their group.
He claimed that he was originally booked with another travel
agency, Wing Ann Travel Co., for a five-day Cebu tour. This Cebu
tour was allegedly cancelled due to insufficient number of
clients and accused-appellant was subsequently transferred to
and accommodated by Select Tours. The other accused who did
not take the witness stand opted to adopt as their own all
testimonial and documentary evidence presented in court for
the defense.
On 29 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting all the accused.
Only accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung
filed their joint appeal brief.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Accuseds contention that they were deprived of their
right to counsel and due process when their previous counsels
also represented the other accused despite "conflicting
interests" was not accepted by the SC having found that said
counsels tried to present all the defenses available to each of
the accused and that they did not, in any way, put in jeopardy
accused-appellants' constitutional right to counsel. It does not
appear from the records that the effectiveness of accusedappellants' previous counsels was diminished by the fact that
they also jointly represented the other accused.
The SC held that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well
as on the plastic bags containing "shabu," are inadmissible in
evidence. Accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e.
that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any
statement they might make could be used against them, when
they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen
Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic
bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame.
By affixing their signatures, accused in effect made a
tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession
of "shabu" is punished by law.
These signatures of
accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights
(Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung
from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is
inadmissible against them.
The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude
application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional
guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend
to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Among the prosecution witnesses, only Gomez testified that all
the seized baggages, including those owned by Chuen Ming and
Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of "shabu." His
testimony was given credence by the TC since he was presumed
to have performed his duties in a regular manner. However,
Gomez' testimony inculpating accused-appellants was not
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. Customs collector
Bonifacio cannot recall if each and everyone of accused were
found in possession of any box or boxes of Alpen Cereals and
the testimony of NARCOM officer Capt. Francisco casts doubt on
the claim of Gomez that he recovered boxes of "shabu" from the
baggages of accused-appellants. While Capt. Francisco was
categorical in stating that boxes of "shabu" were recovered from
the baggages belonging to the other nine (9) accused
Malaysians, he admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez
actually recovered boxes of "shabu" from accused-appellants'
baggages. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties accorded to Gomez cannot, by
itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accusedappellants to be presumed innocent especially in the light
of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution witnesses.
There are other circumstances that militate against the
conviction of accused-appellants. First, accused-appellants are
British (Hongkong) nationals while all the other accused are
Malaysians. It is difficult to imagine how accused-appellants
could have conspired with the other accused, who are total
strangers, when they do not even speak the same language.

42

Second, overwhelming evidence consisting of testimonies of

accused-appellant An Wing Cheung's superiors was presented to
show that he was a bonafide employee of Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. Third, evidence showed that accusedappellant Ming was not originally part of the tour group arranged
by Select Tours but he was only accommodated by the latter at
the last minute when his package tour to Cebu was cancelled by
Wing Ann Travel Co. Finally, as testified to by Capt. Francisco,
both accused-appellants adamantly refused to sign on the
transparent plastic bags containing shabu." The SC, thus, held
that
accused-appellants'
participation
in
the
illegal
transportation of "shabu" into the country has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, Spinster,
57 years old, whose body was found strangled in her bathroom
inside her house at the Maravilla cmpd., Ignacio St., Pasay City,
in the early morning of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in
"shambles," and the drawers & several cabinets were open, &
some personal garments, handbags & papers were scattered on
the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in
one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's
house, was taken to the Pasay City police HQ for investigation in
connection with the case, but was later released that same day
for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was
apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a
bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In
explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of
jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery
of Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the
police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966. In this
statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio
Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok," Jesus Medalla, Mario
Cudillan, one "Danny" Fernandez, and one "Rammy."
When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the
Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed
an extrajudicial confession on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to
before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966.
In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation
in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso"
Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the
declarant went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, & identified them.
Based on this, they were charged for Robbery with Homicide.
They entered a plea of not guilty and the prosecution presented
nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the
actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in
the decision under review was based principally and mainly on
the EJ confessions of Cudillan. Thus, the details of the crime
were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement."
The only
evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and
Hernando Carillo.
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the
Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of
compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel when he was investigated by the police.
The lower
court nevertheless convicted them. Thus, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in utilizing the EJ of
Cudillan (now deceased) against appellants; in concluding from
the alleged "silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by
Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an
admission of guilt?
HELD: Judgment appealed reversed, and Alegre, Comayas and
Medalla are hereby ACQUITTED.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan on the basis of
which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio
Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as
evidence and are not competent proof against appellants
Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,"
there being no
independent evidence of conspiracy.
As a general rule, the
extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately
made, is not admissible and does not have probative value
against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as
the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized

exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in

the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants
to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or
failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio
Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando
Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal
cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken
as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an
incriminating question. It has also been held that while an
accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as
evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his
silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against
him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
People v. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)
FACTS: Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po
Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation on
July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married. Hardly a
day had passed when Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and
strangled to death in their hotel room.
On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was
touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun
was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a headache
and was not feeling well enough to do the sights.
For the slaying, Yip Wai Ming was charged for murder. He was
later on convicted by the RTC of Manila.
There was no
eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence
about the killing is circumstantial.
Evidence presented by the prosecution alleged that on the day
of the murder, Cariza Destresa, the occupant of room 211, the
room adjacent to room 210 of the couple heard a loud argument
inside the couples room and a struggle where there was
supposedly a faint cry and a loud thud (like someone banging on
the floor). The front desk clerk also testified that Yip Wai Ming,
at about 10 a.m., came down later to meet with Gwen de los
Santos who was to accompany them to a tour around Manila.
Ming left his fiance Lam in their room and gave specific
instructions that she shouldnt be disturbed. He was perspiring
and kind of in a hurry. During the whole morning of July 11,
1993, after appellant left the hotel until his return at 11 o'clock
in the evening, he did not call his fiancee Lam Po Chun to verify
her physical condition. When Ming arrived at 11 p.m. on that
day, he asked the receptionist for the key of his room. Then
together with Fortunato Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to Room
210. When the lock was opened and the door was pushed, Lam
Po Chun was found dead lying face down on the bed covered
with a blanket. Appellant removed the blanket and pretended to
exclaim 'My God, she is dead' but did not even embrace his
fiancee. Instead, Ming asked the room boy to go down the hotel
to inform the front desk, the security guard and other hotel
employees to call the police.
When the police arrived, they
conducted an examination of the condition of the doors and
windows of the room as well as the body of the victim and the
other surroundings. They found no signs of forcible entry and
they observed that no one can enter from the outside except the
one who has the key. The police also saw the victim wrapped in
a colored blanket lying face down. When they removed the
blanket and tried to change the position of her body, the latter
was already in state of rigor mortis, which indicates that the
victim has been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12) hours. The
police calculated that Lam Po Chun must have died between 9
to 10 in the morning of July 11, 1993 (pp. 2-29), tsn, September
22, 1993).
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung,
learned that her life was insured with the Insurance Company of
New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong, with Ming as the
beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than
the monthly salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter
in Hongkong.
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence linking Ming
to the killing is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Judgment reversed. Accused acquitted.
The SC found that the trial court relied only and conjectures and
surmises in arriving at its conclusion. Before a conviction can be
had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to but one fair and

43

reasonable conclusion, which points to the accused, to the

exclusion of all others, as the guilty person Every hypothesis
consistent with innocence must be excluded if guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is based on circumstantial evidence. All the
evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with that he
is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt. The SC found that certain key elements, without which
the picture of the crime would be faulty and unsound, are not
based on reliable evidence. A key element in the web of
circumstantial evidence is motive which the prosecution tried to
establish. Nevertheless, the supposed insurance policy with
which motive was established was not duly proven.
The
prosecution presented Exhibit "X", a mere xerox copy of a
document captioned "Proposal for Life Insurance" as proof of the
alleged insurance. It is not a certified copy, nor was the original
first identified. The authenticity of the document has thus not
been duly established. The policy was unsigned and it was not
clear whether it was indeed taken out by Lam. Also, Law only
earned $5000 a month while the premium of the policy was for
$5400. Such a discrepancy negates the assumption that there
was a policy taken and a motive for the crime.
There was also no conclusive findings as to the time of the
death as testified to by Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal
officer of the WPD.
The fact that there as no forcible entry does not presupposes
nor negates the possibility that somebody may have knocked
and entered the room after Lam opened the door thinking it was
hotel staff. Detective Yanquiling was so convinced that it was
Ming who did it that he did not conduct any other further
investigation.
The TCs reliance on the Destreza testimony was also rebutted by
the SC being unreliable having given contradictory statements
as to the time when she heard the banging sounds or even to
the date as to when her Australian boyfriend came to Manila.
Ming was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing.
There was no warrant of arrest. Officer Yanquiling testified that
there was no warrant and he arrested Ming based on series of
circumstantial evidence. He had no personal knowledge of Yip
Wai Ming having committed the crime. Ming stated that five
police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him
to undress, forced him to lie down on a bench, sat on his
stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water
and beer over his face. When he could no longer bear the pain,
he admitted the crime charged, participated in a re-enactment,
and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not
informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of
his choice to assist him in confessing the crime.
The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution
provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible against him." Section 17,. Article III provides: "No
confession, shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of
the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen
by the accused is inadmissible in evidence.
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)
FACTS: British Horace William Barker, a WB consultant, and his
Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza lived in Tuba, Benguet where, in
the early morning of 27 August 1991, Horace was brutally slain
and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a
robbery in their home.
Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante as
one of the suspect.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the prosecution initially included
Richard Malig in the information for robbery with homicide and
serious physical injuries filed with the RTC of Benguet. Prior to
the arraignment of Malig, the prosecution filed a motion to
amend the information
to implead as co-accused Hector
Maqueda but, later, the Prosecutor asked that accused Malig be
dropped from the information since the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. The motion to drop Malig was
granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and
Maqueda were issued.
Maqueda was subsequently arrested on March 1992 in
Guinyangan, Quezon and was brought to the headquarters of
the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag,

Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, directed

SPO3 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so
and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under
the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in
the crime at the Barker house.
On 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail where he stated
that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the
above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty
among the accused in this case."
Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such
statement and asked him if he was in the company of
Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the
Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor
Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail
since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of
Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to
talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony.
Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to
Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor but found
out later that they were going to rob the Barkers. He initially
objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it. He admitted
having hit Mrs. Barker with a lead pipe after she came down and
in helping Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had
followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were already
unconscious on the floor, Salvamante looted the house. They
made their escape through Baguio City & then rode a Philippine
Rabbit Bus heading for Manila.
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Information
with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the accused. Salvamante
remained at large and trial proceeded against Maqueda only
who entered a plea of not guilty.
Maqueda interposed a defense of alibi stating that he was not in
Benguet then and that he was working as a caretaker in a
polvoron factory in Sukat, Muntinlupa. This was denied however
by the owner Castrence.
In its decision promulgated on 31 August 1993, the TC found
Maqueda guilty on the ground that there was a conviction
"based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well
as on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing the
supposed confession of Maqueda to be admitted in evidence
against him?
HELD: The trial court erred in admitting the Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by Maqueda to SPO3 Molleno.
The TC
pointed out that the Sinumpaang Salaysay is not an extrajudicial
confession, it is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a
distinction between the two as shown in Sections 26 and 33,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually
applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused
which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or
of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial
confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. HOWEVER,
the exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel
and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article
III of the Constitution are not confined to that period
prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information
but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense." Ordinarily,
once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the
accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest,
he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the
issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any
public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate
him in connection with the commission of the offense for
which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such
investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
Here, the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2
Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable
violation of the said Constitutional provision. As disclosed by a
reading thereof. Maqueda was not even told of any of his
constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was
also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled

44

Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to

paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
NEVERTHELESS, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda
to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa are not
governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of
Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to
Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in
connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state
witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private
person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily
limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist
without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by
government and that government has the duty to protect. or
restrictions on the power of government found "not in the
particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general
principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that
governmental power is not unlimited.'' They are the
fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power,
or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the
people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships
between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to
Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. Citing Aballe vs. People, the declaration
of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense
may be given in evidence against him and any person,
otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what
he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need
not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its
substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial
admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is
his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is
willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above
entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case." In the light of these admissions,
Maqueda's guilt was established beyond moral certainty.
His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he
was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, he also admitted his participation therein.
Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial
court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The
following circumstances were duly proved in this case: (1) He
and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker
house an hour after the crime in question was committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively
identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as
one of two persons who committed the crime; (3) He and coaccused Rene Salvamante are friends; (4) He and Rene
Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left
the place sometime in September 1991, (5) He was arrested in
Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992, and (6) He freely and
voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the
least guilty." Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides
that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1.

There is more than one circumstance

2.

The facts from which the inferences are derived are

proven; and

3.

The combination of all the circumstances is such as to

produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as
jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if
the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty.

habeas corpus relief from a District Court claiming that an error

had been committed when the trial court admitted some of their
confessions into evidence. All three co-defendants none of
whom had testified at trial, claimed that error had occurred
when their interlocking oral confessions were admitted into
evidence with cautionary instructions to the jury that each
confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it
and could not be considered as evidence of a co-defendants
guilt.
The District Court granted habeas corpus relief holding that
as to the admission of the interlocking oral confessions, that the
co-defendants rights had been violated under the SCs decision
in Bruton v US, in which it had been held that an accuseds right
of cross-examination is violated by the admission of a codefendants confession inculpating the accused, notwithstanding
jury instructions that the co-defendants confession must be
disregarded in determining the accuseds guilt or innocence.
The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: WON the admission of co-defendants confessions
infringed respondents rights
Held: No. The SC held that the admission of respondents
confessions with proper limiting jury instructions did not infringe
respondents constitutional rights.
In this case, unlike in Bruton, the defendant had already
confessed. Incriminating extrajudicial statements will not have
the same devastating consequences to a defendant who has
already confessed.
In this case, defendant corroborated his co-defendants story
and has blamed himself. Thus the natural motivation to blame
others, which renders incriminating statements suspect (as held
in Bruton), does not exist in this case.
The right to confrontation does not bar admission into evidence
of every relevant extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying
declarant simply because it in some way implicates the
defendant. An instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendants statement only against its source is sufficient to
avoid offending the defendants confrontation right.
When the defendants own confession is before the jury, the
possible prejudice that may result from the jurys failure to
follow the courts instructions is not so devastating or vital as to
require departure from the general rule allowing admission of
evidence with limiting instructions.
Dissent: J. Stevens expressed the view that there had been a
violation of right under Bruton and that such was not harmless.
People v. Encipido, G.R. No. 7009l, Dec. 29, 1986
People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, Feb. 20, 2001

All the requisites are present in this case. Therefore, conviction

affirmed.
Bruton v. US,
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)
Facts: Three co-defendants, who had been convicted or murder
at a joint trial before a jury in a Tennessee trial court, sought

45

although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by

the defendant.
Facts: Feliciano Santos, owner of some sick horses, went to the
drug store of Santiago Pineda, a registered pharmacist with a
prescription from Dr. Richardson to purchase potassium chlorate
for the sick horses. When Santos administered the medicine to
his horses, the horses died. Santos, thereupon brought the
remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination
and it was found that the packets contained not potassium
chlorate but barium chlorate (which was a poison). The two
chemists, Drs. Pea & Darjuan of the said Bureau when to
Pinedas drug store and bought potassium chlorate but where
again given barium chlorate. Dr. Buencamino performed an
autopsy of the horses and found that indeed they were
poisoned.
In the trial, the two chemists testified to their
purchase of potassium chlorate but where instead given barium
chlorate. The admission of such testimony was objected to by
the defense. The TC convicted Pineda for violation of the penal
provisions of the Pharmacy Law, thus, this appeal.

N.

Previous Conduct as Evidence

1.

Rule 130, 34-35

Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one

did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
(48 a)
GR: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time
Exceptions: It may be received to prove a specific
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.10

intent
knowledge
identity
plan
system
scheme
habit
custom or
usage, and
the like.

Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. An offer in writing to pay

a particular sum of money or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected
without valid cause, equivalent to the actual production
and tender of the money instrument, or property. (49 a)
2.

Cases

US v. Evangelista, 24 Phil 453 (1913)

In a trial for arson, the prosecution may prove that the accused
had attempted to set fire to the house on the day previous to
the burning alleged in the information, for the purpose of
showing the intent of the accused in subsequently setting fire to
the house. Where a person is charged wit the commission of a
specific crime, testimony may be received of the other similar
acts committed about the same time, only for the purpose of
establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 457 (1918)
Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate
with barium chlorate, a poison, causing the death of two horses.
After analyzing the packages, two chemists went to the drug
store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which
when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to
demonstrate defendant's motive and negligence. It is
permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent and
to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one
occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is
possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent
intent may even be established. There is no better evidence of
negligence than the frequency of accidents. Evidence is
admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive,

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting the

testimony of the two chemists?
Held: The SC affirmed the judgment. As a general rule, the
evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is
inadmissible. But Pineda has confused the res inter alios acta
maxim with certain exceptions thereto.
The testimony
presented was not to convict the accused of a second offense
nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at
issue and thus to prejudice defendants case. The purpose is
to ascertain Pinedas knowledge and intent and to fix his
negligence.
If Pineda has on more than one occasion
performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly
excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may
even be established. It has been said that there is no better
evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show
motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another
offense by the defendant.
People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)
Facts: After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana
Vicente to bring out her money and jewelry. As she turned over
the items, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had
pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified by
Maximiana from a police line-up and was charged. During the
trial, Maximianas neighbor, Juana de la Cruz, testified that on
the night in question, her house was assaulted by malefactors.
de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar
on the left eyelid. She identified that man to be Irang.
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates
Maximinianas testimony that the man of the same description
was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of
her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime is, as a
rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible
when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify
defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at
the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime.
Facts: On the night of November 8, 1935, 7 persons with white
stripes on their faces, two carrying guns while the rest had
bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto and Maximiana
Melocotones. Some of these persons went up the house while
the rest remained on guard downstairs. The men ordered
Perfecto to bring out his money but before he could do so
Perfecto was attacked with bolos by the men. Perfecto slumped
to the floor dead. So, the men instead ordered his wife to get
the money and jewelries to which she complied and surrendered
about P70 in case and P200 worth of jewelry.
That same night, a group of men with similar descriptions as
those that robbed the Melocotones assaulted the house of Juana
de la Cruz.
After they left the house of the Melocotones, Toribio
Melocotones, son of Perfecto and Maximiana, who had seen the
assailants arrive and leave their house reported the incident to
the police. Maximiana gave a description where she stated that
one of her assailants had a pockmarked face. When groups of
men where presented to Maximiana for identification she
pointed to Benjamin Irang as the one who struck her with the
butt of his gun and demanded delivery of money and jewelries.

46

He was also identified by Juana de la Cruz as one of those who

assaulted her home.
Irang later on executed an affidavit which was sworn to by him
before the deputy clerk of the CFI of Nueva Ecija stating he was
merely invited to the said town and when already there he was
brought by a certain Fidel Estrella to be part of a group that
would raid the house of Perfecto Melocotones and that he
merely stood guard. He also assailed the admission of the
testimony of Juana de la Cruz that the said group supposedly
assaulted her house.
The CFI of Nueva Ecija convicted said accused Irang.
Issue: Whether or not Juana de la Cruz testimony is admissible?
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz that her house is
located only about 100 meters from that of Perfecto and that
they were assaulted by a group of men fitting the same
description as those who assaulted Perfectos house is
admissible.
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a
prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise
relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the
perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his
presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time
charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected
with the crime.
His affidavit is also admissible. An admission made under oath
before a deputy clerk of court cannot be considered involuntary
merely because the person who made it allegedly having done
so under threat, the persons supposed to have threatened him
having denied such fact.
Judgment affirmed.
People v. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
Facts: Ernesto Basa and Ernesto Balaktaw were sleeping in a
pushcart along a sidewalk when Basa was assaulted by Sofronio
Palin (who held down Basa) and Geronimo Soliman (who
stabbed him many times with a balisong). Thereafter, they ran
away. Balaktaw brought Basa to the police who in turn brought
him to a hospital where however Basa died. As a defense,
Soliman stated that on several occasions Basa had assaulted
him, once he was punched and in another with a lead pipe, and
on that occasion he was being extorted money. Soliman during
that incident stabbed him as Basa and three of his companions
attacked him. Palin corroborated that statement of Soliman.
The TC convicted both men.
Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence convicting
the two accused?
Held: Judgment affirmed.
The findings of fact particularly the character of the wounds
inflicted and the admission made by Soliman that he had
inflicted the wounds support the testimony of Balaktaw as to
what happened.
The defense points out that the TC erred in not allowing them a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence particularly the
criminal record of Balaktaw. The court herein hled that the
criminal record of Balaktaw cannot be considered as newly
discovered evidence because it was available to the defense
much prior to the trial of the case. Also, the fact that a person
has been previously convicted for a crime does not necessarily
disqualify him as a witness for he amy still prove to be a truthful
one.
The defenses claim that the trial court also erred in not allowing
the defense to prove that the deceased had a violent,
quarrelsome or provocative character. While good or bad moral
character may be availed of as an aid to determine the
probability or improbability of the commission of an offense,
such is not necessary in a crime of murder where the killing is
committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of
such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show
that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in
the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary.
People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (19sep1928) 28871

Facts: Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land who
sold the land to Basilio Copreros with right of repurchase. The
period for repurchase having expired, Basilio Copreros took
possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927,
made application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of
Iloilo for the registration of the consolidation of his title to said
parcels. On the 26th of the said month, Basilio Copreros leased
said parcels to Severino Haro. Because of this, Babiera sued
Copreros for the recovery of the possession which was
dismissed by the lower court. Babiera appealed but asked for its
dismissal later then filed a complaint for recovery of property.
Fermin Bruces who was Severino Haro's copartner on shares in
said lands, while tilling the land, was constantly harassed by
Justo Babiera accompanied by his copartner on shares, Rosendo
Paycol.
On August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions
were returning to the town of Oton, and upon their coming near
Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente Babiera, his
father Justo Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores, said
Severino Haro had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which
Severino Haro received several wounds in consequence of which
he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo.
Held: Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men,
Severino Haro's alleged attitude, in having tried to take
Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to accept P2 for the
damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its
owner, is highly illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been
presented to explain this change of determination, as
unexpected as it is unreasonable.
With respect to the allegation that Margarito Mediavilla and
Severino Haro began the attack, inasmuch as it has not been
proved that they were the instigators, it cannot be conceived
that they committed said unlawful aggression, for he who has no
reason to provoke, has no reason to attack unlawfully.
The defense also attempted to prove that Severino Haro was of
a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of
starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge
would not permit it.
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he
acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been
of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof
must be of his general reputation in the community and not of
isolated and specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325,
p.570), such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove,
and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting such
proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence
that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it
would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof
that it was the said accused who treacherously attacked the
deceased.
US v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (13nov1913) L-8332
Facts: These defendants were charged with the crime of
coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Bulacan.
During the trial, the prosecution asked the witness for the
defense how many times was he convicted of assault upon other
persons. To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado
objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr.
Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying that he
wish to demonstrate that he (witness-defendant) has a
pugnacious (aggressive) disposition.
Upon the question and the objection Judge Barretto ruled that
"the character of the witness has an intimate relation or may
have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the
present cause. The objection was overruled."
The defendants were convicted of the crime charged of which
decision, the defendants appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in overruling the
objection of the accused to the private prosecutor's question
referring to the character of the witness.
Held: Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by
the party against whom he has been called, except by showing:
1.

that he has made contradictory statements: or

47

2.

by showing that his general reputation for the

truth, honesty, or integrity is bad.

The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted

to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was
bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness,
except by showing that he has made contradictory statements
or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the
witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has
been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the
present case, the other offense to which the question above
related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and
we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342,
is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally
defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied
and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to
the above question was properly interposed and should have
been sustained. The question now arises, did the admission of
the question prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was
proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding
the particular proof brought out by this question to show that
the defendants are guilty of the crime. then the question and
answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect
prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors committed
by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the
parties, should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion the
evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault
to which reference is made in the complaint in the present
cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a
matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or
rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related
could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.
People vs Lee, 32SCRA596 (29may2002)139070
Facts: At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia
Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the living room of their
house. The living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent
lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was an alley leading to
General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling
with people and activity. There were women sewing garments on
one side and on the other was a store catering to customers. In
their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball
game on television. Herminia was seated on an armchair and
the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a
sofa against the wall and window of their house and the
television was to his right. Herminia looked away from the game
and casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise, she
saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window
behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel
Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body
towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun
hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia
stood up but could not move as accused-appellant fired a
second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more two hit the
sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were
fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in
a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia
turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted for
help. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia
brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later died.
Held: In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character
of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing.
Accused-appellant has not
alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was
made in self-defense. There is no connection between the
deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent
death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the
positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the
victims bad character he could have been killed by any one of
those from whom he had stolen from is pure and simple
speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is
not necessary in cases of murder committed with
treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a murder
case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or
provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the
prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme
Court held:
"x x x While good or bad moral character may be
availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense (Section

15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in the crime of

murder where the killing is committed through
treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character
may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it
has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in
the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p.
126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder."
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder
committed through treachery and evident premeditation. The
evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in
his living room watching television when accused-appellant
peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him
twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim
to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker.
O.

Hearsay Rule
1.

Testimonial Knowledge
a.

Rule 130, 36

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal

knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
(30 a)
b.

Cases

People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992)

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence. The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not has no probative value.
People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 (30jan1971) L28482
Facts: On 23 December 1966, between 8 and 9 in the evening,
the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their
house at barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband was making
rope in the annex of their house, while the wife, four meters
away, and was applying candle wax to a flat iron. Silvino Daria
was using a lamp where he worked. Outside, the night was
bright because of the moon overhead.
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was
alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped through a crack in
the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass southward
in the direction of the house Silvino Daria that was six meters
away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened,
she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each
appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two
detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning
and his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot.
Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate,
wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified
that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and
he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza.
Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot
wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal
and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to
the two accused as the killers (Exibits "B" and "C," respectively).
Held: We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal
on the material points.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in
the declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan
Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does
satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged
by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have
realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely
inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of
impending death, considering that he died only one hour after
being shot.
People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944 (14aug1965) L20986
Facts: In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno

48

Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged

with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not
guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police
Force of Digos, Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness
regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the
accused Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from
admitting his participation in the commission of the offense
charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to
commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone
of them. Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer
asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's
alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao,
Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that
whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his
clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the
objection directing the witness to answer the question but
without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had
interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was
allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators
except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting
officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied.
Hence the present petition for certiorari praying that the
abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared
erroneous and for a further order directing said respondent
judge to allow witness Bano to answer the question in full.

bottle of wine and glass were likewise recovered from the same
pit.

Held: The question involved herein is purely one of evidence.

There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected
to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the
fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).

In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the

prosecution sufficiently satisfies the quantum of proof necessary
to uphold a judgment of conviction. The following circumstances
proven by the prosecution indubitably point to the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime committed against Augusto
Esguerra.

In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as

manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing more
than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had
mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with
him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that
Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano
would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the
persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited
purpose, we believe that the question propounded to the
witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to
answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his
answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show
that the persons named really and actually conspired with
Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer
intended to establish would seem to be relevant to explain why
the police force of the place where the offense was committed
subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly
named by Puesca.
People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (27feb1989)
74065
Facts: At about 5pm of December 11, 1981 Ernesto Guzman
saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra
drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, appellant told
Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto
Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised
appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman went to
the police and reported what appellant told him.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
Corporal Rogelio Castillo and Detective Rodrigo Salamat
arrested appellant. Appellant told Corporal Castillo that he killed
the victim and where he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus
Patriarca arrived. Appellant himself led the policeman and
Barangay residents to where the body was in a toilet pit in the
backyard of Ernesto Guzman. The policeman, with the help of
the Barangay residents, dug out the body. The body of the
victim was Identified by Ernesto Guzman, his wife, and Jose
Esguerra, victim's brother. Pat. Patriarca took pictures of the
body, noted the statements of Ernesto Guzman and Jose
Esguerra, and took down the confession of appellant. Later, the
cadaver was subjected to autopsy.
A man's T-shirt with collar, colored yellow, red and blue, and red
shorts, were recovered from the pit where the body of the victim
was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were identified by Ernesto
Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with
the victim on December 11, 1981. A small table, rubber slipper,

Defense version: Gaddi was asked by Guzman to buy gin. That it

was Guzman who confessed the killing to him but Guzman told
the police that it was Gaddi who killed Esguerra.
Held: Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on
circumstantial evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the
validity of such conviction that:
1) there be more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity
of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all
that is required is that the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty.

1. The fact that said victim was last seen on the day he was
killed in the company of the accused, drinking gin at the back of
the house of Ernesto Guzman.
2. The fact that on the day after the drinking spree, the accused
himself admitted to Ernesto Guzman that he stabbed his
drinking companion and that the latter was 'nadisgrasya niya"
so he dumped the body of the victim in a hole being dug out for
a toilet, located at the yard of Ernesto Guzman
3. The fact that when he was turned over to Pat. Arturo Angeles
and Pat. Rogelio Castillo of the Northern Police District by the
barangay people who apprehended him, be admitted the truth
of the charge of the barangay residents that he killed someone
and that he dumped the body of the victim in a place being dug
out as an improvised toilet . At the time the barangay people
started digging for the body of the victim, the appellant was
even instructing them as to the exact location where the body
was buried
4. The fact that the place where be led the police officers and
the barangay residents, i.e. the toilet pit in the backyard of
Ernesto Guzman, was indeed the site where he buried the victim
as the body of the victim was found there after the digging.
5. The fact that the T-shirt and shorts which the accused was
wearing during the drinking spree were later recovered from the
place where the victim was buried.
Appellant however disputes the trial court's reliance on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as a basis for his
conviction. As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses is entitled to great
weight and respect since it has the advantage of observing the
demeanor of a witness while on the witness stand and therefore
can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not.
Moreover, appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on
Gaddi's confession of the crime to him cannot be given credence
for being hearsay is unavailing. This Tribunal had previously
declared that a confession constitutes evidence of high order
since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person
of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably
was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him,
there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was
testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal
knowledge; that is, he was testifying to the fact that the
appellant told him that he stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not to
the truth of the appellant's statement.
The trial court found no reason to doubt Guzman's credibility as
a witness considering his stature in the community as a member

49

of a religious movement participating in such activities as

"maanita" and procession of the Fatima and Black Rosary
[Rollo, p. 30.] In fact, on the day the killing took place, he left his
house where appellant and his companion, Esguerra were still
drinking and went to the house of Junior Isla to attend a
"maanita" and participate in the weekly activity of bringing
down the crucifix and the image of the Fatima.
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
Facts: Leake and Hagert were engaged in a collision on
Highway 3. It resulted in the damage of Hagerts car and Leakes
plow. The accident occurred at around 6:45 pm. Hagert hit the
rear of Leakes tractor which was towing his plow. Leake
claimed that it was Hagerts negligence which caused the
accident while Hagert claims that because of the absence of
lights and rear reflectors, she could not see Leakes tractor and
plow.
During trial, evidence was adduced and different
testimonies of persons were presented.
One such testimony was that of Edward Gross, an adjuster who
investigated the scene of the accident.
He stated in his
testimony that while he was making his investigation, he talked
to Leakes son, who told him that the lens in the small light had
been missing from its frame for some time prior to the accident.
Leakes contended that such statement was hearsay.
Issue: WON said statement was indeed hearsay
Held: Yes. Allen Leake contends that whether or not the red
lens was out at the time of the accident is a material question of
fact, determinative as to the contributory negligence by Allen
Leake.
Leakes son did not testify in the present action; he was not a
party to the action; his statement was not made under oath; his
statement was not subject to cross-examination; and he was not
available as a witness at the time of trial because he was in the
army and overseas.
We find that it was error for the trial court to admit into evidence
the testimony concerning what Leakes son said to Edward
Gross; the sons statements were hearsay and should have been
excluded.
U.S. v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
Facts: While conducting a search of the premises of defendant
Zenni, Ruby Humphrey, pursuant to a lawful search warrant
which authorized a search for evidence of bookmaking activity,
government agents answered the telephone several times. The
unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on
various sporting events. The government proposes to introduce
this evidence to show that the callers believed that the premises
were used in betting operations. The existence of such belief
tends to prove that they were so used. The defendants object
on the ground of hearsay.
Issue: WON the utterances of the unknown callers fall within the
operation of the hearsay rule, and thus inadmissible
Held: The utterances were not within the operation of the
hearsay rule.

definition is that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be

one.
Conclusion: The utterances of the bettors telephoning in their
bets were nonassertive verbal conduct, offered as relevant for
an implied assertion to be inferred from them, namely, that bets
could be placed at the premises being telephoned.
The
language is not an assertion on its face, and it is obvious these
persons did not intend to make an assertion about the fact
sought to be proved or anything else.
As an implied assertion, the proferred evidence is expressly
excluded from the operation of the hearsay rule by Rule 801 of
the federal Rules of Evidence, and the objection thereto must be
overruled.
Estrada vs Desierto 356 SCRA 108 (03apr2001) 14671015
Facts: The Supreme Court, in a prior decision, used the
Angara Diary (AD) to establish Estradas intent to resign.
Issue: Does the use of the AD violate the rule against the
admission of hearsay evidence?
Held:

No.

The AD is not an out of court statement. The AD is part of the

pleadings in the cases at bar. Estrada (E) cannot complain he
was not furnished a copy of the AD. Nor can he feign surprise on
its use. To be sure, the said diary was frequently referred to by
the parties in their pleadings. E had all the opportunity to
contest the use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the AD was an out of court
statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. The
rules of exclusion do not cover admissions of a party and the AD
belongs to this class. Although the AD is not the diary of E, E is
bound by it, in accordance with the doctrine of adoptive
admission. Sec. Angara acted for and in behalf of E in the crucial
days before Pres. Arroyo took her oath as President. Admissions
of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (E).
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover
independently relevant statements. It was also an admission
against interest, which could be considered an exception to the
hearsay rule. The AD contains statements of E which reflect his
state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to
resign.
BOSS JOEL: this is a weird decision. Why did the SC talk about
hearsay, res actos inter alia, and other rules of evidence when
there was neither trial nor hearing held? It should be noted that
the Rules on Evidence will only apply when there is a trial or a
hearing. (Sec2, Rule128) When the SC relied on the admission
against interest rule they effectively excluded any chance that
the best evidence rule and the hearsay rule could be applied.
Thus, if there would be objections on the ground of best
evidence and/or hearsay, these would be overruled because the
basis for the offer of the AD is admission against interest.
Besides, objections based on best evidence would not be
possible because there was no document presented.
2.

The Federal Rules of Evidence state that:

Rule 801. (a) Statement. A statement is (1) an oral
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(c) Hearsay. Hearsay is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trail or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Rule 802. Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or
by Act of Congress.
Assertion is not defined in the rules, but has the connotation of a
forceful or positive declaration.
The effect of the definition of statement is to exclude from the
operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or
nonverbal, not intended as an assertion.
The key to the

Exceptions

Exceptions to the hearsay rule

.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.10
.11
.12
.13
.14

waiver
independently relevant evidence
dying declaration
Declaration against interest
Act or declaration about pedigree
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
Common reputation
Part of the res gestae
Verbal acts
Entries in the course of business
Entries in official records
Commercial lists and the like
Learned treatises
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding

a.

Dying Declaration

1) Rule 130, 37
50

Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a

dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (31
a)
Requisites for admissibility of a dying declaration
.1

declaration of a dying person

.2

made under the consciousness of an impending death

.3

his death is the subject of inquiry

.4

as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of

such death
2)

Cases

People v. Devaras, 37 SCRA 697 (1971)

Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later,
as the victim was about to be taken to the hospital, a patrolman
was able to get his statement as to the identity of the
perpetrators. The victim was unable to sign the statement and
he died the next day.
Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae because of
the lapse of considerable time between the commission of the
offense and the taking of the statement. However, the
statement amounts to a dying declaration, as it is a statement
coming from a seriously wounded person even if death occurs
hours or days after it was inflicted if there be showing that it was
due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish from the time
he made his declaration until the end came. There is no need for
proof that the declarant state "that he has given up the hope of
life. It is enough if. from the circumstances, it can be inferred
with certainty that such must have been his state of mind. It is
sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably
to the conclusion that the time [of such statement] the
declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he
actually died. Its admissibility is not affected by death occurring
hours or days afterwards.
People v. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (28feb1985) L45470
Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain found him
lying on the sand at the bank of a river. Pablos hands were tied
on his back and he was lying face down. The barrio captain took
Pablos ante-mortem statement and learned that he was Pablo
Remonde, he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon, and that Pablo was
not sure if he would survive the gunshot wounds he suffered.
Pablo died in the hospital 3 days later. Laquinon was charged
and convicted of Murder. Laquinon argues that the statement is
not a dying declaration because it was not made under the
consciousness of an impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not
admissible as a dying declaration since the deceased was in
doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to
show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, at the
point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is
the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an
exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however, as
part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde
had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of impending death was
inferred from the extent of the injuries. In Laquinon, the
declarant expressly said that he was not sure that we was going
to die. The moral of the story is, in taking a dying declaration,
dont ask if the declarant thinks he will die.
Facts:
People's version of the case is as follows:
On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening,
Samama Buat, barrio captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur,
was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a short while he heard
gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred
meters to the south of his house. Then, his brother, Leocario
Buat, arrived and told him that a man was shouting for help at
the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the
barrio councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where

the unidentified man was. His brother, Leocario and the barrio
councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat found the man
lying on the sand and asked who he was. The man answered, "I
am Pablo Remonde." Remonde's two hands were tied on his
back. He was lying face down.
Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo
Remonde. He asked him who he was to which he answered that
he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who shot you"
and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked
Pablo Remonde whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered
he would survive to which the victim answered "I do not know."
After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality of
Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting
of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the
incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter
answered that he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon. Pablo
Remonde was placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to
the hospital. Pablo Remonde was admitted to the Canos Hospital
in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to by Dr. Alfonso
Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on the victim from
whose body a slug was recovered. Pablo Remonde died in the
hospital on November 16, 1972 because of bullet wounds.
The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the
deceased. The trial court summarized his defense, as follows:
In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member;
that he was ordered by one Noli Cabardo, then their CO, to fetch
Pablo Remonde; he requested one Cristino Nerosa to go with
him, and matter of factly, they brought Remonde to the place
where said CO Cabardo with ten companions, was waiting at the
riverbank; that before reaching the place, Nerosa separated
from him and he alone brought Remonde to Cabardo. There
Cabardo confronted Remonde why, having been commanded to
buy some provisions in Matanao, he (Remonde) never returned;
to which Remonde answered that he spent the money 'in
drinking and gambling; when upon Cabardo got mad and as
Remonde attempted to escape, he (witness) heard a shot which
must have been fired by Cabardo as he was holding a .38 Cal.
revolver; that he (witness) also had that evening a Cal. 22 paltik;
that after the shot he saw Remonde sprawled on the ground,
and then Cabardo ordered them to go to the mountain as in fact
they did; that two days later during the day, their mountain
camp was raided by the PC and Cabardo and two others were
killed while he (witness) was able to escape and went to
Magpet, North Cotabato, and engaged in farming therein with
his relatives; but believing that as a KM member he 'committed
something,' he surrendered to the Davao PC Barracks in May,
1975 (Exhibit '2'), where up to now he is being confined.
Issue: May the Statements of Remonde be admissible as a
dying declaration.
Held: The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is
not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the
deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The
declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in
extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is
extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of
declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the
statement was made immediately after the incident and the
deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a
charge against the accused.
Indeed, the Court cannot believe that CO Cabardo did the killing
as related by the accused for the following reasons:
First, when the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO
Cabardo, he was already hand-tied at his back, that the place of
the shooting was "covered by thick bushes and beside the
river", and that CO Cabardo was with ten men excluding the
accused; under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that
the deceased, with all those overwhelming handicap, would
attempt to flee.
Second, if the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he
would do would be to flee away from and not towards Cabardo;
in doing the former he would turn to his right or to his left or
towards his back; if he fled to his left or right, or towards his
back, he would be exposing one side of his body, or his back,
and when fired upon in that position he would have been hit on
one side of the body or at his back. The evidence as testified
to by Dr. Llanos however, shows that the deceased had only
one wound a gunshot wound, in the abdomen; this shows he
was fired upon frontally, the bullet going through and through

51

the intestines and lodged, presumably in the bony portions of

his back, that is why the slug (Exhibit "B") was recovered. The
accused's version, therefore, that the deceased tried to flee is
hard to believe for being against the physical facts.
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (27jan1981) L26193
Facts: Catalino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his
house lying and wounded. Espina asked for the police. When
police officers arrived, they asked Espina who slashed and
robbed him. Espina answered that it was Sabio. His declaration
was taken down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged
and convicted of robbery with homicide. Sabio questions the
admissibility of the declaration on the ground that it was not
made under the consciousness of an impending death because
the victim had hopes of recovery for his first word to his
grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.
Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on
the victim's forehead which had affected the brain and was
profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak unless his
head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that
"only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his
subsequent demise from the direct effects of the wound on his
forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have
known that his end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till
3 days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative
force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and
not the rapid succession of death, that renders the dying
declaration admissible. The fact that the victim told his
grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's
feeling of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the
realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to
the authorities.
However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of
the charge of robbery is at best circumstantial and does not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried
away personality belonging to the offended party. There was no
eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the
alleged missing objects recovered. The consummation of the
robbery cannot he inferred nor presumed from the circumstance
that the accused was seen running "with his hands inside his
shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash
amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty,
or that the things and merchandise inside the house were in
disarray. Nor can the dying declaration of the victim be admitted
to establish the fact of robbery. The admission of dying
declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause
and surrounding circumstances of death.
de Leon: Could not have the statement been admissible as proof
of Sabios guilt of robbery as a part of the res gestae?
Facts: The 13-year old accused was charged with Robbery with
Homicide for the death of Catalino Espina, an octogenarian,
owner of a small sari-sari store located in his house, who, in the
early morning of October 5, 1965, was found on the second floor
of his dwelling wounded on the forehead, from which injury he
died three days later. The merchandise in his store was in a
state of disarray and the tin can containing the cash sales in the
amount of P8.00 was found empty. The accused was positively
identified by JESUSA BIRONDO, a neighbor of the victim who saw
him running from the scene of the incident that fateful morning.
CAMILO SEMILLA saw the accused ran pass him about six meters
away towards his (accuseds) house at about 5am while waiting
for someone to help him carry his banca to the shore. The victim
in his ante-mortem statement taken by the police in the
presence of the victim's grandnephew also identified him. The
accused was found guilty as charged, with the attendant
aggravating circumstances or disregard of respect due to the
80-year old victim and recidivism, and without any mitigating
circumstances. He was sentenced to death but in view of his
youth, the trial Court recommended that the penalty be
commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the dying declaration of the victim may
be used to prove the crime of Robbery.
Held: The dying declaration of the victim which points to the
accused as the one slashed and robbed him cannot be admitted
to establish the factor of robbery. The admission of dying
declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause
and surrounding circumstances of death.

The arguments advanced are unavailing. The defense questions

the admissibility of Exhibit "A" of the prosecution as an
antemortem statement arguing that there is no evidence
showing that when the declaration was uttered the declarant
was under a consciousness of an impending death; that, in fact,
the victim had hopes of recovery or his first word to Camilo
Semilla was for the latter to fetch the police. Defense counsel
argues further that there are doubts as to when said Exhibit "A"
was thumb-marked because, although it was already in
existence in the morning of October 5, 1965, as alleged by
Patrolman Fuentes, the accused was never confronted with the
document when he was taken in to custody by the police for the
first time from the morning of October 5 to October 6, 1965,
thereby implying that the document did not yet exist at that
time.
The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead which had
affected the brain; his inability to speak until his head was
raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu
Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise
from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen
the conclusion that the victim must have known that his end
was inevitable. The death did not ensue till three days after the
declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is
not indispensable that declarant expires immediately thereafter.
It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession
of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declarations
admissible.
Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo
Semilla to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling
of hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the
realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to
the authorities. The mere failure of the police to confront the
accused with the antemortem declaration the first time the
latter was arrested and incarcerated from, neither militates
against the fact of its execution considering that it was evidence
that the police was under no compulsion to disclose.
People v. de Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)
Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her grandson, Alvin
Valencia, came home and found her wounded. He asked his
grandmother "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim
said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired. It is
not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya.
De Joya was charged and convicted of robbery with homicide.
Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in
itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant
must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the
subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given
fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The statement as
offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was
expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. It
is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is
related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant
wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption cuts
short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that
which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary
statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not
there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from
that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the
statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told
only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. Since the
declarant was prevented from saying all that he wished to say,
what he did say might have been qualified by the statements
which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying
declarations are received.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here
was incomplete. The words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by
themselves a sensible sentence. The phrase "Si Paqui" must,
moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo,
what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did
this to you?" The deceased was cut off by death before she
could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin.
The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si
Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her killer. But
Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the
rest of her communication might have been had death not
interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as
a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the
bloody deed.

52

Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this

decision. Under the context, what else could have Si Paqui
meant other than that he was responsible for the crime?
People v. Salison, G.R. No. L-115690, Feb. 20,
1996
Facts: At around 8PM 30Nov1990, witness Maria Magdalena
Ayola saw appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando
Valmoria, who was then watching television in a store. Salison
placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder and brought him
behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango tree.
There, appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen.
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three
other accused Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles suddenly
appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked
Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia Fernandez
approached them that the three co-accused disappeared,
leaving Salison and Valmoria behind. Fernandez was able to
separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused
returned and started to maul Valmoria again, with Salison
rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and
Andiente picked up pieces of wood and started to hit Valmoria at
the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria
fell to the ground and, upon finding a chance to do so, he stood
up and ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The
assailants followed Valmoria but failed to further hit the victim
because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house. During this
time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly
thereafter, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in
his head which was bleeding at that time.
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents
accompanied him to the house of witness Patricia Alcoseba, the
purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his
declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should
die and no witness would testify, his written declaration could be
utilized as evidence.
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba,
Valmoria and his parents proceeded to the hospital.
Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However, at
4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and
was rushed to the hospital. After three days there, Valmoria
died.
Issue: May the statement of the victim be admitted as a dying
declaration?
Held: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was
the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed by him right after
the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he
sustained.
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement,
which was reduced into writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and
purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence
since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not
accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The
appellant further contends that the declaration was not made
under the consciousness of an impending death.
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any
objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the defense
waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its
submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into
English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and
forms part of the record.
As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the
declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his
imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used
as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person
would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to
testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that
declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is
still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was
made shortly after the startling incident and, under the
circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.

b.

1) Rule 130, 38
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made
so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in
interest and against third persons. (32 a)
Requirements for hearsay testimony on declaration against
interest
.1

declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify

.2

against the interest of the declarant

.3

the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was

made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true

.4

as evidence against himself or his successors in interest

and against third persons

cf Rule 130 Sec. 31

Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property,
is evidence against the former. (211)

Admission by privies

Declaration against interest

One of 3 exceptions to res

inter alios acta

Exception to hearsay

Evidence
against
the
successor in interest of the
admitter

Evidence against even the

declarant, his successor in
interest, or 3rd persons

Admitter need not be dead or

unable to testify

Declarant is dead or unable to

testify

Relates to title to property

Relates to any interest

Admission
need
not be
against
the
admitters
interest

Declaration must be against the

interest of the declarant

2)

Cases

Viacrusis v. CA, 44 SCRA 176 (1972)

Previous recognition of ownership in another by a party in
possession of property in dispute is admission against interest
which may be received even against 3rd persons.
Facts: It appears that the land of about 4 hectares involved in
this case is part of a bigger lot of about 14.6303 hectares,
covered Title in the name of Pedro Sanchez; that, on June 8,
1936, Sanchez executed the deed, Exhibit B, selling said lot of
14.6303 hectares to Anastacio Orais; that said Exhibit B was, on
1936, filed with the RD, and recorded in the memorandum of
incumbrances of Homestead OCT No. 243; that, on July 7, 1941,
or about 5 yrs later Sanchez executed another deed, Exhibit 10,
conveying the disputed portion, of four (4) hectares to Balentin
Ruizo who, in turn, sold it, on 1945, to Guillermo Viacrucis
(Exhibit II); that, on January 12, 1959, Anastacio Orais who
claimed to have made oral demands formally demanded from
Viacrucis that he vacate said portion and surrender its
possession to him (Orais) that this demand was not heeded by
Viacrucis who, instead, executed, on March 19, 1959, the deed,
Exhibit 9, confirming the sale of said portion, allegedly made by
him, on January 12, 1954, in favor of his brother-in-law Claros
Marquez; and that the deeds of sale, Exhibits 10, 11 and 9, in
favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, respectively, have not
been registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte.

Declaration Against Interest

53

The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiffs

therein respondent herein.
On appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis and Mr. and Mrs.
Marquez, said decision, against them and in favor of Mr. and
Mrs. Orais, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not there was admission by silence on the
part of Orais.
Held: It should be noted, however, that said testimony of Mrs.
Castelo and this recognition by the now deceased Pelagio
Castelo which were confirmed by the public document Exh. G
constitute a declaration of Mr. and Mrs. Castelo adverse to
their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to
section 32 of said Rule 130. Petitioners have no reason
whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of
said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than
five (5) years before their (petitioners) predecessor in interest,
Balentin Ruizo, had entered into the picture, when Orais and
Castelo were the only parties who had any interest in the object
of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such
admission "may be received in evidence," not only
against the party who made it "or his successors in
interest," but, also, "against third persons."
As regards the alleged failure of Orais to say anything when the
bank refused to accept OCT No. 243 as collateral for the loan
applied for by Orais, upon the ground that the land covered by
said certificate of title was not his property, there is no
competent evidence on whether or not Orais had said anything
in response to said statement. Moreover, OCT No. 243 was in
the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no matter how real the sale by
the latter to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in
question as security for said loan, unless and until OCT No. 243
shall have been cancelled and a transfer certificate of title
issued to Orais. This, however, could not take place before the
filing of his loan application, because the owner's duplicate of
said certificate of title admittedly delivered by Sanchez to
Orais had been lost in the possession of the latter's counsel,
to whom he (Orais) had turned it over in connection with a given
criminal case.
People v. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825 (1928)
Declaration against interest, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
covers not only pecuniary interest, but also penal interest.
Facts: Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes
about the occupation of certain land situated in the municipality
of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15,
1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was
renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo
duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed
almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded
but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there
Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where
he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in
which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought.
About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the
wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above
outlined. The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio
Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to
Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the
witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who
testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her
testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness
Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was
that Toledo was in another place when the fight between
Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation
was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in
helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of
the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando
Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando
Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal
president of Pinamalayan.
Issue: Whether or not the verified declaration of Holgado was a
statement of fact against penal interest.
Held: It is held that error was committed in not admitting the
verified declaration of H as the statement of a fact against penal
interest.
One exception concerns the admission of dying declarations.
Another exception permits the reception, under certain

circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to

their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But by a large
preponderance of authority in the United States, the
declarations of a person other than accused confessing or
tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent
for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
The general rule rejecting evidence of confessions of third
parties made out of court intended to exonerate the accused,
examined in the light of its history and policy, and found to be
unjustified. It should not be received in the Philippine jurisdiction
where the principles of the common law have never been
followed blindly. A study of the authorities discloses that even if
given application they are not controlling, for here the fact is
that the declarant is deceased and his statements were made
under oath, while they read in such a way as to ring with the
truth.
Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as a part of the
res gestae for it was made by H on the same morning that the
fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient time for
reflection. The declaration fulfilled the test of the facts talking
through the party and not the party talking about the facts. The
modern tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting
spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when
other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured.
People v. Majuri, 96 SCRA 472 (1980)
Facts: At or about 1PM of 28Jan1972, the accused was at the
seashore of Calarian relaxing since he has just arrived from Jolo,
Sulu that particular day.
At that time, he was already running away from the authorities
because he is an escapee from San Ramon Prison and Penal
Farm.
Later on, the accused proceeded to his father's house which is
just near the seashore, Upon reaching the house, he saw Nori
Mohamad (Majuris common law wife?) but he had no time to
talk to her because immediately after seeing him, Nori ran
away, going to the direction of the street.
Armed with the bolo which he had been carrying, he chased
after Nori and he caught up with her at the street where he
started stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the different
parts of the body.
When he saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, he
hurriedly left the place and ran towards the far end of Calarian.
On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with parricide.
Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and
examined by his counsel. He admitted that he killed his wife. He
declared that after he was informed by his counsel that the
penalty for parricide is death or life imprisonment, he,
nevertheless, admitted the killing of his wife because that was
the truth.
In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he
understood that by pleading guilty he could be sentenced to
death or reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was not absolutely proved.
Held: Counsel de oficio assigned to present the side of the
accused in this review, contends that the marriage of Airol to
Norija was not absolutely proven. That contention cannot be
sustained. The testimony of the accused that he was married to
the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was
a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio
and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his
testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the deceased
was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her
infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of
their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their
marital status.
Fuentes v. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)
Facts: At 4AM 24Jun1989 Julieto Malaspina together with
Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a
benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur.

54

Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the

shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair
but now you have a short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed
Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to
the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner
fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his
abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied
the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that
death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region 1-1/2 in. in
length with extracavitation of the small and large intestines."
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the
victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was
compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a
bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro" because
"Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also
from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he
met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he
stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the
latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were
many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and
escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight
o'clock in the morning of 24Jun1989 while he was in a store in
the barangay.
The RTC of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty.
CA affirmed the judgment.
Held: One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is
that pertaining to declarations made against interest. The
admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a
declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact
cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the
admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the
instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There
is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or
physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates.
His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso
facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the
defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can
break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and
his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed
Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any
serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be
misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of
evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the
real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the
extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus
increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons
who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether
clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this
case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse.

c.

Pedigree

1) Rule 130, 39
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act
or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify,
in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree. (33 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to pedigree
.1
.2
.3

act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify

in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage

.4
.5

where it occurred before the controversy

the relationship between the 2 persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

"Pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,

marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, the names of the relatives, and facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
2)

Cases

Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)

Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the
Sta. Catalina Elementary School on 15Aug1964 when he was
advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar,
Jr., of his separation from the service on the ground that he had
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.
A few days later the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was
designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school.
On 31Aug1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public
Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the
date of his birth is not 26Nov1897 but 11Dec1901. Attached to
his letter was the affidavit of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A.
Sienes, in which these two affiants declared that they knew that
the petitioner "was born on 11Dec1901, in the Municipality of
Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of Negros
Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the
late spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA
REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and we were present when
said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore, we were also
invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of
said PEDRO GRAVADOR."
On 13Apr1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus
and damages in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental.
The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on
11Dec1901 accordingly granted his petition. Immediate
execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was
reinstated.
The respondents appealed directly to this Court.
Held: It is our considered view that the lower court correctly
relied upon the post-war records, for three cogent reasons.
In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have
no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as
to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives
and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family
tradition. Indeed, even in his application for back pay which he
filed with the Department of Finance, through the Office of the
Superintendent of Schools, on 07Oct1948, the petitioner stated
that the date of his birth is 11Dec1901. He repeated the same
assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the GSIS
and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth
to 11Dec1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of the
petitioner's brother, contained in a verified pleading in a
cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the
petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante
litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a
declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and
meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, 11Dec1901 is established as the date of birth of the
petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but also by
the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother,
Constantino, who was born on 10Jun1898 and who retired on
10Jun1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not
have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war
records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than
he.
Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
Facts: The present appellate review involves an action for
reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private
respondent before the RTC over a parcel of land with a house
and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that

55

petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes
Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on 05Mar1983 without
any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her
husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners'
father, Hermogenes, died on 03Oct1973, hence they seek to
inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as
sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by TCT #66886,
as a consequence of which TCT #358074 was issued in the
name of Martin Guerrero. On 02Jan1988, Martin Guerrero sold
the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and
thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on 25Oct1988. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on 02Nov1988,
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property
in question by right of representation.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
presented as the lone witness, with the following documentary
evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and
their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of
Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed
records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller;
death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and
Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage
certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners thereafter
rested their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits
to which a Comment was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's
Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in
accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code.
On 03Dec1992, the RTC issued an order granting the demurrer
to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance.

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming

seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's
estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative
may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be
some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of
the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is
sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not
merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other member of the family.
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case
is one instance where the general requirement on evidence
aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part
of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner
Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient
proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being
such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.
More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure
by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the
decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely
concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and
without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the
niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one
case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own
relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a
foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very
fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless
produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on
their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion
that the same may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at
the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary
that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive.

In upholding the dismissal, respondent CA declared that the

documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as
the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are
all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.
Held: Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly
of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death
and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil
registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed
by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the
course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such
a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject
to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration;
and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that
is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy
has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth
elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is,
whether or not the other documents offered in evidence
sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to
present evidence other than such declaration.

d.

Family Tradition

1) Rule 130, 40
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree. (34 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to family
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
.1

reputation or tradition existing in a family

.2

previous to the controversy

56

.3

in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members

.4

the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the

family, either by consanguinity or affinity

Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,

engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree.
de Leon: note that in family tradition, the declarant must be
dead or unable to testify. In family reputation or tradition, there
is not even a declarant to speak of; just a witness who was
aware of an exiting family reputation or tradition.
2)

Case

People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991)

Testimony of a witness and the witness grandfather as to the
date of birth and age of the witness is evidence on family
tradition which is admissible as an exception to hearsay.
Facts: On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
complainant was playing at the Freedom Square inside the
public market of San Carlos City when appellant, a 170-pound,
53 year old market watchman at the time, held her by the hand
and took her upstairs to the second floor of the public market
building which houses some government offices and which at
the time was expectedly deserted. There, he told the
complainant to hold his penis and jack it off. Thereafter,
appellant ordered complainant to lie down, and when she
refused he pushed her down on the floor. When complainant was
lying flat on her back, appellant placed himself on top of her
while she was still wearing her pedal pusher shorts and panty.
So, appellant forced her to take off her pedal pushers and panty
and thereupon he lay on top of her. Appellant then tried to
insert his penis into her vagina but it did not penetrate fully
before he ejaculated. Complainant bled a little. Thereafter,
appellant gave complainant P 2.00 and left. Complainant stood
up and went down the building but never told anybody about it
because she was afraid the appellant would kill her.
On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening
complainant was sitting at the Freedom Square when appellant
approached her and told her to go with him upstairs to the
second floor of the public market. Complainant refused but
appellant shoved her towards the stairs, held her by the left
arm, and brought her to the upper floor near the civic center.
There, appellant succeeded in raping the complainant.

Held: We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal
grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was
born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence
as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39
and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred and the names
of the relatives.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is
beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites for
its admissibility, namely:
.1 that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of
the members of a family;
.2 that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person
concerned existed previous to the controversy; and
.3 that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of
the family of said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar
considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put
in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating
to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of
seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the
witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal
grandfather of the rape victim.
Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary
evidence to dispute the prosecution's claim that the victim in
this case was below twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape
incidents under consideration, we affirm the trial court's finding
that the victim in these rape cases was under twelve years of
age.
It is axiomatic in rape cases that the slightest penetration of the
female's private organ is sufficient to consummate the crime.
Ferrer v. de Inchausti, 38 Phil 905 (1918)
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, to be
admissible as an evidence of pedigree, need NOT be proven to
have been made at the same time as the occurrence of the
events documented.

Complainant felt some liquid oozing out from appellant's organ

and into her being. And after appellant had withdrawn his sex
organ, complainant discovered that her vagina was bleeding.
Appellant then stood up and told her not to tell anybody about
it. Then appellant gave her P 2.00 and left.
As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by Patrolwoman
Evangeline Alfaro, a member of the San Carlos City INP assigned
at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the main entrance of the
public market. Pat. Alfaro knew appellant well because he was
the public market watchman at the time. A minute later, Pat.
Alfaro saw complainant coming down the same. Pat. Alfaro
noticed that complainant was pale, with blood flowing to her
thighs and legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy.
Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what happened
to her. Complainant answered that she was taken upstairs and
raped by appellant. Immediately, Pat. Alfaro brought
complainant to the city hospital where she was examined by Dr.
Oscar Jagdon in the presence of two medical technologists. Dr.
Jagdon confirmed the report that indeed complainant was raped.
Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro reported the incident to the Station Guard
by phone then took complainant to the police station after the
medical examination. When they reached the station, appellant
who had already been taken into custody was readily identified
by complainant as the rapist. Complainant was then
investigated and she rendered her statement to the police.

e.

Common Reputation

1) Rule 130, 41
Sec. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation
existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of
public or general interest more than thirty years old, or
respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in
evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places
may be received as evidence of common reputation. (35)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Common
reputation
.1
.2
.3

Common reputation
existing previous to the controversy
respecting either
.a facts of public or general interest more than 30 years
old, or
.b marriage or
.c moral character

Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as

evidence of common reputation.

Accused-appellant's version: Alibi; roamed around checking

padlocks of stores then had a snack
The accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual
age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not
established with certainty, hence, it was error on the part of the
trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape as
defined and penalized under paragraph 3, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.

2)

Cases

City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil 227 (1905)

57

Facts: This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots

described in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the
defendant.
Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The
latter consisted of the testimony of John R. Wilson, Eduardo
Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera Roco, Lorenzo del Rosario, and
Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified that
he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question
belonged to the city (p. 11 of the bill of exceptions). The next
witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged
to the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not
know to whom it now belongs (pp. 12 and 13 of the bill of
exceptions). It must be borne in mind that this witness referred
to the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to
the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut (be adjacent
to) upon the streets referred to, but do not form a part of either.
According to the complaint, they are building lots.
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in
question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that
all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular
his testimony is at variance with that of the preceding witness,
who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government.
Villega's testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of that he
had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of
the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently
for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered
the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of
actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
Held: Such testimony, however, does not constitute the
"common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned.
"Common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to
universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not
sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.
Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga
had been partitioned between the municipality and the Central
Government, share and share alike, and that the Central
Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and
Barcelona, which are precisely the street on which the property
abuts.
Of these documents the most important of all is the petition
presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the "mayor of the city of
Manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the letter written
by him on the 9th of October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of
Manila. Lorenzo del Rosario, in his testimony, admitted the
authenticity of both documents which contain an offer to the
municipality of Manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel.
Lorenzo del Rosario admitted also that he signed the first
document under the misapprehension that the land belonged to
the city, but that he had been subsequently informed by some
of the city officials that the land did not belong to the
municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he
signed the second document because the President of the
Municipal Board, Seor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to
avoid litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was
not contradicted. We accordingly hold that the provisions of
section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the
case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise
is not admissible in evidence.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a
perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the
complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to
dismiss.

f.

Res Gestae

1) Rule 130, 42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made
by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. xxx
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to res gestae
.1

.2

Statements made by a person either

.a while a startling occurrence is taking place or
.b immediately prior or
.c immediately subsequent thereto
with respect to the circumstances thereof

2)

Cases

People v. Putian, 74 SCRA 133 (1976)

A declaration made by a person immediately after being
wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be
considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in
evidence. A statement was given sometime after the stabbing
while the declarant was undergoing treatment at a medical
clinic, where he had no time to concoct a falsehood or to
fabricate a malicious charge against the accused and no motive
has been shown as to why he would frame-up the accused
would render the statement admissible as a part of the res
gestae.
Facts: Appellant admits that on 22Nov1969 while Teodulo
Panimdim was attending a dance, he (Panimdim) was stabbed in
the left groin. As a result of that assault, Panimdim died five
days later at the provincial hospital. The question is: Did Putian
stab Panimdim?
According to the prosecution, in the evening of that day, while
Patrolman Arturo Yap was passing Barrio Tabo-o, he noticed a
commotion at the back of the dance hall in that barrio. He was
informed that someone had been stabbed. He looked for the
culprit. He found Guillermo Putian behind the municipal building
with a dagger and scabbard in his possession. Yap investigated
Putian. The latter denied that he stabbed Panimdim. Yap
arrested Putian and surrendered him to Jesus Gomonit, the
guard at the municipal hall.
Patrolman Yap then repaired to the clinic of Doctor Saceda
where the victim, Teodulo Panimdim, alias Doling, was brought
for treatment. At the clinic, Yap wrote on a piece of paper the
victim's declaration.
When that statement was taken, Panimdim was in a sitting
position. Without anybody's help, he put on his undershirt, pants
and shirt. He went to his house without anyone's assistance.
Yap explained that Panimdim mentioned only a person named
Guirmo and that he, Yap, was the one who added the surname
Putian in the statement Exhibit C. He clarified that he wrote that
surname because he knew of no other person called Guirmo in
that locality except Guirmo Putian, an alleged gambler.
Issue: Whether or not the statements given by Panimdim was
part of res gestae.
Held: The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous
exclamations and (b) verbal acts. The trial court admitted
Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous statement made after
the commission of a felony.
Appellant Putian contends that Panimdim's statement was not
spontaneous because it was "made several hours after the
incident". He claims that the requisite that the declarant gave
the statement before he had time to devise or contrive was not
present in this case. Appellant further contends that because
the statement is in narrative form, it is not the statement
contemplated in the rule.
We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing
Panimdim's statement as a part of the res gestae and as proving

58

beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted upon him the stab
wound that caused his death five days later in the hospital.
"Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by
the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending
death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying
declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or
immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time
when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still
continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of
the res gestae."
Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing
while he was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic. He had
no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a malicious
charge against Putian. No motive has been shown as to why he
would frame up Putian.
People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 (1994)
Facts: Atanacia Ramos had a daughter Rosita. Rosita married
Domiciano Peralta. They had a daughter Siony. On morning,
Siony came to Atanacia at her house frantically told her that
Domiciano was strangling Rosita. They went to the Peralta home
and found Rosita dead. Domiciano was not there. They
immediately reported the matter to the police, who eventually
arrested the Domiciano. At the preliminary investigation, Siony
executed a sworn statement implicating her father. Domiciano
was charged with Parricide. At the trial Atanacia testified as to
Sionys declaration. However, Siony testified for her father and
said that though she saw someone strangling her mother, she
did not see who it was. After the defense rested, the prosecution
presented the investigating judge who testified as to the
regularity of the conduct of the preliminary investigation. TC
convicts.
Held: The statement Siony made to her grandmother when she
rushed to inform her of her father's attack on her mother was
part of the res gestae. Res gestae means the "thing done." It
refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime,
when the circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. Siony
rushed to Atanacia immediately upon seeing her father
strangling her mother to death. Her spontaneous declaration to
Atanacia was part of the res gestae and is assumed to preclude
the probability of premeditation of fabrication. Since the
utterance was made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses rather than reason and reflection, and
during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could
not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken
as expressing Siony's real belief as to the facts just observed by
her.
Besides, where a witness executes a statement for the
prosecution and retracts his testimony and subsequently
testified for the defense, the test to decide which testimony to
believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. Retractions are generally unreliable
and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts.
Siony testified during the preliminary examination conducted by
Judge Paano that the appellant choked her mother to death. Her
subsequent retraction was an afterthought and has no probative
value at all.
Furthermore, there are certain circumstances that may have
persuaded the daughter to change her former declaration and
testify in favor of her father. First, the accused was her father
after all, and she probably felt that she should not be
responsible for his incarceration for the rest of his life. Second,
her testimony was given 7 years after the incident and therefore
could not be expected to be as accurate as the statement she
made in the preliminary investigation only hours after the killing.
Third, during all this time, her father had been under detention
and she must have believed that this was punishment enough
for him. Lastly, she was, at the time she testified in court, living
with her father's sister, who may have greatly influenced her
testimony and caused her to recant her earlier statement.

g.

Verbal acts

1) Rule 130, 42

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. xxx So, also,

statements accompanying an equivocal act material to
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae (36 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to verbal acts
.1
.2
.3

statements accompanying an equivocal act

material to the issue
giving it a legal significance
2)

Case

Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919)

Facts: Tan Po Pik died in the Philippines intestate. After he died,
Marta Torres, claiming to be his widow, took possession of his
estate and partitioned it between herself and her children by the
deceased. Plaintiffs claim to be the legal wife and children of the
deceased from China. They now sue to recover their supposed
share of the estate. The SC found numerous inconsistencies as
to the testimonial and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs as
to lead to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not who they
claim to be. However, the plaintiff offered in evidence a sworn
declaration of the deceased that the plaintiffs were his children.
Defendants offered letters between the deceased and his
brother showing that deceaseds sworn declaration was to
deceive the customs authorities to allow plaintiffs to enter the
country. Plaintiffs object to the admissibility of such letters.
Held: The declaration was made in proceedings before customs
authorities upon arrival of the plaintiffs from China. The arrival
and admission of these plaintiffs and the declaration of Tan Po
Pik are isolated parts of an event which is the voyage from
China to the Philippines of these supposed children of the
deceased. Their preparations for the voyage and the plans
conceived by them to obtain their sure entrance into this
country are also part of the voyage. In order to consider the
declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs authorities,
the other acts, declarations, and events occurring before the
said entrance into the country, which may have an essential
bearing or which have led to the realization of their entrance
into the country are admissible in evidence in this case on the
ground that they constitute parts of the same transaction, or of
the res gestae. A word, an expression, or an act of a person,
considered apart from the circumstances surrounding them,
does not signify anything, and in many cases it signifies the
opposite of the true sense of the said word, expression, or act. It
is imprudent and illegal to consider the declaration made by Tan
Po Pik before the customs authorities separately from the
circumstances which prompted him to make such a declaration.
We must therefore inquire into circumstances which surrounded
the entrance of the plaintiffs and the declaration made by Tan Po
Pik on that occasion.
In this case, letters between Tan Po Pik and his brother in China
contained an agreement that for plaintiffs to enter the
Philippines, Tan Po Pik was to declare before the customs
authorities that plaintiffs were his children. The names of the
children whom Tan were supposed to declare as his children
were the same as the names of the plaintiffs, except that they
now bear the surname Tan. The letters even refer to one of the
plaintiffs as the deceaseds nephew. If these plaintiffs were
really children of Tan Po Pik, there would have been no necessity
for the above letters. Thus, Tan Po Piks declaration before the
customs authorities is for the sole purpose of allowing the
children to enter the Philippines, and such a declaration is
entirely false. All these letters formed an essential part of the
fact of the coming of these plaintiffs to Manila, because if these
letters had not been transmitted and received the plaintiffs
could not have succeeded in entering the Philippines. Therefore,
all the statements and declarations-of Tan Po Ho in these
documents relative to the prosecution of the object of the
conspiracy are admissible in evidence.
People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
Facts: Complainant Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota, then 52
years old and a widow, was asleep inside the room at their
market stall located in the public market of barangay Oscariz,
municipality of Ramon, Isabela, on the evening of 20Jan1980.
With her were her two married daughters, his son-in-law and
grandchildren.
At about 10PM, the accused woke up the complainant to
observe some people drinking at a stall in violation of the
barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after 10:00 o'clock in
the evening. So they went.

59

They stood a few meters away from the said stall for ten
minutes to observe the drinking session. Suddenly the accused
held her hands which made the complainant shout but was not
heard due to the loud music.
The accused slapped her and brought out his gun which he
pointed at her breast threatening to kill her if she creates any
noise. The accused then pulled her and she fell on the ground
hitting her head on the pavement so she lost consciousness,
sustaining injuries on the palms of her hands.
When she regained consciousness after a short while, she was
dragged by the accused towards the banana grove near the
market. She managed to stand and walk while being dragged.
The accused then carried her body across the canal and dropped
her on the ground causing her to fall flat on her belly and her
fingers were again injured by the broken glasses on the ground.
She could not free herself nor shout for help because of the
threat to her life.
After she fell flat on the ground, the accused held her and
pressed her down and he proceeded to remove her skirt and
shorts and thereafter her blouse leaving her exposed naked with
her back to the ground. She was not wearing any panty or
brassiere then. Besides pressing her down the accused stepped
on her thigh with his left foot as he went on top of her naked
body. Then he stood up warning her not to make any noise and
he removed his pants and tee-shirt after which he again went on
top of her naked body holding her hands. Pointing the gun at her
breast anew, the accused repeated his threat to kill her if she
resisted. Then the accused started mashing her breast and
succeeded in having sexual congress with the complainant. She
felt his penis penetrating her vagina followed by a push and pull
movement for less than an hour, until she felt semen emitting
from his penis and entering her body. When she reached home
about 12:00 midnight, Silveria asked her what happened and
she revealed that the accused abused her. When Silveria
pressed for details, the complainant replied that she will tell her
the following morning.
The next morning complainant told Silveria everything that
happened to her and thereafter she proceeded to Santiago town
and reported the incident to Mr. Segundo Maylem, post
commander and Executive Vice Chapter Commander, VFP
Southern Isabela, from whom she sought assistance. She was
advised to submit herself to an investigation and medical
examination. After due investigation by the PC, a complaint for
rape was filed signed and sworn to by complainant in the MTC
against the accused.
In appealing his conviction, the accused, through counsel
assailed the credibility of complainant and interposed the
defense of denial and alibi. However, by way of rebuttal of the
People's brief filed by another collaborating counsel for
appellant, the failure of the prosecution to establish
involuntariness on the part of the victim was emphasized.
Held: The appeal is impressed with merit.
Complainant was a widow, 52 years of age. She had been
married three times. She was not that innocent about the world.
When appellant invited her at 10PM to step out of her house,
she should have declined. Going out alone with a man late in
the evening is neither in good taste nor safe even if the one who
invited her was the barrio captain.
But obviously, the appellant was quite intimate with the
complainant. When he knocked at her door and was allowed
entry, he proceeded into the bedroom of complainant and woke
her up himself.
Complainant went with the appellant in her shorts. She took no
precaution as any discreet woman would do by at least putting
on her panty and a brassiere instead of stepping out with the
appellant in her shorts.
If she could not be heard as her voice was drowned by the
blaring stereo player, she should have shouted louder again and
again. Better still, she should have run towards the canteen
which was just two meters away or to her residence which was
one market stall away. After allegedly shouting once, she kept
her peace.
She was allegedly dragged although she admits she willingly
walked along. She was allegedly carried across the canal by the
appellant although she was taller and definitely bigger than
appellant.

When she fell on the ground, the appellant removed her shorts
and skirt without difficulty. She offered no resistance. Even as he
stood up to remove his pants she did not attempt to stand up to
escape nor to shout for help. There was no sign of struggle or
resistance. Then the appellant put his penis into her vagina
penetrating her. They had sexual intercourse for almost one
hour. She even felt the semen of appellant as it entered her
body. Not a whimper, not a sound from the complainant was
heard. She claims she was afraid due to the gun of appellant
and his threats. She did not even describe the type of gun the
appellant threatened her with several times. Nor had the
prosecution shown appellant ever had a gun. All indications
show that she submitted to his advances.
As the Court sees it, what actually happened in this case, is that
when the complainant went out with the appellant that evening,
she was aware of the risk of going out alone with a man for a
reason that is far from unavoidable. They were close and side by
side for sometime, allegedly watching the drinking session at
Linda's canteen. They must have succumbed to the temptation
of the flesh. One thing led to the other until they had sexual
intercourse. Perhaps the complainant did not initiate or motivate
the sexual interlude. In the least, she must have abetted it if not
willingly submitted to the advances of the appellant. Indeed,
they were in ecstasy for almost one hour. Such mutual and
passionate lovemaking can certainly not be characterized as
involuntary. It was free and without any compulsion.
The appellant was 48 years old when the incident happened. To
think that a younger man would rape an elderly woman of 52
years, widow, three times married, would be quite unusual. It is
more probable that it was consensual.
The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to
her daughter Silveria of what happened to her when she
returned home as part of the res gestae. It is important to stress
that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also
be made at a time when there was no opportunity for her to
concoct or develop her own story. As the Court observed, the
complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual
encounter. She took a walk. She spent some time thinking of
what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some bruises on
her body and back because she was lying down on the ground
during the sexual intercourse and their passionate interlude.
She had enough time to make a decision on what will be the
nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be categorized as
part of the res gestae.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered
ACQUITTING the appellant of the offense charged, with costs de
oficio.
People v. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)
Facts: At around 7pm of 07Nov1983, Adelaida Lingad left her
niece, Grace Paule and her three (3) children namely: Geraldine
(Irene), Glenly and Enrique, all minors, at home to attend the
wake of her uncle in a house 200 meters away from her place.
The children were the only ones left at home. Her husband was
then working abroad. At that time, Adelaida had P4,000.00 in
cash which was wrapped in newspaper and kept hidden under
her bed. Before leaving the house, Adelaida instructed the kids
to go to bed.
At around 1pm or 2pm of 08Nov1983, accused Tala, Tolentino,
Matawaran and an unknown person whose face was covered
entered the house of Adelaida Lingad by forcibly breaking the
window grill of the comfort room and demanded to know from
the children where their mother hid her money. Grace Paule
knew Manolito Tolentino alias Bong because he is both an uncle
and a barriomate. She also knew Carlito Tala alias Boy who is a
relative of her mother and Rodolfo Matawaran who is a
"barkada" of Carlito. She recognized all the accused for the
lights were on. When the man whose face was covered
threatened to stab the kids, Geraldine got so frighten that she
revealed to the accused where her mother hid the money.
After Tolentino took the P4,000.00, he stabbed Grace Paule and
the children. During the stabbing incident, Grace Paule lost
consciousness but was able to regain it back after about five (5)
minutes and shouted for help. Her mother and grandmother,
who lived nearby, heard her and immediately proceeded to said
house but the four (4) accused had already left.
When accused Tolentino's brother informed Adelaida about the
stabbing incident that took place in her house, Adelaida
immediately rushed to her house and saw all the children with

60

stab wounds. Glenly was lying on the bed already dead while
her bloodied niece Grace was sitting down near the door looking
pale and holding her heart. Upon reaching Geraldine, who was
lying at the porch, she asked her the identities of the person
responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering "BongBong" and also mentioning the names of Tala and Matawaran.
However, when she asked her son Enrique the latter was not
able to answer but merely made a sign with his three (3) fingers.
Thereafter, Adelaida lost consciousness and was brought to the
house of her mother.
Grace Paule was the only surviving victim.
Defense: Alibi, delivered water melons.
Held: We find Grace's testimony credible. There is no evidence
on record to show why said witness would falsely implicate the
accused-appellant Tala who is a relative of her mother unless it
is the truth. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by
prosecution witness Adelaida Lingad when the latter testified
that her deceased daughter Geraldine mentioned the names of
the accused-appellant Tala and accused Matawaran as the
persons who stabbed her before she died. As to accusedappellant's contention that the statement of Geraldine, naming
her assailant soon after she was stabbed is inadmissible as part
of res gestae, We find said contention fallacious.
The trial court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae,
namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the
statements made must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances which are all present in
the case at bar as Geraldine had named accused-appellant as
one of the perpetrators in the commission of the crime
immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing incident.

(Rule 130, Sec. 44). Both official and business records are only
prima facie evidence.
If the person making the entry is still alive, use the record to
refresh his memory. (Rule 132, Sec. 16)
2)

Cases

Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)

Facts: This case arose out of a grade crossing accident which
occurred in Massachusetts.
The accident occurred on the night of 25Dec1940. On
27Dec1940, the engineer of the train, who died before the trial,
made a statement at a freight office of petitioners where he was
interviewed by an assistant superintendent of the road and by a
representative of the Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission.
This statement was offered in evidence by petitioners under the
Act of 20Jun1936. They offered to prove (in the language of the
Act) that the statement was signed in the regular course of
business, it being the regular course of such business to make
such a statement. Respondent's objection to its introduction was
sustained.
Issue: Whether or not the statement made by the engineer was
admissible as entries in the course of business.
Held: We agree with the majority view below that it was
properly excluded.
We do not think that it was made 'in the regular course' of
business within the meaning of the Act. The business of the
petitioners is the railroad business. That business like other
enterprises entails the keeping of numerous books and records
essential to its conduct or useful in its efficient operation.
Though such books and records were considered reliable and
trustworthy for major decisions in the industrial and business
world, their use in litigation was greatly circumscribed or hedged
about by the hearsay rule-restrictions which greatly increased
the time and cost of making the proof where those who made
the records were numerous.
An accident report may affect that business in the sense that it
affords information on which the management may act. It is not,
however, typical of entries made systematically or as a matter
of routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect
transactions with others, or to provide internal controls. The
conduct of a business commonly entails the payment of tort
claims incurred by the negligence of its employees. But the fact
that a company makes a business out of recording its
employees' versions of their accidents does not put those
statements in the class of records made 'in the regular course'
of the business within the meaning of the Act.
In short, it is manifest that in this case those reports are not for
the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business.
Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of
lading and the like these reports are calculated for use
essentially in the court, not in the business. Their primary utility
is in litigating, not in railroading.

h.

Entries in the Course of Business

1) Rule 130, 43
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty. (37 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to
Entries in the course of business
.1
.2
.3
.4

Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to

which they refer
by a person deceased, or unable to testify
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated
if such person made the entries in his professional capacity
or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.

Note that in business records, the person making the entry must
be deceased or unable to testify. In official records, the person
making the entry need not be deceased or unable to testify

Philamlife v. Capital Assurance Corp., (CA) 72

O.G. 3941
Facts: Philam entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with
Capital Assurance and the Galang spouses. The Galangs were
agents of Philam.
Under the agreement, Capital and the Galangs, jointly and
severally, agreed to pay Philam a certain sum with interest in
consideration of Philams issuance of a clearance in favor of the
Galangs. The sum was paid in full by Capital Life.
However, there appears to be a stipulation in the Agreement to
the effect that Capital and the Galangs would pay to Philam any
and all obligations of the Galangs arising from the unremitted
premium collections and such other agency accounts.

61

Pursuant to this, Philam wrote a letter to Capital informing it that

the Galangs had collected premium payments from policy
holders and failed to remit the same to it. Philam demanded
payment therefore.
The Galangs did not admit that such
amount was due and so Capital refused to pay. Philam sued for
collection of the additional amounts against Capital, the lone
defendant.
During the trial, Philam had but one witness, Narciso Bacani, the
chief of its Accounts Control Office. He testified on a statement
of account showing that the Galangs are indebted to Philam. He
however, DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW
THE ACCOUNT HAD RISEN AS HIS OFFICE MERELY COMPUTED
THE CHARGES BASED ON DEBIT MEMOS RECEIVED FROM OTHER
DEPARTMENTS OF PHILAM.
CFI ruled against Capital. Capital contends that Philam has not
proven the alledged unremitted premium payments. It contests
the admissibility of the said statement of account (SOA).
Issue: WON the SOA is admissible.
Held: No. The witness could have had knowledge of the entries
made as it was his office which made such entries in the SOA,
but certainly he did not have personal knowledge of the facts
stated in the entries i.e., that the Galangs had collected
premiums and failed to remit them since by his own admission,
he merely computed the charges.
Moreover, he is not a person deceased, outside of the Phils, or
unable to testify so that the entries made could be received in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Consequently,
the testimony of the witness here is worthless as evidence and
the SOA to which he testified is likewise bereft of probative
value.
The entries in question being so far removed from the
exceptions to the hearsay rule, cannot and should not substitute
for a witness personal knowledge of the transactions sought to
be established. Complaint dismissed.
Dissenting (justice de Castro): Testifying on the SOA, the
witness stated without controversion that he prepared the same
pursuant to his duties as a section chief of the account control
office.
As a matter of course, his section compiles and
computes unremitted premium collections based on data
received from the other departments. It is hard to see how the
statement should be less trustworthy when the person who
prepared it is available and did precisely testify on it.
As for his knowledge of the facts
necessity makes it sufficient that
the regular course of business,
information gave it in compliance

stated in the entries, practical

he received the information in
when the person giving such
with a duty.

It is not essential that the entrant should have personal

knowledge of the fact entered by him if he made the entry in the
regular course of business, recording a report made to him by
one or more other ersons in the regular course of business lying
in the personal knowledge of the latter, there is no objection of
receiving the entry provided that practical inconveniences of
producing on the stand the numerous persons thus concerned
would in the particular case outweigh the probable utility of
doing so.
The entrant may be said to have received the information on the
regular course of business, when the person giving such
information gave it in compliance with his duty.

i.

Official Records

1) Rule 130, 44
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public

officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the

performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to
Entries in official records
.1

made in the performance of his duty

.2

by either
.a

a public officer of the Philippines, or

.b

by a person in the performance of a duty specially

enjoined by law

Note that in official records, the person making the entry need
not be deceased or unable to testify, but he must be a public
officer or a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law. In business records, the person making the
entry must be deceased or unable to testify. Both official and
business records are only prima facie evidence.
2)

Cases

Fortus v. Novero, 23 SCRA 1330 (1968)

Facts: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land. She
had only one child, Crisanta Ilagan. Crisanta predeceased her
mother. Crisanta was married to Fermin Fortus. They had an only
son, the Victorino Fortus. Ciriaca died intestate. The property
therefore passed on to Victorino Fortus. However, Victorino
never caused the OCT to be cancelled and to have another
issued in his name. Ciriacas estate was therefore not yet
closed.
Victorino Fortus and Julia Fortus were husband and wife but were
childless. Upon Victorino's death, Julia executed an affidavit of
extra-judicial summary settlement of Ciriacas estate and had it
registered. Rosario Novero, claiming to be an illegitimate child of
Victorino with Patricia Novero, initiated proceedings for
summary settlement of Ciriacas estate. Julia opposed, along
with the Fortuses, who claim to be Victorinos half-brother and
sisters. They claim to be the legitimate children of Fermin Fortus
with Jacoba Aguil.
The Fortuses did not present the marriage contract or certificate
of their alleged parents, but sought to present secondary
evidence. The SC found the testimonial evidence the Fortuses
presented to lay the basis for introduction of secondary
evidence were inconsistent, incredible
and insufficient to
establish than an original marriage contract was indeed
executed. However, the Fortuses presented baptismal
certificates of some of them to prove the marriage of their
parents. Note that they must prove marriage because otherwise,
they would be illegitimate relatives of Victorino which would
disqualify them from inheriting from him.
Held: The record of baptism attests to the fact of the
administration of the sacrament on the date stated therein, but
not the truth of the statements therein made as to the
parentage of the child baptized. Neither are the baptismal
certificates public documents or public writings, because the
parochial records of baptisms are not public or official records,
as they are not kept by public officers, and are not proof of
relationship or filiation of the child baptized.
Furthermore, though the Fortuses invoke that since for the past
30 years their parents had deported themselves in public as
husband and wife and had been living under the same roof, the
legal presumption is that they had entered into a lawful
marriage. This presumption, however, is only applicable where
there is no clear and concrete evidence showing otherwise. In
this case, however, there is a certificate from the Division of
Archives to the effect that 'no copy of the marriage record of
spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil supposed to have been
solemnized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the Municipality of
Rosario, Batangas had been received by said office for file', and
this certification is further strengthened by the affirmation of
Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in the office of the municipal
treasurer of Rosario, Batangas, that there was no record of such
marriage supposedly contracted between the spouses Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil from 1902 and 1922 of the Municipality
of Rosario, Batangas. At most, the baptismal certificates were
only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia Fortus had
overcome by satisfactory evidence to the effect that Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were never married and hence all of

62

their children are not legitimate brothers or half brothers and

therefore have no right to inherit from Victorino Fortus.
Escolin: Before, baptismal certificates were competent evidence
to establish the parentage of the child. After Act 3753, baptismal
certificates were no longer competent.
Johnson v. Lutz, ()
Africa v. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 (31mar1966) L12986
Facts: It appears that in the afternoon of 18Mar1948 a fire
broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo
street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage,
right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal properties and
effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here,
sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the
first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent
in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them
was attributed as the cause of the fire.
1. Police Department Report:"Investigation disclosed that at about 4PM 18Mar1948, while
Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck, plate
No. T-5292 into underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station
located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this
City, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the
burning match stick near the main valve of the said
underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly
blazed. Quick action of Leandio Flores in pulling off the gasoline
hose connecting the truck with the underground tank prevented
a terrific explosion. However, the flames scattered due to the
hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck
and the following accessories, and residences."
2. The Fire Department Report:In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic)
subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette
stand,) the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a
photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted
herewith. It appears in this picture that there is in the premises
a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to information
gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and
matches, installed between the gasoline pumps and the
underground tanks."
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of
their employees.
Issue: Whether or not reports on the fire prepared by the Manila
Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines are admissible in evidence
as entries in official records.
Held:
As to report of Detective Capacillo:
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
mentioned:
a. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance
of his duties, or by such other person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
c.that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be
considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the
reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not
within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the
investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired
by them through official information? As to some facts the
sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to

Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station

where the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank
truck from which gasoline was being transferred at the time to
the underground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo
Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any
reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as
"official information acquired by the officers who prepared the
reports, the persons who made the statements not only must
have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the
duty to give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule: the facts stated therein were not acquired by the
reporting officers through official information, not having been
given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the
cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of
appellees.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance
of defendants failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show
its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the
doctrine may be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one
of them.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The
persons who knew or could have known how the fire started
were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
As to report by Captain Leoncio Mariano:
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer
in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal
observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered
as an exception to the hearsay rule. Those facts, descriptive of
the location and objective circumstances surrounding the
operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent
measures of caution than those which would satisfy the
standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. There
is no more eloquent demonstration of this than the statement of
Leandro Flores before the police investigator. Flores was the
driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without
assistance, was transfering the contents thereof into the
underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before
loading the underground tank there were no people, but while
the loading was going on, there were people who went to drink
coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from
the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when
the tank was almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the
valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he
heard someone shout "fire."
Decision reversed.
People v. Leones, 117 SCRA 382 (30sep1982) L48727
Facts: Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the
store of Mr. & Mrs. Pepito Leona at San Fernando, La Union
where she resided.
On 22Apr1973, the complainant who had headache stayed in
her room. Earlier that day, the members of the Leones family,
including the accused-appellant Joseph Leones and his sister
Elizabeth, had gone to nearby beach resort for a picnic.
At about past noon the appellant and Elizabeth returned to their
house. While there, the appellant and Elizabeth entered the
room where complainant was lying down and forced her to take
three tablets dissolved in a spoon which according to them were
aspirin. The complainant refused to take the tablets but was
forced to do so when the appellant held her mouth while his
sister pushed the medicine. Then the appellant and Elizabeth
left the room and after a while the complainant felt dizzy.
Later, the appellant returned to the complainant's room and
took off her panty. Then the appellant went on top of her. The
complainant tried to push him but as she was weak and dizzy,
the appellant succeeded in abusing her.

63

At about 4:30 P.M. of the same date, Natividad Leones, the

stepmother of the appellant, found the complainant unconscious
near her room without any panty on. She was then taken to the
La Union Provincial Hospital by the driver of the Leona family.
When admitted to the hospital at about 6PM of the same date,
the complainant was semiconscious, incoherent and hysterical.
She refused to talk and to be examined by the doctors. She was
irritated when approached by a male figure. The complainant
was first attended to by Dr. Antonino Estioco who found out that
she had vaginal bleeding. The complainant was then referred to
Dr. Fe Cayao who was informed by Dr. Estioco that she might
have been a victim of rape.
In the presence of the
complainant's father, Dr. Cayao examined her on 26Apr1973
after which she issued a medical certificate with the following
findings:

Hernandez its driver, collided with a passenger truck at

Paraaque, Rizal. In the course of and as a result of the
accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year
old, causing him physical injuries which resulted in his death
several days later. Edgardo Hernandez was prosecuted for
homicide through reckless imprudence and after trial was found
guilty of the charge and sentenced to one year prision
correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P3,000, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay costs. Edgardo Hernandez served out
his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity. Two writs of
execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the
indemnity, but both writs were returned unsatisfied by the
sheriff who certified that no property, real or personal, in
Hernandez' name could be found.
On 17Feb1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara
Salvador, father and mother respectively of Armando, filed the
present action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary
liability.

i.

Presence of erythema (redness of the skin) of the vestibular

portion of external genitalia;

ii.

Healing lacerations of the hymen at 2:00 o'clock and 10

o'clock;

iii.

Easily admit one finger with pain;

iv.

Unclotted blood at the vagina cavity;

v.

Smear exam for sperm cell-negative; D'plococci-negative

Florence test-reagent not available.'

The company appealed. To prove their case against the

defendant Company, the plaintiff presented evidences, among
them, the sheriffs return of the writs of execution. Defendant
company objected to CFI admitting the sheriffs return. CFI
ruled against defendant company.

Because of the lack of facilities in the hospital, Dr. Cayao was

not able to make any examination to determine whether drug
was given to the complainant.

In their appeal, defendant contends that admitting the sheriffs

return without presenting the sheriff in court deprived them of
the opportunity to cross-examine the said sheriff.

Defense: Alibi, at the beach.

Issue: Whether or not it is necessary that the sheriff testify in

court on his return of the writs.

Held: The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2",
showing the date of her admission in the hospital on 22Apr1973,
her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing
lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries
having been made in official records by a public officer of the
Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by
law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital. (Rule
130, Sec. 38, Rules of Court). In the case at bar, Dr. Antonino
Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was
not presented as a witness for the government.
Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10
o'clock of the hymen which was then already healing on
22Apr1973, it follows reasonably that the defloration occurred
several days before, which may have happened when Irene
Dulay took a week-long vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La
Union (tsn, p. 10, June 27, 1975) and there is evidence that she
had a suitor named Ferdinand Sarmiento who is from nearby
Agoo, La Union. And when she returned to the house of her
employer in San Fernando, La Union, she had already chest and
stomach pains and a headache.
From the same clinical case record, Exhibit "2", it appears
clearly that the alleged victim, Irene Dulay, was having her
menstrual period when she was supposedly raped for the
Complaint indicated that she had vaginal bleeding. She herself
admitted in her testimony that on 22Apr1973, she was having
her menstruation. (tsn, p. 9, June 27, 1975).
It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human
experience and behavior that a man would have sexual
intercourse with a woman then having her menstrual period, as
was the admitted condition of the complainant when she was
allegedly abused by the accused. And because of this universal
abhorrence, taboo and distaste to have sexual contact with a
menstruating female and this is so however passionate and
lustful the man may be unless he is depraved or demented, We
cannot believe that the accused-appellant, a young fourth year
college student of civil engineering studying in Baguio City,
would break or violate such a taboo by drugging the
complainant girl with the help of his sister and afterwards have
sex relations with her in her menstrual condition.
There are also proof that complainant was obsessed with the
accused and that the complainant was praning.
Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729
(16aug1956) L-8171

Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the

defendant Company to pay to plaintiffs damages.

Held: A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public

official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
and forming part of official records, and is prima, facie evidence
of the facts stated therein. The sheriff making the return need
not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.
To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving
private documents, an exception is made with reference to the
method of proving public documents executed before and
certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials.
The courts and the legislature have recognized the valid reason
for such an exception. The litigation is unlimited in which
testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare
as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in
whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is
not needed from official sources. Were there no exception to
official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting,
the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court
or delivering their depositions before an officer. The work of
Administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence.
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy
and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge
of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken
to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require.
Judgment affirmed.
People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (27jan1993)
103292
Facts: While Evelyn de Vera and Maria Victoria Parana were
walking home through an uninhabited place at about 11PM on
14Oct1988, accused Cabuang and Matabang suddenly appeared
from the surrounding rice fields. Cabuang grabbed Maria Victoria
and covered her mouth, Evelyn ran away because she became
terribly frightened and Matabang followed in pursuit. Matabang
lost sight of Evelyn along the road.
From her hiding place in the front yard of a house along the
road, Evelyn saw Maria Victoria pass by in a tricycle with the
accused Cabuang, Matabang and two (2) other men and heard
Maria Victoria crying and pleading for help. Evelyn clearly
recognized Cabuang and Matabang, but not the other two (2).

Facts: On 09Aug1947, a taxicab owned and operated by

defendant appellant Company and driven by Edgardo

64

Early the next morning, on 15Oct1988, the body of Maria

Victoria was found in the barangay traversed by the road on
which Maria Victoria were walking the night before.
Issue: Whether or not the Police Blotter was conclusive.
Held: Appellants principally urge that the trial court had erred in
finding that prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera had positively
identified Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as the
assailants of Maria Victoria. Appellants point to the entry in the
Bayambang police blotter (Exhibit "I") which stated that the
assailants were "still unidentified" although the entry was made
after prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera was questioned by the
police.
We consider this contention bereft or merit. Upon receiving the
report that a dead body was found, members of the Bayambang
Police Station immediately proceeded to the reported crime
scene on the morning of 15Oct1988. The police investigator, Pfc.
Elegio Lopez, who initially questioned witness De Vera that
morning, noticed that she was in a state of shock. He
accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the
afternoon of the same day when Evelyn had calmed down
sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement to the police.
Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the
police blotter at around 11AM, stating that the assailants were
still unidentified; there was, upon the other hand, Evelyn de
Vera's sworn statement made and completed in the afternoon of
the same day, where she revealed the identities of the men she
had seen the night before and who she believed were
responsible for the rape and death of her cousin Maria Victoria.
The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the
doers of the horrific rape, killing and robbery of Maria Victoria
the first time she was questioned by the police, does not
adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case law that
the delay of a witness in revealing to the police authority what
he or she may know about a crime does not, by itself, render the
witness' testimony unworthy of belief.
Entries in a police blotter though regularly done in the course of
performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth
of such entries, In People v. Santito, Jr., this Court held that
entries in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie
evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in the
police blotter could well be incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony
given in open court during the trial is commonly much more
lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police
blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a police
report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence
gathered in the course of the police investigation and presented
in court. In the case at bar, we conclude that Prosecution
witness Evelyn de Vera did positively and clearly identify
Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those who
had raped and killed and robbed the hapless Maria Victoria
Parana.
People v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-107735, Feb. 1,
1996
Facts: The evidence shows that at around 7pm of 26Nov1989,
within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos Road,
Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and
the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with "Ramon Doe" on
the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers
pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened
towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed
weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded
him and simultaneously stabbed him in the stomach and at the
back, after which the assailants ran towards the highway leaving
Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought to Mary
Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw
Tonog drunk; Tonog even attempted to box him but he parried
his blow; Tonog continued walking but when he chanced upon
Ramon he suddenly and without provocation boxed and kicked
Ramon; Ramon fought back but was subdued by his bigger
assailant so the former ran towards the highway; when Tonog
met a certain "Mando" he boxed the latter who however fought
back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this moment he
saw Ramon return with a bolo on hand; he warned Ramon not to
fight but his advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand
Ramon struck Tonog on the belly; when "Mando" saw what
happened he ("Mando") pulled out his knife and also stabbed
Tonog at the back; Ramon and "Mando" then fled towards the
highway.

The accused further claimed that he even stayed with the victim
and called out the latter's companions to bring him to the
hospital; that prosecution witness Brenda Gonzales only arrived
at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken to the hospital;
that Brenda even inquired from him what happened and then
prodded him to testify; that his refusal coupled with the fact that
he owed Gonzales some money earned him the ire of the latter
and that was why he was charged for the death of Tonog.
Held: The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information
Sheet prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention
him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal
suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and
candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Entries in
official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not
conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily
entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate,
sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to
the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the
trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters
stated in the police blotter.
Significantly, the Advance
Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense
during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance
by the accused on the document must fail since the court
cannot consider any evidence which has not been formally
offered.
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by
the police officer only after interviewing Camba an alleged
eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the
attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the
slightest effort to present Camba on the part of the accused
should militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3)
requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception
to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public officer who
prepared the document had no sufficient and personal
knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed
by him was acquired from Camba which therefore could not be
categorized as official information because in order to be
classified as such the persons who made the statements not
only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must
have the duty to give such statements for the record. In the
case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such
statements.

j.

Commercial Lists

1) Rule 130, 45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of
statements of matters of interest, to persons engaged in
an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or
other published compilation is admissible as tending to
prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by
them therein. (39)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to
Commercial lists
a.
b.

statements of matters of interest

to persons engaged in an occupation

65

c.

contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published

compilation
d. as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated
e. the compilation is
i. published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and
ii. generally used and relied upon by them therein.
e.g. NEDA reports, part of the newspaper which reports the
prices of shares
2)

Cases

State v. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843 (1979)

Facts: Lungsford was arrested upon being found in possession
of a 1968 Plymouth Road Runner which was stolen from James
Wilton. He was charged with the crime of knowingly possessing
a motor vehicle with an altered serial number. The State unable
to produce Wilton at trial to identify the vehicle or to testify that
it was stolen. Lungsford testified at trial that he bought the car
from James Law. Although he had title and registration he
couldnt corroborate the hearsay nature of certain evidence
admitted. The errors focus on the way the police attempted to
prove that the car in question was stolen.
Cars have distinguishing numbers which are placed in the cars
at the point of production. The vehicle identification number
(VIN) indicates the year, type and make of the car. In the case
at bar, the VIN was riveted into the drivers side of the
dashboard. There was also a factory order number stamped
under the hood of stamped to the radiator brace on the drivers
side. There was also a packing slip number in the coils of the
back seat. A car can be traced through any of these numbers.
Since it appeared that the VIN wasnt factory installed, the
National Automobile Theft Bureau was requested to trace the
car through the factory order no. A factory trace provides the
time of manufacture and reveals the zone office where the car
was sold, permitting the identification of the first owner. The
VIN for the vehicle may also be determined. The trace of the
factory order number stamped on the radiator brace produced
an allegedly corresponding VIN.
Lungsford claimed that the windshield was smashed and the VIN
tag was broken loose on one side, that he bought new seats
from a junkyard, replaced the engine and put in a new radiator
and brace. No receipts were presented. He re-registered the
car due to a lost license plate.
The State relied on the NATB factory trace information to
establish that the car was the same one Wilton reported stolen.
The judge didnt allow the State to prove what NATB told the
detective, but the entire tracing process was crucial in the
States attempt to link the car in Lungsfords possession to the
stolen Wilton vehicle which it had allowed. The judge convicted
Lungsford.
The NATB is a non-profit corporation, national in scope, financed
by about 500 automobile insurance companies representing
95% of the industry. Its purpose is to prevent and reduce theft
and losses of automobiles.
It gathers and disseminates
information on stolen automobiles and assists law enforcers in
their identification and recovery. It is the repository for all
vehicle information and identification numbers on all American
and Foreign made cars, thus an informational warehouse &
registry of the industry.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal investigation report of NATB
be admissible in evidence?
Held: Conviction reversed. Although Walsh was not permitted
to tell the jury the contents of the information he received from
NATB, his whole process of tracing the identity of the said car
was dependent thereon. This crucial link was evidential against
Lungsford. The record is devoid of any proof on the reliability of
the NATB procedures and of any evidential basis for admission
of data derived therefrom. There must be compliance with Evid.
R. 63 (30) whereby the judge must be convinced that the
compilation, list, register, periodical is published for use by
persons engaged in that occupation and is generally considered
useful or reliable. If such is met, then statements from the
compilation, etc. are admissible to prove the truth of the
relevant matter stated. The rationale of this rule is that the use
of such materials is necessary because it is too difficult to call
the witness to the stand all those who have participated in the
preparation or compilation of such.
The trustworthiness
requirement is satisfied by the requirement that a finding be

made by the judge that the material is regularly published for

use by persons who rely on it. There is no reason to falsify such
compilation etc. since it needs to be accurate.
The trial judge erred in holding that this hearsay of Wilton was
admissible under business records exception.
While police
records may qualify as business records for certain purposes
and in certain respects, they are not vehicles by which
substantive evidential status may be conferred upon the
otherwise hearsay declarations of a victim or witness to the
crime, accident or other occurrence.
If the declarant is
unavailable to testify and if the statement is not admissible
under res gestae or dying declarations, it cannot be admitted
predicated upon the circumstance that the statement was made
to a police officer who paraphrased its content in his report. The
rationale is that records made in the usual course of business
normally
possess
a
circumstantial
probability
of
trustworthiness. The business record exception is predicated
on the fact that the record itself is kept in the usual course of
business and that the recorded information is obtained from a
declarant having a business duty to communicate truthfully.
Both have to be met. In this case, the 2 nd criteria was not met.
A police record is admissible to prove that a report of a crime
was made by a member of the public and when it was made and
received. But it is not admissible to prove the truth of the
contents of that report since members of the public, whether
targets of investigation, witnesses or victims, are not under a
duty to make an honest and truthful report. Citizen declarations
are held to constitute hearsay in respect of otherwise admissible
police reports.
PNOC Shipping vs. CA (299 SCRA 402)
Facts: In the morning of 21Sep1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV,
owned by the Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp., collided with Luzon
Stevedorings (LSC) vessel, Petroparcel near Fortune Island in
Nasugbu, Batangas. After an investigation was conducted, the
Philippine Coast Guard found Petroparcel at fault. After an
unsuccessful demand by Maria Efigenia, they sued LSC and
Capt Duruelo (captain of the boat) for damages. Since, LSC had
sold all of its boats, barges and ships to PNOC Shipping, PNOC
assuming the obligations of LSC on the boats replaced LSC as
party defendant. The Lower Court ruled in favor of Maria
Efigenia awarding P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the
fishing boat with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
In arriving at the above disposition, the LC cited the evidence
presented by Maria Efigenia consisting the testimony of its sole
witness, Edilberto del Rosario, their general manager.
He
testified that Maria Efigenia XV was wooden boat owned by the
said corporation and, at the time it sank, it was then carrying
1,060 baneras of assorted fish the value of which was never
recovered. Also, lost were two Cummins engines (250 hp),
radar, pathometer and compass. Because of the loss of the
ship, they had to hire a lawyer to litigate their claim in the Baord
of Marine Inquiry and here in the lower court. The lower court
considered the following documentary evidence: (1.) Marine
Protest executed by Delfin Villarosa; (2.) a quotation for the
construction of a 95-footer trawler by Magalong Engineering
costing P2,250,000; (3.) a pro forma invoice for the Cummins
model engine costing P1,160,000 each; (4.) a quotation for a
compact daylight radar costing P145,000; (5.) quotation of
prices for nylon ropes, compass, floats; (6.) retainer agreement
between del Rosario and F. Sumulong Law for attorneys fees
and (7.) a quotation for nets and baneras (tubs). On the other
hand, PNOC presented Lorenzo Lazaro, its Senior Estimator at its
shipyard, as an expert witness stating that the award was
excessive but he could not give a breakdown of the prices for
the replacement of the boat. MR was denied. On appeal to the
CA, the award was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the
documents presented by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corp. as in the
nature of documents in a commercial lists, in the nature of
market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and
price lists, exempt from the hearsay rule?
Held: Decision modified. Award of Actual Damages deleted and
an award of P2,000,000 in Nominal Damages is given.
To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory
damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with
reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof
on the basis of available evidence.
Damages cannot be
presumed and courts must point to specific facts as basis for the
measure of the award. In this case, actual damages was proven
only by the sole testimony of the fishing corps. general manager
and certain pieces of documentary evidence.
PNOC had

66

objected to the admission of such evidence on the ground that

these were not duly authenticated and that Del Rosario had no
personal knowledge on the contents of the writing and neither
was an expert on the subject. This objection was ignored by the
lower court.
The court herein held that the price quotations that became the
basis of the award are ordinary private writings which under the
Revised Rules of Court should have been proferred along with
the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have
testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even
though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he
was not the one who issued the price quotations. Such a
testimony was hearsay. Also, any testimony he makes shall be
considered self-serving interests.
The court also holds that the documents do not fall under any of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The CA had considered said
documents as part of one of the exception under the
Commercial Lists and the Like Rule. In order, to fall under such
an exception, a document must be:
1. it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged
in an occupation;
2. such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or
other published compilation;
3. said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation; and
4. it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same
occupation.

in the contemporary political history of the country of which

courts of justice could take judicial cognizance.
There can be no doubt of the propriety of the trial courts action
in applying the table to the transaction at bar. No evidence of
the rate of exchange between Japanese occupation currency
and Philippine currency at the time the transaction took place
having been presented, the case is one which calls for the
application of said conversion table.
The doctrine laid down in Roger vs. Smith, Bell is inapplicable to
the case at bar. The transaction in that case was a debt which
created the relation of debtor-creditor between the parties, and
the instrument in which it is recorded did not provide for the
payment of the debt in any specific currency. Hence, the debt
had to be paid in legal tender at the time payment of the
obligation was demanded, under the provision of the Act of the
U.S. Cognress.
However, in the case at bar, the transaction is distinct. It is a
sale with the right of repurchase and it was executed on
22Jun1945. It did not create a relation of debtor and creditor
between the parties. It simply conferred upon the vendor a
legal right which he may or may not exercise.
k.

Learned Treatises

1) Rule 130, 46

Therefore, applying ejusdem generis, the exhibits mentioned are

mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario. These
are not published in any list, register, periodical or other
compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these
market reports, as these are not standard handbooks or
periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and
relied upon in the work of the occupation. These are merely
letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.

Sec. 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise,

periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth
of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies that
the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject. (40 a)

Damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay

evidence. Nevertheless, since the fishing corp. had been
injured, nominal damages are awarded not as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of a technical injury.

Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to

Learned treatises (used to prove unwritten foreign law)

Estrada vs. Noble, [C.A,] 49 O.G. 139

Facts: Maximino Noble conveyed a parcel of land he owned in
Camarines Sur to Proculo, his son, on 22Jun1945 by means of a
public deed.
The public deed stipulated that the sum of P2,600 in Japanese
currency (P180 of which was paid to Francisco Espiritu by
Proculo as repurchase price in July 1944) and P500 Philippine
currency, the total of P3,100 was paid by Proculo to Maximino in
1944 & in June 1945. That this sale is being made subject to the
condition that Maximino preserves unto himself, his heirs and
assigns, the right to repurchase or redeem the parcel of land for
P2,600 and P500 and within a 5-year period from the date of the
instrument, provided that if Maximino, his heirs and assigns fail
to exercise the right of redemption within the time aforesaid,
this sale shall be irrevocable and unconditional without the
necessity of executing any other instrument.
On 28Feb1948, by means of another public deed, conveyed the
same parcel by way of absolute sale to Gregoria Estrada for
P3,000 Philippine currency. Only P2,300 was paid, the P700 to
be invested in the redemption of the property from Proculo.
Gregoria offered to redeem, tendering P700 to Proculo, which he
refused. Hence, this action for conventional redemption to
compel Proculo to reconvey the property to her. The trial court
ruled in favor of Gregoria. Proculo contends that the said court
should not have applied the Ballantine Scale of Values and
should have fixed the redemption price at P3,100 which was the
amount he paid therefore, under the case of Rogers vs. Smith.
Issue: Whether or not the courts can simply take judicial notice
of the Ballantine Scale of Values?
Held: Yes.
Ballantine submitted a conversion table which
recommended the adoption of measures which were greatly
needed to solve the problem created by transactions made
during the Japanese occupation and to hasten the economic
recovery of the country. The SC, CA and the different CFIs in the
country have repeatedly applied its provisions in numerous
cases. It is therefore an official document whose publication
constituted a leading event of general interest and whose
provisions are widely known and have played an important part

a.

published treatise, periodical or pamphlet

b.

on a subject of history, law, science or art

c.

Either
ii.

the court takes judicial notice, or

iii.

a witness expert in the subject testifies that the

writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical
or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or
calling as expert in the subject
2)

Cases

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)

Philippine courts can not take judicial notice of foreign law.
Failure to prove foreign law whether unwritten under Rule 130,
Sec. 46 or written under Rule 132, Sec. 24, raises the
presumption that the law is the same as ours.
Escolin: This provision is useful to prove an unwritten law. E.g.
learned treatises on unwritten law which the court has taken
judicial notice: Manresa, Sanchez-Roman. E.g. of writers of
treatises acknowledged as experts: Corpus juris, Corpus juris
secundum, LRA
If it is a written law that is sought to be proven, cf Rule 132, Sec.
19
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
xxx

67

E.g. of written official acts: Judicial decisions, executive orders.

Our courts take judicial notice of local laws. However, there are
certain instances when an official copy of the written official act
is required to be presented. cf Rule 132, Sec. 24
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(25 a)

the court held that the case is barred by res judicata because of
the previous civil case but on motion for reconsideration,
support and recognition were granted. The CA reversed, saying
the evidence wasnt enough to establish paternity. In the
second case, the witnesses of the kids who testified in the first
case refused to testify, & the court did not admit the testimonies
of these witnesses from the former trial. Thus, this petition on
certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal to testify fall under the
unable to testify provision of Sec. 47, Rule 130?
Held: The SC affirmed the CA. The witnesses werent dead.
Neither were they outside the RP. They simply didnt want to
testify. This doesnt amount to an inability to testify. Therefore,
the prior testimony rule cannot be applied in this case. Also, the
plaintiff in this case could have asked the court to compel these
witnesses to come, but they didnt do so. All in all, the evidence
wasnt enough to show paternity for the children in order to be
recognized by Tan.

Ways to prove written foreign official acts

a.

official publication, or

b.

copy
i.

attested by the officer having the legal custody of

the record, or by his deputy, and

ii.

if the record is not kept in the Philippines

1.

accompanied with a certificate that such

officer has the custody made by
a. a secretary of the embassy or legation
b. consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or
c. by any Philippine officer in the foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept

2.

and, authenticated by the seal of his office.

l.

Prior Testimony

1) Rule 130, 47
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. (41 a)
cf with the rules on admissions (Rule 130 Secs. 26-33, RoC) and
interrogatories (Rule 24, RoC)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to
prior testimony
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

testimony or deposition
of a witness deceased or unable to testify
given in a former case or proceeding
involving the same parties and subject matter
as evidence against the adverse party
adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine him
2)

Cases

Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 54 (1967)

Absent a showing that the witness is dead, outside the
Philippines, or unable to testify, their prior testimony is
inadmissible. Mere refusal to testify is does not amount to
inability to testify. The party could have urged to court to have
these witnesses summoned, arrested, and punished for
contempt in case of refusal to obey the summons.
Facts: Petitioners Carmelita and Rodolfo thru their mother,
Celestina Daldo, as guardian ad litem, filed a case for
recognition as illegitimate children and support against
Francisco Tan. Oral evidence was presented by them & as the
plaintiff were about to rest, Celestina moved for dismissal
because the parties have reached an amicable settlement.
Celestina she said in an affidavit submitted to the court,
Francisco is not the father of my children . . . So, the court
dismissed the case. One year & eight months later, a similar
case was instituted with the grandmother as guardian. At first,

People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976)

Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the
witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation of this
case be adopted as part of the evidence in chief of the
prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the
condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by
counsel for the accused. At the trial, the witnesses for the
prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were
recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the
appellant.
Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in
chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses
taken down by question and answer during the preliminary
investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel
who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close crossexamination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject
to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine the
witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced and,
pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand
during the trial and again examined in the presence of the
appellant. Upon the facts, there was no curtailment of the
constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to
face.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)

Facts: Defendant Herschel Roberts was charged with forgery of
a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and with possession of
stolen credit cads belonging to the latter and his wife, Amy. At a
preliminary hearing, defendants appointed counsel called the
victims daughter, Anita, as the defenses only witness. Anita
testified that she had permitted defendant to use her apartment
for several days while she was away. However, she refused to
admit that she had given defendant checks and the credit cards
without informing him that she did not have permission to use
them. At the defendants subsequent credit cards with the
understanding that he could use them. The daughter did not
appear at trial even though several subpoenas had been issued
to her at her parents residence.
The State offered the
transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony in rebuttal. The
defendant objected to this on the ground that it was violative of
the Confrontation Clause. The mother testified that Amys
whereabouts were unknown to them. The TC admitted the
transcript into evidence while the CA reversed. The SC of Ohio
ruled that the transcript was inadmissible because the mere
opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing did not
afford constitutional confrontation for purposes of trial.
Issue: Whether or not the transcript of testimony is admissible?
Held: Yes, the introduction in evidence at defendants trial of
the
daughters
preliminary
hearing
testimony
was
constitutionally permissible.
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires a showing of his
unavailability. Even then his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate indicia of reliability. The daughters prior
testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability afforded the trier of
facts a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement. Even though defense counsels questioning of the
witness occurred on direct examination defense counsel tested
the testimony with the equivalent of significant cross-

68

examination. His questioning which was replete with leading

questions and comporting with the principal purpose of crossexamination which is to challenge the veracity of the daughters
testimony, clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of
form. This was so even though the witness was not personally
available for questioning at the trial and that the defendant had
a different lawyer at trial from the one at the preliminary
hearing. It afforded substantial compliance with the purposes
behind the Confrontation Clause. The record disclosed that the
witness was constitutionally unavailable for purposes of the
defendants trial. Case was reversed and remanded.

P.

Opinion Rule

1. Rule 130, 48-50

Sec. 48. General rule. The opinion of a witness is
not admissible, except as indicated in the following
sections. (42)
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a
witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess, may
be received in evidence. (43 a)
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion
of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding (a) the identity of a person about whom he has
adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of
the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person. (44 a)
GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible.
Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or

training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge;
a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
his impressions of the
i. emotion
ii. behavior
iii. condition or
iv. appearance of a person
2.

Cases

Dilag & Co. v. Merced, 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)

Facts: Plaintiff was the owner of a truck which was entrusted to
Pabo Dilag. On the night of December 31, 1944, during the
Japanese occupation, the truck was stolen. After the liberation,
Dilag saw the truck parked in front of the City Lunch in San
Pablo City. Recognizing that it was the same car owned by their
company he had seized the car with the aid of policemen. The
plaintiff company filed a case for recovery against Merced its
present possessor and also against Lim Ben, Sy Pua and Sixto
Zandueta, former alleged owners. In the course of the trial in
the lower court, Jose Aguilar of the Bureau of Public Works
testified as to the tell tale marks of alterations on the motor
number of the truck. This testimony was impugned by the
defendants on the ground that Aguilar was not qualified as an
expert on motor numbers.
Issue: Whether or not Aguilar qualified as an expert?
Held: Yes. It appears that Aguilar has been with the Bureau
since 1930, having occupied the position of inspector in charge
of weighing and measuring trucks and verifying their motor
numbers, chief of registration division for 8 years and from 1938
to date of the trial, chief investigator of motor vehicles, charged

with the duty of investigating conflicting claims on motor

vehicles. With such a background experience, a person who has
occupied those positions should be deemed amply qualified for
the simple task of determining whether the number appearing
on the motor of a particular vehicle is genuine or not.
Although a witness, in order to be competent as an expert, must
show himself to be skilled or experienced in the business or
profession to which the subject relates, there is no precise
requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall
have been acquired. Scientific training and study are not always
essential to the competency of the witness as an expert. A
witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his
knowledge was acquired through the medium of practical
experience rather than scientific study or research. Generally,
speaking, any person who by study or experience has acquired
practical knowledge or experience may be allowed to give in
evidence his opinion upon matters of technical knowledge and
skill relating to such business or employment. Even where the
problem presented is one which ordinarily requires some
scientific knowledge or training, one long experienced may
testify as an expert, although he has pursued no special study of
the matter. Knowledge acquired by doing is no less valuable
than that acquired by study.
U.S. v. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
Facts: Benito Perez, Policarpio Guevara and Felipe Bautista were
suspected of committing theft of a revolver. They were arrested
and taken by Valentin Trono, a sub-inspector of the municipal
police and other policemen, to Sapang-Angelo and beaten and
ill-treated. Perez died the next morning.
Trono et al were charged with murder and convicted by the trial
court. They are now contending on appeal that Perez was not
ill-treated but that the cause of death was hypertropic cirrhosis
(whatever that means!) as certified by the examining physician,
Icasiana.
The testimony of the physician was not given
credence by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the court is bound by the testimony of a
physician acting as an expert witness?
Held: No. Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence
worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on
questions of a professional character. The courts, however, are
not bound to submit to such testimony. They are free to weigh
them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as
proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with
other elements of conviction which may have been adduced
during the trial.
In the present case, the court did not give credit to the
testimony of the physician because:
it appears that the physician was an intimate friend of one of
the accused Angeles;
the physician stated in the certificate that Perez died from
cholera (not hypertropic cirrhosis) but the mom of the
deceased testified that her son was of a robust constitution
and suffered no ailments whatever;
the physicians certificate stated that Perezs body showed
only two small bruises but other witnesses testified that they
saw more bruises in different parts of his body;
the physician himself when he was testifying during the trial
withdrew his statements made in the physicians certificate.
State v. Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals , 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993)
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (1993)
People v. Adoviso GR# 116196-97 23jun1999
Facts: In this case, on the night of February 18, 1990, Emeterio
and Rufino Vasquez were shot by five assailants inside their
house in Bula, Camarines Sur. During the incident, Bonifacio,
son of Emetrio, saw Pablo Adoviso and five other hooded
persons shooting his father and his nephew being shot. He hid
himself in the dark and only rushed to the injured victims aide
when the assailants left, accompanied by his son Elmer. Elmer
gave first aid to his grandfather and cousin by binding their
wounds with diapers while Bonifacio went to the municipal
building to fetch the police. The police came and brought the
two victims to the hospital. Both, however, died the next

69

morning. Adoviso was charged for the murder of the two

victims. In his defense, he alleged alibi and that he offered in
evidence the testimony of Ernesto Lucena, a polygraph exminer
of the NBI in Manila. In a Polygraph report, Lucena opined that
his polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions
indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevenat to the
investigations of the crimes. Nevertheless, the TC convicted
him for murder.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in not considering the
polygraph as having exculpated the accused from the crime
charged?
Held: Judgment affirmed. The witnesses were able to see and
identify him clearly and thus his defense of alibi couldnt stick.
As to the polygraph test defense, a polygraph is an
electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and
records certain physiological changes in the human body that
are believed to be involuntarily cause by an examinees
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind
a polygraph or a lie detector test is that a person who lies
deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious
block in breathing, which will be recorded in the graph.
However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of
polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of
establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime,
whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction
for the reason that the polygraph has not as yet attained
scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different here. In
People vs. Daniel, the court stated that much faith and credit
should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not
conclusive. Appellant had not advanced any reason why this
rule should not apply to him.
People v. Baid GR#129667 31jul2000
Facts: Complainant is a 27-year old single woman, who was
diagnosed as having suffered from schizophrenia since 1988. In
December 1996, she was confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic in
Cubao, Quezon City because of a relapse of her mental
condition. On the other hand, accused-appellant was a nurseaide of said clinic.
On December 22, 1996, at around 3 a.m., accused-appellant
sneaked into the patients' room. He woke the complainant up
and offered her a cigarette, at the same time touching her foot.
Complainant took the cigarette. As she smoked it, accusedappellant caressed her. Apparently, she was aroused, because
she afterward removed her pants. It turned out she was not
wearing any underwear. Accused-appellant also removed his
pants and the two had sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they
transferred under the bed and continued their sexual
intercourse. Complainant said she felt accused-appellant had an
orgasm. A female patient who had been awakened tried to
separate the two, and, as she failed to do so, she went out to
call the two nurses on duty. The nurses responded but, when
they arrived, accused-appellant had left, while complainant had
already put on her pants.
Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes for medico-legal examination. She told him
what happened. Dr. Reyes reduced her narration of the incident
into writing and then gave her a physical examination.
Dr. Reyes said the fresh abrasion, located at 6 o'clock posterior
of the complainant's genitalia, could have been recently caused
by a hard blunt object, such as an erect penis during sexual
intercourse, or by the insertion of a finger. Dr. Reyes found that
complainant was suffering from mental illness and that she had
lapses in the course of her interview.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the complainant who
was pra-pra is admissible in evidence.
Held: Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed
that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive
and was capable of making known her perceptions to others.
Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions
particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive
answers to them.
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that
of a rape victim ("inappropriate affect") during her testimony,
such as by smiling when answering questions, her behavior was
such as could be expected from a person suffering from

schizophrenia.
Otherwise,
straightforward, and coherent.

complainant

was

candid,

Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on

complainant's consciousness and memory, it is established that
schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of
consciousness and gross deficits of memory. It has long been
settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of
mental handicap alone.
With regard to the alleged inconsistencies between
complainant's sworn statement and her testimony as to the
number of times she and accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse and where they did the same, an examination of the
evidence for the prosecution, particularly complainant's sworn
statement and her interview with the examining medico-legal
officer, shows that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse
with her in different positions at various places in the same
room. When complainant testified, she stated that, aside from
the fact that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her
on her bed, he made her transfer later under the bed. Be that
as it may, complainant has consistently established in all of her
statements that he had sexual intercourse with her on her bed.
Whether or not he had sex with her near the window and while
facing him is of no moment and does not negate the finding of
rape. Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her testimony,
they are minor and inconsequential.
They show that
complainant's testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than
diminish the probative value of her testimony, they reinforce it.
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room
where other patients were sleeping. This circumstance, it is
argued, is antithetical to the possibility of the commission of
rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of
time and place and the crime of rape can be consummated
even when the malefactor and the victim are not alone.
The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the
number of witnesses presented during the trial, so much so that,
if the testimonies so far presented clearly and credibly
established the commission of the crime, corroborative evidence
would only be a mere surplusage.
Nor does the absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of
complainant destroy the finding of rape since ejaculation is
never an element thereof. What consummates the felony is the
contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however slight, to the
vagina of his victim without her consent. Neither is it required
that lacerations be found in the victim's hymen. We have held
that a medical examination is not a requisite for a rape charge
to prosper as long as the victim categorically and consistently
declares that she has been defiled. In this case, aside from
complainant's positive testimony, the medical examination of
the complainant showed an abrasion on her labia minora,
indicating that she had recent sexual intercourse. That the deep
healed lacerations found on the complainant's genitalia may
have been caused seven days prior to December 22, 1996 is
immaterial and irrelevant considering that she is a non-virgin.
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications of
Dr. Salangad as an expert witness. However, he cannot do this
now as he did not raise any objection to Dr. Salangad's
qualifications in the trial court. On the contrary, he even crossexamined her on the matters on which she testified.
In
accordance with Rule 132, 36, objections not timely raised are
deemed waived.
The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of
complainant to give expert testimony as a psychiatrist did not
by that fact alone make her a biased witness and her testimony
unworthy of consideration. As has been said:
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to
be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly
fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The
problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of
an abuse of that discretion.

70

1.

Civil Cases
a.

Rule 133, Sec. 1

Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how

determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.

Q.

In determining whether a contract is a sale or equitable

mortgage, the evidence presented must be clear and
convincing, not merely a preponderance of evidence.

Rule 130, 51: Character Evidence

Sec.
51.
Character
admissible; exceptions.

evidence

not

generally

(a) In Criminal Cases:

(1) The accused may prove his good moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove
his bad moral character which is pertinent it to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
Note that in criminal cases, the prosecution goes first. Hence, it
can not present evidence on the bad moral character of the
accused on its evidence in chief.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended
party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil
case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of
character involved in the case.
This covers either party to the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14.
(46 a, 47 a)
cf Rule 132, Sec. 14
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence
of the good character of a witness is not admissible until
such character has been impeached. (17)
GR: Character evidence not generally admissible
Exceptions
a.

In Criminal Cases:
i.

accused may prove his good moral character

which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged.

ii.

In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad

moral character of the accused which is
pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged.

iii.

moral character of the offended party may be

proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.

b.

In Civil Cases only when pertinent to the issue of

character involved in the case.

c.

good character of an impeached witness

R. Rule 131, 1: Burden of Proof

Sec. 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty
of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. (1 a, 2 a)
Burden of proof the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law

b.

Cases

Pornellosa v. LTA, L-14040, 31 January 1986

Facts: The plaintiffs Pornellosa Spouses are claiming a parcel of
land by virtue of a deed of sale by its former occupant, Vicenta
San Jose, who sold to them also the house located in the said
property. However, the lot in question happens to form part of
the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled
through the consent of its owner. This Estate was acquired by
the Philippine Government by virtue of Commonwealth Act no.
539, Sec. 1. There is no evidence showing that Vicenta San Jose
owned the land. She merely owned the house on it. This action
by the spouse is to compel the Land Tenure Administration to
sell the lot in question to them in the amount of P1,505.00. All
the spouses presented in support of their claim were documents
of the sale of the house to them by San Jose.
Issue: Whether or not the spouses Pornellosa have proven their
claim to own the lot in question?
Held: A partys claiming a right granted or created by law must
prove his claim by competent evidence. A plaintiff is dutybound to prove his allegations in the complaint. He must rely on
the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of
his opponent.
The plaintiffs who want to compel the Director of Lands to sell
them the lot of an expropriated landed estate should prove their
allegation that they acquired the rights of a bona fide occupant
to said lot. A sale of a house is not sufficient to convey title or
any right to the lot on which the house stands.
Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public document.
IFC v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977)
Facts: Tobias bought an installment one Dodge truck from Leelin
Motors. Tobias executed a promissory note in favor of Leelin
Motors, which note was secured by a chattel mortgage on the
truck in favor of Leelin Motors. The latter indorsed the note and
assigned the mortgage to IFC. As a consequence, Tobias paid
six installments to IFC. On May 14, 1970, IFCs counsel wrote to
Tobias demanding him to pay or to surrender the truck
otherwise court action would be pursued. At the time the letter
was written, Tobias was in arrear in the payment of more than 2
installments. Tobias wrote back saying that he was surrendering
the truck because the truck was with Leelin Motors when it met
an accident & because of the delay in its repairs. Upon learning
of the accident, IFC decided not to get the truck and sued for
payment. The LC and CA dismissed the IFCs complaint on the
ground that inasmuch as Tobias surrendered the truck, he
complied with the IFCs demands. Now, IFC claims that it is an
unpaid vendor who under Art. 1484 of the NCC may choose
exacting fulfillment of the obligation, canceling the sale or
foreclosing the mortgage if any; and that it now chose the first
option. Tobias claims that IFC is now estopped to claim payment
when it demanded the surrender to which demand Tobias
acceded.
Held: The SC reversed the LCs and CAs rulings. Art. 1484 is
clear in that an unpaid (in the payment of 2 or more
installments) vendor has the 3 options (alternative, not
cumulative).
IFC has not availed of cancellation nor of
foreclosure (which presupposes more than a mere demand to
surrender possession). Thus, IFC is still free to avail of the
remedy of exacting fulfillment. As regards estoppel, to hold IFC

71

in estoppel, it must be shown that the latter knew of the

accident when it gave Tobias its options to pay or to surrender.
IFC claims it had no such knowledge. Nobody in his right mind
would give the options Tobias had, if the accident was known.
The more plausible thing to do is to ask for payment had IFC
known. Besides, the allegation of IFC that it had no knowledge
is a negative allegation which needs no evidence to support it,
not being an essential part of the statement of the right on
which the cause of action is founded. The burden of proof,
therefore, is on Tobias to disprove IFCs lack of knowledge.
Tobias failed.

2.

Criminal Cases
a.

Rule 133, Sec. 2

Rule 133, Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In

a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
For self-defense, the accused must show clear and convincing
evidence.
b.

Cases

People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970)

The prosecution has the burden of proving even the negative
elements of a crime (e.g. lack of license to possess a firearm).
Escolin: The remedy is to present the certification of the officer,
who is in charge of issuing the licenses, that the accused was
not issued a license.
Facts: The LC found Pajenado guilty of murder and illegal
possession of firearm. He appealed to the SC and argued that
there is no prima facie case in which to hold him guilty of illegal
possession of firearm because the prosecution failed to prove
his lack of a license to carry a firearm.
Issue: Whether or not Pajenado should be found guilty of illegal
possession of firearms?
Held: No. Under the provisions of Sec. 2, Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, in criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense
charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged
by the prosecution must be proven if it is an essential
ingredient of the offense charged. The burden of proof was with
the prosecution and in this case they must prove that the
firearm used by Pajenado in committing the offense charged
was not properly licensed. It cannot be denied that the lack of
or the absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. The information filed
against Pajenado specifically alleged that he had no license or
permit to possess the said gun. Thus it seems clear that it was
the prosecutions duty not to merely allege that negative fact
but to prove it as well.
People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977)
The elements of self-defense must be proven by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence.
Facts: On the night of September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina
was clubbed to death by Ricardo Verzola in the presence of
Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan, Bangued,
Abra. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by the
two to the ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Verzola then
went to his house, changed his clothes and threw his
bloodstained sweater undershirt and underwear, including the
piece of wood be used in clubbing the deceased, inside their

toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal building and

reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an
accident.
The police authorities went to Lipcan to conduct the
investigation. They found the body of the deceased sprawled at
the foot of the bamboo ladder. When questioned, Josefina
revealed that Verzola was the assailant of her husband.
She later gave a written statement narrating the incident,
stating that Verzola went to their house, entered her room
where she was sleeping with her husband, woke her up and had
carnal knowledge of her; that when Bernardo woke up and
attempted to rise Verzola clubbed Bernardo. This statement was
sworn to by her before Municipal Judge Valera.
At about 4:00 a.m., Verzola was picked up by the police and, in
the municipal bldg., he executed a written statement admitting
that he clubbed the victim several times. He stated therein
that, he went to Bernardos house and went under their house
pricking with a bamboo twig Josephina who was laying down.
She came down to my place, where they did everything. But
before that in the night, Josephina told him 'THAT HER HUSBAND
WAS PLANNING TO KILL HIM and just after they were through,
Josephina went upstairs inside (the) house, and because he
cannot withstand anymore the plan of her husband to kill him,
he went upstairs and in the room he saw Bernardo lying down.
He clubbed him three times at the nape, and when he did not
move anymore that was the time when we both with Josephine
Molina throw him downstairs of their house. After that he went
home. He further admitted that Josephina was his paramour.
The said statement was sworn to in front of Judge Valera.
Verzola then guided the authorities to his house where, in their
presence, he retrieved from the toilet his bloodstained clothes
as well as the piece of wood which he used in clubbing the
deceased.
Dr. Luis P. Bringas Municipal Health Officer, who conducted the
autopsy, testified that the deceased died instantaneously as a
result of cardio-respiratory failure caused by "cerebral
compressions and hemorrhages". The deceased sustained
different lacerations on the head and back of the ear.
Versola, later, impugned his statement and claimed he did so in
self-defense. Thus, he testified that while he was feeding his two
cows in front of his house, he heard cries for help coming from
Bernardos house. Recognizing it to be Josefinas voice, he
proceeded to the house. He armed himself with a pan of a plow
upon entering the yard because he feared an intruder had
entered the Molina's residence. At the door of the room, he
heard the man say: 'Vulva of your mother, I will kill you." As he
entered the room, he saw his Josefina in a corner, being
maltreated by Bernardo. After he noticed his presence, he said:
"Vulva of your mother, I will kill all of you." At that juncture,
Bernardo stooped to pick up a bolo from the floor. As Bernardo
was still bending towards the bolo, he struck him twice with the
piece of wood, hitting the head of the victim, causing him to fall.
After he had fallen, he tried to revive the victim by shaking the
head of the latter on his lap while saying: "Hoy, Hoy, Hoy". He
explained that this was the reason why there were bloodstains
on his clothes.
Josefina corroborated said new statement of Verzola. Both
appellants contended that they were not aware of the contents
of their E-J confessions as they were made to sign them by the
police w/o being able to read their contents.
The trial court convicted Verzola as principal while Josefina as an
accessory to murder.
Issue: Whether or not the accuseds guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
Held: SC affirms Verzola conviction but acquits Josefina.
There can be no question that once an accused has admitted
the killing of a human being, the burden is on him to establish
the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing
or at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his
exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such
affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that for the prosecution for even if that
were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself
had admitted the killing. It is evident that no such proof was
adduced by Verzola. Verzolas conduct was incompatible with
the reaction of one who killed another in legitimate self-defense.
Although he claims that he brought the victim down the stairs in
order to bring him to the hospital, yet when he was able to get a

72

jeep he did not utilize it for that purpose but instead used it in
going to town. Moreover, he kept quiet about the incident. It was
only from Josefina Molina that the police learned for the first
time that Verzola was the assailant of the deceased. Verzola
attempted to conceal his participation by hiding his bloodstained
clothes and the weapon he used.
The physical facts of the case, such as nature, character and
location of the wounds sustained by the deceased and the
presence of the bloodstains on the beddings of the victim are
undisputed. These facts and circumstances belie the claim of
the appellant that he clubbed the victim in self- defense. On the
contrary, they sufficiently indicate that the fatal injuries were
inflicted upon the victim when the latter was lying defenseless
on the floor, as he was either sleeping or was just beginning to
wake up.
Although Josefina admitted in her extra-judicial statement that
she was the paramour of Verzola for over a year, there is no
proof that she had knowledge of the criminal design of her coappellant. Neither has she cooperated with him by previous or
simultaneous acts, much less is there any showing that she
supplied the principal with material or moral aid. Her only
participation was in assisting her co-appellant in bringing the
body of the deceased to the ground. The question, therefore, is
whether or not by said overt act she could be held criminally
responsible as an accessory.
An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor
cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with knows of
the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in
three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b)
by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in
order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape
or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts
with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime. The main difference separating accessories after the fact
the responsibility of the accessories is subsequent to the
consummation of the crime and subordinate to that of the
principal.
There was no proof also that the act of Josephina in bringing
down the body was to destroy the body of the crime or to make
it appear that death of the victim was accidental. It must be
noted that Josefina testified that she helped her co- appellant
bring the body of the deceased down the stairs because of fear.
U.S. v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1975)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 19 (1977)
3.

Administrative Cases
a.

Rule 133, Sec. 5

Rule 133, Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases

filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
b.

S.

Cases

Presumptions
1.

Conclusive presumptions

a. Rule 131, 2

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of

his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3 a)
Instances of conclusive presumptions
a.

a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,

intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot,
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it:

b.

The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord

at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them.
b.

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or

representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon.
Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby
adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with the
provisions of this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules
of Court and special laws.
Art. 1433. Estoppel may in pais or by deed.
Art. 1439. Estoppel is effective only as between the
parties thereto or their successors in interest.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a
thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the
seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes
by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
Art. 1435. If a person in representation of another
sells or alienates a thing, the former cannot
subsequently set up his own title as against the buyer or
grantee.
Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from
asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against
the lessor or bailor.
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons
concerning immovable property, one of them is misled by
a person with respect to the ownership or real right over
the real estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his
legal title or interest therein, provided all these
requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or
wrongful concealment of facts known to the party
estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other
should act upon the facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the
true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have
accordance with the misrepresentation.

acted

in

Art. 1438. One who has allowed another to assume

apparent ownership of personal property for the purpose
of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he received the
sum for which a pledge has been constituted, set up his
own title to defeat the pledge of the property, made by
the other to a pledgee who received the same in good
faith and for value.
Statutory instances of estoppel
a.

non-owner transferor who later acquires title passes

ownership to the transferee by operation of law (Art. 1434
NCC)

b.

agent who alienates can not claim title against the

transferee (Art. 1435 NCC)

c.

a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the

thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor. (Art.
1436 NCC)

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are

instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration,
act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out
of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it:

Arts. 1431-1439 NCC: Estoppel

73

d.

e.

in a contract between 3rd persons concerning immovable

property, one of them is misled by a person with respect to
the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is
precluded from asserting his legal title or interest therein,
provided all these requisites are present:
i.

fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of

facts known to the party estopped;

ii.

party precluded must intend that the other should

act upon the facts as misrepresented;

iii.

party misled must have been unaware of the true

facts; and

iv.

party defrauded must have acted in accordance with

the misrepresentation. (Art. 1437 NCC)

One who has allowed another to assume apparent

ownership of personal property for the purpose of making
any transfer of it, cannot, if he received the sum for which a
pledge has been constituted, set up his own title to defeat
the pledge of the property, made by the other to a pledgee
who received the same in good faith and for value. (Art.
1438 NCC)
c.

Cases

Molina v. CA, 109 Phil 769 (1960)

Facts: Felix Molina then overseer of Basilisa Manjon, informed
her that some guerilla soldiers would arrest her for investigation,
because one Conchita Cuba complained to them against her for
having illegally encroached on her property. Afraid to be taken to
the guerilla camp Manjon asked the Molina what was best for
her to do. He suggested that she execute a fictitious deed of
sale in his favor for the portion in question which was the one
claimed by Conchita Cuba, in order that he could defend her
rights in his name against the claim of Conchita Cuba. Manjon
accepted the suggestion and asked Molina to have the
corresponding deed of sale prepared which Manjon signed.
However, Manjon made the Molina sign a statement in, which he
expressly admitted that the transaction was only a simulated
sale. The Molina denied the whole story and asserted that the
statement was a forgery. Manjon sues Molina for recovery of
possession of land.
TC ruled for the Manjon on the ground that she could not have
disposed the land because it was part of the public domain,
sales patent having been issued to plaintiff by the government
only on 1948. CA affirms.
Held: Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, when a person
who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it
and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee. Case
remanded to determine whether the sale was indeed fictitious.
Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586 (1994)
The juridical relation between petitioners and private
respondents is that of lessee and lessor. Considering this jural
relationship, petitioners cannot claim that they purchased the
questioned lot from somebody else. A tenant cannot, in an
action involving the possession of the leased premises,
controvert the title of his landlord. Nor can a tenant set up any
inconsistent right to change the relation existing between
himself and his landlord, without first delivering up to the
landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement
between themselves.

2.

Disputable presumptions

a. Rule 131, 4
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful
intent;

(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences

of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the
latter;
(g) That a thing
belonged to the latter;

delivered

by

one

to

another

(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has

been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid
when a receipt for the later ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken
in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on
himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of
anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing
accordingly;
(1) That a person acting in a public office was
regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in
the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a
case were laid before the court and passed upon by it;
and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised
in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before
the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and
regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a
contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or
indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument
was made before the instrument was overdue and at the
place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was
received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is
considered dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all
purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aircraft;

74

(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken

part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and whose existence has not been
known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of
disappearance, where there is danger of death under the
circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any
case, before marrying again, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Family Code and in the rules for a declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the
thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered
into a contract of copartnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and
who have acquired property through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry, such
contributions and their corresponding shares including
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are
equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the
mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days after such termination of the former
marriage, these rides shall govern in the absence of
proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after
the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days
after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as
long as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to
be printed or published by public authority, was so
printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to
contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the
country where the book is published, contains correct
reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was
to convey real property to a particular person has
actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is
necessary to perfect the title of such person or his
successor in interest;

(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two

persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck,
battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died
first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined
from the probabilities resulting from the strength and
age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the
older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is
deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty,
the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex
be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the
sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other
between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more
persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of
one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died
at the same time. (5 a)
b.

Cases

People v. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 (1976)

Mere non-presentation of a written statement of a witness to the
police which she allegedly did not sign, does not give rise to the
presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the
prosecution case". The presumption that suppressed evidence is
unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the
disposal of both the defense and the prosecution through use of
compulsory processes, e.g. subpoena duces tecum.
People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1 (1992)
The presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of the
witness is merely corroborative. Neither does it apply in cases
where the witness, as in this case, is available to the accused
because then, the evidence would have the same weight
against one party as against the other. Mere failure to present
the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation is not suppression of
evidence.
Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604 (1905)
Facts: This is an action to recover possession of a tract of land,
for payment of rent due (from 1899 to 1902) damages and costs
brought by Miguel Pascual against Macario Angeles. The land in
question formerly belonged to Ciriaca Pascual (sister of Miguel)
who leased such to the defendant Angeles. Upon the death of
Ciriaca, it was inherited by the Miguel and Angeles recognized
Miguel as heir and successor to his sister, and that he had paid
the rents due to the lessor (Ciriaca) to the Miguel since Ciriacas
death in 1894, when in 1901 eventually decided to keep the
land for himself and stopped paying rent. Angeles specifically
denied the genuineness and due execution of the lease
agreement, and argues that he has been in adverse, quiet,
peaceful, public and continuous possession of the same lot for
30 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the
defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial alleging
that it was not necessary to show that the land in question had
been allotted to the plaintiff in the partition of the estate of his
sister since it satisfactorily appeared that the defendant had
been paying rent or the plaintiff under the questioned lease,
thus recognizing him as the lawful owner and successor to his
sister. Also that he had sufficiently proved the identity of the
land in question. The motion for a new trial was denied thus he
appealed to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not Angeles or a tenant can deny the title of
his landlord in a contract of lease?
Held: The SC held that since the action arose from a contract of
lease which presuppose in the lessor a right to the ownership or
possession of the property, the lessor cannot be compelled to
prove his title thereto. The tenant cannot deny the title of his

75

landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of

landlord and tenant between them. Since Miguel was the
testamentary successor of his sister, and that the lessee
recognized him as possessor and heir to the deceased by paying
rent to him. Angeles is now barred from questioning the right of
Ciriaca and her successor Miguel to the land.
Also the
defendant cannot question the genuineness and due execution
of the lease which he himself recognized as it was admitted into
evidence. He also cannot question the identity of the land in
question since in his answer, he stated that he had been in
possession of the lot in question and so both parties were in
agreement as to the lot in question.
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil. 194 (1909)
Facts: Manuel Ormachea Tin-Congco and Luis Vizmanos were
engaged in business and that in the course thereof Santiago
Trillana (Defendant) purchased from them merchandise to the
value of P4,000. In June or July 1901, the partnership was
dissolved and the business was divided up between the
partners.
All accoutnes and debts of the defendant were
allotted to the plaintiff. On Jan. 15, 1904, the Plaintiff filed a
complaint against defendant to recover said amount.
The
indebtedness was proven by the documents (vales) signed by
the Defendant in favor of Plaintiff or of Vizmanos or Lawa (their
agent).

reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as

mandatory.
Respondent argues further that even if viewed as a mandatory
presumption rather than as a permissive inference, the
presumption did not conclusively establish intent but rather
could be rebutted. The court pointed out that, a reasonable jury
could interpret the presumption as conclusive and not
technically as a presumption which could be an irrebutable
direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts
triggering the presumption (which is the voluntariness of the
killing done by Sandstorm) thus effectively shifting the burden
of persuasion on the element of intent. Montanas own Rules of
Evidence expressly state that the presumption at issue here
may be overcome only by a preponderance of evidence
contrary to the presumption. Such a requirement shifts not
only the burden of production but also the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of intent.
A State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt and may not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant by means of such a presumption.
Because
Sandstorms jury may have interpreted the instruction as either
a burden shifting presumption or a conclusive presumption,
either interpretation would have deprived defendant his right to
due process and thus render such instruction unconstitutional.

In his answer, the defendant alleged that the had already

settled his accounts and obligations contracted in the business
to which the complaint refers, by means of periodical payments
in tuba. In evidence of this, while testifying under oath, he
introduced a document dated 19 November 1903, signed by the
agent Lawa declaring that the defendant had no outstanding
debt with the partnership. The trial judge ruled in favor of the
Plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable to pay the said
amount?
Held: Yes. When the agent Lawa executed the document, the
business had already closed and he had ceased to act in it
administration and management.
Therefore, he was not
authorized to sign the document made out by the debtor,
extinguishing the latters liability. Since the vales existed, and
were in possession of the creditor, it was because the amounts
they called for had not yet been paid, inasmuch as an obligation
can only be presumed to have been fulfilled when the proofs of
its existence have been returned to the debtor.
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)
County Court of Ulster City v. Allen , 442 U.S. 140
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

3. Rule 131, 4: Legitimacy or Illegitimacy

Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy.
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child born after three hundred days following the
dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the
spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of such child must prove his allegation. (6)
T.

[Note: Sec. 3, Disputable presumptions (c.) That a person

intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act.]
Facts: In this case, 18 yr. Old David Sandstorm confessed to the
slaying of Annie Jessen.
Based upon the confession and
corroborating evidence, David Sandstorm was charged with
deliberate homicide in that he purposely or knowingly caused
the death of Annie Jensen. At trial, the jury was informed that
although Sandstorm admitted killing the victim, he did not do so
purposely or knowingly, and therefore was not guilty of
deliberate homicide but of a lesser crime. They contended
that 2 court-appointed health experts described the mental
state of Sandstorm as compounded by a personality disorder
aggravated by alcohol consumption. The prosecution requested
the trial judge to instruct the jury that the law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequence of his voluntary acts.
Sandstorms counsel objected arguing that the instruction has
the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose
or knowledge to the defense and that is impermissible under the
Federal Constitution and due process of law. The objection was
overruled and the jury found petitioner guilty, sentencing him to
100 yrs. in prison. Sandstorm appealed to the Montana SC
affirming in toto. Thus, this petition on certiorari to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not such instructions given by the Trial judge
shifted the of proof on criminal prosecution to the defense?
Held: The SC reversed the Montana SC.
The Respondents contention was that the instruction was merely
a permissive inference that is, it allows but did not require the
jury to draw conclusions about defendants intent from his
actions and that such inferences are constitutional.
Nevertheless, the SC found that the jury was not told that they
had a choice of inferring intent but rather it can be seen that a

Examination of Witnesses
1.

Rule 132 1-18

Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The

examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1 a)
Examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
a.
b.
c.

done in open court

under oath or affirmation
answers of the witness shall be given orally, unless
i. the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
ii. the question calls for a different mode of answer

Sec. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. The entire

proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions
propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the
statements made by the judge or any of the parties,
counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be
recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other
means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made
by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a
correct statement of such proceedings. (2 a)
The rules now require even the statements of the judge be
recorded.
Requisites for transcript to be deemed prima facie a
correct statement of the proceedings

76

a.

made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder

and

b.

certified as correct by him

Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. A

witness must answer questions, although his answer
may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is
the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or
insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;

Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and

extent. After the cross-examination of the witness has
been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party
calling him, to explain or supplement his answers given
during the cross-examination. On re-direct examination,
questions on matters not dealt with during the crossexamination, may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. (12)
Re-direct examination
a.

to explain or supplement his answers given during the

cross-examination

(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of

justice require;

b.

with leave of court, on matters not dealt with during the

cross-examination

(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters

pertinent to the issue;

Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion

of the re-direct examination, the adverse party may recross-examine the witness on matters stated in his redirect examination, and also on such other matters as
may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (13)

(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject

him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise
provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade
his reputation, unless it be to the very fact at issue or to
a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed.
But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous
final conviction for an offense. (3 a, l9 a)

Re-cross-examination
a.

on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and

b.

with leave of court, other matters

Rights of a witness

Sec. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of

a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness
cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court
will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the
interests of justice may require. (14)

a.

To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting

questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;

A witness can be recalled only with leave of the court.

b.

Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice

require;

c.

Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to

the issue;

d.

Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a

penalty for an offense, unless otherwise provided by law; or

e.

Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his

reputation, unless it be to the fact

Obligation of a witness answer questions, although his answer

may tend to establish a claim against him

i.
ii.
iii.

at issue or
from which the fact in issue would be presumed
of his previous final conviction for an offense.

Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual

witness. The order in which an individual witness may
be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Sec. 5. Direct examination. Direct examination is
the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (3 a)
Direct examination the examination-in-chief of a witness by
the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.
Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.
Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as
to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
a.
b.

as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or

connected therewith
with sufficient fullness and freedom
i. to test his
1. accuracy and
2. truthfulness and
3. freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse
ii. to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue

Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. A

question which suggests to the witness the answer
which the examining party desires is a leading question.
It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On Preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and
intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a
child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deafmute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true
a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to
that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed. (5
a, 6 a, and 8 a)
Leading questions a question which suggests to the witness
the answer which the examining party desires
GR: Leading questions not allowed.
Exceptions
a.
b.
c.

d.

cross examination;
Preliminary matters;
difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a
witness who is
i. ignorant, or
ii. a child of tender years, or
iii. feeble mind, or
iv. a deaf-mute;
unwilling or hostile witness (cf Rule 132, Sec. 12); or
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own
witness. xxx
A witness may be considered as unwilling or
hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest,
unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having

77

misled the party into calling him to the witness

stand.
e.

witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or

managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.

Misleading question one which assumes as true a fact not

yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he has
previously stated.

statements be in writing they must be shown to the

witness before any question is put to him concerning
them. (16)
Requisites for impeaching a witness by prior inconsistent
statements
a.

If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the

witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

b.

the statements must be

Misleading questions are never allowed. No exceptions.

Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that
his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but
not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that
it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or
the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted
of an offense. (15)
Impeachment of adverse party's witness
a.
b.
c.
d.

contradictory evidence
evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad
evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony
evidence of conviction of an offense

Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness.

Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing
a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.

GR: The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his

credibility.
Exceptions: When party may impeach his own witness (except
evidence of bad character)
a.

an unwilling or hostile witness; or

b.

a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or

managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.

Grounds for declaring a witness unwilling or hostile

a.
b.
c.

adverse interest
unjustified reluctance to testify, or
misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

related to him

ii.

with the circumstances of the times and places and

the persons present

c.

he must be asked whether he made such statements

d.

if so, allowed to explain them

Escolin: if the witness refuses to acknowledge the prior

inconsistent statement, present someone who can testify that
the recording of the prior statement was accurate (e.g.
stenographer, in which case, the statement is prima facie
evidence of the fact stated therein).
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness.
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached.
(17)
cf Rule 130, Sec. 51
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;
exceptions.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile

only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing
of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify,
or his having misled the party into calling him to the
witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the
witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by
the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been
called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his
bad character. He may also be impeached and crossexamined by the adverse party, but such cross
examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief. (6 a, 7 a)

i.

xxx
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Sec(ion 14. (46 a,
47 a)
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible
until such character has been impeached.
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On
any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude from the
court any witness not at the time under examination, so
that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses.
The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate
and to be prevented from conversing with one another
until all shall have been examined. (18)
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by
himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time
when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that
the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such
case the writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses,
cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in
evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a
writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or
record correctly stated the transaction when made; but
such evidence must be received with caution. (10 a)

Consequences of being an unwilling, hostile, or adverse

witness

Requisites for a witness to refer to a memorandum

a.

a.

the memorandum must have been written or recorded by

himself or under his direction

b.

either

b.
c.
d.

may be impeached by the proponent, except by evidence of

bad character
may also be impeached by the opponent
may be cross-examined by the opponent, only on the
subject matter of his direct examination
proponent may ask leading questions

Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of

inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the

c.

i.

at the time when the fact occurred, or

ii.

immediately thereafter, or

iii.

at any other time when the fact was fresh in his

memory

he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded

78

d.

the memorandum must be produced and may be inspected

by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, crossexamine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence.

e.

if the witness retains no recollection of the particular facts,

he must swear that the writing or record correctly stated
the transaction when made

Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record

given in evidence, the remainder admissible. When part
of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same
subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence. (11 a)
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject
may be inquired into by the other.
When a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding
may also be given in evidence.
cf Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919) under Rule 130 Sec. 42
Sec. 18. Right to inspect writing shown to witness.
Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be
inspected by the adverse party. (9 a)
2.

Cases
a.

Examination in Open Court

People v. Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428 (1976)

Facts: In Crim. Case no. 289, People vs. Ojoy, of CFI of Iloilo,
after the accused had testified in his defense, his counsel
manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only
their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution
on matters stated therein. Private prosecutors objected to the
proposed procedure but notwithstanding the Judge issued an
order sustaining the proposed procedure. Contending that the
said order violates Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 of Rule 132 and Sec. 1 of
Rule 133, the petitioners herein file this petition on certiorari
with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not said order is violative of the Rules of
Court, requiring that the testimonies of witnesses should be
given orally in open court?
Held: The SC annuls said order.
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear
and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the
opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent" demands
confrontation for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot
be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions
and obtaining immediate answers.
Personal appearance of the witness before the judge, enables
the judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced
upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that
the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and
expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. The physical condition of the witness will reveal his
capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his
deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character.
The great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in
the appellate court is based upon his having had just that
opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to
ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.
Thus, if a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the
conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his impressions of
the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much
more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews
the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had
the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and
utterances of the witnesses.
Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to
protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of

the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions

directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general
rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the
issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness
can testify only on those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are
not allowed, except or, preliminary matters, or when there is
difficult in getting direct and intelligible answer from the witness
who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or a
deaf mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted,
and the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted
if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to adopt any
procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is
specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)
Facts: Aug. 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was
assassinated as he was about to disembark at the tarmac of the
Manila International Airport. Lying prostrate on the ground also
was the dead body of Rolando Galman, the supposed assassin.
PD 1886 was promulgated by then President Marcos creating an
ad hoc Fact Finding Body which became known as the Agrava
Board (chaired by Justice Corazon Agrava). Pursuant to said
decree various witnesses testified and appeared before the said
board and/or produced documentary and other evidence.
Among the witnesses where Gen. Fabian Ver, Gen. Prospero
Olivas, and orther soldiers comprising Aquinos security detail.
Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted
to Pres. Marcos and which was referred to the Tanodbayan. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed
with the Sandiganbayan 2 informations for murder (one for
Aquino, the other for Galman) against Ver et al either as
accessories, accomplices and several principles.
Upon arraignment, all accused pleaded guilty.
In the course of trial, the prosecution offered as part of its
evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver et al before the
Agrava Board.
Ver filed a formal motion to exclude his testimony in said board
contending that it is violative of his right against selfincrimination and the immunity granted by PD 1886. Olivas and
the other respondents followed Vers motion with their own
similar motion.
The Tanodbayan opposed said motion
contending that the immunity could not be granted because of
their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before
the Agrava Board.
On June 13, 1985, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
admitting all the evidence except the testimonies produced by
Ver et al in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. MR was
denied.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies given by Ver et al can be
admitted in evidence, being violative of their right to selfincrimination?
Held: 9-5, Petition Dismissed.
LACK OF DUE PROCESS AND APPLICATION OF EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
As to the argument that the fact-finding initiative of the Agrava
Board did not constitute a custodial investigation - The court
herein held that the Agrava Board was created by PD 1886 not
merely to determine the facts surrounding Aquinos death but
also to identify the culprits for their consequent prosecution. As
pointed out PD 1886, sec. 12 provides that the Agrava Board if
its findings warrant the prosecution of any person the Board
may file the initiatory complaint with the proper government
agency. By its very nature, the investigation and questioning
made by the Agrava Board was in the nature of a custodial
investigation requiring that the accused be given counsel and
that he be appraised of his rights under the Miranda doctrine.
The court found in review of the pleadings and annexes of the
proceedings of the Agrava Board was constitutionally infirm for
not conforming with the specified constitutional standards thus
they should be excluded.
EFFECT OF IMMUNITY STATUTES
Use Immunity vs. Transactional Immunity - The Court further
pointed out that PD 1886 denied to Ver et al the right to remain

79

silent because under Sec. 5, PD 1886 that they should answer

all questions raised if not they would be cited for contempt of
court. Also, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness
against themselves. Nevertheless, PD 1886s denial of such
rights was based on the fact that the law provided immunity to
the persons who may testify in front of said board. Thereinafter,
the court differentiated, use immunity from transactional
immunity as applied here and granted by law.
Use
immunity prohibits use of witness compelled testimony and its
fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution.
Transaction Immunity grants immunity to the witness from
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony
relates.
PD 1886 grants use immunity only. It makes only the witness
immune from use of any statement given but not immune from
prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying
do not render the witness immune from prosecution
notwithstanding his invocation of his right of self-incrimination.
He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement
and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of
being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against selfincrimination. Due process demands that the Agrava board
should have been informed of their Miranda rights.
Invocation of right to remain silent before giving testimony and
to prevent its use is wrong. The literal interpretation of PD
1886 in such a way is repugnant to Article IV, Sec. 20 of the
Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility.
Dissents:
Teehankee The right against self-incrimination in proceedings
other than criminal is considered an option of refusal to answer,
not a prohibition of inquiry. The privilege must be invoked at the
proper time and that time is when the question is propounded.
This has to be so because before a question is asked there
would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited
from the witness is self-incriminating or not. A person who has
been summoned to testify cannot decline to appear, nor can he
decline to be sworn as a witness and no claim of privilege can
be made until a question calling for incriminating answer is
asked; at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time only,
the claim of privilege may properly be interposed.
Melencio-Herrera - There should be no automatic immunity
bath of the entire testimony before the Board for immunity
does not extend to such of the evidence as is not privileged.
Relova Under PD 1886, testimony adduced before the Agrava
Board may not be used against the witness only after he has
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore,
respondents cannot invoke the immunity clause of PD 1886
since they did not claim the privilege to remain silent when
being asked questions at the Agrava Board hearing.

b.

Cross-Examination

de la Paz, Jr. v. IAC, 154 S 65 (1987)

They claimed that the parcel of land was not accounted for in
the probate proceedings but is actually community property of
the parties.
The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were
admittedly compulsory heirs of Ponciano de la Paz who died in
1916. Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano while: 1)
Emilio de la Paz, Jr., is the son of Emilio, a recognized natural
child of Ponciano; 2) Manuela de la Paz is the recognized natural
child of Ponciano; 3) Natividad de la Paz is the daughter of
Emilio, recognized natural child of Ponciano; 4) Margarita de la
Paz is the daughter of Wenceslao, a recognized natural child of
Ponciano; and 5) Zenaida de la Paz, is the daughter of Augusto,
another recognized natural child of Ponciano. As regards
petitioner Enrique de la Paz, Loreto denied his claim that he is
one of the heirs of Ponciano. The petitioners, however, allege
that he is also a compulsory heir of Ponciano, he being the son
of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr., the eldest child of the decedent.
The parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement during
pre-trial. Hence, trial on the merits followed.
Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony
on March 12, 1984.
On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his crossexamination of Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, not
completed. The petitioners' counsel moved in open court for the
continuance of the cross-examination on the ground that he still
had to conduct a lengthy cross-examination.
On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction
of transcript" due to some errors in the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto.
The motion was granted.
This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners''
counsel to manifest that he would not be able to undertake the
cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. The trial was
rescheduled three times.
During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the
petitioners, nor their counsel appeared despite due notice.
Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she be allowed to
present evidence ex parte before a commissioner. The motion
was granted and Loreto presented additional evidence ex parte
in the afternoon of the same day. On this same date, she
finished the presentation of her evidence and submitted her
case for decision.
Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion
were allowed to cross-examine Loreto.
On the scheduled hearing set on September 18, 1984, the
petitioners' counsel failed to appear, and the cross-examination
of Loreto was deferred for the fourth (4th) time.
Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed
his repeatedly postponed cross-examination of Loreto. The
cross-examination was, however, cut short and rescheduled
again on motion of the petitioners' counsel.

Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a

witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits
the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain
in the record. Implied waiver of the right of cross-examine may
take various forms, as long as the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness
but failed to take advantage of it reasons attributable to himself
alone. Repeated absences, and/or unjustified motions for
postponement of the hearing in which the witness is scheduled
to be cross-examined until the witness passed away is a waiver
of the right to cross-examine.

Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended

complaint was filed for the purpose of substituting the
respondents, herein, they being the children and heirs of Loreto.

Facts: On May 12, 1983, Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint

against the petitioners with the RTC of Rizal for a judicial
declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land
in the name of Ponciano de la Paz with damages

This petition notwithstanding, the lower court continued the

proceedings. Thus, on March 29, 1985, the lower court
promulgated a decision declaring the private respondents, the
children and heirs of Loreto, as the true owners of the subject
parcel of land.

Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the
properties adjudicated to her and her mother as a result of a
partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz and
approved by the court. The subject matter of Civil Case No. 1399
was Ponciano's testate estate.
In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was
among the properties adjudicated to Loreto and her mother.

At the resumption of the trial on January 21, 1985, the

petitioners moved verbally to strike off the record the entire
testimony of Loreto. The motion was denied. A verbal motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
The petitioners filed a petition with the IAC to annul the lower
court's orders dated January 24, 1985 and February 11, 1985
and to prohibit the court from further proceeding.

The IAC denied the petition and the MR.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Loreto should be
stricken off the records.
Held: A motion to strike off testimony from the record is an
interlocutory order. Well-settled is the rule that interlocutory

80

orders may not be subjects of a petition of certiorari unless

issued in patent abuse of discretion.

referred to in the dispositive part of the Appellate Court's

judgment, had earlier migrated to the United States.

In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine

Loreto was through no fault of the respondents. As can be
gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for crossexamination from the time she finished her direct testimony on
March 12, 1984 to November 7, 1984, the last scheduled
hearing of the case before her death on December 1, 1984. The
petitioners not only kept on postponing the cross-examination
but at times failed to appear during scheduled hearings. The
postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later date duet o
the correction of the stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony
may be justified, but the same cannot be said for the
subsequent posponements requested by the petitioners. The
scheduled trials before November 7, 1984, did not push through,
because of the petitioners' fault. It may also be recalled that at
the scheduled hearing on September 14, 1984 neither the
petitioners nor their counsel appeared leading to the
presentation of evidence ex parte. And also during the
scheduled hearing on September 18, 1984, when the petitioners
were allowed to cross-examine Loreto despite the fact that the
case was already deemed submitted for decision, the petitioners
again failed to appear.

The respondents prayed for the sticking off from the records the
testimonies of the petitioners witnesses which the court
allowed. As a consequence, the case was dismissed.

Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had

waived their right to cross-examine Loreto. Through their own
fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her
testimony stands.

Fulgado v. CA, 182 S 81 (1990)

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal, civil, or
administrative, is a fundamental right which is part of due
process. The right is not to an actual, but a mere opportunity to
cross-examine. Failure of the adverse party to move to schedule
the hearing for the cross-examination of a witness before he
died or migrated abroad (the imminence of which the adverse
party was aware) is a waiver of such right. The burden is on the
party wishing to exercise the right to cross-examination, not
necessarily the plaintiff, to schedule the hearing.
Facts: On September 9,1967, Ruperto Fulgado, a man
approaching the twilight of his life, undertook the arduous task
of filing an action in the CFI against herein respondents for the
annulment of certain contracts of sale and partition with
accounting. The defendants (herein private respondents) filed
their answer to the complaint with special and affirmative
defenses and a counterclaim.
After several deferments, the pre-trial conference was finally set
for February 1, 1968 at 8:30 in the morning. Private respondents
and their counsel failed to appear on time at the pre-trial and
were subsequently declared as in default. Plaintiff Fulgado was
then allowed to present his evidence ex parte before the Deputy
Clerk of Court.
Meanwhile, upon learning of their predicament, private
respondents immediately filed a motion to lift the order of
default on the same day that the order was issued. The trial
court denied said motion in its order of February 16, 1972. Their
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Persistently,
respondents filed a petition for relief from the default order.
Once more, this was denied.
On April 24, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado. On appeal, however, the CA found that
private respondents had been deprived of their day in court by
the unjust denial of their motion to lift the order of default.
The Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on
June 27,1974 and the records of the case were remanded to the
trial court.
The case was set for hearing but was rescheduled because the
judge went on leave. In the meantime, Fulgado died and was
substituted by his heirs. Fulgado's witness, Jose Fulgado,

The CA affirmed the TCs decision.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the witnesses should be
excluded.
Held: The appeal is well-taken.
The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by
cross-examination has always been understood as requiring, not
necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an
opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.
Thus the resolution of the present case would hinge on whether
or not this was an opportunity for cross-examination.
From the records presented, it is manifest that private
respondents had enough opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff
Fulgado before his death, and Jose Fulgado before his migration.
When the Court of Appeals set aside the default judgment and
remanded the case to the court of origin for trial on the merits,
"granting to the defendants the opportunity to present their
evidence." This was a positive signal for them to proceed with
the cross-examination of the two Fulgados. But despite
knowledge of Ruperto's failing health (he was then 89 years of
age) and Jose's imminent travel to the United States, private
respondents did not move swiftly and decisively. They tarried for
more than one year from the finality of the Appellate Court's
decision on June 27, 1974 to ask the trial court on July 3, 1975 to
set the already much delayed case for hearing "in any date of
August and September ... ."
Razon v. CA, 207 SCRA 234 (1992)
Capital Subdivision v. Negros Occidental, 52 O.G.
4672 (1956)
U.S. v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
U.S. v. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)

c.

Recalling Witnesses

People v. Rivera, 200 S 786 (1991)

The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or
exercisable by an applicant's mere general statement that there
is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in
order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or
that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions
that should have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To
regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground
for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no
longer discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the
bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is
essential before the Court's discretion may rightfully be
exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory
showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall.
There must be a satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for
instance, that particularly identified material points were not
covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described
vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall
is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so
inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent
such particulars, there would be no foundation for a trial court to
authorize the recall of any witness.
Furthermore, failure of the recalled witness to be appear is not
ground to strike out his testimony. There should have been a
showing of the indispensability of his further examination, what
it was that would have been elicited, and that such additional
testimony would cause the evidence to become inadmissible.
Lastly, striking out of testimony must be upon motion. It can not
be ordered motu propio.
Facts: Wilfredo Sembrao was charged with Arson for allegedly
willfully causing the fire which destroyed the 2nd and 3rd floors of
the I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath Owned by Juanito
Tan and frequented by Stanley Fabito. On December 8, 1987,

81

prosecution witness Benjamin Lee testified on Sembranos act of

running from the VIP room where the fire started and his refusal
to stop.
On April 26, 1987, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examinations were conducted after which Lee was asked to step
down. After the prosecution completed its presentation of
evidence but before it could rest its case, defendants original
counsel withdrew and was substituted by defendants original
counsel withdrew and was substituted by atty. Rodriguez, who
then filed a motion to recall Lee for further examination on the
ground that there seems to be many points and questions that
should have been asked but were not profounded by the other
defense counsel who conducted the cross-examination. The
court granted the motion over objections of the prosecution.
Lee failed to come since he left his work and transferred
somewhere else to dispense with the recall of Lee but the RTC
denied this and even ordered the testimony of Lee to be stricken
of the record due to a lack of complete cross-examination.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTCs grant of leave to recall Lee was
proper?
Held: No. Certiorari granted.
Although the Rules of Court gives the court discretion in
granting leave for the recall of witnesses, such cannot be
exercised on the basis of applicants mere general statement
that there is need to recall a witness in the interest of justice
or in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his case
or the reason invoked in the present case. To regard these
generalities as sufficient ground to recall a witness would make
it ministerial rather than discretionary. Thus, there must be a
satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for
the recall (e.g. that particularly identified material points were
not covered in the cross, that particularly described vital
documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is
prayed for, that the cross-examination was conducted in so
inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof). Here,
the questions that were supposedly not asked were not specified
in the motion.
Moreover, the RTC acted whimsically when it ordered the
striking out of Lees testimony. The court acted unilaterally
without any motion to this effect and without giving the
prosecution opportunity to contest it. The striking out was
ordered without any showing that further cross was really
indispensable. Here, Lee was already subjected to both cross
and re-cross so that the absence of cross can neither be invoked
as a ground to strike out Lee testimony.
People v. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA 716 (1968)
Facts: Estrada was one of several accused in kidnapping Elvira
Principe. The CFI found Estrada guilty and was sentenced to
death.
The case of the people was established thru the
testimonies of 12 witnesses. Ceribo, one of the witnesses who
testified for the prosecution, testified that he was a surrendered
Huk and he already knew about the kidnapping because there
was a conference in Barrio Biga where it was agreed to kidnap
Elvira because she was the one pointed to by Estrada. Estradas
defense was that the charge against him was a pure concoction.
Estrada sought to recall Ceribo because it was claimed that he
was to retract his previous testimony from the prosecution and
then testify for the defense. However, the court denied the
defense the right to call back Ceribo.
Issue: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in denying
the defense the right to call back witness Ceribo?
Held: The SC held that under Sec. 14, Rule 132 Rules of Court
explicitly provides that the court may grant or withhold leave to
recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may
require. It was the better part of discretion and caution on the
part of the court to have denied it. The record is loaded with
circumstances tending to show insidious attempts, too obvious
to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the
prosecution.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Ong Su, 79 SCRA 207
(1977)

d.

Leading Questions

People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 (1994)

A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from

being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses, acceptance
of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or,
otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he
can make them known to the court. In the case before us, the
trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it
was necessary at times to ask her leading questions, "her
testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her
mental condition did not vitiate her credibility.
State v. Scott, 149 P2d 152 (1944)

e.

Impeaching One's Own Witness

Becker v. Eisenstodt, 158 A.2d 706 (1960)

f.

Impeachment By Bias

U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)

U.S. v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1976)

g.

Impeachment
Statement

By

Prior

Inconsistent

Villalon, Jr. v. IAC, 144 S 443 (1986)

A party may impeach a witness by introducing into evidence
their previous testimony in his disbarment proceedings which
are inconsistent with their current testimony. An attorney may
waive the confidential nature of his own disbarment
proceedings.
Facts: On May 16, 1979, a case for "Annulment of Deed of
Absolute Sale, Recovery of Possession and Damages" was filed
by private respondent Catalina NEVAL Vda. de Ebuiza, mother of
the other private respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, against
petitioner Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr. and his sons for the
recovery of a parcel of land located at Urbiztondo, San Juan. La
Union.
The property involved was also the subject of a Disbarment
Case previously filed on July 22, 1975 with this Court by private
respondent Francisco EBUIZA, charging petitioner Villalon with
falsification of a deed of absolute sale of that property in his and
his sons' favor, but which petitioner Villalon claimed to have
been his contingent fee for the professional services he had
rendered to EBUIZA's parents. The Disbarment Case was
referred by this Court to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation where testimonial
evidence was received. The case still pends thereat.
In the course of the trial of the Civil Case, petitioners introduced
in evidence the testimonies of some of the private respondents,
namely, NEVAL, EBUIZA, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan (NEVAL, et
als.), in the Disbarment Case for the purpose of impeaching
their testimonies in the Civil Case.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of
the Civil Case all matters relating to the proceedings in the
Disbarment Case. Over petitioners' opposition, on September
20, 1985, the TC issued its questioned Order granting the Motion
to Strike. Their MR was denied so they filed a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus with the IAC which denied
their petition.
Held: By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived
petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility of their
adverse parties' witnesses by proving that on former occasions
they had made statements inconsistent with the statements
made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are
material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject matter
involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged
falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is
the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of
the said deed of absolute sale is sought.
The offer of evidence, suggested by respondent Appellate Court
as a remedy open to petitioners, while procedurally correct,

82

would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of

impeachment. The broader interests of justice would then
require that petitioners be given sufficient latitude to present
and prove their impeaching evidence for judicial appreciation.
People v. Resabal, 50 Phil 780 (1927)
To impeach a witness by prior inconsistent statements, he must
be given ample opportunity to explain the discrepancies by a
reading to him of such prior statement. Mere presentation of the
statement, without said declaration having been read to the
witness while he testified, is no ground for impeaching his
testimony.
Escolin: Note that the accused now does not have the right to
cross-examine the witness during the preliminary investigation.
He can only give questions to the investigating officer to be
propounded to the witness.
Facts: The evidence shows, as an indisputable fact, that in the
early morning of April 25, 1926, one Primo Ordiz died at his own
home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of Maasin, Leyte, form
the effects of an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound
in the left lung, as appears from the death certificate.
The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness,
because of his having been excluded from the information to be
used as a witness for the prosecution; and, because, moreover,
of the contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary
investigation and during the trial.
The TC convicted the accused of murder.
Counsel for the defense alleges that the trial court erred in not
ignoring Glicerio Orit's testimony, and in not acquitting the
accused Alejo Resabal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Held: We are of the opinion that the mere fact of having been
excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the
Government, does not prevent this witness from telling the truth
in this case, especially in the absence of proof showing the
interest he might possibly have in testifying against the
accused. Neither is the apparent contradiction which may be
noted in his declarations before the court of the justice of the
peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to
discredit his testimony, for the simple reason that this witness
was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his
declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, to
explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused. The
mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having
been read to the witness while he testified in the Court of First
Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.
U.S. v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)

h.

Impeachment By Other Means

U.S. v. Mercado, 20 Phil. 127 (1913)

Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 SW2d 679 (1967)
Coles v. Harsh, 276 P. 248 (1929)
U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services, 583 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1978)
Newton v. State, 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
State v. Oswalt, 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)

i.

Facts: Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama and Pampang were

charged and convicted for the murder of Eleno Lamorena in the
CFI of Lanao.
On appeal, said persons assigned as error the trial courts
refusal to admit a certain witness presented by the defense on
the ground that said witness had been present during a hearing
despite the courts order that all witnesses leave the court.
Issue: Whether or not the exclusion of the witness was proper?
Held: Yes. Conviction affirmed.
Under the circumstances of the case, it lies within the discretion
of the court to admit or reject the testimony of the witness.
Although the SC is of opinion that the lower court should have
admitted the testimony of the witness, especially when he said
that he did not hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there
is nothing to show that this error has affected appellants
defense especially since there is no indication whatsoever as to
what the witness would have stated in his testimony.
State v. Bishop, 492 P2d 509 (1972)
Facts: Joe Berry Bishop was convicted of sale and possession of
dangerous drugs. When the case was called for trial, defense
counsel requested all witnesses be excluded. The prosecutor
stated that most of his witnesses were police officers. Counsel
for the defendant argued that his client would be prejudiced by
allowing the officers to remain and moved for their exclusion.
This motion was denied because the trial court wanted the
police officers who would be witnesses to be able to view the
trail as an educational experience, and wanted them to be able
to see the fruits of their labor. Hence, this appeal to the CA of
Oregon.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in not excluding the
witnesses and was the defendant prejudiced by this failure to
exclude the witnesses?
Held: Yes, the trial court erred. A review of Oregon SC cases
reveals that a motion to exclude witnesses is normally granted.
The practice of excluding witnesses from the courtroom except
while each is testifying is to be strongly recommended,
particularly here the testimony of the witnesses is in any
measure cumulative or corroborative.
However, these
authorities mean that when one party moves to exclude
witnesses and the other party voices no objection, the motion
should always be granted. When the motion is opposed, the
trial courts discretion comes into play. The trail court must
weigh the good cause shown for not excluding witnesses
against policy favoring exclusion. Thus, if the record contains
some showing of good cause for not excluding the witnesses
and if the trial court made a reasonable choice between the
good cause shown and the policy favoring exclusion, its decision
will not be disturbed on appeal. But if the record contains no
reason for not excluding witnesses, or an insufficient reason,
then the trial court has abused its discretion. In this case, the
CA found that the reasons advanced by the trial court were not
relevant to the purpose of the trail, namely, the determination of
whether the defendant
was guilty of the crime charged.
Balanced against the danger that the witnesses memories might
be confused by other testimony, and the other reasons for the
rule of sequestration (exclusion), the reasons advanced by the
court were insufficient.
Yes, he was prejudiced. The State has the burden to prove the
lack of prejudice from denial of defendants motion to exclude
witnesses, and when a trail court has abused its discretion by
not excluding witnesses, prejudice will be assumed unless the
record affirmatively reflects the contrary.

Exclusion of Witnesses

People v. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1930)

83

j.

Refreshing Recollection

more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in

which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be
given. (22 a)

State v. Peoples, 319 S.E. 2d 177 (1984)

U.

Authentication and Proof of Documents

Requisites for admissibility of private document

1.

a.

Rule 132 19-33

Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of

their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

offered as authentic due execution and authenticity must

be proved
i.

either by
1.

anyone who saw the document executed or

written; or

2.

evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country;

a.

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public

except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Public documents

b.

a.

written official acts, or records of the official acts of the

sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

b.

notarized documents, except last wills and testaments; and

c.

public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents

required by law to be entered therein.

ii.

any witness who believes it to be the

handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his
1.

upon which the witness

acted or been charged, and

has

2.

has thus acquired knowledge of

the handwriting of such person

a comparison, made by the witness or the

court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge

Unless it is an ancient document; requisites

1.

more than 30 years old

Private documents

2.

produced from a custody in which it would

naturally be found if genuine, and

authenticity

Must prove genuineness

and due execution

3.

unblemished by any alterations or circumstances

of suspicion

Binding against the parties and 3rd

persons

Binds only parties to the

document

Public documents
Genuineness
presumed

and

Certain transactions are required

to be in a public document (e.g.
donation of real property)

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any

private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker. (cf with Rule 132, Sec. 22)
Any other private document need only be identified
as that which it is claimed to be. (21 a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23 a)

b.

not offered as authentic identified as that which it is

claimed to be

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents

consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of
the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter. (24 a)
Documents consisting of
a.

entries in public records made in the performance of a duty

by a public officer prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.

b.

all other public documents evidence, even against a 3 rd

person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public

documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19
(official acts), when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)

Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private

document not necessary. Where a private document is

84

The record of public documents of official acts may be

evidenced by
a.
b.

an official publication thereof or

a copy
i. attested by
1. the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or
2. his deputy, and
ii.

the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as

above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Proof of lack of record
a.

A written statement

if the record is not kept in the Philippines

1. accompanied by a certificate that such officer
has the custody made by
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

2.

secretary of the embassy or legation

consul general
consul
vice consul, or
consular agent or
any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept

authenticated by the seal of his office.

Procedure in obtaining copy of foreign official acts

a.

get a copy from the legal custodian

b.

have the legal custodian attest that the copy is correct

c.

have the Philippine consul certify that the person in #2 is

the legal custodian of a copy of official act

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state.

Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Attestation of copy must
a.

state the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific

part thereof, as the case may be

b.

be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be

any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court

Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. Any public

record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which
it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just
determination of a pending case. (27 a)
GR: Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is
kept
Exception: upon order of a court where the inspection of the
record is essential to the just determination of a pending case
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. An
authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof,
attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
(28a)
Public record of a private document may be proved by
a.

the original record, or

b.

a copy thereof

b.

i.

signed by an officer having the custody of an official

record or by his deputy

ii.

that after diligent search no record or entry of a

specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office,

accompanied by a certificate that such officer is supposed

to have custody

If a notarized document is lost, get certifications of loss

from
a.

notary public

b.

bureau of archives

c.

clerk of court who commissioned the notary public

Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. Any judicial

record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of
jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion
between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the
record, in respect to the proceedings. (30 a)

Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of

a.
b.
c.

want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer

collusion between the parties, or
fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the
proceedings

Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every

instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being
prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved. (31 a)
Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law
a.

may be presented in evidence without further proof

b.

the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie

evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved

Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain.

The party producing a document as genuine which has
been altered and appears to have been altered after its
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute,
must account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration
was
made
by
another,
without
his
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the
parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocently made, or that the alteration did not change
the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to
do that the document shall not be admissible in
evidence. (32 a)
The party producing a document as genuine which has
been altered and appears to have been altered after its
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute
a.

must account for the alteration, either as

i.

i.

attested by the legal custodian of the record

ii.

ii.

with an appropriate certificate that such officer

has the custody

iii.
iv.

Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written

statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in

b.

made by another, without his concurrence,

or
made with the consent of the parties
affected by it, or
otherwise properly or innocently made, or
the alteration did not change the meaning
or language of the instrument

If he fails to do that the document shall not be

admissible in evidence

85

Sec. 32. Seal. There shall be no difference between

sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as their
admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33 a)

Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is

required under Section 21, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court, to wit:

Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial

language. Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied
with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid
interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys
are directed to have such translation prepared before
trial. (34 a)

Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how

proved. Before any private writing may be received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:

Documents written in an unofficial language

a.

shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied

with a translation into English or Filipino

b.

parties or their attorneys are directed to have such

translation prepared before trial.
2.

Cases
a.

Proof of private documents

Buag v. CA, 158 SCRA 299 (1988)

The authenticity and due execution of a private document is not
proven by testimony that the party thumbmarked it. The
circumstances of the presence of the witness during the
execution must be related. There must be proof that the party
understood it, considering he was illiterate (implied from the
thumbmarking). There must be showing that the document was
duly read, explained and translated to the illiterate party.
Facts: These is a case for recovery of possession of a parcel of
land in Pampanga between Bunag and Bautista. Bunag claims
that the property in question was originally owned by his father
Apolonio Bunag Aguas as shown by Tax Declaration Nos. 546 for
1941 and 320 for 1960 (Exhs. B & E). They had transferred their
residence to Tarlac from Pampanga and Jose Bautista Santiago, a
nephew-in-law, was allowed by his father to erect a house on
said lot and lived therein on the condition that he would pay for
the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. He
admitted, however, that he only learned about this agreement
from his father. On September 15,1962, and September 24,1962
he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista, thru his
lawyer, to vacate the lot and remove the houses thereon, (Exhs.
A & B).
On the other hand, Bautista testified that he is the
owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, of
January 3, 1941, signed by Apolonio Bunag with his thumbmark;
that Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista,
but as the latter had no money, he referred the matter to his
father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he
sent the P100.00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale
was consummated between his father and Bunag; that he came
down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he stayed
there with his family until liberation when they left the house
and allowed his sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that he
planted bananas, chicos, trees, calamansi, eggplants, thereon;
that he had been paying the land taxes thereon (Exhs. 5 to 5-M);
that the property is declared in his name (Exh. 6); and he denies
that her sister Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her
to stay on the property as her sister had a house of her own
then. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said
property from Apolonio Bunag and that she was present when
Bunag affixed Ms thumbmark on the document (Exh. 1); that
aside from this deed, there were other documents supporting
the sale as the note (Exh. 2) containing the consideration and
the parties. Assessor's Field Sheet of the property (Exh. 3) and
the letter of the assessor to Bunag in 1941 informing him of the
revision of the assessment. (Rollo, pp. 15-18). The trial court
decided in favor of petitioner. The CA, finding the deed of sale
(Exhibit 1) to have been validly executed and rueld in favor of
Bruno. MR was denied by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was authentic and
validly executed?
Held: Note here that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not
acknowledged before a notary public and neither are there any
signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of attesting
witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the
similarly typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint.
The deed of sale is not notarized and is, therefore, a private
writing whose due execution and authenticity must be proved
before it can be received in evidence.

(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the
maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
To support its conclusion as to the due execution and
authenticity of the deed of sale, the CA relied on the testimony
of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents. However, the
TC had ruled otherwise since it received the testimony of Brigida
with caution, coming as it does from a sister of the defendants.
The circumstances other alleged presence during the
"execution" of the deed of sale was not related. Neither does
she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the
document. It should be noted that the deed was written in
English. Since it appears that said document was merely thumbmarked, it could reasonably be inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the
supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the circumstances, the
minimum proof necessary to establish due authenticity should,
in the least, include evidence that the document (Exhibit "1")
was duly read, explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag.
Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented.
The SC also considered the lack of instrumental witnesses in the
document. The mischief that lurks behind accepting at face
value a document that is merely thumb-marked. without any
witnesses to it, and not acknowledged before a notary public
could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules
on evidence that a private writing must be shown to be duly
executed and authenticated. The probative value of the
testimony of Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish us with any
details surrounding the execution of Exhibit "l," coming as it
does from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not,
be overlook falling short the minimum requirements of
credibility. The testimony of an eye-witness as to the execution
of a private document must be positive. He must state that the
document was actually executed by the person whose name is
subscribed thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general
manner that such person made the writing. More so if the
document was merely thumb-marked.
The Court adopts the TC's findings and its conclusion that the
due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1)
was not proved and thus such private document should be
excluded.

b.

Ancient documents

Bartolome v. IAC, 183 SCRA 102 (1990)

Where the offerors witness testified that the document had a
missing 4th page, the document can not qualify as an ancient
document because it is blemished by alteration or circmstance
of suspicion. An incomplete document is akin to an altered
document, more so if the missing page contains the signature of
the parties to the document. Proof of the documents
authenticity and due execution is therefore necessary.
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, 197 SCRA 234 (1991)
Lack of signatures on the first pages of a document alone is not
a blemish that would disqualify a document from being an
ancient document. Allegations that the pages had been
substituted should be proven in order to disqualify the document
from being an ancient document, more so if the documents were
shown to be exact copies of the original on file with the Register
of Deeds. Proof of their due execution and authenticity is no
longer required.
de Leon: Note that the document was actually a public record
because it had been registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Therefore, the court did not have to determine whether the

86

document was in fact an ancient document because it was in

the first place a public document whose authenticity and due
execution need not be proven. The problem with this case is it is
now authority to say that private documents whose first pages
are not signed by the parties can qualify as ancient documents.
Keep in mind that crucial to the ruling in Lacsa was the fact that
the document presented matches the one on file in the Registry
of Deeds. Had there been no matching copy in the Registry of
Deeds, I submit that the document can not qualify as an ancient
document.
Facts: An action for recovery of possession was field by Songco
and Doe alleging that Lacsa owed the disputed piece of and by
showing an OCT and that the respondent occupied the land by
fraud. Respondents denied the allegation and said that the OCT
relied upon by the petitioners was superseded by a TCT by
virtue of a document (Exh. 3) and later by superseded by
another document (Exh. 7).
Petitioners submit that the
documents are not ancient documents for it must not only be 30
yrs. old but also found in the proper custody and is unblemished
by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion. They allege
that the document cannot be considered as such because the
first 2 pages did not bear the signatures of the parties to the
document.

doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] and that since his
wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her, he was
entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00." As evidence of
this foreign award, Rances submitted what purports to be an
"original copy of the decision" of the Dubai court written in
Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation
by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter
dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh
"Honorary Consul for Philippines." In its answer filed on 11
December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal
arguments: (1.) that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon
by Rances could not be considered as evidence, not having been
properly authenticated; (2.) that Pascor was not a party to the
Dubai court proceedings; (3.) that the POEA had no jurisdiction
over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and (4.)
that the claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M84-09-848, having been there dismissed as a counterclaim.
In its decision, the POEA held Pascor liable to pay Rances the
amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of exchange at
the time of payment."
The POEA denied Pascor's appeal for
having been filed out of time. On 29 May 1986, the POEA
denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and
elevated the case to the NLRC. On 14 August 1986, NLRC denied
petitioner's appeal as filed out of time.

Issue: Whether or not the documents are ancient documents?

Held: Yes, under the rule, the documents must be atleast 30
yrs. old and this was shown by the fact that exh. 3 was
executed on April 7, 1923 and Exh. 7 on January 20, 1924. The
next requisite that it be found or produced from a custody in
which it would naturally be found was shown when the
document was found under the care of the Register of Deeds as
they certified that both documents are copies of the original.
The petitioners contention that the lack of signature on the first
two apges cast doubt on the authenticity of the document was
answered by the SC saying that we cannot uphold this surmise
absent any proof whatsoever. As the petitioner failed to show
proof of the irregularity, the SC ruled that the document is valid.
As a contract appearing honest and lawful on its face must be
treated as such and one who assails the genuineness must
present conclusive evidence of fabrication.
c.

Proof of foreign judgments

Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122

(1988)
To be enforceable, the foreign judgment must be proven as a
public document of a written official act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country. The offeror must
submit an attestation issued by the proper foreign official having
legal custody of the original judgment that the copy is a faithful
reproduction of the original, which attestation must be
authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer having jurisdiction
in that country.
Facts: Teodoro Rances was engaged by Pacific Asia Overseas
Shipping Corporation (Pascor) as Radio Operator of a vessel
belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship
Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having
been transferred from one vessel to another four times for
misbehaviour and inability to get along with officers and crew
members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated
the services of Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible
work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination.
Pascor filed a complaint against Rances with the POEA for acts
unbecoming a marine officer and for character assassination.
Rances denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way
of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a
court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against
petitioner's foreign principal. The POEA found Rances liable for
inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and
challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6)
months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12)
months suspension. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio
the counterclaim of Rances.
Later, Rances filed a complaint against Pascor where he sought
to carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in
Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had
pleaded as a counterclaim in the first POEA Case. Rances
claimed that be had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$
9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$
5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country,"
with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the
claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rances

Issue: (Related to evidence) Whether or not the Dubai decision

was admissible in evidence as proven?
Held: The appeal should have been allowed by the NLRC
because there was a real effort and legal cause for the said
appeal. In the end, the decision of the POEA was set aside.
Ruling on the merits,
An examination of the complaint filed by Rances in the POEA
shows that the cause of action pleaded by Rances was
enforcement of the decision rendered by the Dubai Court which
purported to award him, among other things, an additional
amount of US$ 1,500.00 under certain circumstances. Petitioner
argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and
jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under
Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it
will be seen that the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all cases
'involving employer employee relations arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen." Respondent Rances,
however, relied not upon the employer - employee relationship
between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's
foreign principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him
from the Dubai Court which had apparently already been
partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$
5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a
claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must
be brought before the regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it
is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the
rules of evidence which are mandatorily applicable in
proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings before
the POEA.
Even assuming in arguendo that the POEA has jurisdiction, still
Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision
was not properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision
purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public
writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of
proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the
following terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. An official record or
an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or
litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a
copy of a writing is attend for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the

87

attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court

having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any
attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal
custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that
the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the
original decision, which attestation must furthermore be
authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction
in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984,
signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does
not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under
Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in
evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is
accompanied by a document which purports to be an English
translation of that decision., but that translation is legally
defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires that documents written in a non-official language like
Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied
by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. In the instant
case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation
of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the
POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been
made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine
Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity
of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and
English languages has been shown. The English translation
submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate
translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that
translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and
faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by
reliance upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court decision,
even on the basis of the English translation submitted by
respondent Rances, does not purport on its face to have been
rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign
principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances simply assumed that
the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign principal.
The Dubai decision does not Identify the parties to the litigation
that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai
decision can scarcely be enforced against petitioner Pascor.
Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to
be rendered against petitioner Pascor, we must note that
petitioner Pascor has expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever
been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of Pascor in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before the
Dubai Court. Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of
the Dubai Rules of Procedure governing acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.
Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai
Court had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Pascor's foreign principal Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. it
still would not follow that Pascor would automatically be bound
by the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or suretyship) of
Pascor is limited in its reach to the contracts of employment
Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with persons like
respondent Rances. Such statutory inability does not extend to
liability for judgments secured against Gulf East Ship
Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf East outside
Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may
involve a contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.
Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23 (1993)
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. Mere testimony of a
witness is not sufficient to prove foreign law.
Facts: Zalamea purchased two tickets from the Manila agent of
TWA. Cesar and Suthiras tickets were purchased as a 75%
discount, while Lianas was a full fare ticket. They all had
confirmed reservations. In NY, on the appointed date, they
checked in an hour earlier but they were placed in the wait-list.
Eventually, only Cesar was able to board while the 2 others had
to book with American Airlines. Upon their arrival in Manila,

they filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of

air carriage. The LC ruled in their favor, while the CA modified it
as regards moral damages, on the ground that there was no
fraud or bad faith, since . . . overbooking of flights is specifically
allowed by the Code of Federal Regulations by the CAB.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that there was no
fraud or bad faith because it has a right to overbook flights?
Held: The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing
overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must alleged and prove. Written law may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer
has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil.
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely
on the testimony of it customer service agent that the Code of
the CAB allows overbooking. Aside from said statement no
official publication of said code was presented as evidence.
Thus, the CAs finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by
the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
d.

Documents in unofficial language

Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122

(1988)
A document written in an unofficial language should be
translated into either English or Filipino. The translator should be
identified either as an official interpreter of the court, or as a
competent translator of both languages. The translation should
be either sworn to as an accurate translation of the original, or
agreed upon by the parties.
People v. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976)
Affidavits written in an unofficial language and not accompanied
with a translation are inadmissible in evidence.
Escolin: The NIRC provides that all notarial documents which
dont have the required documentary stamp tax will not be
admitted in evidence.
Facts: One night, Monleon arrived at his house drunk. He
inquired from Concordia, his wife, whether their carabao had
been fed by their ten-year old son, Marciano. She assured him
that the carabao had been fed. He repaired to the place where
the carabao was tethered to check the veracity of her
statement. He discovered that the carabao had not been
adequately fed. He became furious.
When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened. A
violent quarrel ensued between them. He placed himself astride
his wife's chest, squezzed her neck, pressed her head against a
post, and kicked her in the abdomen. He shouted: "What do I
care if there would be someone who would be buried tomorrow.
You let your brothers and sisters stand up and I will also include
them." Felicisimo, one of the couple's six children, pulled away
his father and stopped his assault on Concordia.
The following morning Concordia vomitted blood. She died at
eleven o'clock on that morning of June 2. Death was due to
"acute abdomen" (Exh. B), a pathologic condition within the
belly, requiring surgical intervention
Sixteen days after Concordia death, Monleon thumbmarked a
confession, written in the Cebuano dialect and sworn to before
the town mayor (Exh. C). He admitted in that confession that he
assaulted his wife and that he had repented for the wrong which
he had done to her. He orally admitted to Perfecto Bongo, a
lieutenant in the Cebu City police department and a relative of
Concordia, that he (Monleon) assaulted his wife because he was
drunk and she was a nagger.
On July 31, 1970 or about two months after Concordia's death, a
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
exhumed her body. He found bluish-black discolorations on the
sphenoid temporal bones of her skull, on the atlas or cervical
vertebra below the skull or at the base of the neck, and on the
first ribs. The discolorations were due to internal hemorrhage
"caused by trauma or external violence." The doctor ventured
the opinion that the "acute abdomen" could have been caused
"by external violence"

88

Monleon denied that he used violence against his wife. He

testified that he and his wife had merely a verbal quarrel and
that Clemencia, the sister of Concordia and the wife of his elder
brother, testified against him because Clemencia and Monleon
had a boundary dispute regarding the lands inherited by
Clemencia and Concordia from their father, Victor Bongo.
Monleon said that Lieutenant Bongo asked him to sign a "recibo"
that he would take care of his children. He also said that some
persons threatened to kill him if he did not affix his thumbmark
to his confession.
The trial court convicted Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his
counsel de oficio alleged that the trial court erred in giving
credence to Monleon's confession, the affidavit of his son,
Marciano, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
the NBI medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino Cunanan; in
treating the alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo to
Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae and in rejecting
the testimonies of Monleon and his two children, Marciano and
Felicisima.
Held: TCs judgment affirmed but lowered to reclusion perpetua.
The court herein held that:
The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission of the crime of
which Concordia Bongo was the victim was established by the
prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and Epifania
Bongo. Hence, Monleon's extrajudicial confession (Exh. C) was
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133
and sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses do not destroy the probative value of the confession
nor negate Monleon's admission therein that he assaulted his
wife. A court may reject portions of the confession by reason of
the improbability of the facts or statements therein or because
of their falsity or untrustworthiness.
The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that Monleon was not
forced to affix his thumbmark to the confession. There is no
evidence that he was tortured or maltreated. Monleon could
have complained to the fiscal during the preliminary
investigation that he was forced to execute his confession. He
did not do so.
Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting
Marciano Monleon's affidavit which was written in the Cebuano
dialect (Exh. E) and which was not accompanied with the
corresponding translation. That confession is well-taken.
The
trial court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of
appellant's counsel because section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides that documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English, Spanish or the national language "To
avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are
directed to have such translation prepared before trial"
The trial court, also, erred in ruling that the alleged declarations
of Concordia Bongo to the husband of Clemencia Bongo
Monleon, as to the violent acts inflicted upon her (Concordia) by
appellant Monleon, are part of the res gestae. That ruling was
made in connection with Clemencia's testimony (not on direct
examination but in answer to the questions of the trial judge)
that at eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, 1970, or about an
hour after Concordia was assaulted by Monleon, she (Concordia)
left her house and went to Clemencia's house three hundred
meters away and recounted to Clemencia's husband (appellant
Monleon's brother) how she was beaten by Monleon. Appellants
counsel observed that it was incredible that Concordia, after
being severely maltreated by Monleon (according to the
prosecution's version), would still have the strength to go to
Clemencia's house which was located on a hill. Clemencia's
testimony reveals that she must have been confused in making
that assertion, assuming that it was accurately translated and
reported. A careful scrutiny of her entire testimony reveals that
what she really meant was that Concordia on the following day,
June 2, recounted to her, as Concordia recounted also to
Epifania, how she was maltreated by Monleon. In all probability
what happened was that Clemencia, on arriving at her house at
around eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, apprised her
husband that she witnessed the assault made by Monleon on
her sister, Concordia.
People v. Salison, 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
Facts: At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30,
1990, witness Maria Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison
approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was then watching

television in a store. Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's

shoulder and brought him behind a neighbor's house where
there was a mango tree. There, appellant Salison boxed
Valmoria in the abdomen.
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three
other accused Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles suddenly
appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked
Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia Fernandez
approached them that the three co-accused disappeared,
leaving Salison and Valmoria behind. Fernandez was able to
separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused
returned and started to maul Valmoria again, with Salison
rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and
Andiente picked up pieces of wood and started to hit Valmoria at
the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria
fell to the ground and, upon finding a chance to do so, he stood
up and ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The
assailants followed Valmoria but failed to further hit the victim
because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house. During this
time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly
thereafter, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in
his head which was bleeding at that time.
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents
accompanied him to the house of witness Patricia Alcoseba, the
purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his
declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should
die and no witness would testify, his written declaration could be
utilized as evidence.
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba,
Valmoria and his parents proceeded to the hospital.
Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However, at
4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and
was rushed to the hospital. After three days there, Valmoria
died.
Issue: May the statement of the victim be admitted as a dying
declaration?
Held: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was
the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed by him right after
the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he
sustained.
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement,
which was reduced into writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and
purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence
since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not
accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The
appellant further contends that the declaration was not made
under the consciousness of an impending death.
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any
objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the defense
waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its
submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into
English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and
forms part of the record.
As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the
declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his
imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used
as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person
would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to
testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that
declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still
admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly
after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the
victim had no opportunity to contrive.
People v. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435 (1999)
Facts: The accused is charged with Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. To prove that the accused was not a
registered owner of a gun, the Prosecution introduced as
evidence a certification dated August 20, 1991, issued by Supt.
Antonio T. Sierra, Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office
(FEO) at Camp Crame. The certification stated that accusedappellant is not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any
kind or caliber.
The defense objected saying that it was hearsay because the
person certifying was not presented in court. The TC however
admitted the same.

89

The accused was found guilty by the TC.

Issue: Whether or not the certificate is admissible and if it is,
was it sufficient.
Held: On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the
testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP
Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal
firearms. Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence admits of
several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section
44, Entries in official records.
Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same
Rules allows the admission of the said document.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the
Commanding Officer of the PNP-Firearm and Explosives Office,
which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the
Philippines, is competent and admissible evidence to prove that
accused-appellant is not a licensed holder or possessor of a
firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a
custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an
entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to
be as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office
as his testimony on the stand to this effect would be.
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April
13, 1999

Sec. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered

orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of
the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon
as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably
apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to
within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be
specified.(36 a)
When objection to evidence offered must be made
a.

orally immediately after the offer is made.

b.

in writing within 3 days after notice of the offer,

unless a different period is allowed by the court.

c.

a question propounded in the course of the oral

examination as soon as the grounds therefor shall
become reasonably apparent.

The grounds for the objections should always be specified.

Grounds for objection

V.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Offer and Objection

1.

Rule 132 34-40

j.

Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider

no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. (35)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the
testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the
time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered
after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence.
Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the
court to be done in writing.(n)
When to make offer
a.

testimony the time the witness is called to testify

b.

documentary and object after the presentation of a

party's testimonial evidence

Offer of evidence shall be done orally unless allowed by the

court to be done in writing.
Offer of evidence

Hearsay
argumentative
leading
misleading
incompetent
irrelevant
best evidence rule
parole evidence rule
question has no basis

Identification of evidence

Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary.

When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of
the examination of a witness that the questions being
propounded are of the same class as those to which
objection has been made, whether such objection was
sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to
repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse
party to record his continuing objection to such class of
questions. (37 a)
Requisites for a proper continuing objection
a.

in the course of the examination of a witness

b.

objection has been made

c.

reasonably apparent that the questions being

propounded are of the same class as those to which
objection has been made

d.

adverse party records his continuing objection to such

class of questions

Sec. 38. Ruling. The ruling of the court must be

given immediately after the objection is made, unless
the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform
itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall
always be made during the trial and at such time as will

90

give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to

meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection
need not be stated. However, if the objection is based on
two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection
on one or some of them must specify the ground or
grounds relied upon. (38 a)
The ruling of the court on an objection
a.
b.

must be given immediately after the objection is made

unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to
inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling
shall always be made
i. during the trial and
ii. at such time as will give the party against whom
it is made an opportunity to meet the situation
presented by the ruling.

GR: The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need

not be stated.
Exception: If the objection is based on two or more grounds, a
ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must
specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
Escolin: The parties may ask for the ground for the ruling, even
if the rules does not require the judge to so state.
Sec. 39. Striking out answer. Should a witness
answer the question before the adverse party had the
opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and
such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall
sustain the objection and order the answer given to be
stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the
striking out of answers which are incompetent,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Requisites for Striking out an answer
a.
b.
c.

witness answers the question before the adverse party

had the opportunity to voice fully its objection
objection is found to be meritorious
court order that the answer given to be stricken off the
record.

On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of
answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise
improper.

evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary

evidence is done only when the party rests its case.
PB Com v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991)
Where the genuineness and due execution of documents of an
instrument attached to a complaint are deemed admitted by
failure to specifically deny it under oath, such instruments are
considered as evidence although they were not formally offered.
Escolin: cf Rule 8, Sec. 8
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action
or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in
or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in
the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused. (8a)
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991)
Mere fact that a document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has been offered as evidence. Marking at the pre-trial
was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time.
However, if an exhibit has been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and has itself been incorporated into the records
(i.e. recital of the contents of the exhibit).
b.

When objection make

People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993)

Objection to testimony on the ground of lack of a formal offer of
the testimony should be done when the witness was called to
testify.
Catuira v. CA, 236 SCRA 398 (1994)
Failure to object upon the time a witness is called to testify on
the ground that there was no formal offer of the testimony is a
waiver of the objection. Objection on such ground after the
witness has testified is too late.
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385
(1990)

Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents

or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court,
the offeror may have the same attached to or made part
of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror
may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony. (n)

Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it

is formally offered (i.e. when the party rests its case) as an
exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time (e.g.
identification of the evidence) is premature. Mere identification
and marking is not equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence.
A party may decide to not offer evidence already identified and
marked.

If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded

by the court, the offeror may

de Leon: Note that the court also said that there was no
continuing objection because continuing objections are
applicable when there is a single objection to a class of
evidence. This ruling is no longer applicable because the new
rules on evidence is now clear that continuing objections are
applicable only to testimonial evidence.

a.

have the same attached to or made part of the record,

if the evidence is object or documentary

b.

If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state

for the record

2.

i.

the name and other personal circumstances of

the witness and

ii.

the substance of the proposed testimony.

Cases
a.

When evidence considered offered

People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997)

The court shall consider no evidence, even an extra-judicial
confession, which has not been formally offered. Mere fact that
evidence has been identified and marked in the course of the
examination of a witness, without the contents being recited in
his testimony, does not mean that it has been formally offered
as evidence. Identification of documentary evidence is done in
the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the

de Leon: Does this mean that party may remain silent when
inadmissible evidence is being identified and marked, and then
object when it is formally offered? Interpacific Transit was
explicit when it said What really matters is the objection to the
document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
de Leon: What if after an exhibit has been identified, marked,
and its contents recited, the offeror decides not to formally offer
it into evidence. Is the court authorized to consider such exhibit
on the strength of the ruling in Tabuena? I would say yes
because the recital of the contents of the exhibit is now part of
the testimony of the witness which has been formally offered.
People v. Cario, 165 SCRA 664 (1988)

De los Reyes v. IAC, 176 SCRA 394 (1989)

91

People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 940 (1955)

Proof beyond reasonable doubt
PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194
(1992)

a.

does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding

possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.

b.

Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof

which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Sheraton Palace v. Quijano, (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116

A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
Vda. de Oate v. CA, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

W. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence

1.

Rule 133

Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior
weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court
may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case,
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of
their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number. (1 a)
MEMORIZE!
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior
weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court
may consider
a.

all the facts and circumstances of the case

b.

the witnesses' manner of testifying

c.

their intelligence

d.

their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to

which they are testifying

e.

the nature of the facts to which they testify

f.

the probability or improbability of their testimony

g.

their interest or want of interest

h.

their personal credibility so far as the same may

legitimately appear upon the trial.

i.

number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not

necessarily with the greater number.

An cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument

must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a
criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. (2 a)
MEMORIZE!
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.

Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground

for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an
accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if;
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
a.

There is more than one circumstance

b.

The facts from which the inferences are derived are

proven, and

c.

The combination of all the circumstances is such as to

produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before

administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. (n)
MEMORIZE!
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence
Substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion
Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence.
The court may stop the introduction of further testimony
upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is
already so full that more witnesses to the same point
cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally
persuasive. But this power should be exercised with
caution. (6)
Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. When a motion is based
on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the
matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties, but the court may direct that the
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions. (7)
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
a.

the court may hear the matter on affidavits or

depositions presented by the respective parties

b.

but the court may direct that the matter be heard

wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
2.

Cases

People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA 512 (1985)

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Facts: In a prosecution for arson committed in Davao City, there

were no eyewitnesses. However, there was evidence as to the
presence of the accused at the scene of the crime before and at
the time the fire started, that he moved out hurriedly and
running away from the burning premises, that he had previously
manifested resentment against the owner of the premises and
even hinted that he would burn the owners house, that he
abandoned his job, left Davao City without leaving a word to
anyone, and went into hiding in Manila, that he concealed his
identity by disguising himself with long hair, long moustache,
and colored eyeglasses, that he exhibited indifference and
unperturbed attitude towards the fate suffered by the victims,
that he did not even condole with the bereaved family and
relatives or pay them a visit, that he did not attend the wake or
the funeral, and that he had a serious misunderstanding and
strained relationship with the owner of the burned premises.

It is improbable that the appellant would have utilized the three

witnesses in perpetrating a heinous crime without a showing
that they were of his confidence.
Dissent, J. Tuazon The evidence is conclusive and airtight. The
witnesses were all simple folks who gave simple, flawless
narration of the murder. None of them have been shown to
have sufficient reason to lie.

Held: There are enough circumstantial evidence to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
U.S. v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
Facts: Agapito Lasada, Santiago Lasada, Macario Lasada, and
Panfilio clasa were charged with the crime of murder (of Pedro
Sopriengo, a Chinaman). The 2 principal witnesses for the
prosecution, Moldes and Resardo, positively identified the 4
defendants as the assailants.
3 other witnesses for the
prosecution testified that they saw Agapito Lasada carrying a
stick or a club and dressed in caamo and accompanied by 3
men walking around the town. On the other hand, the defense
sought to establish an alibi, and for this purpose presented
witnesses testifying that Agapito Lasada was sick with beri-beri
and could hardly walk, and that at the time of the incident he
was at the house of Vicente Tuazon, the municipal president of
the town of Abuyog.
Issue: Whether or not defendants are guilty? Whether or not the
testimony of the defenses witness should be accepted?
Held: To determine whose testimony is to be accepted as true,
an analysis of the proofs is necessary. There are several modes
of impeaching a witness. One mode is by cross-examination to
involve the witness in contradiction and discrepancies as to
material facts stated by him. But if the conflicts cannot be
reconciled, the court must adopt that testimony which it
believes to be true, and in reaching this conclusion it can take
into consideration the general character of the witness, his
manner and demeanor on the stand, the consistency of his
statements, their probability and improbability, his ability and
willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence, his motive to
speak the truth or swear a falsehood.
The SC believed the prosecution witnesses. (Although the
dissent believed the defense witnesses.) Vicente Tuazon the
principal witness for the defense was deeply interested in the
case because he had been directed to confine the defendant in
accordance with the decision of the court. Doctor Stallmens
testimony provided that Agapito could hardly walk but
defendant could and in fact did walk around town and never was
in a condition that he could not travel. The testimony of
Barbasan and Mundala wherein they stated that they, together
with Moldes and Resarda were invited to the house of Julia
Sopriego and that Julia offered them P200 each on condition that
they would testify that the defendant and his brothers killed he
father is so unreasonable that it can not be believed.
People. v. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
Facts: Abendan was convicted in the CFI of Pangasinan for the
murder of Doria. It was alleged that, during his term as Chief of
Police, the accused arrested Doria, took him to a cemetery, tried
to bury him alive and then finished him off. The prosecution
presented three witnesses, Samson, Delfin and Arzadon who
were allegedly ith the accused when the incident happened.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of the three witnesses is
sufficient to convict the accused of murder?
Held: No. Acquitted.
The truthfulness of the witnesses is doubtful since they had
every reason to be hostile to the accused appellant.
It is shown that the appellant had caused the arrest of Samson
and Delfin because of certain criminal charges. While Aazon
had been investigated by the appellant for the theft of cement.
It also appears that on one occasion the appellant slapped and
kicked Delfin because of the latters admission of illegal acts.

People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)

Facts: SPO3 Jose Nio narrated that at about 9:00 p.m., July 9,
1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio
Cenining, he went to Bgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They
were to conduct an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons there. From there, they proceeded to
Bgy. Onion where they met Nilo Solayao and four others. Nio
became suspicious when they observed that the latter were
drunk and that Solayo was wearing a camouflage uniform.
Solayaos companions, upon seeing the government agents,
fled.
Nio introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried
coconut leaves which the Solayao was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know as
"latong."
When he asked Solayao who issued him a license to carry said
firearm, Solayao answered that he had no permission to possess
the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and
turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who
subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal
possession of firearm.
Solayao, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the
shotgun but averred that this was only given to him by one of
his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still
wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware
that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves
since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further
claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after the
others had been used up. Solayaos claim was corroborated by
one Pedro Balano that he indeed received a torch from
Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun
wrapped in coconut leaves.
On August 25, 1994, the TC found Solayao guilty of illegal
possession of firearm under Sec. 1 of PD 1866. It found that
Solayao did not contest the fact that Nio confiscated the
firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to
possess the same. It hardly found credible Solayaos submission
that he was in possession of the firearm only by accident.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in admitting in evidence the
homemade firearm?
Held: In People v. Lualhati, it was ruled that in crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof,:
the existence of the subject firearm and
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does
not have the corresponding license or permit to possess
the same.
As to the argument that the subject firearm was the product of
an unlawful warrantless search - In this case, Solayao and his
companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of Nio's
group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a
camouflage uniform and that upon espying the peace officers,
his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers
were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons were roaming around the bgys of Caibiran. This
case is similar to Posadas v. CA being a "stop and frisk"
situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even
before an arrest could be made.

93

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second

element, that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess
the subject firearm, the SC pointed out that the prosecution
failed to prove that Solayao lacked the necessary permit or
license to possess the subject firearm. It is the constitutional
presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal
possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential
element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the
prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that
Solayao admitted before Nio that he did not have any authority
or license to carry the subject firearm. In other words, the
prosecution relied on Solayaos admission to prove the second
element.
The SC stated that this admission is not sufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. An admission by the accused, in this
case Solayao, can take the place of any evidentiary
means establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact
averred in the negative in the pleading and which forms
an essential ingredient of the crime charged. By its very
nature, an "admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or
of circumstance from which guilt may be inferred, tending to
incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish
his guilt. It is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts
pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other
facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself,
insufficient to authorize conviction."
Said admission is extra-judicial in nature thus not covered by
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, An
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the trial or other proceedings in the same case does not require
proof. Not being a judicial admission, said statement by
accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even
establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the
prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or
lack of a license.
The SC agrees with the argument of the Sol. Gen. that "while the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject
firearm was seized by the police from the possession of
appellant, w/o the latter being able to present any license or
permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive
proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm.
In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from
its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the
firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification
from the government agency concerned."
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995)
Facts: Agapito and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses
residing in Cagayan and among their neighbors are Bgy Captain
Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta and Robert Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse responded to
a report that a there was a stabbing incident in said Bgy 12.
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his
way, he met PO1 Dolores, a policewoman of his own Station who
immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan
knife and told him, "I killed my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was and in front of the
Bgy. Capt.s store, Eclipse saw Agapito on the ground w/ blood
all over his body.

from work, Agapito, in the presence of Robert Santos, met her

with the following intemperate questions: Your mother's cunt,
why do you arrive only now? Where did you come from?
Dolores just kept quiet, and then went to the market. To buy
something to cook for supper. Upon returning home, while
cooking in the kitchen, she heard an argument between them
pertaining to some bullets and a hand grenade w/c the latter
gave Santos. Dolores tried to pacify them but Santos was
running out of the house with a bolo and being chased by
Agapito who was holding a knife and whose clothes were
bloodied. A struggle ensued between Agapito and Robert and,
while wrestling, Agapito dropped the knife which Dolores picked
up and tried to stab Robert but she was so overwhelmed by
nervousness, falling unconscious.
When she regained
consciousness, found herself beside her dying husband, Dolores
picked up the knife and bolo. It was at this precise time when
Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident. Dolores gave the
knife and bolo to Eclipse. Eclipse invited her to go with him to
the Tuguegarao PNP Station and when they arrived there,
Eclipse, in the presence of Dolores, reported that she killed her
husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her
composure, she did not say anything.
The TC convicted Dolores giving full faith and credit to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found nothing on
record which showed that their impartiality had been vitiated or
compromised or that they had any motive to falsely impute
upon the appellant the commission of the crime. It further
declared that when the appellant surrendered the knife and bolo
to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she killed
her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing
more was needed to prove her culpability. The trial court held
that the confession was admissible for it was not made in
violation of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. The appellant was neither under police custody
nor under investigation in connection with the killing of her
husband.
The trial court rejected the story of the defense.
First, she testified that she did not confess to Eclipse in the
presence of Barangay Captain Liban. If her denial is true, why
did she not correct or even protest what Eclipse did or reported?
Second, she blamed Robert Santos who did her husband in. If
this is true, why did she not tell it to Eclipse and Bgy. Capt. Liban
at the scene of the crime? Why did she withhold such a very
vital information when she was brought to the Tuguegarao PNP
Station shortly after the incident?
Third, the accused never filed a counter-affidavit during the PI,
since, it afforded the accused the best opportunity to explain
her innocence and to identify the "real killer" of her husband.
Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. How can a man
injured be able to chase another man and wrestle him to the
ground?
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta are
at variance at a very vital point particularly the wrestling of the
bolo. Racheta said that when the two men caught up with one
another Robert could no longer run anywhere else, he turned
around, faced Agapito and hacked and stabbed him many times.
Such inconsistency in the version of the two defense witnesses
cannot but heighten one's conviction that the defense theory is
a conjured one.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to
the testimony of Bgy. Capt. Liban and SPO1 Eclipse?
Held: SC held that the Ruling of the TC affirmed.

Eclipse called for Bgy Capt. Liban to come out of his house. In
the presence and within the hearing of said barangay official,
Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm surrendering because I
killed my husband".

The TC held that prosecution witness Eclipse told the truth when
he declared under oath that the appellant surrendered to him a
blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him that she killed
her husband.

Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the lifeless

body of Agapito to a funeral parlor while he and Dolores went to
the PNP Station. Policeman Eclipse turned over Dolores together
with the bolo and knife to the Desk Officer. Eclipse then orally
made his report to the Desk Officer which was noted down in the
Police Blotter.

If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of

the appellant because of esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow
that sentiment to compromise his official and public duty as a
peace officer. It is settled that the absence of evidence as
to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the
conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an accused
had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the
natural order of events and of human nature and against
the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness
to falsely testify against the accused.

The defense contended that it was not Dolores but a Robert

Santos who killed Agapito. In the p.m. of July 30, 1990, Agapito
and his neighbor Robert were in the former's house passing the
time over a bottle of beer grande. When Dolores arrived home

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Liban's testimony does not have to corroborate Eclipse's

testimony or the confession of the Dolores.
What must be
corroborated is the EJ confession & not the testimony of the
person to whom the confession is made, & the corroborative
evidence required is not the testimony of another person who
heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti. Except
when expressly required by law, the testimony of a single
person, if credible and positive & if it satisfies the court as to the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to
convict. In determining the value & credibility of evidence,
witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant
herself does not question its presence because she knows that it
has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti
is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been
committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred
remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means
the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of
two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for
example a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b)
that some person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that every
element of the crime charged must be clearly established by
independent evidence apart from the confession. It means
merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise,
the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if
it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other
evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such
confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not,
independently of the confession, establish the corpus delicti
beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the TCs characterization of the appellant's declaration
that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession is
wrong, it is only an admission. In a confession. there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do
not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused
or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. Underhill distinguishes a confession from an admission
as follows: A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of
guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which constitute the
crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts
acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered
with other facts. Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or
an admission, it was admissible against the appellant and,
having been duly proved, together with the other facts and
circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the
appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the
admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of
killing her husband.
The circumstances described in the TC decision constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the appellant, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person. The requirements then of Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant are present.
In appellant's favor, however, is the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.

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