CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: Due Process (Case Digests)

A.

Publication Requirement

Tanada VS Tuvera
Facts: Herein Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders in compliance with the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgate.
On the other hand, the Respondents, thru the Solicitor General seek for its
dismissal on the ground of petitioners lack of standing.
Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are the proper party to file the instant
petition;
(2) WON publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law
or statute becomes valid and enforceable
Held: (1) YES. The Court already held in its previous decisions that: When
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same.
(2) As to second issue, YES. Art. 2 of the Civil Code do not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.

B.

Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

Ang Tibay VS CIR

Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
National Labor Union (NLU) averred that Toribios act is not valid. The case
reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and National
Workers Brotherhood (NWB) won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new
trial.
HELD: YES. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or
documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the
SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103. It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy
or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
CA 103.
The SC also outlined those administrative bodies, like the CIR, although
not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
comply with the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due
process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
Office of the Court Administrator VS Pascua
Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter,
addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator
of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and corruption were being
committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, Bulacan. On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal
and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Then NBI
Director Epimaco Velasco ordered discreet investigation.
They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the lett
er writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of
their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz,
an accused in respondents sala.
In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta,
Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged
with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the
preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed

was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction
over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the
respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to
respondent the sum ofP2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a
drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice. In view
of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent
judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been
caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazofiled the following
report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with
Judge PASCUAL at the
Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where
Subject is attending thegraduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told
Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00which he (Judge
PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money
becauseaccording to him there were plenty of people around. He then
instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him(Judge PASCUAL) at his office the
following day.At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March
1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to theoffice of Judge PASCUAL at the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four(4)
pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously
marked and glazed withfluorescent powder.In the meantime, the
Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes,
CANDIDOCRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that
Judge PASCUAL had already receivedthe marked money. The
Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject
about theentrapment. Subject denied having received anything
from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search,the marked money was
found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table.Subject
was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to
ultra violet light
examination. After finding Subjects right hand
for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and
fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure
(S.O.P.).On even date, the results of our investigation together with the
person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL wasreferred to the Inquest Prosecutor of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with therecommendation
that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized
under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.
Issue: WON the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were
strong enough to convict him.

Held: NO. We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted
by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer,
the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at
the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded th eright to
open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and
present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative
case, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to
which
respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be fa
ulted, it should be only after dueinvestigation and after presentation of
competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character. While
then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter,
ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet investigation of
respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or
the entrapment of respondent judge.
**Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt after a thorough investigation of the whole evidence. The
principle of reasonable doubt being applicable in the instant case, therefore,
we find that the alleged act of bribery committed by respondent has not
been sufficiently and convincingly proven to warrant the imposition of any
penalty against respondent.
Government of the United States VS Purganan
Facts: Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The
Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for
reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that
the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001,
the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance
of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order
to prevent theflight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr.
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for
his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as
required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein
seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be

allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court
deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to
guide lower court.
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee
before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
(2) Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
(3)

Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial

Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
(1) YES. By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the
material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima
facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute
an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by

Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or
affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition
Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents,
the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On
the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee,
who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.
(2) YES. The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional
right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The
provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable
in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the
present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the

trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before
the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be
applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing:
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it
is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents
were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition
case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office
is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for
the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail
to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably
delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings
should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with
the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual
rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may
negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that
he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and
when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
(3) NO. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a
criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one which the constitutional rights of the accused are
necessarily available. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due

process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process

and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given
full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears
the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet,
instead of taking it, he ran away.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia

Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. A
Warrant of arrest was issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the
Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region
filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent.
In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the privaterespondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law
granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused
hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in
these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders
and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion
of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even
in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors
handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time
and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before
this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal,
be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order
but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence,

this instant petition.

Issue: WON a Potential Extraditee is entitiled to post a bail.
Held: YES. The Court held that while our extradition law does not provide
for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process
under the Constitution. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply
for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in
favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines, as one of the counties as
signatories to such treaties, should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired, especially the deprivation of an extraditee of his
right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
"CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE" SHOULD BE USED IN GRANTING
BAIL IN EXTRADITION CASES. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
C. Academic Discipline

Alcuaz v. PSBA