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DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants vs. PABLO G.

BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants and appellees.
Facts:

The petitioner in this case filed a case of partition despite the

existence of debts of the decedent.

Issue:
The petitioner urges that their action for partition and liquidation may be
maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of the
estate, subject to the taking of adequate measures either for the payment
or the security of its creditors. Is his contention correct?
Held:
No.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a
deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action
for partition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment
of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this
they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees
are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians". The
reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is
no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the
estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending
obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or
compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the
heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such
obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted to
administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary
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partition, the regular estate proceedings offer the advantage of requiring all
creditors of the deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective
claims within a comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87,
unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; while in
ordinary judicial partitions the creditors' claims are only extinguished by the
expiration of the period of extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore, may
have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed
from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the
very estate proceedings sought to be avoided, and he may properly object
to an action for partition on this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are
agreeable to assuming personal liability for all the decedent's obligations,
those known as well as those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings can
not be avoided.
Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court
from directing and ordering that the pending obligations of the estate be
paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respective shares to
be received by the heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the
administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its debts be
accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performing
the duties of the administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care
of such debts, as prayed for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action
for partition can not be converted into a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the procedure outlined
by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of Court, especially the provisions on publication
and notice to creditors.
PEREGRINA REBONG, petitioner vs. FIDEL IBAEZ, Judge of First Instance
of Laguna, respondent.
(A very short case. Need not be digested. The Following is a reproduction
of the original case)
This is a petition for certiorari against the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna on the ground that the latter acted in excess of

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jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for
cancellation of the lien or annotation on the certificate of title issued to the
petitioner, of a land extrajudicially inherited by him as the only heir of her
predecessors in interest to the effect that the property described in the title
is subject to the claims of the creditors and other heirs of the deceased Jose
Rebong and Maria Rebong within two years from July 9, 1947, in accordance
with sections 1 and 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

section 4 of Rule 74, has not yet terminated or ceased, for the period of two
years from July 9, 1947, have not yet elapsed, the respondent judge had no
jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien or annotation as
prayed by the petitioner. Neither section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court,
nor section 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes the substitution of a bond for a
lien or registered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient,
inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased.

The petitioner based her petition on section 112 of Act No. 496 and offered
to file a bond of P5,000, the estimated value of the above mentioned
property to answer for such contingent claims.

In view of the foregoing, it is plain that the respondent judge has not acted
in excess of jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion, but in conformity
with the law, in denying the petitioner's petition, and the petition for
certiorari is therefore denied.

The pertinent part of said section 112 of Act No. 496 provides:
"SEC. 112. * * * Any registered owner or other person in interest may at
any time apply by petition to the court, upon the ground that registered
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or
been created which do not appear upon the certificate; * * * and the court
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after notice to all
parties in interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief
upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may
deem proper; * * *."
According to the above quoted provisions, the court "may order the entry of
a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a
certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security if necessary," upon application of a registered owner on
"the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased, or that
new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the
certificate." Applying these provisions to the present case, it is evident that,
since the registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or
other heirs of the petitioner's predecessors in interest, established by
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Intestate estate of the deceased LUZ Garcia PABLO G. UTULO, applicant

and appellee, vs. LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor and
appellant.
Facts:

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia,

the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed
judicial administratrix.
The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr.,
Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the
presumptive forced heirs.
Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the
pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased,
she died in the said province without any legitimate descendants,
her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband.
The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration
of the property of his deceased wife, stating in his petition that her
only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor,
and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the
share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez,

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and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said

deceased.
The oppositor (mother of the decdent) objected to the petition,
opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter
and the appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged
that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was
no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that
should the court grant the administration of the property, she
should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had
a better right than the applicant.

Issues:
1. Is judicial administration is proper in this case?
2. Who has the better right to be the administrator, the husband or
the mother?
Held:
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision
enunciates the general rule that when a person dies leaving property in the
Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however,
is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same
Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand
pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the required
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publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all
the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the
inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a
person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held
that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect
that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may
have legal, capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia
Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of
representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that
he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be
a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living. In
order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the
property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his
deceased wife be instituted-an administration which will take up time and
occasion inconveniences and unnecessary expenses.
2. Since there is no need for judicial administration, there is no need to
determine who has the better right to administer the estate of the
decedent.

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CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff and appellee, VS. ZACARIAS ANDAL,
defendant and appellant. QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and
AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors and appellants.
Facts:

Plaintiff and the intervenors were siblings. They inherited a parcel of

land from their father.

The intervenors sold their share to Andal, allegedly for P150

The plaintiff now sought to repurchase the said parts of the land.
However, Andal refused, even when she offered a higher price
which is P860.

Then, Andal allegedly made a simulated sale back to the

intervenors.

Now, plaintiff sought brought the action to repurchase the land

from Andal.

The intervenors and Andals defense: They said that there was
already partition between the siblings. According to the facts there
was a document of partition, however it was not presented in trial.
(I think they invoked this defense in order to show that there was
already a termination of the co-ownership, therefore plaintiffs right
to redeem was already extinguished)

During trial, when the defendant and intervenors tried to present

witnesses to prove such partition, the counsel of the plaintiff
objected invoking the best evidence rule. The document of partition
is the best evidence of the terms of partition.

Issues:

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The defendant and intervenors now assail that the trial court was in error in
denying the admissibility of their evidence proving the existence of the
partition due to the fact that the partition should be put into writing. Are
their contentions correct?
Held:
Yes.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is
such a contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds.
One line of authorities holds the affirmative view, other authorities say no.
The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the
statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a
separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each
tenant in common. (27 C. J., 206.) The differences in the conclusions
reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the
several states. (40 Amer. Jur., 15.)
APPLICABLE ONLY TO EXECUTORY CONTRACTS.
As enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil
Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law
has been uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases to be applicable to
executory and not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C. J., 206.) In this
jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the
statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485; Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat,
48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein
enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the
action for specific performance. (Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat, supra.)
ORAL PARTITION ENFORCED IN EQUITY WHEN PERFORMED

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On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or
partly performed.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as
a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form
exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes
only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The Civil Code, too, requires the
accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to
validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the
existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may
be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs.
Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
SECTION 1 OF RULE 74, NOT CONSTITUTIVE BUT MERELY EVIDENTIAL OF
PARTITION.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the public
instrument therein required is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or
an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this
Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of
a partition as between the parties de-pendent on the execution of a public
instrument and its registration. The requirement that a partition be put in a
public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of
debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not
come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs
of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by law.
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MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES, TIMBOL, ERLINDA

REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II,
EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their
mother,MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARTO MARTILLANO,
respondents.
Facts:

During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of

approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad,
Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under
the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property.
Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued
to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes,
who was the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by
Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot
was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It
appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh.
"6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children.
Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax
declarations for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the
original certificate of title for the whole property-OCT No. 255-was
issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of Marcelo
Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were
not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an
area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent
Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel
corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated.
The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. I-A-

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Issue:

14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and

started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan
created on 1936. They formally partitioned the property. Therefore,
the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael Reyes, Jr.
Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land
which should have been received by his father.
Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the
true owners of the land, as shown by the torrens title over the land.
Gardiolas defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and
that Rafael Jr. could not have inherited this land for it was disposed
of by his father way before he inherited it.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.s heirs. Stating that there
was no evidence that the Gavinos children had a written partition
agreement. CA reversed.

Is the CA correct in reversing the trial court?

Held:
No.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children
of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no
law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.24 In
Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a
public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no
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such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different
from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to
the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid. Barcelona,
et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is
valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among
heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer
of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification
of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir
accepting and receiving the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of such
oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the
Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed in
1936 was not valid for some reason or another, we would still arrive at the
same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs
automatically became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The
rights to the succession. are transmitted horn the moment of death of the
decedent,26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in coownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his
share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion
disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of
the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent
Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino
Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son
and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners
herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes,
Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of

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Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael,
Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the
owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The
issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot
No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its
owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an
heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation
or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title
of right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not
improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not
create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners
as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, The latter cannot give them what he never had
before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners'
immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action
against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the
latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private
respondents the owner. ship and possession of the lot from the time Rafael
Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint
and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when,
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they
definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question.
And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual
physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and onehalf
(13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of
possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial
court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial
court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for
reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of
the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.

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In the matter of the INTESTATE ESTATE of PAZ E. SIGUION TORRES,

Deceased, ALBERTO S. TORRES, petitioner and appellant vs. CONCHITA
TORRES and ANGEL S. TORRES, oppositors and appellees.
Facts:

Alberto Torres prayed for the issuance of letters of administration in

his favor, for the administration of Paz Siguion Torres, his father,
estate.
Conchita Torres opposed this saying that there was already an
extrajudicial partition between the heirs pursuant to the rules of
court.
Then Alberto then averred that the attempts actually designate
their respective shares had failed, and properties of considerable
value were not included in the partition.
He also then averred that there was a P50,000 debt of the estate
The trial court dismissed Albertos petition.

Issue:
Is the trial court correct in ruling that the judicial settlement of the estate of
the deceased is not necessary in this case?
Held:
Yes.
It appears from the pleadings filed herein that the petition to place the
estate under administration was predicated mainly on the alleged inability
of the heirs to agree on a physical division of the properties. The alleged
existence of an indebtedness and noninclusion in the list incorporated in the
deed of extrajudicial partition, of certain properties that form part of the
estate, seemed to be merely an afterthought as the reference to them was
made only in the answer to the opposition and motion for dismissal of the
petition, and is riot made under oath. There is also no allegation as to the

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particulars of the debt and the omitted properties sufficient to identify
them. In the circumstances, we agree with the lower court that a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is not here
necessary.
This is not to overlook the allegation that the estate has an outstanding
obligation of P50,000.00. It is to be noted, however, that appellant, as
heretofore observed, did not specify from whom and in what manner the
said debt was contracted. Indeed, the bare allegation that "the estate has
an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot be considered a
concise statement to constitute a cause of action. It must be for this reason
that the lower court, notwithstanding the existence of such averment in
appellant's supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed the petition
filed by said appellant.
Nor does the unverified statement that there are other properties, not
included in the deed of extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the
heirs, justify the institution of an administration proceeding because the
same questions that may arise as to them, viz. the title thereto, and their
partition, if proven to belong to the intestate, can be properly and
expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.
PEDRO ERMAC, and his children, ELENA, CARLOS, ANTONIO, LUCIANO',
HILARIO, INDALECIO and FRANCISCA, all surnamed ERMAC, petitioners, vs.
CENON MEDELO and JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA as presiding judge of
Branch II of the LANAO DEL NORTE Court of First Instance, respondents.
Facts:

Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit died leaving a parcel of

land.
Their heirs filed for the summary settlement of the estate. They
presented a plan of partition.

8|Page

Pedro Ermac sought to exclude Lot 1327 from the estate as it

belongs to him and his wife. The court denied it saying that they
should file a separate suit.
They filed a separate suit. The probate court approved the partition
despite the objection of Pedro saying that the court should await
the outcome of their separate suit.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court should have waited for the outcome of the
separate suit?
Held:
No.
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time. This is specially true
with small estates for which the rules provide precisely a summary
procedure dispensing with the appointment of an administrator together
with the other involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required in tha
determination of the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to
inherit therefrom and the payment of his obligations. Definitely, the
probate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of
ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the decedent's estate.1
While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular
administration proceedings,2 it is not proper to delay the summary
settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third person
claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him.3 Such
claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court
should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal
obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the
results of the suit. For the protection of the claimant, the appropriate step is
to have the proper annotation of lis pendens entered.

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BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondents.
Facts:

Teodoro Tolete died, leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who
are children of his deceased brothers and sisters.

His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating saying that

Teodoro had no children or dependents, neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces..

Then, his wife sold the property to Sampilo, then Sampilo sold it to
Salacup.

Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of

administration. She alleged that Teodoros wife, Leonicia de Leon
has no right to execute the affidavit of self adjudication for there
are other heirs aside from her.

The trial court ruled in favor of Sinopera. The CA modified the ruling
stating that the affidavit of Leonicia is null and void, but the
subsequent sales are valid insofar as it is not above Leonicias share
from Teodoros estate.

Issues:
The petitioners now argue that Sinoperas cause of action has already
prescribed because according to the rules of court, persons deprived of
their right due to the partition or self adjudication must bring their action
within two years from the date of partition or self-adjudication. Is their
contention correct?
Held:
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No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in the said
proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have the chance to
participate.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. in
Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of
them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is
made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the
addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the
"distributees and estate" are Indicated was the persons to answer for right
violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also
significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the
extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no
notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who
took part or bad knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound
thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any
manner ,deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the
extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the
period of two years, and both "the distributees and estate would be liable
to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons who, in
accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy the prejudice to their
rights within, the two-year Period. But as to those who did not take part in
the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the
setlement, there is no direct or express provision, and it is unreasonable and
unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period
extend the effects of the settlement to the two years. To to them, to those
who did no t take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express
legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to
due Process law.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of exrajudicial settlement or
by affidavit, is ail ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be
contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons
who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the

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extrajudicialy settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect
is made, either directly or by implication. We have examined the two cases
cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the
circumstances on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of
the case at bar.
The two year rule is applicable only:
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition,
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in
the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the
heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court
of Appeals having found that the decedent left, aside from his widow,
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
GENOVEVA BELTRAN, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. CORAZON
AYSON and FABIAN JIMENEZ, defendants and appellants.
Facts:

Macario Beltran died. Then, his wife, Corazon Ayson and Jose de la
Cruz executed an deed of partition apportioning the estate amongst
themselves.

Thereafter, nephews and nieces of the deceased appeared sought

to set aside the extra-judicial partition.

The defendants-appellants now are saying that the plaintiffs rights

has already prescribed because the case was filed beyond two years
from the date of the partition.

10 | P a g e

Issues:
Whether or not the cause of action of the plaintiffs already prescribed?
Held:
No.
This Court has previously ruled out such contention in the similar case of
Sampilo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 103 Phil., 70; 55 Off. Gaz., 5772.,
wherein the case of McMicking vs.. Sy Con Bieng, supra, was also cited by
the appellants therein:
"* * *the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs
from objecting to an extrajudicial partition is applicable only (1) to persons
who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74
have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented
by themselves or through guardians.
"The next contention of appellants is that plaintiffs action is barred by the
statute of limitations. The origin of the provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon
which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190,
fails to support the contention. In the first place, there is nothing therein, or
in its sources, which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action
against third persons. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part
in the extrajudicial proceedings, but not against third persons not parties
thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a
different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act
had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been
included in the chapter which defines the statute."
In the instant case, both requirements were not complied with, because not
all the interested heirs have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, it

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being admitted that the deceased left, aside from his widow, appellant
Corazon Ayson, and his half-brother, Jose de la Cruz, nephews, nieces and a
sister living at the time of his death, and that the latter heirs were not aware
of the deed of extrajudicial partition until shortly before the filing of their
complaint (pars. 4 and 6, Stipulation of Facts).
Neither is Section 43, par. 3, of Act 190 (now Article 1146, New Civil Code),
also invoked by appellants, applicable to the facts of the case. Assuming
that there was fraud as the widow and half-brother of the deceased had
declared in the deed of extrajudicial partition that they are the sole
surviving and exclusive heirs of the late Macario Beltran, it does not appear
that the fouryear period have elapsed when the action was instituted. It is
interesting to note that the court a quo rejected the contention of appellees
that appellant Corazon Ayson executed the deed of extrajudicial partition
fraudulently and in bad faith, while the parties stipulated that the appellees
were not aware of the deed of extrajudicial partition until shortly before the
filing of their complaint.
LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL, TAIB AMEROL, DIBARATUN
AMEROL, DIBARATUN MATABALAO, MINDALANO DIBARATUN,
DIPUNDUGUN MORO, and MANUCAO MORO, petitioners, vs. MOLOK
BAGUMBARAN, respondent.
Facts:

Bagumabaran sought to eject the petitioners from the parcel land

registered to his name. He got it through a free patent and
subsequently registered it in his name obtaining a Torrens title.
The petitioners interposed a counterclaim stating that Bagumbaran
applied for a free patent through fraud, knowing that the said land
was already subject to a previous application for free patent.
The trial court said that indeed there was fraud, however, it
dismissed the counterclaim of the petitioners because, according to
the trial court, their action has prescribed. For 4 four years has

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already lapsed from the date of the issuance of the Torrens title.
Even though Bagumbaran acquired the property through fraud, it
was adjudicated to him due to prescription.
Issue:
The petitioners contend that the prescriptive period is 10 years and not 4
years. Therefore, if it is 10 years, their action can still prosper because they
brought the same 9 years after the issuance of the Torrens title. Is their
contention correct?
Held:
Yes.
Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual
possession and occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent
and Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 in his name, created an implied
trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent's
name by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently
misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land
in question when he was not because it was Liwalug Datomanong.
Bagumbaran falsely Pretended that there was no prior applicant for a free
patent over the land but there was-Liwalug Datomanong. By such
fraudulent acts, Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the
property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong.
Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the
name of respondent, he, even being already the registered owner under the
Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the Torrens system was
not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or
misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Further, contrary to the
erroneous claim of the respondent,9 reconveyance does not work to set

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aside and put under review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of
Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected
as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in
this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner,10 or to
one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.

new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed
prescription. It provided:

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must

perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of
this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance
of the Torrens title over the property.16 The only discordant note, it seems,
is Balbin vs. Medalla,17 which states that the prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained
by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman.18 But in Gerona, the
fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190,
was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30,1950
as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144
and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old
Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then
resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action
for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.

x x xx x x x x x

Regarding the jurisprudence invoked by the respondent to support its

claim that the 4 year period applies:
Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to buttress his position
and support the ruling of the trial court have a common denominator, so to
speak. The cause of action assailing the frauds committed and impugning
the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all accrued prior to the effectivity of
the present Civil Code. The accrual of the cause of action in Fabian was in
1928, in Miguel, February, 1950, and in Ramirez, 1944. It must be
remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the
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SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.-Civil actions other than for the
recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods
after the right of action accrues:

3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the
right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the fraud;
x x xx x x x x x
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.