Sei sulla pagina 1di 45

EN BANC

G.R. No. 206987

September 10, 2013

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
to canvass the votes cast for petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) in the recently
held 2013 Party-List Elections.
On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioners
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds, to wit: 1
I.
Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 and espoused in the cases
of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
v. Commission on Elections.
II.
There is no proof showing that nominees Arthur J. Tariman and Julius D. Labandria are actually
nominated by ANAD itself. The Certificate of Nomination, subscribed and sworn to by Mr.
Domingo M.Balang, shows that ANAD submitted only the names of Pastor Montero Alcover, Jr.,
Baltaire Q. Balangauan and Atty. Pedro Leslie B. Salva. It necessarily follows, that having only
three (3) nominees, ANAD failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section
4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366.
III.
ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National and
Local Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 ("R.A. No. 7166").
ANAD went before this Court challenging the above-mentioned resolution. In Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
Comelec,2the Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the
parameters prescribed in the aforesaid decision.
In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013,3 the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioners
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections.
The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for
its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2007 Elections.

Hence, the present petition raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a summary evidentiary
hearing mandated by the due process clause, and whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding
that petitioner submitted only three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007Elections.4
We dismiss the petition.
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.5
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise
of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise
of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 6
ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it promulgated the assailed
Resolution without giving ANAD the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing, thus violating its right to
due process. It is to be noted, however, that ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing on23 August
2013, during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANADs president, authenticated documents and answered
questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANADs qualifications. 7
ANAD, nonetheless, insists that the COMELEC should have called for another summary hearing after this
Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Comelec . This is a superfluity.
ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary hearing of 23
August 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to establish said
qualifications. In re-evaluating ANADs qualifications in accordance with the parameters laid down in
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the COMELEC need not have called another summary hearing. The
Comelec could, as in fact it did,8readily resort to documents and other pieces of evidence previously
submitted by petitioners in re-appraising ANADs qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the
qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the summary hearing of 23 August2012
continued until election day and even there after.
As to ANADs averment that the COMELEC erred in finding that it violated election laws and regulations,
we hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.9
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of five,
in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives
through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor). 10 Such factual finding of the
COMELEC was based on the Certificate of Nomination presented and marked by petitioner during the 22
and 23 August 2012summary hearings.11
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against
arbitrariness.1wphi1 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the
list to the COMELEC.

In Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec,12 the Court discussed the importance of Sec.8 of R.A. No. 7941 in this wise:
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the
party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real
intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers
of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of
election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of
general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed
choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees
circumvents the voters demand for transparency. The lawmakers exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal
has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.
Moreover, the COMELEC also noted ANADs failure to submit a proper Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476, viz:
The prescribed form for the Statement of Election Contributions and Expenses is attached to these Rules
as Annex "F." The Schedules of Contributions and Expenditures (Annexes "G" and "H", respectively)
should be supported and accompanied by certified true copies of official receipts, invoices and other
similar documents.
An incomplete statement, or a statement that does not contain all the required information and
attachments, or does not conform to the prescribed form, shall be considered as not filed and shall
subject the candidate or party treasurer to the penalties prescribed by law.
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements as the
exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted mainly of a list of total contributions from other persons, a list of
official receipts and amounts without corresponding receipts, and a list of expenditures based on order
slips and donations without distinction as to whether the amounts listed were advanced subject to
reimbursement or donated.13 This factual finding was neither contested nor rebutted by ANAD.
We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the rule that factual
findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there
is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be
applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution
itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it
is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.14
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections.15Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
issued the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013.
In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered 200,972 votes. 16 As
such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for it are canvassed, statistics show that it
will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the Petition, finding no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192685

July 31, 2013

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of
Deeds, Pasig City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O.
CHENG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199115
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory powers to the Ombudsman. 1 Hand
in hand with this bestowal, the Ombudsman is mandated to investigate and prosecute, for and in behalf of
the people, criminal and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees, as
well as private persons in conspiracy with the former.2 There can be no equivocation about this powerand-duty function of the Ombudsman.
Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1) one is for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 192685; and (2) the other is for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 199115.
Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution 3 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J,
dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L. Espenesin (Espenesin),
Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema O. Cheng (Cheng), and the
Order4 denying Ampils motion for reconsideration thereof. Ampils complaint charged respondents with
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 113171, which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J on
the administrative aspect of the mentioned criminal complaint for Falsification and violation of Republic
Act No. 3019 against the Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the Ombudsman issued a
Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of Simple Misconduct and meting on Espenesin the
penalty of one (1) month suspension. On motion for reconsideration of Ampil, the Ombudsman favored

Espenesins arguments in his Opposition, and recalled the one-month suspension the Ombudsman had
imposed on the latter.
These consolidated cases arose from the following facts.
On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered
into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be
known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the
heart of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of
construction and development of the condominium building.
A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling
to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will
vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with
Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). As a result, the SEC issued a sixty (60) day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for
claims against the ASB Group of Companies pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body,
or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from disposing of their properties in any manner,
except in the ordinary course of business, and from paying their liabilities outstanding as of the date of the
filing of the petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group of
Companies.5 Subsequently, the SEC, over the objections of creditors, approved the Rehabilitation Plan
submitted by the ASB Group of Companies, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the objections to the rehabilitation plan raised by the creditors are hereby
considered unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by petitioners is hereby APPROVED, except those
pertaining to Mr. Roxas advances, and the ASB-Malayan Towers. Finally, Interim Receiver Mr. Fortunato
Cruz is appointed as Rehabilitation Receiver.6 (Emphasis supplied).
Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO under the
JPDA and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),7 allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the
development and completion of The Malayan Tower. At the time of the execution of the MOA, ASB had
already paid MICO P427,231,952.32 out of theP640,847,928.48 purchase price of the realty.8
The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower
representing their investments. It provides, in pertinent part:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the Project,
each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective
contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof,
and on the basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as
defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled to the following (which entitlement
shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the
event that the actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB the following net saleable area:

(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase
price ofP640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid
proceeds of said presales);
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall
be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in
Schedule 4 hereof which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the
Project and determination of its actual construction costs. If the actual remaining
construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b)
of this Section 4 shall apply.
(b) In the event that the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction
Cost as represented and warranted by ASB to MICO under Section 9(a) hereof, and MICO pays
for such excess, the pro-rata sharing in the net saleable area of the Building, as provided in subparagraph (a) of this Section 4 shall be adjusted accordingly. In such event, MICO shall be
entitled to such net saleable area in Schedule 4 that corresponds to the excess of the actual
remaining cost over the Remaining Construction Cost.
(c) To ensure the viability of the Project, the parties agree on a single pricing system, which MICO
shall have the exclusive right to fix and periodically adjust based on prevailing market conditions
in consultation with, but without need of consent of, ASB, for each partys primary sale or other
disposition of its share in the net saleable area of the Building. In accordance with the
immediately preceding provision, MICO hereby adopts the selling prices set forth in Schedule 5
hereof. Each party or its officers, employees, agents or representatives shall not sell or otherwise
dispose any share of said party in the net saleable area of the Building below the prices fixed by
MICO in accordance with this Section 4 (c). MICO shall have the exclusive right to adopt
financing and discounting schemes to enhance marketing and sales of units in the Project and
such right of MICO shall not be restricted or otherwise limited by the foregoing single pricing
system provision.
(d) Each party shall bear the profits earned and losses incurred as well as any and all taxes and
other expenses in connection with the allocation or sale of, or other transaction relating to, the
units allotted to each party.9
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units 10 and the allotted parking
spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs
covering the same subject units but with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in
his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which
were originally issued in ASBs name.
On 2 April 2006, counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment in the
CCTs which he had originally issued in ASBs name.11 Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin effect
in the second set of CCTs, the registration of the subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASBs name.
On 17 May 2006, Espenesin replied and explained, thus:
The registration of the Malayan-ASB Realty transaction, from its inception up to the issuance of titles,
were all handled by respondent Atty. Francis Serrano. He therefore appeared and we have considered
him the legitimate representative of both parties (sic). His representation, we gathered, covers the interest
of both MICO and ASB in as far as the titling of the condominium units are concerned.

Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in consonance
with the sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some in the
name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back
and requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly there
was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and considered the
representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and
placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error committed in the
issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released
yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of rectifying a simple mistake. 12
After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASBs name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote
respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively,
introducing himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of
the ASB Group of Companies.13Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name the subject
units at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for ASB under the MOA, and actually, already registered
in ASBs name with the Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units
should have benefited him and other unsecured creditors of ASB because the latter had categorically
informed them previously that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool created under the
Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB Group of Companies." Ultimately, Ampil demanded that Yuchengco and
Cheng rectify the resulting error in the CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to
ASBs name.
Respondents paid no heed to ASBs and Ampils demands.
As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the following:
1. Respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and intercalated and substituted the
name of MICO under the entry of registered owner in the questioned CCTs covering the subject
units of The Malayan Tower;
2. The alterations were done without the necessary order from the proper court, in direct violation
of Section 10814 of Presidential Decree No. 1529;
3. Respondents violated Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code by:
3.1 Altering the CCTs which are public documents;
3.2 Effecting the alterations on genuine documents;
3.3 Changing the meaning of the CCTs with MICO now appearing as registered owner of
the subject units in Malayan Tower; and
3.4 Effectively, making the documents speak something false when ASB is the true owner
of the subject units, and not MICO.
4. Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the felonious acts of
respondents;

5. Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
5.1 Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the Pasig City Registry of Deeds, committed
an offense in connection with his official duties by allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced or influenced by respondent Serrano into altering the questioned CCTs; and
5.2 The actions of respondent Espenesin demonstrate manifest partiality, evident bad
faith and/or, at the least, gross inexcusable negligence.
6. Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible officers of MICO, as principals by
inducement and conspirators of Espenesin and Serrano, are likewise liable for falsification of the
CCTs and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 15
As required by the Ombudsman, respondents filed their counter-affidavits: Espenesin and Serrano filed
individually, while Yuchengco and Cheng filed jointly. Respondents respective counter-affidavits uniformly
denied petitioners charges and explicated as follows:
Respondent Espenesin countered, among others, (i) that their intention was only to cause the necessary
rectification on certain errors made on the CCTs in issue; (ii) that since the CCTs were not yet issued and
released to the parties, it is still within his authority, as part of the registration process, to make the
necessary amendments or corrections thereon; (iii) that no court order would be necessary to effect such
changes, the CCTs still being within the control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been released
to the respective owners; (iv) that the amendments were made not for the purpose of falsifying the CCTs
in issue but to make the same reflect and declare the truth; and (v) that he merely made the corrections in
accordance with the representations of respondent Serrano who he believed to be guarding and
representing both the interests of MICO and ASB.
Respondent Serrano, on the other hand, argued: (i) that the units in issue are not yet owned by ASB; (ii)
that these units were specifically segregated and reserved for MICO in order to answer for any excess in
the estimated cost that it will expend in the completion of the Malayan Tower; (iii) that ASB is only entitled
to these reserved units only after the Malayan Tower is completed and that the units are not utilized to
cover for the increase in the cost expended by MICO pursuant to Section 4(c) of the MOA; (iv) that the
Malayan Tower was still incomplete at the time when the alterations were made on the CCT, hence, the
claim of ownership of ASB over the reserved units is premature and totally baseless; (v) that prior to the
fulfillment of the resolutory condition, that is, after the completion of the Malayan Tower and there remains
a balance in the Remaining Construction Cost, the units still rightfully belongs to MICO; and (vi) that the
alteration was made merely for the purpose of correcting an error.
Respondents Cheng and Yuchengco, while adopting the foregoing arguments of Espenesin and Serrano,
further averred that: (i) Ampil has no legal personality to file this suit, he being merely an unsecured
creditor of ASB whose interest was not definitively shown to have been damaged by the subject
controversy; (ii) that their participation as respondents and alleged co-conspirators of Serrano and
Espenesin was not clearly shown and defined in the complaint; (iii) the CCTs issued in the name of ASB
have not yet been entered in the Registration Book at the time when the alterations were effected, hence,
the same could still be made subject of appropriate amendments; (iv) that the CCTs in issue named in
favor of ASB were mere drafts and cannot legally be considered documents within the strict definition of
the law; (v) that court order authorizing to amend a title is necessary only if the deed or document sought
to be registered has already been entered in the registration book; and (vi) that MICO is the duly
registered owner of the land on which Malayan Tower stands and ASB was merely referred to as the
developer.16
Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685 dismissing Ampils
complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be
prefaced by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner of the subject units.

The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA and, thus, refrained
from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard
pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short, the
Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the
last element of the crime, i.e., that the change made the document speak something false, had not been
established.
Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict respondents for
violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the Ombudsman denied
Ampils motion and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint.
On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found Espenesin liable
for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying for a finding of guilt
against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman reconsidered its earlier
resolution and recalled the one-month suspension meted on Espenesin.
Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court.
And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsmans resolution absolving Espenesin of
not just Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, but also of Simple Misconduct.
Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil: first, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans failure to
find probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the
Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices under
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and second, raising grievous error of the Court of Appeals
in affirming the Ombudsmans absolution of Espenesin from administrative liability.
To obviate confusion, we shall dispose of the first issue, i.e., whether probable cause exists to indict
respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and for
their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Despite the Ombudsmans categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil is adamant on the existence of
probable cause to bring respondents to trial for falsification of the CCTs, and for violation of Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In fact, he argues that Espenesin has been held administratively liable
by the Ombudsman for altering the CCTs. At the time of the filing of G.R. No. 192685, the Ombudsman
had not yet reversed its previous resolution finding Espenesin liable for simple misconduct. He insists that
the admission by respondents Espenesin and Serrano that they altered the CCTs should foreclose all
questions on all respondents (Espenesins, Serranos, Yuchengcos and Chengs) liability for falsification
and their commission of corrupt practices, under the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019,
respectively. In all, Ampil maintains that the Ombudsmans absolution of respondents is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsmans incomplete disposition of Ampils complaint.
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" 17 brooks no objection. The Ombudsmans
conduct of preliminary investigation is both power and duty. Thus, the Ombudsman and his Deputies, are
constitutionalized as protectors of the people, who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the government x x x, and shall, x x x notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof." 18

The raison d'tre for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate the Office of
the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges and fiscals
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of
official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers.19
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to
determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. 20 On this score, we have consistently
hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of its constitutionally mandated
powers.21 The Ombudsmans finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be
assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.22
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsmans discretion in determining
probable cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. 23 (Emphasis
supplied).
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.
While we agree with the Ombudsmans disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict respondents
for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why
the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampils charge that respondents committed prohibited acts
listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order
denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents
violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampils complaint-affidavit as one "for: Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended." 24 The
Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar Ampil
on 17 September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of
Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended."25

The Ombudsmans silence on the component anti-graft charges is pointed up by the specific allegations
in Ampils complaint-affidavit that:
18. The acts of ATTY. ESPENESIN and his co-conspirators are clear violations of Section 3 paragraph (a)
and/or (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act x x x;
xxxx
19. On the basis of the evidence x x x and the admissions of the conspirators themselves, ATTY.
ESPENESIN is liable under both pars. (a) and (e) thereof or either of the two. By maliciously and
feloniously altering the subject CCTs (sic), contrary to law and to the prejudice of ASB and Ampil, ATTY.
ESPENESIN committed an offense in connection with his official duties and he admitted having done so
in conspiracy with his co-respondents. x x x ATTY. ESPENESIN allowed himself to be persuaded, induced
or influenced into committing such violation or offense which is the substance of par. (a) of RA 3019;
20. In committing such unauthorized and unlawful alterations on the subject CCTs (sic), ATTY.
ESPENESIN caused undue injury to ASB and to AMPIL as an unsecured creditor, who is ultimately one of
the beneficiaries of said CCT from the ASSET POOL created by the SEC, and gave MICO unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official duties as Register of Deeds of Pasig City.
Such acts were admitted by ATTY. ESPENESIN in his letter to ASB x x x. Such acts, taken together with
his admission, indubitably show ATTY. ESPENESINs manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or, at the
least, his gross inexcusable negligence in doing the same;
21. ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under Section 3 pars. (a) and/or (e) of RA 3019, as well as under Article
171 par. 6 of the RPC. ATTY. SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO and (sic) GEMMA O. CHENG are
also liable for violation of the said provisions of law in conspiracy with ATTY. ESPENESIN, the latter as a
principal via direct participation, ATTY. SERRANO, as principal by inducement and YUCHENGCO and
CHENG, also by inducement, who being responsible officers of MICO ultimately benefited from said
unlawful act.26 and the pith of the Resolution which carefully and meticulously dissected the presence of
the first three definitive elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code:
The first three definitive elements of the crime, albeit present, are defeated by the absence of the fourth.
The respondents readily admitted that an alteration was indeed made on the CCTs in issue allegedly for
the purpose of correcting a mistake in the name of the registered owner of the condominium units
involved. Said alteration had obviously changed the tenor of the CCTs considering that ASB, the initially
named owner, was changed into MICO. The first and third elements are undeniably present.
Anent the second element, the respondents argued that the CCTs in issue were mere drafts and are not
legally considered "genuine documents" within the strict definition of the law. Albeit the contention is
partially true, no proof has been shown to prove that the CCTs issued in favor of ASB were mere drafts.
The CCTs of ASB are obviously complete. If we are to compare it with the appearance and contents of the
CCTs issued in favor of MICO, one will notice no definitive difference between the two except that one set
was named in favor of ASB and the other set, in favor of MICO. Nothing is shown that will clearly prove
that the former were mere drafts and the latter are the final copies. As far as the appearance of the CCTs
of ASB is concerned, all appear to be complete and genuine. Proof to the contrary must be shown to
prove otherwise.
Delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs can be legally
categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed by respondent
Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon
appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the

CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the regular
performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears thereon. 27
On the whole, the Ombudsmans discussion was straightforward and categorical, and ultimately
established that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, altered the CCTs issued in ASBs name resulting in
these CCTs ostensibly declaring MICO as registered owner of the subject units at The Malayan Tower.
Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsmans findings
thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampils complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the
charges contained therein with nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of the subject units at The Malayan
Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not detract from, much less diminish,
Ampils charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of offenses under Sections 3(a)
and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of
rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an act or the
offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act;
(3) the act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duty of the latter. (Emphasis supplied).
Whereas, paragraph (e) of the same section lists the following elements:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officers official, administrative or judicial
functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. 28
As Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Espenesin is tasked, among others, to review deeds
and other documents for conformance with the legal requirements of registration. 29 Section 10 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and
for Other Purposes provides:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a
public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel
mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He
shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same
are properly cancelled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefore, and advising him of
his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of the Decree.
Most importantly, a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds is charged with knowledge of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, specifically Sections 5730 and 108.31
In the instant case, the elements of the offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
juxtaposed against the functions of a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds establish a prima facie graft case
against Espenesin and Serrano only. Under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, there is a prima facie
case that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, allowed himself to be persuaded to alter the CCTs
originally issued in ASBs name, against the procedure provided by law for the issuance of CCTs and
registration of property. In addition, under Section 3(e) of the same law, there is likewise a prima facie
case that Espenesin, through gross inexcusable negligence, by simply relying on the fact that all
throughout the transaction to register the subject units at The Malayan Tower he liaised with Serrano,
gave MICO an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the registration of the subject units.
In Sison v. People of the Philippines, we expounded on Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with
the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.
Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has
been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care
which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."

In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were made under his watch.
Petitioners admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his
signatures because he pre-signed these forms only proved his utter disregard of the consequences of his
actions. Petitioner also admitted that he knew the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did
not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors. This was an
admission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable,
considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to implement the law to the letter. As local chief
executive, he should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his
constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to break it.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on personal canvass, no
matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the law. These
requirements are not empty words but were specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the acquisition
of government supplies, especially since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass. Truly, the
requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial body assures the general
public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions do not occur. It also guarantees that no personal
preference is given to any supplier and that the government is given the best possible price for its
procurements.
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to prove any
undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways by
which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violatedthe first, by causing undue injury to any party, including
the government, or the second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged under
either mode or both. The use of the disjunctive "or connotes that the two modes need not be present at
the same time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.
Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with having
given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers. Under the second mode,
damage is not required.
The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition;
benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or
higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor
or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just
that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves
that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers. These suppliers
were awarded the procurement contract without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best
possible price for the government. The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent,
were able to profit from the transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to
the government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his acts. 32 (Emphasis supplied).
We stress that the Ombudsman did not find probable cause to indict respondents for falsification simply
because the Ombudsman could not categorically declare that the alteration made the CCT speak falsely
as the ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower had yet to be determined. However, its initial
factual findings on the administrative complaint categorically declared, thus:
x x x Espenesin justified his action by asseverating that since the CCTs were still under the possession
and control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been distributed to the owners, amendments can
still be made thereon.

It is worthy to note that the CCTs of ASB, at the time when the amendment was made, were obviously
complete. From its face, we can infer that all have attained the character of a binding public document.
The signature of Espenesin is already affixed thereon, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the
titles have already been entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March
11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. Allegations to the contrary must be convincingly and positively proven, otherwise,
the presumption holds that the CCTs issued in the name of ASB were regular and the contents thereon
binding.
Stated in a different light, delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these
CCTs can be legally categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed
by x x x Espenesin in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon
appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the
CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the regular
performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears thereon. The law has made it so clear that it
is the entry of the title in the Registration Book that controls the discretion of the Register of Deeds to
effect the necessary amendments and not the actual delivery of the titles to the named owners.
This being the case, strict compliance with the mandates of Section 108 of P.D. 1529 is strictly called for.
The provision is clear that upon entry of a certificate of title (which definitely includes Condominium
Certificate of Title) attested to by the Register of Deeds, no amendment shall be effected thereon except
upon lawful order of the court.
In the instant case, it became obvious that after the CCTs of ASB were entered in the Registration Book
on March 11, 2005 at exactly 11:55 a.m., the notations thereon were thereafter amended by Espenesin
when Atty. Serrano purportedly informed him of the alleged error inscribed therein. The proper remedy
that should have been undertaken by Espenesin soon after he was informed of the error is to either
initiate the appropriate petition himself or to suggest to the parties to the MOA to file said petition in court
for the amendment of the CCTs. An amendment by way of a shortcut is not allowed after entry of the title
in the Registration Book.
xxxx
If the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is not legally authorized to determine the
respective rights of the parties to the MOA when deciding on the petition for amendment and cancellation
of title, all the more with the Registrar of Deeds who is legally not empowered to make such determination
and to cause an automatic amendment of entries in the Registration Book on the basis of his
unauthorized determination.
Espenesins liability is grounded on the untimely and unauthorized amendment of the CCTs in issue. This
is regardless of whether the amendment had made the CCTs speak of either a lie or the truth. What
defines his error is his inability to comply with the proper procedure set by law. 33 (Emphasis supplied).
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime.
As the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even
moral certainty;34 it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.35 It is sufficient that based on the
preliminary investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 36 that:
x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 37

Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be well-founded on such
state of facts in the prosecutor's mind as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe
or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that it is so. 38
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.39
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.40
A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. 41 (Emphasis and italics supplied).
In this instance, Espenesin explains and categorically admits that he altered, nay corrected, 38
certificates of title which we again reproduce for easy reference:
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in consonance
with the sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some in the
name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back
and requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly there
was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and considered the
representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and
placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error committed in the
issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released
yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of rectifying a simple mistake. 42
The letter of Espenesin itself underscores the existence of a prima facie case of gross negligence:
1. Serrano transacted the registration of the units in The Malayan Tower with the Office of the
Register of Deeds, Pasig City;
2. Serrano had previously presented a joint venture agreement, the MOA, which Espenesin
followed in the initial preparation and issuance of the titles;
3. Before some CCTs initially issued in ASBs name were released, Serrano returned and
requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because those titles
were supposedly erroneously registered to ASB; and
4. Just on Serranos utterance and declaration which Espenesin readily believed because he
considered Serrano the representative of both parties, and without any other documentation to
base the amendment on, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on those specified titles and
replaced it with the name of MICO.

Espenesin, a Registrar of Deeds, relied on Serranos word alone that a supposed error has been
committed. Even if ownership of the units covered by the amended CCTs has not been categorically
declared as ASBs given the ongoing dispute between the parties, the MOA which Espenesin had
previously referred to, allocates those units to ASB:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the Project,
each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective
contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof,
and on the basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as
defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled to the following (which entitlement
shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the
event that the actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB the following net saleable area:
(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price
of P640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of said presales);
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be delivered to
ASB upon completion of the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof which shall
be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project and determination of its actual construction
costs. If the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction Cost, subparagraph (b) of this Section 4 shall apply.43
The MOA even recognizes and specifies that:
E. ASB has pre-sold a number of condominium units in the Project to certain buyers as set forth in
Schedule 1 hereof, and in order to protect the interests of these buyers and preserve the interest in the
Project, the goodwill and business reputation of Malayan, Malayan has proposed to complete the Project,
and ASB has accepted such proposal, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, including the
contribution to the Project (a) by Malayan of the Lot and (b) by ASB of its interest as buyer under the
Contract to Sell.
xxxx
Section 3. Recognition of ASBs Investment. The parties confirm that as of the date hereof, ASB invested
in the Project an amount equivalent to its entitlement to the net saleable area of the Building under
Section 4 below, including ASBs interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell. 44
One fact deserves emphasis. The ownership of the condominium units remains in dispute and, by
necessary inference, does not lie as well in MICO. By his baseless reliance on Serranos word and
representation, Espenesin allowed MICO to gain an unwarranted advantage and benefit in the titling of
the 38 units in The Malayan Tower.
That a prima facie case for gross negligence amounting to violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 exists is amply supported by the fact that Espenesin disregarded the well-established
practice necessitating submission of required documents for registration of property in the Philippines:

Documents Required for Registration of Real Property with the Register of Deeds:
1. Common Requirements
o Original copy of the Deed or Instrument (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)If the original copy
cannot be produced, the duplicate original or certified true copy shall be presented accompanied
with a sworn affidavit executed by the interested party why the original copy cannot be presented.
o Owners copy of the Certificate of Title or Co-owners copy if one has been issued. (Original
Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
o Latest Tax Declaration if the property is an unregistered land. (Original Copy + 2 duplicate
copies)
2. Specific Requirements
1. Deed of Sale/Transfer
xxxx
For Corporation
1. Secretarys Certificate or Board Resolution to Sell or Purchase (Original Copy +
Duplicate Copy)
2. Articles of Incorporation (for transferee corporation) (1 Certified Copy of the Original)
3. Certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the Articles of
Incorporation had been registered . (1 Certified Copy of the Original)
4. For Condominium or Condominium Certificate of Transfer, affidavit/certificate of the
Condominium Corporation that the sale/transfer does not violate the 60-40 rule.(Original
Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
5. Subsequent transfer of CCT requires Certificate of the Condominium Management.
(Original Copy)
6. Sale by a Corporation Sole, court order is required.(Original copy of the Court Order)
Additional Requirements
xxxx
11. Condominium Projects
Master Deed (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
Declaration of Restriction (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
Diagrammatic Floor Plan (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)

If the Condominium Certificate of Title is issued for the first time in the name of the registered
owner, require the following:
o Certificate of Registration with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Original
Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
o Development Permit (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
o License to Sell (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy) 45
Espenesin, by his own explanation, relied on nothing more than Serrano, who he "came to know and
considered as representative of both parties," and Serranos interpretation of the MOA that Serrano had
brought with him.
On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents Espenesin
and Serrano committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampils general assertions that the two, as officers of
MICO, benefited from the alteration of the CCTs, there is a dearth of evidence pointing to their collective
responsibility therefor. While the fact of alteration was admitted by respondents and was affirmed in the
Ombudsmans finding of fact, there is nothing that directly links Yuchengco and Cheng to the act.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against
respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts,
more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law
are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. 46 In this
case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents
possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary investigation aspect of this
case. We do not adjudge respondents guilt or the lack thereof. The assertions of Espenesin and Serrano
on the formers good faith in effecting the alteration and the pending arbitration case before the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission involving the correct division of MICOs and ASBs net
saleable areas in The Malayan Tower are matters of defense which they should raise during trial of the
criminal case.
As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle in the law of public officers is the
three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in
these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others.47
On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the Ombudsmans last ruling that
Espenesin is not administratively liable.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.48
In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest 49 and established by
substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple
Misconduct.50 Thus, a person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if
the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. 51

In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the Ombudsmans own finding,
present. Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or
for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. 52 This has already been demonstrated as
discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for established rules on land registration by a
Register of Deeds himself. As he himself admits in his letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on the
specified CCTs because he believed that Serranos request for the re-issuance thereof in MICOs name
constituted simple error.
Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be
made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and
the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to
the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not
appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any
person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as
married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby
be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened
the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may
hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant
any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to
reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court
which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith,
or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not
presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure, alteration or amendment upon a
certificate of title.
In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the fact of Espenesin already signing
the CCTs issued in ASBs name as "only a part of the issuance process because the final step in the titling
procedure is indeed the release of the certificate of title." 53 The Ombudsman further ruled:
Considering that prior to the release of titles, Espenesin merely rectified what was represented to this
office as error in the preparation of typing or the certificates, hence, it is wrong to subject him to an
administrative sanction. This is bolstered by the fact that, at the time of release (and perhaps even up to
the present time), there was no final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a
better right to the property in question.54(Emphasis supplied).
This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of Espenesins misconduct. It highlights
Espenesins awareness and knowledge that ASB and MICO are two different and separate entities, albeit
having entered into a joint venture for the building of "The Malayan Tower."
As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for Serranos new
instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serranos bidding. He heads the Office of
Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of records of instruments affecting
registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city wherein such office is situated." He should

not have so easily taken Serranos word that the amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and
innocuous error. Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an
authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His
actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides
mistake.
Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same MOA, in the initial
preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASBs name. Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds who is required
by law to be a member of the legal profession,55 possesses common sense and prudence to ask for
documents on which to base his corrections. Reliance on the mere word of even the point person for the
transaction, smacks of gross negligence when all transactions with the Office of the Register of Deeds,
involving as it does registration of property, ought to be properly recorded and documented.
That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the registration of property, whether as
an original or a subsequent registration, brooks no argument. Again, and it cannot be overlooked that,
Espenesin initially referred to a MOA albeit Serrano worked on the registration transaction for both ASB
and MICO. Subsequently, Serrano returns, bearing ostensible authority to transact even for ASB, and
Espenesin fails to ask for documentation for the correction Serrano sought to be made, and simply relies
on Serranos word.
We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds failure to require documentation which would serve as his basis
for the correction. The amendment sought by Serrano was not a mere clerical change of registered name;
it was a substantial one, changing ownership of 38 units in The Malayan Tower from one entity, ASB, to
another, MICO. Even just at Serranos initial request for correction of the CCTs, a red flag should have
gone up for a Registrar of Deeds.1wphi1
Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is "in the Registration Book where the prohibition to erase,
alter, or amend, without court order, applies." We disagree with Espenesin. Chapter IV on Certificate of
Title of Presidential Decree No. 1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42 and 43 belie the claim of Espenesin:
Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the original and
duplicate copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his record book and shall be
numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the Register of Deeds with the seal of his office. Said certificate
of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall forthwith send notice
by mail to the registered owner that his owner's duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon payment of
legal fees.
Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be filed in the
Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar certificates of title
and shall constitute the registration book for titled properties.
Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may be issued by the
Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the same land shall be in
like form, entitled "Transfer Certificate of Title", and likewise issued in duplicate. The certificate shall show
the number of the next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was originally
registered, giving the record number, the number of the original certificate of title, and the volume and
page of the registration book in which the latter is found.
Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent transfer certificate of title in the
record, is simultaneous with the signing by the Register of Deeds. The signature on the certificate by the
Registrar of Deeds is accompanied by the dating, numbering and sealing of the certificate. All these are
part of a single registration process. Where there has been a completed entry in the Record Book, as in
this case where the Ombudsman found that "the signature of Espenesin is already affixed on the CCTs,
and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles have already been entered in the Registration Book

of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m.," the Register of Deeds can no
longer tamper with entries, specially the very name of the titleholder. The law says that the certificate of
title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof.
To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin knew full well that "there is no final
determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a better right to the property in question."
Espenesins attempt to minimize the significance of a Registrar of Deeds signature on a CCT only
aggravates the lack of prudence in his action. The change in the titleholder in the CCTs from ASB to
MICO was an official documentation of a change of ownership. It definitely cannot be characterized as
simple error.
Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a public officers deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present. 57 In particular, corruption as
an element of grave misconduct consists in the officials unlawful and wrongful use of his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.58
In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known legal rules. 59 The penalty
for Grave Misconduct is dismissalfrom service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement
benefits, cancellation of eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service, including government-owned or controlled corporation. 60
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the
Ombudsman dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Ombudsman is hereby directed to file the necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 against public respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin and private respondent Francis
Serrano.
The petition in G.R. No. 199115 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September
2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113171 and the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-070474-J are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin is GUlLTY of Grave
Misconduct and we, thus, impose the penalty of DIMISSAL from service. However, due to his retirement
from the service, we order forfeiture of all his retirement pay and benefits.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200804

January 22, 2014

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,


vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Decision dated November 23, 2011and Order dated February
16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case No. 11-13833 which
dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for
certiorari from the Decision dated June 10, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 4
(MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436, a small claims case for sum of money against respondent Emma
Mondejar (respondent).
1

The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.
5

Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from the
homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of
said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her family consumed a total of
1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed rate of P113.00 for every 10 cu. m.
of water, plus an additional charge of P11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted
to P28,580.09. However, respondent only paid the amount of P5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of P23,111.71
which was left unpaid despite petitioners repeated demands.
8

In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid petitioner the
agreed monthly flat rate of P75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same
would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable
and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far
above the average daily water consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the
propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid P23,111.71 claim.
10

In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondents water line for not paying the adjusted water charges since
March 2003 up to August 2005.
11

The MTCC Ruling


On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, then, it
can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of P75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of P1,050.00 for
the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total payments equivalent
to P1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid petitioner.
12

14

The MTCC disregarded petitioners reliance on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boards (HLURB)
Decision dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura, et al. v. Dona
Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose new water consumption rates for water
consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied with the
directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards the
rates to be charged, and (b) that the HLURB approved of the same.
15

16

Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date when it actually
began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement containing the
terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty respondents
obligation. Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of P75.00 per month should still be the basis for
respondents water consumption charges for the period August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005. Based on
petitioners computation, respondent had only paid P300.00 of her P1,500.00 obligation for said period. Thus, it
ordered respondent to pay petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to P1,200.00 with legal interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand on October 14, 2010 until fully paid.
17

18

19

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish with
certainty respondents obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount sought to be collected.
20

The RTC Ruling


On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the said
petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant
the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum than that
which has been awarded.
21

22

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated February 16, 2012, hence, the instant
petition.
23

24

The Issue Before the Court


The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners recourse under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts
established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in
the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal
is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the
proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation, wherein it was held that:
25

26

27

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may
only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law,"
this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of
all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety
of certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of
an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so

defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at
some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari
proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment
and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTCs apprehension that respondents recourse before it
(was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the court] to
supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the private respondent to pay the
petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded." Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an
original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is
therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC,
in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely
abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the
controversy.
28

29

30

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail
the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTCs ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC). To be
sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the
venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for
judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be
had before the Court. This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
1wphi1

31

32

33

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari
petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This
petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously
mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded
thereto for its proper disposition.
34

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioners, v.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMINGCORPORATION (PAGCOR), AS REPRESENTED BY ITS INCUMBENTCHAIRMAN
EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.
DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Resolution 2 dated September 30, 2009 issued by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110048, which outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mark Jerome S. Maglalang (petitioner). Also assailed is the
appellate courts Resolution3 dated November 26, 2009 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts follow.
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned or
controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869. 4
Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions
as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato 5 (Cecilia) approached him in his
booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and
P500.00 bills. There were 45 P1,000.00 and ten P500.00 bills for the total amount of P50,000.00.
Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously
spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then
placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to
Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then
pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she
observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster
contained20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by
declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that
Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her
money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the
tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth.
However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them
were invited to the casinos Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter,
petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident. 6
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum 7issued by the casinos Branch Manager,
Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino
customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he
should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Incompliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letterexplanation8 dated January 10, 2009.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum 9dated March 19, 2009, stating that the

Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed
on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration10 seeking a reversal of the boards decision and further prayed in the alternative
that if he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate
penalty. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production 11 dated April
20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the
recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly
containing the latters factual findings. In a letter-reply 12 dated June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos R.
Bautista, Jr. who did not indicate his authority therein to represent PAGCOR, denied the said motion.
Petitioner received said letter-reply on June 17, 2009.
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum 13 dated June 18, 2009 practically
reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith is another
Memorandum14 dated June 8, 2009 issued by PAGCORs Assistant Vice President for Human Resource
and Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors in its meeting
on May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner received
said memoranda on the same date of June 18, 2009.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition 15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended,before the CA,averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal
basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of
the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing
the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that
he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only
a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSCs appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that
discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only
by reprimand.
In its assailed Resolution16 dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
recourse from the CA.Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,17 the CA held that
the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration18 which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution 19 dated November 26, 2009. In
denying the said motion, the CA relied on this Courts ruling in Duty Free Philippines v.
Mojica20 citing Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA,21 where this Court held as follows:
It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution]
government-owned or controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they
have original charters, as distinguished from those created under general law.
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983.

Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the management of
PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service
Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to:
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the Civil
Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the service
which may be appealed to the Commission.
Hence, this petitionwhere petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error of
judgment
1.

IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER AND IN


DENYING THE LATTERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION[;]

2.

IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PENALTY INVOLVED IS NOT
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS[;]

3.

IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER IN A MANNER WHICH


IS UTTERLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE[;]

4.

IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION AS TO THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY


OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT[;]

5.

IN UNDULY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED


DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD[; AND]

6.

IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED


DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF RESPONDENT WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.22

Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and jurisprudence that provide that
when the penalty involved in an administrative case is suspension for not more than 30 days, the CSC
has no appellate jurisdiction over the said administrative case. As authority, petitioner invokes our
ruling in Geronga v. Hon. Varela23 which cited Section 47,24 Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section 47
provides that the CSC may entertain appeals only, among others, from a penalty of suspension of
more than 30 days. Petitioner asserts that his case, involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not
appealable to the CSC. Thus, he submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a
petition for certiorari. 25
On the other hand, PAGCOR alleges that petitioner intentionally omitted relevant matters in his

statement of facts. PAGCOR essentially claims that petitioner refused to apologize to Cecilia; that he
treated Cecilias complaint with arrogance; and that before taking the aforementioned 10-minute
break, petitioner slammed the cash to the counter window in giving it back to the customer. PAGCOR
argues that the instant petition raises questions of fact which are not reviewable in a petition for
review on certiorari. PAGCOR maintains that the CAs ruling was in accordance with law and
jurisprudence. Moreover, PAGCOR counters that petitioners remedy of appeal is limited as Section 37
of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that a decision
rendered by heads of agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than 30 days is imposed
shall be final and executory. PAGCOR opines that such intent of limiting appeals over such minor
offenses is elucidated in the Concurring Opinion of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in CSC v.
Dacoycoy26and based on the basic premise that appeal is merely a statutory privilege. Lastly, PAGCOR
submits that the 30-day suspension meted on petitioner is justified under its own Code of Discipline. 27
Prescinding from the foregoing, the sole question for resolution is: Was the CA correct in outrightly
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies?
We resolve the question in the negative.
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime
Holdings, Inc.28 on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the
court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based
on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of
comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is
irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating

the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of
qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot.29
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
provides for the unavailability of any appeal:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office.
A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department
or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation
shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions
shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine
in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or
office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except
when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
department head. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 4730of E.O. No. 292 essentially providing
that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC.
Correlatively, we are not unaware of the Concurring Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v.
Dacoycoy,31 where he opined, to wit:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what
the law declares as final are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy
reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous
for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their
multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative
system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative
agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be

over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence,
erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial
review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials
from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from
a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law
are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,32 we held:
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and
unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the
same. The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate
jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be
questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared
by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a
contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of
the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special
civil action for certioraria scribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such
as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is
grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no
appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as
the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 33
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law in view of petitioners allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CAs outright dismissal
of the petition for certiorarion the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any
legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an
error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts
exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent
court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the
evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred

or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. 34 Considering the circumstances
and since this Court is not a trier of facts, 35 remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 30, 2009 and
November 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110048 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR.,
HONORABLE CAESAR A. CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDAROGRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; AND MYRNA M. GARCIA
AND CUSTODIO MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to review the March 26, 2013 1and
May 15, 20132 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0285, ordering the
dismissal of the case against the private respondents for violation of Section 3602 3 in relation to Sections
2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended,
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The antecedents as culled from the records:
Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. (Vestidas Jr.) were
charged before the CTA under an Information which reads:
That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio
Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively, conspiring and
confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of AntiVirus Software
Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to customs duties, by misdeclaration under Import Entry
No. C181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of Customs (BOC), covering One
Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain
40 pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties
amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php
3,341,245) of which only the amount of One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos
(Php100,362) was paid, in violation of the abovecaptioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the
Government in the amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos
(Php3,240,883).4
In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and Vestidas Jr. pleaded Not Guilty to the aforementioned
charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference was held on September 5, 2012 followed by the pretrial on
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

C hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

September 13, 2012. Both the prosecution and the defense agreed to adopt the joint stipulations of facts
and issues entered in the course of the preliminary conference.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented a number of witnesses who essentially observed 5 the physical examination of
Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted6 by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained7 the process of
electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged
misdeclared goods therein.
Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on December
10, 2012.
On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with
Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013, which was granted by the CTA. Thereafter,
they filed the Demurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012, claiming that the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:

a) The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the


prosecution were inadmissible in court;

b) The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared


goods were not presented as evidence; and
c) None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive
identification of the two accused as the ones responsible
for the supposed misdeclaration.
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. in its March 26, 2013
Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the CTA, no proof whatsoever was presented by the prosecution showing that the certified true
copies of the public documents offered in evidence against both accused were in fact issued by the legal
custodians.8 It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that when the
original of a document is a public record, it should not generally be removed from the office or place in
which it is kept.9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its contents may be proven using secondary evidence
and such evidence may pertain to the certified true copy of the original document issued by the public officer
in custody thereof. Hence, the CTA wrote that the certified true copies of the public documents offered in
evidence should have been presented in court.
Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, which reads, [a]n authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the
original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody. Considering that the private documents were submitted and
filed with the BOC, the same became part of public records. Again, the records show that the prosecution
failed to present the certified true copies of the documents.
The CTA noted that, in its Opposition to the Demurrer, the prosecution even admitted that none of their
witnesses ever positively identified the accused in open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were
not competently and properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses.
The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CTA in its May 15, 2013
Resolution, stressing, among others, that to grant it would place the accused in double jeopardy.12
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG),
as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of
judgment in the case.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA when in ruled
that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2)

the object evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the
witnesses failed to positively identify the accused as responsible for the misdeclaration of goods.
The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the
filing thereof under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was
received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the RATS was
only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr. (Atty.
Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case,
considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty. Campos, it was only on that
occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA. Thus, it was prayed that the petition
be given due course despite its late filing.
This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.
The 60day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.13 While there are recognized exceptions14 to such strict
observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. 15
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant
the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on August 12, 2013,
or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural
lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to
circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry
even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the
petitioners failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly,
this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb
smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of revenue every year.
The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect that the case
against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The failure to present the certified
true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the misdeclared
goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and, worse, the failure to file this petition on time
challenging a judgment of acquittal, are telltale signs of a reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the
case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the Courts vigilance against
inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive
branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of
competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers,
lest the governments goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar
activities.
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA displays gross
ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in the first
place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.
In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result would
remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. In this case, a perusal of the challenged resolutions
of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part or denial of due process.
The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact,
presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.16Here, the

subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in accordance with the rules on evidence and existing
jurisprudence.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs that the canons
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.17 Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26, 2013 and May 15, 2013 Resolutions
of the Court of Tax Appeals are AFFIRMED.
The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation for possible criminal or
administrative offenses committed by the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing and handling of the subject complaint for
violations of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Secretary of Finance, the Collector
of Customs, and the Office of the Ombudsman for their guidance and appropriate action.
C hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as
Secretary of the Board, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents.
U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioners.
Bonifacio A. Alentajon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the university of the people, the U.P.
administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the
Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program.
Spawned by the public clamor to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist profile of the U.P
studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the coverage of government educational subsidies so as to include the
deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.
After broad consultations with the various university constituencies by U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P.
Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted
official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the
implementation of the program.

In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP
benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give
undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University.
Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source
of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the
University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into
brackets. At the end the application form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement,
as follows:
Statement of the Student
I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information which I have furnished are
accurate and complete. I understand that any willful misinformation and/or withholding of
information will automatically disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or subsidy,
and may serve as ground for my expulsion from the University. Furthermore, is such
misinformation and/or withholding of information on my part is discovered after I have been
awarded tuition scholarship or any form of financial assistance, I will be required to reimburse
all financial benefits plus the legal rate of interest prevailing at the time of the reimbursement
without prejudice to the filing of charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my
home/residence to verify the veracity of the information provided in this application and I will
give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate with
the fact-finding team may mean suspension of withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges.

Student's Signature
Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian
I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the information which my
son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this application together with all the documents
attached. I further recognize that in signing this application form, I share with my
son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for the truthfulness and completeness of the
information supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my
home/residence to verify the information provided in this application and I will give my utmost
cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding
team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges of my
son/daughter/dependent.

Parent's/Legal Guardian's/Spouse's
Signature 1
From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program.
One such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the punishable acts under Section 2 (a) of the
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate falsification or
suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application form.
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a
student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90
was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.

On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home
investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City.
Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion
Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form.
Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the
matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. 2
In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the
investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977
Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers
Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket
9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was
required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial
rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the
Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. 3
On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the
United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to
find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." He also stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio,
was shouldering the expenses of the college education of his two younger brothers. 4
Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal
before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the following:
That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a student of the College of
Law, UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) recipient (Bracket
4 for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG
BAYAN) benefits which he filed for schoolyear 1989-1990, and schoolyear 1990-1991, with
the Office of Scholarship and Student Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial Assistance
Service) voluntarily and willfully withheld and did not declare the following:
(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and
(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A., in
support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico,
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to
his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02
September 1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31 January 1980, and further
amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988). 5
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT 6 rendered a decision in SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating

Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information
about the income of his mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and
Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies in violation of paragraph [a],
Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June
1992]." As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required
him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it
shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action." 8

The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review
pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. On November 26, 1992, the
Executive Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board
of Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR meeting on January 25, 1993. 9
On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Education,
thereby making her automatically a member of the BOR, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a
letter expressing her view that, after a close review of Nadal s case by her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to
find Mr. Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief. Consequently, he should be allowed to
graduate and take the bar examinations this year." 10
At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but because "the Board was willing
to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and predicament of the mother as
an immigrant 'TNT' in the United States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension,
effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest." The
BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. 11
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly against the advice of his
counsel. 12The motion was placed on the agenda of the February 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day

before said date, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal's
case be deferred until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting.
On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held
a special meeting to accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as the sole item on its
agenda. Again, Nadal's motion for reconsideration was included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in view of
the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was deferred.
At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes
Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim
that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University
(AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he
was a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no
direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that
Nadal Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material
misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that
would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be
anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole
pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the
investigation and the reviews." He added that "the respondent's eligibility for his AdeMU high school
scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to 1983 does not in any way establish that he is 'not guilty as
charged' before the SDT," since the formal charges against him do not include withholding of information
regarding scholarship grants received from other schools.
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into executive session where the following
transpired:
The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed the Secretary to reflect in
the minutes of the meeting the following decisions of the Board in executive session, with only
the Board members present.
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not guilty as
charged of willful withholding of information in relation to his application for Socialized Tuition
and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990
and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation

of paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline,
as amended.
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during the Executive Session:
four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes, pending
verification with Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P.
Nadal's statement in his STFAP application that he was granted scholarship while he was in
high school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the
conditional votes would be considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty. The
Chairman requested the President to make the verification as soon as possible the next day.
In answer to a query, the Chairman clarified that once the information was received from
Ateneo, there would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.
The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional votes.
The Chairman himself did not vote. 13
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a
recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting at
the Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal
"guilty" as the members voted as follows: six members guilty, three members not guilty, and three
members abstained. 14Consequently, the BOR imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1)

year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the
suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12%
interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled
his financial obligations with the university. 15
On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that "after learning of the latest
decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for
(his) financial obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now letting nature take its course," Nadal
begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the case. 16
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President
Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The
petition prayed:
After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:
a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision rendered on 28 March 1993,
exonerating petitioner from all the charges against him, and accordingly dismissing SDT No.
91-026;
c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation expenses of at least
P150,000.00.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17
The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction was
immediately set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court declared that the only issue to be
resolved was "whether or not the respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal's) right to due
process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993
meeting. After the respondents had presented their first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked

respondents' counsel whether they were amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said counsel replied in the
negative, asserting the University's prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its rules of
discipline. 18
On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following Order:
The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident (application for
preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order and opposition thereto). For
lack of material time set this for continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 both at 2:30 p.m.
In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not be rendered moot and
academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose V. Abueva, President of the University of the
Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P. Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili,
the officers, agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby
temporarily restrained from implementing their decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in
Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 entitled University of the Philippines vs. Ramon P.
Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes of the 1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P. held at
the Romblon Room, Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R.
Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself
as a hostile witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower court issued the following Order:
The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting
on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of "NOT GUILTY" in
his favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, without notice to the herein petitioner,
called another meeting the following day to deliberate on his (the Chairman's) MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, which this time resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While he main issue
of violation of due process raised in the petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the respondents from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 21-026 and from suspending the petitioner for one year.
It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ that there must be a
right to be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due process in the March 29 Board
meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be protected for, in administrative proceedings, a
respondent's right to due process exists not only at the early stages but also at the final stage
thereof.
With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as well as to other UP
personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even after this case had already
been filed, the Court is convinced that there now exists a threat to the petitioner (respondent
in SDT Case No, 91-026) that the decision of the Board of Regents finally finding him guilty of
willfully withholding information material to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial
Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented at any time, especially during the
enrollment period, and this implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as it would
delay him in finishing his course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job.
The injury thus caused would be irreparable.
"Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Where the damage is susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not
irreparable." (Social Security Commission v. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L13555, May 30, 1962).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues in the instant
proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents, their
officers, agent(s), representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026, and from suspending petitioner, upon the latter's filing
a bond in the amount of P3,000.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 20
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order, raising
the following issues: whether or not Nadal was denied due process in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against him, and, whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the
May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension
penalty it had imposed on Nadal.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant petition, we shall confront a threshold issue
raised by private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by the Board of Regents as a
collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of
Regents" nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not real parties in interest who should file the same. 21
A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest." 22Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue

here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and Regulations
on Student Conduct and Discipline by withholding information in connection with his application for
STFAP benefits, which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the
financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have the effect of subverting a
commendable program into which the University officials had devoted much time and expended precious
resources, from the conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme of
tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public funds allocated to the State
University.
Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed
below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant petition. 23 Moreover, under

Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR
shall be served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance with these legal provisions that
Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University President and member of the
BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and every member of the BOR be
named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained, notwithstanding
the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the naming of the party would be but a
formality. 24
No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on the right of an academic institution to
refuse admission to a student arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. In
our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 25 wherein certain law

students were dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the matter of admission
of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore, beyond the province of the courts to
decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was denied due process. To
clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by
respondent's counsel: "What was conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process
from the start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on March 28, 1993." 26

With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack
of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non
v. Dames II 27 that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due

process," 28 the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting.
Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining in Non v. Dames II and in the instant case. In
the former case, the students were refused admission for having led or participated in student mass actions
against the school, thereby posing a collision between constitutionally cherished rights freedom of
expression and academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for having breached the
University's disciplinary rules. In the Non case, the Court ruled that the students were not afforded due process
for even the refusal to re-enroll them appeared to have been a mere afterthought on part of the school
administrators. Here, Nadal does not dispute the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate until the
BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on the agenda.
In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March
29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of
individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students
whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did
respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings
where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was
"supposed to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all
administrative charges against him." 29
Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993 admitted that there was no
final verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of the conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he
was "not morally convinced that there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because
there was no direct evidence that his mother received income from the United States and this income was sent
to the Philippines to support the studies of the children." 30 Two regents shared the view of Regent Carpio,

with the following result: four voted guilty, three, not guilty, and three cast conditional votes. The BOR
agreed that, upon the suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU about Nadal's
alleged scholarship as a student in said institution. Consequently, no definitive decision was arrived at by
the BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of exoneration handed down as averred by
respondent.
Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting where all twelve members of the BOR
were present, that all of them participated in the voting held to reconsider the previous day's decision. He
stated "I remember Regent Arcellana questioning the voting again on the ground that there was already a final
decision, but there was a vote taken on whether a motion for reconsideration can be decided by the board, and
a majority of the board ruled that the matter can be reconsidered again upon motion of the chairman." 31
At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three (3) voted that he was not guilty and three
(3) abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio, the final decision was that which was rendered on
March 29, 1993 as "no other decision was made by the Board with respect to the same issue." 32
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was "not given due process in the March 29
meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original
charge." 33Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not

Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU.
However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of
withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. 34 It should be stressed that the reason why
Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that
Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought
additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the
AdeMU.

In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification
aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a
"stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the
help of another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the
income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond
reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required, that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise. 35 In light of the foregoing circumstances, we find that Nadal has been sufficiently proven

to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits of the
STFAP.
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at
all costs so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to the hallowed
Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those
who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of
chicanery in the practice of his profession.
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar." (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that honesty and integrity are
requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the reason why a certification of good
moral character is one of the documents that must be submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a
charge of immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground for disqualifying
him.
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that respondent has committed an act
of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant
violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's
inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised.
As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water
turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating. In more
relevant terms, through its power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution is able to exercise
its academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend and refuse admission to a student who
has subverted its authority in the implementation of the critically important STFAP.
At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is encompassed by the right of academic
freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology 36 the Court stated that a

school or college which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending
to the choice of students." Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 37 the
Court further expounded:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school,
the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the
Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject,
as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.

For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . .
as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to
assist and cooperate with the schools.
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going
a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic
freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based
on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would
work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a
decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into
account the circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly,
it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample
justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher
learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming
jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear
and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or

government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.

39

Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden
grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed.
Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him
from doing and that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of 1993-1994. It must
have been with consternation that the University officials helplessly watching him complete his academic
requirements for taking the Bar. 40 In the event that he be allowed to continue with his studies he would, in

effect render moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed upon him by the
BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for STFAP scholarships from
misleading the University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in instant case, withholding
vital information and stating downright falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not only would
this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violated the rules and regulations of
the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty intent to give financial assistance
to poor but deserving students through the STFAP which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and
modifying it's operations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition
formandamus.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Potrebbero piacerti anche