WRIGHT, Crispin. Scepticism and Dreaming Imploding The Demon.

Mind Association
Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon

Author(s): Crispin Wright
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 87-116
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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and Dreaming:ImplodingtheDemon
Scepticism
CRISPIN WRIGHT
Much literature
on thetopicof externalworldscepticismproceedsas if then
werea singlegeneralformofproblemthathastobe confronted.
In fact,however
forepistemological
arguments
scepticism
come in a variety
of significantly
different
formsand,whilegenerality
is ofcoursea meritin a response,thereis nc
reasonto expectthattheyshouldsuccumbto a uniform
treatment.
My concern
hereis withthelargebutnotcomprehensive
groupof scepticalarguments
that
make play witha purportedly
undetectable
but cognitively
disablingstatevictimisation
dreaming,
pervasivehallucination,
bytheCartesiandemon,Brainin-a-vathood,
etc.I believethesearguments
do sharea best-mostchallengingform,whichI shalldelineatebelow.' I also believethat,so delineated,
theycan
be madetosuccumbtoa head-on,rationalresponse-something
ofwhicha subI shallfocus
stantialamountofdistinguished
recentcommentary
has despaired.2
on theexampleofdreaming;
butitwillbe possibleto substitute
throughout
any
oftheotherfamiliar
fantasies
without
important
change.
' The formof argument
in questionwas,nearenough,thefirstof twohighlighted
in
my"FactsandCertainty"
(1985). Buttheoverallapproachadoptedthere-ofarguing
that
successfulscepticalargument
shouldbe seennotas callingintoquestionourrightto acas "Thereis a materialworld","Thereare manyminds","The
cept suchpropositions
worlddidnotfirst
comeintobeinglessthanfiveminutes
ago",etc.,butrather
as showing
forwhichtheyqualifyallows
their"unfactuality",
i.e. as disclosingthatthenotionoftruth
forthemneednotdemandsupportwithreasons-thisapproachwas
thatclaimingtruth
incases,like"I am notnowdreaming",
neverentirely
comfortable
"I am nota brainin a
of thescepticaldoubtis notthatthethought
vat",etc.,wherethethrust
expressedis beyondanyone'sjustifiedappraisalbutconcernsa predicament
peculiarto thesubjectconcerned.How can what I now expressby "I am not now dreaming"be a "hinge
proposition",
beyondtheneedforjustification,
ifitcoincidesin itstruth-conditions
with
whatyoucan nowexpressby"Wright
is notnowdreaming"
andthelatteris a perfectly
ordinary
empiricalproposition?
Thedifficulty
is thatbeinga "hinge",ontheaccountof"FactsandCertainty",
is a functionofa statement's
No provisionis madefortheidea of
place inourschemeofthought.
wouldseemingly
a "personal"hinge,ofthekindwhich"I am notnowdreaming"
haveto
be. To be sure,theproblemis notimmediately
lethalfortheapproachto thefirst
class of
describedin"FactsandCertainty".
scepticalarguments
(Anditdoes notbearatall on the
prospects
ofso approaching
theotherclassofarguments,
on whichinanycase thelecture
Butmaintaining
theapproachis goingtorequiresomeradicalmoves:one
concentrated.)
sufficient
ofourrespecwayoranother,
distancewillhavetobe putbetweenthecontents
of"I am notnowdreaming"
and"Wright
is notnowdreaming"
toallow
tiveaffirmations
whichthelattercannotassumein
theformer
to assumea statusin mythought
justifiably
wouldbe toarguethatwhatI nowexpressby"I amnotnow
yours.(A stepinthisdirection
at all.)
cannotbe an objectofyourthought
dreaming"
In anycase, theproposalsketchedbelowis independent
andmaynicelycomplement
treatment
ofthesecondformofscepticalargument
the"FactsandCertainty"
highlighted
inthelecture.
2
SirPeterStrawson
ofpessimism
instance,
(1985) providesaneloquentexpression
aboutthepowersofreasoninthefaceof scepticaldoubt.AndBarryStroud(1984,p. 20)
ifwe letourselvesacceptthetermsin
thattheCartesianChallengeis unanswerable
grants
whichitis framed.
Mind,Vol. 100 . 397 . January1991
? Oxford University
Press 1991

88
CrispinWr-ight
l
ifwe reflect
such
thataneffective
Thedespairmayseemonlytoounderstandable
tworelatively
responsehas to be givenwithintheconfinesof threeconstraints,
exigentintheextreme.
obvious,thethirdless so, andtheircombinedeffect
that,odd as itmightat firstseemto
The firstderivesfromtheconsideration
say so, knowledgeis notreallythepropercentralconcernof epistemologicoin theclaim
scepticalenquiry.Thereis notnecessarilyany lastingdiscomfort
we have no genuineknowledgein some
that,contrary
to our preconceptions,
science.Wecan livewith
broadareaofourthought-sayintheareaoftheoretical
knowsomeofthethingswe believedourtheconcessionthatwe do not,strictly,
thatwe arefullyjustifiedin
selvesto know,providedwe can retainthethought
call theRussellianRetreat.
For
them.Thatconcessionis whatwe might
accepting
Russell(1912, Chs. I and 11)proposedthatsuchis exactlythemessagewhich
hasforus: we mustcontent
ourselveswith
generally
philosophical
epistemology
we had
wherestandardly
defeasibility
andinconclusive
justifications
probability,
wantedto claimmore.What,however,is nottolerableis thethesisthat,among
thematerialworld,otherminds,orthepast,we
propositions
about,forinstance,
correjustified
opinion;thatno realdistinction
neveractuallyattaintogenuinely
sponds to thatwhich we are accustomedto draw betweengroundedand
and mereprejudiceor dogma.Butjust
ungrounded
beliefs,earnedinformation
to deliver(cf.
thisclaimis whatthebest-radical-sceptical arguments
purport
Dancy 1985,pp. 8-9).
to a sceptical
then,is thatone mustnot,in responding
The firstconstraint,
andhave
be content
torelyon pointswhicharespecifictoknowledge
argument,
no evidentanaloguefortheweakerepistemicnotionsattackedbyradicalsceptitoreformulate
toattempt
cism.One is obliged,morespecifically,
scepticalarguto know-ledgein termsof such weakernotions;onlyif it
mentsantagonistic
tomarshala theory
ofknowlsucceedsis itgermane
emergesthatno suchattempt
edgeinone's response.3
is motivated
thatscepticalarguments
are
The secondconstraint
bythethought
' So formulated,
maywell seemtoo obviousto be worthstating.But
theconstraint
forinstance,
somewidelydebateddiscussionsviolateit.RobertNozick's(1981) attempt,
theprinciple
byquestioning
to castdoubton thecogencyof certainscepticalarguments
fromknownpremissesvia knownentailments,
depends
thatknowledgeis transmissible
towit,roughly,
X's
on hisclaimthatknowledgeis subjecttoa tracking
condition;
entirely
be covariant
knowingthatP requiresthatherbelievingthatP and thefactof P's truth
or notknowledgeis indeedsubjectto such
acrossnearbypossibleworlds.Well,whether
a condition,
no non-factive
epistemicnotioncan be so subject,sincetheapplicationof
in questionin the
of theproposition
sucha notiondoes notso muchas requirethetruth
ones.Butthescepticalarsimilarcounterfactual
actualworld,letalonein all sufficiently
in termsofnonifre-tooled
guments
whichNozickhad inmindcan all rununhampered
claimthanitmayseem.Itis implicitly
factivenotions.(Thatis actuallya moresubstantial
who
I suggest,
bythediscussionin?111below.)Ofcourse,therearephilosophers
justified,
in thecase of e.g. reasonablebeliefalso (see foothavewantedto querytransmissibility
at all, needsthesupportof
note13 below).Butthatproposal,ifitcan be wellmotivated
thesphereofNozick'sdiagnosis.
considerations
quiteoutwith

Scepticism
andDreaming:Imploding
theDemon 89
notproperly
rebutted
byconsiderations
whoseforcedependson theassumption
ofan adversarialstance:a scenarioin whichtheobjectis to defeata realphilosophicalopponent,
theSceptic,in rationaldebate.Thereareno realsuchopponents.That generations
of philosophershave feltimpelledto grapplewith
scepticalarguments
is notattributable
to a courtesy
due toan historically
distinguishedsponsorship
buttothefactthatthesearguments
areparadoxes:seemingly
validderivations
fromseemingly
well supported
premissesof utterly
unacceptableconsequences.
inwhichonecould
And,ofcourse,noteverykindofsituation
properly
claimto havewona debatewitha sponsoris one in whichone would
havedisposedoftheparadoxwhichthesponsored
Consider
argument
presented.
themythical
glass-chinned
scepticwhoclaimsthatthereis no reasonto believe
at all. Nothing
anything
easierthantoconfound
suchan opponent
indebate.But
ifyouyourself
areled,incamera,as itwere,tothatabsurdconclusionbya seeminglywell-motivated
route,itis no intellectual
comfort
toreflect
thattheposition
is self-defeating;
on thecontrary,
thatsimplyintensifies
theembarrassment.
The
whatspecifically
and in detailshouldbe concludedaboutthe
questionis rather,
illusionofcogencywhichthereasoning
somehowwas able toconjure?
The secondconstraint,
then,is thatone mustnot,inresponding
to a sceptical
be contentto relyon attackson thestability
argument,
of theconclusion,or on
themutualcoherenceofthepremisseswhichareusedto support
it.Thatis good
butdefusing
strategy
againstanopponent;
a paradoxdemandsa properly
detailed
diagnosisandexposeofitspowerto seduce.
is imposedbythereflection
The thirdconstraint
that-torevert
harmlessly
to
theordinary
adversarial
rhetoric-theScepticdoes notneedto winbutonlyto
draw.Thatis: theconclusionofa scepticalargument
whichpurports
to shownot
indeedthatnoneof ourcherished
beliefsaboutsomesubjectmatter
is justified
butmerelythatthereis nojustification
forthinking
loses littlein disotherwise,
claim.IfI findittotallyunacceptable
quietingpowertothestronger
tothinkthat
noneofmyopinionsabouttheexternal
for
has
itis
world, instance, anyground,
to be toldthatthecase has beenoverstated-that
it is merely
hardlya comfort
thatI havenojustification
forthinking
thatthesituation
is anybetter
thanthat.
To see howthisreflection
imposesa definite
we
constraint,
suppose arepreFsentedwitha validentailment,
where
B
is
an
A,,
conunacceptable
{A,,
IAn B,
thatthereis nojustification
forbelievinganything
clusion-say,precisely,
about
theexternal
world.Then,as justremarked,
"Thereis nojustification
forbelieving
thatB is false"is hardlya morepalatableresult.Butwe willhavethatresultprovidedthat{A,, . . ., An)are suchthat,evenifnoteachpositively
there
justified,
is atleastnojustification
fordenying
theirconjunction.4
Result:thepremisses
of
4The pointassumesthatjustification,
reasonablebelief,etc.,aretransmissible
across
entailment.
The thought
thenis simplythat,whereIA,, . . . A, I v
F B,
(i) not:B v not:{AI & ... & A,};
hence,
(ii) justified[not:B] F-justified[not:IA, & ... & A, I ), bytransmissibility
ofjustification;
hence,
(iii) notjustified[not:{Al& ... & A,} ] H notjustified[not:B].

90
Crispin
Wright
an interesting
scepticalargument-onethereis no livingwith-do notstandin
needofjustification;
itis enoughthatwe lackanyjustification
forthedenialthat
theyareall true.
The consequential-atfirstblush,surprising-constraint
is,accordingly,
that
onemustnot,inresponding
toa scepticalargument,
be content
torelyonconsiderationsthattendto showthatits premisseshave notbeen convincingly
supported.Forevenifthatis true,thefactis thatinteresting
scepticalarguments
do
notneedto support
theirpremisses,
butcan fallbackon thethesisthatwe have
no convincingcase fortheirconjointdenial. More generally:a satisfactory
responsetoscepticism
mustdeal withscepticism
atbothfirstandsecond-order.5
The constraints
are indeeddemanding,
expeciallythethird.But,as I said,I
thinkwe can playbythemandstillwin.
II
Descarteswrote:
I mustremember
thatI am a man,andthatconsequently
Nevertheless,
I am accustomed
to sleepandinmydreamsto imaginethesamethings
thatlunaticsimaginewhenawake,or sometimes
thingswhichareeven
lessplausible.How manytimeshasitoccurred
thatthequietofthenight
mademedreamofmyusualhabits:thatI washere,clothedina dressing
gown,and sitting
by thefire,althoughI was in factlyingundressed
in
bed! It seemsapparentto me now,thatI am notlookingat thispaper
withmyeyes closed,thatthishead thatI shakeis notdruggedwith
sleep,thatit is withdesignand deliberateintentthatI stretch
outthis
handandperceiveit.Whathappensinsleepseemsnotatall as clearand
distinct
as all this.But I am speakingas thoughI neverrecallhaving
beenmisled,whileasleep,by similarillusions.WhenI considerthese
I realiseso clearlythatthereare no conclusiveindimatters
carefully,
cationsbywhichwakinglifecan be distinguished
fromsleepthatI am
is suchthatitis almostable to
and mybewilderment
quiteastonished,
convinceme thatI am sleeping.(FirstMeditation,
1968,pp. 145-6;my
italics)
That"thereareno conclusiveindications"
todistinguish
wakingfromdreamingdoes notimpress,
at firstsight,as a particularly
damagingscepticalthought.
The Cartesianquestforcertainty,
Whyshouldwe wantconclusiveindications?
no doubt,cannotbe satisfiedby less thanconclusiveness;
butthereseemsno
shoulddemandso much.
goodcause whya questforjustification
Thatis a pointerto thefactthatsome workwill be wantedto massagethe
intoa radical scepticalargument.
We will come to thatin ?IV.
quotedthought
itis as welltoemphasisehowstrongis thebasisfortheclaimthat
First,though,
Descartesis making.His claimis thatordinary
waking-perceptual-experience
is in no essentialway phenomenologically
fromdreamexperidistinguished
order.
ofarbitrary
5And indeed,withscepticism

theDemon 91
Scepticism
marksof thedistinction
ence-that,notwithstanding
thevarietyof contingent
andqualityofan episode
whichwe areinpracticecontent
torelyon,thecontent
to classifyit as dreamor perception.
of experienceis neverlogicallysufficient
is
Thisis true,andfundamental
to ourconcerns.It is truebecausethedistinction
thatthemanifest
conoftheconceptofdreaming
ctiological:itis characteristic
is dominantly
tentofdreamexperience
causedin waysappropriately
dissociated
environment.
By contrast,
expefromcurrent
eventsin thesubject'sperceptible
contentis dominantly
causedby
riencecountsas perceptual
onlyifitsmanifest
in wayswhichensurethatthereis a subeventsin theperceptible
environment
betweenthem.Thisdoes notprecludeexamples
stantialmeasureofcongruence
whereaspectsofthecontent
ofa dreamdo seembestexplainedas responsive
to
environment
(cf.Wittgenstein
On Cerelementsin thesubject'scontemporary
Buttocometothinkthatenough,sustained
tainty,
1969,concluding
paragraph).
detailofa dreamwas so responsive
wouldbe tocometo havereasontothinkof
perception.
itnotas a dreamat all butas someformofdormitory
experienceby considerations
Dreaming,then,is markedofffromperceptual
whichconcernitscausalorigin.Thereis a lotmoredetailto fillin aboutthedistinctionso drawn,but thisis enoughforDescartes'purpose.Dreamingonly
is
becausecausedin waysin whichperceiving,
countsas dreaming
necessarily,
thatexperience
cannotdisthought
notcaused.Butitis a completely
compelling
close itsowncausalprovenance
as partof itspropercontent.
Knowledgeofthe
hastobe theproduct
ofinference,
forwhichthatexpeofan experience
xetiology
thushasno ingressintotheterritory
riencecanatbestsupplya datum.Experience
in whichthedistinction
andperceptual
is made.
experience
betweendreaming
Descartes'italicisedclaimis thussecure.Buthowexactlydoesitleadtoa generalisedscepticaldoubt?BarryStroud'sanalysis(1984,pp.9-24)involvesgrantingDescartesthat
at thattime,
(a) Atno timedoes anyoneknowthattheyarenotdreaming
also
is a consequenceoftheitalicisedclaim,andgranting
does Descartesknowthathe is clothedin a
(b) Onlyifhe is notdreaming
dressinggown,andsitting
bythefire,etc.
Thelatter
is plausibleenoughifwe takeitthat,inthescenariodepicted,
Descartes
and
couldknowthathe is clothedin a dressinggown,etc.,onlybyperceiving,
are governedby incompatible
reflectonce morethatdreamingand perceiving
Butstill,howis scepticaldamagetobe donewith(a) and(b)?
causalconstraints.
withtheknowledgethat(b) is true,andproSupposewe creditDescarteshimself
ceed to invokewhatwe maycall
Descartes' Principle:
In orderto knowanyproposition
any
P, one mustknowto be satisfied
whichone knowstobe necessaryforone's knowingP.
condition
Thenitimmediately
followsthat
gown,andsitting
bythe
(c) Descartesknowsthathe is clothedina dressing
fire,etc.,onlyifhe knowsthathe is notdreaming.
Andnow(a) and(c) setup a modustollenstotheconclusionthatDescartesdoes

92
CrispinWright
notknowthathe is clothedin a dressinggown,andsitting

bythefire,etc.
Thatconclusionmaystillseemto be wantingin generality.
But reflectthat
Descartesmayreasonablyclaimto have chosenhis situation
as a putativebest
inwhichthecredentials
case-a situation
oftheclaimtohaveperceptual
knowledgeofcertainmatters
couldnotbe improved.
Whenmightonemorereasonably
claimtobe garnering
perceptual
knowledgethanin suchsober,lucidandreflectivecircumstances?
thebestcase is notgood
So, accordingto theargument,
enough;andall othersfallwithitinconsequence.
The argument
as formulated
mayseemtocomeclosetocrystallising
thescepin theoffing
ticalthought
here.Butitmayalso seemto havetwosalientpoints
ofvulnerability.
One is itsuse ofDescartes'Principle.Stroud(1984,p. 29) says
nothing
to motivatetheprinciplebeyondthesuggestion
thatit is something
to
whichwe mayeasilybe led by reflection
on "uncontroversial
everydayexamin a contextofparadox-until
ples".Thatmightseemratherweakjustification
we remember
our thirdgoverning
constraint.
But an objectorof "externalist"
inclination
maywanttoclaimmore,thatthereis positivereasontorejecttheprinof knowledgeacrossknownentailciple.For ifwe assumethetransmissibility
aboutwhichsuchentailments
ments,
andmakeharmless
assumptions
areknown,
oftheiterativity
theprinciple
ofknowlemergesas merelya variantformulation
is oftenregarded
as suspectwhenknowledge
is regarded
as
edge.6Anditerativity
a matter
of(possiblyuncertified)
reliableexternal
sinceonemightbe
connection,
"hookedup" to someregionofrealitywithout
appropriately
knowingit.
I suspectthattherehas seemedto manyto be an obviousproblemwithiterativityfromsucha standpoint
onlybecausetheylapse,illicitly,
intointemalism
at
the second"K", as it were-so thatthedrivingthoughtis thatone mightbe
"hookedup" to someregionof realitywithout
appropriately
havinganyreason
in thefavouredextemalist
to thinkso. If each occurrence
of "K" is interpreted
way-as a matterof de factoreliableconnection-itis farfromimmediately
clearthata subject'ssecond-order
beliefsabouthisknowledgeof somesubject
hisbeliefsaboutthatsubjectmatter
willnotbe reliablewhenever
matter
are.7But
we don'tneed to chase thepointdown.For once a treatment
of second-order
is on ouragenda,itis quiteunclearthatexternalism
has theresources
scepticism
6 Proof:
Iterativity
entailsDescartes'Principle.The Principlesays thatifK(Kp -o q),
thenKp -- Kq. SupposeKp; then,byiterativity,
KKp. Supposetheantecedent
ofthePrinciple,
andthatitis knownthat{Kp,Kp -- q } e q. Thenbothpremissitselfareknown.So, bytransmissibilies ofthatentailment,
andtheentailment
ty,its consequentis known:Kq. Two applicationsof conditionalproofthen
yieldthePrinciple.
entailsiterativity.
Take "q" as "Kp".
(ii) Descartes'Principle
thattheknowingsubjectmight
It is,bytheway,nota relevant
objectiontoiterativity
belief.Likewise,itis no objectiontotransmissisecond-order
simplylacktheappropriate
ofanentailment,
andknewthattheentailment
bilitythata subjectwhoknewthepremisses
was good,mightsimplynothaveformedanybeliefin theconclusion.The acceptability
ingeneral,does
rulesforknowledge,
andindeedforepistemic
ofproof-theoretic
operators
The germanequestionis rather
not hold out hostagesto psychologicalcontingency.
whether
satisfaction
ofthepremisses
foran application
oftheruleensurestheavailability
to thesubjectoftheepistemicstatedepictedin theconclusion.
(i)

fora satisfactory
inanycase. The wholedrift
responsetoscepticism
oftheexternalistresponseis to seeka constitutive
accountofknowledgewhichallowsthe
thatwe knowtobe unimpugned
possibility
underscepticalpresbyourinability,
sure,tomakea case thatwe do.8Ifiterativity
indeedfailsas a consequenceofthis
aspectoftheaccount,thenitsfailureis boughtatthecostoflayingouraspirations
to knowledgewideopento second-order
Andifitdoes notfail,the
scepticism.
objectionlapses.
A better
objectionto Stroud'sCartesianargument
has,ineffect,
alreadybeen
noted.It concernspremise(a). Whyshouldthelackof"conclusiveindications"
inthecontent
ofexperience-thefactthatitis alwaysconsistent
withthecontent
ofan experiential
episodethatitbe dreamor waking-be thought
for
sufficient
thethesisthatno-oneeverknowsthattheyarenotthendreaming?
The premise
is eitherunjustified
or-if knowledgeis deemedto demandsuch conclusive
grounds-theweakerclaim,thatwe veryoftenarecertain,
withamplejustification,thatwe arenotthendreaming
andareveryoftenright,
is leftuntouched
by
theargument,
whosestingis consequently
drawn.
Ourtask,then,is tofinda versionoftheargument
whichcan warrant
(at least
agnosticism
about)itsanalogueofpremise(a) whilesimultaneously
keepingits
witha typeofepistemic
sting-working
claimwhichwe aresimplynotprepared,
intherelevant
cases,toforgo.
111
It is muchmoredifficult
toaccomplishsuchan argument
thanhasbeengenerally
A formulation
intermsofknowledge,
howeverinternally
acknowledged.
impressive,merelyinvitesevasionby RussellianRetreat.But an evidentdifficulty
in
to runthesortof argument
sketchedin termsofreasonablebeliefis how
trying
anyanalogueof premise(b) is to survive.Granted,if Descartesactuallywere
as he seemingly
sitsin frontof his fire,etc.,he wouldnotknowthe
dreaming
propositions
whosetruth
he thentakeshimself
toperceive.Butmighthe notstill
reasonably
believethem-precisely
because,in circumstances
of suchfocussed
phenomenological
lucidity,he reasonably(but wrongly)takeshimselfto be
awake?Itappearsthatneither
norreasonablebeliefcanservetheconknowledge
struction
ofa radicalscepticalargument
alongthelinesconsidered.
One response,as faras premise(b) is concerned,
wouldbe to restrict
attentionto appropriate
demonstrative
beliefs-beliefsde re concerning
perceptually presenteditems.For theseare beliefs,accordingto currently
influential
theveryentertaining
of whosecontentdemandsconcurrent
orthodoxy,
perceptualcontactwiththeobjectstheyconcern;theyarehencesimplyunavailableto
a dreamingsubject,and thusprovidesecurecases foran analogueof premise
(b) in termsof reasonablebelief.It is unclear,moreover,
thattherestriction
8 Nozick,forinstance,
is veryclearaboutthis(1981,n. 5, p. 197andfollowing).

94
CrispinWright
would in any way emasculatetheresultingscepticalargument.

For it is far
fromc-lear
thatthereasonableness
ofotherputatively
perceptually
basedbeliefs
could survivea demonstration
thatno suchdemonstrative
beliefscan be reasonablyheld.
Buttheproblemrecurswithpremise(a)-now thepremisethatI cannotreasonablybelievethatI am notnowdreaming.
Eventhoughmyrecentandcurrent
to markitwithcertainty
experience
bearsno feature
as wakingexperience,
itis
offactorsmake
surelyperfectly
reasonableforme to takeitto be so. A number
it so. The experienceis seemingly
of veryfamiliarthings:mydesk,theother
inmyoffice,theviewfromthewindowoffamiliar
furnishings
landmarks
inthe
physicalenvironment
inwhichI liveandwork.The contribution
ofmydifferent
thecoffeeI recallmakinga short
sensesto theexperienceis internally
orderly:
whileago looks,smellsandtasteslikecoffee.Andmanifold
ofmycurfeatures
rentexperienceare perfectly
intelligible
to me, in thelightof whatI (apparently)recollectof my actionsover the last hour or so-switching on the
of
computer,
openingmymail,hangingup mycoat.In sum:a complexstructure
beliefsI hold aboutmyphysicalenvironment,
aboutthepatterns
thatwill be
in perceptualexperienceof it,and aboutmyown recenthistory-all
manifest
thesebeliefsbed smoothly
downaroundthethought
thatI am notnowdreaming.It wouldbe merelegislationto insistthatthereis no notionof reasonable
in suchconsiderations.
beliefwhichis entrained
And no suchnotion,however
in detail,can be at theserviceofthesortof scepticalparadox
bestcharacterised
envisaged.
to generatesucha partheattempt
However,itis nowclearin whatdirection
billofhealthwhichthesupposition
adox shouldproceed.The kindofepistemic
thatI am notnow dreamingacquiresfrommyreflections
above has to be one
ofmyconsciousness
bestowedpurelybyfeatures
andsystemofbeliefs.The relis thusone generated
evantsenseofreasonableness
of interbythesatisfaction
fromDreamingmustworkwitha notion
nalist standards.
So a radicalArgument
which,like knowledge,is answerableto non-internalist
standardsbut,unlike
knowledge,
allowsno space forRussellianRetreat.Is anysuchnotionto hand?
Ifnot,thenfullytoexplainwhynotwouldbe,itseems,todisposeoftheproblem.
All thatwouldremainwouldbe a mopping-up
further
ofveroperation:
scrutiny
whichproceedinterms
ofknowledge,
inordertodetermine
sionsoftheargument
whether
evenso muchas a RussellianRetreatis reallycalledfor.In fact,howin prospect.
an outcomeis not,I think,
It is plausiblethat
ever,so anti-climactic
thereare epistemicnotionsfitfortheradicalscepticalpurpose.
Let me sketchtheshapeof one such.Anybeliefwhichis notconclusively
defeatintwoways:evidencemaycometolightwhich,withcan suffer
grounded
outin anywaycompromising
theoriginalcredentials
of thebelief,generates
a
totalstateof information
whichno longersupports
it;or evidencemaycometo
lightwhichdoes compromise
theoriginalcredentials-suggests
thatthateviin waysmarredbyerror,
or slipshodpractice,
dencewas gathered
or deceit,for
fitness
ofthesubject,orqueriesthe
example,orcalls intoquestionthecognitive

Scepticism
theDemon 95
conduciveness
ofthecircumstances
inwhichthebeliefwasformed.9
Letthepedigreeof a beliefembraceitsholder'sgroundsifany,hercognitivecondition
as
sheformsitandthecircumstances
surrounding
itsformation.
Considerthesituationof a belief,whether
trueor false,and whatever
thecharacter
of evidence
bearingon itwhichhas notyetbeengathered,
whichis as a matter
offactindefeasibleinthesecondway-a beliefwhosepedigreeis flawless.Forsucha belief
therewillno feature
ofitspedigreesuchthatitwouldbe rational,
ifoneknewof
thatfeature,
toregardtheprobability
ofthebelief'sbeingtrueas unenhanced
by
thefactofthesubject'sholdingit.Thatwillbe a keyfeature
ofthesortofnotion
we want.
Let us saythattheholdingbya subject,x, ofa particular
beliefat a particular
timeis warranted
justincase thefollowing
twoconditions
aremet:
(i) x has sufficient
reason,all thingsconsideredwhichshe is in a position
to holdthebelief;and
toconsider,
ofitspedigreeinx's thought
(ii) one whoknewofall features
wouldnotbe
placedina positionwhere,independently
ofanyreasonbestowedtherebytoregardthebeliefas false," itwouldbe rationalto viewtheprobaas beingunimproved
bilityofitstruth
bythefactofx's holdingit.
Warranted
beliefis an interesting
notion.Unlikeknowledgebutlikereasonable belief,itis notfactive-doesnotrequirethetruth
ofpropositions
to which
it applies.(Thoughonlyconsistent
setsof beliefscan be simultaneously
warranted.'
butunlikereasonablebelief,warrant
1) Likeknowledge,
is senhowever,
sitivetoreal,as opposedtoreasonably
supposed,aspectsofpedigree.SupposeI
believequitereasonably
thata proposition
is true forinstance,
"Itis raining
outside"-which merelyreflectsthe contentof a vivid and unusuallycoherent
dream.Suppose,even,thattheproposition
inquestionis actuallytrue.Anyone's
intuition
willbe thatthewaymybeliefis arrivedatprevents,
inordinary
circumas knowledge.
Butitalso prevents
itscounting
stances,itscounting
as warranted;
forifyouknowthatmybeliefis inspired
be ratiobya dream,youwillcertainly
ceterisparibus,toregardmyholdingitas doingnothing
toprobanallyentitled,
Thatwarranted
beliefis analogousto knowledgein thisrespect
bilifyitstruth.
inmotivating
suggeststhatthereshouldbe no insuperable
an analogue
difficulty
forpremise(b) in termsofit.Moreon thatina moment.
Butthecrucialpoint,of course,is whether
beliefis at theserviceof
warranted
in contrastwithknowledge,strictly
radical scepticalarguments-whether,
ofourbeliefsis something
we cannottolerably
thewarrantedness
simregarded,
I Stephen
Yablohassuggested
thetwotypesofdefeatmightmemorably
be calledoverridingandundercutting
respectively.
"Undercutting"
is JohnPollock'sterm(1986).
' The qualification
is, of course,essentialif,as we are,we are in searchof a notion
whichcontrasts
withknowledgein theclearestpossibleway,i.e. a non-factive
notion.
Without
it,no falsebeliefcouldbe warranted;
forthata beliefis falseis certainly
a feature
in whichitis formedwhich,ifone knewof it,wouldconferreason
ofthecircumstances
toreFardtheprobability
ofthebelief'sbeingtrueas beingunimproved...
etc.
' Sincethereis no havingsufficient
reason,all things
considered
whichone is ina positiontoconsider,
bothtobelievea proposition
andto believeitsnegation.
Eitherone set
ofreasonsdominates
theother,orneither
sufficient.
is, incontext,

96
CrispinWright
I thinkitis clearthatthisis so. To

indeference
toscepticalpressure.
plyforswear
entailshavingreasonto
havereasontothinkthata beliefwe holdis unwarranted
reasontoholditortherearecredibilitythink
thateitherwe do nothavesufficient
a fullknowledge
inourthought-that
features
ofthewayitoriginates
destroying
fortheprobofitspedigreewouldbe persuasivethatourholdingitdoesnothing
warrant-an
concerning
So a successfulscepticalargument
abilityof itstruth.
worldare
whichshowed,a priori,thatall ourbeliefsabouttheexternal
argument
such
dilemma:that,foranyparticular
imposethefollowing
unwarranted-would
atit,eitherwe do not,all
whatpainshavebeentakeninarriving
belief,nomatter
reasonto
havesufficient
whichwe areinpositiontoconsider,
thingsconsidered
holdit;or itis,froma God's eyepointofviewas itwere,no morelikelyon that
accountthatitis truethanifwe hadsimplyguessed-that,inpointofenhancing
we followedwere
whatever
atthetruth,
procedures
thelikelihoodofourarriving
and its
conclusionon eitheralternative;
merelya charade.Thatis an intolerable
thatthereis no reasonto discountit,wouldhardlybe
second-order
counterpart,
anybetter.
IV
It is plausible,then,thata radicalversionofStroud'sCartesianparadoxneednot
forwantofa suitableepistemicnotionon whichtobuild.Andwarranted
founder
whichis not
beliefdoes indeedgeneratea versionof theDreamingArgument
ofthebest
buthas,itseemstome,a goodcase tobe thedistillate
merelyarresting
Let us setitup.
inthevicinity.
scepticalthought
to believeP at t. So read,
We read"Rxt[P]" as: x has available a warrant
believesP. The notionthat
"Rxt[P1"does notimplythatx actuallywarrantedly
thatofx's beinginpositionto
roughly,
bestservesthescepticalpurposeis rather,
abilitieswhichheactuallyposbythebestexerciseofcognitive
acquirea warrant
changein his actual
sesses at t and whoseexercisewill notinvolvesignificant
forinstance,
atthetime.So moderate
inebriation,
modeofcognitive
functioning
intellectual
andrecwitha measureofnormalperceptual,
to a degreeconsistent
suchthatRxt[P], since
willnotlimittheclass ofpropositions
ollectivefunction,
involvingthosefaculties;but
we are permitted
to idealiseto bestperformance
and
of anybutthemostelementary
dreaming
mathematics,
deafness,ignorance
unconsciousness
all will,sinceeach is a statewhicheitherplaces limitson the
willinvolvesigabilitieswhichx actuallyhasorwhosediscontinuation
cognitive
modeofcognitivefunctioning.
nificant
changeinhiscurrent
theidea of availablewarrant-ofinformaCharacterised
onlyto thisextent,
as itwere-whileitmayseemintuitive
enough,is
tionbeingthereforx's taking,
after
you thinkthatmatters
vague.You shoulddecidewhether
unquestionably
has twopreto follow.The argument
youhavereviewedthescepticalargument
belief.The first
rulesspecificto warranted
misses,and deploystwo inference
thatthey
forthesupposition
premiseis thatno-oneeverhas availablea warrant

Scepticism
andDr-eaming:
Imploding
theDemon
97
x andt,where"Dxt"expressesthatx
arenotthendreaming;
thatis,forarbitrary
is dreaming at t:
(PI) Not:Rxt [not:Dxt].

ofStroud'spremise(a) above.Moreaboutitshortly.
Thisis thecounterpart
In orderto obtainthesecondpremise,we considera counterpart
of Stroud's
premise(b). Restricting
attention
to propositions,
P, whichx hadno groundsfor
tobelieveat t
can comewarrantedly
believingbeforetand,suchis hersituation,
we can affirm
onlybythenperceiving,
(2) IfRxt[P], thennot:Dxt.
come intotherelevantcategoryforanyperObviously,countlesspropositions
in fact,whichencode
time-all propositions,
ceivingsubjectat anyparticular
newinformation
forheratthatstageofherlifewhich,inthelightoftheircontent
is accessibleto heronlyifsheperceives.Bearingthe
andherepistemichistory,
in mind,claim(2) shouldseementirely
uncontroversial.
ForifP is a
restriction
to believeat t onlybythenperceiving,
proposition
whichx can acquirewarrant
then,granted-forthe reasonsearlierrehearsed-thatperceivingnecessarily
fromdreaming
is a significant
excludesdreaming,
andthattheshift
toperceiving
theavailabilityto x at t of warrantto
changein mode of cognitivefunction,
believeP mustenjointhatshe is notthendreaming.
Butnow,havingrehearsed
thatreasoning,
thereseemsno reasonso torestrict
x's capacitiesor situation
at t thatshe is notthenin positionto do thesame;in
whichcase
(P2) Rxt[IfRxt[P], thennot:Dxt].
The firstrulefor"R__" is thefollowing
So muchforthepremisses.
version
of Transmission:
Rxt A,...,A,,};
(A,.. .,A,,}
Rxt[B],
to believeeach of
where"RxtIA, .
A,J"says thatx has availablewarrant
A, . . ., A, (and"e " as throughout,
expressesentailment).
Wecan supposethatx is a normally
reflective
rationally
subjectwho,via best
exerciseof ordinary
inferential
abilities,can cometo see thatIA, . . ., A,,} - B.
believesa particular
The rulethenaversthatsucha subjectwhowarrantedly
set
foranyof theirconsequences.Well,
of propositions
can alwaysget a warrant
trueif,as we ordinarily
likethatmustbe generally
obviously,
something
suppose,
itis possibleto extendtheclass of beliefswhichwe arejustifiedin holding-a
fortiorithosewhichwe areflawlesslyjustifiedin holding-byvalid inference.
has to be exceptionless?
Butis itobviousthatthegenerality
Surely,at anyrate,
thereis spaceforan enquiry;or so ithas seemedto some.12
12
thereasonableness
towhich,forinstance,
ofa beliefis a matter
Anyviewaccording
relativetoa framework
of"relevant
is goingtohavea moofreasonableness
alternatives",
thatreasonsareinvariably
transmissible
acrossentailment;
tivefordenying
merelytakea
oftheentailment
inquestionis a condition
case whereconsistency
withtheconsequent
on
as "relevant".
an alternative's
counting
Suppose,forexample,a theorist
attracted
to such
inwhichothers'behaviour
is beingtreated
a viewholdsthat,inanycontext
as makingpar-

98
CrispinWright
But we can prescindfromthisconcern.For theworstthatcan resultfrom

doingso is thatthetreatment
tofollowtakeson a provisional
character-atreatmentwhichwe canfallbackon if,as seemslikelyenoughinanycase,thereturns
outto be no cogentobjectiontothisversionoftransmission.
Similar remarksapply to the second rule for"R_ _", simple Iterativity:
Rxt [A]
Rxt [Rxt[A]].
A strong
motivefortheruleis providedbythereflection
thatpossessionofa warrantoughtto be an at leastweaklydecidablematter:
thatifx has a warrant
forP
at t,thatoughtto be something
forwhichshecan accumulategood thoughperhapsdefeasibleevidence-which,naturally,
needinvolveno flawofpedigree13Andthethought
without
significant
changeinmodeofcognitive
function.
that
thereshouldbe weakdecidability
in thissenseis in turnencouraged
bytheidea
is to be a normativenotion,guidingourpracticesof beliefformathatwarrant
tion-a roleitcan hardlydischargeifwe cannottell,evenweakly,whenbeliefs
arewarranted
and whentheyarenot.Once again,one wouldnothaveto refuse
all forceto theseconsiderations
in orderto wonderwhether
therule,so motivated,wouldhavetobe exceptionless.
Butonce again,we can forourpurposes
cutoffthedebatewiththereflection
that,at worst,we thereby
bestowa provisionalcharacter
on thetreatment
tofollow.
oftheparadoxis immediate.
The derivation
Suppose
(i) Rxt [P];
then
(ii) Rxt [Rxt[P]],
Since {Rxt [P], If Rxt [P], thennot:Dxt} F not:Dxt, itfolby (i) andIterativity.
lowsfrom(ii) and(P2) byTransmission
that
(iii) Rxt [not:Dxt],
to (P1). So, from(P1) and(P2)

contrary
(iv) Not: Rxt [P].
Thisconclusion
intolerable.
Itsaysthat,
nomatter
is,evidently,
whenandwhoyou
is availabletoyouforanyproposition
are,no warrant
a warrant
forwhich
getting
ticularbeliefsabouttheirmentalstatesreasonable,theassumption
thatthereare other
mindsbesidesmineincorporates
sucha condition
on relevant
alternatives.
Others'behaviour,thatis to say,is aptto makesuchbeliefsreasonableonlyin a contextin whichthe
idea thatI am theonlymindabroadis alreadydismissedas an irrelevant
possibility.
Plainly,on sucha view,myreasonstoregardyouas hopingfora 'phonecall arenottransmissibledowntothethesisthatthereareothermindsbesidesmine.
The earlieststatement
of thispointknownto me is in FredDretske's(1970). Butthe
centralclaim-thatsometimes
thetruth
oftheconsequent
ofan entailment
is a presuppositionoftheevidential
forceofdatastandardly
takento support
one ofthepremisses-is
independent
ofanycontextualism
aboutjustification,
andprovidesthebasisofone ofthe
mostarresting
yetsimplescepticalstrategies:
thatwhichtookcentrestageinmy
precisely
(1985).
13 Forexample,
ifitis possiblebya mixture
ofperception
andrational
reflection
toget
groundsforA, thenit shouldbe possible,bya mixture
ofperception
andrationalreflection,torecognisethatthatis so.

theDemon 99
Scepticism
So percepfunction.
requireperceptual
circumstances,
would,in yourepistemic
beliefsthat,in thecirforso farunwarranted
tionis nevera sourceof warrants
cannotget
anyotherway.Crudely,perception
cannotbe warranted
cumstances,
it.Butthatis justto saythatalmostall our
youcannotgetwithout
youanything
relianton perception
bymeansessentially
beliefs-whicharewarranted
worldly
at all-are unwarrantable.
ifwarranted
version,
wouldbe thesecond-order
as I havestressed,
Hardlyless intolerable,
to discountthisconclusion.It meritsnotice,therefore,
thatthereis no warrant
than
for(P1), justthatwillbe theresultif,rather
that,assumingthereis warrant
formulations
andIterativity
as rules,we takeappropriate
workwithTransmission
willbe, thereis at leastno
ofthemas premisseswhich,thescepticalcontention
in
seemto be no point,in thiscontext,
to deny.14Therewouldtherefore
warrant
conceivedas rules
or Iterativity
aboutTransmission
developinganyreservation
of
aboutthetruth
torejectevenmereagnosticism
unlessitalso provideswarrant
premisses.Mere misgivingsabout theirvalidityas rules,
the corresponding
willnotbe tothepurpose,so itseems.
bycounterexample,
unsupported
as rules,and (P2) accepted,it is likewise
and Iterativity
WithTransmission
availablefordenialof
enoughfora scepticalparadoxthattherebe no warrant
thanwe haveso farreviewed.
(P1). Butmorecan be donetojustify(P1) directly
point,which,on
The Cartesianidea was merelythe"no conclusiveindications"
thefaceof it,simplyfailsto engagetheclaimthatI mighthave a genuinebut
A betterline,
thatI am notnowdreaming.
forthinking
justification
inconclusive
to be found,perhaps,in Stroud(1984, pp. 21-3), wouldreflectthat,assuming
thereis a difprocedures,
havetobe earnedas theproduceofcognitive
warrants
couldleadonefroma stateinwhichone
inseeinghowanysuchprocedure
ficulty
toposthatone was notthendreaming
forthesupposition
so farhadno warrant
is possibleinatleast
forthatclaim.Andonlyifthattransition
sessionofa warrant
williteverbe true,forsomex andt,thatRxt[not:
circumstances
someepistemic
Dxt].
seemscompelling:
Thatthefollowing
principle
Whatis thedifficulty?
ExecutionPrinciple(PEP):
Pr-oper
dependson the
to believea proposition
If theacquisitionof warrant
cantheprocedure
thenexecuting
properexecutionofsomeprocedure,
in questo believetheproposition
a warrant
notgiveyouanystronger
forbelievingthatyouhaveexecuted
tionthanyouhaveindependently
theprocedure
properly.
a
Forexample,ifgetting
(PEP) is apttoimpressas barelymorethana platitude.
boardis twelvefeet
justification-tobelievethata skirting
warrant-flawless
on measuring
it,thenI cannotgeta stronger
longdepends,inmycircumstances,
forthinking
up thanI have independently
forthatbeliefby measuring
warrant
thinkthat
care.If I (warrantedly)
was donewithappropriate
thatthemeasuring
was slipshod,I oughttoregardtheresultas vitiatedinproportion,
themeasuring
to regarditas correct-inwhichcase, acquiwarrant
unlessI haveindependent
28 below.
infootnote
established
The pointdependson theprinciple

100 CrispinWright
sitionofthelatterdidnotafterall dependon theexecutionoftherelevant

procedure.
But theproblemis obvious.Suppose I set myselfto acquirea warrant
to
believethatI amnotnowdreaming
ofwhatever
bysomeprocedure,
sort-pinchingmyself,
ortesting
thebeliefthatI amnotnowdreaming
foroverallcoherence
withmysystemofbeliefsin general,or whatever
youlike.By (PEP), theresult
cannotbe betterwarranted
thanthebeliefthatI haveproperly
executedtheprocedureis independently
warranted;
andthatbeliefcannotbe independently
warforitscomponent,
rantedatall unlessI haveindependent
warrant
thatI reallydid
execute theprocedureand did notmerelydreamits execution.But thenit appears
whichI havesetmyselfto acquire-onlyif

thatI mustalreadyhavethewarrant
so does executionof theprocedure
force.Therecan thusbe
haveanyprobative
no routefroma statein whichone has no warrant
forthesupposition
one is not
ofa warrant
totheacquisition
forthatbelief;hence,itseems,thebelief
dreaming
is unwarrantable,
justas (P1) says.15
to warrant
of (PEP) whichreplacesall references
1 In viewof thefactthata version
withreferences
toreasonablebeliefdependson theproperexeIftheacquisitionofreasonto believea proposition
cutionof someprocedure,
thenexecutingtheprocedurecannotgive you any
in questionthanyou have indepenreasonto believetheproposition
stronger
properlydentlyforbelievingthatyouhaveexecutedtheprocedure
tothesortofconno lessplausible,onemightwonderwhy,contrary
generates
something
theconclusionthat
wouldnotsupport
earlier,an analogousargument
siderations
sketched
evenreasontobelievethatone is notnowdreaming.
Therewouldthen
thereis no getting
about
bytheconsiderations
ofpremise(b) supported
be theprospect,
witha counterpart
I advertedto,of running
in termsof
a radicalscepticalargument
demonstrative
thought
merereasonablebeliefafterall.
which,acon thesortof considerations
The troublewiththisis that,sincereflection
makeit reasonableto believethatI am notnow
cordingto theearliertrainof thought,
thecoherenceof thecourseof mycurrent,
apparently
perceptual
dreaming-essentially,
aboutthepatterns
thatwill
withbeliefsI holdaboutmyphysicalenvironment,
experience
inperceptual
ofit,andaboutmyownrecenthistory;-sincesuch
be manifest
experience
reasontothinkI amnotnowdreamreflection
is supposedonlytoprovidean inconclusive
ina dream.
onewhichcouldbe accomplished
involvedis presumably
ing,the"procedure"
betweenrunning
theprocedure
andmerelydreaming
that
Butthenthereisn'tthecontrast
inthetextwould
onehasdoneso whichan analogueforreasonablebeliefoftheargument
need.
inthetextdoesn'ttripupoverthesame
Butnowitmaybe wondered
whytheargument
bydefacto
point.WhycannotI geta warrantforthebeliefthatI am notnowdreaming
internal
toexplorethequesprocedure?
Properly
ofthesamereflective
flawlessexecution
bestsuitedto thesceptical
tionwoulddemandmoredetailaboutthenotion(s)ofwarrant
is thathavinga warrant
is toenhance
(i) thatthegeneralintention
purpose.Butremember
of beingright;and (ii) thatthekindof dreamswhichare germaneto the
theprobability
smooth-they
below,phenomenologically
scepticalpurposeare,as I expressthematter
ofordinary
reflective,
perceparedreamswhichhaveall thephenomenological
trappings
runthesortofreflective
So supposeI faultlessly
envisaged,
tualconsciousness.
procedure
beliefs,myexperience
anddecidewitheveryjustification
that,relativetomybackground
theinterior
ofmystudyis in all detailsas itoughtto be ifI am awakeandperceiving
of thesupposition
thatI am nothavingthe
how coulddoingso enhancetheprobability
smoothdreaminwhichitis possibletodojustthat?On
kindofsuper-phenomenologically
of mythinking
thatI am notnow dreaming
remains
theotherhand,thereasonableness
ofthinking
itis thereasonableness
that,whenthingsseemin all respectsas
unimpugned:
theexplanation
is thatI am,rather
thanthatcirfamiliar
ifI amperceiving
surroundings,

Scepticism
theDemon 101
Thatcompletesthelayoutoftheparadox.It has rather

a lotofmovingparts.
Still,we havedonea reasonablejob of motivating
thevariousconponents,and
thereis thethirdconstraint
to fallbackon wherecompletecogencymightseem
to be wanting.ButtheprincipalclaimI wantto makeon behalfof theanalysis
proposedis thatit capturestheessentialsof thisparticular
groupof sceptical
onhowprecisely
arguments:
specifically,
thatifyoureflect
anyofthehypotheses
in question-theDemon,Brain-in-a-Vathood,
etc.-is supposedto generatea
ramified
scepticaldoubt,youwillfindyourself
on analoguesofourtwo
relying
premisses-that
thehypothesis
is first-person
undecidable,
andthatitstruth
may
be takentoputoneoutoftheperceptual
as itwere-and on analoguesof
market,
ourtworules-thattherelevantepistemicnotionis transmissible
and iterative.
Thedetailsmaydiffer.
Descartes'Principle,
forinstance,
packsTransmission
and
Iterativity
intoone.'6Butthereareno essentially
simplerwaysofdoingthejob;
ouranalysisdoesnotopentheparadoxto"resolutions"
whicha moreskilfulfor'7
couldobviate.
mulation
In whatfollows,I presentthescenariofortheworstcase-that in whichwe
cometotheviewthatthereis no relevant
objectiontotheusemadeintheparadox
of eitherTransmission
or Iterativity.
Shouldeitheror bothturnoutto be objecwillbe thattheparadoxfounders
in anycase.
tionable,tantmieux;theargument
Anyoneencountering
Cartesianscepticism
forthefirsttimeis likelyto feelthat
thereis something
dubiouslyeclecticaboutit-that,by comparisionwithhis
treatment
ofperception,
Descartesgoes suspiciously
esseneasyon thefaculties
cumstances
areotherwise
butsomehowso fashioned
as deceptively
tosustaintheappearance thatI am. (This is notto endorsean inference-to-the-best-explanation
responseto
themainproblemwithwhichis precisely
tomaketheneededconnection
scepticism,
with
probability-to
explainwhywhatwe countas bestexplanations
aremorelikelytobe true.
All thatI am granting
is thattheacceptanceofbestexplanations
hadbetter
be, in at least
one legitimate
senseoftheword,reasonable.)
for(P1), andI shalltry
Obviouslythereis muchmoretosayaboutthe(PEP) argument
to saysomeofitbelow.
16 Albeittransmission
notas above butin theformthatrequiresthebridging
entailmentstobe known,orreasonably
believed,etc.
17 I do notknowhowtoprovethisto a readerwho,havingworked
through
theStroud
oftheabovefromit,remainsunconvinced.
discussionandthedevelopment
Sucha reader
willnot,presumably,
following
as theessentialintuitive
sequence:
regard,the
(1) I haveno wayofdetermining
thatnot:H;
(2) IfH, thenI am notperceiving;
hence,
(3) I haveno wayofdetermining
thatI am perceiving;
hence,
toanyofwhatI normally
(4) I am notentitled
regardas perceptually
grounded
beliefs.
On theotherhand,a readerwhoacceptsthatthisis theintuitive
sequencewillfindthat,
on analysis,ittakeson essentially
theshapedescribed.
Andifsuchis nottheintuitve
sequence,howexactlydoes theparadoxwork?

102 CrispinWright
thinkthatwe merely
tiallyinvolvedinhisreflective
project.One mightnaturally
thescopeofthescepticism
thematter.
Butthefact
bypursuing
standtogeneralise
of theDreaming
is, on thecontrary,
thatthereinlies thekeyto thedissolution
Argument
andall itsilk.
betweendreamingand
The paradoxpresented
leans on theincompatibility
Butis dreaming
toproperintellectualfunctionperceiving.
anylessantithetical
Mathematicians
and logicianssometimes
to reasoningand comprehension?
problems,
only
reportdreamsin whichtheyhavehiton "proofs"ofoutstanding
ofthesort-and sometimes
even
torealiseon wakingthattheyhaddonenothing
were not so muchas well-formed.
thattheirdreamedconstructions
Surely,
dreamscan produceillusionsof cogentthought
no less thanof perception.
But
another
cannotwe generatea
then,can we notconstruct
paradox?Specifically,
totheabove,anddiffering
onlyinthat(P2) is replacedbya
paradoxisomorphic
therelation
betweendreaming
andtheharvest
notofperceppremiseconcerning
excludescompetent
intellectual
functionbutofintellection?
Thus,ifdreaming
which
tionas itexcludesperception,
then,foranyx andt,ifQ is anyproposition
to believeat t
x had no groundsforbelievingbeforet and can acquirewarrant
onlybycompetent
intellection,
surelywe mayaffirm
IfRxt[Q], thennot:Dxt.
(2*)
Bearinginmindtherestriction
ontherangeof"Q", (2*) is apttoseemacceptable
forreasonsexactlyanalogousto thosesupporting
(2) above.ForifQ is a propositionwhichx can acquirewarrantto believeat t onlyby intellection,
then,
excludesdreaming,
andthatthe
granted
that,likeperceiving,
genuineintellection
to intellection
is a significant
shiftfromdreaming
changein modeof cognitive
tox at t of warrant
to believeQ mustenjointhatsheis
function,
theavailability
forrefusing
Andthen,as before,thereseemsnojustification
notthendreaming.
tox at t,andthereby
thistrainofthought
generating
Rxt [IfRxt [Q], thennot:Dxt].
(P2*)
Theupshot,
willbe a scepticalargument
fromtheDreaming
differing
accordingly,
Argument
onlyin that(P2*) replaces(P2), whoseconclusion-Not:Rxt [Q]itcanclaimedaboutperception:
claimsaboutourintellect
justwhatitsprecursor
thatcannot
it-generatesno warrants
notgetyouanything
youcannotgetwithout
be generated
anyotherway.
for
Once again,countlesspropositions
comewithinthescopeoftheargument
time-all propositions,
in fact,which
anyintellective
subjectat anyparticular
forhimatthatstageofhislifewhich,inthelightoftheir
encodenewinformation
is accessibleto himonlyif he reasonsand
contentand his epistemichistory,
is that(2*) aboveis itselfan admissiblesubstituend
reflects.
Butthekeythou-ght
for"Q" so restricted:
a proposition
warranted
acceptanceof whichcan onlybe
function.
The secondparadoxaccordingly
basedon intellective
yields
Rxt
then
not:
Not:Rxt [If
Dxt];
[Q],
thenegationofitsownpremise(P2*).
as
How is thisanyhelp?In thepresenceofa result-Not:Rxt [Q], interpreted

and Dreaming:Imploding
Scepticism
theDemon 103
of ourabilitytojustifyanybeliefat all by
above-which is totallydestructive
meansrelianton rationalreflection,
howcan we so muchas proceedto address
thescepticalproblem-howdo anyofourthoughts,
aboutanything
at all,retain
anycredibility?
Well,butwe do nothavethatresult.Thatwouldrequirethepremissesto remainin force.But since theconclusionof thesecondparadoxis
inconsistent
withitspremise,(P2*), the"paradox"is merelya reductioof the
All itshowsis that(P1) and(P2*) cannotbe simulofitspremisses.
conjunction
true.
taneously
Now reflect
that(P1) is commonto bothparadoxes;and that(P2) and (P2*)
areestablished,
or so itwas argued,byexactlyparallelconsiderations-the
case
for(P2) is cogentifandonlyifthatfor(P2*) is. Thatwouldseemtoenjointhat
if(P1) and (P2) weresimultaneously
true,so wouldbe (P1) and (P2*). But,as
justnoted,(P1) and(P2*) cannotbe simultaneously
true.Itfollowsthat(P1) and
(P2) cannotbe simultaneously
trueeither-theDreamingArgument
proceeds
fromunsatisfiable
premisses.
Thethought
maypersist:ifthereis a standing
scepticaldoubtaboutmyreason,
howcan I avail myselfof anyof this?Andtheansweris: thereisn'ta standing
second paradox
scepticaldoubtabout yourreason-only the self-defeating
which,rather
thangenerating
stablereductio
anysuchdoubt,issuesina perfectly
ofitspremisses.
(Andiftherewerea standing
scepticaldoubtaboutyourreason,
evenforthereasoningwhichgoes intotheconyouwouldnotbe in themarket
struction
of scepticalparadoxes,letalonetheirresolution.)
VI
demonstrates
thesimultaneous
unsatisfiSuppose,then,thatthistrainofthought
oftheparadoxbythe
abilityof(P1) and(P2). Oughtthattocountas a resolution
lightsof thethreeconstraints?
Well,we have workedhardto complywiththe
first-toensurethatourresponseis notknowledge-parochial.
Andwe havethe
bestpossiblelineopen in connection
withthethird.A demonstration
that(P1)
confersa warrant
forthenegationof
and (P2) arenotsimultaneously
satisfiable
the premise- Not:Rxt [not:
theirconjunction.
And thatdirectlycontradicts
Butfurther
workwill
((P1) & (P2))] -of thesecond-order
scepticalargument.
thatwe notcontentourselves
be neededto complywiththesecondconstraint,
withrefuting
"The Sceptic"butdevelopa properly
dissolution
ofthe
diagnostic
paradox.
thediagnosiswouldbestproceed.
Howeverit seemsclearin whatdirection
For(P2) was,surely,
established:
itis,simply,
a consequenceoftheincompatible
demandedby theconceptsof perceiving
and dreaming
rtiologies
respectively,
the interpretation
of "Rxt [...]", and the restrictionon the range of "P". So (P1)
in believing
wouldhaveto befalse: it is nottruethatno-oneis everwarranted
Buttheargument
thattheyare notthendreaming.
fromthe(PEP), thatno-one
forthatbelief-could workfroma positioninwhich
couldeveracquirewarrant

104 CrispinWr-ight
Perthebeliefwas unwarranted
toone inwhichitwas not-remainsimpressive.
hapsitcan be punctured.
Butifnot,theconclusionis clear:we havetodropthe
thattheavailability
ofa warrant
consistsinthepossibility
ofacquirassumption
ingit.Warrants-atleastsomewarrants-canbe unearned.
This is an intriguing
twist.The prospectis of a sharpvindication,
usingthe
veryapparatusof thescepticalargument
itself,of one of thecentralthemesof
theideathatamongourbeliefstherearesome
Wittgenstein's
notesOn Cer-tainty:
whichwe are warranted
in acceptingnotas a resultof somespecificcognitive
butrather
as a product
ofa specialplacetheyholdinourframeaccomplishment
workof thought
and enquiry.I believethatWittgenstein's
pointhereis logical18-thattherehavetobe suchbeliefs-andthatitcoversa variety
ofcases of
whichthepresent
sortofexample-thatI amnotnowdreaming,
notnowa brainin-a-vat,
notnow thedupeof Descartes'demon,etc.-is onlyone.19The fascinatingpossibility
is thattheparadoxwe generalised
is in effecta demonstration
thatwe arecommitted
toan important
class ofexamplesofthisideabytheother
inthescepticalreasoning.
characteristics
assignedto thenotionofwarrant
We shouldnotlightly
letgo ofthisprospect.
readerwill
But,as theperceptive
to object,the"demonstration"
of thesimultaneous
havebeenwanting
unsatisfiThe
of
on
it
is
based
was
flawed.
fact
is
that
itsimply
and
which
ability (P1)
(P2)
Thereason
isn'ttruethatthecasesmadefor(P2) and(P2*) standorfalltogether.
notexcludecompetent
is thatdreaming-arguably--does
intellectual
function
as
itexcludesperception.
Dreamingis,itwas claimed,necessarily
exclusiveofperceptionbecausethetwomodesofconsciousness
imposedifferent,
incompatible
constraints
on thecausalprovenance
oftheiringredient
experiences.
By contrast,
inthecase ofdreaming
andintellection
all thatwas remarked
is thatdreamscan
producean illusionofthelightofreason;thatindreamswe sometimes
succumb,
in completeconviction,to inferential
monstrosities
and othersolecismsof
It thusfallsfar
Butthisis an empiricalclaim.Anditlacksgenerality.20
thought.
shortofwhattheallegedparalleldemands,thatdreaming
shouldnecessarily
and
earnedbyoperations
of theintelgenerally
precludetheacquisitionof warrants
lect,justas itprecludeswarrants
earnedbyperception.
And,withhindsight,
perhapswe shouldnothaveexpectedanything
else. We
we do notperceive,evenifnot
are intuitively
quiteclearthat,whendreaming,
abouttheexact natureof theexclusion.Surely,if accordingto our ordinary
intellectual
function
was excludedby dreamingin just thesame way,
thought
in theattempt
therewouldbe a strongintuitive
senseofabsurdity
toconstruct
a
aroundthesupposition
scepticalargument
that,forall I know,I couldbe dreamingnow.The replywouldleap to mind:"Well,ifso, youare in no conditionto
18
This aspectof theinterpretation
of On Certainty
is well emphasisedin Williams
(1991).
19Themainfocusof"FactsandCertainty"
(Wright
1985)is on another
important
type
of example,typified
by "Thereis an externalworld","Thereare othercentresof consciousness","The worlddid notfirstcomeintobeingfiveminutesago, repletewithapparenttracesofa muchmoreancienthistory".
20 The importance
ofthispointwas urgedon mebyGideonRosen.

Scepticism
andDreanming:
Imploding
theDemon 105
Butthatreplydoes notleaptomind;we senseno

reflect
on theconsequences."21
incoherence
insupposing
simultaneously
boththatwearenowdreaming
andthat
we remaincompetent
toexplorewhatfollowsfromsupposingso.
VHl
However,thoughflawedin detail,theresponseto theDreamingArgument
just
Let me tryto put thepieces
rejectedstillexemplifies
a soundbasic strategy.
together
somewhat
differently.
reflect
or notdreaming
as ordinarily
conceivedsuspends
that,
whether
First,
inference
andreflection-is,likeperthem,soundintellection-understanding,
ceiving,subjectto atiologicalconstraints.
SupposeI followa proof,to myfull
in
I
will
Then
so
have
a
certainsequenceofthoughts,
culmisatisfaction.
doing
in whichfollowing
the
natingina certainsetofbeliefs.Butthisis notsomething
reasonforsayingso is
proofcouldwhollyconsist.One familiar,
Wittgensteinian
thatfollowing
a proofis a specificformofunderstanding,
andtheclaimto have
doneso is consequently
answerable
towhatthesubjectis subsequently
abletodo
in thewaythatanyclaimto understand
is. Butthereasonmoregermaneto our
in contentthe sequenceof my
presentconcernsis that,howeverappropriate
unlessthereare
thoughts
mayhavebeen,theywillnotbetokencomprehension
whenone lineis valcertainappropriate
causal relations
amongthem:roughly,
idlyderivedfromothers,
myfollowing
thederivation
requiresthatmyacknowlof thatlineat thatparticular
edgingtheavailability
pointin theproofincludes,
theinferentially
thoseofmybeliefswhichregister
amongitscausalantecedents,
relevant
characteristics
oftheparentlines.
The pointis absolutelycrucial,so worthemphasis:on anyoccasionwhereI
a chainofinference,
itis possible
construct
correctly
follow,orcomprehendingly
inexactlythesame
in so doingshouldhaveoccurred
thatthetrainofmythought
haveinvolvednogenuineunderstanding
ofthereasondetailyetmyperfonnance
intheidea ofa subjectwho,whilecapaing.Thereis,forexample,no absurdity
ble of graspingeach of the ingredientthoughtsinvolved in ratifying
a
sophisticated
proof,lackstheabilityto followthereasoninginvolved;yetcan
anda strongsenseoffamiliarity,
nevertheless
rehearseit,witheveryconfidence
Sucha subjectdoesnot,underhypnosis,
as a resultofhypnotic
suggestion.
myswhichgenerally
andelsewhere
teriously
acquirea local intellectual
penetration
as he
eludeshim.Andthereasonwhynotis thatthesuccessionofhisthoughts,
ofinferentiallytheproof,is causallysustained
notbyhisapprehension
rehearses
a
relevant
characteristics
butbytheoriginalhypnotic
episode.Thinking
through
notionthanis, say,
is no morea purelyphenomenological
chainof inference
howa tunesounded-where,howevervividandaccuratethemenremembering
and howeverconfident
thesubjectthatshe thereby
recallsthe
tal impression,
21Thoughthisis, in effect,
a responseofWittgenstein's.
?383.
See On Certainty

106 CrispinWright
unlessthereis an appropriate
tune,itcountsfornothing
causalrelationbetween
thephenomenological
ofthetune.
episodeanda relevant
priorexperience
The same goes forcertainsub-inferential
of theintellect
accomplishments
whichare always implicatedin the acquisitionof a prioriknowledge-for
instance,theratification
of principles
of inference
as "primitively
obvious",in
Peacocke's(1987) terminology,
Christopher
andofjudgements
a cleargenerally
headedgraspofwhosecontent
is sufficient,
without
inference,
topersuadeus of
theirtruth.
orjudgement
inmind,andbeingapproHavingtherelevant
principle
priately
smitten
withconviction,
countsas an accomplishment
oftheappropriate
kindonlyiftheaetiology
oftheconviction
dependson one'sapprehension
ofgermanefeatures
ofcontent
andstructure.
Descartes'claimthat"...thereareno conclusiveindicaEarlier,in sustaining
tionsby whichwakinglifecan be distinguished
fromsleep...",we appealedto
whatI describedas the"completely
thatexperiencecannot
compellingthought
as partofitspropercontent".
discloseitsowncausalprovenance
Buttheidea is
no less compelling
forepisodesofthought.
That,as a trainofthought
develops,
theingredients
arecausedincertainwayscannotitselfbe manifested
bytheircollectivecontent(thoughitmay,ofcourse,be partofit).Descartes,whenhe ventured to regard cogent intellectionas markedoff by phenomenological
characteristics
ofclarity
anddistinctness-whatever
exactlytheyare-missed an
insightwhosecounterpart
in thecase of perceiving
he seemingly
did notmiss.
For thefactis thatepisodesof apparently
no less thanepicogentintellection,
sodesofapparent
perceptual
experience,
may,forall thatis phenomenologically
evidentto thesubject,havean etiologyinconsistent
withtheirbeinggenuinely
intellective/perceptual.
Say thata stateor seriesof statesof consciousnessis phenomenologically
smooth(cf.footnote
15 above)justincase anynormally
andreflecexperienced
tivesubjectwouldfindno causetherein
tosuspectthathe was notperceiving
and
thinking
perfectly
normally.
Dreams,even phenomenologically
smoothones,
excludeperceiving.
Butourfirst
alwaysandnecessarily
responsetothesceptical
foundered
ontherealisation
that-atleastforall thathasbeenshownargument
doesnot,alwaysandnecessarily,
dreaming
excludecogentintellection,
thoughit
do so. However,itnowseemsthatitis merelya workofdefinimaysometimes
tiontorestore
theresponse,at leastin essentials.Say that
x is maundering
at t
justincase x is thenina phenomenologically
smoothstatewhich,likedreaming,
forperception
necessarily
precludesthecausal conditions
but,in addition,likewiseprecludesthecausalconditions
ofcompetent
To stress:I do not
intellection.
knowwhether
andam notclaimingthatanyofouractualdreamsarealso mauninvolvedisruption
oftheatiderings.(Of course,as noted,theynotinfrequently
But it does not seem unlikely.In any case, any
ologyof soundintellection.)
smoothepisodemay,as faras thephenomenology
phenomenologically
is conThe crucialthought,
cerned,be a case of maundering.
now,is thatthereis no
basisforaccepting
via the(PEP), but,
(P1) oftheDreaming
Argument,
supported

Scepticism
theDemon 107
where"Mxt" expressesthatx is maundering

at t,refusing
(P1**) not:Rxt [not:Mxt].
For an absolutelyanalogousline of supportive
argument
is available.If I set
myself
toacquirea warrant
tobelievethatI amnotnowmaundering,
bywhatever
procedure,
theresultcannot,in accordancewiththe(PEP), be betterwarranted
thanthebeliefthatI haveproperly
executedtheprocedure
is independently
warranted;andthatbeliefcannotbe independently
warranted
atall unlessI am indein thinking
pendently
warranted
thatI reallydid executetheprocedure
andwas
not merelymaunderingthroughits apparent execution. So, as in thecase of
dreaming,
itappearsthatI mustalreadyhavethewarrant
whichI havesetmyself
toacquire-onlyifso does executionoftheprocedure
haveanyprobative
force.
Therecan thusbe no routefroma statein whichone has no warrant
forthesupto theacquisitionof a warrant
positionone is notmaundering
forthatbelief;
hence,itseems,thebeliefis unwarrantable,
justas (P1**) says.
Whatabout(P2) and
(P2**) Rxt [IfRxt [Q], thennot:Mxt],
wheretherangeofadmissiblesubstituends
for"Q" is restricted
as in (2*)? May
we affirm
thesame: thattherecan be no basis foraccepting(P2) butrefusing
(P2**)? Surelyso. For maundering
has been defined in such a way thatit
injustthewaythatdreaming
excludescompetent
intellectual
function
excludes
Giventherelevantrestriction
on therangeof "Q", thereis accordperceiving.
withthesituation
injustifying
ingly,in contrast
of(2*), no difficulty
IfRxt [Q], thennot:Mxt
(2**)
ina fashionexactlyanalogousto thatwhereby
(2) was earlierjustified;at which
forrefusing
thejustifying
trainof
point,onceagain,thereseemsnojustification
tox at t,andthereby
thought
generating
(P2**).
So now we can proceedmoreor less as in ?V. (P1**) and (P2**) generatea
scepticalargument,
formallyexactlyanalogousto the DreamingArgument,
whoseconclusion-Not:Rxt [Q]-includes (2**) within
itsrange.Hence(P1**)
and (P2**) cannotbe simultaneously
true.But (P1) and (P1**), and (P2) and
so we haveargued,by,respectively,
(P2**) areestablished,
exactlyparallelsets
of considerations;
so thecase forthepremissesof theDreamingArgument
is
cogentifandonlyifthatfor(P1**) and(P2**) is. Thatwouldseemtoenjointhat
if(PI) and (P2) weresimultaneously
true,so wouldbe (P1**) and (P2**). But,
as just noted,(P1**) and (P2**) cannotbe simultaneously
true.We may be
to concludeas beforethat(P1) and (P2) cannotbe simultaneously
true
tempted
either-thattheDreaming
And
Argument
proceedsfromunsatisfiable
premisses.
of thethirdconstraint
itis onceagainopento us to respondto therequirements
this
conclusion
our
confidence
that
by laying
alongside
(P2) was actuallydemin
onstrated
the
considerations
advanced
its
favour.
We
concludethat
by
thereby
at t to believethatsheis not
(PI) is false:thatitis nottruethatx has no warrant
thendreaming,
andhencethattheimpossibility
of earning a warrant
to believe

108 CrispinWright
showed-does
thatoneis notnowdreaming-ifthatis whatthe(PEP) argument
is everpossessed.
notimplythatno suchwarrant
VIII
objection.OursecondresponseinvolvesthefolButthereis,ofcourse,a further
lowingclaims:
bythecase madeforthem,then(P1**)
(i) If(P1) and(P2) wereestablished
analogouscase which
and(P2**) wouldbe established
bytheprecisely
can be madeforthem.
so couldnotbe so es(ii) But (P1**) and (P2**) arejointlyunsatisfiable,
tablished.
(iii) (P1) and(P2) arealso jointlyunsatisfiable.
Wemaybe satisfied
ofthecorrectness
of(i) and(ii), buthowexactlyis (iii) supposedto follow?Oughtnottheconclusiontobe merelythat(P1) and(P2) were
notestablished
bythecase madeforthem?Thatis notwhat(iii) says.
itseems,tocarrythrough
conclusion,
The troubleis thatwe needthestronger
sceptic.A proofthat(P1) and(P2) are
thecanvassedresponsetothesecond-order
abouttheir
entitles
us,as notedabove,todismissagnosticism
jointlyunsatisfiable
truth;buta proofmerelythat-necessarily-theywerenotestablishedby the
withsuchagnostiadvancedto supportthemis quiteconsistent
considerations
tohaveshownthat(P1) and(P2) cannot
cism.Not,ofcourse,thatitis noprogress
be so supported.
Ourfinding
is thattheconceptofwarranted
belief,
convincingly
be suchthatthe
cannot,on painof contradiction,
iftransmissible
and iterative,
are simultaneously
warranted
on the
premissesof the DreamingArgument
foritsconclusion;
has beenprovided,therefore,
groundsdeployed.No warrant
thereis in anycase no
anditerative,
beliefis nottransmissible
and ifwarranted
againsttheordinary,
warrant
fortheconclusion.Thisis a tellinglineofthought
toimpose:a scepwhichtheDreaming
purports
Argument
scepticism
first-order
theidea thatperception
is
torepudiate
ticismaccordingtowhichthereis warrant
can conButno-onewhois mindful
ofthethirdconstraint
a sourceof warrants.
there.How now,ifithasnotbeenshownthatthepremisses
leavematters
tentedly
arejointlyunsatisfiable,
do we resisttheclaimthat
of theDreamingArgument
to rejectthem-thattheymaybe trueforall we are
thereis at leastno warrant
fortheconclusion
inbelieving-andthatthesamegoes,accordingly,
warranted
too?
we wouldneedas a lemmathat(PI)
theresponse,
In orderdirectly
toreinstate
and(P2) aretrueonlyifestablished
bythecase madeforthem.Itis notoutofthe
we mighttryto arguethatany
questionthatthatmightbe argued.Alternatively,
(P1) and (P2) wouldhave to have analogues
supporting
cogentconsiderations
of(P1**) and(P2**),andthat(P1) and(P2) couldnotbe true
equallysupportive
ButI shallreviewa different,
and
intheabsenceofall supporting
considerations.
I thinkbetter,
rangeofmancuvres.

theDemon 109
Scepticism
Let us write"Axt[P]" as an abbreviation

for"Not:Rxt[not:P]". Correspondingly,let"Axt{A,, . . . AnI " expressthatx has no warrant
at t to denytheconjunctionofA,, . . . A, ""Axt[PI" will accordingly
be readas "Agnosticism
is
warranted
aboutP forx att"-althougha trifle
misleadingly,
sincepossessionof
warrant
to believeP willentail"agnosticism"
aboutitinthissense.22
In theseterms,
thesecond-order
DreamingArgument
proceedsfrom
Axt{(P1), (P2)}
-the claimthatthereis no warrant
to denythat(P1) and (P2) arebothtrue-to
theconclusionthat
Axt [not:Rxt [P]]
-the claimthatthereis no warrant

to denythatthereis no warrant
foranyperceptuallybasedbelief.Andnoticethat,assumingclassicallogicandin thepresence of the originalrules for"Rxt [...]", thereis no difficultyin advancing from
this second-order
scepticalconclusionto the original.For the conclusion,
expandedandharmlessly
is that
re-bracketed,
Not: Rxt [not:not: Rxt [P]].
Andthis,via doublenegation
elimination
andcontraposing
on Iterativity,
entails
Not: Rxt [P].
Thusthesecond-order
is in positionto
sceptic,despitehis weakenedpremisses,
arguefortheverysameconclusionas hisfirst-order
counterpart!
Thatreflection
hardlyseemsto help.(In fact,though,
itdrawson something
whichwe willlaterputto serviceagainstthesceptic.23)
Butthecrucialquestion
nowconcernsthestatusofthematerialconditional
Axt[(P1)] ->Axt [(P1**)].
(I)
In orderto see why,reflect,
to beginwith,thattheearlierdemonstration
of the
of {(P I**), (P2**) I maybe presumed
availabletox att,so thatwe
inconsistency
mayaffirm
(II)
Rxt[not:{ (P1**), (P2**)I].
thatit has
Granted,then,that(P2**) is, as arguedabove,true,and reflecting
"Rxt"in initialposition,we can securebyIterativity
that
Rxt[(P2**)]
(III)
andhencethat
Rxt[not:(P1**)]
(IV)
from(II) and(III) byTransmission.
(IV), ofcourse,yields
Not:Axt[(P1**)],
(V)
andfrom(V) and(I) we mayinfer
Not:Axt[(P1)],
(VI)
acrossentailment,
whence,since"Axt"is transmissible
Not:Axt[(P1), (P2)].
(VII)
22
23
Remember
thatRxt[A]precludesRxt[not:A].
See thetextannotated
27.
byfootnote

110 CrispinWright
But (VII) is preciselythe denial of the second-order

DreamingArgument's
premise.And,bytheprinciples
thatinform
theconstruction
of all thesceptical
fromdreaming
arguments-firstandsecond-order,
andfrommaundering-with
whichwe havebeenconcerned,
(II) and (ILL)areuncontroversial.
So, couldwe
butsecure(I), we wouldhave thebestpossiblerejoinderto thesecond-order
DreamingArgument:
refutation
ofitspremise,
andthereby
decisivepre-emption
oftheretreat
to agnosticism
whichsecond-order
scepticism
exploits.
So, whatcan be said for(I)? Well,underwhatcircumstances
wouldit fail?
Can itbe coherently
envisagedthatAxt[(PI)] andNot:Axt[(P1**)] mighthold
at thesametime?The latter,
fullyexpanded,comesto
Not:notRxt[not:not:Rx/[not:Mxt]],
whencevia DNE
Rxt [Rxt[not:Mxt]]
-the claimthatx has availablea second-order

warrant
at t: a warrant
tobelieve
thatthebeliefthatsheis notthenmaundering
is warrantable.
Butnowtheevident
is tounderstand
howsucha warrant
couldindeedbe availabletoa subdifficulty
ject without
a corresponding
second-order
warrant
beingsimultaneously
available withrespecttothesupposition
thatsheis notdreaming.
Whatcouldexplain
thedifference?
Dreams-at leastthoseon whichscepticism
seekstocapitaliseand maunderings
are alike in beingphenomenologically
smoothstates,distinorintellective
modesofconsciousness
guishedfromgenuinely
perceptual
byaetiof whichthereflective
ologicalconsiderations
subjecton whomthesceptical
aretargeted
can haveno directawareness.How thencan thethought
arguments
I
that am notnowmaundering
in pointof warrantability
of
possiblyfarebetter,
whatever
level,thanthethought
thatI am notnowdreaming-whatfurther
disto (I) couldexploit?
analogyis therewhicha counterexample
Thoseconsiderations
Andanyonewhocongive(I) atleastsomeplausibility.
siders(I) demonstrated
canconcludethediscussionatthispoint.Butperthereby
haps we can further
strengthen
the case. One possible way proceedsvia
consideration
whether
a Thinning
rulefor"R__,
Rxt [Rxt[A]]
Rxt [A],
shouldbe regardedas valid.Of course,"Rxt"is notfactive,so theentailment

in general.ButThinning
fromRxt[A] toA willnotgo through
for"Rxt"seems
tobe no objectiontothecorplausibleenough.Atleast,thereought,presumably,
ofreason,intuitively
ruleforsufficiency
understood.
Fortohavesufresponding
ficient
reasontobelievethatsufficient
reasontobelieveA is availableconstitutes,
reasontobelieveA. Anda warrant
is justa sufsurely,alreadyhavingsufficient
of pedigree.How could
ficiencyof reasonwhichsatisfiescertainconstraints
therebe a problemfortheruleundertheimposition
of thoseadditionalconiftherewas nonebefore?24
straints
24 Thethought
is this.SupposeRxt[Rxt[A]],andwrite"Jxt[A]"for:x hasattsufficient
reason-(thoughperhapsnota warrant)-tobelieveA.SinceRxt[A]entailsJxt[A],we can

and Dreaming.Imploding
Scepticism
theDemon 1]]
Suppose we have Thinning;whatfollows?Preciselythat"Axt"is likewise

andThinning.25
subjecttoIterativity
Butinthatcase,since(P1) and(P1**) each
effectively
has "Axt"in initialposition,theyare respectively
equivalent to Axt
[(P1)] andAxt[(P1**)].The failureof(I) wouldtherefore
requirethepossibility
that(P1) be truewhile(P1**) was false.Andinthatcase,theargument
fromthe
ProperExecutionPrinciple
cannothavebeencogentinbothcases.Perhapsitwas
But thenwhatreasonwillremainto accept(P1) or-what is,
cogentin neither.
thesamethingon thepresentsupposition-itsagnosticisation?26
crucially,
So if
Thinningis valid for"Rxt",any attemptto protectthe DreamingArgument
againsttheimplosivetrainofthought
describedbycontending
that(I) allowsof
mustface theextremely
awkwardtaskof explaininghow the
counterexample
fromtheProperExecutionPrinciplefailsto accomplishfor(P1**)
argument
whatitaccomplishes-according
toscepticism-for
(P1). Wemaydoubtthatthe
taskis feasible.
But I thinkit is possibleto administer
a decisiveblow withoutrelianceon
Thinning,and indeedwithoutattempting
to establish(I). Above we derived
(VII), thedenialofthesecond-order
Dreaming
Argument's
fromtheset
premise,
of (I), (II) and(III). Now (VII) simplifies
via doublenegationelimiconsisting
nationto
Rxt[not:[(P1), (P2)]].
So we mayaffirm
[(I) & (II) & (III)] HRxt[not:[(P1), (P2)]].
for"Axt",
Hence,bytransmission
Axt[(I) & (II) & (III)] F-Axt[Rxt[not:[(P1),(P2)]]].
Buttheconsequent
ofthatmaybe rewritten
as
Not:Rxt[Axt
[(P1), (P2)]],
-the claimn
thatthepremiseforthesecond-order
is unwarDreamingArgument
Andsurely,
rantable.
howevermatters
standwiththearguments
for(I), we areat
leastfullyentitled
toaffirm
Axt[(I) & (II) & (III)]?
obtainJxt[Jxt[A]] fromthesupposition.
Thisstatement
depictsa stateofjustifiedbelief
which,in thecircumstances,
meetsall theconditionson warrant.
But accordingto the
inthetext,thestatedepictedconstitutes
a formofsufficient
thought
reasonforA, so may
be as welldepictedby"Jxt[A]".Whence"Jxt[A]"likewisedepictsa statemeetingall the
conditions
onwarrant.
So thereoughttobe noobjectiontodepicting
thatstateby"Rxt[A]".
25 Proof:
(i) "Axt"thins.SupposeAxt[Axt[B]]; i.e. Not:Rxt[not:not:Rxt[not:B]]. Thenwe
eliminatethedoublenegationandcontrapose
on Iterativity
for"Rxt"to obtain
Not:Rxt[not:B], = Axt[B].
(ii) "Axt"iterates.
We havethatifRxt[not:not:Rxt[not:B]], thenRxt[Rxt[not:B]].
willgivethatifRxt[not:not:Rxt[not:B]], thenRxt[not:B]. So,
So Thinning
if Not: Rxt [not:B], thatis: Axt [B], thenNot: Rxt [not:not:
contraposing,
Rxt[not:B]], thatis,Axt[Axt[B]].
26 Someonemight
wonderwhether
thisquestiondoesn'timplicitly
shiftthegoalposts.
Of whatconcernis itif(P1), orAxt[(P1)], is unjustified-wasnotthegistoftheoriginal
thirdconstraint
thata scepticalargument
can proceedwithout
precisely
justification
ofits
premisses?
Notat all; readon.

112 CrispinWr-ight
I'll cometo thatin a minute.Forsomeonemightin anycase be unpersuaded

of the destructiveness
of Not: Rxt [Axt[(P1), (P2)]]. Does not the contrary
thought
simplyamountto a surreptitious
changeoftherules?Wasn'tthewhole
pointofthethirdconstraint
thatan interesting
does notneed
scepticalargument
to workwithwarr-antedpremisses-thatit is enoughto workwithpremisses
whosenegations
areunwarranted?
Surely,then,itcannotbe germane
toestablish
thepremisses
resultconcerning
anyunwarrantability
utilised;forthescepticmay
to their"agnosticisation"
withoutsignificant
of the
alwaysretreat
compromise
scepticalvalueofhisconclusion.
Butthisis a doubleconfusion.
incontrast
First,second-order
scepticism,
with
thefirst-order
has no wayofeludinganygenuinejustificatory
variety,
obligation
ForAxt[AxtIA,,. . ., A,,I] is,when"Rxt"iterates,
byfurther
agnosticisation.
no
logicallyweakerthanAxtIA1,. . ., A,,j.27 Second,therecertainly
is a genuine
jusYoucannotconstruct
tificatory
obligation.
a par-adoxusingpremisses
whichhave
noclaimwhatever
tocredibility.
A paradoxprecisely
consistsinthecase forcredibilitymade on behalfof an incredibleconclusion.And to say thisis notto
renegueon thethirdconstraint
and theconsiderations
whichsupported
it.It is
to agnosticism
whichitwas arguedthatfirst-order
merelythattheretreat
scepticismmaysafelymake,mustbe a retreat
toa warri-anted
The sceptic
agnosticism.
forcertainof his precan, indeed,in theabsenceof compellingjustification
misses,fallbackon theclaimthatthereis at leastnojustification
fortheirnegations.But thisclaim mustbe justified,of course,if the resultingsceptical
is to haveanyinterest
at all. The agnosticism
mustbe motivated;
argument
any
foolcan deriveunpalatable
consequencesfromwhollyunmotivated
premisses.
So we havearrivedat thefollowingstateof affairs.
First:ifeach of (I), (II),
and(III) is true,thepremiseofthesecond-order
is false.But
Dreaming
Argument
ofthatpremise'sunwarrantability,
second,so I havejustargued,a demonstration
no lessthanoneofitsfalsehood,
putspaidtotheparadox.Andtherewillbe such
ifwe can obtainAxt[(I) & (II) & (III)]. Can we?
a demonstration
thatRxt[(II)] andRxt[(III)] areavailablefrom(II) and(III) by
Well,reflect
andthat(II) and(III) can be regarded
iterativity;
as established.
Butthefollowing is a sound principle:
Rxt [Al],
Rxt [A,,-]; Axt [A,]; A,,A.
}-
Axt[B]8
See footnote
23.
Proof:
(i) Suppose{Al, . . . A, I v- B. Then {Al, . . ., An,-,
not:B I F not:A.
27
28
So
So
So
(ii) Rxt[Al],. . ., Rxt[A,-,],Rxt[not:B] HRxt[not:An]

(iii) Rxt[A1],. . ., Rxt[A I], not:Rxt[not:Aj]f-not:Rxt[not:B].
(iv) Rxt[A1],. . ., Rxt[An-],Axt[An]F Axt[B].

theDenion 113
Scepticism
So, taking A,,.

A,-,I as I(II),(III) ), A, as (I), andB as [(I) & (II) & (III)],
we can secureAxt[(I) & (II) & (III)] justprovidedwe have,not(I) butmerely
its agnosticisation:
(,)A
Axt [Axt[(P1)] --+Axt[(P1**)]].
And so much surelyis vindicatedby the considerations
we have already
reviewed.(,)A saysthatthedenialof(I) is unwarrantable.
Well,getting
a warrant
to deny(I) willinvolveexplaining
howAxt[(P1)], andhence,fornowfamiliar
reasons,(P1) itself,
mightbe truewhileAxt[(P1**)],= not:Rxt[Rxt[not:Mxt]],
might
be false.Evenwithout
theobligation
is therefore
Thinning,
toexplainhow,
whilethethought
is indeedunwarrantable,
thatI am notnowdreaming
warrant
is nevertheless
availableto believein thewarrantability
ofthethought
thatI am
notnowmaundering.
Thatwillinvolvefirst
howthe(PEP) argument
explaining
failedforthecase ofmaundering;29
andthenexplaining
eitherhow,despitethe
verytightapparent
analogy,thecorresponding
doesnotfailinthecase
argument
ofdreaming,
or how,forquitedifferent
to thinkI am notnow
reasons,warrant
is impossible.
Wearenot,nodoubt,inanypositionconclusively
dreaming
torule
outall possibility
of suchan explanatory
package.But we are surelyrationally
entitled
toregardtheprospects
as dim.Andthatis enough(defeasibly)
perfectly
to warrant(,)A.
At theend,then,second-order
scepticismis confounded,
ironically,
by an
instanceof theverykindof move whichis its own stock-in-trade
and which
tomakeitso awkwardto deal with:theretreat,
intheabsenceofproof
promised
ofa neededpremise,
totheclaimthat,forall anyoneis inpositiontoaffirm
tothe
thereis no prospectofsufficient
contrary,
groundsforitsdenial.
Ix
Itremainstoconsiderhowmatters
nowstandinrelation
tothesecondoftheorigin effect,
inalthreeconstraints:
theconstraint,
thatanydissolution
ofa sceptical
paradoxmustbe appropriately
diagnostic.Recall thatour first,unsuccessful
responsetotheDreamingArgument
ofa cogentandpreopenedup theprospect
cise exegesisof one of thecentralthemesof On Certainty:
theidea thatwe are
in acceptingcertainofourmostbasicbeliefs,including,
warranted
foreach subnotas a resultofsomespecificcogject,thebeliefthathe is notnowdreaming,
nitiveaccomplishment
butrather
as a productofa specialplace theyholdin our
The diagnostic
can we but
cognitiveframework.
proposalalliedto thisfinding,
makeit stick,will be thatit is preciselybecausewe failto recognisethispoint
thattheSceptic'skeypremise-thatnoneof us can have any warrant
forthe
beliefthathe is notnowdreaming,
or maundering,
or a brain-in-a-vat,
etc.,-is
We illicitly
convert
theperceivedimpossibility
ofearninga warrant
compelling.
29 Since ifit succeeded,we shouldhaveRxt[(P1**)], whichis inconsistent
withthe
falsity
ofAxt[(P1**)].

114 CrispinWright
forbeliefsofthiskindwiththeirunwarrantability
toutcourt,failingtorecognise
is imposedby theveryapparatusof thescepticalargument
thatthisdistinction
itself.Butis anything
ofthisprospectstillin view?
Indeed.The firstresponsehad it that(P1) was actuallyrefuted.
If thatresult
hadstood,we wouldhaveno optionbuttoallowthatthereis sucha thingas warrantedly
believingthatone is notnowdreaming,
maundering,
etc.But theconclusionof the firstresponsegives way to weakerfindingson eitherof the
responses-via (I) or, as seems to me moresolid,via (I)A- whichwe just
reviewed.If we go via (I), ourresultis thatRxt[not:[(P1), (P2)]], andhencegrantedRxt [(P2)]-that Rxt [not:(P1)]. If we go via (,)A, our resultis that
Not:Rxt[Axt[(P1),(P2)]]whence-granted
againRxt[(P2)]-we obtainthestill
weakerNot:Rxt[(P1)].30Fromeach of theseconclusions,
however,it stillfollows that(P1) was notdemonstrated
bytheplaymadewiththe(PEP). Andthe
fromthe(PEP) wouldaccomplish
thought
maystillconvincethattheargument
itsobjectwerethefurther
correctthatwarrants
forbeliefsoftheilk
assumption
we are concernedwith-I am notnow dreaming,
etc.-had to be earned.The
invitedmoralthusremainsthat,forthisclass of belief,thereis sucha thingas
in whicha fulldiagnosisandfinalresounearned
andthatthedirection
warrant;
stillas earliersuggested-intothe
lutionoftheparadoxshouldgo is,accordingly,
territory
somewhat
lastnotes.
impressionistically
mappedinWittgenstein's
Butwe shouldnotoverstate
It has notbeenshown
ourconstructive
findings.
inthinking
Ithasnotbeenshown
thatI amwarranted
thatI amnotnowdreaming.
in denying
thatI am warranted
thatthereis no warrant
forthinking
thatI am not
nowdreaming.
It has notevenbeenshownthatthereis no warrant
forthinking
thattheclaimthatI am notnowdreaming
is unwarranted.
What,precisely,
has
beenshownis thatinthepresenceofcertain
principles-(I),or(I)A-which may
in theapparatus
thereareelements
ofthesortofsceptical
wellseemcompelling,
withwhichwe havebeenconcerned-specifically,
theclaimthat(P2)
argument
is verifiable
reflection
byrational
(whencethesamegoesfor(P2**)),thepresupavailabletorationalreflection
available
positionthatanything
maybe presumed
to x at t, and the transmissibility
and iterativity
of the epistemicoperator
thescepticalargument
or secondinvolved-which,whether
proceedsat first30 Proof:
(i) SupposeRxt[(P1)].
Thengiven
(ii) Rxt[(P2)],
we get
(iii) Rxt[(P1),(P2)] byTransmission;
andhence
(iv) Rxt[Rxt[(P1),(P2)]] byIterativity.
We have
(v) Rxt[(P1),(P2)]e Axt[(P1),(P2)];
fromwhich,with(iv),
tothecitedresult.
(vi) Rxt[Axt[(P1),(P2)]] followsbyTransmission,
contrary
Notice,bytheway,thattheavailability
ofNot:Rxt[(P1)] from(I)A generalises
andconsolidatesourresponseat thebeginning
of ?VIII to thefirst-order
sceptic:(P1) is unwarin itssupport
rantable
notjustbythesortsofconsideration
offered
buttoutcourt.

theDemon 115
Scepticism
ofjustification
oftheconjunction
ofitspremisses
order,undercut
all possibility
of thatpremisewhichconcernsdreaming
or someother
and,morespecifically,
notionofcognitiveimpairment.
If,as I earlier.suggested,
an effective
argument
fromDreaming,or fromBrain-in-a-Vathood,
etc.,cannotproceedwithoutall
theseelements-ifouranalysisdoes indeedcapturetheessentialimplicitdetail
we mayindeeddrawa largebut
ofthiskindof scepticaltrainof thought-then
negativeconclusion:thatthereis actuallyno methodofsceptically
undermining
ourrightto relyon anyofour cognitive
facultiesusinga fantasy,whateverits
of the
undetectable
Endorsement
exactnature,offirst-personally
impairment.
needsto deploywillbe inconsistent
withthe
apparatuswhichsuchan argument
ofone ofitspremisses-theanalogueof (P1), orofitsagnosticisajustifiability
conclusionaboutthe statusof that
tion.But a positive,Uber Gewissheitlich,
intheapparatus.
premiseconsequently
awaitsvalidation
ofall theotherelements
here.31
ThatprojectliesbeyondthepurelyimplosivebriefI haveundertaken
Department
ofLogic andMetaphysics
University
ofSt.Andrews
St.Andrews
FifeKYJ69AL
Department
ofPhilosophy
University
ofMichigan
AnnArbor,
MI 48109
'USA
CRISPIN WRIGHT
REFERENCES
Dancy, J. 1985: Introduction
to Contemporary
Epistemology.
Oxford:Basil
Blackwell.
in HaldaneandRoss,eds.,
onFirstPhilosophy,
Descartes,R. 1968:Meditations
UniThePhilosophicalWorksofDescartes,Vol. I. Cambridge:Cambridge
Press.
versity
Dretske,F. 1970: "EpistemicOperators".Journalof Philosophy,67, pp.
1007-23.
Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press.
Nozick,R. 1981:PhilosophicalExplanations.
Peacocke,C. 1987: "Understanding
Logical Constants:A Realist'sAccount".
ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy,
63.
31The argument
presented
herebeganto takeshapein myundergraduate
Knowledge
andRealitylecturesgivenin Michiganin theSpringandFall semesters
of 1989.Thanks
to thestudents
Thanksalso to thosewhoattended
whoparticipated.
colloquiaat McGill,
MichiganState,andPenn.StateatwhichI triedoutversionsoftheseideas,andtotheparat USC. In addition,
I am grateful
ticipants
at the1990Discipuliconference
to Paul BoghossianandGideonRosenforinteresting
discussion,
to Bob Hale forhisusualperceptive
and constructive
criticalreactions,
to Jonathan
Dancy,JohnSkorupskiand MarkSainsonan earlierdraft,
andespeciallytoStephenYabloforpointing
buryforhelpfulcomments
outa confusion
inthewayI was atone pointreading"Axt{AI, . . . ",A, andfornoticing
itoutmightactuallystrengthen
theargument.
I didnotintheendunrehowstraightening
servedly
backhissuggestion,
but?VIII hasturned
out,I think,
substantially
thebetter
for
hisobservation.

116 CrispinWright
Pollock,J. 1986:Contemporaty
Theor-ies
ofKnowledge.Totowa,N.J.:Rowman
& Littlefield.
Russell,B. 1912:TheProblemsofPhilosophy.
Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press.
P. 1985:Scepticism
Strawson,
andNaturalism:
SomeVacrieties.
London:Methuen.
Stroud,B. 1984: TheSignificance
ofPhilosophicalScepticism.
Oxford:Oxford
University
Press.
Williams,M. 1991: Unnatur-al
Doubts:Epistemological
Realismand theBasis
ofScepticism.
Oxford:Basil Blackwell,forthcoming.
Wittgenstein,
L. 1969:On Certainty.
Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
Wright,
C. 1985: "Factsand Certainty".
Henriette
HertzPhilosophicalLecture
fortheBritish
Academy,inProceedings
oftheBr-itish
71,pp.429Academy,
472.


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Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon

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notknowthathe is clothedin a dressinggown,andsitting

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would in any way emasculatetheresultingscepticalargument.

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I thinkitis clearthatthisis so. To

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(PI) Not:Rxt [not:Dxt].

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But we can prescindfromthisconcern.For theworstthatcan resultfrom

to (P1). So, from(P1) and(P2)

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sitionofthelatterdidnotafterall dependon theexecutionoftherelevant

whichI havesetmyselfto acquire-onlyif

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Thatcompletesthelayoutoftheparadox.It has rather

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Butthatreplydoes notleaptomind;we senseno

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where"Mxt" expressesthatx is maundering

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Let us write"Axt[P]" as an abbreviation

-the claimthatthereis no warrant

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But (VII) is preciselythe denial of the second-order

-the claimthatx has availablea second-order

shouldbe regardedas valid.Of course,"Rxt"is notfactive,so theentailment

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Suppose we have Thinning;whatfollows?Preciselythat"Axt"is likewise

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I'll cometo thatin a minute.Forsomeonemightin anycase be unpersuaded

Rxt [A,,-]; Axt [A,]; A,,A.

(ii) Rxt[Al],. . ., Rxt[A,-,],Rxt[not:B] HRxt[not:An]

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So, taking A,,.

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