Gatchalian Promotions Talent Pool, Inc. vs.

Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406

Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for disbarment against Atty. Primo L. Naldoza for appealing a decision which is final and executory,
deceitfully obtaining $2,555 from the client allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case, and issuing a spurious receipt to conceal
the illegal act. Respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal and asserted that it was the latter who initiated
the action to delay the execution of POEA decision. He also denied the two other charges. Trial procedures were instituted before the
IBP.
Meanwhile, a criminal case based on the same facts was filed before RTC Makati, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable
doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of $2,555. Having been acquitted in the criminal case, he manifested a Motion for
Dismissal of the IBP case.
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention on the ground that the criminal case for estafa is completely different from
the proceedings before him. Acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC Decision
itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555. He was
suspended by the IBP for one (1) year. Thus, he appealed before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not respondent should be freed of the administrative proceeding since he was acquitted of the criminal charge.
(2) Whether or not respondent is negligent when he appealed the decision of the POEA knowing it to be final and executory.
Held:
(1) Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.
xxx
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the
trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action
before this Court.
(2) Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal
was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that
respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed
for petitioner's failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to
stand on.
xxx
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll
of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.

Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, January 20, 2000. 322 SCRA 529
Facts: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand,
respondent, who is now of age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise
admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings
he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and
receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Issues:
(1) Whether respondent is exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

(2) Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of
at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Held:
(1) NO. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of
law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of membership or association dues.
(2)YES. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid
his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides
that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends
that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be
exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the
US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal
from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of
the law.
ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual membership.
RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by the State, which is a
necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as
one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his
IBP membership fee dues is denied.
VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUT
Gross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer
(Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign papers by placing his revolver on his lap when she refused to do so)
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de Barrera (Mrs. Barrera) in the estate proceedings of her late husband. Laput
presented to her several papers or pleadings for her signature. However, Mrs. Barrera refused to sign the pleadings but requested
Laput to leave them so that she may ask somebody to translate the same for her (she was from Cebu). Laput got angry and drew his
revolver from its holster and placed it on his lap to intimidate the 72-year-old woman into signing the papers. Mrs. Barrera was
compelled to sign them, but is now before the court seeking the disbarment of Laput.
Issue:
W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct
Held:
Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering that they were performed by a man dealing with a 72year-old woman. The offense is compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the BAR, the offender should have set an
example of a man of peace and champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom
the offender had pledged to defend and protect his client. He was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty. Daarol went to her house because he was a
friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She knew Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of ZANECO (electic
cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Masons convention so the
latter said he should ask for the permission of her parents. They consented and so she served as an usherette, Daarol picking her up
and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioners house and invited her for a joy ride, with the permission of her mother (who was
Daarols former classmate). They went to the beach and Daarol proposed his love for Barrientos and told her that if she would accept
him, he would marry her within 6 months from her acceptance. After a few days of courting, she accepted the offer of love. Visitations
continued and they agreed to get married in Dec 1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when they left, he took her for a joy ride to an airport in Sicayab where there
were no houses around. There, he pressured her into having sexual intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and that he would marry
her and that December was very near anyway they would marry soon. She gave in after much hesitation because she loved him. She
cried after the deed.
This event happened frequently thereafter during August to October 1973, where she consented because she loved him.
Eventually, she became pregnant and informed Daarol. He however suggested that she have the baby aborted. She refused. He told
her that she didnt have to worry because they were getting married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and her mother and told them that he could not marry her because he
was already married. He reassured them though that he has been separated from his wife for 16 years and that he would work for the
annulment of his marriage and subsequently marry her. So Barrientos waited and delivered the baby but eventually wasnt able to
contact Daarol anymore (he went MIA).
ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then,
respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a
marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it
turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. He is perverted. He
says that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." Worse, he even suggested abortion.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and
has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam
religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral
delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
is in order.

BERBANO V. BARCELONA
FACTS
Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty-in-fact for their pending casevwith the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (regarding their Ayala lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested
by Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was recommended to Atty.
Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they learned that Atty. Daen had
decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will cause the
release of Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano could only produce P15,700 by asking from
relatives who were with her.

There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona regarding the grease money to be used to allegedly
bribe an SC justice. Berbano made another payment via a pay-to-cash check for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went to the
house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000. Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daens nephew while Berbano
gave him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure Atty. Daens because the check
had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount given to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000.
For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance, Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Barcelona with the IBP. Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer
and to appear before the Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted the Commissioners
findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred
HELD
Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have
proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
Berbanos Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the finding that respondent committed the acts complained of.
The act of Atty. Barcelona in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal
proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioners judgment.
Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01). Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal
processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having
connections with a Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the first time Atty. Barcelona has
been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and Atty.
Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.). Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to
clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given
to such connections (related to Canon 12).
HILDA D. TABAS V. ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty. Mangibin for allegedly having committed forgery. Tabas claims that in
March 2001, a certain Galvan mortgaged to her a piece of real property to secure a P48,000 loan. The deed of the REM was registered
and annotated. On October 2001 however, a certain Castillejos, falsely representing herself as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibin
and asked him to prepare a discharge of the said mortgage and then notarize it afterwards.
Atty. Mangibin prepared the said discharge but he didnt ask Castillejos for any other document other that a Community Tax
Certificate. He later on notarized the said deed. Subsequently, the mortgagor Galvan was able to mortgage the same property again
with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When Tabas learned of the cancellation, she promptly informed Atty. Mangibin that her signature in the
deed was forged. However, he did not help her.
Atty. Mangibin admits of the discharge deed but denies liability for the falsification under a claim of good faith. He says he
did not know of Castillejos fraudulent intent and so, he cannot be faulted. He claims it is beyond the realm of his futy to investigate
the identity of persons appearing before him. And that as a matter of routine, he only requires the CTCs of persons appearing before
him.
IBP recommended to give respondent merely a warning, to be more careful in the preparation of legal documents so that
such situations may me avoided in the future. Bar Confidant however recommended suspension. He was found guilty of gross
negligence.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the Notarial Law and should be suspended from the practice of law.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, suspended for 2 years.
A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined. A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and
deed.
The circumstances in this case indubitably show that respondent did not take even ordinary precautions required in the premises.
Respondents conduct showed serious lack of due care in the performance of his duties as a notary public. Because of his
carelessness, respondent failed to notice the glaring difference in the signature of mortgagee in the deed of real estate mortgage
from her purported signature in the questioned discharge of real estate mortgage. Hence, he breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for the law and legal processes as well as to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
SESBRENO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the petitioner to prosecute their cases. They had
undertaken an an agreement wherein it was stated that Sesbreno will get 30% of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. they may
recover. Atty. Sesbreno registered his charhing/retaining lien on the Agreement.
The camineros he was representing obtained a favorable judgment. RTC ordered that they be reinstate with back salaries,
with privileges and adjustments. The respondent to that case DPWH appealed to the SC where Sesbreno still represented the
camineros. Later on, the Governor of Cebu proposed a compromise settlement of the cases. The parties signed a Compromise
Agreement wherein it is stated that camineros will be paid full back wages. Also states that the camineros are subject to lawyers
charging and retaining liens as registered in the lower court.
Sespreno was not the counsel anymore after finality of judgment adopting the compromise agreement. The camineros
moved for execution however, only 45% of the amount due them was released because the court retained the 55%, holding it was
payment of the lawyers fees pending determination of such amount. However, instead of complying with the court order directing
partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.
Sesbreno now sues for Damages and Attorneys Fees against respondents and his former clients. RTC ruled in favor of
Sesbreno. The court further upheld the petitioners status as a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charging lien. CA
reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of contract.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis
of the judgment rendered by this Court.
Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for attorneys fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where
the latter agreed to pay the former thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they might recover in the
mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have filed. Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their
contract nor was a specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use of the word whatever
shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering
that the parties agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed upon by them in the
compromise agreement approved by the court.
To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of
the court, the law creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and
executions issued pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been retained by the client.
A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer for services in a suit secured to him out of the
judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed to appropriate
the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns
it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater
deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.

Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and considering further that he had settled his case as against
his former clients, SC did not sustain his right to damages for breach of contract. The attendant circumstances, in fact, show that the
camineros acknowledged their liability to the petitioner and they willingly fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human
nature for the petitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving the agreed attorneys fees.
Summary of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
Facts: Two Arizona attorneys opened a legal clinic for low income people. Seeking to increase their volume of business they ran a
newspaper ad. The State Bar tried to discipline them and they claimed the prohibition violated the Sherman Act and the 1st
Amendments free speech clause, as it applied to the state through the 14th Amendment.
Issue: Whether the State Bars ban on attorney advertising violated the attorneys right to free, commercial speech, where the
advertisement only lists specific prices for routine services?
Holding: Yes, the flow of such information may not be restrained, and the present application of the disciplinary rule against attorney
advertising violates the 1st Amendment.
Procedure: Judgement of S. Ct. of AZ is affirmed in part and reversed in part by S.Ct.
Rule : 1st Amendment and 14th Amendment.
Rationale: The Sherman Act does not apply to restraint of trade that is conceived and supervised by a state government. If the
Commercial basis of the atty-client relationship is to be promptly disclosed on ethical grounds, once the client is in the office, it seems
inconsistent to condemn the candid revelation of the same information before he arrives. Habit and tradition are not in themselves
an adequate answer to a constitutional challenge, and therefore the HX foundation has crumbled. The belief that legal services are
so unique that fixed rates cannot be established is refuted by the record, the State Bar sponsors a program where attorneys perform
services like those advertised at standardized rates. The prohibition of advertising serves only to restrict information that flows to
consumers. Advertising is the traditional means for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of
exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served to burden access to legal services. Restraints on advertising are an
ineffective way of determining shoddy work. An atty who is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising.
Most lawyers will behave as they always have: They will abide by their oaths. Advertising by attys may not be subjected to blanket
suppression. Advertising that is false, misleading, illegal, or deceptive is subject to restraint, and there may be reasonable
restrictions on the time, manner, and place of advertising.
MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain advertisements pertaining
to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and
annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent,
while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely
rendering legal support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based on certain US
cases decided.
ISSUE:
W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.
W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a
person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises
them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also

practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And applying the
criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the practice of law.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics
of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are
when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently
been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.

IN RE: TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the last election, he admits that he made use of a card
written in Spanish containing the fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering services as
notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.). He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a
lieutenant of a barrio if his home municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to make known to
the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including his services to handle land registration cases for P3/every
registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is unprofessional. His
acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating circumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly, solicitation of cases result in
the lowering of the confidence of the community and integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in
incenting to strife otherwise peaceful citizens).
Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot , 74 Phil. 579
Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which
reads as follows
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila
Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60

Issue: Whether or not the advertisement is ethical.

Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practice of merchantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)