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Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
involved the production and erection of Concrete backed piers, vertical posts,
tension eye-bars and approach spans; all key structural foundation elements
within the design of a cantilever bridge. In 1905 the scope of the work was
focused towards the superstructure. Construction Work began on the cantilever
span whilst working drawings were being approved by Cooper. This process took
almost 7 months and many calculations of self-weight and maximum load were
based on the initial design proposal where the span was 200ft shorter. These
miscalculations were to have consequential effects on the upcoming building
phase.
Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
facts.(Quote - Cooper). Work still commenced for many hours after Cooper had
made this imperative declaration due to the tight deadlines of completion.
Collapse
At 5:30 on 29th June 1907 the deflected chords on the Quebec Bridge could no
longer hold the increasing self-weight of the bridge. Those on the northern
shore saw the end of the half arch bend down a little and a moment later One
Whole, enormous fabric began to break down. Slowly at first, then with a terrific
crash (Manitoba Free Press 1907) 75 workers were killed that day and 11
injured. In addition to the tremendous loss of life, it is estimated that property
loss through the collapse of the section of the bridge will not be less than
$2,000,000. (Manitoba Free Press, 1907)
Investigation
Three forensic engineers John Kerry, Henry Holgate and John Galbraith formed a
royal commission report as instructed by the Governor General of Canada. They
constructed a 200 page document with over twenty appendices. Their findings
were considered a breakthrough in forensic engineering. During investigation,
deliberations were made into the planning, design and collapse. It was reported
that grave error was made during the calculation phase, the dead load of the
bridge was assumed safe even though it was an approximation which turned out
to be off by almost 18% This erroneous assumption was made by Mr Szlapka
and accepted by Mr Cooper, and tended to hasten the disaster. (Royal
commission report, 1908).The stated critical stresses were also incorrect and
much higher than those calculated by AISC standardised formulas. Poor
management skills were a key finding in the report, communication error led to
work not stopping when instructed and many workers were unfit for their job.
Main Cause
It was ultimately concluded that the critical compression members responsible
for the collapse were chord 9L and 9R (Fig 3) The failure of these chords were
due to their defective design. (Royal commission report, 1908) This was later
confirmed on Nov 1907 when compression tests were performed on 1/3 scale
models of chord 9L and 9R. The structural lattice found within the chords was
meant to increase stiffness but proved to act in contrary. During testing, the
lattice system failed explosively due to shearing of its rivets, immediately
followed by buckling of the chord. (Holgate et al.,1908.) The cantilever and
anchor arms were also designed to be slightly curved; these curved members are
known to increase secondary stresses. As a rule secondary stresses are much
3
Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
more dangerous in tension that in compression members, which seem to have
been the first to give way in the Quebec bridge (ER, 1907e).
Lessons Learnt
Assumptions should never be made in any project; calculations should be
checked and approved by multiple people. If a worker does not agree with a
decision they should make their opinion heard, this proved fatal for the Quebec
Bridge. Projects should never be rushed, an unrealistic deadline puts
unnecessary pressure on workers; errors are likely to be made. Most importantly
workers should be capable of the work they are undertaking too avoid fatalities.
It was clear that on that day the greatest bridge in the world was being built
without there being a single man within reach who by experience, knowledge
and ability was competent to deal with the crisis. (Holgate et al., 1908).
Figures
Month of
Observation
June
June
June
June
June
August
August
Chord
Deflection
mm
1.56.5
1.56.5
1.56.5
1.56.5
19
19
8
Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
August
August
August
8R
5R & 6R
A9L
Bent
13
57
Bibliography
ENR. (1907e). The Quebec Bridge superstructure details, Part VII. Engineering
Record, Building Record Sanitary Engineer, 169-170
Holgate, H., Derry, J., G. G., and Galbraith, J. (1908). Royal Commission Quebec
Bridge Inquiry Rep. Sessional Paper No 154, S.E. Dawson, printer to the
King, Ottawa.
John Kerry, Henry Holgate, John Galbraith. Royal Commission Quebec Bridge
Inquiry. Quebec: S.E. Dawson, 1908.
Petroski, H. (1995). Engineers of dreams: Great bridge builders and the spanning
of America, Knopf, New York.
Unknown (1907). Manitoba Free Press, Winnipeg, Canada, Friday, August 30,
1907, Page 8.
Unknown (1907). Manitoba Free Press, Winnipeg, Canada, Friday, August 30,
1907, Page 1
William D Middleton (2001). The Bridge at Quebec. United States: Indiana
University Press.