MMDA, et al., v.

Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay

Facts:
On January 29, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against
several government agencies to clean, rehabilitate, and protect Manila Bay, and to submit a concrete plan
of action for the purpose to the RTC.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENRs Water Quality Management Chief, that water
samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform
was about 50,000 to 80,000 MPN/ml which is beyond the standard 200 MPN/ml.
The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission of the
government agencies resulting in clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B.
Petitioners appealed to the CA contending that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also
asserted that cleaning the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA sustained the RTCs decision stressing that the petitioners were not required to do task
outside of their basic function under existing law.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus do clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
(2) Whether or not Sec. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is only limited to cleaning up of specific pollution incidents
and not cleanup in general.
Ruling:
Yes, cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one
that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment, an act which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. Sec. 3 (c) of RA 7924 stated that MMDA is mandated to put adequate
and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid waste disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth
not only in PD 1152 and RA 9003 but also in its charter. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal
system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power
or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience. A
discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to
perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposalrelated duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis. Therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be
compelled by mandamus.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in
the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where
its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government
agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water
quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident.
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20
is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude
and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We
note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the
waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that
empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person who causes
pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes
the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the
bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless
polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083

Fact:
A cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and
"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."
The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?
Ruling:
YES, Petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a
balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of
the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORP.

Facts:
PAB issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its
wastewater pollution source installation which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal
leading to the adjacent River after an inspection conducted by the PAB which showed that Solars
untreated wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to a river. The result of
the analysis shows that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of color units, BOD and suspended
solids in violation of Sec. 8 of PD 984 and Sec. 103 of it IRR and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
Solar moved for the reconsideration/appeal of the execution of the Order and for the meantime,
PAB allowed Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the PAB to conduct another inspection and evaluation
of Solars wastewater treatment facilities.
On July 21, 1989, the RTC dismissed Solars petition based on the following grounds:
1. Appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the PAB as well as the writ of execution
was the proper remedy, and
2. the PABs subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered the petition
moot.\
However, the CA ruled that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of the PAB may result in
great and irreparable injury to Solar, and that while the case might be moot, larger issues demanded that
the question of due process be settled.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the Order issued by the PAB were not violative of the requirements of law.
(2) Whether or not a petition for certiorari is proper in the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes, under Sec. 7 (a) of PD 987, the PAB has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater which exceeds the maximum standards set by the NPCC (now by PAB), or
whenever the waste discharged by an establishment pose an immediate threat to life, public health, safety
and welfare or to animal or plant life.
The SC explained that it is not essential that the PAB prove that an immediate threat to life, public
health, safety of welfare, or to animal or plant life exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued, it is enough if the PAB finds that the waste discharge do exceed the allowable standards set by
NPCC (now the PAB). The applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well
not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an
immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life remains necessary.
No, the proper remedy is appeal form the trial court to the CA Solar did in fact did.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by PAB v. MARCOPPER MINING CORP.

Facts:
Marcopper was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system from October
31, 1985 to October 21, 1986, before its expiration, Marcopper filed an application for the renewal thereof
with the NPCC. On September 20, 1986 NPCC directed Marcopper to cease and desist from discharging
mine tailings into Calancan Bay. The directive was brought through the efforts of certain religious groups
which had been protesting Marcoppers tailings sea disposal system. Marcopper requested NPCC to refrain
from implementing the said directive until its adoption of an alternative tailings disposal system.
Thereafter, a new temporary permit dated November 11, 1986 to expire on February 10, 1987 was given
to Marcopper , with the condition that the tailing disposal system shall be transferred to San Antonio Pond
within 2 months.
Pursuant to EO 192, NPCC was abolished and its powers and functions were integrated to the
Environment and Management Bureau and into the Pollution Adjudication Board. On April 11, 1988 the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, in his capacity as chairman of PAB, issued an Order
directing Marcopper to cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan bay. Marcopper
appealed the Order to the Office of the President and issued a restraining order enjoining the cease and
desist order but Marcopper shall pay a cost (ETF) of not less than P 30,000.00 a day for the rehabilitation of
the Calancan Bay. Marcopper complied with the payment until they and filed a motion manifesting that it
would discontinue its contribution/deposits to the ETF since it has stopped dumping tailings in the bay.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the cease and desist order issued by the PAB was in violation of Sec 7 (a) of PD 984 for
being ex parte and without a public hearing.
(2) Whether or not Marcopper is still obliged to remit the amount of P 30,000.00 as ETF after it
discontinued in discharging sewage or industrial waste to the bay.
(3) Whether or not PAB has the power to issue the cease and desist order to Marcopper, a mining company.
Ruling:
No, the PAB can issue the cease and desist order for the said authority was based on its findings of
a prima facie evidence of an imminent threat to life, public health, saefety or welfare, to animal or plant
life or it exceeds the allowable standards set by the PAB. The PAB may issue the order ex parte and without
conducting a public hearing.
The fact that Marcopper was no longer dumping its tail mining into the sea is irrelevant, for the
payment of ETF arises from the Order from the Office of the President and not from the dumping of mining
tail. The court ruled that the ETF is more than sufficient to cover the cost of rehabilitation of the Bay so the
SC ruled that the Marcopper be permitted to stop paying the P 30,000.00 for the rehabilitation of the bay.
Yes, as a general rule the adjudication of pollution cases pertains to the PAB, except in cases where
special law, expressly or impliedly, provides for another forum, under the Mines Regional Director is given
power with respect to mining operations. The SC ruled that there is no conflict between the laws, the panel
of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board are only vested with the power to resolve disputes
involving rights to mining areas, mineral agreement or permits and those involving surface owners,
occupants and claimholders/concessionaires. The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the
MAB clearly exclude adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP v. LLDA

Facts:
URC is engaged in manufacturing animal feeds at its plant, LLDA after conducting a laboratory
analysis of URCs corn oil refinery plant wastewater, found that it failed to comply with the government
standards. LLDA later issued an ex parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why no order should be
issued for the cessation of its operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig River and
why it was operating without a permit from the LLDA. Thereafter, due to a complaint and another analysis
of URCs wastewater, which showed its continued failure to conform to its affluent standards a pollution
case was commenced against URC.
During the hearing of the case, petitioner manifested its plan to upgrade the wastewater treatment
facility of its corn oil refinery plant which was completed only in 2007. On May 9, 2007, a resampling of
petitioners wastewater was conducted which showed that URC finally complied with the government
standards.
After evaluation of the case, LLDA found that URC was found to be discharging pollutive wastewater
in two periods: from March 14, 2000 November 3, 2003 and from March 15, 2006 April 17, 2007 for a
total of 1247 days. Petitioner moved to reconsider that it be ordered to pay only accumulated daily
penalties for on the ground that , first, LLDA erred in adopting a straight computation of the periods of
violation on the flawed assumption that petitioner was operating on a daily basis, without excluding among
others, the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent rehabilitation work and second, in
disregarding the Daily Operation reports and Certifications which petitioner submitted to attest to the
actual number of its operating days.
The LLDA find the arguments of URC as unmeritorious and find it liable and to pay for penalty for a
total of 1274 days.
URC challenged the orders before the CA, attributing that LLDA committed grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding its documentary, and maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy from the enforcement of LLDAs order justified such recourse as an exception to the rule requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial action.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the LLDA committed error in computing the actual date of penalty.
(2) Whether or not URCs recourse to CA is in violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Ruling:
No, the SC respected LLDAs decision in not attaching any evidentiary weight to the Daily Operation
Reports or Certifications. LLDA gave URC 15 days to submit any valid documents to show proof of its nonoperating dates that would be necessary for the possible reduction of the accumulated daily penalties, but
petitioner failed to comply therewith.
Yes, administrative due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute
the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek chance to be
heard before the case against him is decided.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it
is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Hence,
URC having given chance to present evidences in support of its claims, it was notified of the assailed Order
to pay and it was allowed to file a Motion for Reconsideration, the SC ruled that the minimum requirements
of administrative due process have been complied with in this case.