Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
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(1)
If
the
Commission
on
Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
EN BANC
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972,
with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No.
526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine
Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the
adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
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The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to
order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing,
giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing
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Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the
event of integration, Government authority will dominate the
Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar
will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its
affairs.
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EN BANC
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SO ORDERED.[2]
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Mendoza,
Austria-
did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court
the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the
amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from
respondent on several occasions but respondent ignored her.
Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants
son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the
Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint2 for
disbarment against respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached to the
verified complaint was the affidavit3 of Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill,
Brgy. Bata, Bacolod City, after having been sworn to in
accordance with law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C.
Belleza [to] Atty. Alan Macasa when she looked for a
lawyer to help her son in the case that the latter is
facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of November
2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of
them, I am the one who facilitated the payment of Mrs.
DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
Date
Amount
November 11,
2004
P15,000.00
A week after
10,000.00
November 18,
2004
5,000.00
xxx
x x x4
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Respondent Disrespected
Legal Processes
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xxx
xxx
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xxx
xxx
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Failed
to
Return
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While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the
identity of Attorney Grecia's "driver," her swift action in
summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the
stolen pages of the medical chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold
Alabastro into identity of the man was fruitless for he was never
seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney
Castro, not Grecia, who stole the pages from the medical folder
and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible
fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles
and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to
mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge
Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom
afterwards, is not credible for he would have called the attention
of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the man
to ascertain his identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was
properly disregarded by the investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise
wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge
Bernad noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying
on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July 16, 1991,
and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue
barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was
not sharp when he was cross-examined regarding more recent
events. For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent
on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a hearing was held on
that date as shown by the transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried
to make an issue of the absence of a court order to deposit Linda
Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who asked
that the chart be left with the clerk of court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages
72 and 73 of the medical chart for the entries therein are
favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the
entries show that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital
on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to stabilize her
blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the
Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M.
Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical
chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01,
canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as
canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
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failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999
resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so
that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed
within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under
Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,[6] in
which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion
for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests
that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within
15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion
should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the
agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any
error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts
or misappreciation of the evidence.[7]
On the question whether petitioners present petition was
filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c),
although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999,
respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion
for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition
was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally
served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was
received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions
are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to
petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence,
it may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15
days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the
burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that
the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for
filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution
in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of
the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
delay would only be two days.[8] The delay may be overlooked,
considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are
undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for
determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be
allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice.[9] For this reason, laws
dealing with double jeopardy[10] or prescription[11] or with
procedure like verification of pleadings[12] and prejudicial
questions[13] have no application to disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting
appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where the
appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due
course to appeals even though filed six,[14] four,[15] and
three[16] days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.
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SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the
public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the
commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is
that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the
opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies
therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not
be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official.[25] However, if
the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral
delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a
member of the bar for such misconduct.[26]
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question,
respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6,
this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In
addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to
do no falsehood.
BIDIN, J.:
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by
respondent.
Despite complainant's repeated demands however, respondent
persistently refused to pay back the said amount, prompting the
former to seek assistance from the Civil Relations Office of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through an affidavitcomplaint. The Civil Relations Office in turn endorsed the
affidavit-complaint to this Court on April 24, 1978. (Rollo, p. 4).
The complaint alleges that respondent lawyer, by abusing the
trust and confidence of complainant's son, was able to obtain a
loan in the amount of P1,000.00 which he unjustifiably refused
and still refuses to pay despite repeated demands. This act,
complainant alleges, constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer
of the court and is a clear violation of respondent's oath of
office.
In compliance with this Court's resolution dated May, 25, 1979,
respondent filed his comment on the affidavit-complaint alleging
among other things that the complaint was without basis and
malicious in nature. He however, categorically admits having
borrowed money from complainant's son, Luis, Jr. He reasons
out that he was unable to repay the loan because Luis, Jr. failed
to appear at the appointed place of the payment. Respondent
further cites the fact of Luis Jr.'s absence from the country to
justify such act of non-payment.
Complainant, in his reply, challenged the veracity of
respondent's contentions and reiterated his previous allegation
of respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his indebtness
despite repeated demands.
On October 15, 1979, the case was duly referred to the Office of
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 139 of the Rules
of Court and was assigned to the Office of Solicitor Jesus G.
Bersamira. After the investigation conducted by said Solicitor,
wherein respondent failed to appear despite due notice, the
case was deemed submitted for report and recommendation.
Solicitor Bersamira, however, was appointed to the Bench and
no report nor recommendation was made by him. On November
8, 1984 the case was re-assigned to another Solicitor.
On March 12, 1990, the Solicitor General rendered its report, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty.
Prudencio S. Saludares be charged with violation of
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that he be
suspended for 1 year from the practice of law.
Attached is a copy of the complaint for suspension.
(Solicitor General's Report and Recommendation, p. 3)
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society with honor and dignity (Marcelo vs. Javier, 214 SCRA 1
[1992] ).
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably
establish respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer
in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, thereby degrading not only his person but his profession
as well.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
provides that a lawyer must not engage in unlawful, immoral or
deceitful conduct. A member of the Bar must act with integrity,
honesty and professional decorum. He must comport himself in
a manner which will secure and preserve respect and confidence
of the public. Both his professional and personal conduct must
be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. He is required not
only in fact to be possessed of good moral character, but must
also be perceived to be leading a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. His conduct should
be characterized by candor, competence and fairness (Roque vs.
Clemencio, 212 SCRA 618 [1992] ).
It bears stressing that a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. No moral qualification for
bar membership is more important that truthfulness and candor.
(Fellner vs. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729 as
cited in Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 [1992]). To this end
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession
(Lyons vs. Hall [LQ App] 90 so2d 519, 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited in
Marcelo vs. Javier, supra).
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship
between respondent and complainant, it is well-settled that an
attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, showing
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso vs.
Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991] ).
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the conduct of
respondent Saludares in failing to honor his just debt to
complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct.
This dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of
interjecting paltry excuses for his unwarranted refusal to pay a
valid and just debt.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ORDERS the Suspension of
Attorney Prudencio S. Saludares from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months from notice, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with
more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the
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- versus -
x-----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
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by Danilo Gonzales
of Senecio C. Marzan,
Rolando Dela Cruz;
in
notarized
favor
by
6.
Joint Affidavit By Two
Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March 1994,
executed
by
Evelyn
C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena,
subscribed
and
sworn
to
before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
7.
Sworn
Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed
by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn
to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
Deed of Sale[9] dated 17
August
1994,
executed
by
Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
8.
9.
Joint Affidavit by Two
Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June 1994,
executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan,
subscribed
and
sworn
to
before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
10.
Absolute
Deed
of
Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by
Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N.
Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11.
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed
by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12.
Joint Affidavit By Two
Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April 1996,
executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo
L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
13.
Conditional
Deed
of
Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed by
Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma.
A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14.
Memorandum
of
Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by
JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and
AZTEC Construction represented by Mr.
George Cham,
notarized
by
Rolando Dela Cruz.
Absolute
Date
of
June
1993,
executed
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e.
After the annulment of his
second marriage, they have parted ways when
the mother and child went to Australia;
f.
Since then up
respondent remained celibate.[26]
to
now,
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FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the
following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a
college student, and was about 20 years and 7 months
old during the time (July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent, having been born on
December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del
Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time
of the said relationship, having been born on August 6,
1932;
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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995
THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M.
TIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City,
and
the
Spouses
WILFREDO
and
LORENA
AGUIRRE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, J.:
In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required
ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the petitioners, to show
cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for the
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
considering:
. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that
this Court did not read the petition as borne out by the
following statement:
". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this
Honorable Court had read the petition and
the annexes attached thereto and hold that
the same has "failed to sufficiently show that
the respondent Court had committed a grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the
questioned judgment". . .
which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious,
and considering further his use of intemperate
language in the petition, as exemplified by his
characterization of the decision of the respondent
Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool the
winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs'
favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who
dictated it"; or one with "perfidious character,"
although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who
were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal
therefrom; and by his charge that the respondent Judge
was "a bit confused with that confusion which is the
natural product of having been born, nurtured and
brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the
non-propertied class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent
Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not
owned any real property until March 5, 1974 when his
Honor was already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC
Judge; in one scale of the balance, a 311 square
meter lot, 6 houses from the Provincial Road, about 6
kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall of Justice, and, in the
other scale, His Honor's brand-new car, impeccable
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This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath
"to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the
courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under the first canon
of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]),
this Court said:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become
commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid
excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section
20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical
terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal
ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And
more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to
conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the
courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati
vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his
intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he
may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of
it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack court's decision in words calculated
to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are
the temples of right. He should give due allowance to
the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
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SO ORDERED.
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XXX
On 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the motion of
respondent and issued an order[8] for the implementation of the
writ of demolition. The demolition order was actually carried
out the next day, or on 10 January 1997, by the deputy sheriff of
the lower court.[9]
In response to the situation, complainant filed before the
Court of Appeals an action for Indirect Contempt against
respondent, Biyaya Corporation, Judge Amatong, And the
Register of Deeds of Kalookan City.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 February
1997, found respondent and his co-defendants, Judge Amatong
and Biyaya Corporation, guilty of indirect contempt. The
dispositive portion of the resolution states:
WHEREFORE,
in
the
light
of
the
foregoing
disquisitions, defendants-appellees Biyaya Corporation and MTC
Judge Ramonito Amatong, and their counsel, Atty. Alvin
Sarita are hereby adjudged GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT as
they are hereby fined to pay the amount of P30,000.00 each, as
per SC Administrative Circular No. 22-95, amending Section 6,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, with a warning that repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Alvin Sarita is likewise REPRIMANDED for his contemptuous
or improvident act despite receipt of Our Restraining Order,
without prejudice to any further administrative sanction the
injured party may seek in the proper forum.
Describing the unfortunate behavior of respondent, the
Court of Appeals said:
Specifically, the Court is convinced that Atty. Alvin Sarita should
answer for contempt of court for misleading if not deceiving the
defendant-appellee MTC Judge into doing a precipitate act of
implementing the writ of demolition of appellants family house
which is restrained by this Court, or for making false allegations
that led his clients to commit a contemptuous act. (Cu Unjieng
vs. Mitchell, 58 Phil. 476.) His misinterpretation of the resolution
is no defense otherwise, all lawyers can effectively avoid
restraining orders of the higher court by arguing around the
bush.[10]
The Court of Appeals also granted the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
ordered Biyaya Corporation and Judge Amatong to immediately
restore the demolished family house of complainant or, return to
him the estimated value of the same.
Thereafter, complainant filed a case for disbarment against
respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The
commissioner[11] assigned to investigate the case issued an
order[12] dated 3 September 1997, directing respondent to file his
answer or comment to the complaint. The period of time
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FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR.
SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDE JR., J.:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former
clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for
"malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be
discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint."
They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they
specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court
of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to
our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition
[sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious
misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado
Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the
performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us
in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without
informing us the reason why and riding high on the
trust and confidence we repose on him either
abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously
neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in
the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91
Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in
default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us
that everything was in order. That he had already
answered the complaint so that in spite of the
incessant demand for him to give us a copy he
continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later
that he never answered it after all because according to
him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of
Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and
malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong case and
our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only
proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in
the practice of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in
failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing
of a motion for reconsideration, which was
unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the
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VALERIANA U. DALISAY,
Complainant,
Present:
-versus-
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CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 23, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
Page 52
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
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x x x
x x x
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x x x
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by complainant
Virginia Villaflores against respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos,
charging the latter with Gross Negligence and Dereliction of
Duty.
Complainant Virginia Villaflores is the defendant in Civil Case No.
1218-BG entitled, "Spouses Sanchez represented by Judith
Medina vs. Spouses Villaflores," filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33.
Receiving an unfavorable judgment, complainant sought the help
of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) to appeal her case to the
Court of Appeals. The PAO filed for her a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC.
On 1 September 2004, complainant received a copy of a
Notice2 from the Court of Appeals requiring her to file her
appellants brief within 45 days from receipt thereof.
Immediately thereafter, complainant approached respondent,
who had previously handled her sons case, to file on her behalf
the required appellants brief. Since respondent agreed to
handle the appeal, complainant handed to respondent on 8
September 2004 the amount of P10,000.00 as partial payment of
the latters acceptance fee ofP20,000.00, together with the
entire records of the case. The following day, on 9 September
2004, complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance
fee in the amount of P10,000.00. These payments were duly
receipted and acknowledged3 by the respondent.
On 21 September 2004, an Employment Contract4 was executed
between complainant and respondent whereby the former
formally engaged the latters professional services. Upon the
execution of said contract, complainant again paid the
respondent the amount of P2,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses.5
On 14 January 2005, complainant received a copy of a
Resolution6 dated 6 January 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals
dismissing her appeal for failure to file her appellants brief
within the reglementary period. Thus, on 17 January 2005,
complainant went to respondents office but failed to see
respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
A. C. No. 7504
VIRGINIA
VILLAFLORES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEGAL PROFESSION
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respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of
First Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year, the case has
been elevated to this court as provided by law, for full
investigation of the facts involved, and for the rendition of the
appropriate order.
The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine
Bar, residing at Cebu, Cebu. On March 20, 1918, he was
appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. As such
guardian, he came into possession of certain property, including
twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares of the
Philippine Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of
the minor, he borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the
Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter, to guarantee the
loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, deposited with the Cebu branch of the
Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to
the guardianship. On April 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a written
agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National
Bank, pledging, without the authority of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, the shares of stock in question, to guarantee
the payment of the loan above referred to.
These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum
filed in this court on behalf of the respondent, which caused the
judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession.
To quote counsel for the respondent, "the misconduct of which
the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the
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the
the
the
the
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to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but the
injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. The
Illinois court, however, admits that although the general rule is,
that an attorney-at-law will not be disbarred for misconduct not
in his professional capacity, but as an individual, there are cases
forming an exception where his misconduct in his private
capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his
disbarment.
The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith
([1906], 73 Kan., 743). In the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice
Johnston, it was said:
It is next contended that some of the charges against
Smith do not fall within the cause for disbarment
named in the statute. As will be observed, the statute
does not provide that the only cause for which the
license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended
are those specified in it, nor does it undertake to limit
the common-law power of the courts to protect
themselves and the public by excluding those who are
unfit to assist in the administration of the law. It merely
provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient
for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's
license. (Gen. Stat., 1901, sec. 398.) In the early case
ofPeyton's Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that
this statute is not an enabling act, but that the power of
the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of
the profession is inherent; that "it is a necessary
incident to the proper administration of justice; that it
may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases, unless positively
prohibited by statute; and that it may be exercised in
any manner that will give the party to be disbarred a
fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.' If there is
authority in the Legislature to restrict the discretion of
the courts as to what shall constitute causes for
disbarment, or to limit the inherent power which they
have exercised from time immemorial, it should not be
deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly
expressed. It is generally held that the enumeration of
the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be
taken as a limitation on the general power of the court,
but that attorneys may be removed for common-law
causes when the exercise of the privileges and
functions of their high office is inimical to the due
administration of justice . . . .
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists
between attorney and client, as well as between court
and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the
qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an
attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If
that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it
would seem to be equally essential during the
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PRISCILLA
Z.
vs.
ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
LEGAL PROFESSION
ORBE, complainant,
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