Pp vs.

Bacor
Facts:
Julian Albores was resting at the living room of his house at Barangay Seor, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental.
His companions in the house were his son Dionisio and the latters common-law wife Delia, who were then
eating in the kitchen. Suddenly, Julian heard a gunfire followed by Delias exclamation that Dionisio had fallen
down on the floor. Consequently, Julian rushed to the kitchen and found Dionisio lying face down on the
kitchen floor made of bamboo slats. Julian shouted for his neighbors help but no one helped him. Immediately,
thereafter, Julian brought his wounded son to the hospital for treatment but just a few minutes after arrival there,
his son died.
On June 6, 1991, appellant approached Jesus Bernido, Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Sinacaban Police
Station and told the latter that he was the one responsible for the killing of Dionisio Albores. In view thereof,
Bernido asked appellant what prompted him to surrender and appellant told him that it was due to his guilty
conscience. Consequently, Bernido, accompanied by police escorts brought appellant to the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) in Oroquieta City. SPO3 Ydulzura informed PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot that appellant wanted to
make a confession of a crime he had committed.
Thereafter, in her presence, appellant was asked by the policemen if he had a lawyer and appellant replied that he
had none. Appellant was also asked if he wanted to avail of the services of the PAO and he answered in the
affirmative. She then inquired if appellant was not intimidated, coerced or forced and whether appellant was
promised any reward. She also informed appellant that he had the right to remain silent and not to answer
questions which may incriminate him and that any statement he will make may be used against him in the future.
After being informed of such facts, appellant still declared that he was going to confess because he had
committed a crime.
During the taking of appellants confession, in the presence and with the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot, SPO3
Ydulzura likewise reminded appellant in the Visayan dialect, which he knew and spoke, that he had the right to
remain silent and the right against self-incrimination and to secure the services of a lawyer of his own choice to
assist him in the taking of his confession. Despite such reminder, appellant still agreed and accepted the
appointment of PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot as his lawyer to assist him during the taking of his affidavit of
confession. In his affidavit, appellant acknowledged and admitted that he was the one who shot Dionisio
Albores. He declared therein that he shot Dionisio Albores because the latter threatened to kill him and because
he knew that Dionisio was an ex-convict.
SPO3 Ydulzura read the contents of appellants affidavit to him, in the presence and with the assistance of PAO
Atty. Anggot. Appellant signed his name on the affidavit and subscribed and swore to the veracity of his
affidavit. Before signing the affidavit, Atty. Lumasag read to appellant the contents thereof and informed him of
his constitutional rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination and to counsel of his own choice.
Subsequently, appellant was asked if the statements in the affidavit are true and correct and he declared that the
statements therein are true and correct and that he was willing to sign the affidavit on his own free will.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant validly waived his right to remain silent and, therefore, whether his confession
is admissible in evidence against him.
Held: Yes. Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
Decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a

competent and independent counsel preferably of the confessants choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must
be in writing. The Court finds that accused-appellants confession satisfies the said requirements.
First. Accused-appellants confession, as quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals, leaves no doubt as to its
voluntariness and spontaneity. Accused-appellant does not deny that he surrendered to the police on June 6,
1991, almost three months after the fatal shooting of Dionesio Albores, and confessed to the crime because he
could no longer bear a guilty conscience. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that the signature
on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn confession was his without any claim that he was forced, coerced, or threatened
to make the confession.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that he gave the confession without being warned of his constitutional rights.
This is not true. The record shows that he was advised of his rights, particularly the right to remain silent, not
only once but thrice: first, by his counsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public Attorneys Office (PAO); second, by
SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator who took accused-appellants confession; and lastly, by the branch
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, before whom
accused-appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each time, he was asked whether he was willing to
give a statement and he said he was. This is sufficient. Contrary to accused-appellants contention, there is no
need for a separate and express written waiver of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant was not arrested.
He presented himself to the authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he was being bothered by his
conscience. By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and with the
assistance of counsel and after having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively
waived his right to remain silent.
Accused-appellant, when asked, said he wanted to have the assistance of counsel. Atty. Anggot of PAO was
appointed counsel de officio to assist accused-appellant and the latter expressly accepted her appointment as his
counsel before giving his confession. The assistance of a PAO lawyer in the present case satisfies the
constitutional requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused.
Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntarily and validly made unless the contrary is
proven and that the burden of proof is upon the party who claims the contrary. In this case, this presumption has
not been overcome.
People vs. Pablito Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997
Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The offense was
committed on February 19,1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2 nd year
student at the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in
Valenzuela. While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of
his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant relative. She
did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen,brought her to the
kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their
backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she
moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to
the lot and abandoned her. At 11amher body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic
injuries."
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to
form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house was searched
but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house.
They took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but

implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were likewise brought
there by the police. The following day a physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant
has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.
By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and
whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke
down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The
mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. Since no
lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the
police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for
forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against
them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read
almost everyday. After his confession,appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His
confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date he was at
his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm,
and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he
was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. The
trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty of the crime charged in the
Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the constitution, and is therefore
inadmissible as evidence against him.
Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and
may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation
by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant
talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did
not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and
are admissible in evidence.
The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex crime of rape
with homicide.

Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999
Facts:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief,
ProjectoTumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among
those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed
Matters Section, and RedentorAguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan
sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage
in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents toLegaspi Village following a report
that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents
composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car.At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep,
driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan
alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag
to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred
the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing
Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time
to see Pasicolanhanding over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela
arrested the two accused. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various denominations of 20, 50, and 100 dollars. Vela and
the other NBI agents stated in their affidavits that there were dollar bills in the letters which, if converted to
Philippine pesos, at the then exchange rate of P22 to US $1, were worth P11,000.00. 15 the addressees agreed to
leave the envelopes of the letters with the NBI. Those letters which was not claimed were opened in court in the
presence of the counsel for the defense. The letters were found to contain three (3) one dollar bills, one (1) five
dollar bill, one (1) twenty dollar bill, a check for twenty-five dollars, and fifty (50) Saudi Arabian riyals.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. Romero, Marcelo, andPasicolan
were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of
the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time.
According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same
letters confiscated from them.
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were declared guilty.
The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbavan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because
he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. The purpose for securing the signature of petitioner
on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero.It is
known that during custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any
admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to
sign the letters, thelettersare still admissible as evidence because the letters were validly seized from petitioner
and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest.
A ruling that petitioner's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on
February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of the crime validly seized during a lawful arrest.
That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them
was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted
solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI
agents and other prosecution witnesses. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO

FACTS:
In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house of CesarioAlcantara allegedly robbed and raped
hisdaughterMarites. The group took cash in the amount of P1,400.00, three wristwatches, one can of coffee, and
one chicken.
On December 9, 1987, both accused appellants Janson and Pinantao pleaded not guilty.
Appellant JOEL JANSON, denied the accusation against him and claimed that he was not assisted by counsel
during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he did not know how to read or write, and that he was made
to execute a sworn statement before a certain policeman named Ulep. Only after the investigation did Atty.
Zerrudo sign the document. On cross-examination, he said that he was put in jail for another crime, robbery.
Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against him, saying that he did not know Marites and
CesarioAlcantara. He claimed that he was arrested in March 1987 because he was implicated by appellant
Janson as one of the perpetrators of the crime, per instruction of one Cristina Agio.
On September 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment and found accused Ricky Pinantao alias
Ogco and Joel Janson guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues:
(1) Whether the guilt of appellants Janson and Pinantao proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Whether the extrajudicial confession of Janson is admissible as evidence for the prosecution? and
(3) Whether said confession be used against co-accused Pinantao.
Ruling: NO. Appellants should be acquitted.
The trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which if
considered would materially affect the result of the conviction.
The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, admitted in open court that the sworn statement of appellant
Joel Janson was taken without the presence of counsel and that this statement together with the waiver of his
right to counsel, was already prepared when it was presented to Atty. Zerrudo for signing.
Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson cannot be admitted in evidence. The
manner by which it was obtained violated accuseds constitutional right to counsel.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information
is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of
extracting confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead the accused to admit something false.
What is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation
for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. These
constitutional guarantees have been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if
not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel, and it must be in writing. Indeed, any waiver
of the right to counsel without the assistance of counsel has no evidentiary value.
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently.
Appellant Joel Janson was illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the time of the offense. As held in the
case of People v. Bonola, where the accused was unschooled and only nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is
difficult to believe that considering the circumstances, the accused made an intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel. In such instances, the need for counsel is more pronounced.
It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already had a prepared statement when they went to
the lawyer who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel.
Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used against Ricky Pinantao. An
extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized unless repeated in open court or
when there is an opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements.

It is considered hearsay as against said co-accused under the res inter aliosacta rule, which ordains that the rights
of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of
Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by
the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of
an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez.
Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion
praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court,
Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted
the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order
for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the
court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court ofManila is directed to conduct
the extradition proceedings before it.
i. YES.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is
not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial

for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar
facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement
with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents
were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his
claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay
the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed
to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be
within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, respondent.

FACTS:
An information was filed charging Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section 5,
paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, allegedly committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the
use of laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant "AAA,"a minor, 13
years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and
thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.
After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision against Fitzgerald.
Meanwhile, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the ReExamination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail.
On August 31, 2001, the CA granted Fitzgerald's bail application.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on

September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set aside.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact that the
latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong.It also
questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case had been remanded to the
RTC for new trial, In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated
the previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt;and justifies his provisional release on
humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating health.
ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail

HELD:

With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether the CA erred when
it allowed respondent to bail.
The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of
the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon
filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specified condition. n sum,
the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege
subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule
114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the existence of any of the
circumstances enumerated therein such as those indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk
that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based, "xxx not on the
grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is already of old age and is
not in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding that "xxx as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong
xxx."The Resolution disregarded substantive and procedural requirements on bail.
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by respondent; it
is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for
bail.It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.There may also
be an existing proposition for the "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent
suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when the only
evidence on record as to the latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August
30, 2000, respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx."That medical
recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November 13, 2000 Resolution, it held that the
physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison.
Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. In its
August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate an undue risk that he would
commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.
The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution. Such finding,
therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's bail application. The CA,
therefore, erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail.
Rodriguez vs Presiding Judge
483 Scra 290 (2006)

FACTS: After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez, they applied
for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for
each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail which was denied. The US government
filed a petition for certiorari entitled Govt of the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court
to resolve the matter of bail guided by this courts ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The
lower court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their
bail which was denied. Hence, this special civilaction for certiorari and prohibition directed against the order for
cancellation of cash bond and issuance of a warrant of arrest. ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice
and hearing before the cancellation of bail HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED IN PART. SET ASIDE for
petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already
presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already
exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, copetitioner is entitled to provisional release. Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has
offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that
her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the
passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there
is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her 60s, sickly and under medical
treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their
grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard
why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued. Absent prior notice and hearing, the bails cancellation
was in violation of her right to due process. We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only
upon a clear and convincing showing that: 1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and 2)
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia,
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extradite in an extradition1 proceeding.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed
an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice
The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz
Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense
of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further
hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent
judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the
instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the

potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing
PP VS SANDIGANBAYAN, VALERO VS CA
TRILLANES VS. PIMENTEL
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Facts:
July 27, 2003- more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later that day, Former President GMA issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring
a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
June 30, 2007 - petitioner, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the Senate
June 22, 2007 - petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of
Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests
were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or
the media
(e) To be allowed to receive reporters and other members of the media
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related
activities
July 25, 2007 - the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.
- September 18, 2007 - trial court just the same denied the motion, citing the Jalosjos case
Trillanes petitioned for certiorari on the following grounds
- The jurisprudence cited by the honorable court is inapplicable
a. The accused in the Jalosjos case was already convicted. He was not, therefore he still enjoys
the presumption of innocence
b. Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude. He was charged with "coup
d'etat," a political offense
c. Jalosjos attempted to flee. He did not.
- The recommendation to allow the petitioner to attend the senate sessions was not overruled
- His election by the people as senator provides the proper justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate
- There are enough precedents to allow liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail
a. Joseph Estrada
b. Nur Misuari
Issue: Whether or not the contentions of Trillanes are tenable
Ruling: No. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided bylaw. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of
a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.
ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL vs JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE
Facts:
An information for murder was filed and raffled in the sala of Judge Infante. Said information contained a
recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.
Based on the said information, without the accused filing a petition for bail and without hearing, Judge Infante
issued twin orders, one granting bail to the accused and another releasing the accused from custody.
Atty. Gacal, private prosecutor, upon learning the orders, made a very urgent motion to cancel the bailbond and
to enforce or re-issue a new warrant of arrest but the same was denied by Judge Infante on the ground that it was
a pro forma, without conformity coming from the public prosecutor, and that he was not authorized to act as such
under Section of 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. He further directed that the bail issue be held in abeyance
awaiting the comment of the public prosecutor.
The public prosecutor, in his comment, stated that the bail and the releasing of the accused was proper based on
his recommendation and that such recommendation was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutors right to bail
hearing.
Atty. Gacal then filed an administrative complaint against Judge Infante, that the granting of bail without a
petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of
the law and the rules.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
Held:
Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines on the matter of bail: (1) in case no
application for bail is filed, bail hearing was not dispensable; and (2) public prosecutors failure to oppose
application for bail or to adduce evidence did not dispense with hearing.
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His role in the
administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the
Judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was
inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its

requirement. He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter
of judicial discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be
held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the
accused. His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the
accused. Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
COMENDADOR vs. DE VILLA
200 SCRA 80; 2 AUG 1991

G.R. No. 93177, No. 95020, No. 96948, No. 97454

Facts:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same
incident.
The petitioners, who are officers of the AFP, were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged
participation the failed coup d' etat on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71. The charges against them are violation of AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman), and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the RPC (Murder).
Before the charges were referred to General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel had been constituted to
investigate the petitioners. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and
medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10
days within which to file their objections in writing. This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal. The PTI Panel denied the
motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial of the motion, alleging denial of due process. They also allege that the
initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits.
One of the petitioners applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted
the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame
without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
WON there was a denial of due process.
WON there was a violation of the accuseds right to bail. **
Held:
NO denial of due process.
Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February
12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their
counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing.
They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver
of their right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
No. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist.
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
National security considerations should also impress that release on bail of petitioners constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a
scenario of say 1,000 accused soldiers roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail. They could freely resume their heinous activity
which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, and replace the same with a system consonant with their
own concept of government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated, and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot
say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

ASWAT vs. GALIDO

G.R. No. 88555 November 21, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Aswat and Felix Nebres were both enlisted men of the AFP respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and
Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido's Baguio
resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of Galido's wife. On December 29, 1988, Aswat was involved in a
shooting incident at Baguio City, which resulted in the death of Nebres.
Records disclose that Aswat voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities and was briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City
Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on December 31, 1988. Aswat has been detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters
in Lucena City since then.
On April 20, 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War
(AW). the specification being homicide.
While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant petition, contending: (1) that the specification of homicide
with which he was charged was committed outside a military installation and hence the offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian
court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. III of the Constitution; and (3) that he
should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside from the allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of
commencement of his detention.
Petitioner seeks to make a distinction between offenses committed outside and those committed inside a military installation or
reservation. He assails the jurisdiction of the SOLCOM-GCM, alleging that the specification of homicide was committed in Baguio City
and in an area outside any military installation or reservation.
Issues:
WON Aswat shall be tried in a regular, civilian court;
WON he is entitled to be released on a bail as a matter of right pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. III of the Constitution.
Held:
NO. The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument was obliterated sometime ago.
Article 94 of the AW, in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a Philippine military reservation as falling within the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948, however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article 94:
Art 94. Various Crimes. Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal
ordinances which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under
municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when the
offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct xxx
There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to military law at the time the latter was shot and killed.
Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOM-GCM, he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of
the General Court-Martial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such jurisdiction.
NO. Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled in Comendador vs. De Villa that the guarantee is not
without any exception. It has been held that the right to has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt
military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Under Article 70, A.W., "any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these article shall be
placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require." Confinement is one way of ensuring presence during sessions of the
General Court-Martial; the more important reason underlying the authority to impose confinement is the need to enable the proper
military authority to instill discipline with the command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By confining the petitioner, petitioner's
unmilitary conduct may be curtailed from spreading within the ranks of the command. The necessity for such confinement is a matter
properly left to the sound discretion of petitioner's superior officers.

VILLASEOR VS. HON. ABAO, ET AL SANCHEZ,

FACTS
-Petitioner, a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary, of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of
a family of five, was charged with themurder of a Boac police sergeant. He was admitted to a P60k bail which
was reduced to P40k. The petitioner on May 29 posted a property bond and wasset at provisional liberty.

However, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended theinformation, now accusing the petitioner with DirectAssault
Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority withMurder" before the arraignment on the murdercharge. So on August
7, respondent judge cancelledthe petitioners bond and ordered his immediatearrest.-On September 9 upon
petitioners motion toreconsider, the respondent judge resolved to admitpetitioner to bail provided he puts up a
cash bond of P60k.
On September 15, on petitioners motion thatoriginal bond previously given be reinstated,respondent judge
resolved to fix "the bond anew inreal property in the amount of P60,000, but to beposted only by residents of the
province of Marinduque actually staying, therein" with propertieswhich "must be in the possession and
ownership of said residents for five years."-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for preliminary junction to
SC, seeking to set aside respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9 and 15, andto reinstate the bail bond
approved on May 29(original bond), charging the respondent judge of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his
jurisdictionand w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/ violation of the Consti and the ROC in issuing the disputed
orders-Oct 3: the Court issued a writ of preliminaryinjunction upon a P1k bond.-Nov 5: SC allowed continuation
of the proceedings of the criminal case to avoid delay in its prosecution.
ISSUE
Whether or notthe P60K bond fixed by respondent judgetransgress the constitutional injunction that excessive
bail shall not be required?
RULING:
NO, the principal factor considered, to thedetermination of which most other factors aredirected, is the
probability of the appearance of theaccused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.
Reasoning
Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of theaccused to give bail; (2)) nature of the offense; (3)penalty for the
offense charged; (4) character andreputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused;(6) character and strength
of the evidence; (7)probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8)forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the
accusedwas a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
inother cases.Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definitionof bail):
"the security required and given for therelease of a person who is in the custody of the law,that he will appear
before any court in which hisappearance may be required as stipulated in the bailbond or recognizance."-Circular
47 of the Department of Justice, reiteratedin Circular 48, directed prosecuting attorneys torecommend bail at the
rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium periodof the penalty prescribed for the
offense charged,unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty. Here,petitioner is charged with a capital offense,
directassault upon an agent of a person in authority withmurder. A complex crime, it may call for theimposition
of capital punishment.
De la Camara vs. Enage
Facts:
Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged
participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co. 18
days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed cases of multiple frustrated murder and for multiple murder
against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. On January 14, 1969 an application for bail was filed by
petitioner which was granted and the amount was fixed at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of the bailbond is excessive
HELD:
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So
the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing
can be clearer, therefore, than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional
provision under the circumstances.
YAP JR VS CA
FACTS:

Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was
convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess
of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.
Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to
travel?
Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances
of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of
flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the
court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the
case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

Manotoc vs. CA
FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the
Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition
with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However,
pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear
him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6
of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP
respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US
relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also
denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC
communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him
bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional
right to travel.
ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.
HELD: NO. The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his

constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well
as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He
never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.
SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ, SILVERIO VS CA
PP VS DONATO, LARDIZABAL VS REYES
Waiver of the Right to Bail
People Versus Sergio and Ramil Manes
G.R. No.122737 February 17, 1999
Facts: The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize
their purpose armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shut Nicanor
Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with which they were then provided, inflicting upon the said
Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death
immediately thereafter.
The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused.The trial court issued a warrant
of arrest against the accused. the accused filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the prosecution.
The trial court, however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at any
stage of the trial and the trial court rendered judgment and convicted both the accuse guilty of the crime.
In the appeal, accused questioned the trial court's failure (a) to hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider defense
of relative in favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of Tamorite's
unlawful aggression.The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of murder.
Issue: Whether or not both the accused should be granted the right to bail?
Ruling: No, both the accused should not be granted the right to bail.
Under the law, in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence
of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and
have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly.
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed.
However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only
in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court at the earliest
opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail.
What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. When an accused is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death,
and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/feb1999/gr_122737_1999.html

Due Process in Criminal

Alonte Versus Savellano
G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998
Facts: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was
alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the mayor
of Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian.
The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change
of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and
the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte.The case was raffled to the Manila RTC
under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being
due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for
decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived
his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the
details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
Issue: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
Ruling: NO. Alonte was not being denied of criminal due process.
Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective
counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn
Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness
and truth of her two affidavits one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her
desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confront
and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may be waived." (emphasis supplied) it should be pointed
out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated.
The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder of
the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not
affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in
our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to
the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be
misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court
likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be
subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.

The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between
him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it
not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a
waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not
shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the
lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/mar1998/gr_131652_1998.html
VIII - Rights During Trial
Due Process in Criminal Cases
People V. Macarang
FACTS:
Two separate informations were filed charging appellant, Ariel Macarang, with the crime of qualified rape of his
own daughter; one when she was 12, the other when she was 13. He was sentenced to suffer the ultimate penalty
of death in each of the criminal cases.
Ariel filed an appeal against the fact that the trial court had considered appellant to have waived his right to
present his evidence without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the consequences of such waiver.
The trial court, apparently irked by the numerous postponements of the cases, issued a warning that if in the next
scheduled hearing, he would not still be ready to present evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right
to do so. Despite warning, accused was still not able to present evidence, therefore he was declared as deemed
to have waived his right.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant was deprived of his right to due process in such criminal case.
HELD: YES. In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, the presiding judge is called upon to
see to it that the accused is made aware of the consequences of not heeding the warning given by the trial
court. It must be noted that the waiver of the right to present defense evidence in the present cases was not even
voluntary nor upon the instance of the appellant but imposed by the trial court, apparently to penalize appellant,
after he and his counsel repeatedly moved for the postponements of the scheduled hearings.
As stated by the trial court, appellant manifested in open court that he was still not ready to do so, that is, that
he was not ready to present his evidence. Appellant never said that he did not wish to present evidence. It
should have been clear to the trial court that appellant never intended to waive his right to present his
evidence. Thus, a simple forewarning to the appellant that the next time that he would not be ready with his
defense evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right to present it, did not satisfy appellants
constitutional right to due process. The trial court should have first apprised appellant or explained to him in
clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. The trial court should have satisfied itself that
appellant understood the real import of the courts action if it would consider him as having waived his right to
present his evidence if he would not be ready to do so the next time the case would be called for trial.
Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant to have waived his right to present evidence, the trial court
granted the motion of appellants counsel to withdraw his appearance. Appellant, therefore, had no more
counsel. The trial court did not ask him if he would wish to solicit the services of another counsel de parte or
want the court to designate a de oficio counsel for him. Consequently, appellants inaction should not be taken
against him. It did not justify the trial court to render judgment against him without first ensuring that appellant
was aware of the consequences of the waiver of his right to present his evidence, and without exerting any effort
to ask him if he would like to be represented by another lawyer of his own choice or through the assistance of
the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) or through a counsel de oficio appointed by the court.

Dimarucut V. People
FACTS:
The accused was charged with Frustrated Murder in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan for allegedly hitting a certain
Angelito Rosini on his head with an iron pipe. After trial, he was charged of the lesser penalty of frustrated
homicide.
While still at the trial stage, petitioners motion to admit and demurrer to evidence was denied as it was not
seasonably filed (petitioner was granted fifteen (15) days from August 8, 2001 within which to file demurrer to
evidence but filed his motion to dismiss only on September 4, 2001), in accordance with Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.[16] Before the CA, petitioner and his counsel filed no less
than four (4) motions for extension to file brief, his counsel admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the
appellants brief due to personal problems emanating from his [counsels] wifes recent surgical operation. but
which was never filed nor attached. The last extension given expired on June 6, 2007, without any brief
submitted by petitioner or his counsel.
He filed the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008, asking for another 30 days to file the appeal brief, reiterating that
his failure to file was due to the fault of his lawyer who is suffering from personal problems and depression. He
also cited his advanced age of almost 76 and medical condition (hypertension with cardiovascular disease and
pulmonary emphysema.) But even as he did, still no appellants brief was attached by petitioner. This was
denied; thus, the appeal.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process of law given that he was not served with a notice requiring him
to show cause?
HELD: No. Under Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal
case may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief
within the prescribed time. The phrase with notice to the appellant means that a notice must first be furnished
the appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. [13]
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice requiring him to show cause
why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellants brief. The purpose of such a notice is to
give an appellant the opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed because of
such failure, in order that the appellate court may determine whether or not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory.
Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA
in considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4)
extensions granted to him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of appeal by the appellate court sans notice to
the accused for failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave abuse. Thus, although it does not
appear that the appellate court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant
has filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the appeal, in which he stated the
reasons why he failed to file his brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion after considering said
reasons, the dismissal was held proper. Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but the
appellant took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude of
indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to
prosecute his appeal.
Here, the Court notes the repeated non-observance by petitioner and his counsel of the reglementary periods for
filing motions and perfecting appeal. Having been afforded the opportunity to seek reconsideration and setting
aside of the motu proprio dismissal by the CA of his appeal for non-filing of the appeal brief, and with his
subsequent inaction to have his appeal reinstated after the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
cannot impute error or grave abuse on the CA in upholding the finality of its dismissal order. Non-compliance
with the requirement of notice or show cause order before the motu proprio dismissal under Section 8, paragraph

1 of Rule 124 had thereby been cured.[17] Under the circumstances, the petitioner was properly declared to have
abandoned his appeal for failing to diligently prosecute the same.
Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary
period. Thus, we explained in Redea v. Court of Appeals:[21]
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will suffer deprivation of property without
due process of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his
former counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he was allegedly placed under the
impression that the counsel had prepared and filed his appellants brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA
and remand the main case to the court of origin for new trial.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence and allowed a
litigant another chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients
liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. None of these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients
cause must be shown. Here, petitioners counsel failed to file the appellants brief. While this omission can
plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the
proceeding below. (Emphasis supplied.)
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with
the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.[22]
EUGENIO V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Lolita Eugenio is a commissioned agent of respondent Alfredo Mangali in his check re-discounting
and lending business. Eugenio persuaded Mangali to extend separate loans to Saquitan and Ty (the borrowers).
Two parcels of land, covered by TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, were offered as securities for the loans.
With regards to TCT No. 171602, its validity was confirmed with the Register of Deeds of Manila. With this
assurance, Respondent Mangali extended loans with a condition that the borrowers shall execute Deed of Sale.
The loans lapsed and remained unpaid. Respondent Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds the status of
TCT Nos. 171602 and 92585. He found out that TCT No. 171602 had been cancelled in 1995 while TCT No.
92585 is not registered with the Register of Deeds. Mangali sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and an entrapment operation was conducted. A Complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Documents was filed against Eugenio. The RTC convicted Eugenio of one count of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
filing of this petition.
Petitioner denied taking part in any conspiracy to swindle Mangali. Petitioner claimed that since 1993, Mangali
had sought her services to run errands for him in the titling of lots and follow-up of a Social Security System
claim. Afterwards, Mangali recruited her as his commissioned agent in Mangalis check re-discounting and
lending businesses. Thus, even before 14 November 1995, petitioner had brokered check rediscounting and loan
deals with Mangali.
Petitioner Eugenio avers that the prosecution failed to prove that there was conspiracy between her and the
borrowers to defraud Mangali. She further avers that the entrapment operation was illegal due to some
irregularities which attended her arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether the inference for Petitioners innocence must prevail
HELD:
YES. While it is true that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the
concerted acts of the accused, this does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself,
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
conspiracy suffices to negate the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.

In determining petitioners participation in the events leading to her arrest, the following unrefuted facts must be
considered: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission basis, in the latters check re-discounting and
lending businesses and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602.
As Mangalis agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn
commissions. This also explains why she was present in all the ocassions Mangali met the borrowers, Saquitan
and Ty she was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable
her to receive commission from Mangali.
Regarding the validity of TCT No. 171602, petitioner merely relied on the certification by the Register of Deeds
of Manila that the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that
office.
On petitioners alleged liability for Estafa in using the allegedly falsified TCT No. 92585, the trial court
anchored its finding on the presumption that petitioner was party to its falsification because she had possession
of such title. However, as pointed out by petitioner, it was Ty who brought with her what she represented to be
her owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 92585 and which she presented to Mangali. For the presumption of
authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must stand to profit or had profited from the use of the falsified
document. Here, the prosecution failed to show any proof that petitioner received a portion of the loan Mangali
extended to Ty, just as there is no proof on record that she received any share from the loan Mangali extended to
Saquitan. Petitioner is not a party to any of the documents Mangali, Ty, and Saquitan signed.
In sum, the lower courts rulings are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review. Indeed,
when, as here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences,
one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail,
consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.
BIRAOGO V PHIL TRUTH
LEJANO VS PP, DEL CASTILLO VS PP
G.R. No. 153414
June 27, 2006
VICTORIA G. CALLANGAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* Respondent.
Callangan was found guilty of the crime of perjury. She then filed a motion for new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her day in
court because of the gross negligence of her counsel, Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte, and his utter lack of diligence in the performance of his
duty to represent her in every stage of the suit. She attributed the following omissions to her counsel:
1. failure to file the demurrer to evidence despite leave of court previously granted;
2. failure to inform his client of the April 14, 1999 order of the court considering the intended demurrer to evidence as abandoned;
3. failure to attend the hearing for the reception of the evidence for the defense (i.e., petitioner) despite notice, which failure was deemed
by the MTC as a waiver of petitioners right to present her evidence;
4. failure to seek proper relief from the adverse effects of said orders and
5. failure to appear on the promulgation of judgment.
The MTC denied the motion for new trial. It held that the ground invoked by petitioner was not among those provided in the Rules of
Court for new trial in criminal cases. Upon appeal, the MTC decision was affirmed.

Issue: Whether Callangans right to be heard was violated. No

Ruling: True, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC when it issued the order denying
petitioners motion for new trial. The records of the case are bereft of any indication that Judge Cornejo
arbitrarily, despotically or deliberately failed to afford petitioner her constitutionally mandated right to be heard.
The cause of petitioners travails and misfortune was the negligence of her own counsel.
However, in view of the circumstances of this case, outright deprivation of liberty will be the consequence of petitioners criminal
conviction based solely on the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to give meaning to the due
process clause of the Constitution, the Court deems it wise to allow petitioner to present evidence in her defense.
The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The recognized exceptions are: (1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients
liberty or property or (3) where the interests of justice so require. In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant.

The omissions of petitioners counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of her case. They show conscious indifference to or
utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic inaction of petitioners counsel on important incidents and
stages of the criminal proceedings constituted gross negligence.
The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her
counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without counsel. Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty
without affording her the right to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due process.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process.
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned.
In People v. Ferrer, the essence of the right to counsel was enunciated:
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause
for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of
the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance
by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a
simple perfunctory representation. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by a counsel who did not devote himself to the defense of her cause.
Counsels utter lack of action after the prosecution rested its case revealed an extreme shortcoming on his part. Such inaction definitely
proved infidelity to and abandonment of petitioners cause.
Considering that this case involved personal liberty, the gross negligence of counsel shocks our sense of justice. It should not be allowed
to prejudice petitioners constitutional right to be heard. The Courts pronouncement in Reyes v. Court of Appeals, applies strongly in this
case:
The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because the
presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render
justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she
might be charged.
Therefore, in consonance with the demands of justice and to prevent any outright deprivation of liberty, the Court deems it best to give
petitioner a chance to present evidence in her defense. The case should be remanded to the MTC for acceptance and appraisal of
petitioners evidence.
Petitioner does not seek her exoneration but the opportunity to present evidence in her defense. Considering the gross negligence of her
counsel on whom she reposed her trust to protect her rights, justice demands that she be given that chance.

_________________________________________________

PEOPLE V. SIONGCO G.R. NO. 186472 JULY 5, 2010

Rule 115 Rights of the accused
FACTS: Appellants Siongco, Boton and Enriquez, induced 11-year old Nikko Satimbre, a resident of Balanga, Bataan, to board a bus
bound for Pilar, Bataan and promised the latter a Gameboy. He was then bought to Dinalupihan, Bataan where he was kept for the
night. Two days after, Siongco called Elvira Satimbre, Nikkos mother, and demanded P400,000.00, in exchange for the release of her
son. Siongco further threatened that Nikko would be killed if Elvira failed to give the ransom money. Nikko was moved to Taguig City
and was cautioned not to tell anybody that he was kidnapped. Appellants were finally arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by
the PAOCTF four days after Nikko was kidnapped. The RTC convicted appellants of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, then
punishable by death, with the exception of Boton, on the ground of reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the conviction byt modified the
penalty to reclusion perpetua.

On review, the appellants claimed that they were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel
when the RTC appointed Atty. Michael Moralde (Atty. Moralde) as their counsel de oficio during the pre-trial
conference, direct examination and cross-examination of the prosecutions principal witness, Nikko. This was so,
despite Atty. Moraldes manifestation during Nikkos cross-examination that the defense of his actual client,
accused Boton, conflicts with that of the other accused.
ISSUE: Whether Appellants were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel by the
appointment of Atty.Moralde.
HELD: NO, A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was appointed as appellants counsel de oficio in
six (6) hearings, because their regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antoniano from the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO), was inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio is appointed
during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this case the regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the
court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. The choice of counsel
by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself
scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and
independent, to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace
of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused, to the detriment of the eventual resolution of
the case.

Milla vs Pp
Facts:
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI).
In March 2003, Milla represented himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development
Corporation, which was engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and offered to sell MPI a property
therein located. For this purpose, he showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title registered in the
name of spouses Farley and Jocelyn Handog (Sps. Handog), as well as a Special Power of Attorney purportedly
executed by the spouses in favor of Milla. Since Lopez was convinced by Millas authority, MPI purchased the
property for P2 million After receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated
25 March 2003 executed by Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2) an original Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT
After receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003
executed by Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2) an original Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT Milla then gave
Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopezs partner, a copy of the new Certificate of Title to the property registered in the
name of MPI but did not furnish the latter with the receipts for the transfer taxes and other costs incurred in the
transfer of the property. This failure to turn over the receipts prompted Lopez to check with the Register of
Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the Certificate of Title given to them by Milla could not be found therein;
(2) there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog to MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in
the name of a certain Matilde M. Tolentino.

Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the amount of P2 million from Milla, , who then issued Equitable
PCI Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 dated 20 and 23 May 2003, respectively, in the amount of P1 million each.
However, these checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. When Milla ignored
the demand letter sent by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the MPI Board of
Directors, filed a Complaint against the former on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October 2003, two Informations
for Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents were filed against Milla and were raffled to the Regional Trial
Court.
After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed, with leave of court, his Demurrer to Evidence.[9] In its Order
dated 26 January 2006, RTC Br. 146 denied the demurrer and ordered him to present evidence, but he failed to
do so despite having been granted ample opportunity.[10] Though the court considered his right to present
evidence to have been consequently waived, it nevertheless allowed him to file a memorandum. RTC Br. 146
found Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.
CA affirmed RTC
Issue: whether or not Milla was deprived of due process because of negligence of counsel?
Decision: No
Held:
Milla was not deprived of due process.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived him
of due process. Specifically, he states that after the prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, and that the former was never advised by the latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was
purportedly surprised to discover that RTC Br. 146 had already rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that it
had issued a warrant for his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion for New
Trial, which Milla claims to have been denied by the trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus,
demonstrating his counsels negligence. These contentions cannot be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the
negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved client.[20] In this case,
Milla was able to file a Demurrer to Evidence, and upon the trial courts denial thereof, was allowed to present
evidence.[21] Because of his failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in considering that he had waived his
right thereto. Nevertheless, the trial court still allowed him to submit a memorandum in the interest of justice.
Further, contrary to his assertion that RTC Br. 146 denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed
by his former counsel, a reading of the 2 August 2007 Order of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially denied the
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Recall of Warrant of Arrest, but granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Avail of Remedies under the Rules of Court, allowing him to file an appeal and lifting his warrant of arrest.
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla was given opportunities to defend his case and
was granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel
were so gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process.

Pp vs Rio
Facts (regarding counsel de officio):
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to
his poverty.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the
accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he desired the appointment of a counsel
de oficio on appeal, in view of the reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch as
poverty should not preclude anyone from pursuing a cause. It was also recommended that the clerk of court of

the trial court be required by the Court to submit the response of the accused-appellant along with a certificate of
compliance with the duty imposed on him 2 by Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial
court upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain from the appellant, if he is
confined in prison, whether he desires the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Supreme Court to appoint a
counsel to defend him de oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to be prepared by the clerk of the
appellate court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant to his inquiry.
Issue: whether or not legal assistance should be given to accused?
Decision: yes
Held (dont know if this is from SC or lower court, basta ito ang reason lol):
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied
the appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason
offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de parte on
account of his poverty, a reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice in any forum.
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his
appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional mandate provided in
Section 11 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel
Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the
court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal
to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to
protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life
must have more in law." 9 Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone,
whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to
favor one party over another
Facts (case regarding rape of the child):
The above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. After relieving herself but
before she could raise her panty, the accused entered the bathroom with his body already exposed, held Wilma's
hands, and ordered her in a loud voice to lie down and when she resisted, the accused got mad and ordered her to
lie down.
The medical report also showed that Wilma is "in a non-virgin state physicially."
The accused's defense was anchored on alibi. Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of rape.
Issue: whether or not accused is guilty of rape?
Decision: yes
Held:
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication especially between parents and children, husband and
wife, and other relatives and even among those not related to each other. For such defense to prosper, the
accused must prove that it was not possible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, in this case the accused's
brother Amado, it deserves but scant consideration. 29 Moreover, the Court notes the fact that while the accusedappellant had another brother and sister living in Manila besides the complainant's mother, those two never came

to his aid. Were the accused the innocent man he claims to be, these siblings would have readily helped in his
defense. The testimony of his other brother Amado alone cannot raise the necessary doubt to acquit him as
against the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female, especially a twelve-year old child, would undergo the
expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention suffer the scandal, embarrassment and
humiliation such action inevitably invites, as wen as allow an examination of her private parts if her motive were
not to bring to justice the person who had abused her. A victim of rape will not come out in the open if her
motive were not to obtain justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve will abuse her child and make her undergo the
trauma of a public trial only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for leaving her without the services of an
unpaid helper were it not with the aim to seek justice for her child. Nobody in his right mind could possibly wish
to stamp his child falsely with the stigma that follows a rape.

MARTINEZ VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed a
motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and prompted petitioner to
go to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.
Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper attaching thereto affidavits
by himself and two disinterested persons of his eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate court
subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing the petitioner to pay the proper docketing fees
within five (5) days from notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was also denied
by the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a manifestation through his counsel that he was transmitting the
docket fees required "under protest" and that the money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was
evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.
In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to pay
the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the required docket fee.
In the second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion on the ground that it was short of
150.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
appeal as pauper litigant?
RULING:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court held that a motion to
litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in
petitions for review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of the present rules is more in
keeping with the Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a
motion to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed by himself and two other disinterested persons were
enough to convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as indigent.

The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further
ordered to allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he paid.
PEOPLE VS TABIO
FACTS:
Jimmy Tabio, appellant, raped a 23 years old with a mental age of a six-year old child. Tabio was charged with
three (3) counts of rape in a single Information.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the
prosecutions failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the information
Ruling:
The information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not qualified rape. We quote with
approval the appellate court when it said:
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional
disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that
sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both
qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information.
In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had carnal knowledge with a
mentally retarded complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of the mental disability of the complainant
at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the information.
Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and the supreme penalty of death could
not be validly imposed.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information.
The Court also observes that there is duplicity143 of the offenses charged in the information, which is a ground
for a motion to quash. Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of
appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver
People vs Aure (2008)
Facts: On 20 January 2000, 2 separate informations for rape were filed with the RTC charging appellants
(Arnulfo Aure and Marlon Ferol) of rape of AAA. Both happened on November 7, 1999 when AAA was under
investigation for illegal recruitment. Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial. The appellants
pleaded not guilty to the charges. On Nov 9, AAA went to a hospital for a medical examination wherein she
admitted to the doctor that she was raped. Per advice of her lawyer, she reported the incident to the
NBI.Subsequently, preliminary investigations were made but appellants did not appear during the hearings. The
prosecution proffered documentary evidence to bolster the testimonies of its witnesses: (1) sworn statement of
AAA, (2) medico-legal certificate of AAA, (3) referral-letter of the NBI to the Caloocan City Prosecutors
Office, (4) joint-affidavit of Agent Abulencia, Agent Erum and other NBI agents,etc. The defense presented the
testimonies of appellants, SPO2 Jaime Acido, Virgilio Torres, Ronald Orcullo, Mary Ann Aglibar,etc to refute
the foregoing accusations. Appellants denied any liability and interposed the defense of alibi. On 12 November
1999,NBI agents swooped down in the CIDG office to conduct an inquest proceeding on appellants for the rape
of AAA. Colonel Danao refused to turn over appellants because the proceeding was improper as appellants were
not previously arrested. RTC rendered a decision convicting Aure and Ferol but they were acquitted for the other
charge for failure to prove conspiracy. Appellants maintain that the foregoing findings and rulings of the RTC are
inconsistent with the allegations of conspiracy in the two informations and that the RTC cannot individually and
separately convict appellants of rape because the informations in the two cases alleged conspiracy between them
in raping AAA. Also, appellant Ferol cannot be convicted in Criminal Case II of rape committed on 8 November
1999 because such fact was not alleged in the informations. Appellants argued that the said finding and ruling of

the RTC violated their constitutional rights to be informed of the nature of the case against them, to be presumed
innocent of the charges, and to due process.
Issue: THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST OF ACCUSED APPPELLANTS FOR THE
CONDUCT OF THE REQUISITE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
THE RTC IN RENDERING AND PROMULGATING THE SUBJECT ASSAILED DECISION
MANIFESTED CLEAR SIGNS OF BIAS, PARTIALITY AND PREJUDICE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS.
Held: It appears from the records that upon filing of a complaint by AAA for rape against appellants with the
Caloocan City Prosecutors Office, a preliminary investigation was scheduled on 3 and 17 December 1999 by
Prosecutor Yu. Thereafter, two subpoenas for the said investigation, dated 22 November 1999 (for the 3
December 1999 schedule) and 3 December 1999 (for the 17 December 1999 schedule), were sent by Prosecutor
Yu to appellants at the latters CIDG office. Despite receipt of these subpoenas, appellants did not appear during
the conduct of preliminary investigation. Appellants claim that they did not receive said subpoenas in the CIDG
office does not inspire belief because they were active, on-duty police officers at the CIDG during the period of
November and December 1999. In fact, appellant Ferol was the acting Chief of the Warrant Department of the
CIDG office during the period of November and December 1999. The said department was in charge of
receiving subpoenas and warrants from courts and other offices. It was unbelievable that they did not receive,
nor was informed, of the subpoenas.
Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is not enough since bias and partiality can never be
presumed. There was no plausible proof that Judge Vidal was bias. On the contrary, the records show that Judge
Vidal was fair and considerate to both prosecution and defense. In the said 47-page Decision, Judge Vidal has
thoroughly and extensively discussed the facts and the law on which appellants conviction for rape were based.
Thus, the appellants were afforded due process.
People vs Guevarra (2008)
Facts: On Aug 30, 2002, the accused were charged with murder wherein he pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
merits followed and the prosecution presented witnesses namely: Anacleto who is the cousin of the deceased saw
appellant shoot Inspector Barte several times with a short firearm. He also brought the victim to the hospital,
Antonette, 2 police officers who were in duty and the surgeon.
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant and Ferdinand Ravino. No documentary
evidence was presented. Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He said that at the time of the incident, he
was at Brgy Malad, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro vacationing at the house of a certain Hector Africa (Africa).
He arrived therein on the afternoon of 23 August 2002 and left on the morning of 26 August 2002. He was not
acquainted with Inspector Barte and came to know that he was accused of killing Inspector Barte when he
arrived at Batangas City from Oriental Mindoro on the afternoon of 26 August 2002. He was informed that he
would be salvaged for killing Inspector Barte. Hence, he became afraid and hid in his house for two weeks.
Thereafter, he surrendered to the mayor of Batangas City who turned him over to the Batangas City police. He
alleged that Anacleto and Antonette testified against him because he did not support the candidacy of Antonette
during the previous election for barangay captain where Antonette lost. He supported then the candidacy of the
incumbent barangay captain. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 4 July 2006 convicting appellant of
murder.
Issue: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT

Held: Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is the weakest of all
defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.Denial and alibi must be proved by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence otherwise they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for
him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, the
court found no cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies of Anacleto and Antonette
credible. In addition, the crime scene was well-lighted by a nearby lamp post and lights coming from the videoke
bar which enabled him to recognize appellant. Further, he was familiar with the face of appellant because the
latter was his barriomate. Anacletos direct account of how appellant shot Inspector Barte is candid and
convincing. Aggravating circumstance were also proven but he is entititled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. (mao ra gyud na ang discussion sa fulltext, not sure kung related sa topic nato.)
PP VS BARTOLINI, PP VS MENDOZA
TAN vs. PP (2009)
Speedy Trial
FACTS: On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the
People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City. The cases pertained to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of
Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares and the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. In two other
related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the
Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that the cases be consolidated together
which the trial court granted. Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things, the first date of
trial on 27 February 2001.
ISSUE: whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tans right to speedy trial.
HELD: There is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioners
right to speedy trial
An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2)
of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free
from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old
legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy
trial.
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accuseds right to speedy trial is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether
petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the
delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence

was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight months, the
prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830.
The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To this,
we apply the four-factor test previously mentioned.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal
Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when
this matter was discussed during the initial hearing.Petitioners conformity thereto can be deduced from his nonobjection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be
only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation that the
cases be tried separately is fatal to his case
In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said right
to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee.More
importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutions manifestation during the preliminary
hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and
waived his objection thereto.
JACOB AND LEGARDA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (635 SCRA 94, 2010)
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated March 27, 2000 finding probable cause against several
public officers and private individuals, including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President, and Celso L.
Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for perpetrating the socalled "tax credit scam."
Petitioners provided an undisputed account of the events that subsequently took place before the Sandiganbayan:
On April 14, 2000, petitioners and the four other Petron officers who were similarly charged filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation [with the Office of the Ombudsman].
On 17 April 2000, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued an Order giving the prosecution a period of sixty
(60) days within which
to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take appropriate action on the said motion for reconsideration of
accused movants and to inform the Court within the same period as to its findings and recommendations
including the action thereon of the Honorable Ombudsman.
Sixty (60) days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to submit a report on the status of
the motions for reconsideration. Months passed, and then, AN ENTIRE YEAR PASSED. There was still nothing
from the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1 June 2000 while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on 18
May 2001.
In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally and consistently invoked their right to speedy trial
and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In the course of more than one year, however, the [Sandiganbayan 4th
Division] kept affording the prosecution one chance after another. The sixty days granted to the prosecution
became more than four hundred days still, there was no resolution in sight.
Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, ordered the dismissal of all criminal cases
arising from the purported tax credit scam on the ground that the accused, including petitioners, had already been
deprived of their right to a speedy trial and disposition of the cases against them. Petitioners assert that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in reversing Justice Narios order of dismissal of Criminal Case
Nos. 25922-25939 because such reversal violated petitioners constitutional right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL.

HELD: NO.An accuseds right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14(2), Article IIIof the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may
be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within
the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense
he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the
old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution
of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy
trial
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest
of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last.
Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the
Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the
Sandiganbayan, and even more than a year thereafter.
Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in Criminal
Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process could not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the
protection of the rights of petitioners themselves (and their co-accused) and their rights should not be
compromised at the expense of expediency.
In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the defendant,
who may be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying people
accused of crimes rather than granting them immunization because of legal error.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Narios dismissal of the criminal cases
was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to
prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman.
There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other accused, was prejudiced by the delay in
the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report thereon.
So was the State. We have balanced the societal interest involved in the cases and the need to give substance to
the petitioners constitutional rights and their quest for justice, and we are convinced that the dismissal of the
cases is too drastic a remedy to be accorded to the petitioners. The People has yet to prove the guilt of the
petitioners of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that
before resorting to the extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case by dismissing the
cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to
explain the delay in the submission of his report on his reinvestigation.
JACOB v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2010)
FACTS
Petron received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by assignment from 18 private firms registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) and
used these TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities. Petron then forwarded said documents to the One Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center (OSS), with a request for authorization to use said TCCs to pay for its excise tax liabilities.
However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman eventually found that the aforementioned
transactions involving the TCCs were irregular and violative of the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 29, 1989.
The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against several public officers and provate individuals including Jacob (President of
Petron) and Legarda (Vice President of Petron) for perpetrating the so-called tax credit scam.
Petitioners and four other Petron officers who were similarly charged filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Sixty days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to submit a report on the status of the motions for
reconsideration. Months passed and then an entire year passed. The sixty days granted to the prosecution became more than four hundred
days but still, there was no resolution in sight.
Justice Nario then issued a verbal order dismissing the cases. Six months after the verbal order of dismissal, the Sandiganbayan Special
Fourth Division issued an Order setting aside said verbal order.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
petitioners right to speedy trial.
HELD
No. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays.
Even though we acknowledge the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by petitioners and their co-accused
by reason thereof, the weighing of interests militate against a finding that petitioners right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases
involving them would have justified the dismissal of the criminal cases.
In the cases at bar, the dismissal made in open court by the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a valid dismissal or
termination of the cases. This is because the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the approval or consent of the other
members of the Division. In fine, there has been no valid and effective order of dismissal of the cases.
MARI v PEOPLE (2011)
FACTS
Complainant executed a sworn statement in PNP-CIDG of Tacloban City where she stated that she was raped by the respondent at her
boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A warrant of arrest was issued and private respondent voluntarily surrendered and was then
incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.
Private respondent filed a motion for bail and was allowed to post bail set at P200,000.00. A probable cause was found against private
respondent and an Information for Rape was filed. A warrant of arrest was immediately issued against private respondent.
The arraignment and hearing were repeatedly rescheduled on different dates due to different reasons. One of the reasons for the
postponement of hearing was the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of venue before this Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately
dismissing the rape case against private respondent.
HELD
No. The Supreme Court debunked petitioners argument that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private respondent too
hurriedly. Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two occasions.
Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive. Because of private respondent's
continued incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and oppressive
to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for transfer of venue.
Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in dismissing the case against private respondent
for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.

GARCIA VS DOMINGO, RE: REQUEST RADIO TV COVERAGE OF THE ESTRADA PLUNDER CASE

ANIMAS VS MINSTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

FACTS: Diosdado Yanson was a political leader of Ernesto Montilla, candidate for Mayor of Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental in the November 11, 1971 local elections. The petitioners were charged with murder in
connection with the alleged killing of Yanson on the of the November 11 elections.
The accused were arrested almost a year later, on September 21, 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. It was
only in 1974 that a summary preliminary investigation was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge
Advocate General Service. The report of the Negros Occidental PC Command states that Zacarias Seminio Jr., a
candidate for Vice-Mayor, gave fist blows and kicked Yanson then ordered Carlos Javier to get a piece of water
pipe to beat up the victim, while pointing his pistol and watching the latter being mauled. Yanson was allegedly
brought in a car to Malicon Beach, shot, tied with rope attached to an engine block and dumped at sea.
Originally, 18 men were to be charged with murder, qualified by superior strength, night time, use of motor
vehicle, and treachery. The list of 18 accused was later trimmed to 14.
The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that one of them,
petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General filed the
corresponding charge sheet, but he modified the crime charged from Murder to Violation of Section 878 of
the Revised Administrative Code in Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential Decree No. 9,
Illegal Possession of Firearms with Murder.
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunals Branch of
the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the same to respondent Military
Commission No. 27. Sometime in 1977, the petitioners were released even as the Provincial Fiscal commenced

to investigate the murder charge. However, a warrant of arrest was issued on June 8, 1978, resulting in the rearrest of 14 accused including the petitioners.
On November 25, 1978, with two of the accused agreeing to become witnesses for the State. However, when the
case was called for trial on June 25, 1979, the title of the charge sheet was amended on motion of the prosecution
by the addition of the phrase Violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There was, however, no
amendment of the body of the charge sheet.
Before trial could proceed, the respondent Minister of National Defense ordered on June 30, 1979, the transfer of
the case to the civil courts. Before the order could be implemented, it was superseded by the respondent
Ministers 1st Indorsement dated August 22, 1979, directing immediate implementation of the hand-written
marginal instructions dated August 14, 1979 of the President enfaced on the letter of Nelly Yanson, the wife of
the deceased-victim.
ISSUE: WON the Military Commission has jurisdiction wherein the formers jurisdiction only refers to illegal
possession of firearms and explosive and not in relation to crimes committed with a political complexion.
RULING: The petitioners allege that respondent Military Commission No. 27 has no jurisdiction over the instant
case. They ask that it be declare as null and void the lst Indorsement of respondent Minister of National Defense
and the corresponding order of arrest dated June 8, 1978 of respondent military commission for having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
According to the petitioners, Military Commission No. 27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case filed
against them because General Order No. 59 upon which the Commissions jurisdiction is anchored refers only to
illegal possession of firearms and explosives in relation to crimes committed with a political complexion. They
point out that, from the charge sheet, the only crime imputed against them is murder and that the essential
elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms were not alleged. They also stress that the alleged killing
of the deceased Yanson was devoid of any political complexion.
The President issued Proclamation No. 2045 which ostensibly lifted martial law in the Philippines.
Unfortunately, the more important and necessary step of dismantling the apparatus and structures of martial rule
was not taken.
Proclamation No. 2045 while revoking General Order No. 8 and dissolving the military tribunals earlier
established under the Order, created a lacunae or penumbral area insofar as pending military tribunal cases were
concerned. The policy announced in the Proclamation was to transfer cases pending with the military tribunals to
civilian courts except those which may not be transferred because of irreparable prejudice to the state in view
of the rules on double jeopardy or other circumstances which would render further prosecution of cases difficult
if not impossible. While dissolving military tribunals, the Proclamation also mandated that their dissolution
would be effective only when they finally decide pending cases which should not be transferred to civil courts.
When civilian and military accused are segregated and tried for the same offense in two separate tribunals, the
witnesses would be presented twice and would testify two times on exactly the same incident, with all the
concomitant mischief such a procedure entails. This is not to mention the ever present possibility of the military
tribunal and the civil court coming up with diametrically opposing decisions on the same facts and issues. The P.
D. also mandates that any waiver is for the civilian to submit himself to the military tribunal and not for the
armed forces member to opt for a civilian trial.
Inspite or because of the ambiguous nature of the decrees insofar as civilian takeover of jurisdiction was
concerned and notwithstanding the shilly-shallying and vacillation characteristic of its implementation, this
Court relied on the enunciated policy ofnormalization in upholding the primacy of civil courts. This policy
meant that as many cases as possible involving civilians being tried by military tribunals as could be transferred
to civil courts should be turned over immediately. In case of doubt, the presumption was in favor of civil courts
always trying civilian accused.
The petitioners were investigated for Murder. The crime was committed on November 10, 1971 long before
there was any intimation that cases with absolutely no national security implications nor political complexion
and, whoever the accused may be, would be taken away from the civil courts where they properly belong. The
Summary Pre-evaluation Report prepared by Captain Federico G. Real, Inquest Officer, and approved by Lt.
Col. Meliton D. Goyena, Provincial Commander of the Negros Occidental Constabulary Command refers to the
crime of murder committed by the petitioners. The resolution of Captain Cesar T. Demetria of the Judge
Advocate General Service on the preliminary investigation he conducted covers an investigation for murder,
and nothing else.

When the charge sheet was prepared, the offense charged was no longer murder but Violation of Sec. 878 of the
Revised Administrative Code in Relation to Sec. 2692 of the same Code and P.D. No. 9 (Illegal Possession of
Firearm With Murder). The change in the offense charged was obviously to bring it within the jurisdiction of a
military court.
The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November 10, 1971 long before the
proclamation of martial law. There was no question about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried
by civil courts at the time. Now that it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully never
more to return, there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained, at this time, by
a military tribunal. The reason given by the August 14, 1979 marginal notation on the letter of Mrs. Nelly M.
Yanson for retention of jurisdiction by military courts, In order to calm the fears of injustice by the aggrieved
party, even assuming it to be true, can be overcome through a careful monitoring by an interested parties to
insure that the trial court is indeed responsive to the demands of justice.
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian accused at a time when all civil
courts were fully operational and freely functioning.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is hereby GRANTED. Criminal Case No. MC-27-68 is ordered transferred to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental with the prosecution to be handled by the Provincial
Fiscal. The temporary restraining order dated October 23, 1979 is made permanent.

OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong
Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and
incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate
cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs.
Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the
SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the
persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the
issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from
their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of
Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while
the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during
the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed
by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body
relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE
FATCS: 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok
Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then
manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came
up. From the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which
she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those
in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of

chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus
immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who
advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive
Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The
bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains nothing
except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane
belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San,
Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were
recovered from the baggages of the six accused.
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their
defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him.
ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS
DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante
delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony
of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed
the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. Thus, it is
not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of
corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is
sufficient to produce a conviction.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation. Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the
pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to
confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to. According to
him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence
being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel crossexamined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do
so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance with petitioners right to
confront the witnesses against him.

The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their
charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the
opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the
confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was not
impaired.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
GIMENEZ VS NAZARENO
Facts:
On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr.,
were charged with the crime of murder. On 22 August 1973, the accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September
1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the accused were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the de la Vega
escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case
(Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the
case against all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but
nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6
November 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the other five accused (Suan, et. al.) while
holding in abeyance the proceedings against de la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on the ground that it will render nugatory the
constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated 22
November 1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance of the accused before the court.
Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that a "trial in absentia" may be had when the
following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he
fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in
absentia. De la Vega was arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed
of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the
lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from his detention center. No
explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his
absence unjustified. The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other
accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to de la Vega and rendered a decision as
to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented
in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to
present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to
render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent, a judgment
of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court, and such evidence must prove him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By his
failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence
on his behalf. Thus, an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and
to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.
PARADA VS VENERACION
Facts:
Complainant herein is the accused in the aforementioned case for four (4) counts of estafa which were initially raffled to Branch
30, RTC, Manila presided by Judge SenecioOrtile. Complainant is also duly bonded with the Eastern Assurance and Surety
Corporation (EASCO). On October 23, 1993 complainant notified said court formally thru counsel of his change of address
from 219 Cityland Condominium, Buendia Extension, Makati, Metro Manila to 2412 Nobel St., Bo. San Isidro, Makati, Metro
Manila. On October 27, 1993 he also notified the Manager of the bonding company of his change of address. On February 8,
1994, Judge Ortile inhibited himself from trying the said case and thus, the case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent Judge
Lorenzo Veneracion, and per order of April 26, 1994, the hearing of the case was set for June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994. Apparently,
the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to complainant's former address and that for failure of accused-complainant
to appear on June 3, 1994, respondent ordered the arrest of herein accused-complainant, ordering the confiscation of the bond
and a trial in absentia was conducted. Respondent Judge likewise assigned a counsel de officio, Atty. Jesse Tiburan of the Public

Attorney's Office (PAO) as counsel for the accused.

. . . Furthermore, a warrant of arrest was issued on June 3, 1994 with "no bail recommended".
On June 6, 7 and 8, 1994, respondent court issued orders noting the failure of the petitioner to appear and proceeded with the
trial in absentia. On the hearing of June 8, 1994 the motion of counsel de officio of accused-complainant that defense be
allowed to present evidence upon petitioner's arrest, was denied and further held that the "failure of the accused to appear is a
waiver of his right to adduce evidence".
. . . . On November 25, 1994, a decision was rendered convicting herein accused-appellant of the crime and the decision was
promulgated despite his absence. Accused-complainant was arrested and brought to the Makati City Jail.
Parada filed with this Court the instant complaint dated March 11, 1996 against the respondent Judge Veneracion. He
alleged, inter alia, that the respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law when he did not follow the legal requirements of a
valid trial in absentia which led to his conviction and premature incarceration, that the order of his arrest with no
recommendation for bail was erroneous, and that respondent Judge abused his authority when he issued the June 8, 1994 order
denying the motion of Parada's counsel de oficio to allow him to present his evidence upon his arrest.
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law when he did not follow the legal requirements of a valid trial in
absentia
Ruling:
Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in
absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. 4
In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are clearly wanting. Parada had
not been duly notified of the trial because the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to the former address of Parada's
counsel despite the fact that the latter formally notified the court of his change of address. His failure to appear therefore in the
June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is justified by the absence of a valid service of notice of hearing to him.
As a rule, where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices required to be given
therein must be given to the attorney of record. 5 Accordingly, notices to counsel should be properly sent to his address of
record and unless the counsel files a notice of change of address, his official address remains to be that of his address of
record. 6
It is undisputed that Parada's counsel filed a notice of change of address on October 23, 1993. As such, the respondent judge
should have already taken cognizance of the new address when it sent the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994. It is thus
unwarranted for the respondent judge to still send the notice of hearing to the old address of Parada's counsel because it is not
his official address nor his address of record. Concomitantly, the sending of notice of hearing to his former address is an invalid
service and cannot in any way bind Parada.
It is worthy to stress that due process of law in judicial proceedings requires that the accused must be given an opportunity to be
heard. He has the right to be present and defend in person at every stage of the proceedings. Incidentally, the right to a hearing
carries with it the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings in court. Notice to a party is essential to enable him to
adduce his own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence submitted by the other party. 7 No less than the Constitution
provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. A violation therefore of any of
the rights accorded the accused constitutes a denial of due process of law. The circumstantial setting of the instant case as
weighed by the basic standards of fair play impels us to so hold that the trial in absentia of Parada and his subsequent conviction
are tainted with the vice of nullity, for evidently Parada was denied due process of law.

Bernardo v. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo was charged with six counts of violation of BP 22 for issuing six postdated
checks in equal amounts of Php 22,500. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged. Petitioner failed to appear at the pre-trial conference held on August 25, 1999, thereby prompting the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and set the cases for trial in absentia. After the prosecution presented
its first witness, petitioner filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest, and a Motion to
Quash two Informations charged against him. In an Order dated April 5, 2000, the trial court lifted the warrant of
arrest in view of his appearance, but denied the Motion to Quash.However, petitioner failed to appear on the next
trial date, drawing the trial court to proceed with the trial in absentia and issue another warrant of arrest against
him. The trial court, in a decision promulgated in absentia, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all
the cases.
Ten months following the decision, petitioner posted a bond in another branch of court, which was cancelled due
to petitioner having been convicted and no motion having been filed for his temporary liberty pending appeal.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied due to his and his counsels failure to
appear at the motions hearing. Petitioner, upon the denial of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, appealed to
the RTC. The RTC in turn affirmed the lower courts judgment with modification.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the CA. He filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review within 30 days from June 1, 2004, which was granted by the CA but only 15 days pursuant to Section 1
of Rule 42. Because of his failure to file his petition during the 15-day extension, his petition was denied by the
CA. One of the errors he pointed out is the CAs denial of his petition for review.
ISSUE:
W/N he was denied due process of law upon the CAs denial of his petition for review.
HELD:
NO. The CA correctly dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to comply with Sections 1 and 2(d) of Rule 42.
Since these provisions are clear and mandatory in character, there is no reason for the courts to bend them.
Furthermore, he was not denied due process, as his failure to appear during his trials at the MeTC level
constituted a trial in absentia, which is allowed by the Constitution.
The holding of a trial in absentia is allowed provided that the following requisites are present, viz, (1) the
accused has already been arraigned, (2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. These three requisites are established in the facts of the present case. This being said, he cannot be
said to have been denied due process of law since he was given the opportunity to defend himself.

US v. Tan Teng
FACTS:
The defendant was charged with rape after forcefully having carnal knowledge with a 7 year-old girl. Upon
gaining information regarding the said crime, the police arrested the defendant and taken to the police station to
be examined. The police took a sample substance from the defendants body and had it examined in the Bureau
of Science. It was later found out that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea, the same venereal disease the
victim suffered after having been raped (the results of the analysis was later on used as evidence during trial).
The defendant was later on found guilty for the offense of abusosdeshonestos (rape?). Upon appeal, defendant
pointed out that the analysis of the substance taken from his body is an incriminating piece of evidence, and thus
should be inadmissible.
ISSUE:
W/N the report of the Bureau of Science is an incriminating piece of evidence, and thus inadmissible.
HELD:
NO. As the Court ruled in the present case, the prohibition against self-incrimination provided in Section 5 of the
Philippine Bill only covers oral examination of defendants before or during trial. This prohibition, as established
in People v. Gardner, is for the prevention of extortion of unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them
in the commission of a crime. It does not cover situations such as the one contemplated in the present case. To do
so would limit the actions the courts (and even the sanitary department of the Government) can take. In the case
at bar, since the defendant was not compelled to admit or answer any question pertaining or related to the crime,
it has been held that his right against self-incrimination was not violated.