Islam and Democracy: An Analysis of Muslim-Majority Democracies with an Eye to the Arab

Spring

Paul Kubicek
Oakland University
kubicek@oakland.edu
Paper for the biennial meeting of the International Political Science Association, Religion and
Politics Section
Montreal, Canada
July 2014

Draft of larger work forthcoming work; please do not cite without authors permission

Abstract
Many commentators have noted the dearth of democracy in the Muslim world and suggested
a link between Islam and democracy. The latter point, of course, is hotly contested. One
problem is that it overlooks the fact that democracies are well-established in several Muslimmajority states. This paper, part of a larger comparative project, explores common themes and
"lessons" that can be derived from the most successful of the Muslim democracies--Turkey,
Indonesia, Senegal, and Mali--and applies them to the dynamic political situation in the the
post- 'Arab Spring' cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Factors to be examined include secularism,
local Islamic traditions, institutional arrangements, political culture, and the strength and
orientation of 'Islamist' political actors. The goal is to suggest whether the relatively
successful experience of Muslim democracies gives us any purchase on assessing prospects
for democratic change after the Arab Spring.

The uprisings across the Arab world in 2010-2011optimistically dubbed the Arab
Springunleashed not only a torrent of pent-up frustrations from populations long-subjected
to authoritarian rule, but also a vast literature that speculated on what these dramatic events
might produce. Some works were celebratory and fundamentally optimistic1; others were
more guarded, warning against facile comparisons to the collapse of communism or the
Colored Revolutions of the early 2000s;2 and still others, mostly those published later, were
decidedly pessimistic about what they sometimes dubbed the Arab Winter.3 At the heart of
much of the concern was the question of political Islam, one made all the more relevant by the
electoral victories of Islamic-oriented parties in elections in Tunisia in 2011 and in Egypt in
2012.4 One primary questionone that continues to played out across the region amid
popular mobilization, military coups, constitutional debates, and civil waris whether
Muslim countries, either by virtue of simply having a population professing Islam as a faith or
by having political parties using Islam to gain support and potentially inaugurate Islam as a
basis for governance (at times the two arguments are not completely made distinct) can
become democratic.5 Looking at many countries in the Middle East three years after the Arab
Spring, it is indeed hard to be optimistic.
However, this judgment may both be pre-mature, particularly, as explored later, with
respect to Tunisia, and short-sighted, as it overlooks the fact that many Muslim countries
have, in fact, established relatively successful democracies.6 In other words, while it may be
true that we have yet to witness democracy in the Arab world, we have witnessed it in the
Muslim world in countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Senegal. This paper, part of a
larger comparative research project7, seeks to apply findings or lessons from the democratic
experiences of Muslim-majority countries to the post-Arab Spring environment in order to
provide some insight on prospects for democracy in the contemporary Middle East. In this
vein, the obvious question is whether those facilitating factors found elsewhere, particularly
those that engender interpretations of Islam that are more pluralistic, tolerant, and liberal, 8
are present in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt.
This paper is organized in four parts. First, it establishes a set of countries for
comparative analysis, namely Muslim-majority countries with significant democratic
experience. Secondly, it elucidates common factors in these states that have helped fashion
interpretations of Islam and institutions that are more compatible with democracy. Third, it
applies the findings from the more successful cases of democracy in the Muslim world to the
contemporary cases of Tunisia and Egypt. It concludes with a brief discussion.

Identifying Democracy in the Muslim World

There are numerous indices that purport to measure democracy or the level of
political freedom in a given country. While these indices generally indicate that democracy or
political freedom is less common in the Muslim world than elsewhere, both can be found.
Consider, for example, the democracy scores in 2010the year before the Arab Spring
1

began in Tunisiafrom the Polity IV dataset, which places countries on a ten-point

democracy and autocracy scale, which can be combined into a single score ranging from -10
to +10. Polity IV adopts a fairly rudimentary definition of democracy, focusing mostly on the
degree of contestation and competition for political office.9 In 2010, only 12 of the 44 (27%)
Muslim-majority countries10 included in the Polity dataset met the minimum threshold of six
to be considered democratic.11 Freedom Houses (FH) measurements of political rights and
civil liberties embrace a more inclusive, liberal concept of democracy or even good
governance, including factors such as religious freedom, corruption, gender equality, and
protection of private property.12 FH rates a country on an integer scale of one to seven (with
one being most free) on respect for political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL), with each
concept broken down into numerous elements. An average of the PR and CL scores of 2.5 or
lower marks a country, according to FH, as Free. In its 2010 data, only six of the 46 (13%)
Muslim-majority countries surveyed scored a three or loweronly two, Indonesia and Mali,
squeezed into the Free category with a 2.5 averageand only 12 (26%) scored four or
under.
On both datasets, as well as that of the World Banks Voice and Accountability (VA)
Index , the average score of Muslim countries was well below that of non-Muslim countries,
and statistical analyses, controlling for factors such as GDP per capita, oil revenues, ethnic
heterogeneity, and extent of globalization, find that Islam, defined either as a continuous
variable as the percentage of Muslim population or as a dichotomous variable, remains a
statistically significant factor. In other words, there appears to be a relationship between Islam
and democracy. Some observers have taken to mean that the democratic deficit in the Muslim
world appear[s] to have something to do with the nature of Islam itself.14
13

This conclusion, of course, is hotly contested. One problem is that by treating Islam
the same way across numerous cases, it fails to recognize that Islam manifests itself
differently in different contexts. Furthermore it is, like all religions, multi-vocal, with
concepts that can be both harmful and beneficial to democracy.15 The question, as Bayat
notes, is not whether Islam is inherently compatible or incompatible with democracy but
under what conditions can is it used or interpreted in ways that can contribute to
democratization.16
In order to answer this, we can utilize the experience of those Muslim-majority states
that have or have had significant democratic experience. Going beyond the snapshot data
presented above, one can look back in the datasets to establish when and where democracy
and political freedoms were established. Table 1 identifies those cases, using the cutoff of six
to define democracy on the Polity index and a 3.5 average on the FH indices to define
free, a more generous definition than FHs threshold of 2.5 or lower. Data are through 2012
and countries and time periods with at least ten consecutive years of democracy are bolded.
While there are some differences across the datasets, eight of the nine relative success
stories are in both Pakistan is the exception, whereas the years that Malaysia is counted as
free or democratic significantly vary, in part because FH scores do not extend to the most
democratic period in the countrys first decade of independence.

Table 1 about here

Of these nine cases, seven constitute the comparative cases for this studyAlbania
and Gambia shall be excluded.17 Furthermore, based upon each countrys performance since
1980, including its top score since that date and longest length of time attaining that score,
as well as average score on several datasets since 2000, one can distinguish among these
seven countries those that have been more successful with respect to democratic
development and stability. Data used to make this determination are presented in Table 2,
remembering that a lower number is a better score on the FH scale. Here one sees that
Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, and Mali18 clearly stand out, especially in the contemporary
period, from the other cases. The distinction between Muslim-majority democracies with
more success and those with limited success will be useful in the analysis below,
allowing one to have some differentiation in the dependent variable19 and draw sharper
contrasts between factors that facilitate the emergence and endurance of democratic politics.
Table 2 about here
Islams Role in Muslim-Majority Democracies
The seven Muslim-majority countries that serve as the cases for comparison are all
non-Arab and, with one exception (Indonesia), are not oil exporters. In many other respects,
such as wealth, ethnic and religious diversity, colonial experience, form of government, and
the role of the military, they are quite diverse, as seen in Table 3. Aspects of these variables,
separate from any relationship to Islam, may, of course, help account for the timing of
democratization and/or the democratic performance in a particular case, but, based on this
table, it would be hard to posit any of these factors as common causes for observed
democratic outcomes across all cases. This study, one might add, by no means purports to
examine each of these factors (as well as numerous other possible variables such as
international factors or political culture) in order to answer definitely why democracy emerges
in a particular country at a particular time.
Table 3 about here
However, it makes two key assumptions. First, Islam, broadly defined, can be a
powerful political force, both in terms of social mobilization from below and legitimization
of state policies from above. This has been seen in numerous countries across the Muslim
world. Islam, in other words, canand often doesmatter politically. Secondly, whether and
how Islam matters will vary based upon particular contexts. In some cases, Islamic-oriented
actors will enphasize concern for social justice or invoke notions such as shura (consultation)
or ijtihad (independent reasoning) that may foster or, at least, not impede democratization.20
In other cases, Islam may be used by state and non-state actors to demand obedience, maintain
hierarchies, and legitimize suppression of alternative political views, thereby working against
democracy. The advantage of a comparative study is that rather than simply concluding that
Islam in a more democratic context is somehow unique, one can find common factors that
hold across all or most of the countries being compared.

As noted, this paper is part of a larger comparative study, which includes detailed
information on each of these countries. It employs qualitative historical analysis and draws
upon numerous secondary and primary sources.21 Space considerations preclude detailed ex
ante presentations of hypotheses and their theoretical bases. In lieu of that, this paper will
present those factors found in most or all of the democratic cases, in particular the more
successful ones, and briefly document and explain their role in the cases. In short, they are:
1) a more syncretic, less dogmatic, flexible form of Islam; 2) de-centralized, non-hierarchical
religious institutions and authorities; 3) secularism; 4) incorporation of Islamic-oriented
political actors; and 5) timing, meaning democratization precedes large-scale Islamicoriented political mobilization.
The first factor concerns the predominant nature of Islam as it emerges and develops
within a given polity. In short, there is no one single Islam across the Muslim world; there
are various zones that reflect history and local conditions.22 All successful Muslim-majority
democracies lie on the periphery of the Muslim world, in contrast to the core in which Islam
arrived early and eliminated much of what preceded it, making it easier to impose a singular
version of Islam.23 This argument is not intended to essentialize Islam or suggest that wouldbe Islamic-oriented democrats, particularly in the Middle East, cannot find anything in the
Quran or traditional sources and traditions to advance a more liberal or more pluralistic
interpretation of the faith. However, because they are relying on the same textual sources as
those who might deny such traditions, they are at a relative disadvantage compared to those in
the periphery, where more syncretic practices (often centered on Sufism) took hold,
facilitating rise of a local Islam that was more flexible, inclusive and tolerant. Although
some would later try to bring Arab or Persian interpretations of Islam into these areas, they
failed to gain a significant following as they could be dismissed as foreign imports
incompatible with local traditions.
This is best captured by Sheikh Cherif Haidara, the most popular Muslim preacher in
Mali, who, reacting to more fundamentalist, violent groups in Malis north, stated that, We
do not know this IslamThose who kill and say they want to act in the name of Islam are not
really [Muslims]Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance.24 In neighboring Senegal,
leaders of various Sufi orders, to which most Senegalese Muslims belong, de-legitimize those
endorsing more orthodox or fundamentalist views by labelling them Wahhabis, which
suggests both extremism and foreign providence. Instead, they emphasize that Islam should
support diversity, tolerance, and free choice.25 In Turkey, Turkish Islam as espoused by
many thinkers such as Said Nursi (1877-1960) and Fethullah Glen (1941-) as well as
Islamic-oriented parties, draws upon Sufism and multicultural Ottoman-Turkish traditions and
tries to reconcile Islam with modernity and democracy. It rejects more fundamentalist Arab
or Persian influences that are anti-Western, insist on a single way to be Muslim and are
centered on demanding an Islamic state. Disagreement is not over Islamic doctrines per se
but Islamicate, puting the universal principles of Islam to work in a manner most
appropriate for local conditions.26 In Southeast Asia, figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid,
former chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of Religious Scholars) and later (19992001) president of Indonesia, and Anwar Ibrahim, former leader of the Malaysian Islamic
4

Youth Movement, former Deputy Prime Minister and current leader of the opposition, have
rejected the politicization of Islam as well as a purely scriptural approach that seeks to create
a monocultural environment. Such an Islam, they argue, is not appropriate given their
countries history and multiculturalism.27
The second factor is less ideational and concerns the institutional form Islam takes.
Although at present there is no overarching, pan-Islamic hierarchy (as there is for the Catholic
Church), there have been and are more centralized and hierarchical local structures, in which
there is a vertical chain of command or a state ulama that may impose one interpretation
of Islam as well as attach itself to state power. On the other hand, there may be more decentralized systems that are amenable to both diversity of thought and dispersal of power.
These structures may arise organically in a given society or be imposed or constructed by
rulers or colonial powers. A good example would be the Sufi orders in Senegal, which were
supported both by French colonial authorities and by the post-colonial Senegalese state as a
form of good Islam that would serve as an antidote to bad Islam that might more
directly challenge the state.28 Although each order may be hierarchically structured, insofar as
a disciple pledges his/her allegiance to a sheikh (marabout), there are many Sufi orders and
no national-level office that controls them. Indeed, the Sufi orders have resisted such an
institution, leaving Islam in Senegal quite de-centralized. With respect to this factor one
contrast Indonesia, a more successful case of democratization, with Malaysia, a relatively less
successful one that has seen significant state-sponsored Islamization. In the former case, there
is no strong central institution that can speak for Islam. Instead, there are two large mass
organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, that represent different approaches to
Islam, but are neither part of the state nor empowered to define Islam for Indonesian
Muslims. In Malaysia, however, the British gave local sultans sole control over religious
affairsincluding the power to issue legally binding fatwasand this practice carried over
once Malaysia became independent. One consequence is that the Malaysian state has taken
advantage of the fact that there are designated individuals to speak for Islam to use Islam to
further a statist and often less-than-democratic agenda.29 In Turkey, under the Ottomans there
was a centralized religious authoritythe Sultan served as both the temporal leader and the
caliphand under Atatrk the republican state created a new, centralized institution, the
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Ileri Bakanl). However, the latter was designed
to de-politicize Islam and propagate a version of Islam compatible with Atatrks priorities of
secularism and Westernization. It does not issue fatwas or empower ulama to speak for
Islam. Furthermore, like the centralized Ottoman structure centered on the imperial court, it
co-exists (at times uneasily) with a host of other religious or religiously-inspired groups and
movements (e.g. Sufi orders, Glens Hizmet movement). In short, in all of the more
successful cases of democracy in the Muslim world, one does not see the state-ulama alliance
that has featured elsewhere, a coupling that gives greater potential for centralization of
political power and/or the ability to use religion to augment state authority.
The third factor concerns the strength of secularism, particularly as it applies to the
legal and political system. In most of the cases under consideration, secularism (or, at least,
some secular practices) was introduced by colonial powers; republican Turkey, which adopted
5

secularism on its own, is the exception. Secularism, however, did not stick in all cases; in
Pakistan, Malaysia, and Bangladesh, Islam became the sole state religion, and in Indonesia
belief in God is part of Pancasila, the official ideology, with Islam as one of several
recognized faiths. Lack of secularism, however, both with respect to how adherents of nonrecognized faiths will be treated and potential adoption of sharia as a source of law can be a
real problem for democracy. With respect to the latter, the issue is not only the content of the
law itself, which can be (it does not have to be) discriminatory towards women and used to
repress those who subscribe to a different version of Islam, as seen in Pakistan, Malaysia and
in the Indonesian province of Aceh.30 It is also the fact that use of sharia can take the power
to make laws away from democratically-elected bodies and empowers othersoften
unelected religious scholarsto specify what sharia requires.31 This is not to say that
secularism must in all cases be necessary for democracyStepan for example emphasizes
that many Western democracies have officially established churches32or that secularism is
sufficient for democracy (e.g. in the Muslim world officially secular Chad and Turkmenistan
are hardly democracies and many of the democratic shortcomings in Turkey have been linked
much more to authoritarian secularism than political Islam).
What is striking is that all of our most successful Muslim-majority democracies are
the most secular and three of themTurkey, Senegal, and Maliadopted the French laicit
model, a more assertive form of secularism.33 True, in these countries governments have
used Islam as a cultural reference and as a means to gain support and secularism has
mellowed over time, meaning there is now greater public space for religion and movement
toward more passive secularism (e.g. Turkey now allows female students and state
employees to wear the Islamic headscarf). In part, this is a reaction to democratization, as
seen in Mali in debates over changes in family law.34 However, certain thingsformation of
explicitly religious-oriented parties or adoption of shariaare off the table.35 The point is
that secularism in these states has compelled Islamic-oriented actors to temper their demands
and has protected more moderate voices from extremists. For example, Donal Cruise OBrien suggests that in Senegal the secular state is the the Sufis secret love insofar as it is
buttress against the rise of other manifestations of Islam that might challenge them. 36 In
contrast, in a country such as Pakistan or Malaysia, Islamist groups are free to organize and
campaign for more doctrinaire versions of Islamic law and can challenge state authority on
the grounds the fact is not sufficiently protecting Islam. Consequently, democracy may be
compromised by state-led Islamization, as has been the case in both of these countries.37
The fourth factor is how extensively Islamic-oriented actors are incorporated into the
political system, the so-called moderation-inclusion hypothesis.38 It has generated various
debates, particularly with respect to demonstrating the sincerity of observed moderation
among Islamic-oriented actors. The core of the argument is that incorporating Islamicoriented actors into governance or giving Islamist-oriented actors a chance to participate in
politics tends to moderate their ideology and/or behavior by giving them a stake in the
system, a chance to pursue their goals through peaceful means, and/or an opportunity to work
with other political actors and broaden their constituencies. However, one should emphasize
that inclusion need not be only through democratic or electoral politics; Islamic-oriented
6

actors can be incorporated by various means into the state machinery (e.g. establishment of
religious affairs departments), have a say in policy-making or be given oversight in areas that
are, for them, high-priority (e.g. religious education, family law).
This hypothesis finds some support among our cases, although moderation occurs
through various means. In Senegal, the Sufi orders were incorporated into the political
economy by virtue of their land holdings and developed to ties individual politicians,
including Leopold Senghor, a Catholic and the countrys first president (1960-1980). Later, as
other Islamic-oriented groups emerged, especially in urban areas, they too were incorporated
into the Senegalese jeu politique, at times suspending activities that might be deemed
challenging to the state once they had secured state resources or appointments. 39 In Mali,
Islamic-oriented actors were given seats and participated actively at the National Conference
in 1991 that established the bases of Malis democracy, although they found little support for
proposals such as ending secularism or allowing religious-based political parties.40
Nonetheless, in democratic Mali they have been involved in policy debates, including
successfully changing Malian family law to incorporate some of their concerns (e.g. state
recognition of religious marriages). The moderation-inclusion hypothesis has been
extensively examined with respect to several Islamic-oriented parties in Turkey, although
some of the ostensible learning and subsequent development and moderation of the
currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) occurred not via inclusion but after its
Islamist predecessors were repressed by the government and it realized it needed to change
course (e.g. emphasizing its conservative democratic as opposed to its Islamic nature) to
do better at the polls.41 In Indonesia, President Suharto (1966-1998), although no democrat,
reached out to various Muslim intellectuals and organizations, including patronizing
exponents of more moderate Islam such as the scholar Nurcholish Madjid. However, not all of
these Islamic-oriented figures moderated or became pro-democratic; some defended Suharto
as his regime began to weaken and attacked moderates such as Madjid and Wahid, both of
whom by the mid-1990s had become critical of the regime.42 Similarly in Malaysia, the PanMalaysian Islamic Party (PAS) was incorporated into the government in the early 1970s, but
split with the ruling party and became more radical in the early 1980s. Its subsequent
moderation came when it was in the political opposition and realized that it needed to broaden
its base and work with non-Islamic parties in order to have political influence.43 Like the
AKP, PASs ostensible moderation is thus connected to a desire to improve its electoral
fortunes, but also to an electorate that has repeatedly demonstrated a limited appetite for
Islamist positions, a feature that may not be found universally. As for Pakistan and
Bangladesh, there have been intermittent efforts to incorporate Islamic-oriented actors into the
state and, in Pakistan under General Zia (1978-1988), the government oversaw an extensive
Islamization program. This, however, was done through openly authoritarian means
dissimilarly to semi-democratic Malaysiaworking against rationales for moderation and
the subsequent back-and-forth between civilian and military governments has not fostered the
moderation or cross-cutting alliances one sees in countries such as Turkey and Malaysia.
The final factor is one of timing, namely that successful democratization is more likely
if democratization precedes significant Islamic-oriented popular mobilization, as opposed
7

merely to the incorporation of Islamic-oriented actors (discussed above) who may or may not
be able to or be interested in mobilizing the larger public for their cause. This argument rests
on a couple of grounds. First, democratization in many successful democracies, including
most Western countries, was not immediate and total. Basic rights, including that of franchise,
expanded over time, and in many cases democracy emerges more as a compact between elites
than as a result of popular pressure. Indeed, the transitology perspective in the
democratization literature plays down the importance of political mobilization, suggesting that
too much of it can undermine elite bargaining and the formation of democratic pacts. In the
Muslim world, popular mobilization of Islammeaning primarily mass-based parties or
social movementsmay alarm existing elites and those who oppose or are fearful of
Islamization. Moreover, if these movements emerge in a non-democratic environment or one
with a weak or young democracy, they may not, as in a case where they are not incorporated
into the political system, have much opportunity to work first-hand with democratic principles
or forge ties with more secular-forces. In such an environment, they may be forcibly put
down by existing authorities as too threatening (as has been seen in Algeria and both pre- and
post-Arab Spring Egypt) or their power may destabilize a nascent democracy by overloading
the system and generating political polarization.44
Such has been the experience of Pakistan and Bangladesh, both of which have long
histories of Islamic-oriented mobilization and where the military has stepped in on multiple
occasions to restore order because of political instability and extremism. The case of Malaysia
is also instructive, as arguably its most democratic periodits first decade of independence
was one in which there was comparatively little Islamic-oriented mobilization, allowing more
secular-oriented elites to manage a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural consociational system.
Malaysias subsequent transition into a semi-democracy has coincided with policies to
promote ethnic Malays and Islam, although many of the countrys shortcomings (e.g. lack of
free press, restrictions on political opposition) are arguably grounded more in a concern for
order than Islamic tenets.45 In contrast, in Turkey, Senegal, and Mali, significant Islamicoriented mobilization occurred primarily as a result of democratization and did so in an
environment in which there was widespread support for democracy. It was therefore largely
channeled through democratic institutions. Indonesia has also witnessed greater Islamicoriented mobilization since it democratized in the late 1990s, although it has long had mass
Islamic organizations and political parties. Since the 1950s, they were constrained in an
authoritarian system, but by the 1990s organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah were important actors in civil society and lobbied for great democracy.46
Before moving on, two caveats are in order. First, no claim is made that any of these
factors in isolation is necessary or sufficient for democratization. They are thus best
understood as probabilistic features rather than causes, although in some casesmost
notably Senegalthey are all present and form a rather cohesive narrative. This leads to the
second caveat, insofar as one could argue that these factors are not completely independent.
Indeed, one could suggest they feed upon and build on each other, perhaps even in a
chronological manner in that a positive score on one variable leads to a positive score on
the next one, generating a model for democratization in an Islamic country. If so, of course,
8

this gives coherence to the argument, as seen in a modular case like Senegal. However, it does
have to work this way; the factors that help shape democratic manifestations of political
Islam do not necessarily evolve in a linear or historically deterministic manner. For example,
prior to the creation of the secular Turkish Republic, the Ottoman Empire was not secular and
had a largely hierarchical Islamic religious structure, and in the case of Malaysia, British
policy helped bolster the hierarchical religious role of the sultans in a region with syncretic
Islamic traditions. Furthermore, as suggested above, the findings with respect to the inclusionmoderation hypothesis vary, as not all actors behave or change in the same fashion.
Assessing Prospects for Democracy in Contemporary Tunisia and Egypt
One purpose of comparison is to uncover general patterns or common factors which
can then be utilized to explain and analyze other cases. Such is one goal of this paper, namely
to use the historical experience of relatively successful Muslim-majority democracies
particularly how Islam has been interpreted and utilizedto shed light on prospects for
democracy in the contemporary Middle East, specifically post-Arab Spring Tunisia and
Egypt. Of course, any such comparison is fraught with numerous difficulties, including that
each country has its own unique circumstances and a given case may emerge as an outlier
from the general pattern. However, it is worth noting that some actors in the Middle East wish
to draw upon the experience of countries such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia in building
their own democratic systems. One might therefore ask how countries such as Tunisia and
Egypt rate with respect to the factors that are associated with more successful democratic
outcomes in the Muslim world?
In short, neither fares particularly well. Both countries have a rich, multicultural
history, but this is not featured prominently in current political discourse, particularly with
respect to Islam. Liberal or modern Islam is associated, locally and globally, with the
work of Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), himself a disciple of the Afghanborn and peripatetic Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897).47 Abduh, while a critic of the
West, struggled with the issue of reconciling Islam with modernity. The answer, he believed
was to detach Islam from harmful traditions it had accumulated over time and return, with
fresh eyes, to the basic texts and fundamental principles by applying principles of ijtihad.
This was, at the time, controversial, but Abduh inspired a host of Muslims to seek renewal
(islah), both in Egypt (including in leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood [MB], founded in
1928) and abroad, including in many of todays Muslim-majority democracies. Abduh,
however, left a complex legacy. Indeed, aspects of his thought, particularly the emphasis on
the foundational texts and principles and the belief that the Quran should serve as the source
of legislation, would inspire some Islamists, especially in the Middle East, that had little
interest in being liberal or modern.48 Even though Abduh was influenced by Sufi orders,
these espoused reform Sufism that was critical of popular religion and argued for closer
adherence of teachings and practices of the earliest Muslim communities.49 It was thus not
syncretic in the same way as Sufi-based Islam in Senegal or Mali. Abdushs impact on the
Egyptian MB was filtered through his Syrian follower Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who, while
critical of the ulama and of blind imitation of tradition (taqlid), staunchly advocated adoption
of sharia and creation of an Islamic state, views that were largely supported by the religious
9

authorities. The jurist Ali Abd Al-Raziq (1888-1966) and others who expressed contrary
views represented the rejected alternative. They were condemned by the authorities and
subject to sanction.50 Furthermore, although Abduh and most of his followers could be
described as Egyptian nationalists insofar as they campaigned against Western domination
and influence in Egypt51, they did not fashion an Egyptian Islam that drew upon the
countrys rich history. Faraj Fuda (1946-1992), a thinker who tried to do so by calling for a
separation of religion and politics and Muslim-Coptic unitya perspective that would be
rather uncontroversial in democratic Senegal, Mali, or Indonesiawas labelled an apostate by
the religious authorities and assassinated by extremists.52 This was indicative of Bayat calls
the stagnation of socioreligious thought in Egypt, in which the impact of liberals and
modernists remained negligible and textualist dogma prevailed over the reformist
inclinations of Abduh.53 Hassan Hanafi (1935-), an Egyptian scholar associated with the idea
of an Islamic left, pessimistically contended that the Arab-Islamic heritage (turath) had
been ossified, impervious to diverse interpretations amenable to free thought and
democratization.54
As for Tunisia, the influence of liberal Islam was modest prior to its obtaining
independence in 195655, and its most significant post-independence Islamic-oriented
movementformed first as the Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement) in
1981 and in 1989 renamed Harakat En-Nahda (Renaissance Movement, hereafter
Ennahda)was inspired by the MB and has traditionally appealed more to the general ArabIslamic heritage of the people and unity of the Muslim community (umma) than anything
specifically Tunisian.56 In both countries, Islamic-oriented movements have also been, in
large part because of state repression but also because of their dogmatism, more anti-system
oriented than, for example, those which emerged in Turkey or Indonesia, where Islamicoriented actors developed, often with state encouragement, a more national conception of
Islam that opposed more fundamentalist versionsincluding those inspired by Abduh
that were viewed to have foreign providence.
With respect to the organization of Islam, one sees more efforts at centralization and
state control in both Tunisia and Egypt than in most of the other cases. Both countries were
part of the Ottoman Empire, in which the state formed an alliance with the Sunni ulama to
maintain stability and combat threatening or deviant interpretations of the faith. Each had
their own muftis empowered to speak for Islam and both also had prestigious mosques
Zaytuna in Tunisia and al-Azhar in Egyptthat were unquestioned centers for religious
scholarship and, for the most part, bastions of conservatism. There were, of course, various
efforts to alter this system, but success was limited. In Ottoman-era Tunisia the greatest
reform project was under Vizier Khayr al-Din al-Tunsi (1873-1877), who endorsed a more
modern vision of Islam and advocated ideas such as a legislative council to fulfill the Islamic
requirement of shura (consultation), but also relied upon the ulama to ensure the Islamic
character of the state and created a centralized Habus Council.57 Both the Frenchwho
formally took control of Tunisia in 1881and its post-independence government kept this
structure, which in 1956 was re-named the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This body oversees
mosques and hires and licenses all prayer leaders. The president also appoints the Grand
10

Mufti, who is empowered to issue fatwas (legally non-binding) and speak for Islam in
Tunisia. The overall impact of this system, however, has not been to empower Islam, but, as
in Turkey, subordinate it to the state and inhibit it from playing an independent role in civil
society.58
In Egypt, there is also an official Islam centered around the state and al-Azhar, a
center of global Islamic scholarship that in the past two centuries has increasingly come under
state control as various moves have stripped it of autonomy over finances and personnel
decisions. In the late twentieth century, Egyptian leaders relied upon it to issue fatwas to
legitimate their policies and de-legitimize more radical Islamic elements, thereby virtually
incorporating it as an arm of the state.59 While al-Azhar did challenge the state in the 1990s
on policies such as birth control, it did so from a more conservative perspective and did not
agitate for political change. However, official Islam is but one of many Islams in Egypt,
which, compared to Tunisia, has more diversity and space for more independent voices,
including both the MB and jihadist groups who employ violence.60 The MB, of course, has a
long and complicated history, officially banned since 1948 but, at times, tolerated by and even
cooperating with the state, whereas at other times it worked with secular-oriented groups
against the regime. However, this by itself does not mean that they have played, with respect
to democracy, a constructive role in civil society, as, for example, Muhammadiyah did in
Indonesia or Sufi orders did in Senegal. Writing in the 1990s, Wickham noted that the issue
is the agenda of these actors, which, in the case of the MB, was often not to establish a civil
sphere separate from and coexistent with the secular state, but gradually to extend the Islamic
domain until it encompasses the state itself.61 After 2012, when it gained power, critics
suggested that the MB in fact was far more interested in state capture and strengthening
centralized Islam, such as empowering al-Azhar be give its imprimatur to legislation to ensure
compliance with sharia, than in dismantling the state apparatus.62
Prior to the uprisings in 2010-2011, neither country was secular in a strict sense, as the
constitutions of both countries (Tunisia 1959, Egypt 1971) specified Islam as the state
religion. However, in terms of government practices, Tunisia, influenced by the French laicit
tradition, has been far more secular-oriented. Its founding president, Habib Bourguiba (19571987), like Atatrk in Turkey, favored cultural Westernization. He abolished sharia courts,
pushed through a Personal Status Law that banned polygamy and gave women rights of
divorce, closed religious endowments, restricted wearing of the headscarf, and debilitated the
ulama by placing them under state control.63 Islam remained a cultural marker and, under
both Bourguiba and his successor, Zine El Abindine Ben Ali (1987-2011), it was occasionally
employed by the state to bolster its legitimacy. However, state Islamiziation did not go as
far as it did in Egypt, both under President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), who changed the
constitution in 1980 to establish sharia as the source for law and under Hosni Mubarak
(1981-2011), who enhanced the role of ulama from al-Azhar in cultural politics and public
morality, expanded funding and personnel for the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and
allowed conservative clergy to play a prominent role in the judiciary, education, and the
media. The result was Islamic penetration of the state apparatus, albeit in a form that
ensured that pro-regime elements were promoted and more autonomous or threatening groups
11

were excluded.64 The mufti of al-Azhar, Shaykh Muhammad Tantawi, even declared in 2001
that Egypt has an Islamic state.65 Both countries, however, remained too secular or
insufficiently Islamic for actors such as the MB and Ennhada. For example, the Rashid
Ghannoushi, the latters leader, declared in 1988 that the Tunisian Constitution had two main
defects: no statement that laws must be compatible with sharia and no Islamic Council to
ensure said compatibility.66
The question of secularism has been revisited in each country since 2011. However,
all indications are that secularism has taken greater hold in Tunisia. This is evidenced, inter
alia, in the fact that in October 2011 elections for a Constituent Assembly Ennadha received
only 37 per cent of the vote, a plurality, but not the majority received in 2012 by Islamist
parties in Egypt. While the declaration of Islam as a state religion (kept in Article 1 of the
constitution approved by the Constituent Assembly in 2014) gives some room for Islamist
actors to push for measures such as shariaGhannoushi himself suggested in October 2011
that a mild form of sharia was desirable67he and other Ennadha leaders backed away
from this as it proved polarizing and unpopular. Draft versions of the constitution that
included sharia were dropped, and the document approved in 2014 largely retained the status
quo with respect to Islam, although provisions in Article 6, in which the state pledges both to
spread values of moderation and tolerance as well as protect religion and to prevent the
sacred from being attacked could be used to limit freedom of expression. In Egypt the MB
won both the presidency and the legislative majority in 2012 and thereby faced fewer
constraints. Moreover, the status quo was one that already included mention of sharia as a
source of law. In this case, the debate revolved less around sharia itself than in finding a
mechanism that could best ensure, perhaps in a manner akin to the Council of Guardians in
Iran, that all laws and actions were sufficiently Islamic. In the end, the MB-dominated
Constituent Assembly not only retained sharia as the source of legislation but stipulated that
scholars from al-Azhar were to be consulted on matters pertaining to it.
With respect to inclusion/political incorporation, again neither country fares well in
accordance with the theory. In Tunisia, with a brief exception in the late 1980s, Islamicoriented actors were suppressed. Candidates from Ennadha did compete in elections in 1988,
but afterwards, the movement was banned and many of its leaders were driven into exile. In
Egypt, the MB has had a varied relationship with the state, tolerated in the 1980s and several
times fielding independent candidates for elections, allowing it to emerge in the 2000s as
the strongest opposition party. It was also active in the media and in Egyptian professional
associations. In contrast to Ennadha, maintained a much more active and visible presence in
society.68
If the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is correct, one might therefore expect Islamicoriented groups in Tunisia to be more radical than those in Egypt. While there are, in both
countries, Islamist groups that employ violence and demonstrate little fealty to democracy, a
comparison of Ennadha and the MB shows more moderation in the former. As early as 1993,
Ghannoushi suggested while in exile that if democracy means free elections, alternation of
different groups in power, and respect for freedom and human rights, then Muslims will find
nothing in their religion to oppose democracy.69 While he did endorse sharia as an
12

institution that transcends all [human] laws, he also maintained that Islamic-oriented actors
could work with secular groups on common goals (e.g. removing a dictator).70 Significantly,
in 2005, Ennadha joined forces with secular dissidents in the pro-democratic 18 October
(2005) Collectif, 71 and it joined with two secular parties in 2011 to form a majority in the
Constituent Assembly. As noted, Ennadha backed away from insisting on adoption of sharia,
and Ghannouchi has spoken favorably of the Turkish model, upheld womens rights and
keeping Tunisias Personal Status Laws, and claimed that democracy is the only way to
reach power and to stay in power.72 To be sure, not all are convinced that Ghannoushi or
Ennadha are, to invoke the title of one study, democrats within Islamism. Critics accuse
Ennadha of conducting a double discourse, and cite examples such as calls for jihad of a
new caliphate from some Ennadha officials and a leaked videotape in which Ghannouchi
gives advice to Salafist activists and appears to endorse gradual creation of an Islamic state.73
However, despite numerous problems in Tunisia, including political violence, government
resignations, and delays in producing a constitution, Ennadha continued to work with secular
parties to produce a democratically-oriented constitution.
Egypts situation is quite different. The question of the MBs moderation remained
unsettled prior to Mubaraks fall. While there were some positive signsthe MB renounced
violence (in contrast to more extreme groups in Egypt), adopted idioms of democracy, rights,
and civil society, and some from the MB cooperated with leftists and seculariststhe MB did
not fully moderate in the sense of moving away from Islamism. Wickham, for example, in a
study that is, in many ways, sympathetic to the MB, notes in the early 2000s that its members
had yet to reconcile their call for Islamic law with the full commitment to democracy and
political pluralism.74 Bayat pointedly does not label the MB as post-Islamist, noting that its
leadership remained committed to sharia over democracy and establishing religious authority
as a check over the will of the people.75 As for why this is so, Gumuscu, comparing the MB
with Turkeys AKP, suggests that the formers supporters were largely losers of the states
economic policies, whereas the latter included large segments of the rising Anatolian
bourgeoise. The MB thus continued to appeal to outsider or more marginal groups who
remained committed to Islamism as opposed to a more pragmatic, less ideological conception
of Islam.76 Bokhari and Senzai label the MB as participatory Islamist, suggesting it was
willing to play democratic politics while keeping its core agenda.77 However, after contesting
elections and coming to power, the MB displayed little of the moderation of Ennadha: it
deployed armed supporters to monitor public morality and break up protests; it derided its
critics as enemies of Islam; its backers mounted demonstrations praising al-Qaeda; and it
pointedly excluded secular and liberal representatives from the process of drafting the
constitution, which, as noted, ultimately contained provisions to strengthen the role of Islam
in Egyptian politics.
Finally, the clearest difference between Tunisia and Egypt and the more successful
cases concerns timing, as the former were largely police states and lack meaningful
experience with democracy.78 After their long-ruling authoritarian leaders were ousted both
have attempted to democratize from scratch amid mobilization from numerous political
groups. This is not akin to the gradual or elite-led democratization as in Turkey, Mali or
13

Senegal. This is not to say that countries cannot democratize under these conditionsPoland,
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Estonia did so after the collapse of communism. However,
in all of these countries there was a strong consensus about the countrys future course and
new authorities moved quickly to dismantle the previous system. In post-communist countries
lacking such consensusRomania, Ukraine, Russiademocratization was delayed or failed
to take root. In Tunisia and Egypt, not only are Islamist and Islamic-oriented actors new to
democratic politics (as are all actors in these countries), but they are profoundly distrusted by
other, more secular groups. This is obviously seen in the case of Egyptwhere the 2013 coup
to remove the Muslim Brotherhood from power did enjoy substantial supportbut also, as
noted, in Tunisia, where many are not fully convinced of Ennadhas commitment to
democracy and fear the emergence of Salafist groups. While various parties could agree on
getting rid of the ancien regimealthough significant elements of it remains, especially in
Egyptthere was little or no consensus on what comes next, including policies on core
issues of state identity itself, including those that touch on religion that, compared to purely
economic issues, may be less amenable to compromise. Groups have mobilized their
supporters to press their agenda, meaning that the politics of the streetagain mostly clearly
seen in Egyptcan overwhelm the capacity of nascent institutions to manage popular
demands. Political leaders as well as the public at large do not have infinite patience, and thus
the temptation is to sidestep or do away with these ineffective institutions.
Conclusion
The above discussion of Tunisia and Egypt is admittedly cursory, and the situation in
both countries continues to evolve. It is also not intended to be deterministic, as countries can
overcome poor legacies or lack of alleged pre-requisites and develop in unexpected ways.
Neither country, however, fits the pattern found in other Muslim-majority democracies. Of
course, writing in 2014, it is all too easy to be pessimistic about Egypt. Not only does it
largely lack, according to this analysis, cultural and institutional bases for development of a
more liberal or tolerant Islam, but it is clear that the main political agents on both sides of
the secular-religious divide have yet to moderate and build the trust necessary for democracy.
The country also lacks effective channels to manage political mobilization, creating instability
and giving the army the opportunity to seize power in the name of preventing chaos and
further violence. In other words, the scenario suggested immediately prior to this section of
the paper has already played out. The army, of course, has not proven itself to be a friend of
democracy. At present, Egypts lack of democracy can be attributed far more to its actions
than the MB and other Islamic-oriented and Islamist groups, who are now the target of
reprisals.
There is more reason to be guardedly optimistic about Tunisia. As with Egypt, the
historical deck seems largely stacked against it, although, significantly, it can draw upon a
stronger condition of Westernization and secularism. Indeed, the fact that secularism has,
relatively speaking, taken hold has given incentives to Islamic-oriented actors to back away
from more maximalist positions that would fundamentally change the position of Islam in the
state (e.g. adoption of sharia or change of Personal Status Laws). Tunisia also has some
other advantages that were not discussed above. It is, compared to Egypt, in relatively good
14

economic shape; it lacks a military keen to involve itself in politics; and its small size may
make it more susceptible to positive international influences, particularly from the European
Union.79 With respect to political Islam, the emergence of Salafist groups alarms many, but
other Muslim-majority democracies (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia) have witnessed similar
developments and been able to manage groups who employ violence and whose commitment
to democracy is highly questionable. The key player remains Ennadha, which, unlike the
Muslim Brotherhood, was unable to win a majority of votes in the initial post-Arab Spring
elections and thus from 2011-2014 has shared power with secular-oriented parties. The
importance of this can hardly be overstated, as it created different incentives and opportunity
structures. Although Ennadha does not, like Turkeys Islamic-oriented parties or the Sufi
orders in Senegal, have a history of inclusion in the structures of powerindeed, its path to
moderation occurred while it was banned and exiled and remained confined to rhetoricit is
now included in the emerging democratic system and has demonstrated an ability to make
democratic compromises, including those that have angered its Islamist members and
supporters. Despite all the countrys difficulties, various parties agreed in 2014 to a
constitution that guarantees basic freedoms, establishes a democratic structure, and does not,
on paper at any rate, expand the role of Islam.
However, looking ahead, it remains to be seen if Ennadhas leaders will continue
along the path of moderation and compromise. Unlike in Turkey or Senegal, Islamist parties
will compete with it for the votes of pious Muslims, and their commitment to democracy may
be far more questionable. Ennadha may not want to lose votes on this flank and could be
tempted to try to play the religion card more aggressively in future elections. It could also,
depending upon the outcome, find working in a coalition with these Islamist parties an
attractive option. These scenarios have played out elsewhere in the Arab world where there
has been some political competition (Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt, post-Qaddafi Libya). Tunisia,
of course, is not destined to follow this path, and, by itself, a party or government that is more
explicitly Islamic-oriented need not compromise Tunisias fledgling democracy. However, it
would be politically polarizing and risk instability.
Democracy clearly remains a possibility for Tunisia. Its success hinges on the ability
of Islamic-oriented and non-Islamic oriented actors to work together, which presupposes a
commitment on the part of both to tolerance and moderation, something clearly not seen in
post-Mubarak Egypt. However, as developed in this paper, this commitment has been central
to the story of Muslim-majority democracies elsewhere. Tunisia, compared to some of them,
may possess certain disadvantages, but they (like most countries) did not become democratic
overnight. Tunisias political and religious leaders, if they are committed to democracy,
would be wise to learn from their experiences.

15

Table 1 Muslim-Majority Democracies

Muslim-Majority Democracies Free Muslim-Majority States
as Measured by Polity* (1945- as Measured by FH* (19722012)
2012)
Albania (2002-2012)
Bangladesh (1972-1973)
(1992-2006)
Comoros (2004-2012)
Gambia (1965-1993)
Indonesia (1999-2012)
Kosovo (2008-2012)
Kyrgyzstan (2010)
Lebanon (2005-2012)
Malaysia (1957-1968) (20082012)
Mali (1992-2011)
Niger (1992-1995) (2004-2008)
(2011-2012)
Pakistan (1956-1957) (19731976) (1988-1998) (2010-2012)
Senegal (2000-2012)
Sierra Leone (1961-1966)
(2007-2012)
Somalia (1960-1968)
Sudan (1956-1957) (1965-1968)
(1986-1988)
Syria (1954-1957)
Turkey (1946-1953) (19611970) (1973-1979) (1983-2012)

Albania (1992-1995) (20012010)

Bangladesh (1972) (19791980) (1991-2001) (2010-2012)
Burkina Faso (1972-1973)
(1978-1979)
Comoros (1975) (1991-1992)
(2006) (2008-2012)
Djibouti (1977)
Gambia (1972-1993)
Indonesia (2000-2012)
Jordan (1992)
Kuwait (1973-1975)
Kyrgyzstan (1992) (1994)
Lebanon (1972-1974)
Malaysia (1972-1983)
Maldives (1972-1974) (20092011)
Mali (1992-2011)
Niger (1993) (2004-2008)
(2011-2012)
Pakistan (1988-1989)
Senegal (1984-1992) (20002010)
Sierra Leone (2003-2012)
Tunisia (2011-2012)
Turkey (1972-1979) (19861992) (2002-2012)

*Countries that rate six or better on Polity IV or average 3.5 or better on

Freedom Houses measures of political rights and civil liberties. Sources: Polity IV dataset
from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm and FH from www.freedomhouse.org

16

Table 2 Comparison of Muslim-Majority Democracies

Country

Years Rated
democratic
(> 6) by
Polity, 19802012

Top Polity
Score
Since
1980
(Years)

Top FH
Score
Since
1980
(Years)

Average
Polity
Score
(20002012)

Average
FH Score
(20002012)

Average
VA Score

2.5
(20002012)

More
Success
Turkey

30

3.35

-.16

20

6.31

2.62

.12

Indonesia

14

7.38

2.88

-.17

Senegal

13

3 (20042011)
2 (20032006)
2.5 (20052012)
2.5 (20022007)

7.31

Mali

9 (19891992)
7 (20022011)
8 (20042012)
8 (20002006)

7.54

2.81

-.05

Limited
Success
Bangladesh

15

-.47

13

5.12

-1.02

Malaysia

2.5 (1991- 3.85

1992)
3 (1988- -.54
1989)
3.5 (1980- 4.15
1983)

3.81

Pakistan

6 (19922006)
8 (19881996)
6 (20082012)

4.27

-.42

Sources: Polity Dataset, available at

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm;
www.freedomhouse.org;
World
Bank
VA
scores
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports

17

FH

at
from

Table 3 Profiles of Muslim-Majority Democracies

Country

Democracy
in
2012?
(Polity
and/or FH)*

GDP/capita
2012
(current $,
PPP)

Turkey

Yes

18190

%
Muslim
/%
largest
ethnic
group
98.6/70

Colonial
power

Violent
Struggle at
Foundation

None

Yes

Form
of
Government

Military
coups
since
1960

SemiSeveral
Presidentiala
Mali
Yes
1140
92.4/50 French
No
SemiSeveral
Presidentialc
Indonesia
Yes
4730
88.1/41 Dutch
Yes
Presidential
One
Senegal
Yes
1880
95.9/43 French
No
SemiNone
Presidentialc
Bangladesh
Mixed
2030
90.4/98 UK
Yes
Parliamentary Several
Pakistan
Mixed
2880
96.4/45 UK
Yes
Parliamentaryb Several
Malaysia
Mixed
16270
61.4/50 UK
No
Parliamentary None
Sources: World Bank, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life; CIA World Factbook. * Threshold is 6 or above
for Polity, 3.5 or below for FH, as in Table 1. a President not popularly elected but retains important powers; b
Role of president has varied over time; c President has traditionally played dominant role

Examples include Tariq Ramadan, Islam and the Arab Awakening (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and
Hamid Dabashi, The Arab Spring: The End of Post-Colonialism (London: Zed Books, 2012).
2
See Lucan Way, The Lessons of 1989, Journal of Democracy 22 (2011): 13-23, and Laura Landolt and Paul
Kubicek, Opportunities and Constraints: Comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the Colored Revolutions,
Democratization, published on-line, April 2013.
3
An early work in this vein is John Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East
Revolts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012).
4
Terminology is important but at times imprecisely employed. Bayat distinguishes between Islamism, an
ideology that holds Islamic principles of governance must be formally enshrined in the state, and postIslamism, which seeks inspiration from Islam but is open to democracy by fus[ing] religiosity with rights, faith
and freedom, Islam and liberty. See Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the PostIslamist Turn (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), especially pp. 8-11. My own preference is to refer
to those who use Islamic references in any significant sense as Islamic-oriented, employing terms such as
Islamist to those who embrace Islamism as defined above.
5
There is a vast literature on this topic, which pre-dates the Arab Spring. For more negative assessments, see
Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), and Eric Chaney, Democratic
Change in the Arab World, Past and Present. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 42(1), 2012: 363-414. In
contrast, see John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996);
Khaled El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),
Muhammad Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), and
Bayat, Making Islam Democratic and Bayat, ed. Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
6
I define democracy mainly in a procedural sense, meaning that the holders of political power are subject to the
vote of the people in free and competitive elections and that the people retain civil and political freedoms to
express their views and organize to contest for power. By relatively successful, I acknowledge that these states
(like all states, for that matter) have democratic shortcomings, particularly if one thinks of democracy in a more
liberal sense. These shortcomings include issues of rule of law, womens and minority rights, politicallyinvolved militaries, and constraints on media and free expression. Whether these have anything to do with
Islam per se and (more controversially, perhaps) whether one might be able to speak of Muslim democracy
are interesting questions, but not ones pursued in this paper.
7
Paul Kubicek, Political Islam and Democracy in the Muslim World: A Comparative Examination,
forthcoming.

18

Numerous variables, of course, can affect prospects for democracy. This paper generally sidesteps discussion
of structural pre-requisites or choices (agency) that lack a direct tie to Islam, although I have analyzed them
elsewhere. See Landolt and Kubicek, Opportunities and Constraints.
9
Specifically, Polity IV measures openness, competitiveness, and regulation of executive recruitment,
constraints on executive authority, and the regulation and competitiveness of participation. See the home page
of the Polity IV project, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
10
The twelve countries were Albania, Kosovo, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Comoros, Turkey, Lebanon,
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. My source of data for Muslim-majority countries is estimates
made by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, available at http://features.pewforum.org/muslimpopulation. (accessed April 19 2013).
11
Directors of the Polity IV project suggest a score of 6 to 10 would qualify as a democracy, with a 10
signifying full democracy.
12
Scores are based on a checklist of 10 political rights and 15 civil liberties categories. Freedom House claims
to be assessing political rights and civil liberties, not democracy per se. Its 2010 composite scores do
correlate highly (.861, p < .001) with those of Polity. Many object to Freedom House on both conceptual and
methodological issues, but I find value in them insofar as Freedom House adopts a more liberal notion of
democracy that might capture a more pronounced tension between Islam and liberal democracy, an issue
explored in the fuller study.
13
The VA Index was developed in the 1990s. Scores range from -2.5 to +2.5, but the World Bank does not
define a threshold marking a country as free or democratic. The average score in 2010 for the same set of
Muslim-majority states captured in the Polity dataset was -.92 compared to .04 for the other countries. Data from
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports.
14
Charles Rowley and Nathanael Smith, Islams Democracy Paradox: Muslims Claim to Like Democracy, So
Why Do They Have So Little? Public Choice 139:3 (2009): 273-299, at p. 298. See also M. Steven Fish,
Islam and Authoritarianism. World Politics 55: 1 (2002): 4-37; Nicholas Potrafke, Islam and Democracy.
Public Choice 151:1 (2012): 185-192; and Kubicek, Political Islam, Chapter 1.
15
Alfred Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations, Journal of Democracy 11:4 (2000): 37-57.
16
Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 4.
17
Neither would lend much to comparative analysis. The majority of Albanians are nominally Muslim, but
Albania was officially an atheist country under communism and religious belief among Albanians is low. Islam
is not a central factor in the countrys politics. Gambia, the smallest country in Africa and surrounded by
Senegal, was nominally democratic after gaining independence, but it was dominated by one party, which
pursued more a pan-Africanist than Islamic-oriented agenda. Islam in general did not play a significant role in its
politics.
18
The 2012 coup in Mali ended over twenty years of democratic government. Mali had competitive presidential
elections in 2013 and power was handed over to an elected government, creating hope that it may, despite
significant problems in the north of the country, be able to quickly re-establish democracy.
19
While all of these cases are democratic for some period of time, they are also undemocratic at times,
providing further differentiation. The larger study from which this paper derives also includes Iran as a counterexample.
20
These concepts are discussed, inter alia, in Esposito and Voll, Islam and Democracy; El Fadl, Islam and the
Challenge, and in numerous contributions to M. A. Muqtedar Khan, ed. Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory,
Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006).
21
The most significant scholarly monographs or edited volumes for the countries under review include Robert
Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000);
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001); M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003);
Joseph Chinyong Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009); Banu Eligr, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010); and Mamadou Diouf, ed. Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2013).
22 M. Hakan Yavuz, Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus, Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs 24:2 (2004): 213-232.
23
For a perspective rooted in deep history, see Chaney, Democratic Change, 2012. For a perspective that
ties a singular version of Islam to modernity and state power, see Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
24
Brian Peterson, Mali Islamisation Tackled: The Other Ansar Dine, Popular Islam, and Religious
Tolerance, African Arguments, 25 April 2012, available at http://tinyurl.com/nzp6dcj

19

25

Alfred Stepan, Rituals of Respect: Sufis and Secularists in Senegal in Comparative Perspective.
Comparative Politics 44:4 (2012): 379-401.
26
Yavuz, Is There a Turkish Islam?, p. 218.
27
Both are discussed in John Esposito and John Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001). See also Mujiburrahman, Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of
Abdurrahman Wahid, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10:3 (1999): 339-352, and Anwar Ibrahim,
Universal Values and Muslim Democracy, Journal of Democracy 17:3 (2006): 5-12.
28
Mamadou Diouf, Introduction: The Public Role of Good Islam: Sufi Islam and the Administration of
Pluralism, in Diouf, ed. Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis.
29
Vedi Hadiz and Khoo Book Teik, Approaching Islam and Politics From Political Economy: A Comparative
Study of Indonesia and Malaysia, The Pacific Review, 24:4 (2011): 463-485. See also Nasr, Islamic Leviathan,
and Julian Lee, Islamization and Activism in Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).
30
For Malaysia, see Lee, Islamization and Activism. Since the early 2000s, Aceh has been allowed to implement
sharia, which has led to a host of restrictions on activity and creation of a sharia police. See Human Rights
Watch, Policing Morality: Abuses in the Application of Sharia in Aceh Indonesia, December 2010, available
at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/12/01/policing-morality-0.
31
See, for example, Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim, Islam and the Secular State (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 2008), and Tibi, Islam and Islamism.
32
Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations.
33
For more on different types of secularism, see Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion:
The United States, France, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
34
Benjamin Soares, The Attempt to Reform Family Law in Mali. Die Welt des Islams 49 (2009): 398-428
35
Some groups do campaign for this, sometimes using cloaked language to avoid sanctions, but they have not
won substantial support.
36
Donal Cruise OBrien, Symbolic Confrontations: Muslims Imagining the State in Africa (London: Hurst), p.
63.
37
Nasr, Islamic Leviathan.
38
For a review of this theory and several works that employ it, see Jillian Schwedler, Can Islamists Become
Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, World Politics 63:2 (April 2011): 347-376.
39
Roman Loimeier, The Secular State and Islam in Senegal, in David Westerlund, ed. Questioning the Secular
State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics (New York: St. Martins, 1996), p. 195.
40
Julia Leininger, The Diverse Role of Muslim Actors in Malis Democratic Consolidation: Fostering
Plurality to Inhibiting Strong State Institutions, Paper prepared for the Workshop on Religious Actors in
Democratization Processes: Evidence from the Five Muslim Democracies, Princeton University, 2010, available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1780470
41
See Gamze Cavdar, Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model of Political Learning, Political Science
Quarterly 121:3 (2006): 477-497, and various contributions in M. Hakan Yavuz, ed. The Emergence of a New
Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006).
42
Hefner, Civil Islam.
43
Liow, Piety and Politics, and Liow, Islamist Ambitions, Political Change, and the Price of Power: Recent
Success and Challenge for the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS, Journal of Islamic Studies 22: 3 (2011): 374403.
44
The classic source on the risks of mobilization in a system with weak institutions is Samuel Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
45
Arend Lijphart, the scholar most associated with the idea of consociationalism, upheld pre-1969 Malaysia as a
relative success, but later suggested that the country was no longer democratic due to limitation of freedom of
expression and the interesting political and economic discrimination in favor of the [ethnic] Malays. See
Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
p. 153.
46
Greg Barton, Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia, in Deborah Brown and T.J. Chen, eds.
Religious Organizations and Democracy in Contemporary Asia (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006).
47
For a basic primer on Abduh, see Yvonne Haddad, Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform, in Ali
Rahnema, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 2005).
48
This would include figures such as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) in the MB and contemporary Salafi groups,
although his connection with the latter is much more dubious. See Henri Lauziere, The Construction of
Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History, International Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies 42:3 (2010): 369-389.
49
Vincent Cornell, Muhammad Abduh: A Sufi-inspired Modernist, in David Marshall, ed. Traditional and
Modernity: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p. 108.

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50

Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Al-Raziq, wrote in 1925
that Islam did not prescribe any particular form of government. Rida (among others) criticized this view, and AlRaziq lost his position at al-Azhar.
51
See Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State (Boulder
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 10-11.
52
Meir Hatina, Identity Politics in the Middle East: Liberal Thought and Islamic Challenge in Egypt (London:
IB Tauris, 2007).
53
Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 174, 178.
54
Charles Kurzman, Introduction: Liberal Islam and Its Context, in Kurzman, ed. Liberal Islam (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 12.
55
Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism, and Human Rights (London: IB Tauris, 2007), pp. 155-160.
56
Stefano Maria Torelli, The AKP Model and Tunisias al-Nahda: From Convergence to Competition?
Insight Turkey 14(3) 2012: 65-83.
57
Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, Muslim Reformist Action in Nineteenth-Century Tunisia, The American
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 20:2 (2008):
58
For more on Islam in Tunisia, see Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Politicization of Islam: A Case-Study of
Tunisia (Boulder CO: Westview, 1998).
59
Tamir Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary
Egypt, International Journal of Middle East Studies 32:1 (2000): 9.
60
This is well captured in Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 1999 and Bayat, Making
Islam Democratic.
61
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World, PS, September
1994, p. 508.
62
Hazem Kandil, Sisis Turn, London Review of Books 36(4), February 20, 2014: 17-19.
63
Esposito and Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam, p. 92.
64
Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, pp. 211-212.
65
Quoted in Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 167.
66
Hamdi, The Politicization, p. 126.
67
Quoted in Torelli, The AKP Model, p. 76.
68
Wickham, Mobilizing Islam.
69
Quoted in. Esposito and Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam, , p. 114.
70
Rachid Ghannouchi, The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic Government, in John Donohue and
John Esposito, eds. Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), pp. 271-278.
71
Rikke Haugblle, and Francesco Cavatorta, Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand Up? Opposition
Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2011):
323-341.
72
See Torelli, The AKP Model, Oguzhan Gksel, Perceptions of the Turkish Model in Post-Revolutionary
Tunisia, Turkish Studies, forthcoming, and Mark Lynch, Rached Ghannouchi: the FP Interview, Foreign
Policy, December 5, 2011.
73
Azzam Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Doubts about Ennadhas intentions from various Tunisian actors are discussed in Gksel, Perceptions.
74
Wickham, Mobilizing Religion, p. xi.
75
Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 177.
76
Sebnem Gumuscu, Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt.
Comparative Political Studies 43:7 (2010): 835-861.
77
Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (New York: Palgrave 2013).
78
Both states had elections, but opposition parties were restricted and limits on freedom of expression and use of
emergency laws and security police (mukhabarat) disqualify them as democratic.
79
For more on these factors, see Landolt and Kubicek, Constraints and Opportunities.

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