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(47)

UNITED STATES V. CHIU GUIMCO, 36 PHIL 917 (1917)


EN BANC: Arellano, Johnson, Araullo, Carson, Malcolm
PONENTE: J. Street
Jose A. Clarin and Irureta Goyena & Recto for appellant Guimco.
Attorney-General Avancena for appellee United States
NATURE: Appeal filed by accused Chiu Guimco to reversed CFI Misamis judgment subjecting
him to a fine of P1,800 for violation of Sec 628 Code of Civil Procedure and ordering him to
be confined in jail until he should produce the will of his deceased brother, or until the
further order of the court
FACTS: Joaquin Cruz, a Chinese merchant living in Gingoog, Misamis, died while visiting
China. Before his departure from the Philippines, he executed a will before Anastasio
Servillon (notary public), in which Chiu Guimco (brother) and Co-Iden were named as
executors
1. Upon Cruzs death, Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden appeared before Servillion and at their
request, Servillon drew up a petition for the probate of the will. The will, however,
was not produced before the notary public and he was not informed as to who had
the will.
2. In Sept 1910, Chiu Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of the
deceased, entered into an agreement with Maria Villafranca (decedents Filipina wife;
married 1902) whereby she relinquished her claims to the estate for a consideration.
3. In 1914, Uy Cuan secured a special permit to enter the Philippines for 6 months to
effect the settlement of her deceased husband. Chiu Guimco informed her that he
and his deceased brother had been partners in the business.
4. He also entered into an agreement with Uy Cuan (decedents Chinese wife; married
1898) for the distribution of the estate and for the payment of rentals on her interest
in the real estate. No payments were made
5. Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, made inquiries into the affairs of the
estate and on Jan 26, 1915, wrote a letter the Chiu Guimco to produce the will to
institute probate proceedings
6. After consulting with Antonio Yacapin, Chiu Guimco replied that the will in question
had never been in his possession and that he had never seen it
7. A complaint was then filed under Sec 628 Code of Civil Procedure charging Chiu
Guimco with the failure to produce the will within the time required by law.
8. The court found Chiu Guimco guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1,800.
9. Subsequently, the court believing that the will was still in Chiu Guimcos possession,
ordered him to produce the will but Guimco failed to do so. The court ordered the
confinement of Guimco in the provincial jail.
ISSUE: WON the judge acted within his power when he ordered the commitment of Guimco
to the provincial jail
RULING: No.
RATIO: Sec 629 Code of Civil Procedure (now Rule 75 Sec 5), which allows imprisonment of
a person who neglects to deliver a will after the death of the testator without reasonable
cause, can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where administration proceedings are
not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that
there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action
by the court under this section appropriate.

ISSUE: WON a person may be criminally prosecuted for failure to produce a will upon the
death of the testator
RULING: No.
RATIO: The remedy provided in section 629 Code of Procedure is clearly a totally different
remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628 (now Rule 75 Sec 4). It is not
permissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.
To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec. 628 would virtually
compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will by him would be
conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would
constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in a criminal action the
defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.
1.
CRIMINAL LAW; FAILURE OF EXECUTOR TO PRODUCE WILL. The testator, having
executed his will, confided it to the keeping of one of the executor named therein. After the
death of the testator this executor failed to present the instrument to the court within the
time provided by law; and a criminal prosecution was thereupon instituted against him
under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that in this action the court
could not commit the defendant to jail under the authority conferred by section 629 of the
same code.
2.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; COMMITMENT FOR FAILURE TO PRODUCE WILL.
A court cannot make a valid order committing a person to jail for failure to produce the
will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except
when acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons.

(48)
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON
applicant-appellant, 36 PHIL 156 (1918)
EN BANC: Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avancena, Fisher
PONENTE: J. Street
Hartigan & Welch for applicant-appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibanez de Johnson, personally and as guardian, and for
Simeona Ibanez
NATURE: Appeal filed by Ingeborg to annul the decree of probate of Johnsons will and to
put the estate into intestate administration and to be declared as the sole legitimate heir
FACTS: Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died
testate in Manila on Feb 3, 1916
1. His will was a holographic instrument, signed and written in his own handwriting, but
was signed by 2 witnesses only (instead of 3 as required by Sec 618 Code of Civil
Procedure)
2. Thereafter (Feb 9, 1916) the will was presented before CFI Manila for probate on the
ground that the Johnson was a US citizen (Illinois) at the time of his death and that
the will was executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois
3. After publication of the notice, the hearing was set for March 6, 1916. On March 16,
1916, the will was declared legal and admitted to probate. The court appointed Victor
Johnson and John T. Pickett (refused to serve) administrators
4. The will disposed of the decedents estate:
a. 100 shares of Johnson-Pickett Rope Co to Victor Johnson (brother)
b. P20,000 to decedents parents in Sweden
c. P5,000 to Ebba Ingeborg
d. P75/month to wife, Alejandra Ibanez, if she remains single
e. P65/month to Simeona Ibanez (spinster) if she remains single
f. The rest of the property to five children: Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor
and Alberto
5. Based on the records of the case, the court found:
a. Emil Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877 and emigrated to the US and lived in
Chicago from 1893 to 1898
b. On May 9, 1898, Johnson married Rosalie Ackeson. They had one daughter: Ebba
Ingeborg (born October 16, 1898). He was then drafted to the military and went
to the Philippines
c. After Johnson was discharged from the military, he continued to live in the
Philippines. Subsequently, Rosalie obtained a divorce decree before the Circuit
Court of Cook Country, Illinois for desertion.
d. On Jan 10, 1903, Johnson became a naturalized US citizen (at Chicago) but he
continued to reside in the Philippines until his death
e. In the Philippines, he married Alejandra Ibanez and had 3 children: Mercedes,
Encarnacion and Victor. He had 2 children with Simeona Ibanez: Eleonor and
Alberto

6. 3 months after the probate of the will (June 12, 1916), the lawyers of Ebba Ingeborg
filed an opposition to the will. They moved to vacate the order of the court dated
March 16 and other orders in the case.
7. CFI Manila denied the motion on Feb 20, 1917. Ingeborg filed an appeal to SC
8. Ingeborg argued that:
a. Johnson was a resident of Manila at the time the will was executed
b. The will was invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property
c. The probate was without notice to Ingeborg
d. CFI Manila acted without jurisdiction in the probate of the will
ISSUE: WON CFI Manila had jurisdiction over the case
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: CFI Manila complied with all the steps required by law for the probate of the will and
the probate was effected in external conformity with al legal requirements.
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and publication was sufficient to
allow the court with jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding.
As held in In Re Davis: The proceeding as to the probate of a will is sufficiently one in rem,
and thus binding against the whole world. The fact that an heir or other interested party is
so far away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the date appointed for
the probate of the will does not render the order of probate void for lack of due process.
ISSUE: WON Ingeborg may appeal within 1 year after the will was admitted to probate
RULING: No.
RATIO: Sec 113 Code of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for relief from judgment may
be filed within six months after such judgment. As such, Ingeborg had 6 months from March
16, 1916 to file for relief from judgment .
ISSUE: WON a will executed in Illinois may be probated in the Philippines
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: The authority expressed in Sec 636 Code of Civil Procedure for the probate of the
will of a citizen of another state or country is applicable to the case of a citizen of a State of
the American Union domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON the probate of the will affects the intrinsic validity of the will
RULING: No.
RATIO: The probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, since the
decree of probate is conclusive only as to the due execution of the will (formal requisites of
the will). With respect to the latter, the will is governed by the substantive law relative to
descent and distribution.
Under Sec 636 Code of Civil Procedure, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will of an
alien is governed by the laws of the State of which he is a citizen.
ISSUE: WON Johnson is a US citizen

RULING: Yes.
RATIO: The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date
stated the testator became a citizen of the United States and by inference, of Illinois.
There is no law in force by virtue of which any alien can become a naturalized citizen of the
Philippines. Therefore, it is impossible for the testator to expatriate himself from the US and
change his political status from being a US citizen to that of a Filipino citizen.
DISPOSITIVE: Order appealed from is affirmed.
1.
WILLS; PROBATE; PUBLICATION OF NOTICE. Where a will is duly probated after
publication pursuant to Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order admitting the
will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against all persons. The fact that an heir or other
interested party lives so far away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at
the date appointed for the probate of the will does not render the order of probate void for
lack of due process.
2.
ID.; ID.; APPLICATION TO SET PROBATE ASIDE. Under Section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure a court has the authority upon timely application of any interested party to
set aside the probate of a will and grant a rehearing, where a proper case for the exercise of
this power is made to appear in the application.
3.
ID.; AMERICAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. The authority expressed
in Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the probate of the will of a citizen of another
state or country is applicable to the case of a citizen of a State of the American Union
domiciled in the Philippine Islands.
4.
STATUTES; INTERPRETATION; PUNCTUATION AND CAPITALIZATION. It is a rule of
hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the
language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written
words.
5.
ID.; ID.; EPIGRAPH. The epigraph, or heading, of a section of a statute, being
nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the section, cannot have the effect
of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text.
6.
WILLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF PROBATE; INTRINSIC VALIDITY. While the probate of a
will is conclusive as to compliance with all formal requisites necessary to the lawful
execution of the will, such probate does not affect the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will. With respect to the latter the will is governed by the substantive law relative to
descent and distribution. s
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; WILL OF AMERICAN CITIZEN. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will of a citizen of one of the American States, proved under Section 636 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, is governed by the laws of the State of which he is a citizen.
8.
CITIZENSHIP; AMERICANS RESIDENT IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. When a person who is
a citizen of the United States and therefore also a citizen of the State in which he was born
or naturalized becomes a resident of the Philippine Islands, he cannot acquire a new
citizenship here; and he must be assumed to retain his State citizenship along with his
status as a citizen of the United States.

9.
EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union,
although they may take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress.

(49)
TESTATE ESTATE OF GREGORIO VENTURA. MARIA VENTURA (executrix-appellant),
MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA V. GREGORIA VENTURA and husband
EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and husband PEDRO D. CORPUZ, G.R.
NO L-26306 (1988)
2ND DIVISION: Padilla, Sarmiento, Melencio-Herrera, Yap
PONENTE: J. Paras
NATURE: Appeal from the order of CFI Guimba, Nueva Ecija Branch 4 in the testate
proceedings of Gregorio Ventura, which removed Maria Ventura as executrix and
administratrix of the estate, and in her place, appointing Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria
Ventura as joint administrators
FACTS: Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura, while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his brother and mother. On the other
hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the decedents legitimate children from
his former wife, Paulina Simpliciano, but the paternity of the appellees was denied by the
deceased in his will
1. During the lifetime of Gregorio Ventura (Dec 14, 1953), Gregorio filed a petition for
the probate of the will which did not include the appellees. In the said will, Maria
Ventura was named and appointed as executrix. The will was then admitted to
probate on Jan 14, 1954
2. Subsequently, Gregorio Ventura died (Sept 26, 1955). As such, Maria filed a motion
for her appointment as executrix and for issuance of letters testamentary. She was
then appointed executrix (Oct 17, 1955)
3. Pursuant to her duties as administrator of the estate, Maria filed her accounts of
administration (June 17, 1960).
4. This was opposed by spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz (July 25, 1960) and
by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura (Aug 5, 1963). They alleged that the report
does not reflect the true income of the estate and that some expenses are allegedly
not administration expenses
5. On Jan 25, 1961, Maria filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the
accounts of administration or to have the accounts approved without the opposition
of the appellees on the ground that the paternity of Mercedes and Gregoria are still
pending before SC.
6. Mercedes and Gregoria filed an opposition to the motion and argued that their
paternity had already been decided by CFI and as such, they have reason to protect
their interest. The motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts was
denied (Feb 9, 1961)
7. CFI set the case for pre-trial on Aug 7, 1963 in connection with the accounts of Maria
(June 17) and the motion to annul the provision of will filed by Mercedes (Dated July
14, 1962)
8. Thereafter, Mercedes filed 4 motions (Oct 22, 1963)
a. to remove Maria as executrix
b. to require Maria to deposit the harvest of palay in a bonded warehouse
c. to render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of administration
d. to include certain properties which were excluded by Maria in her accountin
9. Exequiel and Gregoria filed joint motions to require an updated accounting and to
require the executrix to included excluded properties in her inventory

10. The grounds for the removal of Maria as executrix are:


a. Gross incompetence
b. Maliciously and purposely concealing certain properties of the estate in the
inventory
c. Merely an illegitimate daughter who does not have a harmonious relationship with
appellees
d. Neglect to render accounts and failure to comply with order of CFI (Dec 12, 1963)
which required her to render an accounting for the years 1961-1963
e. Permanent physical defect which hinders her from performing her duties as
administratrix
11. On May 15, 1965, Maria finally submitted her accounts of administration from 1961
to 1965 which was again opposed by appellees
12. Maria filed an opposition to the motion for the removal of the executrix and prayed
that it be held in abeyance until the status of Mercedes and Gregoria are finally
determined
13. On Sept 13, 195, CFI denied the suspension of the proceedings and deferred the
resolution for the removal of Maria. It also ordered the deposit of the palay in a
bonded warehouse.
14. Appellees again filed their opposition to the May 17 accounting of Maria alleging that
the accounts do not reflect the actual income and expenses of the estate
15. Upon finding that Maria squandered the funds of the estate, the court (dated Oct 5,
1965) removed Maria as executrix and in her place, appointed Mercedes and
Gregoria as joint administrators
16. On July 19, 1967, Atty. Arturo Tolentino (for Mercedes and Pedro) and Atty. Jose J.
Francisco (for Gregoria and Exequiel) having failed to submit their briefs (which
expired on July 2 and May 29, 1967), the SC resolved to consider the case submitted
for decision without said appellees brief
ISSUE: WON the removal of Maria as executrix is legally justified
RULING: Yes. (but the court ruled that the issue had become moot and academic)
RATIO: Under Art 854 NCC, the prepetition or omission of one, some or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. As a result of which,
intestacy shall follow.
Rule 78 Sec 6 ROC provides that when no executor is named in the will or if the executor is
incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give a bond, a petition shall be granted to the
surviving wife or next of kin (upon court discretion) to be appointed as administrator.
CAB: The surviving spouse of the deceased is Juana Cardona while the next of kind are
Mercedes and Gregoria, Maria and Miguel. The next of kin has been defined as those persons
entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedents property. The nearest of kin,
whose interest is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
As decided in a separate case by the CFI and SC, Mercedes and Gregoria are the legitimate
children of Gregorio and Paulina. As such, being the nearest of kin of the decedent, they are
entitled to preference over Maria and Miguel in the administration of the decedents estate.
J. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DISSENTING: Preterition results in total intestacy if it was
mistakenly made or through inadvertence. In this case, there was no mistake whatsoever.
The testator himself sought the probate of his will during his lifetime wherein not only did he
exclude Mercedes and Gregoria but even denied their paternity.

Under such circumstances, the omission which was intentional, the effect is a defect
disinheritance covered by Art 918 NCC under which the institution of heir is not wholly void
but only insofar as it prejudices the legitimes of the persons disinherited. The nullity is
partial unlike in true prepetition where the nullity is total.
1.
CIVIL PROCEDURE; DECISION IN CIVIL CASES NOS. 1064 AND 1476 BECAME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY UPON FINALLITY OF THE ORDER APPROVING THE PARTITION DIRECTED IN
THE QUESTIONED DECISION. And so, acting upon appellees motion to dismiss appeal, it is
Our considered opinion that the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1746 declaring that
the appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of the deceased
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the
annulment of the institution of heirs made in the probated will of said deceased became final
and executory upon the finality of the order approving the partition directed in the decision
in question.
2.
CIVIL LAW; WILL; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS; THE PREVIOUS APPOINTMENT OF MARIA
VENTURA AS EXECUTRIX RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Under Article 854 of the Civil
Code, the Preterition of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious, and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous
appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now necessitate
the appointment of another administrator.
3.
SAME; SAME; INTESTACY; SECTION 6, RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT PROVIDES
THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF ANOTHER ADMINISTRATOR. Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: When and to whom letters of administration granted.IF
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) to
the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or the next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such persons as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.
4.
SAME; SAME; SAME; NEXT OF KIN; MEANING. In the case at bar, the surviving
spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The next of kin has been
defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedents
property (Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that the nearest
of kind, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator. Among members of a class the strongest ground for preferences is the
amount or preponderance of interest. as between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
preferred.
5.
SAME; SAME; SAME; SAME; MERCEDES AND GREGORIA VENTURA HAVING DECLARED
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF GREGORIO VENTURA AND HIS WIFE THE LATE PAULINA
SIMPLICIANO ARE ENTITLED TO PREFERENCE OVER THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN MARIA AND
MIGUEL VENTURA. As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife,
the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are
entitled to preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and
Gregoria Vetura as nearest of kind, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in
the discretion of the court, in order to represent both interests.

(50)
UNITED STATES V. CHIU GUIMCO, 36 PHIL 917 (1917)
ISSUE: WON the judge acted within his power when he ordered the commitment of Guimco
to the provincial jail
RULING: No.
RATIO: Sec 629 Code of Civil Procedure (now Rule 75 Sec 5), which allows imprisonment of
a person who neglects to deliver a will after the death of the testator without reasonable
cause, can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where administration proceedings are
not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that
there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action
by the court under this section appropriate.
ISSUE: WON a person may be criminally prosecuted for failure to produce a will upon the
death of the testator
RULING: No.
RATIO: The remedy provided in section 629 Code of Procedure is clearly a totally different
remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628 (now Rule 75 Sec 4). It is not
permissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.
To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec. 628 would virtually
compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will by him would be
conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would
constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in a criminal action the
defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.
1.
CRIMINAL LAW; FAILURE OF EXECUTOR TO PRODUCE WILL. The testator, having
executed his will, confided it to the keeping of one of the executor named therein. After the
death of the testator this executor failed to present the instrument to the court within the
time provided by law; and a criminal prosecution was thereupon instituted against him
under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that in this action the court
could not commit the defendant to jail under the authority conferred by section 629 of the
same code.
2.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; COMMITMENT FOR FAILURE TO PRODUCE WILL.
A court cannot make a valid order committing a person to jail for failure to produce the

will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except
when acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons.

(51)
SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL AND CONSOLACION SIOSON V. COURT OF APPEALS
AND REMEDIOS S. EUGENIO-GINO, 409 SCRA 105 (2003)
1ST DIVISION: Davide, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Azcuna
PONENTE: J. Carpio
Delos Santos Delos Santos & Delos Santos for petitioners
Virgilio C. Manguera & Associates for private respondent
NATURE: Petition for review of the CA decision dated Jan 31, 1994 ordering RD Metro Manila
District 3 to place TCT 1321 in the name of Remedios Eugenio-Gino 1
FACTS: Petitioner Consolacion Sioson and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino are the
niece and granddaughter of the late Canuto Sioson.
1. Canuto and 11 other individuals co-owned a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas. In
particular, Catalina, Canuto and Victoriano each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or
1,335 sqm of the property

1 Ponente: J. Corona Ibay-Somera. De Pano Jr. and Isnani, concurring

2. Subsequently, Canuto had the lot surveyed and subdivided into 8 lots (Nov 20, 1951).
Lot 2-A (670 sqm) and lot 2-E (2,000 sqm) were under Canutos name. The remaining
lots were taken by other individuals
3. On Sept 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolacion entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale
wherein Canuto sold his 10/70 share in the property in favor of Consolacion for
P2,250. The instrument was notarized by Notary Public Jose T. Delos Santos of
Navotas. Consolacion immediately took possession of the lots and declared the
property for tax purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes
4. Later, the surviving children of Canuto (Oct 23, 1968): Felicidad and Beatriz, executed
a joint affidavit affirming the sale in favor of Consolacion
5. Consolacion then registered the Deed of Sale and joint affidavit (Oct 28, 1968) with
RD Rizal and was issued a new TCT covering the said lots
6. Several years later, Remedios filed a complaint against spouses Consolacion and
Ricardo Pascual in RTC Malabon Branch 165 for cancellation of TCT and damages.
Remedios claimed she owned the property as the devisee in Catalinas will dated May
29, 1964. She also alleged that Consolacion obtained the properties through fraud
since the property is twice the size of Canutos share.
7. Spouses Pascual sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Since
the basis of the action is fraud, Remedios should have filed the action within 4 years
from the registration of the title in Consolacions name
8. Remedios filed an opposition claiming that she became aware only of Consolacions
title in Feb 1987; as such, she filed her complaint within the 4-year period.
9. In its order (dated April 28, 1988) RTC Malabon denied Pascuals MTD. RTC held that
the reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is evidentiary and
must await the presentation of the parties evidence. During the pre-trial, Remedios
clarified that she was only claiming Catalinas 10/70 share or of Lots 2-A and 2-E
10. The trial court dismissed the case and ordered Remedios to pay P1,000 attorneys
fees.
a. RTC held that the action is based on fraud, hence covered by the 4-year
prescriptive period.
b. Moreover, the trial court noted that Remedios was aware of Consolacions adverse
title since she testified against them in an ejectment suit filed by spouses Pascual
against their tenants.
c. More importantly, Remedios has no right of action against spouses Pascual
because Catalinas last will which is the basis of her claim to title has not been
admitted to probate. Under Art 838, no will passes real or personal property until
it is probate
11. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decision. CA held that Remedios filed the suit to
enforce an implied trust allegedly created in her favor when Consolacion fraudulently
registered her title over the subject properties. As such, the action has not yet
prescribed since the prescriptive period is 10 years and should be counted from Nov
19, 1988. CA held that Catalinas unprobated last will does not preclude Remedios
from seeking reconveyance as the will may subsequently be admitted to probate
ISSUE: WON the 4-year prescriptive period applies to the case
RULING: No.
RATIO: The 4-year prescriptive period is applicable only if the fraud does not give rise to an
implied trust, and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Art 1390 NCC. In such
case, the 4-year period under Art 1391 begins from the time of discovery of the mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
CAB: Remedios is not seeking to annul the Sale nor does she assail the Deed of Absolute
Sale as a voidable contract. However, she alleged that the excess of 1,335 sqm is not part of

the sale. What she seeks is the removal of the excess area that was issued to Consolacion.
(Her action is for Annulment or Cancellation of TCT and Damages).
Remedios action is based on an implied trust under Art 1456 since she claims that the
additional 1,335 sqm was without basis. Remedios asserts that the additional area was
acquired through mistake or fraud and thus Consolacion should be considered as a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful owner to which the applicable prescriptive
period is 10 years under Art 1144 NCC.
ISSUE: WON the action is barred by prescription
RULING: Yes, by the 10-year prescriptive period under Art 1144 NCC.
RATIO: The prescriptive period to cover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to
an implied trust under Art 1456 NCC is 10 years pursuant to Art 1144. It begins to run from
the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when
the adverse party registers the land.
In Adille v. CA, the SC recoked the 10-year prescriptive period for enforcing implied trusts not
from the registration of the adverse title but from actual notice of the adverse title by the
cestui que trust.
Such commission of specific fraudulent conduct is absent in the present case. Other than
asserting that spouses Pascual are guilty of fraud because they secured the property with an
area twice bigger than what Canuto allegedly sold to Consolacion, Remedios did not present
any other proof of spouses Pascuals fraudulent conduct.
CAB: Remedios filed her complaint more than 19 years after Consolacion registered her title
over the subject property. Thus, the action has already prescribed.
ISSUE: WON Remedios is a real party-in-interest
RULING: No.
RATIO: The Rules of Court require that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or suffer from the
judgment in the suit. If one who is not a real party-in-interest brings the action, it is
dismissible for lack of cause of action.
The basis of Remedios claim over the property is Catalinas will. However, the court found
that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the will to probate. Remedios does
not even contest this finding. As a matter of fact, during the trial the probate proceedings
were still pending.
Art 838 NCC states no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with ROC. This means that until the will is admitted to probate, it has
no effect whatsoever and no right can be claimed thereunder.
CA argues that the reconveyance of the lots to Remedios is in her capacity as executrix of
Catalinas will. This is inappropriate since Remedios sued petitioners not in such capacity but
as the alleged owner of the lots.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted. CA decision (Jan 31, 1994) and its resolution (June 15,
1994) are set aside. The complaint filed by Remedios is dismissed.

1.CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; PRESENT ACTION IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION;


THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO RECOVER PROPERTY OBTAINED BY FRAUD OR MISTAKE
GIVING RISE TO AN IMPLIED TRUST UNDER ARTICLE 1456 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS TEN YEARS.
REMEDIOS' action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that
the inclusion of the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without
basis. In effect, REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square
meters through mistake or fraud and thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable
prescriptive period is ten years under Article 1144 and not four years under Articles 1389
and 1391. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by
fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is ten
years pursuant to Article 1144. This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date
the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the
adverse party registers the land. REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more
than 19 years after CONSOLACION registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28
October 1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint late thus warranting its
dismissal. As the Court recently declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Borras, Following
Caro, we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
prescribes in ten years. We went further by specifying the reference point of the ten-year
prescriptive period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.
DTEHIA
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT'S RULING IN ADDILLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS WHICH IS
ANCHORED ON FRAUD IS NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. In holding that the action filed
by REMEDIOS has not prescribed, the Court of Appeals invoked this Court's ruling in Adille v.
Court of Appeals. In Adille, the Court reckoned the ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing
implied trusts not from registration of the adverse title but from actual notice of the adverse
title by the cestui que trust. However, the. Court, in justifying its deviation from the general
rule, explained: [W]hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes (sic) in ten years,
reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we . . . are not prepared to count
the period from such date in this case. We note the petitioner's sub rosa efforts to get hold
of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his
unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother
Feliza["] with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name also. Such
commission of specific fraudulent conduct is absent in the present case. Other than
asserting that petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured title to Lot Nos, 2-A and 2E with an area twice bigger than what CANUTO allegedly sold to CONSOLACION, REMEDIOS
did not present any other proof of petitioners' fraudulent conduct akin to Adille. REMEDIOS
does not assail the KASULATAN or the JOINT AFFIDAVIT as fictitious or forged. REMEDIOS
even admits the authenticity of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 as certified by the Assistant
Director of Lands. Moreover, REMEDIOS has not contested petitioners' claim that CANUTO
doubled his share in Lot 2 by acquiring VICTORIANO's share. Plainly, the increase in the area
sold from 1,335 square meters. to 2,670 square meters is a glaring mistake. There is,
however, no proof whatsoever that this increase in area was the result of fraud. Allegations
of fraud in actions to enforce implied trusts must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Adille, which is anchored on fraud, cannot apply to the present case.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSUMING THAT THE TEN-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD BEGINS TO
RUN ONLY UPON ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE ADVERSE TITLE APPLYING THE RULING IN ADILLE
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, STILL RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO FILE THE SUIT IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION. Even if we apply Adille to this case, prescription still bars REMEDIOS'
complaint. As executrix of CATALINA's LAST WILL, REMEDIOS submitted to the then Court of
First Instance of Caloocan in Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 the inventory of all the
property comprising CATALINA's estate, which included Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. In a motion
dated 7 November 1977, CONSOLACION sought the exclusion of these lots from the
inventory, invoking her title over them. REMEDIOS was served a copy of the motion on 8

November 1977 against which she filed an opposition. Nevertheless, the trial court overruled
REMEDIOS' objection. In its order of 3 January 1978, the trial court granted CONSOLACION's
motion and ordered the exclusion of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E from the estate of CATALINA.
REMEDIOS did not appeal from this ruling. REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners'
adverse title on 8 November 1977. Even if, for the sake of argument, the ten-year
prescriptive period begins to run upon actual notice of the adverse title, still REMEDIOS' right
to file this suit has prescribed. REMEDIOS had until 11 November 1987 within which to file
her complaint. When she did so on 4 February 1988, the prescriptive period had already
lapsed.
4.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION; RESPONDENT IS NOT A
REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST. Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS' complaint. REMEDIOS
is also not a real party-in-interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly
ruled. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or
suffer from the judgment in the suit. If one who is not a real party-in-interest brings the
action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of action. REMEDIOS anchored her claim over
Lot Nos. 2-A and 2 E (or over its one-half portion on the devise of these lots to her under
CATALINA's LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue
any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding.
Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still
pending. Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This Court
has interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder." REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this
suit on her being a devisee of CATALINA's LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has
not admitted CATALINA's LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST
WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos.
2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.
SYNOPSIS: Petitioner Consolacion Sioson and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino are
the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson. Canuto and 11 other
individuals, including his sister Catalina Sioson and his brother Victoriano Sioson, were coowners of a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245,
which had an area of 9,347 square meters and was covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Catalina, Canuto, and Victoriano each
owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2. On September 26, 1956,
Canuto and Consolacion allegedly executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan wherein Canuto
sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion. Consolacion immediately took
possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the land for taxation purposes and
paid the corresponding real estate taxes. On February 4, 1988, respondent Remedios S.
Eugenio-Gino filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for "Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title and Damages." Remedios claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A
and 2-E because her aunt Catalina Sioson devised the lots to her in her last will and
testament. Consolation and her spouse sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and Remedios should
have filed the action within four years from the registration of Consolacion's title on 28
October 1968, and not some 19 years later on February 4, 1988. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss. Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case. On
appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners filed a petition
before the Court questioning the Court of Appeals' ruling.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioners and granted the petition. According to the
Court, the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to

an implied trust under Article 1144. Remedios' action is based on an implied trust under
Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT
No. (232252) 1321 was without basis. In effect, she asserts that Consolacion acquired the
additional 1,335 square meters through mistake or fraud and thus Consolacion should be
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property.
Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten years under Article 1144 and not four years
under Articles 1389 and 1391. The ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date
the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the
adverse party registers the land. Remedios filed her complaint on February 4, 1988 or more
than 19 years after Consolacion registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October
1968. Unquestionably, Remedios filed the complaint late warranting its dismissal.

(52)
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDMUND SANTIBANEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBANEZ ARIOLA, 452 SCRA 228 (2005)
2ND DIVISION: Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, Chico-Nazario
PONENTE: J. Callejo Sr.
Macalino & Associates for petitioner
Roberto Cal Catolico for respondents

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 ROC which seeks the reversal of the
CA decision2 (May 30, 2001) affirming the dismissal 3 by RTC Makati Branch 63 of civil case
filed by petitioner
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, Efraim Santibanez obtained a loan from First Countryside Credit
Corp (FCCC) for P128,000 to pay for the diesel tractor. To secure his obligation, he and his
son (Edmund) executed a promisorry note in favor of FCCC
1. Efraim Santibanez obtained a second loan (Dec 13, 1980) with FCCC for P123,156 to
pay for another diesel tractor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note
for the said amount in favor of FCCC. In addition, they also signed a continuing
guaranty agreement for the loan dated Dec 13, 1980
2. Efraim died in February 1981), leaving a holographic will. As such, testate
proceedings were commenced before RTC Iloilo City Branch 7. On April 9, 1981,
Edmund was appointed special administrator of the decedents estate.
3. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs (Edmund and his
sister, Florence Santibanez Ariola) executed a joint agreement (dated July 22, 1981)
to divide between themselves the 3 tractors left by the decedent, i.e. two tractors
will go to Edmund and one for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of the decedent corresponding to the tractor they have taken
4. Meanwhile, FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank (dated Aug 20, 1981)
5. Consequently, Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) sent demand letters for the
settlement of his account with FCC, which the latter refused to pay. As such, UBP filed
a collection suit against Edmund and Florence as heirs of Efraim, before RTC Makati
Branch 150. Summonses were issued against both but it was not served on Edmund
as he was in the US at the time and could not be located. Accordingly, the complaint
was narrowed down to Florence
6. In her answer (Dec 7, 1988), Florence alleged the loan documents do not bind her
since she was not a party thereto. And since the joint agreement was not approved
by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the bank
under the joint agreement
7. On Jan 29, 1990, the case was re-raffled to RTC Makati Branch 63. RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit and found that:
a. UBPs claim should have been filed with the probate court where the testate
estate of the decedent was pending as an obligation the decedent
b. The joint agreement cannot bind Florence since it was void for not being
approved by the probate court
c. UBP failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank
to which FCCC assigned its assigned its assets and liabilities
d. The list of assets and liabilities of FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account
8. On appeal to CA, petitioner argued that the obligation of the decedent was
transferred to his heirs; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped
Florence from denying her liability; the property partition in the agreement was not
one of those enumerated in the will; the active participation of Florence in the civil
action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the testate proceedings
9. CA denied the appeal on the following grounds:
a. The claim should have been filed with the probate court following Rule 86 Sec 1
and 5
b. The partition was null and void for not having been approved by the probate court

2 Ponente: Bienvenido L. Reyes with Eubulo G. Verzola and Marina L. Buzon (concurring)
3 Penned by presiding judge Julio R. Logarta

c. The properties are covered by the holographic will when the deceased referred to
them as all other properties.
d. The active participation of Florence did not amount to a waiver
ISSUE: WON the partition in the joint agreement is valid
RULING: No. There can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.
RATIO: In testate succession, no valid partition can be had until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requites it, because unless a
will is probated and notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will
decides issues such as the capacity of the testator to execute a will and the formal
requirements for the validity of the will.
ISSUE: WON the partition in the joint agreement is valid
RULING: No.
RATIO: The provision in the holographic will is all-encompassing; it covers all the properties
left by the decedent which might have escaped his might at the time he executed the will
and any property he may have acquired thereafter.
The joint agreement between Edmund and Florence is invalid since the tractors are covered
by the will and more so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of the will.
It must stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the decedent. To dispose of them in any way without the courts approval is to
divest the probate court of its jurisdiction over the same. Thus, the joint agreement, being in
the nature of an extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative.
ISSUE: WON UBP can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased
RULING: No.
RATIO: A reading of the joint agreement shows that the assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an event, i.e. that each heir shall take possession of their
respective share in the agreement. The partition, being invalid, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any
force and effect.
Moreover, it must be noted that the loan was contracted by the decedent. As such, the bank
should have filed its money claim with the probate court pursuant to Rule 86 Sec 5.
The bank cannot hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by the decedent. The
promissory notes were signed by the decedent and Edmund. Since it failed to file the claim
with the probate court, it may go after Edmund as co-maker. However, the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund.
ISSUE: WON UBP is a real party-in-interest
RULING: No.

RATIO: UBP had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, the assignee of FCCC. Nowhere in the Deed of Assignment can
UBPs participation as a party be found. Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now UBP.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OF A PROBATE COURT.
[W]ell-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned
with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
2.
CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; TESTATE SUCCESSION; IN TESTATE SUCCESSION,
THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED. "In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires
it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of
a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity
of a will."
3.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE; FILING OF A
MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE IN THE PROBATE COURT IS MANDATORY IN
CASE AT BAR. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto
"have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the abovedescribed chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each
heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was
made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect. The Court
notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of
the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of CourtThe filing of a money
claim against the decedent's estate in the probate court is mandatory.
(53)
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG V. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon.
RICARDO PRONOVE, as judge of CFI Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, 114 SCRA
478 (1982)
1ST DIVISION: Teehankee, Makasiar, Plana, Relova, Vasquez, Gutierrez Jr.
PONENTE: J. Melencio-Herrera
NATURE: Petition to review the decision of CA (dated April 28, 1981) which held that the
trial judges order dismissing the testate proceeding was final in nature
FACTS: Clemencia Asaneta, single, died in Manila on May 21, 1977. She left a holographic
will bequeathing all her real properties to Soledad Maninang
1. On June 9, 1977, Soledad Maninang filed a petition for the probate of the will of the
decedent with CFI Quezon City Branch 4

2. Subsequently, Bernardo Asaneta, the decedents adopted son and claiming to be the
sole heir of the decedent, instituted intestate proceedings with CFI Pasig Branch 11
3. The testate and intestate cases were later consolidated before CFI Pasig Branch 11
presided by judge Pronove (Dec 23, 1977)
4. Bernardo filed MTD the testate proceeding on the ground that the holographic will
was null and void and because he, as compulsory heir, was preterited and as such,
intestacy should ensue.
5. Soledad opposed the MTD on the ground that the probate courts jurisdiction is
limited to the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively
disinherited by the decedent
6. CFI Pasig dismissed the testate proceeding based on the grounds raised by Bernardo.
CFI Pasig denied the MR (Dec 19, 1980) for lack of merit and appointed Bernardo as
the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
7. As such, Soledad filed a petition for certiorari before CA alleging that CFI Pasig
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the testate case
8. CA denied the certiorari (April 28, 1981) and ruled that the trial judges order of
dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the testate case and as such,
appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy
ISSUE: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
testate case
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: As a general rule, the probate of a will is mandatory. This is based on provisions of
the Civil Code and Rules of Court which provide that no will shall pass real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with ROC.
The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property is rendered nugatory.
ISSUE: WON the probate court may decide on questions involving the intrinsic validity of the
will
RULING: As a general rule, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity but
as an exception, the probate court may address the issue of the intrinsic validity of the will
when practical considerations demand it.
RATIO: The Nuiguid and Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. In those
cases, the intrinsic validity of the wills was passed upon even before probate because
practical considerations so demanded. In the Nuguid case, the main controversy was the
intrinsic validity of the will as it completely preterited the parents of the testator.
CAB: A crucial issue that must be resolved is whether under the terms of the decedents will,
Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited.
ISSUE: What is the distinction between preterition and disinheritance?
RULING: Preterition and disinheritance two difference concepts
RATIO: Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the force heirs or anyone
or them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited/

Disinheritance, on the other hand, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory


heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
The effect of preterition under Art 854 NCC is to annul the institution of heirs, i.e. the
annulment is in toto and unless in the will, there are testamentary dispositions such as
devises or legacies. On the other hand, in disinheritance, the nullity is limited to that portion
of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
Because the lower court dismissed the testate case, the determination of the controversial
issue had not been thoroughly considered. However, based on the order of respondent
judge, Bernardo had ben preterited.
ISSUE: WON Soledad availed of the proper remedy
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: An act done by the probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by
certiorari. And even assuming that appeal is available, certiorari may be entertained,
particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief
DISPOSITIVE: Decision in question of CA is set aside and the orders of CFI Rizal Branch 11
(dated Sept 8, 1980 and Dec 19, 1980) are nullified. Case is remanded to CFI Pasig, to be
consolidated with testate proceedings.
1.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS;
PROBATE OF A WILL MANDATORY AS A GENERAL RULE. Generally, the probate of a Will is
mandatory under Art. 838 of the Civil Code. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and
public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered
nugatory. (Guevarra vs. Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479 [1943])
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS; PRETERITION DEFINED. ". . . Preterition
"consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 323)" (Nuguid vs. Nuguid,
supra ).
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISINHERITANCE DEFINED. "Disinheritance, in turn, is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil
Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases" (ibid).
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISINHERITANCE AND PRETERITION DISTINGUISHED.
"Disinheritance is always 'voluntary'; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
'involuntary' (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd. edition, Volumen 2, o.p.
1131)." ". . . The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code "shall annul the institution
of heir." This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
disposition in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918
of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also 'annul the institution of heirs', but only
'insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited', which last phrase was omitted in the
case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better
stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.'' (ibid).

5.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; PROPER REMEDY WHEN
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE TESTATE
CASE; CASE AT BAR,- Where by virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination
of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered and it was gathered from the
assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been
preterited while from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable, respondent
Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case and certiorari is a
proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by Certiorari (Llamas vs. Moscoso, 95 Phil. 599 [1954] and even assuming the existence of
the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader interest of justice, a petition
for Certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief.
6.
ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; WILLS;
PROBATE LIMITED TO DETERMINATION OF DUE EXECUTION. . . . The authentication of a
will decides no other question than such as touch the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of
the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may
be raised even after the will has been authenticated (Montanano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676
[1909]) "Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will cannot be
entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios vs. Palacios,
58. O.G, 220)
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NUGUID AND BALANAY CASES AS EXCEPTIONS; NOT APPLICABLE
TO CASE AT BAR. The cases of Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449 [1966]), and Balanay vs.
Hon. Martinez (64 SCRA 452 [1975]), provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic
validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical
consideration" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted
aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case
before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on
the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded. Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled
that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In
the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the
decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter,
whether it was a valid disinheritance.
SYNOPSIS: Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed in the Court of First Instance Branch IV,
Quezon City (Sp. Proc. Q-23304 hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case) a Petition for the
probate of the holographic will executed in her favor, by the decedent Clemencia Aseneta
who died single at the age of 81, while private respondent Bernardo Aseneta, an adopted
son claiming to be the sole heir of the decedent, instituted intestate proceedings with the
Court of First Instance Branch Xl, Pasig. Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, tailed hereinafter the
intestate Case). Later the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before
Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge. Respondent Bernardo S. Aseneta filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void, as the
only compulsory heir was preterited. Despite petitioner's opposition, the lower Court
dismissed the Testate Case. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals denied the petition, and ruled
that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal being final, the proper remedy was appeal which the
petitioners failed to avail of.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it dismissed the Testate Case as generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory and
because by virtue of said dismissal the crucial issue of whether private respondent had been
preterited or disinherited was not thoroughly considered. Assailed Decision and Orders, set
aside.

(54)
REMEDIOS NUGUID V. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, 17 SCRA 449
(1966)
EN BANC: Concepcion, JBL Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar
PONENTE: J. Sanchez
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant
Beltran, Beltran & Beltran for oppositors and appellees
NATURE:
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died on Dec 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. She was survived by her parents, Felix and Paz Nuguid, and 6 siblings: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto
1. On May 18, 1963, Remedios filed with CFI Rizal a petition for the probate of a
holographic will allegedly executed by the decedent on Nov 17, 1951 (11 years
before)
2. The decedents parents opposed the probate (June 25, 1963) alleging that the
institution of Remedios as universal heir would result in preterition and as such, the
institution is void
3. The decedents parents filed MTD (Aug 29, 1963) on the ground of preterition, which
Remedios opposed (Sept 6, 1963)
4. In its order, CFI Rizal (Nov 8, 1963) dismissed Remedios petition and held that the
will is a complete nullity
5. MR being denied, Remedios appealed to CA
ISSUE: WON the will should be allowed to probate

RULING: No.
RATIO: As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the probate court is limited to the examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. However, the questions on the intrinsic
validity of will may be addressed when practical considerations require so.
ISSUE: WON there is preterition
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. On the other hand, disinheritance is
a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law.
CAB: The universal institution of Remedios to the entire inheritance results in totally
abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heirwithout
any other testamentary disposition in the willamounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written.
Moreover, the will does not explicitly disinherit the decedents parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
ISSUE: WON Remedios stands to inherit from the decedent
RULING: No.
RATIO: Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as
such in a will. Nothing in Art 854 NCC suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in
a willvoid because of preteritionwould give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of the heir.
DISPOSITIVE: The order of Nov 8, 1963 upon review is affirmed.
1.
PROBATE OF WILL; COURT'S AREA OF INQUIRY LIMITED TO EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
WILL; WHEN COURT MAY RULE ON INTRINSIC VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. In a proceeding for
the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will; the due execution thereof; the testatrix's
testamentary capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed the
by law. In the case at bar, however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. They questioned the intrinsic
validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that
the case will come up once again before this Court on the same issue of the intrinsic validity
or nullity of the will. The result would be waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These practical considerations induce this Court to meet head-on the issue of the nullity of
the provisions of the will in question, there being a justiciable controversy awaiting solution.

2.
SUCCESSION; PRETERITION; OMISSION OF NAMES OF FORCED HEIRS. The
deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending time her parents. Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply
omits their names altogether. Said will rather than he labelled ineffective disinheritance is
clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
3.
ID.; ID.; PRETERITION DISTINGUISHED FROM DISINHERITANCE. Preterition "consists
in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited." (Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, at al., 72 Phil., p. 325.) Disinheritance;
in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of heir share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law," 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases.) Disinheritance is always
"voluntary"; preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary." (Sanchez
Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil, 2nd edition, Volume 20, p. 1131.)
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS FLOWING FROM PRETERITION AND DISINHERITANCE. The
effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the Civil Code "shall annul the institution of heir. "This annulment is in
toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises
or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice
the person disinherited," which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. (III
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961. Edition, p. 172.) Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited
heirs have been illegally deprived.
6.
ID.; ID.; WHEN LEGACIES AND DEVISES MERIT CONSIDERATION. Legacies and
devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing
in Article 854 of the Civil Code suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will
void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance.
As to him, the will is inexistent. There must he, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of heir.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED LEGACY. Petitioner
insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their
legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the
heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. This theory, if adopted, will result
in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution
of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the
bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial
nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any
application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said articles concerning the
reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would
be absorbed by Article 817 of the same code.

(55)
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN V. COURT OF APPEALS (3 RD DIVISION), VIRGINIA A.
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, 21 SCRA 1369 (1987)
EN BANC: Teehankee, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes
PONENTE: J. Paras
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari 4 of the decision of CA (Aug 30, 1985) ordering the
dismissal of the petition for probate of will and its resolution (Oct 23, 1985) denying
petitioners MR
FACTS: Nemesio Acain executed a will in bisaya in which his siblings Antonio, Flores, Jose,
Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will was allegedly written
on Feb 17, 1960
1. In the will, the testator bequeathed his share in the conjugal property with Rosa
Diongson to his brother, Segundo Acain. The will contained a provision that should
Segundo predeceased the testator, his share shall be given to the heirs of Segundo.
2. Segundo predeceased Nemesio. As such, on May 29, 1984, Constantino Acain filed
before RTC Cebu Branch 13 a petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor
3. After the petition was set for hearing on June 25, 1984, Virginia Fernandez (legally
adopted daughter of the testator) Rosa Diongson (Nemesios widow) filed MTD on the
following grounds:
a. Constantino had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings
b. He is merely a universal heir
c. The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited
The MTD was denied by the trial court. MR was also denied

4 Penned by J. Jose A. R. Melo and concurred by Milagros German and Nathanael P. De Pano Jr.

4.

As such, respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction which was subsequently referred to IAC (March 11, 1985)
5. IAC granted respondents petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate
proceedings.
6. Petitioner filed MR but was denied.
ISSUE: WON private respondents have been preterited
RULING: There is preterition as to the adopted daughter but not to the widow
RATIO: Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them because they are not mentioned therein, or if mentioned they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art 854 NCC does
not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. The same thing cannot be said of Virginia, whose legal adoption by the
testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that Virginia was totally omitted and the widow was deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a
clear case f preterition of the legally adopted child.
ISSUE: What is the effect of preterition
HELD: Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and such annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal personality to file the instant case
RULING: No.
RATIO: In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he must
have an interest in the estate or in the will, or in the property too be affected by it either as
an executor, claimant or an interest party who would be benefited by the estate.
CAB: Petitioner is not the appointed executor, a devisee or legatee (there being no mention
of any legacy or devise). At the outset, he appears to have interest in the will as an heir
however as intestacy resulted from preterition, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator.
ISSUE: WON certiorari is the proper remedy in this case
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: As a general rule certiorari cannot substitute appeal, except when the questioned
order is an oppressive use of judicial authority.
The remedy of certiorari is not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or
some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. They are, however,
proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a
case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds.
(56)

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG V. SATURNINA


RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA and
ANDREA RAVALO, 21 SCRA 1369 (1967)
EN BANC: Concepcion, JBL Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles,
Fernando
PONENTE: J. Makalintal
Gatchalian & Sison and J.A. Bordelosa Jr. for petitioner-appellee
Jose L. Desvarro Jr. for oppositor-appellants
FACTS: On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed before CFI Quezon a petition for the probate
of a document alleged to be the last will of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on Dec 1, 1959.
Said document dated Feb 26, 1949 institutes Mariano as the sole heir
1. The petition for probate was opposed by 2 sets of oppositors: Saturnino and Santiago
Ramagosa claimed that they are entitled to the estate; the other oppositors, claiming
to be next of kind, prayed for the disallowance of the will
2. Mariano Sumilang presented his evidence and rested his case on Feb 16, 1961.
Reception of the oppositors evidence was set for July 14, 1961. However, on July 3,
the oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate on the ground that
the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject-matter because it was revoked by
implication 6 years prior to his death. They alleged that after the execution of the
will, the decedent sold the subject properties to Mariano and Mario Sumilang; as
such, at the time of the testators death the titles to said lands were no longer in his
name
3. Sumilang opposed the MTD (July 17, 1961 and supplementary Aug 21, 1961). On Oct
22, he moved to strike out the oppositors pleadings on the following grounds:
a. Oppositors have no legal standing to oppose the probate of the will
b. Oppositors have no claim or interest in the distribution of the estate of the
testator and
4. In its order (dated Oct 18, 1963), CFI Quezon denied the MTD on the ground that the
MTD goes to the very intrinsic value of the will itself
ISSUE: WON implied revocation warrants the dismissal of petition for probate
RULING: No.
RATIO: The petition being for probate of the will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to the
extrinsic validity thereof. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
The alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one
thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution
of the document; the second relates to descent and distribution.
ISSUE: WON the oppositors have legal personality to oppose the petition for probate
RULING: No.
RATIO: It is well-settled that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate; and an interested party has
been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has
claim against the estate like a creditor.

The very reason for excluding strangers from contesting the will, is so that the court and the
litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no
interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.
1.REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE OF WILLS. In petitions for probate the Court's area of inquiry
is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, as the testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions thereof or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
(Nuguid vs. Nuguid, L-23445, June 23, 1996).
2.
ID.; ID.; IMPLIED REVOCATION DOES NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR
PROBATE. An alleged disposal by testator to prior to his death of the properties involved in
his will is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the
validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and
distribution.
3.
ID.; ID.; LACK OF INTEREST BARS OPPOSITION TO PROBATE. In order that a person
may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate (go The Hua vs. Chuang Kiat Hua, et al., L-17019, Sept 30, 1963) and an interested
party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor (Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, March 26, 1965). Where
oppositors do not take issue with the probate court's finding that they are totally strangers
to the deceased, or do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which
must be protected, the order striking out their opposition and all other pleadings pertinent
thereto must be affirmed.
4.
ID.; ID.; APPEALS; ORDER STRIKING OUT OPPOSITION TO PROBATE NOT
INTERLOCUTORY. An order striking out an opposition to the probate of the will on the
ground that the oppositors have no personality to intervene in the case is final, and
therefore appealable insofar as they are concerned.

(57)
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS V. JUDGE TOMAS LEONIDAS, CFI MANILA Branch 38,
MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, 129 SCRA 33
(1984)
ISSUE: WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Roberts
motion to dismiss
RULING: No.
RATIO: A testate proceeding in this case is proper because Grimm died with two wills and
Rule 75 Sec 1 provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed.
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding, and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.
1.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; PROBATE THEREOF, MANDATORY; INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS FILED PRIOR TO TESTATE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED WITH
LATTER. We hold that respondent Judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss the petition for
probate of Grimm's two wills. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm
died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
add allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code, Sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court). The probate of the will is
mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Pao, L-42088,
May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.

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