At Rights Malthus - Michigan7 2014 GRAMS

AT: Rights Malthus
2ACNuclear War Turn

Authoritarianism guarantees nuclear warshort circuits deterrence
Holdorf, 10 [Polly Holdorf, graduate of the University of Denvers Josef Korbel School of
International Studies, MA in International Security and a BA in International Studies, Limited
Nuclear War in the 21st Century, http://csis.org/files/publication/110916_Holdorf.pdf, Evan]
There are four specific objectives that nuclear-armed regional adversaries might seek to achieve through the use
of nuclear weapons.14 They might seek to deter the U nited S tates from intervening in a conflict or projecting
military power into the region by threatening escalation . If the United States is not deterred by threats of
escalation, the adversary might consider using its nuclear weapons to limit or defeat U.S. military
operations. The adversary might seek to intimidate U.S. allies or friends within the region, or to split regional political coalitions
apart. Certainly the adversary would attempt to limit U.S. objectives in the confrontation and try to dissuade the United States from
For authoritarian or despotic leaders , nuclear weapons may be seen

as a means of survival . These types of leaders may be preoccupied with the survival not just of their
regimes, but of their own personal survival . Regional adversaries facing a confrontation with the United
States would know beyond any doubt that they faced an opponent with vastly superior military
forces and resources. Adversarial leaders may not be prepared to face the disastrous
consequences of a military defeat, particularly one that would result in their removal from power. Such
leaders may feel that their only hope for survival would be to attempt to stave off , or at least delay, a
defeat by employing a nuclear weapon against U.S. forces. It is also possible that an adversary, knowing that
it cannot and will not prevail, may wish to go out with a bang; or they may wish to be
remembered as the leader who stood up to the U nited S tates by utilizing nuclear weapons. A
number of factors exist that could serve as catalysts for future nuclear use. Latent conflicts within a
regional setting could ignite and nuclear threats may be signaled by one or both sides in order to influence
the opposing states actions. A nuclear state on the verge of losing a conventional war might employ its
nuclear weapons in order to avert defeat. Small nuclear states which harbor feelings of isolation (such as North
seeking to impose regime change.
Korea) could perceive the actions of others as threatening and therefore be intimidated into employing nuclear weapons as a means
to protect their interests. Traditional means of deterrence may not work the same way between small
states as they did with the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Strategic discourse between two small
nuclear-armed states may be lacking, thus elevating the prospect for the collapse of deterrence at the
regional level. Small nuclear states may have flawed or incomplete intelligence regarding their
relative positions in a conflict. A misperception regarding an adversarys intentions could compel a country
to conduct a preemptive strike on the opponents nuclear arsenal or conventional military forces. There is also the
possibility that a small nuclear-armed state may have a deficient command and control structure,
increasing the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch .15 The use of nuclear weapons
in a regional setting could support a range of objectives including coercion, war termination, regime
preservation or even revenge.16 Some states could view the use of nuclear weapons as a means-of-lastresort, while others may view them as the only viable means to alter the status quo or to remedy a
deteriorating regional security situation.17 In some circumstances a state may view the use of nuclear
weapons as the best, or the least bad,18 option available to them. The fear of regime change may be a
compelling reason for a nuclear-armed regional adversary to consider employing nuclear
weapons during a conflict. For leaders who are concerned about their ability to remain in power in the
event of a war with a superiorly armed adversary, nuclear weapons could be viewed as a valuable tool to have
in their arsenal. If an attack by a U.S.-led coalition would pose a significant threat to your regime and your nation
cannot afford conventional forces capable of deterring or defeating such an attack, you may
regard nuclear weapons as the answer.19 One can be certain that the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam
Hussein in 2003 are still very fresh, particularly in the minds of the Iranian and North Korean regimes. These regimes are also
aware that they have been identified as security threats to the United States.
2ACSquo Solves
Status quo solves and eco authoritarianism isnt key
Micah, 10 [Micah White, The Guardian, An alternative to the new wave of ecofascism,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2010/sep/16/authoritarianismecofascism-alternative, 9-16-2010, Evan]
Environmentalism is currently marketed as a luxury brand for guilty consumers. The prevailing assumption is that a fundamental
lifestyle change is unnecessary: being green means paying extra for organic produce and driving a hybrid. The incumbent political
regime remains in power and the same corporations provide new "green" goods; the underlying consumerist ideology is
unquestioned. This brand of environmentalism only emboldens ecofascists who rightly claim that shopping green can never stop the
ecological crisis. And yet, ecofascists are wrong to suggest that the suspension of democracy is the only
alternative. Humanity can avert climate catastrophe without accepting ecological

tyranny . However, this will take an immediate, drastic reduction of our consumption. This
requires the trust that the majority of people would voluntarily reduce their standard of living
once the forces that induce consumerism are overcome. The future of environmentalism is in
liberating humanity from the compulsion to consume. Rampant, earth-destroying consumption is
the norm in the west largely because our imaginations are pillaged by any corporation with an
advertising budget. From birth, we are assaulted by thousands of commercial messages each day whose single mantra is
"buy". Silencing this refrain is the revolutionary alternative to ecological fascism . It is a revolution
which is already budding and is marked by three synergetic campaigns: the criminalisation of
advertising, the revocation of corporate power and the downshifting of the global economy . In
So Paulo, the seventh largest city in the world, outdoor advertising has been banned. Meanwhile, artists in New
York City and Toronto are launching blitzkrieg attacks on billboards, replacing commercials with art .
Their efforts have put one visual polluter out of business. Grassroots organisers in the US are pushing for an
amendment to the constitution that will end corporate personhood while others are fighting to
revive the possibility of death penalties for corporations. The second international conference on
degrowth economics met recently in Barcelona. In Ithaca, New York a local, time-based currency is thriving. Buy
Nothing Day campaign is celebrated in dozens of nations and now Adbusters is upping the ante with a call for
seven days of carnivalesque rebellion against consumerism this November. And, most important of all,
across the world everyday people are silently, unceremoniously and intentionally spending less
and living more. Authoritarian environmentalists fail to imagine a world without
advertising , so they dream of putting democracy "on hold". In Linkola's dystopian vision, the resources of
the state are mobilised to clamp down on individual liberty. But there is no need to suspend democracy if it
is returned to the people . Democratic, anti-fascist environmentalism means marshalling the
strength of humanity to suppress corporations. Only by silencing the consumerist forces will
both climate catastrophe and ecological tyranny be averted . Yes, western consumption will be
substantially reduced. But it will be done voluntarily and joyously.
2ACPerm
No linktheres no forced choice between authoritarian and democratic practices
they can be combined
Blhdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blhdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of
Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology
and environmental policy analysis, Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive
arena Struggling for an innovative debate, http://www.fessustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th
December 2012, Evan]
Common questions which, in addition to the ones cited at the beginning of this essay, figure prominently in the current debate
include: How does the eco-political performance of democratic systems compare to that of authoritarian systems? Will our
democratic systems collapse under the pressure of the environmental crisis? May the achievement of sustainability necessitate a
change of political regime? Like those cited earlier, these questions make a range of implicit assumptions
which are themselves not subjected to any critical enquiry. They pre-structure the debate in ways
that, from the outset, preclude certain lines of investigation. For example, such questions, in a simplifying and
generalising manner, juxtapose democratic and authoritarian systems. However, given that both
democratic and autocratic systems come in a large variety of shapes and that , furthermore,
contemporary democracies are, as outlined above, rapidly acquiring expertocratic-authoritarian
features, while authoritarian systems like China are experimenting with strategies of
decentralisation and local empowerment, such a simplistic binary distinction is manifestly
unhelpful if not outright ideological . It ignores factual political developments and
instead focuses public attention on a hypothetical alternative. In fact, if there is any truth in the diagnosis of a
post-political condition, democratic and autocratic modes of government might find themselves
located on the same side of the new cleavage between the political formulation and implementation of
competing visions of societal organisation and development and the purely managerial execution of
systemic imperatives which are non-negotiable, self-legitimizing and allow for no alternative . In
any case, the alleged choice between democratic and authoritarian policy approaches does not
occur in practical day-to-day politics. And given that in eco-political matters democratic and autocratic forms of government
both have a frighteningly poor performance record, ecologists may feel they are being offered the choice between a rock and a hard
place.
2ACFixed Choice Turn

Their ideology of a fixed choice between democratic and authoritarian action
makes action to confront the problem impossible
Closely related is that the lead-questions which frame the contemporary debate on democracy and
sustainability implicitly suggest that we know what sustainability actually means and what targets
need to be achieved, and only need to decide about the most appropriate political means for getting there. Yet, as the
concept does not provide any specification of exactly what is to be sustained , at which level, for what
reason, and for how long, the meaning of sustainability has so far remained as intangible as the beauty of nature, the intrinsic value
of nature or any other entity that environmentalists have placed at the centre of their concern and political efforts. Beyond this, the
focus of attention on the means, i.e. the How?, entirely eclipses the question of Whether?. Indeed,
the current debates about democracy and sustainability notoriously claim that categorical
ecological imperatives will render a transition towards sustainability inescapable and that in one
way (democratic) or another (authoritarian), sustainability will have to be achieved. Time and again,
reference is being made to supposedly objective bio-physical limits or tipping-points which purportedly
make the transition towards sustainability inevitable, because transcending these limits would
trigger ecological collapse and put the survival of the human species under threat . Undoubtedly,
natural resources are finite, bio-physical limits do exist, and the sustainability crisis does render responsive action inescapable. Yet,
the one-dimensional fixation on the alleged choice between democratic versus authoritarian
pathways towards sustainability obstructs the view of what for the foreseeable future is the
most likely scenario: sustained unsustainability .
That turns solvencyrejecting this conception is key to engendering solutions
For the new debate on democracy and sustainability all this represents a most challenging task. The questions which have
framed this debate so far contribute little to tackling this agenda. With their implicit assumptions
and normative commitments they obstruct rather than facilitate a realistic analysis and
constructive discussion. They cultivate notions of democracy and autocracy which are largely
unrelated to socio-political reality . They contribute to the construction and maintenance of
societal self-descriptions which reassure us of our profound democratic and ecological
commitment . They mobilise for the defence of democracy and against the threat of ecoauthoritarianism without ever realising to what extent the prevalent understandings of democracy
have emancipated themselves from the egalitarian-progressive agenda, and to what extent the spectre
of eco-dictatorship is really just a tool in the campaign for sustained unsustainability . Therefore, the
first objective for a new debate on democracy and sustainability must be to break away
from these established patterns of discourse . The assumptions and normative
commitments which have framed and constrained the debate so far need to be subject to
radical scrutiny . This will open up the discursive arena and create space for genuinely
innovative and constructive thinking. Given that this debate concerns the very foundations of the established societal
consensus, we must not expect it to deliver quick answers and easy solutions. Indeed the demand for quick fixes will most reliably
choke the debate before it gets going. The hope that a few institutional reforms might turn contemporary
democracies into ecocracies is just as unfounded as the belief in an expertocratic-authoritarian pathway to

sustainability. But this only re-emphasises the need to open the discursive agenda and struggle for a genuinely innovative debate.
2ACAuthoritarianism =/= Eco

Authoritarians hate the environmentstatistical evidence proves
Reese, 12 [Gerhard Reese, Friedrich Schiller University, When Authoritarians Protect the
EarthAuthoritarian Submission and Proenvironmental Beliefs: A Pilot Study in Germany,
Ecopsychology, September 2012, 4(3): 232-236, doi:10.1089/eco.2012.0035
In the environmental realm, previous research by Schultz and Stone (1994) suggested that authoritarianism and
proenvironmental beliefs are negatively correlated : the more authoritarian one is, the less
concern one demonstrates about the environment. These authors argued that the main reason for this
finding is grounded in authoritarians belief that community, politicians, and business leaders
are immersed in the dominant paradigm that economic growth has a higher value than
environmental protection. Across two studies, Schultz and Stone found a substantial, negative
relation between authoritarianism and proenvironmental beliefs (rs= -.51 and - .54). In a similar vein,
Peterson and colleagues (1993, Study 2) showed that authoritarians were more hostile toward the
environmental movement than less authoritarian individuals. In fact, authoritarians were more
positive toward polluters compared with people supporting the environmental movement .
Subsequent researchers also suggested that higher levels of rightwing authoritarianism predicted
weaker proenvironmental beliefs (e.g., Sabbagh, 2005). Taken together, such findings suggest that an
authoritarian personality or belief system1 is rather undesirable when it comes to the protection of
our environment. Yet, as will be argued in the following, the relation between right-wing authoritarianism and
proenvironmental beliefs requires a more fine-grained analysis. Precisely, it is suggested that above all, the subconstruct
authoritarian submission should relate to stronger proenvironmental beliefs.
2ACTransition Fails
No chance of an eco-authoritarian shiftdemocracy will adapt and coopt the
alternative
The highly sensitive, and politically inconvenient, question that a more differentiated and constructive debate on the relationship
between democracy and sustainability will need to ask is exactly what role democracy plays in this scenario of
sustained unsustainability. This necessitates a shift away from the currently prevalent, but rather
unhelpful, normative statements about what democracy and eco-politics ought to look like and achieve.
Instead, descriptive-analytical accounts are required of what democracy and eco-politics in contemporary consumer societies
factually do look like. As regards the condition of democracy, such descriptive-analytical accounts will acknowledge, firstly, that
today prevalent understandings of democracy have evolved well beyond the ideals in which the
emancipatory social movements had still firmly believed . From the perspective of contemporary society these
ideals of authentic democracy have become too cumbersome, inflexible, demanding and restrictive. Secondly, such descriptiveanalytical accounts will recognize that democracy is not nearly as frail and vulnerable as
the warnings about the threat posed to it by the sustainability crisis suggest . In fact democracy is,
and has always been, highly adaptable to changing societal conditions , and it also has
strong and reliable allies who are well aware that democracy is the best possible political shell
for consumer capitalism. And thirdly, an academically rather than mainly politically committed perspective
on the relationship between democracy and sustainability will also be more perceptive of the fact that the defence
of democracy can actually become reactionary : it does so when it fails to take account of the degree to which
contemporary notions of democracy have actually emancipated themselves from the progressive, egalitarian project and have
instead turned democracy into an essential tool for defending and legitimating personal lifestyles and societal structures which are
predicated on ever rising levels of social inequality and on the continued degradation of the natural environment.
2ACDeliberative Democracy Turn

Authoritarianism cant solve the environmenttheir China example is wrong
Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian
Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative
democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change,
Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute? Australian
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp.429-448, Evan]
While democracy is uncertain and, in many cases, frustrating for those seeking decisive action, it is arguable that
authoritarianism provides a poor foundation for motivating and coordinating collective

action in order to meet ecological imperatives. As Dryzek argues, in theoretical terms, authoritarian
approaches to governance fail to adequately coordinate inputs within the socio-environmental
system to respond to environmental challenges.17 This also appears to be the case in practice.
The Chinese response to climate change is not driven by public demand, and the level of support
is irrelevant in any case. Indeed, consideration of climate change per se does not appear to be most relevant. The push
to reduce emissions intensity appears to be driven by economic, rather than
environmental imperatives. Costs can be reduced where there is currently a good deal of low hanging fruit in
industries with low energy efficiency and high greenhouse gas intensity.18 This form of ecological modernisation
suits a developmentalist agenda, but more difficult choices will ultimately need to be made if
greenhouse emissions are to be kept below dangerous levels. Of course, the lack of responsiveness to the
public sphere is the point of the authoritarians, who wish to side-step an unreliable public will. But my argument here is that
political elites are actually less likely to support environmental causes on their own
terms, not least because the logic of the state is skewed toward the functions of accumulation,
even before we take into account the effect of lobbying by well-resourced interests . It is no accident
that the environmental movement first gained momentum not within the machinery of government, but
within civil society . It remains the legitimacy function and responsiveness to the public sphere
that holds the key to action on climate change.19 Moreover, authoritarianism does not appear
to work on its own terms. If we scratch the surface, the observation that Asia is inclined toward
authoritarianism is less than straightforward. China, for example, is manifestly authoritarian at the
national level.20 However, when we move to regional and local governance the picture is more
nuanced. Local elections are increasingly occurring at village level, along with experimentation
with deliberative methods such as deliberative polls.21 Baogang He and Mark Warren argue that even at the
national level there is an increasing recognition of the limits of authoritarianism in governing complex
social systems (to which I would add the ecological dimension). The result is a transition toward authoritarian
deliberation, which potentially marks a turning point toward greater democracy .22 However, the
main task here is not to rebut the advantages of authoritarianism, but to build an argument in favour of democracy. In theory, a
democracy is supposed to produce better environmental outcomes to the extent that it is inclusive (of all concerns,
including those related to the environment).23 But on the other hand there is a critique in the literature cited above
that, in practice, citizens as political agents fail to adequately synthesise complex information about climate change and translate
this into demand for action. In addition democracies are supposed to be more responsive, with built-in accountability and sensitivity
to legitimacy, ensuring that the system responds to environmental concern. But in practice democratic systems often fail to
adequately realize and translate demand for action on climate change into working policy. I argue below that a remedy to the
situation is a not a turn away from democracy, but toward a more deliberative approach .
All of their offense assumes the ineffective democracy of the status quoa shift to
more participative and deliberative democracy solvesempirics prove
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]
It is notable that the features of democracies that are supposed to be beneficial to the environment
(inclusiveness and responsiveness) cited above correspond closely to the features of a deliberative
system attributed to Dryzek in the introduction (inclusivity and consequentiality).24 To these dimensions, deliberative
democracy adds deliberativeness to a democratic system.25 And it is this deliberative dimension
that holds the key to realising the full potential of democratic systems to respond the
environmental challenges. There is a good deal of support for the argument that engaging citizens in
deliberation produces improved environmental outcomes . This is because deliberation can
consider the interests of non-human agents to the extent that they can be represented via
arguments used by interlocutors in favour of those interests . To this extent, deliberation has the
capacity to make salient the environmental dimensions of issues . It also has the
potential to attune citizens to the complexities .26 Ideally, deliberation produces reflection by
citizens of the kind that Shearman and Smith prize in advocating rule by eco-elites and avoids Giddens paradox, such that
citizens come to reflect on the issue with a view to the long-term . This effect is very different to the idea of
nudge theory, which involves the use of social marketing and behavioural economics to nudge behaviour without inducing
reflection.27 Deliberation, on the other hand involves a far more conscious process, which , arguably, results
in far deeper and more enduring solutions .28 Thus, on the face of it, deliberative democracy
holds the potential to assuage democratic sceptics insofar as deliberation involves careful
reflection by citizens regarding the course of action that they want implemented . But is the citizenphilosopher, who openly reflects on the implications of climate change, a realistic prospect in light of the evidence? There are two
related questions here. The first concerns whether it is possible for at least some proportion of the citizen population to engage in
deliberation, and the boundary contours of this group. The second concerns whether it is possible to improve the deliberative
competence of the population as a whole, and to what extent scaling up deliberation is possible. In terms of the first question,
there is evidence to suggest that thoroughgoing deliberation including ordinary citizens is relatively rare.29 However, this is not to
say that citizens are simply incapable of behaving deliberatively engaging with alternative arguments with an open mind.30 It
seems that the settings in which political discussion is conducted and the norms operating within
the group play an important role in shaping the behaviour of interlocutors , and in turn their ability
to deal with complex issues.31 By contrast, when researchers produce findings against the possibility
of deliberation the results are often obtained in settings that are not actually designed to be
deliberative, in some cases stretching the concept considerably .32 The same also appears to apply to citizens
willingness to participate in political deliberation, where the prevailing democratic experience plays an
important role in motivating citizens33 a point to which I return to later in relation to the question of scaling up
deliberation. The challenge, then, is finding settings in which the ideals of deliberative behaviour can be achieved. One type of
forum that is explicitly designed to be deliberative is the example of mini-publics, which are
the most practical expression of deliberative democracy to date.34 They have provided the test
bed for much of the empirical research involving authentic citizen deliberation .35 Mini-publics
typically involve the random selection of citizens to participate in a forum that is (ideally) held over multiple
days, where discussion is facilitated to achieve the ideals of deliberation and information is
provided, usually in the form of expert presentation . Thus, mini-publics provide a window into the
possibilities for achieving citizen deliberation, which , in theory at least, improves the prospect of
increasing the demand for action on environmental issues such as climate change by making
salient those dimensions that are otherwise crowded out by more tangible and immediate
concerns. In the following section I draw on an example of a mini-public involving members of the Australian public in the
Australian Capital Region to demonstrate these possibilities, before moving to consider whether it is possible to scale up these
affects to the polity as a whole.
Deliberative democracy is uniquely key and solves all their offense

What was the main impact of deliberation? Most importantly, relating to the concerns raised in relation to democracy and climate
change at the beginning of this paper, deliberation served to clear the way for focus on more substantive
issues and improved the ability of citizens to better deal with the kind of complexity associated
with climate change. This occurred because, for most participants, the deliberative setting not only provided
the environment in which information can be acquired, it also provided the incentive
structure to engage with that information .55 The result is a shift from the primitive
citizen, or more charitably a cognitive miser, who is prone to drawing conclusions based on
intuitive modes of thinking (referred to as system I or peripheral processing) toward deeper forms of
cognition (system II or cognitive processing).56 The level of cognition displayed by everyday citizens in deliberative contexts
might not achieve the same standard sought by Shearman and Smith, but it is clearly possible to raise the bar in
their assessment of complex issues such as climate change.57 Deliberation does not fundamentally change the
citizen; they still have roughly the same set of capabilities after as before.58 The value set of citizens is also roughly the same,
although certain values, such a concern for the environment have become activated as part of the process.59 What the
deliberative context did was to engender a set of capabilities that are possible, but not otherwise
brought to bear on every day politics. But deliberation did much more than improve appreciation
for the climate change issue. It helped to change the conditions under which the issue could be
governed and the expectations of citizens in a democratic system . Among many participants, the climate
change issue transformed from being a problem for a distrusted government to address, to an
issue for the community to address, with government partnership with citizens . In other words,
deliberation enhanced the tendency to view the issue of climate change through the lens of
collective identity in solving a common-good problem.60 It shifted emphasis away from elected
representatives and a failure of politics toward individual responsibility for the issue not only
seeking to understand it, but also to contribute to collective outcomes , both directly in form
of action on climate change, and indirectly, via improved levels of political efficacy.61 Moreover, for participants in
deliberation, these effects on political efficacy and civic-mindedness appear to be enduring .62 Thus, it is just possible
that a polity that is more deliberative not only responds to climate change more constructively , in
ways that reflect the inner desires of its citizens; it may also be able to recreate the conditions required
for proper democratic functioning . And in doing so, it may help to avert the reflex of some to
favour more authoritarian modes of governance, or forms of liberal paternalism (such as nudge theory) in the face of
climate change.
--- Methodology
The best social science evidence proves our arguments
***this evidence outlines the methodology and procedure of an experiment conducted to
demonstrate the effect of deliberative democracy on climate change opinions, and showed a
statistically significant increase in groups that participated in deliberation.
A series of citizens deliberative forums were conducted as part of the Australian Research
Council-funded Climate Change and the Public Sphere project on the question of climate change and adaptation
in the local regions of Canberra (Australian Capital Territory) and Goulburn (New South Wales). The research involved
comparing the effect of exposing participants to a series of climate change scenarios ranging
from no change in climate to changes anticipated under business as usual resulting in a high
level of greenhouse emissions. These responses where then compared to the positions that
emerged among a subset of participants involved in a three day deliberative mini-public. The approach
used in the project is outlined in Figure 2. It shows the key components of the research design, split into three phases that spanned
2008 to 2010. The first phase involved the development of three climate change scenarios (baseline,
covering the years 1970 to 2000; medium; and high emissions) and
the impact on the region inclusive of Australian

medium and high emissions
scenarios included two different emission trajectories based on a medium level of emissions
Capital Territory (ACT: Canberra) and the Goulburn- Mulwaree district (Goulburn).36 The
(equivalent to the International Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, SRES scenario A1B, which
approximates a moderate level of greenhouse emission abatement) and a high level of emissions (SRES A1FI, which
approximately tracks business as usual) in the years 2050 and 2100 . The impacts on various climate
parameters for the medium and high emissions scenarios were then produced for the 2050 and 2100 time slices. The scenarios
that were presented to participants covered a range of climatic variables relating to temperature,
rainfall, growing range for key species and climatic domain representation involving a visualisation of
how the climate would migrate. The scenarios were in presentation form using multimedia technology. In most cases the
information was presented in map form, otherwise as graphs or bullet points. The changes to scenario parameters in map, graphical
and schematic form were animated between the time slices to highlight the changes that were occurring over time.37 In phase two,
interviews were conducted with 103 individuals. During the interviews the three scenarios were
presented to participants, who were encouraged to imagine that they were living under the
conditions described by the scenarios. At the conclusion of each scenario presentation, participants were
interviewed about how they might feel under that scenario and respond to the impacts . They also
performed a series of surveys, where the condition of instruction was to respond as if they were living under
the conditions depicted by that scenario. The first survey concerned the broad policy response
that they would prefer to see implemented, in conjunction with a question regarding their willingness to pay (via
taxation) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The second survey involved responding to a series of
statements drawn from public debate about climate change from various media and interview
sources. In the third and final stage of the study, a sub-sample of the participants from stage two were selected to
participate in one of two treatments. The first involved participation in a three-day intensive
deliberative forum, involving three days of evidence gathering and deliberation proper to
develop policy recommendations (n=35). A further twenty participants did not participate in the
deliberative event, but were individually interviewed three months after the phase two interviews in
respect to their longer term response to exposure to the information provided in the scenarios .
The conditions for deliberation were created by careful facilitation, which was designed to first
build a deliberative norm within the group, where participants ideally came to identify with
the need to collectively consider the merits of different arguments in relation to climate change
and adaptation.38 Once participants were familiar with and accepted (in most cases, see below) the conditions under which
discussion would proceed, the process moved to the information stage involving expert presentations and group discussion about
the information provided, where small groups developed and coordinated follow up questions.39 This process was very nearly
derailed due to a small number of individuals at different extremes of the climate change debate refusing to accept the norms of
deliberation, in some cases behaving to disrupt the process and in one case this was a deliberate strategy. It turned out that the
deepest of climate sceptics in particular were very unwilling to reflect on their positions,40 although deep alarmists also behaved
problematically from a deliberative perspective. But the process still maintained an overall deliberative flavour. Non-deliberative
behaviour using information selectively and behaving aggressively and without respect was regulated among participants by the
group itself, a strong majority of whom accepted and policed the norms of deliberation, as well as by the facilitator. In the end, two
deep sceptics left the process: one because of the failure to shape the process, the second for more negative reasons pertaining to
protracted argument with a deep alarmist who did himself eventually agree to participate according to deliberative norms. On the
final day, participants used their accumulated knowledge to develop recommendations that would
address their primary concern in relation to climate change .41 Not surprisingly, the climate change
scenarios had a significant effect on participants, although it tended not to last beyond the interview process.
Each scenario resulted in increased preference for decisive action on climate change: with the
high emissions scenario yielding a stronger result compared to the medium scenario .42 This was
also reflected in the willingness to pay (WTP) monthly to reduce greenhouse emissions. The data is
shown in Table 1. Deliberation also had an effect on preference s. Table 1 shows an appreciable increase in
WTP between baseline and post-deliberation, although it is not statistically significant given the
relatively small numbers. Nevertheless, the level of change in WTP is comparable to that which individuals nominated under the
Medium Emissions Scenario (where they were asked to imagine that they were actually living under those conditions). Moreover,
follow-up discussions with participants suggested that these preferences were more enduring than those
individuals who were only exposed to the scenarios.43
--- AT: DD Fails

Deliberative democracy is feasiblethey overlook transformative moments and
leadership which can overcome opposition
Certainly the challenge is considerable, but not insurmountable . When considering the possibilities
for deliberative democracy and the role of mini-publics in a deliberative system, it is important to consider the
role of transformative moments in politics . One important, and often neglected,
dimension is that of leadership.83 For example, Julia Jennstl analyses the deliberative relationship that was
permitted by the fortuitous combination of personalities at the head of negotiations that led to the
fall of Apartheid in South Africa.84 Jonathan Kuyper recognises the leadership role of Julia Gillard in proposal the
Climate Change Citizens Assembly, in the lead-up to the 2010 election. However, it was also a perceived failure of
leadership on climate change policy in the lead-up to the proposal that contributed to its demise.85
A more consistent role for leadership in providing legitimacy for, and coherence in the
application of, deliberative mini-publics might permit them to properly play a role in shaping
the public discussion.86
We dont need to win full scale-upjust encouraging a culture of deliberative
democracy is key
It simply is not possible to simulate the workings of a deliberative mini-public in ways that involve everyone affected by a decision
deliberating together. For Goodin the solution is to encourage greater internal reflection within a
deliberative system by individuals. 64 But this is not straightforward. Exposure to the climate change scenarios in the
ACR case study above certainly failed to induce deep reflection. It may be that deliberation properly takes place in
groups for a reason we are simply hard-wired to deliberate via discussion .65 Deliberation by
individuals is indeed possible (via internal discussion) even desirable . But it is harder to achieve. And it
may not be reasonable to expect citizens to devote the cognitive resources to deliberate deeply on every political issue that they
encounter. Even the most diligent citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of every issue.66 As Claus Offe points out, there is
an opportunity cost for the effort applied.67 Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how easy is to achieve
deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very specific settings.68 However, improving environmental outcomes
may not require achieving ideal deliberation in all sites in the public sphere, as much as developing the
capacity to avoid the distortion of public opinion by entrenched interests.69 Achieving this likely involves the steady
building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative cultures that are inured to the
blandishments of elites making claims counter to the public interest .70

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AT: Rights Malthus

2ACNuclear War Turn

For authoritarian or despotic leaders , nuclear weapons may be seen

alternative. Humanity can avert climate catastrophe without accepting ecological

2ACFixed Choice Turn

democracies into ecocracies is just as unfounded as the belief in an expertocratic-authoritarian pathway to

2ACAuthoritarianism =/= Eco

2ACDeliberative Democracy Turn

authoritarianism provides a poor foundation for motivating and coordinating collective

Deliberative democracy is uniquely key and solves all their offense

the impact on the region inclusive of Australian

individuals who were only exposed to the scenarios.43

--- AT: DD Fails

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