SECTION 18

Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS: This is a consolidated case assailing the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law
(RH LAW). One of the contentions of the petitioners, the RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program,
they are compelled to provide forty-eight ( 48) hours of pro bono services for indigent women,
under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. The petitioners
explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth
accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.
HELD: NO. As some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
orce, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. The requirement
under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they
do otherwise. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion,force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will.
SECTION 19
*People v. Estoista - 93 PHIL. 647
FACTS: Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through reckless imprudence
and illegal possession of firearm under one information, the appellant was acquitted of the first
offense and found guilty of the second, for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This
appeal is from that sentence raising factual legal and constitutional questions. The constitutional
question, set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty
from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines provided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and
unusual.
ISSUE: WON RA 4 violates the constitutional prohibition on prohibited punishment
HELD: No. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." Expressed in other terms, it has been held
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive, " "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." We
do not believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellants
and similar case, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of
being shocking to public conscience.
People v. Dapitan - 197 SCRA 378

FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Branch 75, San
Mateo) 4th Judicial Region, finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He prays that he be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day ofreclusion
temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua as maximum. According to the OSG, the accusedappellant cannot avail of it since Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103)
specifically provides that it shall not apply to, among others, persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life imprisonment.
ISSUE: WON the penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC violated the
constitutional provision on prohibited punishment.
HELD: NO. The penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 294, par.1 of the RPC is not cruel,
degrading, and inhuman. Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code has survived four
Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom
Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases. As a matter of fact,
the same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes
reclusion perpetua.
Baylosis v. Chavez - 202 SCRA 405 (modified by Robin Padilla)
FACTS: The constitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
put at issue in the special action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at bar. That provision
punishes with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, The petitioner argued that the proviso in question
is unconstitutional because if inflicts on the convicted felon a cruel or unusual punishment,
considering that the Revised Code penalizes rebellion or subversion only by prision mayor. The
penalty fixed in said challenged section is, it is contended, flagrantly and plainly oppressive,
greatly disproportionate to the offense, and shocking to the people's sense of justice. The result, it
is further argued, is that the right to bail is denied under PD 1866 when the act thereby punished is
only an ingredient of simple rebellion or subversion (which are bailable offenses) under the Revised
Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON the said provision violated constitutional provision on prohibited punishment
HELD: NO. It is well settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the
extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual
and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if
within statutory limits. It bears repeating in this connection that mere possession of a firearm
without license or lawful authority, 18 without more, is punished by reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua; and that the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of murder of
homicide is punished by death (now reclusion perpetua 19 ), yet there is no challenge to these
penalties as being cruel or unusual.
People v. Munoz - 170 SCRA 107
FACTS: The accused in this case filed an appeal for reversal of the decision of the Court of First
Instance, convicting them with murder, in Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found guilty as
principal and Muoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case
Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as

accomplices. In support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy
to justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three murders.
ISSUES: (1)WON the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its
imposition. (2)WON they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as
a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
HELD: (1)A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the
death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal
hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation. (2)Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks,"
whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for
the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original
interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and
minimum penalties remains unchanged.
People v. Amigo - 252 SCRA 43
FACTS: Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder armed with a knife, attacked, assaulted
and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the
promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the
penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant
without the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal since the
death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing happened,
the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from
death penalty.
ISSUE: WON Section 19 Article 3 of the constitution intend for the abolishment of death penalty or
not and WON the penalty impose for the petitioner can be categorize as cruel and harsh
HELD: NO(for both). Framers were divided into 2, those who believe in Masangkay ruling that the
Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the
remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium and those who disagree feel that Article
III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to
reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact. A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely
says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to
resort to extrinsic aids. we hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the

imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and
minimum penalties remains unchanged.
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the
forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of
sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX.
*People v. Echegaray 267 SCRA 682 (death penalty)
FACTS: petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo was convicted for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common- law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime. Subsequently, RA 8177 amending the execution of death penalty from electrocution to
lethal injection was implemented. Petitioner now assail the validity of such RA contending that
such execution was cruel and harsh
ISSUE:WON RA 8177 of lethal injection was cruel and harsh
HELD: LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION
19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death
penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. The lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection do not render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in
the intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner claims, that respondent Director is an
untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment which SC held that
the petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered
are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution
by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any
other evidence whatsoever. Furthermore, Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the
implementation of the death penalty (by lethal injection) will carefully avoid inflicting cruel
punishment. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to
give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said
that all punishments are cruel.
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely. these courts have found that lethal injection does
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After reviewing the medical evidence that indicates
that improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison
officials tend to have little training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that
the few minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.
People v. Tongko 290 SCRA 595
FACTS: accused Roberto Tongko convicted of estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. He was sentenced to suffer twenty seven (27) years of reclusion perpetua. by means of
deceit and false pretenses committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the

fraudulent acts, make or draw and issue to one, Carmelita Santos to apply on account or for value
the checks said accused well knowing at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds
ISSUE: WON the penalty of twenty seven (27) years of reclusion perpetua is too harsh and out of
proportion to the crime he committed.
HELD: NO. In People v. de la Cruz: the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and apply to punishments In People v. Estoista: "It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact
that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community."
The history of the law will show that the severe
penalties were intended to stop the upsurge of swindling by issuance of bouncing checks. It was
felt that unless aborted, this kind of estafa "... would erode the people's confidence in the use of
negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the
retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country."
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice 12 LR 32 N98
FACTS: The SC issued a TRO thereby, interrupting the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO. So, the Public respondents file an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration which provides the expression of the house of
representative in expressing that they reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for
the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive
Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President
to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law pursuant to
the debates going on within the senate for the validity of death penalty causing the temporary
suspending the execution of death penalty of petitioner.
ISSUE:WON the execution of death penalty maybe suspended by the court upon rendering a final
judgment
HELD: YES. The postponement of the date can be requested, It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. It is acknowledged
that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is
ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question
arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
Padilla v. CA (supra, Right to Bail)
FACTS: A high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner
Robin Padilla thus, he was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under P.D. 1866 and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as

maximum. The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his application for bail
but thereafter,the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt,
filed a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond which prosper.
ISSUE: WON the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: NO. The penalty for simple possession of firearm ranges from reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and
excessive. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.'
PEOPLE V. ALICANTE GR 127026-27, May 31, 2000
FACTS: We are again faced with the arduous task of determining whether the accused-appellant is
guilty of a crime for which the law mandates the imposition of the extreme penalty of death. The
records reveal that fifteen (15) informations for the crime of rape were filed against accusedappellant Armando Alicante y David for having carnal knowledge of his minor daughter Richelle.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty law as punishments for acts which do not include the
taking of another person's life, is repugnant to the constitution and amounts to a barbaric,
excessive, cruel and unusual punishment
HELD: NO. The death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts
with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty
through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and
because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society
and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival
of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. As the relationship between
the accused-appellant and the victim has in the same wise been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
the Court affirms the imposition of the death penalty in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: The death penalty shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1.
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim.
LIM V. PEOPLE GR 149276, Sept. 27, 2002
FACTS: The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being
challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the right to
bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the
Constitution. Petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks. The first check
was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds while the
second was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the
dishonored check.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and
imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
HELD: NO. Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated
by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the
countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter
people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts
corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential.
What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of
bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we
conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. In this case,
petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality of PD 818. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated
in the following:
WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa
(swindling) cases committed by means of bouncing checks;
WHEREAS, if not checked at
once, these criminal acts would erode the peoples confidence in the use of negotiable instruments
as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and
commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country;
WHEREAS, it is
vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing
penalties provided therefor.
PEOPLE V. GABIANA GR 123543, August 23, 2000
FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in
Criminal Case No. S-1797, which imposed the supreme penalty of death on appellant Pedro
Gabiana y Carubas for the crime of rape. Appellant carried Rosemarie, then 10 years of age, up
their 2-storey house and brought her to a corner. He then raped her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant as
a consequence of the anti-poor, anti- uninfluential and anti-small fry RA 7659.
HELD: YES. In this case, although it was shown that the appellant is the common-law husband of
the complainants mother, the first special qualifying circumstance within the contemplation of
paragraph 1, above quoted, was not alleged in the Information under which appellant was
arraigned. In People vs. Ambray, the Court held that the failure to allege the fact of relationship
between the appellant and the victim in the information for rape is fatal and consequently, bars
conviction of its qualified form which is punishable by death. Qualifying circumstances must be
properly pleaded in the indictment in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to
be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Accordingly, the death
penalty imposed below on appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE V. HORIO GR 137842, August 23, 2001
FACTS: The accused, Danilo Catubig y Horio, was charged with the crime of rape. Appellant raped
her daughter, Dannilyn. The Court finds accused DANILO CATUBIG Y HORIO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

the penalty of death to be decreed. The Constitution guarantees to be inviolable the right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is a requirement
that renders it essential for every element of the offense with which he is charged to be properly
alleged in the complaint or information. Here, the information failed to state the minority of the
victim and her relationship with the offender, both special qualifying circumstances under Republic
Act No. 7659, and for want of such allegations, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty
on the accused. Appellant could only thus be convicted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
PAGDAYAWON V. SEC. OF JUSTICE GR154569, Sept. 23, 2002
FACTS: At bar is the petition filed by thirty (30) death row inmates which seeks (1) to enjoin the
execution of their respective death sentences in view of the possible repeal of laws authorizing the
imposition of the death penalty by Congress and (2) a re-examination of RA 76592 and RA 81773
with the end in view of declaring them unconstitutional. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court
has the power to control the enforcement of its decisions, including the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to stay the execution of a death sentence which is already final.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7659 does not comply with the constitutional requirement of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes under Section 19(1) Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: NO. The mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses of Congress should not per se
warrant outright issuance of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of a death
sentence that has become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and should not be considered
as a ground for a stay of a death sentence. While newspaper reports indicate the supposed
acquiescence of a number of senators and congressmen to the abolition of the death penalty, such
is by no means an assurance that these same legislators will eventually vote for the modification
or repeal of the law. Consequently, the petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
should be denied. Neither does the substantial change in the composition of the Court since the
promulgation of People vs. Muoz and People vs. Echegaray warrant the re-examination of RA 7659
and RA 8177. The validity or the constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the
individual opinions of the members who compose the Court. The Supreme Court, as an institution,
has already determined what the law is (e.g. RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional) in the
subject cases and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in its
composition. Otherwise, we shall see the specter of the same or similar petition every three or four
years as new members are appointed to the Court.
Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532
FACTS: Perez was the Accounts Receivable and Recording Clerk of Storck Products, Inc. ("Storck")
from 1984 to 1993. Provincial Prosecutor filed an Information against Perez for violation of
paragraph Article 315 of the RPC. Regional Trial Court found accused guilty of the crime of estafa
under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code sand entenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prission (sic)
correccional to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal and to indemnify
complainant company Storck Products, Inc. in the amount of Php63,755.50 as well as to pay the
costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the accused.
ISSUE: WON the trial court correctly imposed on Perez the penalty.
HELD: YES. The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender are
special qualifying circumstances that are needed to be alleged in the complaint or information for

HELD: YES. Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, if the amount exceeds P22,000 (In this
case, the amount misappropriated is P83,755.50) the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. When the amount involved in the offense
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Code "shall be imposed in its
maximum period," adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 although the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The maximum penalty should then be termed as
prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever
applicable, shall be added to the maximum period of the principal penalty of anywhere from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
SECTION 20

Held: NO. It has long been settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is not unconstitutional or, more specifically, that
it does not transgress the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt.
The offense is committed by the very fact of its performance, i.e. the mere act of issuing a
worthless check. The offense is malum prohibitum. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum, pursuant to the States exercise of police power.
Tiomico v. CA GR 122539 March 4, 1999 (trust receipt)
FACTS: Tiomico opened a Letter of Credit with BPI for the importation of 2 forklifts. Upon maturity
of the trust receipt Tiomico made partial payments, leaving a balance. Failing to pay the balance,
he was accused for violation of the trust receipt law. Tiomico was found guilty.

**Lozano v. Martinez - 146 SCRA 323 (check)

ISSUE: WON the Trust Receipt Law violates SEC 19 Art III of the Constitution.

FACTS: This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of
RTC Manila declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the constitutionality
of the law are a.) it is violative of the constitutional provision on non- imprisonment due to debt,
and b.) it impairs freedom of contract.

RULING: No, TRL punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or
goods to the prejudice of others regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does
not seek to enforce payment of the loan.
Recuerdo v. People, GR 133036, Jan. 22, 2003 (Check)

ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional. BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. The debt contemplated by the constitution are those arising from
contracts No one is going to prison for non-payment of contractual debts. However, non-payment
of debts arising from crimes is punishable. This is precisely why the mala prohibita crime of issuing
worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a valid exercise of police
power. The Supreme Court however also explained that the non-payment of a debt is not the
gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Caram Resources v. Contreras - 237 SCRA 724 (check).
Facts: Teresita Dizon obtained a loan from Caram Resources payable in installments. She issued a
promissory note and postdated BPI checks, four of which were dishonored when presented to the
bank as the account against which they were drawn had been closed. A complaint was filed
against Dizon for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The respondent stated that to hold her liable there under "would violate the cardinal rule under the
Constitution that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt" and that the postdated
checks were without consideration and were in the nature of "guarantees to ensure the monthly
collection" despite Dizon's admission that they were payments for the loan and that she herself
closed her account resulting in the dishonor of the checks upon presentment,
Issue: WON there is a violation of the cardinal rule under the Constitution that no person shall be
imprisoned for failure to pay his debt.

FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as
payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand
letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was
found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v
Martinez where it was held that BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It
is not the non-payment of debt or obligation which the law punishes and the law does not coerce
the debtor to pay debt but the main objective of the law is the prohibition and penalizing the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is against public order.
SECTION 21
*People v. Ylagan - 58 PHIL. 851
Facts: Against the appellee, Ylagan, a complaint for physical injuries was filed. After preliminary
investigation, where the provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with serious physical
injuries. Upon arraignment, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the information; whereupon the
private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of
the case, which motion was granted by the court. The attorney for the defendant said nothing
about the dismissal of the case. Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another
information in the same justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the same
offense of serious physical injuries. After another preliminary investigation, the case was again
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the information filed in the justice of the peace
court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of double jeopardy.
Issue:

Held: It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, defendant in a criminal prosecution
is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4)
after he has pleaded to the complaint of information. Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion
that the appellee has been once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. It is
true that in United States vs. Ballentine, and in other subsequent cases, this court had held that
there is WHEN WILL DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACH? 1. The first jeopardy must have attached prior
to the second 2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated 3. The second jeopardy must
be for the commission of the same offense or the second offense must include or is necessarily
included in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof no
jeopardy until the investigation of the charges has actually been commenced by the calling of a
witness; but we are now convinced that such a view should be abandoned. There is no provision or
principle of law on jeopardy. All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial
"in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our
system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not
guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger, annoyance, and
vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of being arrested, subjected to a
preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead and stand trial. The rule against double
jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment, but against being again
tried for the same offense. Counsel for the government, however, contends that the previous case
brought against the appellee was dismissed with her consent, on the theory that the phrase
"without the consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should
be construed to mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused". We
cannot accept such a theory. We believe it a sound rule to lay down, that the mere silence of the
defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case does not constitute a consent within
the meaning of section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right not to be put in jeopardy a
second time for the offense is as important as the other constitutional right of the accused in a
criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and should not, be predicated on mere silence.
People v. Balisacan - L-26376
Facts: The accused was charge with homicide. To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition,
however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the
accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was
strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to
the police authorities.
Issue: whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy
Held: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the
present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he
testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision
had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead
a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was
not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo
rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal
herein. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without

giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of
the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this
fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a
nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a
claim of former jeopardy.
Cinco v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 726
Facts: The petitioners were charged in Sandiganbayan for alleged violations of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. The accused filed a motion to quash, praying that the said informations be
dismissed for lack of authority on the part of Tanodbayan. Balana requested the re-filing of the
cases, and in view thereof, the accused, through counsel, in turn requested, that she did so 'under
separate and distinct charges in accordance with the new rules of preliminary investigation' so that
the respondents can refute her charges and specific evidences she may present in support of each
separate charge.
Issue:
Held: Petitioners' apprehension that they might be put in jeopardy of being charged with
informations or crimes other than the crime imputed in the dismissed cases is baseless. There
could be no double jeopardy for the simple reason that they have not year pleaded to the offense
Beside, a preliminary investigation is not a trial for which double jeopardy attaches. We ruled in
Tandoc v. Resultan that: Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often that only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complain or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty therefor, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
People v, Vergara - 221 SCRA 560
Facts: The accused were charged with frustrated murder. They all pleaded not guilty. Again, 2 new
Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused after pleading "not guilty" to the new
Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was opposed
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Issue: Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original
Informations; and, whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.
Held: The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a
crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of
the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected
to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. It is undisputed that
valid Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed against
Salde, et. al. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It is
likewise admitted that Salde, et. al., after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty.
The only question then remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their
express consent. This is hardly what Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did was merely to move for
reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the
accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express

consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved
for the dismissal of the original Informations. While it may be true that, as a general rule, all
motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases
present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing.
Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in
these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the
aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended themselves from the
attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to prosecute the
accused in the above-entitled case." Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases,
and who thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not
necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious motions.
The motion filed in this case has ceased to be contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best
interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the Rubites, on the other hand, are precluded
from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action.
Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile. The order of the court
granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof,
is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over
the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the
aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise
cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not
certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in
these cases, the defense of double jeopardy must prevail.
Navallo v. Sandiganbayan - 234 SCRA 175
Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of Numancia National Vocational School
found to have misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to
restitute the amount despite COA demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded
not guilty and invokes his right to custodial investigation since during the COA audit and actual
cash count he was made to sign the certification on the fund shortage in the absence of a counsel.
Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy set in when petitioner was arraigned by the Regional Trial
Court
Held: Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Court, pleads
double jeopardy. We cannot agree. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following
requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The
accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.* When all the above elements are
present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said
offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is
necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can rightly be barred. In the case at bench, the
RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had
already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
Galvez v. CA - 237 SCRA 685

Facts: Petitioners were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of
frustrated homicide. Before the petitioners could be arraigned respondent prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw informations in said cases which was granted by the judge. The cases were
considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, four new informations were
filed against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms. No bail having been recommended
for the crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein petitioners. Thereafter, a
Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge
Pornillos. However, it was denied by the judge. Petitioners contend that the dismissal of the
original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to
bail. Also, Petitioner said that respondent prosecutor should have amended the original
informations instead of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. Petitioner claimed that there
was a double jeopardy when the new informations were filed against them.
Issue: Whether or not there was a double jeopardy when the new informations were filed against
the Petitioners
Held: No. The court held that the propriety of the withdrawal of the original informations, there
having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in granting the motion and, more
importantly, in consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before
herein petitioners were arraigned, hence before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a
substitution was made at such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is
precisely the evil sought to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that
no first jeopardy had as yet attached. Consequently, it was held that although the offenses
charged under the three new informations necessarily include those charged under the original
informations, the substitution of informations was not a fatal error. In the case at bar, criminal
charges filed against the Petitioners did not amount to their acquittal. Consequently, the same did
not immediately become final, hence petitioners could still file a motion for the reconsideration
thereof. Moreover, such dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
Since jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the new
informations even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither
did it affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.
Cunanan v. Arceo - 242 SCRA 88
Facts: An information for Murder was filed against petitioner Ferdinand Cunanan. The Information
alleged that petitioner was a member of the PNP; it contained no averment that he had committed
the offense charged in relation to his public office. Judge Arceo ruled that on the basis of the
evidence adduced during the trial, petitioner had committed the offense charged while in the
performance of his official functions. He then held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try this case
and that, accordingly, any decision it may render thereon would be null and void. . Judge Arceo
dismissed Criminal Case No. 5708 "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan," pursuant to the Asuncion
ruling. Upon motion by the prosecution, Judge Arceo inhibited himself from further hearing the
case and raffled the case to Respondent Judge Sunga, He denied petitioner's Opposition to the
Order directing the transmittal of the records of his case to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also
contend that Asuncion ruling is inapplicable to the present case, since here trial had already ended
and the case was already submitted for decision when the Asuncion ruling was promulgated. A
transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this late stage will, accordingly, expose him to double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Issue: Whether or not a transfer of Petitioners case to Sandiganbayan will expose him to double
jeopardy
]Held: No. Defense of double jeopardy does not become available to petitioner upon transfer of his
case to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had not been exposed at all to legal jeopardy by the
commencement and trial of Criminal Case No. 5708 because the RTC was not a court of competent
jurisdiction to try the case in the first place. Consequently, upon the commencement of this case
before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner will for the first time be placed in jeopardy of punishment for
the offense of murder. By the same token, the dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not
equivalent to, and did not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The "dismissal"
(later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were
terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it had no jurisdiction to try the case at all.
People v. Tampal - 244 SCRA 202
Facts: Respondents were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in
the RTC of Zamboanga. The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses.
The case was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on
September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the
absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such
date was a legal holiday for Muslims and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that
day. The motion was denied by respondent judge and dismissed the criminal case for failure to
prosecute. The Solicitor General contends that respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the criminal case for failure to
prosecute despite the fact that the public prosecutor's absence was for a valid cause. He also
claims that since the dismissal of the case is void, the case may be reinstated without placing the
private respondents in double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the Private Respondents was placed in Double Jeopardy
sHeld: No. Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy. The three (3)
requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the
same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted or convicted , or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. . In several cases it was held that
dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that
the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of
dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
People v. Montesa - 248 SCRA 641
Facts: Accused Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz were charged with the offense of Falsification of
Public Document. Private Respondents filed a petition for reinvestigation of the case. At the
reinvestigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor, the accused presented what it
considered new material and relevant evidence which consists merely of an affidavit of Feliza

Constantino who declared that she was the one responsible for the preparation of the questioned
public document. In his resolution Rutor recommended the dismissal of the case, the respondent
Judge court issued an order dismissing the case on the basis of the Rutor resolution. However,
private prosecutor, Atty. Edwin P. Cerezo, who received a copy of the dismissal order, filed a motion
for its reconsideration. He alleged therein that the Rutor resolution was not approved by the
Provincial Prosecutor who, on the contrary, directed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor to
proceed with the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not the arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the
case would forever foreclose, on the ground of double jeopardy.
Held: No. The Court held that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor's
recommendation to dismiss the case on the ground of want of probable cause because of the
"admission" of Feliza Constantino that the accused spouses had no participation in the preparation
of the questioned document, despite knowing that said resolution was disapproved by provincial
prosecutor, he still ordered the arraignment of the private respondents and dismissed the case. He
seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the interest of the private respondents.
Presumably, he thought that the arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of
the case would forever foreclose, on the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case. For
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
thereby depriving the State of due process of law or a fair opportunity to present its evidence and
prove its case, the challenged order of the respondent Judge dismissing the case is a null and void.
De La Rosa v. CA 253 SCRA 499
Facts: Nine separate informations were filed against petitioner, charging the latter with violation of
B.P. Big. 22. At the arraignment Petitioner failed to appear due to his illness which was granted by
the court. Several trials were postponed. On November 17, 1992, Counsel for private respondent,
in open court, moved for the postponement of the trial set on that date on the ground that private
respondent had doubts as to his inability to bring out the details of the transaction. Petitioner
objected to the postponement and invoked his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Consequently,
the trial court dismissed all the nine cases against petitioner in its questioned order dated
November 17, 1992. Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to the CA, which rendered a Decision
setting aside the two orders of the trial court and reinstating the cases. Now Petitioner contends
that since the dismissal of the cases against him by the trial court was based on his constitutional
right to a speedy trial, the reinstatement and remand of the same would place him in double
jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement and remand of the dismissed case based on petitioners
right to speedy trial would place him in double jeopardy.
Held: No. The requisites that must occur for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
(d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the
express consent of the accused. In the case at bar, the fourth requisite is lacking. Since the
dismissal of the case was upon motion of the petitioner that the case be dismissed, invoking the
constitutional right of the accused for speedy trial. There being no violation of the double jeopardy
doctrine, the prosecution of the case may still resume in the trial court, as decided by the Court of
Appeals.

People v. Leviste - 255 SCRA 238

FACTS: An Information was filed against the accused, Arnulfo Talisic, for allegedly causing the
publication in the Sun Star Daily, which is damaging to the complainant. The counsel for the
defense filed a petition to dismiss since there was no crime charge on the said information. The
trial judge, herein respondent dismissed the said complaint. The prosecution filed for a MR,
however, also dismissed due to lack of merit. The Private respondent, contends that the dismissal
of the case was based on the right of the accused to speedy trial as the prosecution was not ready
and could not present any other witness on the day set for hearing. He further avers that a
reopening of the case will place him in double jeopardy as the dismissal was without his express
consent.
ISSUE: Would the reversal of the trial courts assailed Orders place the accused in double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (3) a second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attached only: (1) upon
a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has
been entered, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. It is true that in an
unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to
prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the
same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear
right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the
State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
People v. Cawaling 293 SCRA 267

acquitted in a military commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent.
The defense merely offered as evidence certain disposition forms and a letter, dated March 8,
1983, recommending that the case against Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be
dropped and considered closed. No charge sheet and record of arraignment and trial were
presented to establish the first jeopardy.
Cudia v. CA 284 SCRA 173
FACTS: Petitioner was charged by the City Prosecutor of Angeles for illegal possession of fire arms
and ammunition. It was raffled to Branch 60 RTC of Angeles City, however the court called the
attention of the parties since the crime was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Then, the case
was reraffled to Branch 56, a branch assigned to criminal cases committed outside the city. On the
other hand, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an information with the same charge against the
accused and it was raffled to Branch 56. The petitioner contends that THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION
FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.
ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy

ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy

HELD: In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or
is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. In determining when the first jeopardy
may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following: (a)
Court
of competent jurisdiction (b)
Valid complaint or information (c)
Arraignment (c)
Valid plea
(e)
The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. The first jeopardy did not also attach
because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing
the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction
(Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of
the essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both
Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses
committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56. In
light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against
twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason
that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that
petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof. As the first information was
fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure
to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123045, November 16, 1999

HELD: There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and, (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first. And the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the present case, the appellants have
presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and

FACTS: Not content with having instituted administrative proceedings, private complainant also
filed a civil case against petitioner for damages with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of
R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was subsequently
referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that being tried before
the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already cleared him of all charges.

FACTS: This was an appeal from the decision of the RTC which convicted former Mayor Cawaling
and Policemen Tumbagahan, De los Santos and Cajilo for the crime of murder. Prior to the
institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an administrative case had been filed
before the National Police Commission, in which Policemen Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos,
Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and Fontamillas were charged with the killing of Ronie Ilisan. On
April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los Santos,
Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with
prejudice. In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo invoke their right against
double jeopardy. They argue that the first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was
filed before the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which was allegedly dismissed after
several hearings had been conducted.

ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy.

HELD. NO. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent
court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be stressed that
the said proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will
not lie. The administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus,
the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution
for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint.
Dimatulac v. Villon GR 127107 October 12, 1998
FACTS: On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution in
Criminal Case No. 95- 360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been
committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. The YABUTs opposed petitioners
Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been arraigned and,
therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor -- not the private
prosecutor -- had control of the prosecution of the case.
HELD: It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those
cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above
discussed.
People v. Maquiling GR 128986 June 21, 1999
FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the Solicitor General assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals acquitting the accused, herein private respondent, who was found guilty by
the Regional Trial Court of the crimes of Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. The Court of
Appeals accepted the claim of self-defense of the accused which was rejected by the trial court.
The Solicitor General questioned the review by the appellate court of the trial courts assessment
of credibility of witnesses despite its not having been raised as an issue in the appeal brief and its
misappreciation and wrongful assessment of factual evidence. Petitioner questions the jurisdiction
of CA and submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it
denied the petitioner due process and because it committed grave abuse of discretion .
HELD: Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment
to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the
lower court committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of judgment. A direct review
by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The rule on double jeopardy, however,
prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was
based on the merits of the case. Double jeopardy is present if the following elements concur: (1)
the accused individuals are charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been
arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed

without their express consent. In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the existence
of the first, third and fourth elements. Petitioner, however, questions the presence of the second
element and submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it
denied the petitioner due process and because it committed grave abuse of discretion. It has been
held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A denial of due process likewise results in loss or
lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or where the dismissal of an information or
complaint is purely capricious or devoid of reason, or when there is lack of proper notice and
opportunity to be heard.
People v. Nitafan GR 707964-66 February 1, 1999 !31
46
FACTS: three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 in
relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were filed against private respondent Imelda R.
Marcos relating to a series of transactions devised by then President Ferdinand Marcos and
private respondent to hide their ill-gotten wealth. Then, without private respondent yet taking any
action or filing any motion to quash the informations, respondent judge issued an order requiring
petitioners to show cause why criminal case should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates
private respondents right against ex post facto law. On the same day, respondent judge issued
another order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations
should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondents right to double jeopardy was
violated. Respondent judge further stated that to separately prosecute private respondent for a
series of transaction would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy. Respondent judge dismiss the
criminal case on the ground that the consolidated case is a violation of private respondents right
against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy is proper
HELD: NO. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same
is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the
concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any
such jeopardy terminated. Section 7, Rule 117 the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid
indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been
entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. respondent judge has no other
basis on whether private respondent had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea in
those cases pending before the said Branch. Even assuming that there was already arraignment
and plea with respect to those cases, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Private
respondent was not convicted, acquitted nor the cases against her dismissed or otherwise
terminated which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy to
attached.
Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the further prosecution of private respondent
under the three informations pending would violate the formers right against double jeopardy.
Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681, October 1, 1999

10

FACTS:G.R. No. 128136 (2nd part of the consolidated case for purposes of the topic of double
jeopardy) Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada,
Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying
Vicente de la Rosa of the Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central
School. Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan but
such was filed in RTC. Later, a group of concern citizen filed an action against the petitioner for
overpricing thereby a violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, so Graft Investigation
Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with such.
another information was filed for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners for
the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan.

FACTS: petitioner caused the filing of a criminal complaint for Rape against respondent Navarro
and nine other persons. After preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the trial
court, accusing Navarro and his other co-accused of the crime of Rape. before all the accused can
be arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not
sufficiently describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Similar Informations for Rape were likewise filed against the other accused. Respondent
Navarro then filed a motion to quash the Amended Information so the trial court issued the
assailed Order granting the motion to quash, finding that Navarro was not one of those identified
by petitioner to have abused her, and that the Information failed to show his particular
participation in the crime. Navarro escaped from detention. Seubsequently, petitioner filed a
petition alleging that during clarificatory hearing respondent/accused Navarro was identified as
one of those nine (9) persons who sexually abused petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court will expose the petitioners
who are accused therein to double jeopardy?

ISSUE: WON the petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated

HELD: NO. The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double
jeopardy even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the
RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent
jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had
no jurisdiction.
Limpangog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134229, November 26, 1999
FACTS: Three Informations, one for murder and two for frustrated murder were filed against
Petitioners Lito Limpangog and Jerry Limpangog before the Regional Trial Court sentencing him to:
1.
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of TEN (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum 2.
2nd Criminal Case, RECLUSION
PERPETUA 3.
3rd Criminal Case TEN (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN
(17) years of reclusion temporal.CA: declared itself to have no jurisdiction over petitioners appeal
of their murder conviction but still ruled that the accuse are convicted for frustrated murder and
dismissing the murder case
ISSUE:WON there is a violation of double jeopardy against the petitioner
HELD:NO. judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked
anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. The Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction
over petitioners appeal; hence, the challenged Decision is null and void. Under Article VIII, Section
5 (2)(d) of the constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals of final judgments in
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher Leaving no doubt that
the CA had no jurisdiction over the two cases. the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in
resolving the appeal of the conviction for frustrated murder and dismissing the murder case.
Hence, the CAs acquittal of the petitioners on charges of frustrated murder is void and with the
voiding of the CA Decision and the review by this Court of the RTC judgment, petitioners cannot
claim double jeopardy, because they were never legally in danger of conviction by the Court of
Appeals.
Flores v. Joven, GR 129874, Dec. 27, 2002

HELD: NO.In Mosquera vs. Panganiban: the right of offended parties to appeal an order of the
trial court which deprives them of due process, subject to the limitation that they cannot appeal
any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. Under Section 2, Rule
122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a
criminal case is granted to any party, except when the accused is placed thereby in double
jeopardy. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused. The third requisite is not present in the instant case.
Private respondent Navarro has not been arraigned.
MIRANDA V. TULIAO 486 SCRA 377
FACTS: On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later
identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio
Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program. Two Informations for murder were filed
against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later
transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large.
Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt. In Sept.
1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the
ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder
against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the
urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order
denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. Petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and
executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524.

11

HELD: NO. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does
not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not
been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.
CABO V. SANDIGANBAYAN 491 SCRA 264
FACTS: An information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was filed against petitioner Jocelyn E. Cabo and her co-accused Bonifacio C. Balahay.
Claiming that she was deprived of her right to a preliminary investigation as she never received
any notice to submit a counter-affidavit or countervailing evidence to prove her innocence,
petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion seeking the
courts permission to travel abroad for a family vacation. The Sandiganbayan granted the same.
Petitioner returned from abroad on May 24, 2004. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor concluded its
reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her with violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019. Thus, the Sandiganbayan set anew the arraignment of petitioner and her co-accused. On the
day before the scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation With Motion
praying that she be allowed to [re]iterate on her previous plea of not guilty x x x entered during
her conditional arraignment held last May 14, 2004, so that she may be excused from attending
the scheduled arraignment for October 12, 2004. It does not appear, however, that the
Sandiganbayan acted upon the said motion. the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution sustaining
Balahays contention that the facts charged in the information do not constitute the offense of
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Apart from the failure to allege that Balahay had to
officially intervene in the transaction pursuant to law, it also failed to allege that Balahay accepted
and received the money for himself or for another. The information was thus defective in that it
failed to allege every single fact necessary to constitute all the elements of the offense charged.
The Sandiganbayan, however, did not order the immediate quashal of the information.
Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended information.
Petitioner was likewise notified of her re- arraignment which was set on April 14, 2005. However,
on April 11, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment on the ground that the
amended information pertained to Balahay alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be
re-arraigned on the amended information since substantial amendment of an information is not
allowed after a plea had already been made thereon.

the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or
terminated without his express consent. The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case
at bar. It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959 failed to allege
all the essential elements of violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any
offense and was, to all intents and purposes, void and defective. A valid conviction cannot be
sustained on the basis of such information. Petitioner was resultantly not placed in danger of
being convicted when she entered her plea of not guilty to the insufficient indictment.
ROMUALDEZ V. MARCELO 497 SCRA 89
FACTS: Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of
February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal
and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo.
Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription. In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the
dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner
was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the
Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the
filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and
the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period;
that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the
aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. For its part, the PCGG avers in its
Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to
conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that
both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations
Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from
the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be
applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy would attach on the basis of the not guilty plea entered
by petitioner on the original information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.

HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally set
forth the conditions for petitioners arraignment pending reinvestigation of the case as well as her
travel abroad. Among the conditions specified in said order is if it should be found that there is a
need to amend the present indictment x x x, then the accused shall waive her right to object under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be
protected against double jeopardy. Petitioner was duly assisted by counsel during the conditional
arraignment and was presumably apprised of the legal consequences of such conditions. In fact,
she signed the minutes of the proceedings which could only signify her informed acceptance of
and conformity with the terms of the conditional arraignment. Double jeopardy did not attach by
virtue of petitioners conditional arraignment on the first information. It is well-settled that for a
claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to

HELD: YES. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
As to when
these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation
of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326
provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall
be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Thus, this Court rules
that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the discovery thereof or on
May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG. In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed

12

with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the
prescriptive periods. When the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to
submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed,
the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos.
28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
PEOPLE V. TERRADO 558 SCRA 84 (acquittal not reviewable)
FACTS: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the April 6, 2001 Decision of Honorable
Judge Salvador P. Vedaa of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-5813, People v.
Joseph Terrado, a.k.a. Hapon, finding the accused Hapon not guilty of Carnapping (punished
under Republic Act 6538, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972).
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction as the judgment of acquittal was rendered on dubious factual and legal basis.
HELD: NO. It should be remembered that, as a rule, factual matters cannot be normally inquired
into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. The present recourse is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the
ambit of appeal. At least, the mistakes ascribed to the trial court are not errors of jurisdiction
correctible by the special civil action for certiorari, but errors of judgment, which is correctible by a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. In our jurisdiction,
availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal may be allowed in cases
where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, and more serious
than the procedural infraction, if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of
the court a quo, we would run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such
recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed
by the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy. Verdicts of
acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy
behind the principle is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and to
safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. This Court
cannot rule any other way. Accused Joseph Terrado, after being acquitted of the crime charged,
must be afforded the protection against repeated attempts for conviction, in faithful adherence to
the constitutional rule against double jeopardy.
PEOPLE V. CA 626 SCRA 352
FACTS: Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the July 24, 2003 Decision and October 3, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71985. An Information for Arson was filed against Wilson Cua Ting, Edward Ngo
Yao, Willy So Tan, Carol F. Ortega, John Doe and Peter Doe, of the crime of arson. The RTC dismissed
the case. The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of its observation that
the sworn statements submitted by petitioner and respondents contained contradictory positions.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC.
Then petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71985.
However, CA issued a Decision denying the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents contention is correct that certiorari does not lie considering
that such special civil action is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, or more importantly, a
lapsed appeal.
HELD: YES. It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court lies only when, there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, and certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment
despite the availability of that remedy,certiorari not being a substitute for a lost appeal. While
petitioner mainly argues against the use of the equipoise rule, it cannot escape this Courts
attention that ultimately petitioner is asking this Court to resolve the propriety of the dismissal of
the case by the RTC, on the basis of the Information and the attached documents it had filed. This
Court however, will defer to the findings of fact of the RTC, which are accorded great weight and
respect, more so because the same were affirmed by the CA. In addition, it bears to stress that the
instant case is a petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained. The sole office
of writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public
respondents evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon. An error of judgment
that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original
special civil action of certiorari. The dismissal of herein petition does not preclude petitioner from
availing of any other action it deems appropriate under the premises. Double jeopardy cannot be
invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the
case was dismissed. Moreover, while the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest is a ground for the dismissal of the case, the same does not result in the acquittal of the
said accused.
TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY; EXISTENCE; NON-TERMINATION
*Bulaong v. People - 17 SCRA 746
FACTS: Bulaong and others were charged before the Court of First Instance of Laguna with the
crime of rebellion. Trial did not proceed with respect to Agaton Bulaong until 1958 for he was then
at large. Meanwhile Congress enacted the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act 1700) which took
effect on June 20, 1957.Agaton Bulaong was then arrested. The information for rebellion was filed
with the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Another information was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Manila charging Agaton Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in Section 4 of the
Anti- Subversion Act. The case for subversion is still pending in the CFI of Manila; while the case for
rebellion has already been decided by the CFI of Laguna adversely against the accused. Accused
Bulaong appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the decision of CFI. At bar is his
appeal from said judgment of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: whether or not accused Bulaong can interpose the defense of double jeopardy in this case
in view of the filing against him of the information for subversion in the Court of First Instance of
Manila which allegedly involves the same facts obtaining in this case.
HELD: NO. Under Rules of Court, the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only
where he was either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent. Such is not the situation in this case. For accused has not been
convicted or acquitted in the case filed in the Court of First Instance against him for subversion.
Neither was the said case dismissed or terminated without his consent, for as stated, it is still

13

pending in said court. Needless to say, it is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Bustamante v. Maceren - 48 SCRA 155
FACTS: The petitioner was accused of murder in an information filed with the Court of First
Instance. Upon arraignment petitioner entered a plea of guilty, the Court finds the accused Danilo
Bustamante guilty of the crime of murder sentenced to serve (1) year imprisonment.A motion for
Modification of Penalty and Motion for Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Commitment was
filed. When the case against petitioner was reassigned to the sala presided over by the Honorable
Maximo Maceren, Villanueva was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide he is sentenced to suffer an
When is the defense of double jeopardy not available?
GR: Double jeopardy is not available when the case is dismissed other than on the merits or other
than by acquittal or conviction upon motion of the accused personally, or through counsel, since
such dismissal is regarded as with express consent of the accused, who is therefore deemed to
have waived the right to plea double jeopardy.
XPNs: 1. Dismissal based on insufficiency of evidence 2. Dismissal because of denial of accuseds
right to speedy trial 3. Accused is discharged to be a State Witness
52
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the case at bar, the converted
dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of
double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to
the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. In essence, where a
criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the
indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
Rivera, Jr. v, People - 189 SCRA 331
FACTS: After several postponements because of the unavailability of witness accused moved for
dismissal of the case on the ground of denial of the right to a speedy trial after the judge verbally
dismissed the case and proceeded to hear another case, the witness arrived. Upon explanation by
the prosecution, the judge resumed hearing the verbally dismissed case.
ISSUE: WON the accused was place in double jeopardy
RULING: No, the verbal dismissal is not final, not until written and signed by the judge.

ISSUE: WON the accused can raised the defense of double jeopardy. HELD: Considering that
defense counsel raised the question of double jeopardy in favor of petitioner during the new trial
and before Judge Maceren rendered judgment based on said new trial, it is believed that the above
principle can be applied to this case by analogy and that said judge, in the exercise of his
discretion, should have entertained said plea of double jeopardy in the interest of justice,
especially since at the time such plea was made, petitioner had already fully served the one-year
straight sentence imposed upon him by Judge Coquia on December 14, 1970, and was already
entitled to be released from custody after such full service of his penalty under said judgment."
Thus it would appear there is no legal bar to the remedy prayed for by petitioner. NOTE: No reopening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has started serving his
sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant
ha waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of defense
of double jeopardy timely invoked.

Dizon-Pamintuan v. People - 234 SCRA 63

People v. Obsania - L-24447

HELD:NO. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites concur: (1) the first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have validly been terminated,
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Such a concurrence
would not occur assuming that the case was remanded to the trial court.

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to
allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the
prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

FACTS:5 unidentified masked armed persons ransacked the house and took away jewelries and
other personal properties including cash of certain Encarnacion. They were able to recognize items
of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan. DizonPamintuan was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law . Pamintuan was found guilty for
violation of Presidential Decree 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, and sentenced her to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 14 years of prison mayor to 18 years of reclusion
temporal. No civil liability was imposed in view of the recovery of the items. The Court of Appeals
erred in setting aside the penalty imposed by the trial court and in remanding the case to the trial
court for further reception of evidence to determine the actual value of the pieces of jewelry
recovered from the petitioner and for the imposition of the appropriate penalty.
ISSUE: WON a remand for further reception of evidence would place her in double jeopardy.

COMELEC v. CA - 229 SCRA 501

Facts: An information was filed by the Commission on Elections before the RTC charging
respondent Locsin with violation of Section 261 (f) of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.

14

Respondent Locsin was accused of intimidating the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Albuera, Leyte during the canvassing of election returns in said province and preventing them
from performing their functions and duties. When arraigned, respondent Locsin entered a plea of
not guilty and trial commenced accordingly.
Issue:
Held: The granting of the demurrer to evidence by the court produces a different effect altogether.
The case is ordered dismissed, and the order of dismissal being on the merits, is equivalent to an
acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal, as it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The Court of Appeals upheld the Solicitor General's recommendation to dismiss Criminal
Case No. B-1588 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeals
reviewed the evidence of the prosecution and found it insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt on
the part of the accused. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded: As such, when respondent Judge
denied the petitioner's demurrer to evidence, he committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to
consider the testimonies of the witnesses presented, thus certiorari lies against him. Being a
decision on the merits, this dismissal amounts to an acquittal of the accused from the offense
charged. We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the
dismissal of the case, this cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy
Double jeopardy attaches when the accused, charged in a valid complaint or information before a
competent court, is acquitted or convicted or the case is unconditionally dismissed without his
express consent after he has been arraigned and entered a plea Nevertheless, even if the motion
to dismiss the case is made with his consent or by the accused himself, double jeopardy may be
attached in two instances: (i) when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution,
and (ii) when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's
right to speedy trial
People v. Bans - 239 SCRA 48
Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the order of respondent Judge Esther
Bans granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by private respondents and acquitting them of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and the order of the same court, denying reconsideration
thereof. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by respondent
judge on the ground that any reconsideration of the aforesaid order will place private respondents
in double jeopardy; the order granting the demurrer having resulted in the acquittal of private
respondents.
Issue:
Held: In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting
the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal
of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal
case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion
will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial. In the case before us, the
resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after
a finding that the search warrant was illegally issued. Hence, it clearly falls under one of the
admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is
constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused. Furthermore, the present

petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 which calls only for a review of any error
arising from the exercise of jurisdiction or lack thereof and not a review of an error of judgment. A
review of the sufficiency of the evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused lies
outside the function of certiorari as it intrudes into the prerogatives of Rule 45, under ordinary
appeals, where an alleged error of judgment may be subjected to review. A review of the judgment
of acquittal of private respondents under this petition for certiorari (Rule 65) would place the
accused in double jeopardy which is not allowed.
State Prosecutors v. Muro - 236 SCRA 505
Facts: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint
against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution
of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on
the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable
and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He
further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made
such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is
discretionary on his part.
Issue:
Held: It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and
substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double
jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of
said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal
proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since
in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat
to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore
declared: It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting
aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents
the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . . Where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . .
People v. Bellaflor - 233 SCRA 196
Facts: Private respondent was charged with the crime of arson. Upon arraignment,
private respondent pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the
parties rested their case. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that respondent

15

judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration of
private respondent and acquitting the latter. On the other hand, private respondent
argues that the resolution acquitting him of the offense charged has become final and
executory and a reconsideration thereof would place him under double jeopardy.
Issue:
Held: Private respondent's reliance on the defense of double jeopardy is misplaced. In order that a
defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been (1)
convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that
the former case against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge. Generally, protection against
double jeopardy is not available where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the
accused. And there are only two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the
fact the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground
for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the second is where the
criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial. None exists in the case at bar. Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the
dismissal of the criminal case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle of double
jeopardy does not cover him.
Guerrero v. CA - 257 SCRA 703
Facts: An Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner.
Due to several postponements, all filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was finally able to start
presenting its evidence on September 29, 1972 after petitioner entered his pleas of 'Not Guilty. On
May 15, 1990, the private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate originals of the
testimonies. The private prosecutor manifested that he had communicated with one of the
stenographers on record, who promised to look into her files and hopefully complete the
transcription of her stenographic notes. On October 1, 1990, the presiding Judge set the retaking of
the witnesses testimony on October 24, 1990. On October 24, 1990, the retaking of the
testimonies was reset to November 9, 1990 due to petitioner's failure to appear on the scheduled
hearing. On November 7, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to
speedy trial has been violated. On November 9, 1990, presiding Judge denied the motion to
dismiss and reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 21, 1990. On November 16, 1990,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 21, 1990. The
presiding judge set anew the retaking of the testimonies to December 5, 1990. Hence, petitioner
filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for the review of the orders of the Regional
Trial Court dated November 9, 1990 and November 20, 1990 anent petitioner's motion to dismiss,
as well as his motion for reconsideration. The petition was anchored on the alleged violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial.
Issue:
Held: Anent petitioner's contention that the re-hearing would place him in double jeopardy, suffice
it to say that there has been no termination of the criminal prosecution - i.e. of that "first jeopardy."
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: x x x It is a settled rule that to
raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy

must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the
same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted). And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused (citation omitted). [ In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy,
since the fourth element - dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the
accused - is not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted standard, the retaking of
testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond dispute that
petitioner's claim of double jeopardy is utterly without basis.
Teodoro v. CA - 258 SCRA 603
Facts: The petitioner was charged in four separate informations for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. It was alleged that the petitioner, together with Melania Guerrero, who
produced a special power of attorney claimed establish have been executed by the late Clemente
Guerrero, had conspired with their co-accused in selling some properties of the decedent to the
widow's sister, Luz Andico, through fictitious deeds of sale notarized by the petitioner. The motion
to dismiss to was eventually denied by the trial court, as so was the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner questioned the denial of the motions. Petitioner unabashedly
admits that the motion to dismiss in the instant criminal cases was filed after the arraignment so
that the cases could not be refiled again considering the principle of double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the double jeopardy has attached in petitioners motion to quash
Held: No. When the Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss after the arraignment, he failed to attach
the double jeopardy. According to the SC, a person who does not move to quash a complaint or
information until after he has pleaded is deemed to have waived all objections then available
which are grounds of a motion to quash. However, this is subject to exception. By express provision
of Sec. 8 of the same rule, failure to assert certain grounds in a motion to quash filed prior to the
plea does not operate as a waiver of the right to invoke them later. Even after arraignment, a
motion to dismiss the information may be filed if it is based on the ground that: (a) the information
charges no offense; (b) the trial court has no jurisdiction; (c) the penalty or the offense has been
extinguished; and (d) that double jeopardy has attached.
Cuidia v. CA 284 SCRA 173
Facts: An information was filed by City Prosecutor of Angeles City against the petitioner for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. During pre-trial, the court called the attention of the
parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in
Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles
City RTC. However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging
petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The case was
likewise raffled to Angeles City. This prompted the city prosecutor to file a Motion to
Dismiss/Withdraw the Information. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash a 2nd information on the
ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in the first information and which had been dismissed
despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.

16

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the first jeopardy did not attach because the
first information filed against the accused was not valid.
Held: No. In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to
prove the existence of the following: (a) Court of competent jurisdiction (b) Valid complaint or
information (c) Arraignment (c) Valid plea (e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In the case at
bar, the first jeopardy did not attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City
was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an
essential element of jurisdiction. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place. Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles
City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
People v. Lising 285 SCRA 595
Facts: Two (2) Amended Informations for carnapping and kidnapping with double murder were filed
in court against Lising, Manalili, Garcia, Dizon, Manga, and Ligaya Fausto. The RTC acquitted all the
accused in the crime of carnapping because it appearing that the use of the car was done only to
facilitate the commission of the crime of Slight Illegal Detention. When Lising was apprehended, he
implicated Garcia and Manalili. Thereafter, the manhunt for Felimon Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili
began. One by one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise and Beebom fell into the hands
of the authorities. Garcia surrendered and was brought to the NBI. He named Pat. Enrico Dizon as
the companion of Lising when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped and brought to Valle Verde
Lodge. He refused to make a statement or give further information until Rodolfo Manalili was
arrested.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of Manalili and Garcia for kidnapping would violated their
constitutional right against double jeopardy
Held. Yes. Since they were already convicted and met the requirement in order that double
jeopardy mayexist. The decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the crime of
Kidnapping and finding the rest of the accused guilty for the crime of Slight Illegal Detention only
does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all the accused should be equally guilty for the crimes
as charged. Unfortunately, we can no longer convict Manalili and Garcia for Kidnapping in
consonance with the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight Illegal Detention
should be qualified to Serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
considering that a female victim was involved.

with the trial court. While the case is pending accused, the court receive a copy of the return of the
warrant of arrest. It stated that the police failed to effect the alias order of arrest issued by Judge
Gustilo as they could not locate accused-appellant and his whereabouts were unknown.
Issue: Whether or not the Court should proceed to exercise jurisdiction over his appeal.
Held: Yes. The court held that dismissal of accused-appellants appeal at this stage will result in
injustice. In Criminal Case No. 34642, the Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of homicide
and sentencing him to a minimum of prision mayor to a maximum of reclusion temporal will
become final. The findings of the Court of Appeals that he should instead be convicted for murder
and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua can no longer be acted upon by this Court. And in
Criminal Case No. 34643, accused-appellant will be acquitted from the charge of frustrated
homicide as found by the Court of Appeals. In fine, accused-appellant will be benefitted by his act
of jumping bail. To avoid this mockery of justice, the court resolved to continue exercising
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 34642. The acquittal of accused-appellant in Criminal Case No.
34643, however, can no longer be reviewed in view of the rule on double jeopardy.
Cuison v. CA 289 SCRA 159
58
Facts: The RTC was found the accused Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity
was increased.The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review but the Supreme Court
denied the said petition and remanded it to RTC of Pangasinan for promulgation of the decision.
However, respondent Judge promulgated the decision of only with respect to the modified civil
liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
Petitioner submits that the trial courts promulgation of the CA Decision cannot be set aside and a
second promulgation be ordered. Because to do so would contravene the prohibition against
double jeopardy. He contends that the judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final
and that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether or not to pursue with the scheduled promulgation will violate the accuseds
constitutional right against jeopardy.
Held: No. SC held that the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth,
the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial
judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his
mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. The court emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered
the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense.

People v. Araneta, GR 125894 December 11, 1998, 95 OG 4556

People v. CA (MAQUILING), GR 128986 June 21, 1999

Facts: Respondents were charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder for the death of
Datoon, Jr. Accused Narito Araneta posted a bond of P40,000.00 and pled not guilty. The other
accused, Samuel Aronda-in, Joesel Araneta and Marvin Deogluis, remain at large. The charges
against Joebert Araneta, an active member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. He
appealed to the Court of Appeals and continued to be free on the same bailbond he had posted

FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the Solicitor General assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals acquitting the accused, herein private respondent, who was found guilty by
the Regional Trial Court of the crimes of Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. The Court of
Appeals accepted the claim of self-defense of the accused which was rejected by the trial court.
The Solicitor General questioned the review by the appellate court of the trial courts assessment
of credibility of witnesses despite its not having been raised as an issue in the appeal brief and its

17

misappreciation and wrongful assessment of factual evidence. Petitioner questions the jurisdiction
of CA and submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it
denied the petitioner due process and because it committed grave abuse of discretion.

did not object to the appeal interposed by the prosecution, Judge Domael should have known that
granting such appeal would constitute double jeopardy.
Barangan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123307, November 29, 1999

HELD: Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment
to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the
lower court committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of judgment. A direct review
by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The rule on double jeopardy, however,
prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was
based on the merits of the case. Double jeopardy is present if the following elements concur: (1)
the accused individuals are charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been
arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed
without their express consent. In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the existence
of the first, third and fourth elements. Petitioner, however, questions the presence of the second
element and submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it
denied the petitioner due process and because it committed grave abuse of discretion. It has been
held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A denial of due process likewise results in loss or
lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or where the dismissal of an information or
complaint is purely capricious or devoid of reason, or when there is lack of proper notice and
opportunity to be heard.
People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 135451, September 30, 1999
FACTS: The Supreme Court, in the exercise of supervision over judges and court employees, had
initiated this action in consequence of the palpably erroneous ruling of Judge Pepe P. Domael who
rendered decision acquitting the accused on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his answer, he said that he gave due course to the appeal
because the prosecution cited Memorandum Circular No. 3 dated April 1, 1997 of the Department
of Justice pertaining to appeals of decisions of acquittal by the trial court, he admitted that he was
caught off-handed by the novel action taken by the prosecution in appealing a decision of
acquittal in a criminal case. The Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the appealed case for violation
of the rule on double jeopardy and required Judge Domael to explain why he should not be
dismissed from office for gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: YES. It is elementary that the rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal on the merits. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in an appellate court, will put him a second time
in jeopardy for the same offense. The Constitution itself provides that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Such a constitutional guarantee prohibits an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal, and the law does not provide for exceptions other than
deprivation of due process or grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. The
preclusion against appeal by the government from judgments of acquittal applies even though the
accused did not raise the question of double jeopardy. Although the accused Danilo F. Serrano, Sr.

FACTS: On 22 August 1989 a criminal complaint for estafa was filed against BIYAYA's Chairman
Federico Castillo, Vice- Chairman Samuel Barangan, and Board Members Efigenia Marquez,
Merlinda Topinio, Gualberto Ola, Federico Sison Jr. and Rolando Remigio. The complaint alleged
that these seven (7) accused feloniously solicited investments from John Gatmen in the sum of
P31,200.00 where he would be paid 300% in dividends after (15) fifteen days plus another 200% in
dividends after (21) twenty-one days, and on such dates the capital would be returned. But,
despite repeated demands, John Gatmen was never paid his investment and guaranteed profits.
On 30 August 1989 another complaint for estafa was filed by Leovino Jose similarly alleging that he
was defrauded by the same accused by convincing him to part with P43,500.00 and to deposit the
amount with the Biyaya Foundation. But far from complying with their promise, the money was
misappropriated and misapplied to their own use and benefit. Thus, Leovino Jose never recovered
what he invested, much less its promised returns. Petitioner Samuel Barangan now comes to us
contending that respondent appellate court committed a reversible error in holding without
evidence that Leovino Jose invested any amount with the BIYAYA and in holding him together with
the other accused jointly and severally liable to pay Leovino Jose. Barangan argues that there was
no evidence at all that Jose actually invested any amount with BIYAYA. His claim that he was given
slots for his investment should not be given credence in view of his failure to present any of the
slots in evidence. He did not even know the name of the employee of BIYAYA to whom he gave the
money nor could he remember the amount he invested in his name or in the name of his relatives.
HELD: It has been proven time and again that schemes such as in the instant case - innocuously
denominated as a paluwagan - are but rackets designed to victimize the gullible public. We want
to clarify, however, that a paluwagan, which operates as a trust fund from which members can
draw money in case of need, is not illegal per se. But if it becomes a device to entice investments,
usually with the promise of enormous dividends, when in truth the ultimate objective is to swindle
the investors, then the scheme is transformed into an illegal activity. It is undisputed that BIYAYA
was engaged in one such activity which was cloaked in the guise of a paluwagan. Jose's
investment of P43,500.00 was not returned because the officers of BIYAYA went into hiding after
the authorities raided its office. For having engaged in an illegal transaction, the officers and the
members of the Board of the Biyaya Foundation who had actual knowledge of the transactions and
thus tacitly approved and acquiesced thereto, should be made to answer criminally and civilly. It is
indeed difficult to fathom why the accused were acquitted considering that BIYAYA could not have
possibly undertaken the illegal transactions without the imprimatur of its officers and board
members. Yet our hands are now tied by the constitutional mandate against double jeopardy,
hence, their acquittal must stand.
People v. Velasco, GR 127444, September 13, 2000
60
FACTS: The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government
before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez
from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge
deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously

18

considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a reexamination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not
transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary
because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.
ISSUE: WON the contention of the petitioner would prosper?
HELD: NO. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. It bears repeating that where acquittal is
concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal
from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our
jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the
trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not
be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham
because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due
process. (Galaman v. Sandiganbayan)
Tupaz v. ULEP, G.R. No. 127777, October 1, 1999
FACTS: On January 10, 1991, State Prosecutor Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City an information for the alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax
for the year 1979 against Petronila C. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. as corporate officers
of El Oro Engravers Corporation. The said case was raffled to Branch 105, presided over by
respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep. However, on July 25 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died. Then, on
September 20, 1994, Petronila C. Tupaz was arraigned and she pleaded not guilty to the
information. On April 16, 1996, State Prosecutor Alfredo P. Agcaoili filed a motion to withdraw
information, thinking that the accused was charged for nonpayment of deficiency contractors tax
but found that the accused was exempted from paying said tax. Consequently, Judge Ulep granted
the motion and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On May 28, 1996, Prosecutor
Agcaoili filed with the trial court a motion to reinstate information on the ground that the motion to
withdraw information was made through palpable mistake and was the result of excusable neglect.
Over the objection of the accused that it would place her in double jeopardy, Judge Ulep granted
the motion and ordered the information reinstated. Hence, this petition. She contends that by
reinstating the information, the trial court exposed her to double jeopardy. Neither the prosecution
nor the trial court obtained her permission before the case was dismissed. She was placed in
jeopardy for the first time after she pleaded to a valid complaint filed before a competent court
and the case was dismissed without her express consent. When the trial court reinstated the
information charging the same offense, it placed her in double jeopardy.
HELD: The Court sustained petitioners contention. The reinstatement of the information would
expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an
offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment
against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint
filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the
instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioners consent. This consent cannot

be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accuseds
conformity. As petitioners consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be
regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case.
Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information
against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy.
DISSENT JUSTICE DAVIDE WHEN AN ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED TO THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION
BUT WAS NOT ARRAIGNED ON THE AMENDED INFORMATION, THE ERRONEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF
INFORMATION AND ITS SUBSEQUENT REINSTATEMENT WILL NOT PLACE THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. - As shown in the summary of facts in the ponencia petitioner entered a plea of not
guilty on 20 September 1994 to the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91- 17321. But, the
information was amended by the prosecution to indicate therein the date of the commission of the
offense, to wit: on or about August 1994 or subsequently thereafter. The amended information
was admitted by public respondent Judge in the order of 2 March 1995. There is at all no showing
that petitioner was re-arraigned on the amended information. On the contrary, on 5 December
1995 she filed a motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation, which the trial court
granted in its order of 13 December 1995. Not having been re-arraigned on the amended
information, which validly supplanted the original information, the erroneous withdrawal of the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 and its subsequent reinstatement cannot place the
petitioner in double jeopardy. Firstly, the withdrawal had no legal effect since the information was
amended. Secondly, petitioner was not arraigned on the amended information. And, thirdly,
petitioner is estopped on the matter since she had asked for a reinvestigation on the basis of the
amended information.
People v. Verra, GR 134732
FACTS: respondent Acelo Verra was charged with the crime of murder for killing a certain Elias
Cortezo. Subsequently, the case was dismissed. Subsequently, two other witnesses of the shooting
incident appeared after learning of the dismissal of the case and manifested their willingness to
testify. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal which was
granted by the RTC. CA: held that when the trial court issued its order of dismissal, as far as the
court is concerned, the case was ended. To revive the case against the same accused or to
prosecute him anew for the same act imputed to him, the government has to file a new case or
information for the reason that the dismissed case had already been terminated, definitely and
finally.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of double jeopardy
HELD: YES. to revive the case against him would be violative of his constitutional right against
double jeopardy. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." requisites for double
jeopardy to attach: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. There are however two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to
dismiss the case is made by the accused himself: First, is when the ground is insufficiency of
evidence of the prosecution; and second is when the proceedings have been unreasonably
prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy trial. In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited
requisites present. First, there was a valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a

19

conviction, Second, the Regional Trial Court clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the murder
charge against the respondent. Third, he was arraigned with the assistance of a counsel de officio.
Fourth, during the arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Finally, there was a valid
termination of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to Dismiss the case. While it is true
that the respondent joined the prosecution in praying for its dismissal, double jeopardy will still
attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
Merciales v. CA, 379 SCRA 345
FACTS: Criminal cases for rape with homicide, in connection with the death of one Maritess Ricafort
Merciales, were filed against the private respondents. RTC: acquitted the accuse for lack of
sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. CA: dismiss. The
case was set for oral argument
ISSUE:WON the re opening of the case would constitute a violation of rights of theaccuse against
double jeopardy
62
HELD: NO. It should be noted that in the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not
presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated moves by the accused
for the trial court to continue hearing the case, he deliberately failed to present an available
witness and thereby allowed the court to declare that the prosecution has rested its case. In this
sense, he was remiss in his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties. More specifically,
the public prosecutor in this case was guilty of blatant error and abuse of discretion, thereby
causing prejudice to the offended party. Indeed, the family of the deceased victim, Maritess
Merciales, could do nothing during the proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the case in
the hands of the said prosecutor. All they could do was helplessly watch as the public prosecutor,
who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on their behalf, renege on that obligation and
refuse to perform his sworn duty. it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court.
Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in
criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done without
regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and
the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. even assuming that a writ of certiorari is
granted, the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning,
the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is,
in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

HELD: NONE. The proceedings beginning with the issuance of the Resolution reducing the penalty
of the accuse upon the allege motion for reconsideration are patently void and therefore produce
no legal effects whatsoever. From the lowering of the penalty to qualify the accused for probation,
the authorization for temporary liberty on recognizance, and finally the grant of probation, the
orders of respondent Judge arising from these proceedings do not compel respectability and
finality to constitute double jeopardy. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or
without due process does not exist in legal contemplation and cannot be considered to have
attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.
People v. Alberto, GR 132374, Aug. 22, 2002
FACTS: RTC convict petitioner Lucio Alberto of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On June 26, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of the prosecution
to submit its formal offer of exhibits. The said order was lifted after the prosecution filed a motion
for reconsideration finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON the change of the ruling of RTC via a motion for reconsideration constitute a violation
of right against double jeopardy
HELD: NO. The three requisites before double jeopardy can be invoked are: (1) the first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. As to the first jeopardy, it only arises (1)
upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea
has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case was
dismissed. We agree with the Solicitor General that the dismissal order made by the trial court
was not valid and cannot be used as basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The said right cannot be
grounded on an error of law. We agree with the OSGs contention that the trial court exceeded its
authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence
there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is
not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could
still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court
reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
Condrada v. People, GR 141646, Feb. 28, 2003

Poso v. Mijares, AM No. RTJ-02-1693, Aug. 21, 2002

FACTS: A complaint for administrative sanctions against Judge Mijares for allegedly railroading the
criminal case against a self-confessed killer and admitting him to probation, which unduly obviated
the accuseds otherwise definite date with prison was charged against the said accuse. The instant
administrative case stemmed from the proceedings for murder, People v. Virgilio de Guia, where
the victim, a certain Lito M. Galupo, was a relative of complainant Oscar M. Poso. There is a
question in the said case, whether the accused truly moved for reconsideration of the penalty
imposed on him by respondent Judge Mijares. Complainant averred that respondent Judge had
acted upon an unsigned motion which the accused did not even file

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. 10770 presently pending before the
RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2. When he was arraigned on February 26, 1999,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. Due to several postponement of the
hearing, petitioner moved for a temporary dismissal in which the prosecution did not object, thus,
the trial court issued an order temporarily dismissing the case. Subsequently, the prosecution filed
a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case. Petitioner opposed the motion
contending that the revival or reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON the revival would constitute a violation of double jeopardy because the dismissal is
permanent in character, having been made in consideration of his right to speedy trial.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation against double jeopardy

20

HELD: NO. A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on
the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the
case due to the prosecutions failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of
unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition or
trial of the case against him. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal
without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the
subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed under the Revised
Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court. In the present case, it is clear from the records that the
dismissal ordered by the trial court was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a permanent
dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated by the
delay in the prosecution of the said case.
the trial court expressly stated that the same was
subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the temporary dismissal. the Court
finds that the reinstatement did not place petitioner in double jeopardy. The proscription against
double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and
the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other
manner without his consent. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the
reinstatement, said case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court upon his motion. Thus, the
requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not
present in this case.
PEOPLE V. ROMERO GR144156, March 20, 2003
FACTS: Before the trial court rendered a decision, the prosecution, on August 30, 1999, moved for
the re-opening of the case on the ground that the appellant violated one of the above conditions
when he refused to pay the amount of P30,000 to the father of the victim. Instead, the appellant
proposed to pay the lesser amount of P20,000, conditioned on his being set free upon payment
thereof. The trial court granted the motion of the prosecution and ordered the commencement of
trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants right against double jeopardy was violated when the trial court
granted the prosecutions motion to re-open the case after it approved his plea to the lesser
offense of homicide.

respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his Motion to Travel. The OMB -- through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor -- moved to withdraw ex parte the two cases against private
respondent. The SBN granted the Motion. Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court seven
Informations for Malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa and several others. Espinosa filed a
Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that double jeopardy had already attached, because
(1) he had been arraigned in the previous estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to Withdraw the two
earlier ones had been granted without his express consent. Petitioner countered that the
arraignment for the two previous cases was conditional, because it was made solely for the
purpose of accommodating private respondents request to travel abroad while the matters were
pending reinvestigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has waived his right to invoke double jeopardy in the
light of his allegedly conditional arraignment.
HELD: NO. A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear, categorical,
knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment
must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed
to be simple and unconditional. The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of
Article III of the Constitution. This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by
Section 17 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for
double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
x x x (1) [A] first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before
a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Private
respondent has amply shown that he learned of the Motion only after the cases had been
dismissed. It is clear that the dismissal, having been secured by petitioner without the express
consent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of the right against double jeopardy. But it
does unequivocally show the fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such right.
ORIENTE V. PEOPLE 513 SCRA 348

HELD: NO. The trial court was correct in holding that there was no double jeopardy in this case,
considering that it was not terminated as a result of appellants acquittal, conviction or dismissal.
The order approving the guilty plea to homicide, with conditions, was not a judgment of conviction.
The dispositive portion of the said order which in part reads WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
this case is deemed submitted for decision, clearly shows that the trial court still had to render a
decision on the criminal and civil liabilities of the appellant. The said order merely approved the
agreement between the parties on the new plea to a lesser offense by the appellant and the
conditions attached to it. The trial court neither sentenced the accused nor made any ruling on the
civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim.

FACTS: The RTC rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide. However,
on November 12, 1999, before the foregoing judgment became final and executory, the RTC issued
an Order motu proprio setting aside the said judgment because of a mistake in the judgment
proper and requiring both petitioner and his counsel to appear before the court on November 17,
1999. On the latter date, the RTC promulgated its second Decision dated November 15, 1999,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide.
ISSUE: Whetheer or not petitioners argument that the RTC promulgated two decisions and, by
doing so, he was placed in double jeopardy is correct.

PEOPLE V. ESPINOSA GR 153714, Aug. 15, 2003

FACTS: Separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed before the
SBN by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against (1) Respondent Espinosa, then provincial
administrator of Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez; and (3) Romeo Sanano. While the cases were being
reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the SBN a Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad. As ordered, private

HELD: NO. Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to
law and justice. This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate
amendments that are substantial in nature. They merely cover formal changes or such that will not
affect the crux of the decision, like the correction of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will
violate due process if they make substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the

21

other party the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration. The
Court finds that the change in the penalty by the RTC in the instant case did not involve the
consideration of any new evidence but a mere correction of the penalty imposed to conform with
the Revised Penal Code and The Indeterminate Sentence Law. And as the Solicitor General
correctly noted, the trial court modified the penalty in its Decision dated November 15, 1999
before the petitioner could perfect his appeal from the first Decision dated November 4, 1999
which was promulgated on November 10, 1999. Noteworthy is that it was the RTCs second
Decision dated November 15, 1999 which the petitioner elevated on appeal to the CA. It is well
settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy, and, as discussed above, throws the whole case
open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of
assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who
unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.
PACOY V. CAJIGAL 534 SCRA 338
FACTS: On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct
and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to
Murder. Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of
the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to
Escueta. The date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned
for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his
express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on
the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of
the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy. The respondent judge denied the Motion to
Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy
and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in
the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the
Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not
terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no
valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance
of disregard of rank, the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit
and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, that, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is
reconsidered and the original information charging the crime of homicide stands.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the
Homicide case.
HELD: NO. It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case
that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the

frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. A reading of the Order
dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that
disregard of rank is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the
victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for
Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
SUMMERVILLE V. EUGENIO 529 SCRA 274
FACTS: The instant petition originated from a complaint for unfair competition filed by petitioner
against private respondents Elidad Kho, Violeta Kho, and Roger Kho. Arraignment was scheduled
for July 13, 2000; however, on June 22 of the same year, private respondents filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), assailing the May 31, 2000 Resolution of the City
Prosecutors Office of Manila. The DOJ affirmed the resolution. Upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondents, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez issued Resolution which recalled
and set aside the August 17, 2000 Resolution of Undersecretary Puno, but without however issuing
a ruling on the propriety of the complaint and merely indicated that the case would be further
reviewed and the corresponding resolution would be issued. The trial court issued an Order holding
in abeyance all pending incidents to await the final resolution of the motion filed before the DOJ.
Private respondents Khos filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court has all the
facts necessary to resolve the pending incidents. The Khos filed a supplemental motion insisting
that the case be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the re-filing or the reinstatement of the Information would constitute double
jeopardy.
HELD: NO. For double jeopardy to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a valid
complaint or information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted, acquitted, or
the case has been dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. Since the
court held that the October 24, 2001 Order granting the withdrawal of the Information was
committed with grave abuse of discretion, then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a
valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite on the conviction and
acquittal of the accused in the dismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was not
met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
Herrera v. Sandiganbayan 579 SCRA 32
66
FACTS: Petitioners Pat. Edgardo Herrera y Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y Antonio, together
with the other accused, Pat. Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the
Paraaque Police Station, were charged with two (2) counts of murder, FOR THER KILLING OF Shi
Shu Yang and George Go y Tan, before public respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
16674 and 16675. Petitioners insist that respondent Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for
the crime of murder under the amended informations as they had earlier been arraigned under the
original informations for murder and their rearraignment under the amended informations placed
them in double jeopardy.

22

ISSUE: WON the rule on double jeopardy applies.

HELD: NO. Public respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the informations and
made it of record that the evidence adduced during the pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the
petition for bail shall be deemed automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case
on the merits. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioners plea of not guilty under the
amended information. For a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or
the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent. In the present case,
petitioners and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the original informations. Thereafter, at the
instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes
were committed "in relation to their office." On the same day, respondent court ordered the
amendment of the informations accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to
attach, that is, that the informations against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied
with. The fourth element was lacking. Petitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the
original information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were
committed "in relation to their office." Petitioners were thus not placed in danger of being
convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient information. Moreover, there
was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioners.
Javier v. Sandiganbayan 599 SCRA 324
FACTS: Javier was charged with malversation of public funds. The Ombudsman found probable
cause to indict Javier for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and recommended
the filing of the corresponding information. Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. The Commission on Audit also
charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javiers motion. Javier filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two
informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised
Penal Code on malversation of public fund she was being charged under two (2) informations,
which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.

motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering
that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had
pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her. It is well settled that for a claim of double
jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges;
and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated
without his express consent.[38] The third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
Co v. Lim 604 SCRA 702
FACTS: City Prosecutors Office of Manila issued a Resolution dated 7 December 2001
recommending the prosecution of Lim for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612. On 7 March
2003, an Information was filed before the RTC of Manila charging Lim with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612, Lim moved for a reinvestigation of his case before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila, which was granted by the RTC. RTC granted the motion and consolidated the
criminal cases against respondents. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, dismissed Criminal Cases
No. 01-197839 and No. 03-213403 against respondents Harold Lim y Go (Lim) and Avelino Uy Go
(Go), respectively, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the AntiFencing Law. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 84703, which sought the reversal of the Resolution dated 16 January 2006 of the Acting
Secretary of the Department of Justice directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila to
withdraw the informations filed against the respondents
ISSUE: THE RIGHTS OF THE TWO (2) ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATED,
CONSIDERING THAT THEY EXPRESSLY MOVED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST THEM.
HELD: NO. The following requisites must be complied with for double jeopardy to set in: (1) there is
a valid complaint of information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the
accused. The Order dated 11 February 2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the defense
counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents,
through counsel, had given their express consent to the termination of the case on 11 February
2004. Therefore, the fourth requisite, which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case without his or her approval, was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule on
double jeopardy is inapplicable to this case.
Lejano v. People 639 SCRA 760

ISSUE: WON there was double jeopardy.

HELD: NO.Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898 refer to
offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that
for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the instant
case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was
not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a

FACTS: On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
acquitted the accused in this case of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an
immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it
"denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably
regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in
a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of
the evidence and prosecution witnesses."

23

ISSUE: WON judgment of acquittal can be reconsidered.

HELD: NO. A judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under
double jeopardy. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of
being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this
provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the
accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has
been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation
would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

secure Smartnets credit; the REM filed in Pasig City is different from the one filed in the Makati
Register of Deeds; and the CTCs appearing in the REM (particularly of Mr. Gilbert Guy) were issued
in 2001 when the REM was executed on 2000. Atty. Pelicano also denies having affixed his
signature in the notarization.

FACTS: City prosecutor recommended the filing of an informationfor bigamy against Benjamin Jr
and Resalie for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally
married to Sally Go.RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin and Resally for insufficiency
of evidence.Sally Go filed a petition for certiorari with the CA . CA grant the petition. Benjamin then
filed a petition before the SC.

Issue:
Held: It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order
reconsidering the dismissal of the case, nor can it be modified except to eliminate something
which is civil or administrative in nature. One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is
denied due process of law. Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodlands prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in
double jeopardy.
69
However, the present case is replete with evidence to prove that the CA was correct in denying
Goodlands certiorari on appeal. We emphasize that the Orders of the MeTC were affirmed by the
RTC, and affirmed yet again by the CA. We find no grave abuse of discretion in the CAs affirmation
of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 332313.

ISSUE: WON there is a violation of the constitutional right of the petitioner against double jeopardy

RULE ON SUPERVENING FACTS

HELD: YES. All 4 elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid information for the crime of
bigamy was filed against the petitioner, they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
subsequently the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. The CA erred in
reversing the trial courts order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them
n double jeopardy.

*Melo v. People - 85 PHIL. 766

Bangayon v. Bangayon, GR 172777, October 19, 2011 38

Goodland v. Co, GR 196685, December 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner was charged with frustrated homicide. Under this provision, it was proper for the
court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one for the treason that the
proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second
jeopardy for the same or identical offense.
Issue:

Facts: Goodland filed a case against respondents for falsification of public document. After the
prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its case, herein private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence
claiming that the prosecution failed to substantiate its claim that they are guilty of the crime
charged. Private respondents alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
elements of the crime as the prosecution was unable to provide any proof that private respondents
caused it to appear in a document that Mr. Gilbert Guy participated in an act and that the
prosecution failed to establish that Mr. Gilbert Guy did not participate in said act. Thus, private
respondents alleged that the prosecutions evidence itself showed that Mr. Gilbert Guy signed the
REM, delivered the original transfer certificates of title to AUB and that Mr. Guy was duly
authorized by Goodlands Board of Directors to execute the REM. They likewise claimed that the
prosecution failed to prove that the REM was submitted as a comfort document as the testimonies
of the witnesses proving this matter were hearsay and lacked probative value. Also, the
prosecution failed to present direct evidence showing the involvement of private respondents in
the alleged falsification of document.
The prosecution opposed the Demurrer to Evidence
contending that it was able to prove [that] Mr. Guy did not participate in the execution of the REM
because Goodland did not consent to the use of its Makati property to secure a loan and it has no
outstanding credit for any peso loan. The loan of Smartnet was not secured by any collateral. The
REM shows signs of falsification: Mr. Guy signed the REM in blank in the presence of Atty. Ignacio
and before the adoption of the board resolution authorizing the use of the subject property to

Held: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to
article III, section 1 (20) of our constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in
this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It must
be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the
same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has
always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the
one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity
between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so called "same- evidence test" which was
found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate
form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information

24

constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another
when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter. This
rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time
of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies,
the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. Accordingly,
an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for
the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in
existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was
then inexistence, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently
a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things
there can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be
construed to recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist.
General terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that
exceptions have been intended to their language which would avoid results of this character.
*People v. Buling - 107 PHIL. 712
Facts: The accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for having inflicted
wounds on complaining witness Balaba, which according to the complaint would "require, medical
attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the
performance of his customary labors for the game period of time." However, Balaba's injuries did
not heal within the period estimated, and so, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the
accused charging him of serious physical injuries.
Issue: Whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to
the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
Held: Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new ruling? In other words, has a
new fact supervened, like death in the case of Melo vs. People, which changes the character of the
offense into one which was not in existence at the time the case for less serious physical injuries
was filed? We do not believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into
existence. What happened is that the first physician that examined the wounds of the offended
party certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound, incised, wrist lateral,
right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and
incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was
on the basis of this certificate that on December 8, 1956, defendant- appellant was found guilty of
less serious physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto
mayor, etc. But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the offended party, taking an Xray picture of the arm of the offended party which had been wounded. Counsel for the appellant
claims that no fact had supervened in the case at bar, as a result of which another offense had
been ommitted. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof was the same when the first
examination was made on December 10, 1956, as when the examination was made on January 18,
1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in the latter examination failure of this new fact
to be disclosed in the previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence on the part of
the examining physician. We find much reason in this argument. What happened is no X- ray
examination of the wounded hand was made during the first examination, which was merely

superficial. The physician who made the first examination could not have seen the fracture at the
distal end of the right arm, and this could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography. Under
the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to agree with the contention made on behalf of
appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the offense
from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
SAME OFFENSES
*People v. Tiozon - 198 SCRA 368
Facts: In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor, Eutropio Tiozon y Acid was charged for
violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended. Tiozon pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Pretrial was conducted and thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the parties. In a
decision promulgated, the trial court found Tiozon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery. According to the trial court, were it not for its
abolition, "the death penalty, the sentence imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of PD 1866, as
amended", should have been imposed. Tiozon filed a motion to reconsider the decision which,
however, was denied by the court. Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal. Issue: Whether prosecution for
violation of PD 1866, which is qualified by murder or homicide, bars prosecution for murder or
homicide, in light of the right against double jeopardy.
Held: Section 1 of PD 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or
possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes further by providing
that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed." It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense
penalized in Section 1 of PD 1866 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does
not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an
anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for
the qualification is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge
of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and
manufactured firearms." In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm
may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 and (b) violation of
either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused
cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy
cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or
murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Lamera v. CA - 198 SCRA 186
Facts: 2 informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries and (b) an Information for violation
of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim. Issue:
whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code

25

Held: The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore,
apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually invoking his right against double
jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately
obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the two informations. The reason
seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do
so would have been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal
Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the
former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took place only on 27
April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been
arraigned in the previous case.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Since
the informations were for separate offenses the first against a person and the second against
public peace and order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy. The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first,
Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter
(Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code.
The second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under
Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security)
of Book Two of the same Code. Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of
culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.
Undoubtedly then, no
constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two informations against
petitioner.
Gonzales v. CA - 232 SCRA 667
Facts: Two separate informations were filed against petitioner Reynaldo Gonzales y Rivera involving
the crimes of attempted homicide and violation illegal possession of firearms. After trial, the court
a quo acquitted the petitioner of the offense of attempted homicide but found him guilty of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is indeed guilty of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm.
Held: Yes. There is no doubt that the petitioner is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed
an unlicensed firearm. The testimony of the petitioner that he came into possession of the firearm
only after a scuffle, is a lame defense which cannot overcome the solid evidence presented by the
prosecution proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On this score, we note that a prosecution
witness testified that petitioner pulled the gun from his waist and fired a shot aimed at Jaime
Verdes foo.
People v. Turda - 233 SCRA 702
Facts: Respondent was charged with illegal recruitment and two (2) counts of estafa. Accusedappellant Gener Turda, on his part, denies having ever engaged in illegal recruitment activities. He
claims that he was himself a victim of the illegal recruitment activities of his co-accused. He was
sentenced a penalty of life imprisonment. In joint decision, the trial court found guilty the appellant
of illegal recruitment and estafa. However, appellant argued that the trial court erred in imposing

upon him a life sentence based on the new law on illegal recruitment which was not yet in force at
the time the alleged acts were committed.
Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in imposing to a petitioner a life sentence
Held: Yes. The penalty shall be modify. Applying the foregoing principle, not all acts which
constitute estafa necessarily establish illegal recruitment, for estafa is wider in scope and covers
deceits whether or not related to recruitment activities. More importantly, the element of damage,
which is essential in estafa cases, is immaterial in illegal recruitment. Where two different laws
define two crimes, the conviction of one of them is no obstacle to that of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. The safest general rule is that the two offenses must be in
substance precisely the same or of the same nature or of the same species, so that the evidence
which proves the one would prove the other; or if this is not the case, then the one crime must be
an ingredient of the other.
People v. Manungas - 231 SCRA 1
Facts: In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo
Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection
with this, Fernando required the applicants the several amounts for medical, placement and other
fees. The applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi however, and upon verification with POEA, they
found out that Fernando was not a licensed recruiter. Complainants filed complaints of Estafa and
Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Manungas. Manungas maintained that he was not
illegally recruiting because he was connected with a duly licensed recruitment agency, and that
only because the job openings was subsequently awarded to another recruitment agency that the
applicants he recruited were not able to leave for Saudi.
Issue: Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale, given the
circumstances.
Held: Yes. A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the
Labor Code can be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [Revised
Penal Code, Article 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum in se where criminal
intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction.
People v. Deunida - 231 SCRA 520
Facts: Accused was charged with murder and illegal possession of firearms in two separate
informations. However, after a reinvestigation which the court ordered upon motion of the accused
and for lack of the requisite prior preliminary investigation, the prosecution moved for the
withdrawal of the information for murder and the amendment of the information for illegal
possession of firearms on the ground stated in the resolution of the investigating prosecutor that
the filing of two separate informations was erroneous since what the accused had committed is
only one offense, viz., the violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 or
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.

26

Issue: Whether or the crime of murder or homicide is not absorb in the crime of illegal possession
of firearms.
Held: The court ruled that the accused who had been charged with illegal possession of a firearm
and ammunition under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was not placed in
double jeopardy when he was also charged in another case with murder because the former
offense is a different offense punished by a special law while the latter offense is defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code. We reiterated that the constitutional right against double
jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense and that when
the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same
act or set of acts, there is no double jeopardy.

FACTS: The case arose from the killing of two brothers, Juan Tacadao and Leonardo Tacadao, Jr., in
the afternoon of September 16, 1990, at Sitio Isumbo, Barangay Pulot II,Municipality of Brookes
Point, Province of Palawan. Accused74 appellant Gerry Ballabare and his brother, Eder Ballabare, were charged with double murder
with the use of illegally possessed firearms.The accused-appellant contends that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in finding him guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearm. He
points out that both offenses arose out of a single incident and that as a result of the decision
finding him guilty of separate crimes, he was placed in double jeopardy. He cites the case of
Lazaro v. People, in which it was held that conviction of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm is
a bar to another prosecution for Parricide committed with the use of the unlicensed firearm under
the rule on double jeopardy.

People v. Fernandez - 239 SCRA 174

Facts: Appellants was convicted for a violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. They contend that
no buy-bust was conducted, but a frame-up instigated by Police Officer Bermo who brought the
bag, which contained the white crystalline substance. The police forcibly entered Rms. 3-B and 4-B
without the necessary warrant to do so a few minutes after Bermos arrival. He was brought to the
police station but he was not charged with any crime. For these reasons, accused insist that they
should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not appellants were guilty of the offense charged.
Held: Yes. The testimonies on the buy-bust operation are supported by the expert testimony of
Forensic Chemist, Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa, and the physical evidence consisting of the seized plastic
packets of white crystalline substance which yielded positive to Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
and the marked P500 bills recovered from ELEONOR and GAUDENCIO after their arrest. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of
the selling transaction. Material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence.
People v. Quijada 259 SCRA 191
FACTS: The accused was charged and convicted of the crime Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866.
ISSUE: WON the conviction of the accused with two distinct offenses is barred by constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy
HELD: NO If an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession
of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these are separate offenses, with the first
punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the
constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply. For, undeniably, the elements of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the elements of homicide or
murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the
former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the
majority's construction of the subject provision would violate the constitutional bar against double
jeopardy is unfounded.

HELD: The argument has no merit. In the case of People v. Deunida, the Court declared Lazaro v.
People no longer controlling in view of our decisions in People v. Tac-an, [182 SCRA 601 (1991)],
People v. Tiozon, [198 SCRA 368 (1991)], and People v. Caling [208 SCRA 821 (1992)] and held
that Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition does not absorb the crime of homicide or
murder under the Revised Penal Code and therefore does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent
prosecution for the latter crime. It is true that in the later case of People v. Barros, this Court again
ruled that a person who commits homicide or murder through the use of an illegally possessed
firearm, is liable solely for the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm as defined in P.D.
No. 1866, 1, par. 2. This decision, however, has since been overruled by the Court en banc in
People v. Quijada in which it was held that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed
firearm is guilty of two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2.
People v. Calonzo 262 SCRA 534 *no discussion regarding double jeopardy
FACTS: REYDANTE CALONZO Y AMBROSIO was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
five (5) counts of Estafa by Bernardo Miranda, Danilo de los Reyes, Elmer Clamor, Belarmino
Torregrosa and Hazel de Paula. On 5 April 1994 the Regional Trial Court of Pasig found the accused
guilty as charged. Accused-appellant in this appeal assails his conviction by the trial court. He
claims that the court below erred in disregarding the testimony of Nenita Mercado, an employee of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), who categorically stated that their
records indicated that Calonzo never processed complainants' applications for employment
abroad. He concludes from that fact alone that he cannot be deemed to have engaged in the
recruitment of workers for employment abroad. As regards the estafa cases, accused-appellant
contends that the court a quo erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
considering that the amounts claimed to have been collected by him did not correspond to the
amounts indicated in the receipts presented by the complaining witnesses.
HELD: As regards the conviction of Calonzo for estafa on five (5) counts we ruled in People v. Turda,
G.R. Nos. 97044- 46, 6 July 1994, 233 SCRA 713, that recruitment of persons for overseas
employment without the necessary recruiting permit or authority from the POEA constitutes illegal
recruitment; however, where some other crimes or felonies are committed in the process,
conviction under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes.
People v. Benemerito 264 SCRA 677 *no discussion regarding double jeopardy

People v. Ballabare 264 SCRA 350

27

FACTS: This is an appeal by accused-appellant Alexander Alex Benemerito from a Joint Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 91, convicting him of illegal recruitemnt and
three counts of estafa.
HELD: The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another: (a) by abuse
of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. All these elements are present in the
instant case: the accused-appellant deceived the complainants into believing that he had the
authority and capability it send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for
them in Japan for which they would be hired; and that by reason or on the strength of such
assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the various processing and
placement fees. As all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.
75 To prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need be shown, viz., (1) the person charged
with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities (or any of the activities enumerated in
Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended); and (2) the said person does not have a license or
authority to do so. It is not required that it be shown that such person wrongfully represented
himself as a licensed recruiter. A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency, while
an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in
recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment agency. It is settled in out jurisdiction
that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convected of illegal
recruitment and estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as the former
is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while
estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In
short, a conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses
punishable by other laws.
People v. Tobias 266 SCRA 229 *no discussion regarding double jeopardy
FACTS: On 10 January 1991, the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela an information ] charging the accused with "Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearm Used in Murder. The RTC found him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of unlawful possession of firearm aggravated by murder.
HELD: Just like the trial court, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that as of 5 October
1990, the accused did not have a license, temporary or regular, to possess the firearm he used in
killing Jojo Lim. The trial court thus committed no error in finding the accused guilty of the crime
charged. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of life imprisonment. The penalty imposed in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms if homicide or murder is committed with
the use of such unlicensed firearm is death. It is settled that one who kills another with the use of
an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of either homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
People v. Manoyco 269 SCRA 513 FACTS: Accused-appellant Nestor Maozca y Almario was
charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of Article 38(a) in relation to
Article 39(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018; and with two (2)
counts of estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph(2)(a), of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE:
WON there is a violation of right against double jeopardy upon being punished on the same offense
HELD: NO. The crimes herein are considered as distinct and separate. The conviction of an accuse

for illegal recruitment under the labor code does not prohibit the court in penalizing the accuse of
estafa under RPC. The crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent
of the accused is necessary for conviction.
People v. Tan Tiong Meng 271 SCRA 125
FACTS: Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias "Tommy Tan" was charged with Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa. The informations for estafa claim substantially the same
allegations as information for illegal recruitment
ISSUE: WON petitioner was violated for being punished for same offense
HELD: NO. The 2 crimes was proven and ruled to be independent with each other. The POEA having
certified that accused-appellant is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, it is
clear that the offense committed against the six (6) complainants in this case is illegal recruitment
in large scale punishable under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Accused-appellant's guilt of six (6) separate crimes
of estafa has likewise been proven. In People v. Calonzo: the Court reiterated the rule that a
person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided the elements of the crime are present.
76 Both elements have been proven in this case.
People v. Sadiosa 290 SCRA 92
FACTS: Accused-appellant Delia Sadiosa was convicted by the trial court guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale defined by Article 38 (b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1920 and 2018
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of double jeopardy for being punished for same offense
HELD: NO. There is only one crime punished. While on its face the allegations in the information
may constitute estafa, it merely describes how accused-appellant was able to consummate the act
of illegal recruitment - through false and fraudulent representation by pretending that she was a
duly-licensed recruiter who could secure employment for complainants in Kuwait. A person who
has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for
conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may be convicted of offenses
punishable by other laws. However, any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement, when the persons recruited are three or more, the crime becomes illegal recruitment in
large scale under Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code. In both bases, it is the lack of a necessary license
or permit that renders such recruitment activities unlawful and criminal, fortunately, accusedappellant could have been validly charged separately with estafa under the same set of facts in
the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to have been so charged.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the information, that it accurately and clearly
avers all of the ingredients that constitute illegal recruitment in large scale.

28

People v. Sanchez 291 SCRA 333

FACTS found all the accuse guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on
seven counts and sentenced each one of them maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua on raping
and killing Eileen and Allan.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation for double jeopardy for being prosecuted for same offense
HELD: NO. RTC had penalized the accuse not on 2 different crimes but one complex crime which
one act that produces 2 or more offense. It was proven in the facts that the accuse had beaten the
victim and subsequently raped the victim and allan was hit by fist blow and thereby hitting the
pavement resulting its death
People v. Saley 291 SCRA 715 !32
FACTS: "illegal recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to
aspiring overseas contract workers. RTC find appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley,
seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of
estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one
committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.

criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where
the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. In other words, a conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws. The
elements of this kind of estafa are: (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (b) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, i.e., he
was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; and, (d) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. All these
elements are present in the instant case: accused-appellant Nenita T. Juego deceived the
complaining witnesses into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them
abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Taiwan for which they would be
hired although there were none; and, that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the
complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fee. All these representations
of appellant were actually false and fraudulent; consequently she should be made liable under
par. 2 (a), Art. 315 of The Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE V. GANADIN GR 129441 November 27, 1998 *Sorry po Atty, hindi ko po talaga
makita yung case :)
PEOPLE V. BALASA GR 106357 September 3, 1998

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was deprived of its right against double jeopardy for being punished for
same offense
HELD: NO. There is 2 and separate and distinct crime that was committed by the petitioner and all
the facts pertaining to each crime was sufficiently proven, thus, convicting them of the said crime.
Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall
be liable under Article 38(a). Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not
bar the punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense
where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se
which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction.
PEOPLE V. JUEGO GR 123162 October 13, 1998
FACTS: Nenita Juego and Wilfredo Gaerlan were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale by twenty-six (26) individual complainants. In addition,
Nenita and Wilfredo were also charged with three (3) counts of Estafa by three (3) of the twenty-six
(26) offended parties. Only Nenita stood trial as Wilfredo has eluded arrest and remains at large.
77 Of the twenty-six (26) complainants, only six (6) pursued the illegal recruitment case. Five (5)
complaining witnesses were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but refused to sign the
subpoena due to lack of interest to prosecute the case. The rest of the complainants were likewise
duly notified but failed to appear and testify.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for
offenses punishable by other laws.
HELD: YES. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under par. 2 (a), Art. 315, of
The Revised Penal Code, as the offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the

FACTS: Sixty-four informations, all charging the offense of estafa, as defined in Presidential Decree
No. 1689, were filed against Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Norma Francisco, Guillermo Francisco,
Analina Francisco and eight other persons, mostly incorporators and employees of the Panata
Foundation, before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. Fourteen cases, including Criminal Case
Nos. 8429 and 8751, were raffled off to Branch 52. Two more cases, Criminal Case Nos. 8704 and
8749, were similarly assigned to it. Of the sixteen casts assigned to Branch 52, eight were, with
the consent of the accused, provisionally dismissed for lack of evidence. On March 31, 1992,
Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan issued a joint decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8734
and 8428 finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and of having acted in conspiracy in
committing the same. On the other hand, Branch 52 rendered separate decisions in the cases
assigned to it. Thus, on October 14, 1991, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8429 rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and of having acted in conspiracy in
committing the same. Although Branch 52 rendered separate decisions in the cases assigned to it,
all had essentially the same disposition imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon each of
the convicted accused only the name of the offended party and the amount to be restituted
varied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting appellants despite their prior conviction for
the same offense in Criminal Case No. 8429.
HELD: NO. Appellants cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy for which the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. In the instant case, the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 8429 is different from the offense charged in the other cases.

29

While these cases arose out of the same scheme, the fraudulent acts charged were committed
against different persons, hence they do not constitute the same offense.
PALUAY V. CA 293 SCRA 358
FACTS: Petitioner seeks a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a petition for
annulment of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 20974 which he had filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 28. Petitioner contends that the trial court decided the case outside the
issues made out by the pleadings and, therefore, acted without due process. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals should have annulled the trial courts decision. The trial court rendered a decision
finding private respondent Domingo Pulmones guilty of serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Petitioner filed this case for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The
case was, however, dismissed. In its decision rendered on December 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner could not validly file a petition for annulment of
78 judgment without the approval of the Solicitor General; that the petition was an attempt to
secure review of a final and executory decision of the trial court; and, that a review of the case
would expose the accused to double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has personality to file a petition for annulment of judgment.
HELD: NO. The question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is a factual question that
cannot be reviewed not only because the decision of the trial court is now final but also because a
review of such question at the instance of the prosecution would violate the right of the accused
against being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
PEOPLE V. MERCADO 304 SCRA 504
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLI, finding
accused-appellant Vicente Mercado y Mercado alias Vicente Tan guilty of (1) illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment, pay a fine of
P100,000.00, and indemnify private complainants in actual damages amounting to a total of
P190,000.00; and (2) estafa for which he was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
ranging from six (6) years and two (2) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify private complainant Nelson Tamares in the sum of
P45,000.00 by way of actual damages. Another case for estafa filed against accused-appellant
was dismissed for lack of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of
illegal recruitment in large scale and of estafa.
HELD: YES. The Court reiterated the rule that a person convicted of illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code can be convicted of violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa, provided
the elements of the crime are present. The elements of the crime were stated, thus: (a) that the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Both
elements have been proven in this case. The evidence for the prosecution shows that accusedappellant was able to make private complainant Nelson Tamares part with his hard-earned money
upon his fraudulent misrepresentation that he can provide Tamares with work abroad.

People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 115719, October 5, 1999

FACTS: Appellant Yabut was charged with 8 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.
The trial court acquitted him of the 8 counts of estafa but convicted him of illegal recruitment in
large scale. He appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: May the appellant be
convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his acquittal of the crime of estafa?
RULING: YES, the appellant be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his acquittal of
the crime of estafa. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment
may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa
under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is
malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.
Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not
bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one's acquittal of the
crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale, and vice versa.
People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38
FACTS: Dao Lan Ong appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of numerous
counts of robbery, kidnapping and related charges stemming from his conduct over a three-week
period in 2007. On appeal, Ong does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions, but asserts that the trial court made several sentencing errors. We conclude that
some, but not all, of Ong's contentions are meritorious. Ong contends that execution of sentence
for the robbery convictions in counts 6 and 18 must be stayed because section 654 precludes
punishing him for kidnapping to commit robbery and for the ensuing robberies. He also contends
that punishing him for possession of a firearm by a felon, as alleged in count 21, and possession of
ammunition by a felon, as alleged in count 22, violates section 654's multiple punishment bar
because the ammunition was in the firearm.
ISSUE: WON there is violation of section 654's multiple punishment
HELD: YES. Section 654 prohibits punishment for two offenses arising from the same act or from a
series of acts constituting an indivisible course of conduct. `Whether a course of criminal conduct
is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654
depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one
objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.'
On the other hand, if the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives that were independent
and not incidental to each other, he or she `may be punished for each statutory violation
committed in pursuit of each objective' even though the violations were otherwise part of an
indivisible course of conduct`"The principal inquiry in each case is whether the defendant's
criminal intent and objective were single or multiple."A defendant's criminal objective is
`determined from all the circumstances .
People v. Meris, GR 117145-50, March 28, 2000
FACTS: RTC finds the accused, Meris GUILTY of six (6) counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in
large scale. On appeal Meris assigned errors regarding accused-appellants culpability for the

30

crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale are closely interrelated.These alleged errors
boil down to the issue of credibility.
ISSUE: WON Elements of both crimes are present in the case.
HELD: YES. Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if perpetrated against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.All the three essential elements are present in the case at bar.
As earlier discussed, accused-appellant recruited the six complainants. Further, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration certified that neither accused- appellant nor Julie Micua is
licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. A crime of Estafa was also established. This
is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damages.
People v. Logan, G.R. No. 135030-33, July 20, 2001.
FACTS: Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with three (3) counts of the crime of estafa, as
defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in three (3) separate
informations. Regional Trial Court convicted the appellant of the crimes of estafa and illegal
recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: YES. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged
and convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under
paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the rule is that the crime of
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may also be
convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.
Potot v. People, GR 143547, June 26, 2002
FACTS: Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge.
Thereupon, the trial court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed a manifestation with
motion that he is not appealing from the Decision. However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion
for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again
because there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage
of justice. The trial court granted private complainant's motion and set aside its Decision and
ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor for reevaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding
80
charge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to issue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said order would

place the accused in double jeopardy. This was denied for the reason that the State is not bound
by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double
jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.
Ruling: Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modifiedor set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penaltyis
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when
the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused haswaived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.Only the accused may ask for a
modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. Andthis he must do before the said
judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of
the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed bythe accused, except in case of
automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b)when he has partially or totally
served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right toappeal the judgment, except when
the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When one of these
circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses
jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it.In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly
waiving his right to appeal therefrom. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to
become final and unalterable.
People v. CA, 423 SCRA 605
Facts: Assailed in this petition is the judgment of acquittal rendered by the CA convicting private
respondents Claudio Francisco y Recto and Rudy Pacao y Parone of the crimes of homicide and
attempted murder, respectively.
Issue: WON an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.
Held: As earlier mentioned the circumstances of the case at bar call for a judicial inquiry on the
permissibility of appeal after a verdict of acquittal in view of the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy. In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double
jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case,
verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The fundamental
philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression
through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States (t)he
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty. Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco where the Court likewise dismissed a similar
petition not only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by the lower court was not
reviewable via the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said petition
would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. In Velasco, we
clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman
v. Sandiganbayan, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double

31

jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of Appeals. We are not inclined
to rule differently. Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after having been found not guilty by a court
of competent jurisdiction, must be afforded rest and tranquility from repeated attempts by the
State at conviction and their anxiety finally laid to rest. Their acquittal must therefore be accorded
finality in faithful adherence to the rule against double jeopardy.
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 375
Facts: Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to prosecute and/or
cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land, Ombudsman
Investigators of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a fact-finding
investigation. They executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, the
following may be charged with falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and
(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 the petitioners. The matter was further looked into by a panel
of Ombudsman Investigators, which issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to file the
corresponding Informations for 148 counts of violation of Article 315, in relation to Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners.
However, it was likewise recommended that the complaint against petitioner be dismissed, without
prejudice to a thorough fact-finding investigation on his liability in light of this Courts ruling in
Arias v. Sandiganbayan
Issue: whether petitioner may be prosecuted for both estafa through falsification of a public
document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 without violating his right against double
jeopardy.
Held: In the instant cases, the requirement of singularity of criminal intent does not exist because
there are as many criminal intents as there are anomalous transactions, causing grave damage to
the government at each instance. There was no need for the accused to perform another or other
delictual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents maintain that petitioner was motivated by
separate intents as he signed each document, all of which are criminal in character; hence, it is but
proper that corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and every act of falsification
committed. Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are
matters addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime
perpetrated by petitioner and his co-accused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of
the Sandiganbayan constitute delito continuado or classified as concurso de delitos; or involve
separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual issues. Such factual
issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is being tasked
to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his co-accused were
set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force however long a
time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court, in
this case, the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is hardly the appropriate remedy and forum for petitioner to ventilate the issues he
has raised, as only jurisdictional issues can be resolved therein. As eloquently expressed by Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, speaking for this Court in Iligan v. Court of Appeals: If, as petitioners seem to
apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a scenario of multiple
prosecutions for the same offense or, more candidly expressed, of double jeopardy, then this is
neither the procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon that possibility. For, squarely
imputable to petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and a grossly defective presentation

of that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding and at this time. It must be stressed
that our disposition of the matters in the present recourse will not foreclose petitioners right to
ventilate the same in the Sandiganbayan, for as declared in Iligan: However, this observation
would not foreclose relief to petitioners if at the trial of this case the evidence presented and the
developments therein suffice to establish the supervening fact that indeed there could possibly be
a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule 117, they can still hereafter raise
that defense of non bis in idem, provided that they can lay the evidentiary bases therefor and
refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what was earlier said on the nature and the
non-identity of the several crimes of Estafa involved which, to repeat, we pronounced purely on the
bases of existing records sans the benefit of any evidentiary fact since none has been adduced.
People v. Comila 517 SCRA 153
82
Facts: An information for Illegal Recruitment by a syndicate was filed against the respondents. On
the same date April 5, 1999 and in the same court, twelve (12) separate Informations for Estafa
were filed against the same accused at the instance of the same complainants.
Issue:
Held: It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both
illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is
malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is
not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. Here, it has been sufficiently proven that both
appellants represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the capacity to send
them to Italy for employment, even as they do not have the authority or license for the purpose.
Doubtless, it is this misrepresentation that induced the complainants to part with their hard-earned
money for placement and medical fees. Such act on the part of the appellants clearly constitutes
estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2), of the Revised Penal Code.
Diaz v. Davao 520 SCRA 481
Facts: Diaz owned a hotel. While DLPC is a public utility duly franchised to provide light, heat and
power to its customers in Davao City and the municipalities of Panabo, Santo Tomas and Carmen,
in Davao del Norte. Diaz filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC, Davao City. He alleged that
as a holder of a certificate of public convenience, DLPC is mandated by law to provide him with
electric service; the grounds relied upon by respondent Orig in denying his application are
anchored on bias and prejudice, since he (Diaz) is one of the stockholders of Diaz and Co. Inc., the
owner of the Davao Imperial Hotel; and the civil case filed by DLPC is against Diaz and Co., Inc. and
not personally against him. DLPC, for its part, filed a counter-application for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the same case to compel the removal of the electric Meter which Diaz had installed
without DLPCs consent and authority. Thereafter the parties entered into a compromise
agreement.
Issue: WON the compromise agreement entered into between DLPC and Diaz barred the former
from instituting further actions involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509;

32

Held: Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The
purpose of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and
controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public offense
which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion, though complete
reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case
is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal
liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense. Moreover, a compromise is not one
of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability. As can
be inferred from the compromise agreement, Diaz and DLPC merely agreed to (1) reduce the
latters total claims to only P385,000.00; (2) for DLPC to waive its counterclaims against Diaz; and
(3) upon receipt of the amount, for DLPC to immediately install the necessary electric service to
the building. The parties likewise agreed to the dismissal of Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288 for being
moot and academic. Nowhere in said agreement did the parties agree that DLPC was barred from
instituting any further action involving 2 electric Meters
Merencillo v. People 521 SCRA 31
83
Facts: This petition for review assails the decision of the Sandiganbayan in affirming the omnibus
decision RTC in Criminal Cases finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges when
arraigned. Thereafter trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.
Issue:
Held: One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the
Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy if a person is
charged simultaneously or successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal
Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is
an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. A comparison of the elements of
the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and
those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary
inclusion between the two offenses. Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither
identical nor necessarily inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the
essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the
other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is
enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or
receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA
3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration
where the public officer has the authority to intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other
hand, has a wider and more general scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b)

execution of an unjust act which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or
refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do.
Although the two charges against
petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and
distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of
the offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a
second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.
Lapasaran v. People 578 SCRA 658
Facts: Feliciano Lapasaran and others were accused in the Court of First Instance of Davao of a
violation of Republic Act No. 947 which consists in entering and occupying portions of a public
agricultural land which were covered by a sales application of the Oriental Farming Corporation
through force or stealth and without permit from the Director of Lands. Counsel for the accused
filed a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the information, as amended, do not
constitute the offense defined and penalized by Republic Act No. 947 for that Act merely punishes
the unlawful entry and occupation of public lands granted to natural persons and not to juridical
persons as in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the allegations against the accused do not constitute the offense penalized
by RA 947
Held: Considering the procedure laid down by law relative to the purchase of a portion of public
land as above outlined in the light of the allegations of the amended information we are of the
opinion that the violation charged comes within the purview of the law for it is clearly alleged
therein that the accused entered and occupied illegally a portion of public agricultural land which
is merely covered by the sale application of the Oriental Farming Corporation without mentioning if
the land applied for has already been awarded to said applicant. In order that a land applied for by
a private individual may be given the protection of the law, it is necessary not only that it be
applied for but that it be actually awarded to him
84 even if the title still remains in the Government. Since the amended information merely
mentions that the land illegally occupied by the accused was covered by a sale application and has
not been actually awarded as yet, the same is still a portion of public agricultural land the
protection of which from forcible entry or occupation is the main aim of the law. Having reached
this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to determine if the words private individual mentioned
in the law can be interpreted as to include juridical persons as contended by the Government. The
order appealed from is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
*Ivler v. Modesto 635 SCRA 191
Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner charged before the MTC of Pasig
City, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to for the death of respondent Ponces husband and damage to the spouses Ponces
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded
guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

33

Issue: Whether or not petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage.
Held: Yes. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." The
two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the RPC. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
People v. Ocden 650 SCRA 124
Facts: The RTC found accused-appellant Ocden guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and of the
crime of estafa. Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
she is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare allegations of
the prosecution witnesses, no evidence was adduced to prove that she was a non-licensee or nonholder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
No
certification attesting to this fact was formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.
Issue: Whether or not accused can be convicted of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa
separately
Held: Yes. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
and estafa. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of
the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a)
of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
People v. Lalli, GR 195419, October 12, 2011 (trafficking in person)
85
Facts: RTC of Zamboanga City was found appellants guilty of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and
Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate. During the tria, the accused, likewise, tried to
prove that Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the Philippines with four children fathered
by four different men. However, the trial court found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to
the criminal prosecution. These circumstances, even if true, would not exempt or mitigate the
criminal liability of the accused. The trial court found that the accused, without a POEA license,
conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as a prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a
syndicate.

Issue: Whether or not the act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different
offenses, a prosecution under one be a bar in a prosecution under the other.
Held: No. When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different
offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other. The constitutional
right against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice for the same offense, or for
an act punished by a law and an ordinance. The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to
an act or series of acts constituting different offenses.
NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL; INSTANCES OF VOID ACQUITTAL
People v. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 74
Facts: Private respondents were charged with having violated Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandiganbayan. During the trial instead of presenting their evidence, the respondents
filed their respective motions for leave to file their demurrer to evidence based substantially on the
following grounds: (i) that Atty. Pagunuran had no personal knowledge of the transactions involved
and so her testimony was hearsay; (ii) that the prosecution failed to prove that the questioned
contracts were indeed overpriced as Atty. Pagunuran merely relied on the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) table of Typical Construction Costs, 1999 without more; and (iii)
that the ruling of the Court of Appeals in an administrative case (C.A. G.R. SP No. 62084), which
upheld the validity of the direct negotiated contracts, even in the absence of a public bidding, was
already the law of the case. In their respective comments on the petition, the respondents are one
in questioning the propriety of resorting to this present petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 on the ground that it places them in double jeopardy.In its Reply, petitioner argued that the
right of the accused against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the issues presented for
resolution are purely legal. In resolving the legal issues, there is no need to reevaluate the
evidence already adduced before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners also lament the fact that the
Sandiganbayan ignored the legal dictum that the dismissal of the administrative case does not bar
the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar act/s subject of the criminal case. Under
that doctrine, a criminal case already filed must proceed in the normal course of litigation.
Issue: Whether or not prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence
of the accused
Held: Yes. The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused as it is equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove that the
courts action is attended with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the
accused against double jeopardy will be violated. The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal is, however, not absolute. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when
the prosecution is denied due process of law, and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accused demurrer to evidence. As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information.
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the

34

trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent, of the defendant, and (2)
86
the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the
case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should
the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Yuchengco v. CA, 376 SCRA 531
FACTS: Before us is the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to
nullify and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. CR No.
21351 acquitting herein private respondents of the crime of libel. Petitioner Alfonso Yuchengco
alleges in essence that the contents of the two (2) published articles, subject of the Information,
which branded and portrayed him as a gadfly, a corporate raider and a crony of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos were derogatory and libelous per se, hence, malice need not be
proved since the same is presumed pursuant to Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise,
the derogatory publications cannot be considered as privileged communications as no public
interest could be served by maligning him since he was neither a candidate nor did he campaign
for any of the candidates in the June 29, 1993 elections for OPMC Board of Directors. In addition,
the appellate courts adoption of the opinion of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139, in
its decision in Criminal Case Nos. 93-10988 and 93-10989 is highly irregular for the reason that the
latter is an inferior court and that the complainant in said criminal cases was Atty. Leonardo
Siguion-Reyna, who was a candidate in the then forthcoming elections of the board of directors of
the OPMC.
HELD: We stress that a judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable
whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. This means that a review
of alleged errors in the said judgment arising from misappreciation of facts and the evidence
adduced cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy
which is firmly established in this jurisdiction. In any event, we find that the appellate court
committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
assailed decision in the case at bar. All the evidence adduced and the issues and arguments raised
by the parties in their respective pleadings were exhaustively and correctly addressed by the
appellate court in its 54-page assailed decision. Consequently, the said judgment of the Court of
Appeals acquitting herein private respondents of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 93-10985
may not be reviewed, much less reversed, without violating their constitutional right against
double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
San Vicente v. People, GR132081, Nov. 26, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. On June
11, 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot the victim outside the Far East Bank along
Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted to rob him of a
large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine. During the
trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report. Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a
demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner
filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack
of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecutions

evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was
not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt. On October 7, 1996, the trial court
issued an Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of
evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground,
among others, that with the dismissal of the case double jeopardy had set in. The prosecution filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43697. In a Decision
dated July 25, 1997, the appellate court nullified the October 7, 1996 Order of the trial court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated January 2, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON double jeopardy had set in.
87
HELD: YES. Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double
jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present
its case, or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in
dismissing the charges against petitioner.
People v. CA, GR 132396, Sept. 23, 2002
FACTS: Nercy M. Demeterio, Excel Mangubat, Ma. Lourdes Deutsch alias Lyn, and the spouses
Numeriano Rabadon and Leonila Burlaos were charged with Estafa. On August 4, 1994, the trial
court rendered a decision finding Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat to have conspired with one
another to deceive complainant, and convicted them of Estafa. Deutsch, Demeterio and Mangubat
interposed a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals. On November 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals
modified the trial courts judgment. Accused Ma. Lourdes Deutsch whose crime has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, is hereby ACQUITTED. Petitioner likewise denies that Deutsch
would suffer double jeopardy should this petition be granted. Relying on People vs. Castaeda, Jr.,
165 SCRA 327, she explains that since this petition is merely a continuation of the case before the
trial court and not a new one, no jeopardy has yet attached. Deutsch likewise argues that a review
of her acquittal would place her in double jeopardy under Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
She claims petitioner erred in relying on People vs. Castaeda, Jr. since in said case the facts
completely differfrom those in the present case.
HELD: While it is true that double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a decision
acquitting the accused, it is likewise true that an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really acquit and therefore does not
terminate the case. There can be no double jeopardy if the said acquittal is based on a void
indictment. A tribunal, board or officer is said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an erosion or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In acquitting Deutsch, the Court of Appeals merely
interpreted the evidence presented before the trial court, as it deemed fit. Note, however, that the
acquittal of Deutsch is based only on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, considering

35

the circumstances, it is without prejudice to whatever civil action might be appropriately taken by
petitioner Wilson in regard to respondent Deutsch.
People v. Sandiganbayan 491 SCRA 185
FACTS: Dominador T. Belac (then Provincial Governor of Kalinga) and Noe V. Dannang (then
Provincial Budget Officer) were charged with falsification of an official document as defined in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The said accused, together with Juan M. Boguen (then
Provincial Treasurer of Kalinga) and Thomas B. Tubban, Jr. (Officer-In- Charge of the Office of the
Provincial Accountant), were charged with technical malversation under Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment acquitting all the accused of the
crimes charged. Outraged by the acquittal of all the accused, the People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, sought relief from this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted contrary to
law and applicable jurisprudence and with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in acquitting all the accused of all the charges, considering that proof beyond
reasonable doubt had been adduced to prove the guilt of the accused for all the crimes charged.
In any event, respondents insist, the petition should be dismissed outright since the judgment of
the Sandiganbayan acquitting them of all the charges can no longer be reversed or even modified
on appeal under Rule 45 or even in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without placing them in
double jeopardy. In reply, petitioner avers that, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken
cognizance of questions of fact in petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in order to resolve
the legal issues, such as where there was palpable error or grave abuse or misapplication of facts
by the lower court. It also insists that a judgment of acquittal
88
may be reversed without violating the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy
on the ground that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.
HELD: When a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient
evidence to prove its case, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second
attempt at conviction. One other reason why further prosecution is barred to appeal an acquittal is
that the government has already been afforded one complete opportunity to prove a case of the
criminal defendants culpability and, when it has failed for any reason to persuade the court not to
enter a final judgment favorable to the accused, the constitutional policies underlying the ban
against multiple trials become compelling. It matters not whether the final judgment constitutes a
formal acquittal. What is critical is whether the accused obtained, after jeopardy attached, a
favorable termination of the charges against him. If he did, no matter how erroneous the ruling,
the policies embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause require the conclusion that further
proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues on the elements of the offense charged are
barred. A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case,
the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted
without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to
act in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply

because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes
in the findings and conclusions of the trial court. In this case, the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over the crimes charged. The People had its day in court and adduced its evidence. There was no
collusion between the prosecutor and respondents. The anti-graft court extensively analyzed the
evidence of the parties and made its findings and conclusions based thereon. Assuming that any
error was committed in the Sandiganbayans review of the evidence and the records, such errors
are mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction.
People v. CA 516 SCRA 383
FACTS This petition for certiorari assails the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2003 in CAG.R. CR No. 23605, entitled People of the Philippines v. Ramon Galicia y Manresa, on the ground
that said decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion. The decision reversed the trial
courts conviction of herein private respondent Ramon Galicia, and acquitted him. In his Comment,
Galicia contends that there was no grave abuse on the part of the Court of Appeals, and adds that
any mistake or error in the appreciation of facts, evidence or law is merely an error of judgment
and not an error of jurisdiction, and hence, not a subject of a petition for certiorari. Most
significantly, the defense for private respondent points out that to give due course to the instant
petition and review the acquittal by the appellate court of Galicia would constitute double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Would a review of the acquittal of Galicia constitute double jeopardy?
HELD: YES. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the
accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of
precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope
of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. This is not to say that the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy is without exceptions. For there are two recognized exceptions:
(1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or
(2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. However,
in this case, we find that the exceptions do not exist. Firstly, was there a deprivation of due
process, or a mistrial? The records show that during the trial, both parties had
89
more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during
the appeal. The State represented by the prosecution had not been deprived of a fair opportunity
to prove its case. Second, has there been a grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals?
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an
extraordinary remedy. Its use is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior
court is wholly void. Its aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or
to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the court simply because of its
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive
acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower

36

court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.
People v. Laguio 518 SCRA 393
FACTS:3 informations was filed against accuse Lawrence C. Wang for violation of section 16, article
3 in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act);
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and Violation of Comelec
Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban) which the RTC had acquitted
the accuse. People, moved that such ruling be reversed
ISSUE: WON the decision of RTC maybe appealed
HELD: NO. Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may
appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to
the prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy. Thus, any appeal from a judgment
of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy, thus, disallows appeal by the People
from judgments of acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal
would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the
Court has previously made some exceptions. it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence/acquittal. This may be
done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by
an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against
double jeopardy is not violated. Unfortunately, what petitioner filed with the Court is an appeal by
way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is
different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari vs appeal: 1.
As to the Purpose.
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment 2.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of
review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power
of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of
the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. 3.
As
to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared
are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed
against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

Agreement subject mattersince it was not approved by the board. the People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, thru the Office of the Special
90
Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case against respondent
Dumlao.
ISSUE: WON the appeal on sandiganbayans decision in acquitting the accuse would constitute a
violation of double jeopardy
HELD:NO.There are exceptions to the general rule of attachment of double jeopardy after the
accuse has been acquitted by the lower court/CA. In the case under consideration, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence, thus, violated the prosecutions
right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to
prove the accuseds culpability. It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it
even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The
dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
Tiu v. CA 586 SCRA 118
FACTS:Accuse/respondent Edgardo Postanes was convicted of for the crime of grave threats by the
MeTC, reversed by RTC but which ruling was rendered as annulled by the CA, thus, the accuse was
acquitted. Tiu, filed a petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accuse
ISSUE:WON the filing of petition for certiorari constitute a double jeopardy
HELD:YES. The elements of double jeopardy are present in the case at bar: (1) the complaint or
information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction: - the Information filed in
Criminal Case against Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction (2) the
court had jurisdiction;
- the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case
(3) the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
- Postanes was arraigned and entered
a non-guilty plea (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.
- the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. There is no
showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from
the order of dismissal of the criminal case.

People v. Dumlao 580 SCRA 409 (void acquittal)

People v. De Grano 588 SCRA 550
FACTS:Sandiganbayan dismiss the case against the accuse/respondent Hermenegildo C. Dumlao,
being one of the members of the GSIS Board of Trustees who allegedly approved the leasepurchase of the subject GSIS properties consisting of three parcels of land with an area of 821
square meters, together with a five-storey building, in favor of respondent Lao, which leasepurchase agreement was deemed by the Office of the Ombudsman to be grossly disadvantageous
to the government, on violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sandiganbayan held that such contract never
had the force and effect of a valid resolution and did not in effect approve the Lease and Purchase

FACTS: On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza
was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano
(Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their coaccused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil
(Leonardo), who were at-large. The prosecutions evidence to prove treachery and evident
premeditation was not strong, the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents motion for bail.

37

Petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA which was
denied. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied.

constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed reversible error when it dismissed the petition for certiorari
on the ground of double jeopardy.

People v. Duca 603 SCRA 159 (void acquittal)

HELD: YES. Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from
the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued
without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In
criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.
91
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a
complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court
has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or
acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express consent. Although this Court does not
absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where
the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not
actually placed in jeopardy. Hence, any acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction
would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
People v. Nazareno 595 SCRA 438
FACTS: The People of the Philippines seeks, through this petition for review on certiorari, the
reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in People of the Philippines v. Dir. Gen
Cesar P. Nazareno (Ret.), Dir. Gen Everlino Nartatez (Ret.), and Dir. Gen Nicasio Ma. S. Custodio
(Ret.), CRIM. CASE No. 23030. The Sandiganbayan acquitted the respondents Cesar Nazareno,
Everlino Nartatez and Nicasio Ma. Custodio (collectively, the respondents) of the charge of
violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents and thus
proscribes the resolution of the issues raised by petitioner.
HELD: YES. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately
executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal
trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from
a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a
complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the
court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional
ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The petition itself states that it was
formally filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of
the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the petitions clear and unequivocal intention to seek a review on the
merits of the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal puts it on a direct collision course with the

This is more than enough reason to deny the

FACTS: The CA decision reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194- D which affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent Arturo Duca of the
crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Aggrieved with the ruling of the
RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. The CA promulgated its assailed
decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. Petitioner argues
that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondents appeal
without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of
the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that
once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized
to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when
it acted on respondents appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being
violative of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal
without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
HELD: YES. Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the
opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to require the
Solicitor General to file his Comment on Ducas petition. A copy of the CA Resolution dated May
26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for
Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin
Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said
Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the
prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.
92
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the
chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute
the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a
nullity.
*Mupas v. People, GR 189365, October 12, 2011 (void order on demurrer)
FACTS: Petitioner Zafra, Beltran and Roga were charged with malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for
Demurrer to Evidence. She alleged therein that the prosecution failed to present proof that she and
her co-accused had wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously caused the withdrawal of the 200 cases of
Bear Brand Powdered Milk and appropriated these for themselves to the prejudice of DSWD. Thus,
she concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime of malversation
under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. She likewise contended that the prosecution was not
able to present proof that she and her co-accused had done so in violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A.
3019. Public respondent Judge Mupas issued an Order granting the demurrer to evidence of

38

petitioner Zafra. Public respondent ruled that, after evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution, he found them substantially insufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioner
Zafra under the charges filed against her by the Ombudsman. With the grant of her demurrer to
evidence, petitioner was acquitted. The People filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65, assailing the lower courts grant of petitioner Zafras demurrer to evidence, resulting in her
acquittal. The appellate court, through its Third Division, promulgated a Decision granting the
Peoples petition and revoking and setting aside the lower courts Order granting private
respondents demurrer to evidence. In its Decision reversing the trial courts Order, the CA found
that public respondent Judge Mupas committed grave abuse of discretion through his grant of
private respondents demurrer, which consequently resulted in her acquittal. Holding that the
prosecution was able to present sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crimes in the
Information filed against private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondent Judge Mupas committed grave abuse of discretion
through his grant of private respondents demurrer, which consequently resulted in her acquittal.
HELD: YES. We agree with the CAs disquisition that the lower courts grant of the demurrer to
evidence of petitioner Zafra was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The prosecutions
evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against her for her
inexcusable negligence, subject to the defense that she may present in the course of a full-blown
trial. The lower court improperly examined the prosecutions evidence in the light of only one
mode of committing the crimes charged; that is, through positive acts. The appellate court
correctly concluded that the crime of malversation may be committed either through a positive act
of misappropriation of public funds or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit
such misappropriation.
As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would
not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that
when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence, its judgment is
considered void. Parties
PARTIES
Metrobank v. Meridiano, G.R. No. 118251, June 29, 2001
FACTS: The Information dated October 30, 1992 charged the private respondent, Dominador Ong
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115 (P.D. No. 115, for brevity), otherwise known as the
Trust Receipts Law in relation to Article 315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. After resting its case,
the prosecustion formally offered its documentary evidence. On December 1, 1993, the defense
presented its evidence to show that herein private respondent signed the trust receipts in blank
and that he was acting only in his capacity as treasurer of Sun Ray Metal, Inc. Private respondent
also claimed that the contract between Sun Ray Metal, Inc. and the petitioner bank has been
novated when a representative of the bank verbally proposed to restructure the obligation under
the trust receipts, to which he agreed. Private respondent claimed that he paid thrice under the
restructuring agreement and showed as proof of the said novation a receipt evidencing one of his
payments to the petitioner bank. The private respondent formally offered his exhibits in evidence.
On the same day, the prosecution presented Lucila Uy, as rebuttal witness to refute the claim of
the defense that there has been a novation of the obligation under the trust receipts. On August 5,
1994, the defense also called the private respondent to the witness stand to testify on sur-rebuttal.
Thereafter, both parties submitted their respective memoranda.

ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when he acquitted the private respondent.
93
HELD: NO. Conversely, there cannot be a grave abuse of discretion where the trial court gave both
parties the opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from
which its decision is based, as in this case. In other words, if there is no denial of due process,
there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the exception to the
double jeopardy rule. In the present case, inasmuch as the prosecution was never denied any
opportunity to present its case and that there is no indication or proof that the trial was a sham, a
review and consequent setting aside of the trial courts decision of acquittal will put the private
respondent in double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment; (2)
before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. Consequently in such an event, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or for any offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The
record shows that the court a quo allowed both parties an exhaustive presentation and offer of
evidence and submission of their respective memoranda. If indeed public respondent has
misappreciated certain evidence, as argued by the petitioner in this petition, such are not
jurisdictional matters that may be determined and ruled upon in a certiorari proceeding. If at all,
such alleged error by the public respondent was merely an error of judgment, but not an error of
jurisdiction.
ORDINANCE AND STATUTE
*People v. Relova - 148 SCRA 292
Facts: On Feb. 1, 1975, police searched the ice plant owned by Opulencia; they discovered electric
wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed without necessary authority from city
government. Asst. City Fiscal filed info against Opulencia for violation of a city ordinance which
prohibits unauthorized wiring installations. Opulencia pleaded not guilty and filed motion to dismiss
on the ground that the crime had already prescribed (offense charged was a light felony w/c
prescribes 2 mos from discovery thereof). Lower court dismissed the case. Acting City Fiscal filed
another info for theft of electric power. Opulencia filed Motion to Quash upon the ground of double
jeopardy. Judge Relova granted motion and dismissed the case. Motion for Recon denied, hence
this appeal.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy.
Ruling: A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance for having installed a metering
device to lower his electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be
charged again for theft of electric power under the RPC. The second sentence of Art. IV Sec. 22
embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the RPC, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Where an offense is punished by different

39

sections of a statute or different statutes, the inquiry, for purposes of double jeopardy is on the
identity of offenses charged BUT where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the
inquiry is on the identity of acts. Since the dismissal of the case against Opulencia for violation of
an ordinance already amounted to an acquittal, he can no longer charged with an offense
punishable under a statute which arise from the same act.
APPLIED TO IMPEACHMENT
*Estrada v. Desierto, GR 146710-15 and GR 146738, March 2, 2001and MR-GR 14671015 and 146738, April 3, 2001
FACTS:After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the
petitioner of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and
former allies and members of the Presidents administration started resigning one by one. In a
session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by
115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate. The
impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the
President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally. On January 20, the President submitted
two letters one signifying his leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to
exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took
oath as President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:Whether there is double jeopardy grounded on the dismissal and termination of the
impeachment case against the petitioner.
RULING:NO. The impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner resigned from the
presidency thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the
presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachment case against
him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. it was consistently
ruled that when the dismissal or termination of case is made at the instance of the accused there
is NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
People v. Logan, G.R. No. 135030-33, July 20, 2001.
Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with three (3) counts of the crime of estafa, as defined and
penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in three (3) separate informations. Regional
Trial Court convicted the appellant of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: YES. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged
and convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under
paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the rule is that the crime of
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may also be
convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.

SECTION 22
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
RULES
an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action;
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
(e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person
to his disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a peson accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.(Lacson v.
Executive Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999)
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. (Lacson v. Executive
Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999
*People v. Ferrer - 48 SCRA 382
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against
the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) aggravated by circumstances ofcontempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band
and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of
the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended
by AggravatingCircumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion
that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a
presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be
made prior tofiling of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty forfurnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to
death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath.
Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if
thought, assembly and association.

40

Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely
a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) Thestatute specifies persons, groups. 2.)
the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an
ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act.
The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and
their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations,
to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIPwith KNOWLEDGE that
is punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership
punished.Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization.Membership makes
himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations
before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership
in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy
to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a
basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the
statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in
the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution
under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following
elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to
overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN
POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued
pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
*Virata v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 680
Facts: In this case, petitioner is one of the defendants in Civil Case which was filed by PCGG
involves the recovery of ill- gotten wealth amassed by the defendants during the twenty year
reign of former President Ferdinand Marcos. Asserting that the foregoing allegations are vague and
are not averred with sufficient definiteness as to enable him to effectively prepare his responsive
pleading, petitioner Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars.
Issue: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE BILL OF PARTICULARS
SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC. 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND
THE PCGG ARE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO DEPUTIZE A COUNSEL TO FILE THE BILL OF PARTICULARS
IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC.
97

Held: A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification

or more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a more specific allegation of
the facts recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the opposite party
and the court of the precise nature and character of the cause of action or defense which the
pleader has attempted to set forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial,
and reasonably to protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the specific
proposition for which the pleader contends, in respect to any material and issuable fact in the
case, and it becomes a part of the pleading which it supplements. It has been held that a bill of
particulars must inform the opposite party of the nature of the pleaders cause of action or
defense, and it must furnish the required items of the claim with reasonable fullness and precision.
Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly and substantially gives the opposite party the
information to which he is entitled, as required by the terms of the application and of the order
therefor. It should be definite and specific and not contain general allegations and conclusions. It
should be reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will allow. Guided by the
foregoing rules and principles, we are convinced that both the bill of particulars dated November 3,
1993 and the Limited Bill of Particulars of October 22, 1992 are couched in such general and
uncertain terms as would make it difficult for petitioner to submit an intelligent responsive
pleading to the complaint and to adequately prepare for trial.
The bill of particulars dated
November 3, 1993: Clearly from the foregoing allegation, the Republic failed miserably to amplify
the charge against Virata because, instead of supplying the pertinent facts and specific matters
that form the basis of the charge, it only made repetitive allegations in the bill of particulars that
Virata supported and assisted the formation of the corporation concerned, which is the very same
charge or allegation in paragraph 14 (m) of the expanded Second Amended Complaint which
requires specifications and unfailing certainty. As such, the important question as to what
particular acts of Virata that constitute support and assistance in the formation of Erectors Holding,
Incorporated is still left unanswered, a product of uncertainty. We now take a closer look at the
Limited Bill of Particulars dated October 22, 1992. The said bill of particulars was filed by the
Republic to amplify the charge of Viratas being a dummy, nominee or agent stated in paragraphs
17 and 18 of the expanded Second Amended Complaint. In the subsequent bill of particulars
dated November 3, 1993, the said charge was qualified by the Republic in the sense that Virata
allegedly acted only as an agent.
Furthermore, as correctly asserted by petitioner Virata, the
Limited Bill of Particulars contains new matters which are not covered by the charge that Virata
acted as agent of his co-defendants in the expanded Second Amended Complaint. Apparently, as
may be examined from the three paragraphs of the Limited Bill of Particulars, Virata, in so doing
the acts, can not be considered as an agent of any of his co-defendants, on the contrary, the
factual circumstances stated in the said bill of particulars indicate that Virata acted on behalf of
the government, in his official capacity as a government officer. This observation is established by
the allegations that Virata acted as a member of the Central Bank Monetary Board, as chairman of
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, and, when
he executed the Agreement with Meralco on July 7, 1978 concerning the sale of certain properties,
he acted as the Finance Minister of the government and as a representative of the Republic in the
contract. In performing the said acts, he, therefore, acted as an agent of the government, not as
an agent of his co-defendants, which is the charge against him in the expanded Second Amended
Complaint. Accordingly, the allegations in the Limited Bill of Particulars are irrelevant and
immaterial to the charge that Virata acted as an agent of his co-defendants.
As clearly
established by the foregoing discussion, the two bills of particulars filed by the Republic failed to
properly amplify the charges leveled against Virata because, not only are they mere reiteration or
repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded Second Amended Complaint, but, to the
large extent, they contain vague, immaterial and generalized assertions which are inadmissible

41

under our procedural rules. We are of the opinion that the Limited Bill of Particulars dated October
22, 1992 signed by Ramon Felipe IV and the Bill of Particulars dated November 3, 1993 signed by
Reynaldo Ros are valid pleadings which are binding upon the Republic because the two lawyersignatories are legally deputized and authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Presidential Commission on Good Government to sign and file the bills of particulars concerned.
Realizing that it can not adequately respond to this Courts order of April 6 1993 (G.R. No. 106527)
requiring the Republic to submit the bill of particulars concerning the first three charges against
Virata, the Office of the Solicitor deemed it better to seek the help of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government by availing the services of the latters lawyer who would directly file the
required bill of particulars in behalf of the Republic. This circumstance prompted the Office of the
Solicitor General to manifest before the Sandiganbayan on August 20, 1993 that it would be the
PCGG which would file the required bill of particulars and move that it be excused from doing so as
the PCGG, being in-charge of investigating the case, was in a better position than the OSG. Armed
with this authority given by the OSG, the PCGG, through one of its deputized prosecutors, Reynaldo
Ros, filed the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 to amplify the first three charges against
Virata stated in paragraphs 14 b(ii), 14g, and 14 m of the expanded Second Amended Complaint.
The action of the OSG in seeking the assistance of the PCGG is not without legal basis. The
Administrative Code of 1987, which virtually reproduces the powers and functions of the OSG
enumerated in P.D. No. 478 (The Law Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General), provides it.
Contrary to Viratas contention, the Solicitor General did not
abdicate his function and turn over the handling of the instant case to the PCGG. Nowhere in the
manifestation and motion filed by the OSG on August 20, 1993 is there an iota or indication that
the OSG is withdrawing from the case and that the PCGG is taking over its prosecution. What the
OSG did was merely to call the PCGG for assistance and authorize it to respond to the motion for a
bill of particulars filed by Virata. The OSG was impelled to act this way because of the existence of
the special circumstance that the PCGG, which has the complete records of the case and being in
charge of its investigation, was more knowledgeable and better informed of the facts of the case
than the OSG. The authority, therefore, of Attorney Reynaldo Ros to sign and submit in behalf of
the Republic the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 is beyond dispute because 1) he was
duly deputized by the PCGG in pursuance to its power to prosecute cases of ill-gotten wealth
under Executive Order No. 14 of May 14, 1986, 2) the OSG empowered the PCGG to file the bill of
particulars as evidenced by the OSGs manifestation and motion filed on August 20, 1993, and 3)
there was no abdication of OSGs duty by giving the PCGG the authority to file the bill of
particulars. On the other hand, the deputation of Ramon Felipe IV by the Solicitor General to sign
and file the Limited Bill of Particulars is based on Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 478. The
Solicitor General is mandated by law to act as the counsel of the Government and its agencies in
any litigation and matter requiring the services of a lawyer. In providing the legal representation
for the Government, he is provided with vast array of powers, which includes the power to retain
and compensate lawyers on contractual basis, necessary to fulfill his sworn duty with the end view
of upholding the interest of the Government. Thus, the Solicitor General acted within the legal
bounds of its authority when it deputized Attorney Felipe IV to file in behalf of the Republic the bill
of particulars concerning the charges stated in paragraph 17 and 18 of the expanded Second
Amended Complaint.
At any rate, whether or not the lawyer-signatories are duly deputized
would not be decisive in the resolution of this case considering that the two bills of particulars filed
by the Republic are mere scraps of paper which miserably failed to amplify the charges against
Virata. For the Republics failure to comply with the courts order to file the required bill of
particulars that would completely and fully inform Virata of the charges against him, the dismissal
of the action against him is proper based on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court and
the relevant jurisprudence thereon. Simple justice demands that as stated earlier, petitioner must

know what the complaint is all about. The law requires no less. Although this Court is aware of
the Governments laudable efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly taken by the defendants,
this Court, however, cannot shrink from its duty of upholding the supremacy of the law under the
aegis of justice and fairness. This Court in dismissing the action against the petitioner has
rightfully adhered in the unyielding tenet - principia, non homines - the rule of law, not of men.
Trinidad v. CA - 202 SCRA 106
Facts: In an information that was filed in the then CFI, herein petitioner, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, was
charged with violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of title.
Issue:
Held: Under the fourth assigned error, herein petitioner maintains that PD 957 impairs the
obligations of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the contract to sell and that it is an ex post facto law
as the provision thereof provides retroactive effect. The contention is likewise without merit.
Quoting the Solicitor General, the respondent appellate court aptly rebutted this argument, thus:
Under P.D. 957, after the complainant had fully paid for the lo in question, appellant (herein
petitioner) as administrator of t Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, was legally bound
cause the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of the buyer. The
failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to do so is punishable under the penal provisions of Section
39 of said decree. Likewise, under P.D. 957, it is not required that the buyer should pay the taxes.
The buyer is only required to pay for the registration of the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds
for the issuance of the title but it does not mention the payment of taxes. With respect to th
alleged devaluation of the peso, suffice it to state that at the time thde contract was executed, the
full price of the lot was already agreed upon by the complainant and the corporation. Lastly,
appellant (herein petitioner) asserts that P.D. 957 is an ex post facto law as the penal provision
thereof provides retroactive effect. P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as an ex post facto law. The act
made punishable thereunder is the failure of the owner- developer or administrator to deliver the
title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment, not the execution of a deed of sale or
contract to sell over such lot or unit before the passage of the law. In the instant case although the
contract to sell was executed long before the enactment of P.D. 957, the failure of appellant (herein
petitioner) to deliver the title over the lot upon full payment transpired when the decree was
already in effect. Such law is not ex post facto for the simple reason that what is being punished is
the failure to deliver such title after the enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976.
People v. Taguba - 229 SCRA 188
Facts: Respondents were both charged with eight counts of illegal recruitment and three counts of
estafa in separate informations
Issue:
Held: The Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment on a large
scale because only two of the complainants, Jesus Garcia and Elena Santiago, categorically
testified that their recruitment came after February 10, 1986. This was the date when P.D. 2018,
the law defining and penalizing illegal recruitment in a large scale, took effect. P.D. 2018 cannot
apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post facto law to them. A law is ex post
facto if it refers to a criminal act, punishes an act which was innocent when done, and retroacts to

42

the disadvantage of the accused. Prior to the said date, recruiting on a large scale was not yet
punished with the penalty imposed in the said decree.

guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was
reversible error for the Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

People v. Sandiganbayan 211 SCRA 241

Facts: Assailed in this petition is the resolution promulgated by the Sandiganbayan which granted
the private respondent's motion to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on the ground of prescription of the crime charged.
100
Issue:
Held: Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A.
No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given
retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it
should be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter
(10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the
"crime" at the time he committed it. To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post
facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a
crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. An ex
post facto law is defined as: A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act,
which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art. I,
Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post facto law". Most all state
constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws. An "ex post facto law" is
defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done
which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission
of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was
lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they
have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the
proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage. Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our
Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible
error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in
1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive
period under that law should apply only to those offense which were committed after the approval
of B.P. 195.
Co v. CA 227 SCRA 444
Facts: A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioners
conviction of the crime charged on the basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of
Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was
subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to

Issue: Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check
will no longer be considered as a valid defense be actively applied.
HELD: No. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against
accused-petitioner was dismissed. It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor
of the proposition that the Courts decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987) that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner
and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a
check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22. This is after all a criminal action all doubts in
which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita
should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.
Rosales v. CA - 255 SCRA 123
Facts: Rosales was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar with murder and
illegal possession of firearms. The accused now comes to us on a petition for review. He argues
that the killing on 26 September 1982 was in self-defense. Bulan was trespassing on the fishpond
over which he was overseer.[13] The firing of his shotgun into the air was a reasonable exercise of
his authority as overseer and further showed he had no intention to kill. He had to defend himself
when Bulan struggled to wrest possession of the gun since he could have been killed himself.
However, trial court rendered judgment finding accused Leovigildo Rosales guilty of homicide and
imposing upon him the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1866 can be retroactively applied in this case
Held: No. P.D. No. 1866 prescribing the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua approved on 29 June 1983 cannot be retroactively applied in this case which
transpired on 26 September 1982 inasmuch as this law is unfavorable to the accused.
Subido v. Sandiganbayan 266 SCRA 379
Facts: The petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention. In compliance with the order of the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash on 28 September 1995.
It contended that it was clear from 4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over both the offense charged and the persons of the accused considering that the basis of its
jurisdiction is the position of the accused in the government service when the offense charged was
committed and not the nature of the offense charged, provided the said offense committed by the
accused was in the exercise of his duties and in relation to his office. The fact then that accused
Subido was already a private individual was of no moment. In a Supplement to the Motion to
Quash filed on 9 October 1995, the petitioners further asserted that: (1) the allegations in the
information were vague; (2) under Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings, the
grant or denial of bail to an alien in a deportation proceeding was discretionary upon the

43

Commissioner, hence could not be subject to a charge of arbitrary detention; (3) petitioner Subido
was separated from the service before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive
application thereof would be prejudicial to him.
Issue: Whether or not the retroactive application of R.A 7975 to the petitioner would be prejudicial
to him.
Held: No. The petitioners overlook the fact that for purposes of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
the reckoning point is the time of the commission of the crime. This is plain from the last clause of
the opening sentence of paragraph (a), 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975.
That petitioner Parina held a position with a salary grade of less than 27 at the time of the
commission of the alleged arbitrary detention is of no moment. He is prosecuted as a coconspirator of petitioner Subido, a principal accused, who held a position higher than grade 27.
Sesbreno v. CBAA 270 SCRA 360
Facts: Petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Thereafter, petitioner declared the real
property constructed on the said lots for purposes of tax assessment as a residential house of
strong materials with a floor area of sixty (60) square meters. Effective in the year 1980, the
declared property was assessed by Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City under Tax Declaration
No. 02-20454 at a market value of P60,000.00 and an assessed value of P36,900.00.[6] During a
tax-mapping operation conducted in February 1989, the field inspectors of the Cebu City Assessor
discovered that the real property declared and assessed under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 was
actually a residential building consisting of four (4) storeys with a fifth storey used as a roof deck.
The building had a total floor area of 500.20 square meters. The area for each floor was 100.04
square meters. The building was found to have been made of Type II-A materials. Tan two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Cebu City.
102
Issue. Whether or not CBAAs assessment was unconstitutional.

Held: No. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment plus a fine of twenty thousand
pesos as the crime was committed on December 26, 1992 or about a year before Republic Act No.
7659, imposing the penalty of reclusin perpetua to death, came into effect on December 31,
1993. Retroactive application of said law would not be advantageous to appellant in view of the
increased range of penalty and conjunctive fine prescribed, where the quantity of prohibited drugs
is 750 grams or more. A more succint explanation in People vs. Ballagan states: First, the
wealth of jurisprudence in cases wherein life imprisonment is imposed is to the effect that said
penalty, unlike reclusin perpetua, does not carry accessory penalties. In the event that Republic
Act No. 7659 is applied retrospectively to appellant, he has to suffer not only reclusin perpetua
but also the accessory penalties.
*Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999
FACTS:This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Panfilo M. Lacson and
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. questioning the constitutionality of
Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act 8249 an Act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They also seek to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner and
intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process
as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A.
7975.
ISSUE: WON RA 8249 is an ex post facto law.

Facts: Appellant, a British national, was convicted by RTC of Pasig City for attempting to transport
5.6 kilograms of hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
Though caught in flagrante delicto, he denies criminal liability therefor on the novel ground that he
was not aware that his traveling bags contained the prohibited drug. He also challenges the
credibility of the lawmen who apprehended him. He was found guilty of the crime charged by the
RTC and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

HELD: NO. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than
when it was committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. (e) every law which, in relation to the
offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. This Court added
two more to the list, namely: (f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; (g) deprives a
peson accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Ex post facto law,
generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive
law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statue, i.e. one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not retroactive application of RA 7659 can be applied to the appellant

People v. Nitafan, GR 107964-66 February 1, 1999

Held: Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that the imposition of back taxes on his
property is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 22,= Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
When both Public Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back taxes on petitioner's
property, they did not violate the rule that laws shall have only prospective applicability.
Respondents were only applying PD 464 which had been in effect since 1974. Besides, Section 25
of PD 464 is not penal in character; hence, it may not be considered as an ex post facto law.
People v. Burton 268 SCRA 531

44

FACTS: Three criminal informations for violation of Central Bank Circular 960, as amended in
relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, were filed against Imelda Marcos before he RTC of
Pasig, to which she pleaded guilty. These informations were consolidated upon motion of the
prosecution with 21 other cases pending before the RTC of Manila which relate to or form part of a
series of transactions devised by then President Marcos and private respondent to hide their illgotten wealth. The cases were re-raffled and were assigned to respondent Judges sala. Without
any corresponding motion from private respondent, but after giving the prosecution the chance to
show cause why the cases should not be dismissed, respondent judge muto proprio dismissed the
three cases, one of them on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law, and
the two on the ground that the prosecution of private respondent was part of a sustained political
vendetta by some people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of
private respondents right against double jeopardy. Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.

convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner no longer had the option to
appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal. Presidential Decree No. 1990 was
then in full effect. Hence, he could no longer apply for probation since he had appealed.
People v. Valdez, GR 127663 March 11, 1999

HELD: NO. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional.
However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much
more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it
void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action.

FACTS: The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicted as charged the
accused-appellant Rolando Valdez for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated
Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and the prison term of reclusion perpetua,
respectively. The conviction was based on the evidence presented by the prosecution that on
September 17, 1995 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, William Montano, Randy Tibule, Jean
Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. rode on a tricycle driven by
Ramon Garcia in going to Sitio Cabaoangan to attend the wedding party of Jean Maries cousin. On
their way, they met the appellant and his companions who were armed with guns, and without any
warning, they pointed their guns and fired at them which caused the instantaneous death of Jean
Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano, and Ramon Garcia, Jr. and fatal injuries to William
Montano and Randy Tibule. The appellant denied any participation in the said incident and he
questioned his conviction claiming, among others, that the trial court erred in failing to consider
motive on the part of Bernardo Castro to fire at, as he actually fired at the occupants of the
motorized tricycle.

Fajardo v. CA, GR 128508 February 1, 1999

ISSUE: WON RA 8294 is applicable to the accused.

FACTS: On May 26, 1988, petitioner Daniel Fajardo was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight months imprisonment. He appealed,
but the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court likewise denied his petition
for review on certiorari of his conviction. Upon the remand of the record to the lower court, on
June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation contending that he was eligible for probation
because at the time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his
conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for
probation of an accused who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and,
hence, not applicable to him. But still, the trial court denied his application for probation. The
Court of Appeals also denied his petition for certiorari.

HELD: Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June
21, 1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in
the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective
application. In cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law
may be given retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare
accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession
of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) subject of this present review. However, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance
in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also under review herein,
because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua
to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not
beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be
given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.

ISSUE: WON the Judge can declare the CB Circular an ex post facto law even though it was not
assailed.

ISSUE: WON PD 1990, which amend PD 968, providing that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction
is an ex post facto law.
HELD: Presidential Decree No. 1990, is valid. Presidential Decree No. 1990, enacted on October 5,
1985, was printed in Volume 81 of the Official Gazette dated December 30, 1985 but said issue
was released for circulation only on July 1, 1986; hence, P.D. 1990 became effective after fifteen
(15) days from July 1, 1986, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, or on July 16, 1986. It is
not ex post facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity.
An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its
commission. Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in
character. It may not be considered as an ex post facto law. In this case, At the time of the
commission of the offense charged - violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 - in 1981, petitioner
could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation. However, petitioner was

People v. Ringor, G.R. No. 123918, December 9, 1999

FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision dated November 13, 1995 of Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court in Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. guilty of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 13102-R,
also guilty of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in Criminal Case No. 13100-R
ISSUE: WON the RA 8294 which make the use of unlicensed firearm as aggravating circumstance
in murder or homicide shall be applied in the present case.

45

HELD: NO. With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms
under P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina and reiterated in the recent case
of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez, that in cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply considered as an
aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no longer as a separate offense.
Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms shall be imposed provided that no other
crime is committed.In other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for
illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance.Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997) made the use of
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty for the
murder committed by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as erroneously imposed
by the trial court. There was yet no such aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm to
raise the penalty for murder from reclusion perpetua to death, at the time of commission of the
crime.The amendatory law making the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied here because the said provision of R.A. No.
8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.

the grave damage and prejudice of public interest, the Filipino people, the Republic of the
Philippines, and the coconut farmers. Subsequently, the ombudsman acquitted the accuse ruling
that RA 3019 had already prescribed when the complaint was file since the prescription period for
violation of the Anti-Graft Practices Act was ten (10) years. The complaint for violation of R.A. No.
3019 was filed before the PCGG on February 12, 1990 or more than fifteen (15) years after the
birth of the allegedly illegal contract. OSG allege that the action of the state in confiscating illgotten wealth are imprescriptible pursuant to section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or their nominees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
ISSUE:WON the imprescriptible act of state under section 15 article 11of the constitution would
violate the accuseds right against ex post facto

FACTS:27 February 1997 RTC convict accused-appellant Charito Isug Magbanua guilty of the crime
of rape, described and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise referred to as the Death Penalty Law, against his own daughter
and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

HELD:YES. The Solicitor General asserts that the dismissed complaint is for violation of R.A. No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution thereof is actually a suit
intended to recover ill-gotten wealth from public officials, and therefore covered by R.A. No. 1379,
entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have been
Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor"
under R.A. No. 1379
in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto: that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery
of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases such as the complaint against the respondents
Conversely, prescription of criminal cases are governed by special laws on prescription.
Furthermore, to construe Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution in order to give it
retroactive application to the private respondents will run counter to another constitutional
provision, that is, Section 22, Article III

ISSUE: WON provision for death penalty can be imposed retroactively against the petitioner

People v. Torres - 501 SCRA 591

HELD:NO. Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993, cannot be applied
retroactively because, to do so, would go against the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto
laws. For this reason, in order for the death penalty to be imposable, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to establish beyond a shadow of doubt that the case of the accused is already covered
by Republic Act No. 7659. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to discharge this burden. A
perusal of the information reveals that the alleged rapes were committed in 1991 and the days
thereafter. Clearly, since the time frame specified in the information antedates the effectivity date
of Republic Act No. 7659, said law cannot be made applicable to the case of appellant.

FACTS: Dexter Torres was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, as amended, for unlawful possession of 831.91 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug; as well as Section 16, Article III of the same law for illegal possession of 0.26
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as shabu.

People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999

Republic v. Desierto, GR 136506, Aug. 23, 2001

FACTS:The accuse convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)4 initiated the complaint for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The
complaint alleged, that respondent Cojuangco, Jr., taking advantage of his close relationship with
then President Marcos, had caused the latter to issue favorable decrees to advance his personal
and business interests, had caused the government through the National Investment Development
Corporation (NIDC) to enter into a contract with him under terms and conditions grossly
disadvantageous to the government and that respondents were directly or indirectly interested for
personal gain or had material interest in the transactions requiring the approval of a board, panel
or group of which they were members, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to

ISSUE:WON RA 9165 increasing penalty for illegal possession of drugs be imposed

HELD:NO. Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, increased the penalty for illegal possession of
less than five (5) grams ofshabu to
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years and a fine ranging from three
hundred thousand (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00). However, since
this law is not favorable to appellant, it cannot be given retroactive application in the instant case.
This is the mandate of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: ART. 22. Retroactive
effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same. The same law also changed the penalty for illegal possession
of 500 grams or more of marijuana to life imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 toP10,000,000.00. Obviously, the amendment of the penalty from reclusion perpetua
to life imprisonment to death in R.A. No. 9165 cannot, likewise, be applied retroactively to the
present case since it would also be unfavorable to appellant.

46

Salvador v. Mapa - ____SCRA 34 [2008]

FACTS:The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee), through
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador), filed this Petition to nullify the Resolution of the Office of
the Ombudsman in dismissing the criminal complaint of violation of SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A.
3019, against respondents ruling that: To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently,
Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be
utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become expost facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto
laws.
HELD: NO. Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition
against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior
to their issuance and which was innocent when done. An ex post facto law has been defined as one
(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than
it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the
list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes
a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The constitutional
doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this
definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the
act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for
determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the
Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.
Republic v. Eugenio - 545 SCRA 384
FACTS: Following the promulgation of Agan case, a series of investigations concerning the award of
the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and
Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner Anti- Money Laundering Council (AMLC). Under the authority
granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or examine the deposits or
investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC and ruled in granting
the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad,
Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause to

believe that the deposits in various bank accounts are related to the offense of violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman wrote a letter requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO,
and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause
to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were
committed in relation to the criminal cases involving violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the investigation of the accounts is
necessary. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated Resolution
No. 121 Series of 2005 which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and
examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and
two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. Lilia Cheng, wife of cheng yong,
argues that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank
inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act
No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened
between 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
ISSUE:WON there has been a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
HELD:YES. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal
provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17 October 2001.
prohibition against ex post facto laws apply to the interpretation of Section 11, a provision which
does not provide for a penal sanction but which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect
accounts and deposits. Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts or deposits
were involved in activities on enumerated in Section 3 of the law did not remove such accounts
from the shelter of absolute confidentiality. Prior to the AMLA, in order that bank accounts could be
examined, there was need to secure either the written permission of the depositor or a court order
authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction
of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject
matter of the litigation. application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of
transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm,
offensive as it is to the ex post facto clause. Still, we must note that the position submitted by Lilia
Cheng is much broader than what we are willing to affirm. She argues that the proscription against
ex post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit any inquiry into deposits or investments included in
bank accounts opened prior to the effectivity of the AMLA even if the suspect transactions were
entered into when the law had already taken effect.
Valeroso v. People - 546 SCRA 450
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. Petitioner moved to
reconsider but his motion was denied. appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court
affirmed with modification the RTC disposition. It provides that "[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition." P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time
petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866
on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court.

47

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court is correct in affirming the modification of the RTC
disposition.
HELD: YES. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire
the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the
offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." Although an additional fine of
P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused,
considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision
correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years
and two [2] months). Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of
prision correccional maximum, as maximum term.

defendant; or (e) which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when exercised was lawful; or (f) which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The constitutional
proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are
acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. Administrative
Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It merely creates
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its composition
and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply provides the frame of
reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order
No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post facto laws.

Presidential v. Desierto - 548 SCRA 295

FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). By Memorandum Order No. 61, the
functions of the Committee were subsequently expanded by including in its investigation,
inventory and study all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. It likewise provided
for the following criteria which might be utilized as frame of reference in determining a behest
loan. Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan
transactions between Comptronics Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI),
and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). After examining and studying the loan
transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of a behest loan as
defined under Memorandum Order No. 61. Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of
the Committee filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Section
3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI.
The Ombudsman dismissed the case and so was the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post
facto laws.
HELD: NO. The Court do not agree with the Ombudsmans declaration that Administrative Order
No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to the questioned
transactions because to do so would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws. An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the

48