The Israeli Defense Force & the

Sabra and Shatila Massacre

"To what extent is the Israeli Defense Force responsible

for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?"
by Steven Li

United World College Costa Rica

Year: 2014
Month: May
Student Code: 001415 - 0039
Subject: History
Word Count: 3998

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements....................................................................... 3
Abstract....................................................................................... 4
Introduction................................................................................. 5
Investigation................................................................................ 8

The Phalangists...................................................................................8
The Israeli-Phalange Relationship.......................................................10
The Extent of Israeli Involvement.......................................................12
The Invasion of West Beirut...............................................................................12
The Terrorist in the Camps................................................................................. 14
The Front Row At The Theater........................................................................17
Israeli Support................................................................................................... 18

Conclusion.................................................................................. 22
Bibliography..............................................................................24

Acknowledgements
A special thank you to my EE supervisor and EE teacher, Jacob Paulsen. We
did this together!

Abstract
The research question of this essay is "To what extent is the Israeli
Defense Force responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?"
This investigation will be based on a wide variety of sources, from a
government report to a film, from an Israeli perspective to a Palestinian
perspective. Contrasting viewpoints and challenges to conventional
interpretations are assessed throughout to give a more complete picture of
the massacre.
The structure of the essay will be first to gauge the responsibility of the
Phalange. Then, the nature of Phalange-Israeli relationships such as the
degree of control over the Phalange will be investigated. Lastly, Israeli
involvement such the pretenses on which the IDF allowed the militiamen into
the camps and Israeli logistical support to the Christian militiamen during the
massacre will be examined.
The investigation found that, the Israeli Defense Force is responsible
for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila to a great extent, greater than the
Kahan Commissions delineation of indirect responsibility. The IDF took an
active role in facilitating the massacre, not an indirect one, by having
planned and allowed the Christian militiamen into the defenseless refugee
camps of Sabra and Shatila. The IDF had a strong degree of control over the
militiamen. The IDF also actively facilitated the massacre, by providing the
militiamen with lighting, ammunition, food and water and also entrapping

the residents of the camps, while doing nothing to stop the massacre. Under
international law, the IDF had a responsibility to keep the occupants of the
camps safe, which did not happen.
Word count: 255

Introduction
Israel entered Lebanon, fighting in the Lebanese Civil War, to drive out
the Palestinian Liberation Organization stationed there. The invasion was
successful in the regard that all the PLO militiamen were evacuated out of
the country, leaving the Palestinian refugee camps defenseless, full of
women and children. On September 15th 1982, the Israeli Defense Force
invaded West Beirut, a Muslim stronghold, after the assassination of Bachir
Gemayel, Phalange party leader and Lebanese president-elect.
The next day on September 16th near dusk, Christian militiamen
stormed the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila with IDF
authorization, beginning the infamous massacre. Continuing for 36 straight
hours until the morning of the 19th, Muhammad Faqih, a survivor, says "they
didn't spare anyone; they killed everyone they came across".1 On that
morning, journalists arrived at the camps. What they saw shocked the world.
The cadavers of the elderly, women, and children littered the camps. Reports
that women and small girls were raped, sometimes half a dozen times,
before, breasts severed, they were finished off with axes," were
commonplace. The justification of this killing was that women give birth to
children and children grow up into terrorists. Casualty figures range from
800 to over 5000. A Phalangist commander revealed that only if they build a
subway in Beirut, the true figures will be revealed as countless people were
1 Flashback: Sabra and Shatila massacres, BBC News: World Edition, Jan.
24, 2002.
6

buried underground by bulldozers.2 This massacre was declared as the

"worst atrocity of Lebanon's 15-year civil war and perhaps during the entire
Middle East conflict"3 While all this was happening, Israeli soldiers provided
the militiamen with flares and other logistical support. Finally, the Lebanese
Army came on the 19th at noon, closing down the camps.4
Yosef Burg, the Israeli minister of interior and religious affairs, asked if
that Christians killed Muslims - how are the Jews guilty?

However, the

Kahan Commission, the Israeli state-sponsored commission, declared the

Israeli Defense Forces were indirectly responsible for the massacre. 6 Many
of the Israeli command were recommended to resign from their post. The
Kahan commissions consequences were clearly not enough. Ariel Sharon,
the minister of defense, bore personal responsibility, resigned from his
post. He stayed in the government, eventually becoming Prime Minister.
Rafael Eitan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, became minister of agriculture and
deputy Prime Minister. Amos Yaron, Brigadier-General, was promoted,
eventually obtaining the highly prestigious position of military attach to the
2 David Hirst, Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle
East (New York: Nation Books, 2010), 159.
3 BBC News: World Edition, Jan. 24, 2002.
4 Amnon Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre, Trans. Khalil
Jehshan. (Washington: Association of Arab American University Graduates,
1984), 37.
5 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon, (New York:
Thunders Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002), 431.
6 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983, by Yitzhak
Kahan, Aharon Barak and Yona Efrat,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook6/pages/104
%20report%20of%20the%20commission%20of%20inquiry%20into%20the
%20e.aspx.
7

US. 7 The militiamen that entered the camps were granted amnesty by the
Lebanese government. Elie Hobeika, a Phalangist leader, became the
Lebanese Minister of Water Affairs.8 Without bringing those responsible to
justice, what will deter events like this from happening in the future? That is
why it is important to discern responsibility for this massacre, leading to the
research question To what extent is the Israeli Defense Force responsible for
the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?" This will lead to a cleaner understanding
of the untold context of the modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It will shed
light on an issue that has been obscured.

7 Sabra and Shatila: Escaping Justice, Al-Akhbar English, September 14,

2012.
8 Fergal Keane, Syrians aid Butcher of Beirut to hide from justice, The
Telegraph, June 17, 2001.
8

Investigation
The Phalangists
The main party within the Christian military coalition called the Lebanese
Forces, the Phalangists had the most powerful Christian militia in Lebanon
at the time of the massacre. They are now generally regarded are the main
perpetrators of the massacre. Eyewitness reports corroborate this. 9 The other
Christian militia blamed, the South Lebanon Army, was stationed far from
Beirut, south of the Awali River. The relationship between the SLA and the
Phalange was too weak to coordinate a military operation. There is a possibly
of SLA deserters joining, but their numbers would be few compared to the
hundreds of Phalangists.10 Due to the amnesty of war crimes given by the
Lebanese government, some of the Phalange militiamen have now openly
confessed to the killings. They admit that they entered the camps, high on
cocaine, hashish and alcohol for courage, and conducted a three-day orgy
of rape and slaughter.11 In the Kahan Commission, instances when Israeli
soldiers bore witness to the massacre are documented. For example,
Lieutenant Grawbowski, deputy commander of an Israeli tank company, saw
the slaughter of five women and children.12 The leadership of the Phalange
9 Leila Shahid, The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports,
Journal of Palestine Studies 32 no. 1 (2002):36-58.
10 Linda A. Malone, The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla
Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for Massacres
of Civilian Populations."Faculty Publications, 587, (1985).
11 Franklin Lamb, Remembering Janet Lee Stevens, martyr for the
Palestinian refugees, Al-Ahram Weekly, May 12, 2010.
12 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 444.
9

said that the deaths were the result of heavy fighting against terrorists.
That was clearly false as only two Phalangists died in the fighting and around
a dozen were wounded.13
Despite this evidence, the Lebanese government commission led by Assad
Germanos, the Lebanese military prosecutor, found the Phalange completely
innocent. According to the report, there would be no prosecutions.14
Instead, the IDF was blamed for the massacre. However, the full report has
never been published and has disappeared from the archives of the
Lebanese government. This report is described by the Montreal Gazette as a
religiously partisan act to evade responsibility15. In the interest of national
unity, the media did not want the Muslims to know that the Christians
conducted a massacre of Muslims.
However, some evidence exists that Phalange leadership may have been
clueless about the massacre. Barret, the charge daffaires of the US
embassy, called Amin Gemayel, Bachirs brother and a Phalange leader.
Amin seemed clueless on whether the Phalange was in the camps or not.16
However, it seems unlikely that the leadership of the party wouldnt know
when over a thousand Phalange men were mobilized. Amins brother, Bachir,
had already planned on entering the camps.17
13 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict,
1881-2001, (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 548.
14 Morris, Righteous Victims, 547.
15 Associated Press, Lebanons Christians: Divided They Rule, Montreal
Gazette, September 22, 1982
16 Thomas Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days, The New York
Times, September 26, 1982.
17 Morris, Righteous Victims, 540.
10

The Israeli-Phalange Relationship

The Phalangist has made it clear that they want the Palestinians to be
evicted from Lebanon. Two weeks before the massacre, an article where a
senior IDF officer overheard some Phalangists have a conversation was
published in the Bahamane, the newspaper of the IDF. Statements such as
"You have no idea of the slaughter that will befall the Palestinians, civilians or
terrorist, who remain in the city" and "the question we are putting to
ourselves is - how to begin, by raping or killing" were made. Mossad, the
Israeli intelligence agency, reported that if the Phalangists had the
opportunity to massacre Palestinians, they would take advantage of it.18
They heard things from [Bashir] that left no room for doubt that the
intention of this Phalangist leader was to eliminate the Palestinian problem in
Lebanon when he came to powereven if that meant resorting to aberrant
methods against the Palestinians.

19

Reflecting their animosity, the

Christians wrongly assumed the assassination of their beloved presidentelect Bachir Gemayel was perpetrated by the Palestinians.20 The leadership
of the Israeli Defense Force expressed similar sentiments towards the
Palestinians. Begin, Sharon and other members of the leadership all share
the feeling that a good Arab is a dead Arab.

21

18 Konrad Ege, Mossad and the Massacres, MERIP Reports 115 (1983): 3334
19 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, (New York: Anchor Books,
1989), 188
20 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 156.
21 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 52.
11

Israel and the Phalange share very close ties and a very similar attitude
towards the Palestinians at the time. This relationship started at the
beginning of the Lebanese Civil War, where Israel promised to help the
Lebanese Christians if they were ever in trouble.22 By 1982, Israeli command
exercised significant control over the Phalange. One can define the Phalange
as a proxy militia. According to Bachir Gemayel, the leader of the Phalange,
Ariel Sharon, Israeli Defense Minister, treated [him] like a child.

23

IDF Chief

of Staff Rafael Eitan said that we could give them orders whereas it was
impossible to give orders to the Lebanese Army.24 Since 1975, the Phalange
had been receiving direct aid from Israel.25 The Phalangists were on Israels
payroll. Israel provided the Phalange with weapons and other military
equipment such as uniforms.26 Uniforms given to the Phalangist bore a
striking similarity to the uniforms of the IDF. Only the seals on the uniforms
differed.27 was provided. Phalangist underwent world-class military training.
Some Phalangists have even trained inside Israel.28 In 2002, Elie Hobieka, the
leader of the group that first entered into the camps, wanted to go to court
and charge Sharon of war crimes. He was assassinated in a car bombing two
days later after that declaration. Hobeika claimed that he had important
22 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,
23 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 153
24 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 59.
25 Ege, Mossad and the Massacres, 33-34
26 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 426.
27 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,
28 Amira Howeidy, Remembering Sabra & Shatila, the death of their world,
ahram, September 6, 2012.
12

revelations to make, as that he was operating under orders during the

massacre.

29

Hobeikas assassination means that his perspective on the

massacre is forever lost.

The Extent of Israeli Involvement
The Invasion of West Beirut
After the assassination of Bachir Gemayel, the Israeli Defense Force
invaded West Beirut, a Muslim stronghold, on September 15th. This was done
under the orders of Sharon and Prime Minister Begin.30 Philip Habib, an
American envoy, negotiated the Habib Agreement where the Israelis would
not enter west Beirut if the guerrillas left. Habib received specific
guarantees on this from Bashir and from the Israelis.31 With this guarantee,
over 12,000 Palestinian militiamen left Lebanon under international
supervision.32 However, fearing unrest, the IDF entered West Beirut on the
concern of widespread civil violence.33 General Eitan said this was to
prevent a Phalangist frenzy of revenge. To the US Special Envoy Morris
Draper, Prime Minister Begin said invading was necessary as otherwise

29 BBC News, Profile: Elie Hobeika, (September 18, 2013).

30 Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days.
31 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 400-401.
32 Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila: September 1982, (London:
Pluto Press, 2004), 302
33 Eqbal Ahmad, The Public Relations of Ethnocide, Journal of Palestine
Studies 12.3 (1983): 31-40
13

there would be pogroms.34 Despite that, a pogrom still happened, the

massacre of refugees at Sabra and Shatila.
In the takeover of West Beirut, only a few minor exchanges of fire
occurred. No organized resistance was put up, probably due to the fact that
the PLO men left. There were seven Israeli casualties and a hundred Israelis
wounded where there was allegedly two thousand terrorists.35
The Israelis took control of West Beirut, including the refugee camps of
Sabra and Shatila. Israeli soldiers and tanks surrounded the camps on all
sides. Morris Draper said to Ariel Sharon, Israels Defense Minister, You are
in absolute control of the area, and therefore responsible for the area."
Entering and exiting the camps had to be done with the permission of the
IDF.36 Under the 4th Geneva Convention, Israel was an occupying power.
was obligated to protect the camp residents, preventing the commission of
outrages and barbaric attacks committed against them.

37

The Israeli

Defense Forces confiscated all the weapons of the Muslim militias in West
Beirut.38 This created a power vacuum that the Israeli-armed Phalange would
fill, leaving the Muslims powerless and the Phalange even more powerful.
Earlier, the IDF asked the Lebanese Army to mop up the camps before
they asked the Phalangists. They didnt comply, citing that they didnt want

34 Institute for Middle East Understanding, FACT SHEET: The Sabra & Shatila
Massacre: 30 Years Later, last modified September 16, 2012,
http://imeu.net/news/article0023017.shtml.
35 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 154.
36 Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days.
37 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 300.
38 Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days.
14

to become an instrument of Israeli policy.39 However, the IDF, Mossad, and LF

command also convened in August to discuss the cleanup of the camp.
They decided back that the Phalangists would take care of extremist
elements. On September 12 and 13, Sharon and Bachir Gemayel, at a
meeting, "agreed on joint short- and long-term plans of action: Sometime
toward the end of the month, Israel and the Lebanese Christians were to
uproot the remaining 'terrorist' presence in West Beirut. Even before
Gemayels assassination, it was already well decided Israel would invade
West Beirut and allow the Phalange to enter the camps. Before the Kahan
Commission, Eitan testified that he and Sharon made the decision to allow
the Phalangist to enter the camps at a meeting on September 14th, two days
before the massacre.40 On the same day, Sharon discussed with the
Gemayels about the need to avenge Bachirs death

41

Meetings later followed

to strategically plan the operations along with Phalangist commanders.42

Eitan at one point told Sharon that Theyre thirsty for revenge. There could
be torrents of blood. Later in front of the Kahan Commission, Sharon called
that not one officer or intelligence official warned him at the time that
sending the Phalange into the refugee camps would result in a massacre.43
Concerning civilians, the Kahan Commission admits that they knew the
39 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 18.
40 Morris, Righteous Victims, 540-543
41 Linda A. Malone, The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla
Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for Massacres
of Civilian Populations."
42 Ahmad Al-Tal, The Massacre of Sabra and Shatila in 1982, Accessed
September 21, 2013, http://www.mundoarabe.org/sabra_y_chatila_4.htm.
43 Morris, Righteous Victims, 543.
15

Phalangist battle ethics were much more barbaric than the IDF, especially
with the history of massacres perpetrated in the Lebanese Civil War. 44
The Terrorist in the Camps
The Phalange was granted permission to enter the camp under the
pretenses of terrorists lurking within Sabra and Shatila. The supposed
terrorists, the Palestinian Liberation Organization militants, had left Beirut
weeks ago. In a response to a complaint from the Israeli government about
these terrorists, the US government noted that there were around a hundred
PLO officials, assisting Palestinian families and transferring Palestinian
weapons to the Lebanese Army. There were a few dozen armed Palestinians
in the camps, but they were there for protection, allowed under the Habib
agreement.45 Even an intelligence officer told Yaron "terrorists dont exist in
the camp. The Sabra camp is empty".46
A Phalangist soldier said, We have waited for years to be able to enter
the camps of West Beirut. The Israelis chose us because we are better than
they at this kind of house-to-house operation."47 The IDF choose Elie Hobeika
to lead this operation as a counterterrorism expert. Hobeika has a personal
vendetta against the Palestinians as they murdered his family at the
massacre of Damour. Hobeika was notorious for his atrocities against
Palestinians at Tet al-Zaatar and in South Lebanon. The Israelis trained him
44 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,
45 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 547
46 Uri Avnery and Haolam Hazeh, The Commission and the Evidence,
MERIP Reports 115 (1983), 28-32.
47 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 40.
16

and used him for missions. However, he began to receive a reputation for
barbarism and the Israelis dropped him, keeping him in reserve, until they
called him for this operation.

48

The IDF allowed this person who has a

decorated history of atrocities against Palestinians into the camps as a

counterterrorist expert.
Furthermore, Elie Hobeika led only a few hundred militiamen into the
camps against the 2,000+ supposed terrorists with modern and heavy
weapons.49 This number discrepancy may suggest that the terrorists were a
false pretense to allow the Phalange in. Robert Fisk, a journalist that was on
the scene, now compares these alleged terrorists to the WMDs that were in
Iraq.50 In contrast, the Kahan report repeatedly emphasized the 2,000
terrorists in the camps but there was no substantiated evidence that these
terrorists actually existed.

51

Sharon declared that he had the terrorists

names.52 American diplomats assert that Israeli diplomats were deceptive

and bullied them about these terrorists, allowing the IDF to enter into West
Beirut.53 Furthermore, the Israelis were allegedly "thwarting" the efforts of
the Lebanese Army to take control of West Beirut.54
These terrorists didnt exist. A nurse working at the Red Crescent said,

48 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 20.

49 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 304.
50 Robert Fisk, The Forgotten Massacre, The Independent, September 15,
2012.
51 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 547
52 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 304.
53 Seth Anziska, A Preventable Massacre, The New York Times, September
16, 2012.
54 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 27.
17

If wed had weapons, we would have resisted. The wife of a PLO fighter
testified that If thered been fighters, all those things, which wouldnt
happen even in the jungle, wouldnt have happened55 The number of
Lebanese forces wounded or dead in the operation speaks to the fact that
there werent terrorists, as there was no significant resistance put up. 2
Phalangists died and around 12 were wounded during the massacre.56 The
International Commission, lead by Sean MacBride, found that the IDF could
not have estimated in good faith that such a large number of fighters
remained and they had no reasonable grounds to enter the camps.57
The Phalangist attitude towards the Palestinians and Elie Hobeikas
bloody history against Palestinians has already been established. The Israeli
command had full knowledge of these two things. An Israeli soldier later
admitted some of them [Phalangists] affirmed that they were planning to
replace the camps with a zoo.58 An Israeli proposal to second a liaison office
to the Phalange was turned down with the fear that the Israeli army should
not get itself mixed up in atrocities. General Yaron said, we knew that they
wanted to destroy the camps.59 Despite that, Sharon testified to the Kahan
Commission that no intention existed on the part of any one who acted on
behalf of Israel to harm the non-combatant population60 In contrast, Morris
55 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 42.
56 Morris, Righteous Victims, 548.
57 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 307.
58 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 33.
59 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 156.
60 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut- 8 February 1983,
18

Draper, the US envoy, said that it was complete utter nonsense that the
IDF were not able to predict that the atrocities of the massacre would
happen.61 This was a statement made by a representative of Israelis closest
military ally, a country that supplies Israeli with copious amounts of foreign
aid.
Despite the possibility of pogroms, the IDF allowed the Phalangist into
the camps. IDF Brigadier General Yaron executed Order Number 6: refugee
camps [Sabra and Shatila] are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up
the camps will be done by the Phalangists and the Lebanese army.62 Eitan
then ordered the Phalangist commanders to effect a general mobilization of
all their forces, impose a general curfew on all areas under their control, and
be ready to take part in the fighting.63 This statement reflects the extent of
control Eitan and the IDF held over the Phalangists.
The Front Row At The Theater
Instead, the Israeli soldiers watched. An Israeli soldier described the
view from the Israelis command post as like the front row at the theater.64
Israeli troop saw garbage trucks filled with dead bodies.65 Thomas Friedman,
judging from their reactions of disgust to the massacre, says that some of
the Israeli soldiers did not know the full extent of what was going on in the
61 The Accused, dir. by Fergal Keane (2001; BBC-1)
62 Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, 182.
63 Linda A. Malone, The Appointment of General Yaron: Continuing Impunity
for the Sabra and Shatilla Massacres, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 32, (2000).
64 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 157.
65 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 450.
19

camps.66 However, many of the foot soldiers had a clear view of the
massacre occurring, hearing gunshots and screams. The command was
aware of the massacre occurring. Death pits filled with bodies were clearly
within the sight of some Israeli soldiers. The first statement from the Israeli
government was As soon as the Israeli Army realized what was happening,
it called a halt to the killing of innocent people.67 In a press release, the
Israeli government asserted it is regrettable that the reaction by IDF soldiers
to such deeds was not always forceful enough to bring a halt to the
despicable acts.68 However, Eitan on the 18th commanded the massacre to
go on, as they would continue "mopping up the empty camps south of
Fakahani until tomorrow at 5:00 a.m., at which time they must stop their
action due to American pressure."

69

Israeli Support
There is a case to be made that the IDF actively aided the Phalangist in
their rampage through a number of ways, not just standing by and watching.
Furthermore, the IDF had orders to keep the refugees inside the camps,
not allowing them to escape. An Israeli field officer said, I forbid any of you
to intervene in what is happening in the camps.70 This reflected the official
policy towards the events occurring even with the knowledge that innocent

66 Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days.

67 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 289-297.
68 Morris, Righteous Victims, 549.
69 Institute for Middle East Understanding, FACT SHEET: The Sabra & Shatila
Massacre: 30 Years Later, http://imeu.net/news/article0023017.shtml.2
70 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 157.
20

civilians, not terrorists, were being massacred.71 However, not all Israeli
soldiers stood by watching the massacre. On an individual level, some Israeli
soldiers did help the residents of the camps. For example, one witness said,
If it hadn't been for the Jews who came in here, all the women, girls and
children would have been killed.72 This however, was the exception, not the
rule.
Phalangist reinforcements were allowed into the camps by the IDF
despite orders barring so. Abu Nader, the Lebanese Forces chief of
operations, was let in along with more militiamen, allegedly to replace the
first force that entered. However, both Hobeikas group and Naders group
stayed in the camps, continuing the massacre.73 The peak number of
militiamen was 400.74
The Israelis also gave the Phalangists inside significant logistical support. The
most visible form of support was the illuminating flare. At the request of the
Phalange, 81mm mortars were sending illuminating flares to light up the way
as the massacre began around dusk. As the night drew on, Israeli Air Force
airplanes would send even brighter flares.75 Ellen Siegel, a witness, described
the sky with the flares to be like noon in Arizona.76
71 Richard Arens, Israel's Responsibility in Lebanon, Journal of Palestine
Studies 12 no.3 (1983):102-108.
72 Fisk, Pity the Nation, 435.
73 Morris, Righteous Victims, 545.
74 Aude Signoles,Sabra and Chatila - Online Encyclopedia of Mass
Violence, Sciences Po Paris, accessed February 15, 2014,
http://www.massviolence.org/Sabra-and-Chatila,
75 Morris, Righteous Victims, 543.
76 Ellen Siegel and Barbee Lynne, "Inside and Outside the Hospital, People
were Screaming: `Haddad, Kataeb, Israel-Massacre." Journal of Palestine
21

Supplies such as food, water and ammunition were given to the Phalange.
Journalists arrived on the scene, finding used-up boxes of Israeli M-16 bullets.
US Army C ration wrappers and chocolate wrappers with Hebrew markings
were scattered over the camps.77 Tired Phalangists would go to IDF posts for
ammunition, water and food, with the Israelis obliging.78
The IDF loaned the Phalangist bulldozers. These were lent on the request to
destroy roadblocks and barricades within the camps. The IDF knew that no
roadblocks or barricades existed within the camps as they had aerial
photographs of the area.79 Instead, they would be used to bulldoze down
homes and create cemeteries for the refugees. The Phalange attempted to
cover up the Hebrew markings on the sides of the bulldozers. Cadavers
would be bulldozed into massive piles of sand with limbs sticking out. One
pile of around 90 bodies in Shatila was clearly visible with the naked eye
from the Israeli post near the Kuwaiti Embassy.80 The Kahan Commission said
that only one bulldozer was lent out but that was not true. 10 bulldozers later
were used that night.81
Zaki, a witness, said that 'When we got near the Kuwaiti Embassy we
were very relieved because we saw Israeli soldiers and knew we would not
be killed.''82 The refugees were told to go to Sport City. At Sport City, the

Studies 12 no. 23 (1983):61-71.

77 Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days.
78 Leila Shahid, The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports.
79 Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila, 33.
80 Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days,
81 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 212.
82 Friedman, The Beirut Massacre: The 4 Days.
22

Israelis threatened the refugees, saying, "If you don't cooperate with us, we
will hand you over to the Phalangists."83 Mossad and Israeli military
intelligence helped the Phalangists interrogate men living within the camps.
During this time in Sport City, Israelis helped the Phalange execute some
refugees and hundreds of people mysteriously disappeared. 84
Israeli support of the massacre can be summarized in 3 ways: the
entrapment of the refugees, logistical support, and interrogation/execution of
the camp residents.

83 Nour Samaha, Survivors recount Sabra-Shatila massacre, Al-Jazeera

English, September 12, 2012.
84 Robert Fisk, At Last the Truth About Sabra and Chatila Massacres,
CounterPunch, November 28, 2001.
23

Conclusion
With regards to answering the question To what extent is the Israeli
Defense Force responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila?, much
evidence has disappeared, obscuring the truth. The Germanos report has
never been released. 3 separate Palestinians investigations are nowhere to
be found. The Kahan Commission has an unrevealed secret annex.85 Elie
Hobieka never got to testify to The Hague. Still, it is beyond reasonable
doubt that the Phalange played the greatest role in the massacre. A massive
body of evidence supports the assertion that the Phalange committed the
overwhelming majority of the violence. With the evidence available, Israel
played a very significant role in facilitating the violence.
The IDF is responsible to a greater extent than the indirect
responsibility delineated in the Kahan report. Planning days before in
coordination with the Phalangists, the IDF allowed them to enter Sabra and
Shatila on the premises of non-existent terrorists, with knowledge that the
massacre could occur. Zeef Scheef, Israeli military analyst, said Whoever
allowed the Phalangists to enter the refugee camps on their own can be
compared to one who allows a fox into the chicken coop and then wonders
why the chickens were all eaten.86 Yet, the IDF leadership insisted on letting
the militiamen into the camps, leading to the massacre. From multiples
levels of command, from foot soldiers to the Minister of Defense, the Israeli
85 Rosemary Sayigh "Seven Day Horror," AL-MAJDAL, March 2001.
86 al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila, 314.
24

Defense Force had full knowledge that the massacre was happening. Instead
of stopping it, they further facilitated the massacre by preventing the
residents of the camps from escaping.
Furthermore, the Israelis offered all kinds of logistical support. Since
1975, the Phalange has been suckling on the teat of Israel with Israeli
salaries, and training. During the massacre, the Israelis gave food, water,
ammunition, flares and bulldozers with full knowledge that the massacre was
going on. Israeli intelligence helped execute and interrogate camp residents.
That is not indirect responsibility. That is an active role in facilitating the
massacre. Even Ronald Reagan, president of Israels closest military ally,
blamed the massacre on Israel.87 An international commission lead by Sean
McBride agrees with the fact that Israel was involved in the planning and
the preparation of the massacres and played a facilitative role in the actual
killings.88
Allowing a massacre to happen in front of ones own eyes and
supporting it goes beyond just mere negligence or indirect responsibility.
Israel exercised a high degree of control over the Phalangists in such a way
that the IDF is in somewhat responsible for the Phalangists actions. At this
point, there is no distinction between direct and indirect responsibility. The
Israelis were in complete control of the occupied area. Under military law and
the Geneva Convention, they had to look out for the welfare of the occupied
87 Shahid, The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports.
88 Edward Said, Permission to Narrate, Journal of Palestine Studies 13 no. 3
(1984):27-48.
25

citizens. They had a responsibility to the camp residents. That obligation was
clearly not met, as a massacre occurred. Declaring indirect responsibility
seems like a way to evade true culpability for the IDFs actions. Instead, the
IDF is clearly more than indirectly responsible. The IDF is responsible for
the massacre at Sabra and Shatila to a very significant extent.
Word count: 3998

26

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