FROM the desert of the Sahel to the islands of the Pacific, Muslim peoples and states

are today afflicted by conflicts and violence of varying dimensions and intensity.

The malicious myth propagated by Islams adversaries is that Muslims are prone to
violence due to their faith and culture.

Islamic terrorism, militancy and extremism are the only ones to have acquired a
religious sobriquet. With this simplistic explanation for every situation of conflict and
violence involving Muslims, it has become much easier to brush aside the legitimate
interests and rights of Muslim states, nations and communities across the world.

It is thus essential to analyse the nature and causes of the current crises and
conflicts in the Islamic world and point to the steps required to resolve them.

A first observation is that most Muslim conflicts are local. Whether in Cairo,
Damascus, Benghazi or Baghdad, these conflicts arise mainly from local political,
social and economic causes. Often, if unresolved, these conflicts intensify and
extend beyond their original boundaries. Broadly, such local conflicts can be
placed in four categories: socioeconomic, ethnic, sectarian and externally imposed.
Frequently, these categories overlap.

The Arab Spring and the dramatic political changes it propelled have been the most
visible manifestations of indigenous socioeconomic revolt in the Arab and Muslim
world for decades. Even after emerging from colonial and foreign rule or tutelage,
common people in the Islamic world remained quiescent under unequal rule by
elites.

The genie of rising popular expectations and demands, unleashed by growing

inequality, poverty and injustice and the Internet, will be difficult to put back in the
authoritarian bottle. Yet, such popular revolts, as evidenced by the history of almost
all democratic nations, also crystallise these fault lines in societies class, sect,
ethnicity, political affinity yielding a period of turbulent transition.

The revolution (often) eats its children. Its achievements can be reversed. Stability
will only come to the countries of the Arab Spring through clear political direction
and rapid economic growth.

Ethnic differences and diversity are another cause of the current conflicts within
Muslim states. The Kurds, dispersed across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, have
remained a source of dispute and violence especially since the demise of the
Ottoman Empire. The competing loyalties among the Pakhtuns, Baloch, Azeris and
similar ethnic communities within and across Islamic states create difficulties in the
governance of these states and complicate interstate relationships. These ethnic
issues require equitable and wise domestic and regional solutions to be promoted
by governments of the concerned states.

A third and disturbing cause of conflict in the Muslim world is growing sectarianism.
The modern incidence of violence between the Sunni and Shia communities dates
back to the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Soon after, the anti-Soviet war
in Afghanistan, supported by ( Zia-ruled) Pakistan, the US, Saudi Arabia and others,
saw the rise of Sunni militancy.

The years after the end of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan witnessed the first
round of Sunni-Shia violence in Pakistan, mostly financed and sponsored by outside
powers. Pakistan remains afflicted by this menace of sectarian violence. But the
sectarian divide has now emerged as a strategic issue, with implications that go
well beyond the Muslim world.

Today, Shia power, wielded by Iran, Iraq, Alawite Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon is
ranged against Sunni states Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt in the battle for
Syria. The latter are supported by the US and Europe. The outcome will determine
the balance of power in West Asia. This sectarian contest obviously has further
weakened the ability of Muslim states to promote pan-Islamic objectives.

These pan-Islamic objectives would normally be to protect and promote Muslim

communities and groups which face discrimination, oppression and violence from
non-Muslim sources. The most celebrated Islamic cause is to restore the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people and secure Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
Arab territories, including (East) Jerusalem. Due to internal fissures and weaknesses,
the ability of the Arab and Islamic world to secure this sacred goal in Palestine and
Al Quds has progressively declined.

Inevitably, the political space has been increasingly occupied by extremists on both
sides, neither of which wants the internationally prescribed two-state solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. The recent Gaza skirmish may presage a wider conflict which
may draw in not only the West Bank Palestinians but also neighbouring Arab states.

Two decades ago, the cause of Kashmir used to enjoy equal billing with Palestine on
the Islamic agenda. Today, not even Pakistan mentions the K word in its speeches
at the UN. Yet, Kashmir will continue to see violence because of the refusal of its
people to accept Indian rule and inevitably force itself on the Islamic and Pakistani
agendas.

There are several other situations of Muslims being oppressed in non-Muslim states,
most recently the Rohingyas in Myanmar. The Islamic countries have yet to develop
effective diplomatic mechanisms to offer aid and protection to such oppressed
Muslim minorities in non-Muslim states.

The creation of Bin Ladens Al Qaeda was the violent response of Arab and Muslim
extremists to the perceived injustices against Muslim people, especially by the
West. Al Qaeda proclaimed a global and anti-Western campaign and perpetrated the
9/11 atrocity. It also was provided the opportunity to fight Western armies close to
home in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But most of Al Qaedas violence has been directed against fellow Muslims,
especially in Pakistan, but also in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and now in Mali. Worse yet,
Al Qaedas actions and pronouncements have been utilised by adversaries to
portray every Muslim militancy as terrorism. Thus, all Kashmiri militant groups have
been depicted as terrorists, although most of them did not have affiliations with Al
Qaeda.

However, it is clear that such labelling is expedient for the West (also known as the
international community). Mullah Omar and most Taliban leaders and groups were
placed on the US and Security Council terrorism list. Once it was clear that
negotiations would be needed with them, a concerted effort was made to take
cooperative Taliban off the list. Since the Haqqani network is seen to be noncooperative, it has been recently placed on the terrorism list. Pakistan was asked in
the past to kill or capture the Afghan Taliban leadership; now it is being asked to
release them to expedite negotiations.

Some general conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, economic and
social development is essential to resolve most Muslim conflicts and must be the
first priority. Second, a much greater effort is required to explain and project the real
nature and causes of various local conflicts. These should not be allowed to be
tarred with the Al Qaeda brush.

Third, Muslim states need to overcome the sectarian and ethnic divisions which will
further weaken them, individually and collectively. Fourth, external (non-Muslim)
intervention or involvement in a Muslim conflict is unlikely to prove positive in the
long term. Solutions would be best promoted by the concerned Muslim parties
themselves. Finally, the Islamic Conference (OIC) must be awakened from its
slumber to serve its prescribed role as the vehicle for Islamic cooperation.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.