G.R. No.

175540
April 7, 2014
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, Petitioner, vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 31, 2006, adjudging petitioner liable for
damages, and the Resolution2 dated November 22, 2006, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.
The CA's narration of facts is accurate, to wit:
Plaintiff-appellee Zenaida Magud-Logmao is the mother of deceased Arnelito Logmao. Defendantappellant Dr. Filoteo Alano is the Executive Director of the National Kidney Institute (NKI).
At around 9:50 in the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao, then eighteen (18) years old, was
brought to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who
allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the Farmers Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The
patients data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong.
However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at the
Emergency Room of EAMC, stated that the patient is Angelito [Logmao].
Dr. Cabrera reported that [Logmao] was drowsy with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent;
that the skull x-ray showed no fracture; that at around 4:00 oclock in the morning of March 2, 1988,
[Logmao] developed generalized seizures and was managed by the neuro-surgery resident on-duty;
that the condition of [Logmao] progressively deteriorated and he was intubated and ambu-bagging
support was provided; that admission to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilator
support became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and all the ventilator units were
being used by other patients; that a resident physician of NKI, who was rotating at EAMC, suggested
that [Logmao] be transferred to NKI; and that after arrangements were made, [Logmao] was
transferred to NKI at 10:10 in the morning.
At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao] was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was
immediately attended to and given the necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives
around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and
media assistance. Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman of the Department of Surgery, observed that the
severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death. He requested the
Laboratory Section to conduct a tissue typing and tissue cross-matching examination, so that should
Lugmoso expire despite the necessary medical care and management and he would be found to be a
suitable organ donor and his family would consent to organ donation, the organs thus donated could
be detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible beneficiary.
Jennifer Misa verified on the same day, March 2, 1988, from EAMC the identity of Lugmoso and, upon
her request, she was furnished by EAMC a copy of the patients date sheet which bears the name
Angelito Lugmoso, with address at Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. She then contacted several radio and
television stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of Angelito Lugmoso of
Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, who was confined at NKI for severe head injury after allegedly falling
from the Cubao overpass, as well as Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, whose area of
jurisdiction includes Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, for assistance in locating the relatives of Angelito
Lugmoso. Certifications were issued by Channel 4, ABS-CBN and GMA attesting that the request
made by the NKI on March 2, 1988 to air its appeal to locate the family and relatives of Angelito
Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong was accommodated. A Certification was likewise issued by
Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong attesting to the fact that on March 2, 1988,
at about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer Misa requested for assistance to immediately locate the family and
relatives of Angelito Lugmoso and that she followed up her request until March 9, 1988.
On March 3, 1988, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Dr. Ona was informed that Lugmoso had
been pronounced brain dead by Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a neurologist, and by Dr. Antonio Rafael, a

neurosurgeon and attending physician of Lugmoso, and that a repeat electroencephalogram (EEG)
was in progress to confirm the diagnosis of brain death. Two hours later, Dr. Ona was informed that
the EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing, thereby confirming that Lugmoso was brain dead. Upon
learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that some NKI patients awaiting organ
donation had blood and tissue types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from Jennifer Misa
whether the relatives of Lugmoso had been located so that the necessary consent for organ donation
could be obtained. As the extensive search for the relatives of Lugmoso yielded no positive result and
time being of the essence in the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo A.
Alano, Executive Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of
Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise instructed Dr. Rose Marie Rosete-Liquete to
secure permission for the planned organ retrieval and transplantation from the Medico-Legal Office of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), on the assumption that the incident which lead to the
brain injury and death of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.
On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a Memorandum, which reads as follows:
This is in connection with the use of the human organs or any portion or portions of the human body
of the deceased patient, identified as a certain Mr. Angelito Lugmoso who was brought to the National
Kidney Institute on March 2, 1988 from the East Avenue Medical Center.
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due
to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts
to locate the relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient such as appeal through the radios
and television as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [MedicoLegal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as
amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to
retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to
transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and
survive.
A Certification dated March 10, 1988 was issued by Dr. Maximo Reyes, Medico-Legal Officer of the
NBI, stating that he received a telephone call from Dr. Liquete on March 3, 1988 at 9:15 a.m.
regarding the case of Lugmoso, who was declared brain dead; that despite efforts to locate the
latters relatives, no one responded; that Dr. Liquete sought from him a second opinion for organ
retrieval for donation purposes even in the absence of consent from the family of the deceased; and
that he verbally agreed to organ retrieval.
At 3:45 in the afternoon of March 3, 1988, a medical team, composed of Dr. Enrique Ona, as principal
surgeon, Drs. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Rose Marie Rosete-Liquete, Aurea Ambrosio, Ludivino de
Guzman, Mary Litonjua, Jaime Velasquez, Ricardo Fernando, and Myrna Mendoza, removed the heart,
kidneys, pancreas, liver and spleen of Lugmoso. The medical team then transplanted a kidney and
the pancreas of Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other kidney of Lugmoso to Alexis Ambustan. The
transplant operation was completed at around 11:00 oclock in the evening of March 3, 1988.
On March 4, 1988, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, Head of the Cadaver Organ Retrieval Effort (CORE) program
of NKI, made arrangements with La Funeraria Oro for the embalmment of the cadaver of Lugmoso
good for a period of fifteen (15) days to afford NKI more time to continue searching for the relatives
of the latter. On the same day, Roberto Ortega, Funeral Consultant of La Funeraria Oro, sent a request
for autopsy to the NBI. The Autopsy Report and Certification of Post-Mortem Examination issued by
the NBI stated that the cause of death of Lugmoso was intracranial hemorrhage secondary to skull
fracture.
On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing its successful double organ
transplantation. Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on television that the donor

was an eighteen (18) year old boy whose remains were at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon City. As the
name of the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao, Aida informed plaintiff of the news report.
It appears that on March 3, 1988, Arlen Logmao, a brother of Arnelito, who was then a resident of 17C San Pedro Street, Mandaluyong, reported to Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District,
Mandaluyong that the latter did not return home after seeing a movie in Cubao, Quezon City, as
evidenced by a Certification issued by said Station; and that the relatives of Arnelito were likewise
informed that the latter was missing. Upon receiving the news from Aida, plaintiff and her other
children went to La Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket.
On April 29, 1988, plaintiff filed with the court a quo a complaint for damages against Dr. Emmanuel
Lenon, Taurean Protectors Agency, represented by its Proprietor, Celso Santiago, National Kidney
Institute, represented by its Director, Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Jennifer Misa, Dr. Maximo Reyes, Dr. Enrique
T. Ona, Dr. Manuel Chua-Chiaco, Jr., Dr. Rose Marie O. Rosete-Liquete, Dr. Aurea Z. Ambrosio, Dr.
Ludivino de Guzman, Dr. Mary Litonjua, Dr. Jaime Velasquez, Dr. Ricardo Fernando, Dr. Myrna
Mendoza, Lee Tan Koc, Alexis Ambustan, Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso, La Funeraria Oro, Inc., represented by
its President, German E. Ortega, Roberto Ortega alias Bobby Ortega, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, Jr., John
Doe, Peter Doe, and Alex Doe in connection with the death of her son Arnelito. Plaintiff alleged that
defendants conspired to remove the organs of Arnelito while the latter was still alive and that they
concealed his true identity.
On January 17, 2000, the court a quo rendered judgment finding only Dr. Filoteo Alano liable for
damages to plaintiff and dismissing the complaint against the other defendants for lack of legal
basis.3
After finding petitioner liable for a quasi-delict, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) ordered
petitioner to pay respondent P188,740.90 as actual damages; P500,000.00 as moral damages;
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; P300,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Petitioner
appealed to the CA.
On March 31, 2006, the CA issued its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION by DELETING the award
of P188,740.90 as actual damages and REDUCING the award of moral damages to P250,000.00, the
award of exemplary damages to P200,000.00 and the award of attorney's fees to P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, where the
following issues are presented for resolution:
A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN HOLDING PETITIONER DR. FILOTEO ALANO LIABLE FOR MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ACT OF THE
PETITIONER IS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE NOR IS THERE ANY FINDING THAT THE ACT OF THE
PETITIONER WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY OR DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY SUSTAINED BY
RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO.
B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING AND/OR FAILING TO DECLARE
THAT PETITIONER DR. ALANO ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND PURSUANT TO LAW WHEN HE ISSUED THE
AUTHORIZATION TO REMOVE AND RETRIEVE THE ORGANS OF ANGELITO LUGMOSO (LATER
IDENTIFIED TO BE IN FACT ARNELITO LOGMAO) CONSIDERING THAT NO NEGLIGENCE CAN BE
ATTRIBUTED OR IMPUTED ON HIM IN HIS PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT MANDATED BY LAW.
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ZENAIDA MAGUDLOGMAO MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH AND ARE CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.5

The first two issues boil down to the question of whether respondent's sufferings were brought about
by petitioner's alleged negligence in granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal
organs of respondent's son who had been declared brain dead.
Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization for the removal of some of the internal organs
to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the letter of the law, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 349, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his subordinates instructions
to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of respondent's son. In fact,
announcements were made through radio and television, the assistance of police authorities was
sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified. Thus, petitioner insists that he should not be
held responsible for any damage allegedly suffered by respondent due to the death of her son and
the removal of her sons internal organs for transplant purposes.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that there was negligence on petitioner's part
when he failed to ensure that reasonable time had elapsed to locate the relatives of the deceased
before giving the authorization to remove said deceased's internal organs for transplant purposes.
However, a close examination of the records of this case would reveal that this case falls under one
of the exceptions to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding on this Court. There are some important circumstances that the lower
courts failed to consider in ascertaining whether it was the actions of petitioner that brought about
the sufferings of respondent.6
The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:
As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the morning due
to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has exerted all reasonable efforts
to locate the relatives or next-of-kin of the said deceased patient, such as appeal through the radios
and television, as well as through police and other government agencies and that the NBI [MedicoLegal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case.
If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349 as
amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of Surgery to
retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased patient and to
transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said organs to live and
survive.7
A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make certain"
that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways in
which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly
stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased
was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such
instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all
reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives
any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department
of Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been
faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to
comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the doctors and personnel of
NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondent's son to the media and sought the assistance of
the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the
Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval of the deceased's internal organs, the
doctors concerned also the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications
intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the
sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because the notices did not
properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door. The trial
and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of
the deceased, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's identity to NKI. The NKI
could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as found by the
lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.
Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed this case.1wphi1 As
stated in Otero v. Tan,8 "[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of
their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent."9 Here,
there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated,
cannot be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert
witness to prove that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the
doctors could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.
Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding petitioner liable for
damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were
removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by
respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the
Court find evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful
state in which she found her son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 2006, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against petitioner is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170645

July 9, 2010
NIEVES ESTARES BALDOS, substituted by FRANCISCO BALDOS and MARTIN
BALDOS, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REYNALDO PILLAZAR a.k.a.
REYNALDO ESTARES BALDOS, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 8 August 2005 Decision2 and the 22
November 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 65693.
The 8 August 2005 Decision affirmed the 16 August 1999 Order4 of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 74) of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 79-0-95. The 22
November 2005 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However,
his birth was not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36
years later or on 11 February 1985. His certificate of live birth5 indicated Nieves
Baldos as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also
appeared as the informant on the certificate of live birth.
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
a complaint,6 docketed as Civil Case No. 79-0-95, for cancellation of the late
registration of Reynaldos birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her
son.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court treated the complaint as a petition. In its 16 August 1999 Order,7
the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned as
follows:
A thorough examination of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the
evidence of the defendant shows that apart from the scornful denial of plaintiff
that defendant is her son, all documentary evidence available points to the
contrary. The declaration of two disinterested persons, who were neighbors of
the petitioner and his deceased husband, has never been refuted.
No one was presented by plaintiff to corroborate her stand.
In the realm of the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the oppositor is
petitioners son. Petitioners reason for disowning the oppositor is obvious; he did
not live up to her expectation; his wife is ungrateful to everything she did for her
and the oppositor. Bad blood runs in the veins of the parties. But while oppositor
may have done an act that caused plaintiff to rue she gave him life, such acts
however, are not justifications of what she prays from this Court.

An ungrateful act is not a ground to cancel a validly executed document, nor a

reason to strip a person of ones filiation. It may be a ground for disinheritance
though. The documents adduced on record are the best evidence of the parties
relationship.8
Undeterred, Nieves appealed to the Court of Appeals. She insisted that the late
registration of Reynaldos birth was contrary to Presidential Decree No. 651 (P.D.
No. 651).
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 8 August 2005 Decision,9 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
Order. The appellate court held that P.D. No. 651 did not proscribe the late
registration of births of persons born before 1 January 1974. The Court of Appeals
explained that the purpose of the decree was to encourage registration of births
as well as deaths.
Nieves Baldos died on 17 May 1999. Her lawyer filed a motion for substitution10
six years later or on 20 October 2005. In its 22 November 2005 Resolution,11 the
Court of Appeals granted the motion for substitution. From then on, Bartolomes
brothers, Francisco Baldos and Martin Baldos, substituted for Nieves Baldos.
The Issue: The sole issue is whether the late registration of Reynaldos birth is
valid.
The Courts Ruling: The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners insist that the late registration of Reynaldos birth is not authorized by
P.D. No. 651. They claim that P.D. No. 651 applies only to births within the period
from 1 January 1974 up to the date when the decree became effective. They
point out that Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, outside of the period
covered by the decree. Thus, petitioners submit the Court of Appeals violated
basic rules of statutory construction when it interpreted P.D. No. 651 to include
births before 1 January 1974. Petitioners contend the late registration of
Reynaldos birth amounts to simulation of birth.
Respondent Reynaldo counters that P.D. No. 651 does not proscribe the late
registration of births of persons born before 1 January 1974. He maintains that he
has sufficiently proven, by clear and convincing evidence,
the fact that he is the son of Nieves and Bartolome Baldos. He asserts that a
certificate of live birth is a public document covered by the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions.
Presidential Decree No. 651, otherwise known as An Act Requiring the
Registration of Births and Deaths in the Philippines which Occurred from 1
January 1974 and Thereafter, provides:

Sec. 1. Registration of births. All babies born in hospitals, maternity clinics,

private homes, or elsewhere within the period starting from January 1, 1974 up
to the date when this decree becomes effective, irrespective of the nationality,
race, culture, religion or belief of their parents, whether the mother is a
permanent resident or transient in the Philippines, and whose births have not yet
been registered must be reported for registration in the office of the local civil
registrar of the place of birth by the physician, nurse, midwife, hilot, or hospital
or clinic administrator who attended the birth or in default thereof, by either
parent or a responsible member of the family or a relative, or any person who
has knowledge of the birth of the individual child.
The report referred to above shall be accompanied with an affidavit describing
the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 2. Period of registration of births. The registration of the birth of babies
referred to in the preceding section must be done within sixty (60) days from the
date of effectivity of this decree without fine or fee of any kind. Babies born after
the effectivity of this decree must be registered in the office of the local civil
registrar of the place of birth within thirty (30) days after birth, by the attending
physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or clinic administrator or, in default
of the same, by either parent or a responsible member of the family or any
person who has knowledge of the birth.
The parents or the responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth
or the hospital or clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in
case they fail to register the new born child. If there was no attendant at birth, or
if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity clinic, then the parents or the
responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case of failure
to register the new born child. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 76612 amended P.D. No. 651 by extending the period of
registration up to 31 December 1975. P.D. No. 651, as amended, provided for
special registration within a specified period to address the problem of underregistration of births as well as deaths. It allowed, without fine or fee of any kind,
the late registration of births and deaths occurring within the period starting from
1 January 1974 up to the date when the decree became effective.1awphi1
Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth is
outside of the coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of
Reynaldos birth falls under Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry
Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931. As a general law, Act No. 3753
applies to the registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No. 651, as
amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards. Considering that the late
registration of Reynaldos birth took place in 1985, National Census Statistics

Office (NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 198313 governs the

implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office of
the local civil registrar within 30 days from the time of birth.14 Any report of
birth made beyond the reglementary period is considered delayed.15 The local
civil registrar, upon receiving an application for delayed registration of birth, is
required to publicly post for at least ten days a notice of the pending application
for delayed registration.16 If after ten days no one opposes the registration and
the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be
registered, he should register the same.17
Reynaldos certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is
presumed to have gone through the process prescribed by law for late
registration of birth. It was only on 8 March 1995, after the lapse of ten long
years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application for delayed
registration of Reynaldos birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She should
have done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records18 show that
no less than Nieves herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of
Reynaldo. At the time of her application for delayed registration of birth, Nieves
claimed that Reynaldo was her son. Between the facts stated in a duly registered
public document and the flip-flopping statements of Nieves, we are more inclined
to stand by the former.
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The
books making up the civil register are considered public documents and are
prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated there.19 As a public
document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of
validity.20 It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live
birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged
falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly denied for lack of merit the petition to cancel the late
registration of Reynaldos birth.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 8 August 2005 Decision and
the 22 November 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
65693 affirming the 16 August 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74)
of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 79-0-95. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came
two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners
misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of
their dreams.

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit
to interpose any [o]pposition.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks
and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1
Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries
in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to
the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first
name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his
true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name
are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of
the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court,
until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as
clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference
to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of

citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can
justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by
the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall
be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents

or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place
where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be
issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female"
as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that
has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female postoperative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131
of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may
be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there
are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However,
the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166676

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Respondent.
Promulgated: September 12, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of
law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan"
changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary
male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in
her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she
has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development.
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.

body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are
that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to
make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon
payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal
certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing
corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II. CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR
"GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e.,
CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive
weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor
General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
appear in his behalf.

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to
male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer"
to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is
known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex
organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents
uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted
to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule
108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.7

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the
reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and
convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners

be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under
Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103

CHANGE OF NAME

Section 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified
by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall
set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months
after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf
of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are
true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule
shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the
same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,

with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local
civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a
proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party
without whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered
as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have
or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall
construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there
is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition
to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction
or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only
to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies,
intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has
been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land
for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female."[25] The current state
of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as
a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical
testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female,
then a change in the

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base,
an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal
structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes;
as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000
children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot
be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose
sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and

categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent
has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia
and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered
his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps,
like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female
but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning
a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on

whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as
a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under
the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the

ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state
and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of
respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to
a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.