5. Non-imprisonment for debt or non-payment of a poll tax (Sec. 19, Par.

1)
6. Bill of Attainder
- Singles out an individual or a group of individuals as guilty of socially harmful
behavior
- The language of the law determines guilt. It was made in such a way that
when you are covered by its terms, you are already guilty. Even if you go to
court, there is nothing you can do to remove the guilt impugned by the law.
- Subject people to punishment without the benefit of a trial.
PEOPLE vs. FERRER
- Anti-Subversion law is really a bill of attainder, despite the Courts ruling.
- Court held: Membership in the CPP constitutes subversion. However, provision
of the law did not penalize membership (which is a mere status) but specific
conduct, i.e. continued membership even after the law was passed (overt action).
Facts: Judge Simeon Ferrer, RTC judge in Tarlac, declared RA1700 or the AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Judge hence dismissed the
information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP); and 2.) Nilo Tayag
and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA.
The trial court is of the opinion that: (a.) The Congress usurped the powers of the
judge; (b.) assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial; and (c.) created a presumption
of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
Issue: WoN RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
Held: NO. A bill of attainder is defined as the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be
measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: (1.)
statute specifies persons, groups; and the (2.) statute is applied retroactively and
reach past conduct.
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government. The Act applies not only to the
CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct, not the person. Membership to
these organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, must be shown to have acquired with
the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts (knowingly,
willfully, and by overt acts). In fact, there is a provision in RA1700 that gives
leeway for old members to renounce their membership.
It is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE and INTENT to
FURTHER THE SUBVERSIVE GOALS BY OVERT ACTS that is punishable.
Justice Fernando, dissent: RA 1700 violates the fundamental rights to freedom
of and assembly. The law specifically singles out Communist Party of the
Philippines and similar associations
Further, the law is sweeps too broadly.

7. Ex post facto law

- Punishes an act or changes a prior obligation such as:
- Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
- Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed
- Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed
- Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense
- Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful
- Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal,
or
a
proclamation
of
amnesty
- Completely inconsistent with the essence of Criminal Law (regulate socially
harmful behavior), if Penal laws reach back in time, then the power to regulate is
lost because people would be lost on how to act. Criminal Law, would thus, be
left to impose punishment.
US vs. DIAZ-CONDE
Facts: On December 30, 1915 (before the Usury Law was put into effect),
Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco (offended party) delivered to the
Diaz - Conde (defendant) a contract wherein the former borrowed from the
latter the sum of P300 and by virtue of the terms, the borrowers obligated
themselves to pay the defendants interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per
month starting on January, 1916. On the following year, the Usury Law came into
effect. A complaint was filed in CFI Manila charging the defendants to be in
violation of the Usury Law. The case was brought on trial on September 1, 1921
and the defendants were found guilty of the charge. They appealed to the SC.
Issue: WoN the defendants can be charged to be in violation of a law that did not
exist when they committed the acts subscribed to them.
Held: NO. Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are
prohibited in this jurisdiction. Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done
before the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to make said Act applicable to
the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation. CFI Manilas
decision is revoked and defendants are discharged from the custody of the law.

F. Construction/Interpretation
1. Liberality in favor of the accused

- Note: Especially if the language of the law is unclear

PEOPLE vs. SULTAN
April 27, 2000
Facts: While on her way home, Juditha Bautista was accosted by Sultan who
announced that it was a hold up and forced her to come home with him. Her
valuables were taken from her and she was ordered to undress. After which,
Sultan ordered her to lie down and commenced raping the victim. After the initial
coital encounter, he took a short break and proceeded once again to sexually
abuse her. He said that he loved her afterwards and offered to elope. In her effort
to free herself from him, victim agreed. The next day she told her sister who
consequently informed their brother who was a policeman. They staged an
entrapment and accused was arrested. He was tried and convicted of the
complex crime of robbery with rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: WoN the two incidents of rape qualifies as an aggravating circumstance
under Art.14
Held: NO. Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC condemns a person to reclusion perpetua
to death when robbery shall have been committed with rape. In the present case,
the victim was raped TWICE, but since additional rapes, no matter how cruel, do
not count as aggravating circumstances, the Court must construe the penal law
in favor of the offender. Unless a law is passed providing that additional rape/s or
homicide/s may be considered aggravating, this will always be the case.
2. Spanish text of the RPC prevails over its English translation
- The official text of the RPC is Spanish; therefore the Spanish interpretation must
apply even if it is unfavorable to the accused
3. Retroactive application if favorable to the accused
- Parts of a single law can be applied retroactively or non-retroactively depending
on its favorability to the accused (consistent with the principle of liberality in
favor of the accused).
- Only penal laws, not administrative orders, can have retroactive application.
PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ (pp. 616-620; 630-631)
March 11, 1999
Facts: Rolando Valdez was sentenced to death by the complex crime of multiple
murders with double frustrated murder, after allegedly conspiring and helping
Bernardo Castro and one John Doe for killing four people and inflicting fatal
injuries to two others. The victims were riding on a tricycle and were on their way
to a wedding party when Valdez, Castro, and one John Doe fired at the vehicle
with .30 caliber guns, leaving four people dead and two others fatally injured.
Besides the death penalty, the trial court also sentenced to reclusion perpetua
the accused due to illegal possession of firearms as penalized in Presidential
Decree 1866.
Issues:
1. WoN the trial court erred in determining the sentence of the accused
2. WoN Republic Act 8294, amending Presidential Decree 1866, stating
that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal

possession of firearms if homicide or murder is committed with it, can

be applied retroactively.
Held:
1. YES. The four crimes of murder resulted not from a single act but from several
individual and distinct acts. The victims were not killed by only one bullet. The
accused is guilty of four counts of murder (punishable each by reclusion
perpetua) and not the complex crime of multiple murder (punishable by death),
and two counts of frustrated murder and not double frustrated murder.
2. YES. RA 8294 generally has prospective application, but it has
retroactive effect so far as it benefits the accused (Article 22 RPC):
a. Not applied as an aggravating circumstance, because doing so will be
unfavorable to the accused (murder aggravated with illegal possession
of firearms is punishable by death).
b. Applied insofar as the case for illegal possession of firearms is
concerned, because this can no longer be prosecuted as a separate
offense.
Decision: Modified, sentence changed to four counts of reclusion perpetua and
two counts of indeterminate sentence.
4. Prescribed, but undeserved, penalties
- Punishment has to be meted, and in cases wherein the judge thinks the accused
does not deserve the punishment, the remedy is in the Executive via clemency
(consistent with the principle in Art.5, Par. 2).
- Judges should apply the law, notwithstanding their personal moral convictions.
PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES*
November 29, 1950
Facts: Abelardo Formigones lived with his wife Julia and his five children in the
house of his half-brother, Zacarias. One afternoon, the accused, without
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall and stabbed his wife, a blow
that sent her toppling down the stairs. Abelardo took her up in his arms, carried
her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response for
the shouts for help made by their daughter Irene. Upon investigation, Abelardo
readily admitted having killed her, motivated by jealousy. During trial, Abelardo
entered a plea of not guilty but did not testify. Prison guards were presented with
the testimony that Abelardo was rather strange and behaved like an insane
person. Abelardo was found guilty of parricide. Counsel for defendant appeals to
the SC on the theory that appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability.
Issue: WoN appellant imbecility exempts respondent from criminal liability within
the definition in Art.12 of RPC, and if not, WoN appellant is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of jealousy and feeblemindedness.
Held: NO. Appellant is not an imbecile, rather he is feebleminded. The fact that
the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating
circumstance provided in either par.8 (dumb) or 9 (such illness which diminishes
the exercise of willpower) of Art.13. Also, as there is evidence that his feelings of

jealousy is somewhat justified, he is also entitled to the mitigating circumstance

in par.6, that of passion or obfuscation. HOWEVER, the penalty for parricide
having been defined by Art.63 as either reclusion perpetua or death,
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, such
penalty should be applied.
Decision: Appellant sentenced guilty of parricide with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. However, believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty,
case is brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who in his discretion may
reduce the penalty of otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees
fit.
PEOPLE vs. VENERACION*
October 12, 1995
Facts: A seven year old girl was raped and killed. Six men were charged with
rape and homicide but only two were convicted by the RTC. They were sentenced
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, despite the provision in Art.335, RPC (as
amended by Sec.11 of RA 7659) providing for the penalty of death. City
Prosecutor disagreed with the sentence and filed a Motion of Reconsideration to
correct the penalty. The judge refused to act on the merits and denied the same
motion for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the petition to the SC.
Issue: WoN the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he failed and/or
refused to impose a mandatory penalty of death.
Held: YES. We are a government of laws, not of men. Hence, judges are bound to
follow the rule of law and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor;
resisting encroachment by government, political parties, or even the interference
of their own personal beliefs. Since the applicable law in force at the time was
R.A.7659 and Sec. 11 of that statute provided that the penalty imposable was not
reclusion perpetua (as determined by the lower court) but death, it left no room
for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge. If the law is clear, it
must be applied.
Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. As long
as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. Also, as per ROC,
after determination of guilt, judges are mandated to impose the proper penalty
and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused.
II. General principles of criminal liability
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rae
(The Act is Not Guilty Unless the Mind is Also Guilty)

A. Definition of Felony (Art 3) Definition Acts and omissions punishable by

law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are not only committed by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
The elements of felonies in general are:
1. That there must be an act or omission
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal Code
3. That the act is performed or omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa
B. Elements of criminal liability
1. Physical element (Actus Reus)
a. Act: any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external
world, it being unnecessary that the same be actually produced, as the
possibility of its production is sufficient
But the act must be one that is defined by the Revised Penal Code as constituting
a felony; or, at least, an overt act of that felony, that is, an external act that has
direct connection with the felony intended to be committed.
- The Law comes in when the person has committed the act already, besides
internal thoughts are difficult to prove. What the state regulates is the wrongful
action and not the mere thought, not the mind.
- Concept of MANIFEST CRIMINALITY - punish people what they do, not what they
think of, not for who they are.
- OBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF LIABILITY
- Willed bodily movement: something that a person did (i.e. muscular spasm not
considered because it is involuntary and not a product of the will)
- Element of voluntariness is required
ROBINSON vs. CALIFORNIA
Facts: A California statute makes it a criminal offense for a person to be
addicted to the use of narcotics.
Robinson was apprehended by a police officer that saw what appears to be
needle marks and discoloration on the skin of his arm. Another officer examined
the needle marks and discoloration the day after and concluded these marks
and the discoloration were the result of the injection of hypodermic needles into
the tissue into the vein that was not sterile. He also stated that the appellant
was neither under the influence of narcotics nor suffering withdrawal symptoms
at the time he saw him. However, the officer also alleged that the appellant had
admitted using narcotics in the past.
Appellant denied the allegations and explained that the marks were because of
an allergic condition.
Robinson was convicted by the trial court through a jury verdict:
- The trial judge instructed the jury that the statute made it a misdemeanor for a
person either to use narcotics, or to be addicted to the use of narcotics.
- The judge further instructed the jury that the appellant could be convicted
under a general verdict if the jury agreed either that he was of the status or
had committed the act denounced by the statute.

Issue: WoN the California statute is constitutional on the grounds that it makes a
person criminally liable because of the status of being addicted to the use of
narcotics.
Held and Ratio: Although there was evidence in the present case that the
appellant had used narcotics in Los Angeles, the jury was instructed that they
could convict him even if they disbelieved that evidence. The appellant could be
convicted, they were told, if they found simply that the appellants status or
chronic condition was that of being addicted to the use of narcotics.
This statute, therefore, is not one that punishes a person for the use of narcotics,
for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior
resulting from their administration. It is not a law that even purports to provide or
require medical treatment. Rather, we deal with a statute that makes the
status of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be
prosecuted at any time before he reforms. California has said that a person can
be continuously guilty of this offense, whether or not he has ever used or
possessed any narcotics within the State, and whether or not he has been guilty
of any antisocial behavior there.
The court holds that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a
criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or
been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Note: it is the status, not the act that they punish. So if you were from some
other state, was addicted to the use of narcotics, you come to California and you
will be held criminally liable even if you didnt use or possess narcotics within the
state.
b. Omission: means inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty that one is
legally bound to do or required to do. There must be a law requiring the doing or
performance of the act.
- Omission must be punishable by law
- From nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lige: there is no crime where there is no
law punishing it.
- General rule for not rendering assistance is not a ground for criminal liability
- No moral responsibility to help a person if he or she did not cause the injury
PEOPLE vs. SYLVESTRE and ATIENZA
Facts: Martin Atienza was convicted as principal by direct participation and
Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime of arson by the CFI.
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife,
Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after
supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia
why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered that it was the only way he
could be revenged upon the people of Masocol, who, he said, had instigated the
charge of adultery against him and his co-defendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin

Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him,
not even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her co-defendant.
Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to
communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had
just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms length
when they heard cris of Fire! Fire! Turning back they saw their home in flames.
The fire destroyed about forty-eight houses.
Romana listened to her co-defendants threat without raising a protest, and did
not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house.
Issue: WoN Romana Silvestre is an accomplice to the crime of arson principally
and directly committed by respondent Martin Atienza
Held: No. An accomplice is one who does not take a direct part in the
commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by
previous or simultaneous actions. Romanas mere passive presence at the
scene of anothers crime, mere silence, and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, is not punishable. To
show complicity to the crime requires a certain degree of cooperation,
whether moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or
material, through external acts.
Note: There was no legal duty for anyone to try to prevent commission of the
crime. There is no law that punishes a person who does not report a crime or
prevent the commission thereof.
PEOPLE vs. TALINGDAN
Facts:
Teresa Domogma was the wife of the victim Bernardo Bagabag. The couples
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles due to Teresas frequent
unannounced departure from her family home; wherein each time Bernardo took
time to look for her.
On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their
house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made
Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter leave them. At this junction, Bernardo
had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and
Teresa.
About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and
did not come back for a period of more than 3 weeks. Bernardo came to know
that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during the
time of her disappearance.
Just two days before Bernardo was killed, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent
quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the
help of the police.
Accused Talingdan, a policeman then, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's
house and called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left

and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him. The following day,
Corazon, on her way to wash clothes, over heard her mother speaking in hushed
tones with Talingdan and party. She overheard one of them utter the statement
can he elude a bullet. When Teresa noticed the presence of Corazon, she shoved
her away saying you tell your father that we will kill him.
On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house while
having supper.
Issue: In light of the testimony of Corazon, WoN Teresa is an accessory to
Bernards murder
Held and Ratio: YES. It is true that proof of her direct participation in the
conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same liability as
her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if
she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is
convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object. There is in
the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an
accessory to the offense committed. She did not only order her
daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to
have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house
later to investigate. Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less
passive in her attitude regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants. Teresas action after
the assault and killing of her husband makes her liable as an accessory
after the fact under Art 19 Par 3 of the RPC concealing or assisting in
the escape of the principal in the crime.
Punished for the positive act of concealing the identity of the husband's
killers. The law does not impose a legal duty for the woman to alert her
husband of the threat of his life. So the woman is punished for the
crime of preventing the girl from revealing the identity of those
involved.
Makasiar, J. dissenting in part: Teresa should be liable for parricide as principal.
The absence of a marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of
marriage; because the presumption that the deceased and the accused Teresa
were marries subsists by reason of the fact that they had been living together for
at least 13 years as evidenced by the birth of their eldest child, Corazon, who
was 12 years old at the time.
Corazons testimony regarding the plotting after the slapping incident should be
believed; Teresa, therefore, is a co-conspirator.
2. Mental elements (Mens rea)
a. Deliberate intent (Dolo)
i. Elements of dolo
1. Freedom or voluntariness Different from actus reus, more than a spasm, it
is something that the person did freely and voluntarily (will); person had a
choice to act or not to act.

2. Intelligence The power to determine the morality of an act i.e. the capacity
of a person to deliberate the rightfulness/wrongfulness of an act. Discerning the
very nature of the act that a person will do.
3. Evil Intent There is the intention to cause an injury (harm) to anothers
person, property or right
ii. General and specific intent
General: The intent to do a wrong or bring harm; determines WoN person is
criminally liable
Specific: Classification of different intent into different felonies; used in deciding
the liability for a particular type of offense.
PEOPLE vs. PUNO
Facts: On January 13, 1988 in QC, accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband went to Mrs. Sarmientos bakeshop in Araneta
Ave., Q.C., to inform her that he will be taking his drivers duty for the day
because her driver had to go to Pampanga on emergency. Isabelo is the driver of
the husband of Mrs. Sarmiento.
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got
into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right
on a corner of Araneta Ave., the vehicle stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver. Enrique pointed a pistol at
Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her. Mrs.
Sarmiento had P7000 on her bag that she handed to the accused; however, the
accused said that they wanted P100000 more.
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo while Mrs.
Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30000 checks and one P40000 check. Isabelo
then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; shortly after, he changed his
mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga.
According to Mrs. Sarmiento, she managed to jump out of the car then cross to
the other side of the superhighway; and then successfully flagged down a fish
vendor's van, her dress covered in blood from the fall.
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that
according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car. He said he even slowed the car down as he
drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride. He claimed that
she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway
Issue:
1. WoN the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. WoN the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Held and Ratio:
1. No. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured
prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant,
other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or

intimidation. For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the
actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of
her liberty. In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an
incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders. This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
2. No. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American
occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and
pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope
with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the
origin of the law on highway robbery). PD No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately
against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim.
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car, which was casually
operating on a highway, does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case. This is
not justified by the accused's intention.
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and
2 months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor.
Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral
damages.)
iii. Malum prohibitum exception to the requirement of mens rea
- Intent is not necessary for a person to be criminally liable.
- Acts wrong because it is prohibited by law, no notion of inherent moral wrong
- All felonies punished by RPC are generally MALA IN SE (morally wrong).
Note: not all acts punished under special laws are mala prohibita, some
are mala in se or prohibita. Category in which an act falls to depends on
the nature of the act i.e. if an act is inherently wrong
- The only question is: was the prohibited act done? (evil intent not required)
- It is still required to have acted freely and intelligently; but the nature of intent
does not matter. Mental element of the crime should still be present absence
malice in intent
PADILLA vs. DIZON
Facts: Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International
Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments out of the country in violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular
No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any
form out of the Philippines without an authorization by the Central
Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the
Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign
exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors
bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form
prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the
Philippines.

Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or
purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and
regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of black marketing of
foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of
12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than
P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai testified that he was a businessman from Hong Kong; that
he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in an unspecified business
in the country with his business associates; and that he and his business
associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were
handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was
urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the
Philippines.
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused,
Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He
directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under
Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against
Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue: WoN respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or
gross ignorance of the law and gross incompetence without good faith in holding
for the acquittal of the accused, Lo Chi Fai
Held and Ratio: Yes. In the first place, Judge Dizon failed to realize that the
law violated by the accused is malum prohibitum therefore intent is
immaterial to the determination of guilt in the case. The mere act alone,
whether done with or without dolo or culpa, will suffice to charge and
convict Lo Chi Fai.
Further, the denominations and the amount seized composed of currency and
personal checks not under his name - from the accused was inconsistent with the
declaration that the accused presented in Court. The majority of declarations
presented were not even his own. Respondent-Judge failed to acknowledge this
fact. Further still, Respondent-Judge not only acquitted the accused but also
directed in his decision to release to the accused at least US$3000 in spite of the
forfeiture proceedings instituted by the Bureau of Customs. In invoking the
provision of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the release to the accused, the
respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of
the law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority
for the trial court to release the said amount.
GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Election Officer Arsenia Garcia allegedly
decreased the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. from

6,921 votes (as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in 159 precincts) to
1,921 votes; contrary to law i.e. sec 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646.
The trial court sentenced Garcia with indeterminate sentence and is to suffer
disqualification to hold public office. She is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty of 6 months to one year.
ISSUE: WoN a violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No.6646 is under mala in
se or mala prohibita?
HELD and Ratio: Mala in Se. Section 27(b) of RA No. 6646 provides that Any
member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases or decreases the votes received by the candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit
the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in the said RA are mala in se. Criminal intent is
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act that the law
punishes.
Appellant Garcias admission that she was the one who announced the figure of
1,921 instead of 6998, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in
his capacity as the Secretary of the Board. Petitioner also admitted that she was
the one who prepared the Certificate of Canvass (COC), though it was not her
task. In the courts mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her duty
manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.
Appellant avers that she had no idea how the Statement of Votes (SOV) and the
COC reflected 1,921 rather than the 6,921 is unacceptable. As chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate,
correct, and authentic entry of votes she is, therefore, expected to have
exercised extraordinary diligence and care in the performance of her task. Her
failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves
not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of
criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.
iv. Distinguished from motive
Motive not part of mens rea, because not all people have it.
Motive: moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent is
the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.
An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real
motive but just for the sake of committing it. Or, the apparent lack of motive for
committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there is none, but that
simply it is not known to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of ones
conscience where it may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our
observation.

In other words, motive is the purpose of the intent to do wrong. Motive not an
element of liability BUT FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES ONLY.
- Established by testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense.
- Used only when there is doubt as to the identity of the offender
- Or if evidence is merely circumstantial, motive is essential