Bellis vs.

Bellis 20 scra 258

Facts:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he made
two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, the
recognized illegitimate children were not given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private
International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional rights.
Held:
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas law, there are no
legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the
properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.

Aznar vs. Garcia 7 s 95

Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and
consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in
this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel
of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned
back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be
increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of
the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law,
there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion.
Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.
Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in
effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.
1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside the California, and
2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner
and is governed by the law of the domicile.
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be
followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions
that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA

FACTS:
Plaintiff Morada is a flight attendant for defendant SAUDIAs airlines based in Jeddah. On
April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted rape by
fellow crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi nationals. The two were eventually arrested
and deported back to Saudi Arabia while Morada was transferred to Manila. On various dates after the
incident, Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her employer in order to sign documents, purporting to be
statements dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. However, it turned out that a case was in fact
filed against her before the Saudi court, which later found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
Hence, Morada filed this complaint for damages based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code against SAUDIA
and its country manager.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
Whether the proper law applicable is Philippine law or the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Whether or not the case involves a conficts problem
HELD: Is there a conflicts case?
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states
is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and
economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception.
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in
the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign
element may assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her
many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.

Cadalin vs. POEA

FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its
accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all
deployed at various projects in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in
Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even
before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the
prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.
ISSUE:
Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law
HELD: As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters,
such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed
by teh laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either
as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum to
apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it.
Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred
in the Philippine Islands.
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it
ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forums public policy. To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in
question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

Santos v. CA
Facts: In 1983, Antonio Santos was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City. After EDSA revolt, Santos
was reappointed to the same position. On 1 April 1992, Santos optionally retired from the Judiciary under
R.A. No. 910 as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the
government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. In 1993,
Santos re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of
the MMA. His appointment was approved by the CSC. On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924,
which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as the MMDA. On 16 May 1996, the President issued
Memorandum Order No. 372 approving the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924.Pursuant
thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996, which, inter alia, authorized the payment of
separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result
of the implementation of R.A. No. 7924. On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum to Santos
informing him that in view of his voluntary option to be separated from the service his services would
automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be
entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of
service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law. Santos submitted a Position Paper wherein he
asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended, is not an
additional or double compensation, all the years of his government service, including those years in the
Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. CSC-NCR
handed down an opinion that the payment of Santos separation pay must be in accordance with Civil
Service Resolution No. 92-063 which provides that while an employee who was paid separation/retirement
benefits is not required to refund the same once reemployed in the government service but for reasons of
equity, it would be proper and logical that said separation/retirement benefits should nevertheless be
deducted from the retirement/[separation] pay to be received by the employee concerned. MR denied. CSC
affirmed citing Chaves v. Mathay in which it was held that Santos cannot be paid retirement benefits twice
one under R.A. No. 910, as amended, and another under R.A. No. 7924 for the same services he

rendered as MeTC Judge.He can only exercise one of two options in the computation of his separation pay
under R.A. 7924.These options are (1) to refund the gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended,
after he retired from the MeTC and get the full separation pay for his entire years in the government, that
is 9 years and 2months with the MeTC plus two (2) years and eight (8) months for his services as Director
III in the defunct MMA, at the rate of one and one-fourth salary for every year of service pursuant to MMDA
Memorandum dated 30 August 1996; or (2) to retain the gratuity pay he received for his services as MeTC
Judge but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the separation benefits due from the former MMA
for his entire government service. MR denied. CA affirmed the CSC resolution.
Issue: Whether Santos can credit the years he has served as MeTC judge in the computation of his
separation pay
Held: No. First, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the
rate of one and one-fourth (1) months of salary for every year of service cannot by any stretch of logic
or imagination be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the
government, i .e., to include such service in the government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of
separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on
the length of service in the MMA. Second, Santos himself must have realized that Section 11 does not allow
the tacking in of his previous government service. If he were convinced that it does he could have instead
applied For retirement benefits, since by adding his years of service in the MMA to his previous years of
service in the Government he could have retired under the third paragraph of Section 11. Third, after the
approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity
under R.A. No. 910, as amended; and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.
Santos cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution
which provides that pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to
receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another
compensation is attached. to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his
separation pay under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving
the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation
for exactly the same services,i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this
Court against double compensation for exactly the same services.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997
FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage
contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they
slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Ginas version: that contrary to her
expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep.
There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In
an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife
they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her
husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see
hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is
healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to this time. The Gina claims that her
husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow
pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man Chings version: he claims that if
their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage
annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and

psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will
not be cured. Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage
entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I
could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.