1. 1.DASMARINAS VS MONTERREY GR. No.

175550

2. TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC), a registered cooperative established by
Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad residents for the purpose of operating a domestic drinking water service,
applied with the National Water Resources Board (the Board) for a Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) to maintain and operate a waterworks system within its barangay. But respondent La Trinidad
Water District (LTWD), a government-owned corporation that supplied water within La Trinidad for
domestic, industrial, and commercial purposes, opposed the application. LTWD claimed that its
franchise was exclusive in that its charter provides that no separate franchise can be granted within its
area of operation without its prior written consent. Still, the Board granted TMPCs application.
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic,
industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the
extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such
resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.
LTWD contested the grant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad which, after hearing,
rendered judgment setting aside the Boards decision and cancelling the CPC it issued to TMPC. The RTC
denied TMPCs motion for reconsideration, prompting the latter to come to this Court on petition for
review.
Issue : Whether or not Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid to be the foundation of the rulings
of RTC.
HELD: The court ruled on the negative. Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution and Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Plain words do not require explanation. The constitution is clear that franchises for the operation of a
public utility cannot be exclusive in character. There is no exception. In case of conflict between the
Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to
which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare
void all laws that do not conform to it. Since the Court, exercising its Constitutional power of judicial
review, has declared Section 47 of P.D. 198 void and unconstitutional, such section ceased to become
law from the beginning. Thus, the decision of the RTC was set aside and the decision of the NWRB was
reinstated.
3. Merida Water District et al. vs. Bacano et al.
G.R. No. 165993, September 30, 2008
FACTS: On Oct. 10, 2001, Merida Water District (MWD) conducted a public hearing for the purpose of
increasing the water rate. The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) confirmed MWDs proposed
water rate and attached to the approved letter was a Rate Schedule of Approved Rates containing
progressive increase of water rates over a certain period. On Sept. 3, 2002, MWD approved Resolution
No. 006-2 increasing to 90 water consumption for the first 10 cubic meters. Thereafter, petitioner
issued notices of disconnection to those we refused to pay the water rate increase and did not render
service to those who opted to pay the increased rate on an installment basis. On Feb. 3, 2003,
respondents filed with RTC a petition for Injunction against MWD alleging the latter violated LOI 700 by
implementing a rate increase greater than 60% of current rate and failing to conduct public hearing for
the imposed rate of 90. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for not EAR under PD 198 as amended. On
Feb. 26, 2003 one of the respondents questioned the legality of the water rate increase before the
National Water Resources Board (NWRB). RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, CA
affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
(1) Did RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter?
(2) Did respondents recourse to trial courts constitute a proper act despite failure to exhaust
administrative remedies?
HELD:
(1) Yes, D0ctrine of EAR applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative
agency alone; judicial intervention is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. Abeabe vs. Manta does not apply here as the issue involved water rights for irrigation. Petitioners
contention that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over a dispute concerning the increase of water rate is clearly without merit. Respondents failure to

exhaust administrative remedies does not affect jurisdiction of the RTC. Non-EAR renders an action
premature and not yet ripe for judicial determination.
(2) No, since cases were observance of the DEAR has been disregarded require a strong showing of the
inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm. Respondents cited (1) patent illegality
and (2) denial of due process as reasons for failing to EAR but the former was not shown and the latter
did not exist being that MWD as admitted by respondents did in fact conduct a hearing.
4. 4. Metro Iloilo Water vs CA mar 31, 2005
DOCTRINE: The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and
jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents actions violate petitioners rights as a
water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provideoccasion to invoke the
special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention
FACTS: Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198. It was
granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration Conditional Certificate of Conformance No. 71. Its
service areas encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City etc.
Sometime between April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual yet identical petitions for
injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and / or temporary restraining order against herein
private respondents the pertinent portions of which read:
4. That pursuant to the provisions of section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, as amended, the petitioner as a Water
District was authorized toadopt laws and regulations governing the drilling, maintenance and operation
of wells within its boundaries for purposes other than single family domestic use on overlying land, with
then provision that any well operated in violation of such regulations shall be deemed an interference
with the waters of the district;
Private respondents invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, contending that the cases were
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council)
under Presidential Decree No. 1067, otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines (Water
Code). In addition, private respondents Emma Nava and Rebecca Berlin denied having extracted or
withdrawn water from the ground, much less sold the same
Additionally, he alleged the petitioners rules and regulations were not published in the Official Gazette
and hence petitioner had no causeof action. Meanwhile, private respondent Gerry Luzuriaga claimed
that he was not the real party in interest, but Shoemart, Inc. which hasthe control and possession of the
property where the alleged withdrawal of ground water was taking place.
The trial court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the controversy was within the original jurisdiction of
the Water Council, involving, as itdid, the appropriation, exploitation, and utilization of water, and
factual issues which were within the Water Councils competence. Inaddition, the trial court held that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction. MR denied shortly thereafter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may entertain the positions
HELD: Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 31 (now 32) of PD 198, as amended, which reads: Sec. 32.
Protection of waters and Facilities of District. A district shall have the right to:
(a) Commence, maintain, intervene in, defend and compromise actions or proceedings to prevent
interference with or deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of any surface, stream or ground
water supply which may be used or useful for any purpose of the district or be a common benefit to the
lands or its inhabitants. The ground water within a district is necessary to the performance of the
districts powers and such districts hereby authorized to adopt rules and regulations subject to the
approval of the National Water Resources Council governing the drilling, maintenance and operation of
wells within its boundaries for purposes other than a singled family domestic use on overlying land. Any
well operated on violation of such regulations shall be deemed in interference with the waters of the
district.
(c) Prohibit any person, firm or corporation from vending, selling, or otherwise disposing of water for
public purposes within the service area of the district where district facilities are available to provide
such service, or fix terms and conditions by permit for such sale or disposition of water.
By virtue of the above provisions, petitioner states that as a water district, it has the right to prevent
interference with the water of the district; and to enforce such right, it is given remedies of
commencing, maintaining, or intervening in, defending or entering into appropriate actions or
proceedings. In asserting the jurisdiction of the regular courts over its petitions and the propriety of its
filing of the petitions before the trial court, petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court in Amistoso v. Ong,

as reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals, that where the issue involved is not the settlement of a
water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted,
the regular court has jurisdiction and not the Water Council.
A judicial question is raised when the determination of the questions involves the exercise of a judicial
function, i.e., the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. As opposed to a moot question or one properly
decided by the executive or legislative branch, a judicial question is properly addressed to the courts.
The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence
in order to determine whether private respondents actions violate petitioners rights as a water district
and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge
and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it may appear
that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, i.e., the
appropriation of water which the Water Code defines as the acquisition of rights over the use of waters
or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by
law, in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions.
The petitions having raised a judicial question, it follows that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, on the basis of which the petitions were dismissed by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, does not even come to play. The petition is remanded to the trial court.
5. METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. MARGARITA ADALA (July 4, 2007)
G.R. No. 168914
FACTS: Respondent filed on October 24, 2002 an application with the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB) for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain
waterworks system in sitios San Vicente, Fatima, and Sambag in Barangay Bulacao, Cebu City.
At the initial hearing of December 16, 2002 during which respondent submitted proof of compliance
with jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, herein petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water
District, a government-owned and controlled corporation created pursuant to P.D. 198 which took effect
upon its issuance by then President Marcos on May 25, 1973, as amended, appeared through its lawyers
to oppose the application.
In its Opposition, petitioner prayed for the denial of respondents application on the following grounds:
(1) petitioners Board of Directors had not consented to the issuance of the franchise applied for, such
consent being a mandatory condition pursuant to P.D. 198, (2) the proposed waterworks would interfere
with petitioners water supply which it has the right to protect, and (3) the water needs of the residents
in the subject area was already being well served by petitioner.
NWRB granted Adalas application after hearing and an ocular inspection of the area and denied
MCWDs MFR.
RTC denied the appeal and upheld NWRB Decision. RTC denied MFR.
ISSUE/HELD: WON Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public utilities is
constitutional and may be relied upon by MCWD in its opposition of Adalas application for a CPC NO
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise . No Franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for
domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and
except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly
adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.
There being no such consent on the part of its board of directors, petitioner concludes that respondents
application for CPC should be denied.
Possession of franchise by a water district does not bar the issuance of a CPC for an area covered by the
water district.
A CPC is formal written authority issued by quasi-judicial bodies for the operation and maintenance of a
public utility for which a franchise is not required by law and a CPC issued by this Board is an authority
to operate and maintain a waterworks system or water supply service. On the other hand, a franchise is
privilege or authority to operate appropriate private property for public use vested by Congress through
legislation. Clearly, therefore, a CPC is different from a franchise and Section 47 of Presidential Decree
198 refers only to franchise.
Sec. 47 of P.D. 198 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL- The provision must be deemed void ab initio for being
irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973Constitution which was ratified on Jan. 17, 1973 the
constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973.
SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. x x x This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of
the 1987 Constitution, including the prohibition against exclusive franchises.

Water districts fall under the term public utility

A "public utility" is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some
commodity or service of public consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or
telegraph service. x x x (National Power Corp. v. CA)