Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Madianda
Relevant Facts:
Complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Madianda for allegedly violating article 209
of the RPC and Rule 15.02 and 21.02 of the CPR. Respondent was the Chief Legal
Officer while the complainant is the chief nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing
services. Complainant alleged, that she approached the Atty. Madianda for some legal
advice, that in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept
confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage
contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the
respondent that she would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. Complainant states that it
was malicious of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had
already heard her secrets. Complainant averred that her friendship with respondent
soured after her filing a criminal and disciplinary action against the latter, because
respondent demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainants promotion.
According to the complainant, the respondent, by way of retaliation filed a counter
complaint in the ombudsman charging the complainant with falsification of public
documents and immorality, charges based on the disclosures complainant made to the
respondent, using the same basis, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her
before the PRC.
Respondents answer:
Denied giving advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship. Stated the observation that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP. Respondent denied delivery of any legal document and
disclosure of confidential information or secrets. Respondent avers that whenever there
are personal matters referred to her, she just referred them to private law practitioners
and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any
document. Further the respondent states that the truth of the matter is that the
complainants illicit relationship and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the
BFP since she also filed child support case against her lover, that the filing of the instant
case was done to force Atty. Madianda to settle and withdraw the cases filed against
her.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
Stated that the information related by complainant to the respondent is protected under
the A-C privilege communication. Prescinding from this postulate, the investigating
commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she revealed
information given to her during a legal consultation, and accordingly recommended that
the respondent be reprimanded.
Issue:
WON the respondent violated the rule on attorney-client privilege communication.
SC Held:
YES. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship
imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the
profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or
revealed during legal consultations. The fact that no formal professional engagement
follows the consultation is of little moment. Nor will it make any difference that no
contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship.
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. It is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client
privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor; and
According to him, complainant is a businessman engaged in trading and buy and sell of
deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases
pending in court. That before paying the next instalment on his car, he asked
complainant to transfer the ownership to him by executing a deed of sale but
complainant said he will only do so after the termination of his criminal case where he
wants respondent to bribe money to the members of the review committee of DOJ, to
the prosecutor, and the judge for his acquittal. Moreover he argued that it was
complainant who offered him an office space in his building. He averred that he is not
guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made
the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
He also asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage without consideration and
only as a formal requirement so he could obtain the loan. He issued the postdated
check only to serve some kind of acknowledgment that he received a portion of his
attorneys fees and as a form of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was
handling for complainant. He denied receiving a commission from
Romeros loan. That such amount was paid to him as attorneys fees for services he
rendered for Romeo and that he used this to pay his arrears on his car. But because
complainant refused to transfer ownership of the car, he stopped paying.
Issue: WON respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe
government officials in connection with a pending case.
SC Ruling:
Canon 17 of the CPR provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. It has been established that
an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional
character unless the client consents. However, the privilege against disclosure of
confidential communications is limited only to communications which are legitimately
and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. If the unlawful
purpose is avowed, the complainants intention to bribe is not covered by the privilege.
Be that as it may, respondents explanation that it was necessary for him to make
disclosures is untenable. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as
they were not pertinent to the foreclosure of the mortgage case. He is therefore
suspended for six months.
* Complainant asked respondent to prepare and submit his appellant's brief on time at
the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion
* Respondent was able to finish the appellant's brief ahead of its deadline, so he
advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining
balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the
P3,500.00 "tomorrow" or on "later particular date." Please take note that, at this
juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on complainant's part.
* A promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the
brief.
* Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed
complainant's brief on time
* P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now
* respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and case folder to the complainant,
hoping that the latter would see personally the former about it to settle the matter
between them
* However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case;
* Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because
of this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the
appellant's brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was
accordingly granted by the appellate court
* Complainant's refusal to pay the agreed lawyer's fees, was deliberate and in bad faith;
hence, his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical and proper."
* IBP DENIED Dealcas Motion for Reconsideration.
* Dealca filed pleading to Supreme Court, praying for the case to be dismissed for being
baseless, then the case is referred back to IBP
* IBP Investigationg commissioner: Original recommendation of REPRIMAND must be
maintained.
* IBP Board of Governors: Motion for Reconsideration Granted- penalty of
REPRIMAND.
* Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC against his former employer,
Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines
* Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding.
* Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the
progress of the case.
* Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC.
* He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998,
for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.
RESPONDENTS COMMENT:
* The comment filed by Atty. Ortiz was only self-hagiography.
* Since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and
low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself.
* claims that for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public
Attorney's Office with its steady stream of non-paying clients in the "hundreds or
thousands."
* He was confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way
of compromise.
* He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit
the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case, but
admits that the deadline had already lapsed.
* He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his
election as Councilor of Bacolod City, "he was frankly preoccupied with both his
functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer." Eventually, "his
desire to help was beyond physical limitations," and he withdrew from his other cases
and his "free legal services."
IBP Commissioners Findings: REPRIMANDED
IBP CBD: REPRIMANDED and WARNED.
LAW INVOLVED:
FACTS
A criminal case ensued in a shooting incident involving police officers (accused) where
they were tried and were found guilty for two counts of homicide and one attempted
homicide by the Sandiganbayan. Complainants engaged services of the respondents
for the accused.
Unfazed by the denial of his first filing of Motion for Reconsideration, respondent filed an
Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached
Second Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan,
respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam)
on 3 May 2002.
Complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls
they made to his office. Complainants went to respondents last known address only to
find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, in their own efforts of verifying their case,
they were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3
July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been issued against
the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing
to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
Thus complainants filed this complaint.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
RESONDENT- He was not the original counsel of the accused. He was merely
requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at
the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He claims that there was no formal
engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in
true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration and his
personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who
promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put
into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that
all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.
He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel;
the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional
obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his
plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then
decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3
Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between
respondent and complainants
He has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the
Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately,
PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a
new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent.
ISSUE
Whether respondents withdrawal during the pendency of the case in conformity to the
rules and procedure and did it cause negligent act prejudicial to the case?
RULING
- the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross negligence of
respondent.
-Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.
- even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his
obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should
neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.
- Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a
lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed
the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should
have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already
given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of
Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent
in handling the case of the accused.
- He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the
written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138,
Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15
- The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an
attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right
to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written
consent or from a good cause.
HOW SC RESOLVED
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months
PRINCIPLE/LAW INVOLVED
Rule 22.02 of Canon 22
RESONDENT- the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that the
complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct and therefore,
must have been dismissed outright; The misconduct complained of took place in 1997
and complainants filed the case only on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, "A
complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2)
years from the date of the professional misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII).
COMPLAINANT- Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable
settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the respondents
reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which prompted them to
seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to trace the
respondents whereabouts; that the respondent was duly
accorded the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00
plus corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.
ISSUE
Whether the case filed should be dismissed because it has already prescribed being
that the complainant filed more than 2 years from the alleged misconduct?
RULING
- The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.
-There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through
Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchased.
- It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription is untenable.
The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The
lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of
the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.
Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for
- It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondents acquittal
does not necessarily exculpate him administratively." Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court
- As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of
Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondents
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
HOW SC RESOLVED
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt
of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN
WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
PRINCIPLE/LAW INVOLVED
Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of lawyers
since the building which houses the Argao Hall of Justice has been declared a cultural
heritage and is the centerpiece of the said municipality, then the activity planned by
Sara Lee was appropriate in promoting the town of Argao.
The respondents deny that a party was held, saying that only a raffle draw was
conducted and that only softdrinks and finger foods were served to the participants.
Finally, the three respondents maintain that they had performed their duties to the best
of their abilities, acted with absolute good faith devoid of malice, and had no intention to
prejudice the interests of the Court.
IBP RULING
Dismissed for lack of substantial evidence
OCA ruling
Reversed IBP ruling
SC ruling
Adopted OCA ruling, SUSPENDED FOR 1 MONTH
It is undisputed that on July 14, 2007, Sara Lee held a raffle draw at the ground floor
lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice. Ms. Virginia C. Tecson, Sara Lees Business
Manager, wrote a letter addressed to the Executive Judge of the RTC, Branch 26,
Argao, Cebu, requesting permission for the holding of a raffle draw at the Argao Hall of
Justice. Indeed, the holding of a raffle draw at the Argao Hall of Justice by the staff of
Sara Lee degraded the honor and dignity of the court and exposed the premises, as
well as the judicial records to danger of loss or damage
Legal Provision Involved
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 This reminder in Administrative Circular No. 3-92 was
reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 1-99[17] where we described courts as temples
of justice and as such, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times, be preserved and
enhanced. The Court thus exhorted its officials and employees to strive to inspire public
respect for the justice system by, among others, not using their offices as a residence
or for any other purpose than for court or judicial functions
A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC, Section 3, Part I
SEC. 3. USE OF HOJ.
SEC. 3.1 The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public
Attorneys, Probation and Parole Officers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of
Deeds, including their support personnel
SEC. 3.2 The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be
used for residential, i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or commercial purposes.
Admitted the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the defense of pardon.
IBP ruling
1 year suspension
SC ruling
Adopted IBP ruling, 6 month Suspension
It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is
not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain
one's good standing in the legal profession.
Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Undeniably,
therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court.13 Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his
office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office,
grossly immoral conduct, among others.
It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant
to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of
the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his
conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
Legal Provisions involved
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7,Rule 7.03
88. IN RE: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera
B.M. No. 793
July 30, 2004
Facts:
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the
suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He
was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his
client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has
also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in
this realm, provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or
a violation of the lawyer's oath.
The case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation report and recommendation. In its decision, the Superior Court of Guam
stated that Maquera was the counsel of a certain Castro. Benavente the creditor Castro,
obtained a judgement against Castro, thus Castro;s property was to be sold at a public
auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. However, Castro retains the right
of redemption.
In consideration of Maqueras legal services, Castro entered into an oral agreement with
Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988,
Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property
transferred in his name.And after, sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for
Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying
that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee
claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services. The
Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the
requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a
business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer's acquisition of such
interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood
by the client and reduced in writing.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that
although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to
establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines."However, the
IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a
member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139A of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be
suspended as member of the Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in
Guam.
Ruling:
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in
a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court
or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted
as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension
In the case at bar such transaction made by Maquera falls squarely under Article 1492
in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5
of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property
which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the
prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. This is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client30 and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients.
They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17
which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful
the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but
is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal
profession.
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf
regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that
he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in
Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges
against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred
on those grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from
the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the
present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of
membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP,
and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
(docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his
participation in the forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction
as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio
Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V2170 against her parents
On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw
and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia
Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public
by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago
Bernal had died already about eight years before in the year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation
with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before
him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact
the said deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and
so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said
sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the
grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the
last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of
confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the
property. Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same
property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to
prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw
allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather
(deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval. Felicidad BernalDuzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia
Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. The fiscal
exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against
Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Antiniw for
illegal acts and bad advice. Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court
dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975
and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975,
Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Upon formal request of
Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were
ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten
directive of March 9, 1976. On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these
cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the
investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial
Court, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged
threats against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the
transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila. After investigation, Judge
Catalino Castaeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos
and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the
additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge
Jovellanos; however, he recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice
of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa
Definitiva."
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art.
1491 of the New Civil Code.
2. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying
notarial documents.
3. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
HELD: Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code: The following persons cannot acquire
by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the
better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition
would constitute malpractice and is a ground for suspension.
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation
is pending.
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot
after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said
to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judgeLogic
indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss
the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the
litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a
certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty.
Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons
of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension. The sale in
favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client
relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not
take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art.
1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in
consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would
show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is
settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative
testimony When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that
he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all time is expected of him.
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even
if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His
declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be
difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence. There is a clear preponderant
evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent
the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person
who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to
other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of
petitioner in the Philippine Bar. Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of
his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said
humbling experience to make him a better person. Meanwhile, as part of his Petition,
petitioner submitted testimonials and endorsements of various individuals and entities
all attesting to his good moral character.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven
(7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has
already served his disbarment.
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment
imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer
4 and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar.
Petitioner's subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if
he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer
would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record.
Nonetheless, we wish to impart
to him the following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore
the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of
the body politic."
GRANTED
Case 93. Judge Lily Lydia Laquindanum vs. Atty. Nestor Quintana
Notarial Practice
An administrative case grounded on the practice of notarial activities beyond the
designated jurisdictional limit as well as allowing non-lawyers to perform tasks
specifically designated for lawyers.
Facts:
1. According to Laquindanum:
- A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive judges are required to monitor the activities and make
sure that notaries public shall not extend beyond their jurisdictional limit.
- Judge wrote Quintana and directed him to stop notarizing documents in the places
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato.
- However, Quintana continued as evidenced by an affidavit of loss of an ATM card and
drivers license.
- Sec. 11, Rule III of 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Quintana could not extend notarial
acts beyond Cotabato City and Province of Maguindanao. And Midsayap is part of the
Province of Cotabato.
- Also, it was later found out that his wife performed notarial acts.
2. According to Quintana:
- He applied a petition for notarial commission before the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato
but was not acted up by Laquindanum for 3 weeks. The reason for inaction is his
question affiliation with the IBP Cotabato City Chapter and required him of certification
of payments.
- He withdrew his petition and obtained a commission for notary public in the RTC,
Branch 14 of Cotabato City.
- Also, he alleged that the judge singled him out as he is tasked with so many
requirements while the others were not and humiliated him to his clients and colleagues.
- He argued that Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato and subscribed
documents in his office in Midsayap.
- Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive as it is only Judge Concha, the
person who issued notarial commission, and SC can do such.
- He also contended that as a lawyer in good standing, he can practice anywhere in the
Philippines.
3. During investigation
- Judge presented a Deed of Donation dated in 2004 and notarized by Quintana.
However, the said signatory in the document was already dead since 2003.
- He testified that Quintana continued to notarize documents in 2006-2007 even if his
commission expired in 2005 and not renewed the same. These are supported by:
a. affidavit of loss of title
b. certificate of candidacy
c. affidavit of loss of drivers license
d. affidavit of loss
- These were admitted by Quintana except the affidavit of loss of ATM card, affidavit of
loss of drivers license and the affidavit of loss as they were signed by his wife. These
were the result of the entrapment operation done by the judge to impute a violation to
him. He also slapped his wife because of it.
- Quintana alleged that this was also caused by his refusal to transfer membership in
the Kidapawan Chapter wherein her sister is the president.
- The judge denied and stated that it was caused by Quintanas refusal to pay IBP dues.
- Quintana alleged that it was only an oversight and prayed that he be given the chance
to send. He also asked for forgiveness and not to repeat the accusations as notarial
acts as it support his family. He then submitted the evidences that he paid his IBP dues.
- The judge submitted an official receipt that proves her contention that it was only in
2006
that Quintana paid his dues and that during the petition for notarial commission, he has
not paid his dues yet.
OBC:
* Quintana be disqualified in the notary public for 2 years and suspension for 6 months
* He is not authorized to do notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of
Maguindanao, where Midsayap is beyond the stated limits. (Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice)
* Also, evidenced by the affidavits, his wife performed notarial acts even if she is
unauthorized to do so. And respondent, as an official notarial office, is held responsible
for the acts and liabilities that his office will incur.
* Furthermore, it was also a violation of the rules on notarial practice to perform notarial
acts even if the signatory is not personally present at the time of notarization. (Rule 9 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice)
* Also, it is sontended that the lawyer of good standings right to practice law anywhere
in the Philippines and relating it to notarial practice, is strictly regulated by the rules on
notarial practice. Therefore, law on territorial jurisdiction applies. (Rule 9 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice)
Issue:
1. WON Atty. Quinatana notarized documents outside his jurisdictional limit
2. WON he performed notarial acts with an expired commission
3. WON he let his wife notarize documents in his absence
4. WON he notarized a document
Ruling:
* In all 4 issues, Atty. Quintana was guilty. These were all violations of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice and Code of Professional Responsibility.
* This also partakes malpractice of law, falsification as well as deliberate falsehood.
* Signing by his wife in times of his absence, makes him guilty of Canon 9 or assisting
the unauthorized practice of law.
* He also fell short of Canon 7 which directs him t uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.
* Disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for 2 years and suspended for
the practice of law for 6 months.
law for one year. Her notarial commission was revoked.and suspended her as a notary
public for two years.