ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. vs. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H.

MIJARES III,
A.C. No. 8380
FACTS: This disbarment case about the need for a lawyer to account for
funds entrusted to him by his client. Complainant Arellano University, Inc.
engaged the services of respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member
of the bar, to secure a certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the
estero de san Miguel that the University had been occupying. In its
complaint for disbarment, complainant alleged that it gave respondent all
the documents the latter needed to accomplish his work and was given P
500,000.00 on top of his attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses
for facilitation and processing. Respondent informed the University that he
already completed the titling of the property, meaning that he succeeded
in getting the approval of the Metro Manila Development Authority. The
University requested respondent for copies of the approval but he
unjustifiably failed to comply despite repeated demands. When he made
himself scarce, the University was prompted to withdraw all the cases it
had entrusted to him and demand the return of the money it gave to him.
The University eventually terminated respondents services. The
Commissioners recommended that respondent be disbarred, however the
Board of Governors modified it to indefinite suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of misappropriating the money that his
client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing
the titling of a property that it claimed.
RULING:
The Court is not inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite
suspension which is another way of saying he can resume his practice after
a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape up. Every
lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests
of his client such that he must promptly account for whatever money or
property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said
money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and
make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he
must return the money or property immediately to his client upon demand.

In Re: Procedure adopted by Judge Daniel Liangco

(A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC. August 1, 2000)
Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San Fernando, Pampanga received
information about irregularities in the disposition of jueteng cases before
the MTC's of the said region. Upon investigation, Judge Sunga discovered
that of the 55 jueteng cases filed in July 1999, 53 were assigned to Branch
1 of the MTC of San Fernando presided by Judge Daniel Liangco. Noting
that statistical improbability that 53 out of 55 jueteng cases should be
assigned to only 1 Branch, Judge Sunga demanded a written explanation
as to how such a situation had come about. In his letter, Judge Liangco
explained that it has been his practice to automatically take over all jueteng
cases without the need for raffling. The reason he cited is that the accused
in such cases are deprived of their liberty and that by automatically
assigning these cases to his branch, the accused can file motions for bail
and the same can be entertained immediately without waiting for the raffle.
In short, because of the need for provisional liberty, all jueteng cases are
considered to be automatically raffled to his branch so that he may
entertain motions for bail and the accused can be immediately released
upon filing of the bond. The Supreme Court ordered further investigation of
the case and placed Judge Liangco on preventive suspension.
Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7
which provides: "All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings
where there are two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to
the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch
without being raffled." There is no connection at all between respondents
alleged desire to facilitate the release of such accused on bail and his
questionable act of retaining the records of the cases for direct assignment
to his own sala. For after granting bail to the accused, his alleged purpose
of immediately extending provisional liberty to the accused shall already
have been served. There is thus no need or justification to retain the
records of the cases and consider them raffled off to his own sala. The
questioned acts of respondent Judge Liangco constitute a clear breach of
his duty as a judge. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that: A
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent judges manner of
automatically assigning jueteng cases to its own branch without the benefit
of raffle, casts doubt on his integrity as a judge and erodes the confidence
of the people in the judicial system. A judges official conduct and his

behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the

appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. Judge Liangco
was suspended from service for 6 months without pay and issued the
warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 V Pactolin

In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs
Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for
violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private
Individual). It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented
said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his
fellow councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of
public funds. In said decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate administrative actions
against Pactolin.
ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin
considering his conviction?
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime
of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good
morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great
caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed

only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is
appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolins situation is aggravated
by the fact that although his conviction has been affirmed, he has not
served his sentence yet.

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA

A.C. Mo. 7204; March 7, 2007
FACTS:
Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarmnent case against Atty. Ernesto M.
Macabata on the ground of gross immorality. She alleged that sometime in
December 2004 she sought the legal advice of the Atty. Macabata,
regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. On February
10, 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to
discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and
Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the
dinner, Atty. Macabanta sent Cynthia home and while she is about to step
out of the car, held her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her
very tightly.
On March 6, 2005, Cynthia met Atty. Macabanta at Starbucks coffee shop
in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed
in Court. After the meeting, Atty. Macabanta offered again a ride, which he
usually did every time they met. Along the way, Cynthia was wandering why
she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago.
Along Roosevelt Avenue , Quezon City, when she was almost restless Atty.
Macabanta stopped his car and forcefully held her face and kissed her lips
while the other hand was holding her breast. Cynthia succeeded in

resisting his criminal attempt and immediately managed to get out of the
car. In the late afternoon, Cynthia sent a text message to Atty. Macabanta
informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and
needs to get back the case folder from him.
ISSUE:
WON the exchange of text messages between Atty. Macabanta and
Cynthia are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
However, it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard
as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior
to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity
and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community,
and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso
on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of
greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning
the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the
lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion
because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being
kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message,
respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via
cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between
complainant and respondent bears this out.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not
grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or
suspension.

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136 , August 1, 2007

Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)
against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for
"grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his
(complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty.
Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to
Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he had three children. After his marriage to
Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually
went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day,
and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house
in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so, complainant
has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the
conjugal house.Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's

bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face,
which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7,
2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave
birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live
Birth
as
the
girl's
father.
In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their
relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families. He also said that his special relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment.
Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.
Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether
the affair was carried out discreetly. While it has been held in disbarment
cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults
is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it
is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent
in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice
law. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven

otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on

an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

Tiong vs Florendo

FACTS:
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses Elpidio
and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two
years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair.
Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone conversation where he
heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo
confronted the two and both eventually admitted to their illicit relationship.
Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which
was later notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship; that
they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave
Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case
against Florendo.
Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already
pardoned.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.

HELD: No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui

generis case. This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the
courts of undesirable members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by
the offended party of the act complained of does not operate to offset the
ground for disbarment or suspension. Florendos act of having an affair with
his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. He violated the
trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional
Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a
disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may
be disbarred or suspended from his office for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among
others. It cannot be also said, as he claims, that their relationship is merely
a moment of indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than
two years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.

Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan vs Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa

(A.C. No. 7360)
FACTS: Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon
and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same
case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in CriminalCase No. 10256-00 (Esperon
Case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder and later
on November 23, 2005, Atty.Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for
the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of
the Esperon Case. Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor
Toribio for 30,000.00php and failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her affidavit
on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it
notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon
Chapter. On May 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.Silvosa in
Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-up entrapment
operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded 15,000.00php from Lanticse for

the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas who was in
detention for more than two years.
ISSUE:1. Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the
Codeof Professional Responsibility.
2. Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrativecomplaint
exonerate a respondent.
3. Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for
disbarment.
HELD:1. Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Silvosa's
attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is
that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said
case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's finding that
Atty.Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearance in the
motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule
15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest
except by written consent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty.Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at least the
penalty of suspension.
2. No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does not exonerate a
respondent. There is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance, the conflicting
allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of
another. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him. He must show proof that
he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect. The Court says, mere
delay in filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the
bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses
do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of
the commission of the act complaint of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring member of the bench and bar can not escape the

disciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed attempt at bribing

Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty of suspension.
3. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. There is no doubt that
the Sandiganbayans' judgment in Criminal CaseNo. 27776 is a matter of
public record and is already final. Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member
of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude, as ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of Law is a
priveledge, and Atty.Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise his
privilege. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby
disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. So
ordered

OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ
FACTS
Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty.
Valdez. They entered into a retainer agreement, providing that for 900K,
Valdez would represent Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed by him
(Estafa and a mandamus case) and 2 cases filed against him (Other Light
threats and violation of the Anti-Violation against women and their children
act).
Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphic bank transfer.
4 months after, Overgaard demanded for a report on the status of his
cases. In spite of many phone calls and emails, Valdez couldnt be
reached. Hence, Overgaard inquired on his own, and discovered that
Valdez didnt file his entry of appearance in any of the cases, that a
counter-affidavit was required from him, and that the criminal cases against
him have already been arraigned and warrants were issued for his arrest.
He was constrained to find a new lawyer.

Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez to demand the
return of documents entrusted to the latter, as well as the $16K payment.
No word was heard from Valdez. Overgaard filed a case with the IBP for
Valdezs dismissal for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and
deceitful conduct.
The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he did not comply. He
also failed to attend the hearing and was declared in default. Later, a
clarificatory hearing was set, but Valdez never showed. IBP found him
guilty of violating canons 1, 15, 16, 17, and 18 and his penalty was a 3-year
suspension and he was ordered to return Overgaards money.
HELD
SC agrees with the findings of IBP, but declared that Valdez be
disbarred for falling below the standards required of lawyers.
Canon 18 provides that a lawyer must serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 requires a lawyer to not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence will make him liable.
Valdez should indeed be liable because he was not just incompetent, he
was useless; not just negligent, he was indolent; and rather than helping
his client, he prejudiced him. He abandoned his client and left him without
any recourse. It was a clear evasion of duty. Also, his failure to act on the
disbarment case against him, without any explanation, is a clear evidence
of negligence on his part.
Rule 18.04 requires that a lawyer keep his client informed of the
status of his case and to respond within reasonable time to the clients
request for information. Despite Overgaards efforts, Valdez avoided his
client and never bothered to reply. Clearly, the rule was violated.

De Leon v. Castelo (2011)

[Falsification case]
Doctrine:
Lack of intent to misrepresent shows that the defendant is innocent from
falsehood or falsification.
Facts: This case stems from another suit where the government sought the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land of the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu encroaching on a public
Callejon and on a portion of theMalabon-Navotas River shoreline. De Leon,
as voluntary intervenor, accuses Castelo with the serious administrative
offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or
suspension as an attorney. De Leon claims that Castelo made it appear
that spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu have participated in the making and
filing of the Answers when they were already dead as of that time. Castelo
claims that he prepared the initial pleadings based on his honest belief that

Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then still living. Had he known that
they were already deceased, he would have most welcomed the
information and would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim
as defendants for that reasonIssues:1.
W/N Castelo committed falsehood or falsification in his pleadings.
Held/Ratio:1.
NO. To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value; they
are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THELAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice. In the case at hand, Castelo expressly named therein as
defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but also their sons Leonardo Lim,
and William Lim, the same persons whom
the respondent had already alleged in the Answer to be the transferees and
current owners of the parcels of land. More so,
the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu were still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the
answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim
and in the clarification and submission that the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were already deceased. Even assuming that any of the
respondents pleadings might have created any impression that the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, the respondent is still
not guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent was
acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed
the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. Secondly,
having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the
transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the

actual owners needed to be substituted for said spouses, whether the

Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or dead as of the filing of
the pleadings became immaterial. Lastly, De Leon could not disclaim
knowledge that the Spouses were no longer living. His joining in the action
as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other
persons interested in the litigation.

University of thePhilippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C.

Laforteza and 35 other faculty members of the UP College of Law, as well as
admonishing Dean Marvic Leonen for vio, Restoring Integrity, a scathing
manifesto calling for SC Associate Justice
Mariano del Castillos resignation for the latters alleged
pl a g ia r i s m o n h i s d e c i s i o n on t h e c a se o f Vin u y a , e t a l .
v. Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 162230)
promulgated last April 28, 2010.Consequently, Motion for Reconsideration was filed
by Catindig and Laforteza and a manifestation filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen and Prof. Theodore O. Te, relying on the ground that the
proceeding, while docketed as an administrative
matter, is premised on a finding of indirect contempt and that they were not
accorded due process under indirect contempt proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SC erred in finding that the respondents are in breach of
their ethical obligationsfor having issued the restoring integrity statement
HELD: Contumacious speech and/or behaviour directed against the Court o
n the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or
an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.
The petition was denied for No substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of
the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed
for in their motion. The
Manifestation,a p a r t f r o m b e i n g a n e xp r e s s i o n o f s up p o r t f or P r o
f e s s o r s C a t i n d i g a n d L a f or t e z a s m o t i o n f or reconsideration, did
not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the

Court resolves to merely note the same. Contumacious speech or conduct

directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member
of the Bar, subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers
observe and promote due respect for the courts. In such disciplinary
cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disb
arment, suspension,reprimand or admonition. Contumacious speech and/or
behaviour directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable
either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court. When
the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behaviour
directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same the degradation
of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. Verily, when the
Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent
lawyer, the mere citation
ordiscussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case
of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform
the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Had this
Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable
by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP
LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGEOF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN
THESUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC, 8 MARCH 2011,
EN BANC
(Leonardo-De Castro,
J
.)SC Justice Mariano Del Castillo rendered a decision in
Vinuya, et al
.
v. Executive Secretary
(G.R.No. 162230). Counsels Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and
Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty.Bagares) for Vinuya,
et al
. (the
Malaya Lolas

), filed a supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, on theground that, inter

alia, charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the
Vinuya
Decision and a twisting of the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the
ponencia
was made to suit the argumentsof the assailed Judgment for denying the
Petition. Works allegedly plagiarized in the
Vinuya
decision werenamely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens; (2) Christian
; and (3) Mark Ellis article Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime. Such supplemental motion for reconsideration
appeared on internet sites. Thereafter, a statement entitled Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court was submitted by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leone to the
Court through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. The statement basically
conveys that the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court. (See
attachment for complete text of the statement). The SC Ethics Committee
referred this matter to the Court en banc. The high court said the UP law
professors statement was evidently intended to discredit its April 28
decision on the Vinuya et al. v the Executive Secretary et al. case. It claimed
that the law faculty wanted to undermine the courts honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for reconsideration of 70 comfort women.
Accordingly, the Court directed the 37 UP law faculty-signatories to show
cause, within ten (10)days from receipt why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents should be disciplined as Members of
the Bar under the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, profess
ors or privatep r a c t i t i o n e r s , a r e o f f i c e r s o f t h e C o u r t a n d
h a v e v o l u n t a r i l y t a k e n a n o a t h , a s a n indispensable qual

ification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with

goodfidelity towards the courts.
The administrative matter is decided by reminding the Thirty-five UP
professors of their duty as officers of the court while Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
was admonished to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an
officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor
and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. While a lawyer
is entitled to present
his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use
of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. CANON
10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 A
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority,
or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Rule 10.03
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice. CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others . RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances
against a Judge to the proper authorities only. CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon
the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tendsto influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the
court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured

only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing

justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. The
Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents academic freedom.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents proposition in the
Common Compliance thattheir issuance of the Statement was in keeping with
their duty to participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in
keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal
processes andthe courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the
courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to
abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors
are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their
students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and
not just their preferred portions thereof. The Court finds that there was indeed
a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly
when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the merits of the Vinuya
decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were still both sub
judice
or pending final disposition of the Court.
WILSON CHAM v. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA
A.C. No. 7494, 27 June 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario,
J
.) A disbarment complaint was filed by Wilson Cham against respondent
Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, whohe alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased
apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same
withoutp a yi n g t h e r e n t a l s du e . R e s p o n de n t e n t er e d i n t o a C o n t
r a c t o f L e a s e wi t h G r e e n v i l l e R e a l t y a n d Development Corp.
(GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and General Manager,
involving aresidential apartment unit owned by GRDC located at No.
61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for aconsideration of P8,000.00 per
month for a term of one year.Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent
informed the complainant that she would nolonger renew the same but requested an
extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000 witha commitment
that she would be paying the monthly rental during the extension period.
Complainantapproved such request but increased the rental rate to

P8,650.00 per month. Respondent stayed in saidpremises for several

months without paying any rent and even failing to pay her electric bills. A
reportreached complainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated
the apartment unit, bringing along with
P a g e | 16
Legal Ethics Case DigestJudge Philip Aguinaldo3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed complainant's repeated
written demands for payment of her obligations despite due receipt of the same,
compelling complainant to file the present Complaint.Respondent alleged that
she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated
theapartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another
place because she was givennotice by the complainant to vacate the premises to
give way for the repair and renovation of the same, but which never happened
until presently. Respondent actually wanted to ask that complainant to
account forher deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did
not know complainant's address orcontact number. For the same reason,
she could not turn over to the complainant the door keys to
the vacated apartment unit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:Lawyers must promptly pay their financial
obligations.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty
of willful failure to pay justdebt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate
that respondent has existing obligations that she failed tosettle.
Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of letters of demand in her
Answer to the Complaint.Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must
be deemed to have admitted them. A receipt is a written and signed
acknowledgment that money or goods have been delivered. In theinstant
case, the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving
payment, for she was unable toproduce receipts or any other proof of
payment. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to
pay her just debts. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully
failed to pay her justdebts.Having incurred just debts, respondent had the
moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they became due.
Respondent should have complied with just contractual obligations, and
acted fairly and adhered to high ethical standards to preserve the court's
integrity, since she is an employee thereof.Indeed, when respondent

backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a
groundfor administrative sanction. Respondent left the apartment unit without settling
her unpaid obligations, and without the complainant's knowledge
and consent. Respondent's abandonment of the leased premises toavoid
her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule
1.01 thereof, which explicitly state:"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land andpromote respect for law and legal processes."Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct." Verily,
lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the courtsand to their clients. As part of those duties, they
must promptly pay their financial obligations. Theirconduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for
any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity andgood demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.

RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER STATE

PROSECUTOR A.C. No. 7006 October 9, 200718. RE: SUSPENSION OF
ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER STATE PROSECUTORA.C.
No. 7006 October 9, 2007
Facts In the Crim. Case No. 5144, which is declared by Judge Buyser as a
crime of homicide and not of murder, the counsel for the defense filed a
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Bagabuyo
objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder is not
subject to bail. Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan favorably resolved the Motion for
bail and denied the respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. Instead of availing himself of judicial remedies, respondent caused
the publication of an article regarding the order, in which prosecutor
lambasts and lashes out at judge Tan for allowing the murder suspect out
on bail. The article also contains misrepresentation about the strength of
the evidence against the accused in the criminal case. Respondent admits
to have held a press conference but refused to answer whether he made
the statements in the newspaper article. For refusing to answer, the trial
court declared him in contempt. After this, respondent still entertained

media interview in a radio station, and in said interview, again attacked the
integrity of Judge Tan, calling him a judge who does not know the law, a
liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people. He was
ordered by the trial cause to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt and not be suspended from the practice of law for violating
Canon 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, on
scheduled hearing respondent did not appear or informed the court of his
absence.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be suspended for violating the
Code Ruling
Ruling: The Office of the Bar Confidant found that the acts of the
respondent constitute grave violation of oath of office, and with said
findings the Supreme Court agreed. Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 when he caused the holding of a press conference where he
made statements against the Order allowing the accused to post bail. He
also violated the same Canon for his disrespect of the court when he stated
that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that he was studying mahjong
instead of studying the law and that he was a liar. The SC held that it is not
against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules
provide the proper venue and procedure because respect for the institution
must always be maintained. Hence, Atty. Bagabuyo was suspended from
the practice of law for one year.

ANSON TRADE CENTER, INC., ANSON EMPORIUM CORPORATION and

TEDDY KENG SE CHEN vs.PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION, Represented
by Its Liquidator, the President of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 179999March 17, 2009FACTS:
Petitioners are corporations engaged in retail and/or wholesale general
merchandising and they obtained a loan from the respondent. Subsequently, the
petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loan. Respondent made several

demands for payment upon petitioners, to no avail. This prompted the respondent to
file a collection case against the respondent. The petitioner moved for the dismissal of
the case due to the non-appearance of the respondent in the pre-trial. The
respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case due to the respondents
non appearance. The latter asserted that its absence is not
intentional because they are undergoing liquidation process and the
Monetary Board is ordering the closure of respondent due to
insolvency. Respondent pleaded for the relaxation of the rules to avert irreparable
damage to it.
I S S U E : W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e t r i a l co u r t co m m i t t e d g r a ve a b u
s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s m i s s i n g respondents claim against the
petitioner due to non-appearance in the pre trial.
HELD:
Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion. The Court find
that the petition of the petitioner is unmeritorious. Pertinent provisions of Rule 18 of
the Revised Rules of Court on Pre-Trial read: SEC. 4.
Appearance of parties
. I t sh a l l b e t h e d u t y o f t h e p ar t i e s a n d t h e i r counsel to appear at
the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if
av a l i d c a u s e i s s h o wn t h er e f o r or i f a r e pr e s e n t a t i v e s h a l l a p
p e a r i n h i s b e h a l f f u l l y authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.Pursuant to the afore-quoted
provisions, non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial shall because for
dismissal of the action. However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact,
Section 4, Rule18 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides that the nonappearance of a party may be excused if avalid cause is shown therefor. We find
such a valid cause extant in the case at bar. There is no question that herein
respondent received notice of the pre-trial conference scheduledon 10
October 2005, but it failed to attend the same. Such non-appearance
notwithstanding, the Court Of Appeals annulled the 10 October 2005 Order
of the RTC dismissing the case after finding that respondentdid not
intentionally snub the pre-trial conference. There is no reason to disturb such
finding. The Monetary Board ordered the closure of respondent by reason of
insolvency, and it has sincebeen represented by its liquidator PDIC
in all its undertakings. Still in the course of the

liquidation of respondent, its liquidator PDIC was reorganized in the late 2004 to
early 2005. The four departments in thePDIC handling litigation were reduced to one,
with the new Litigation Department having only four in-housecounsels who
assumed thousands of cases arising from the closure by the Monetary
Board of more than400 banks. It is understandable how the notice for
the pre-trial conference in the case could be
lost or o v e r l o o k e d , a s t h e P D I C w a s s t i l l c o p i n g a n d a d j u s
t i n g w i t h t h e c h a n g e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m i t s reorganization.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby DENIED
.
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Gross Misconduct Malpractice of Law
Misconduct
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo
Casuga. Nevada alleged the following:
1.

That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the
jewelries include diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting
P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga
assured her that he will sell them; but despite repeated demands, Casuga
never remitted any money nor did he return said jewelries.

2.

That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with

Nevada (they belong to the same religious sect), Casuga represented
himself as the hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest) that Nevada own;
that as such, Casuga was able to enter into a contract of lease with one
Jung Chul; that he negotiated an office space with Chul in said Hotel for
P90,000.00; that Casuga notarized said agreement; that he forged the
signature of Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never remitted the P90k to
Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:

1.

That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she

later advised Casugas wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casugas
wife; that Casuga can sell said jewelries and reimburse herself from the
proceeds; that he still has possession of said jewelries.

2.

That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a

certain Pastor Oh; that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to
enter into said contract of lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casugas defense.
HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following:
1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly
authorized representative of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never
adduced evidence showing that he was duly authorized either by Edwin or
Corazon. He also dialed to adduce evidence proving that he never received
the P90k from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga
did receive the money. His misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct
and his mere denial does not overcome the evidence presented against
him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is
his duty as a lawyer to account for all moneys and property of his client that
may come to his possession. This is still applicable even though said
property/money did not come to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client
relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim that Nevada
pawned said jewelries. He never presented receipts. Further, even
assuming that Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was still duty bound to
return said jewelries upon demand by Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease)
in behalf of another person without authorization. His forgery made him an
actual party to the contract. In effect he was notarizing a document in which
he is party in violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga
is guilty of Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec.
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed
that disbarment is too severe a punishment against Casuga. He was
suspended for 4 years from the practice of law. His notarial commission
was likewise revoked and he is disqualified to be a notary public while
serving his suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized: the penalty of
disbarment shall be meted out only when the lawyers misconduct borders
on the criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.

FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ

FACT
Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his case in
the CA for a sum of money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando
Hernandez, who received the denied resolution for Garcia as counsel, and
was given 15 days to appeal.
Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for
Extension the day before the expiration of the period to file the appeal,,
alleging that he was counsel for a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial
candidate, and he was also needed in the canvassing of votes, so the
urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him the limited time to file
the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.
30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2 nd Motion for Extension, this
time, because he fell ill, and his physical state will not allow him to file the
appeal on time, thus asking for 20 days extension.
20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the grand
excuse that because he fell ill the last time, his work load piled up, thus
requiring him more time to conclude on the work load he missed when he
was ill, plus the appeal, hence the request for 10 days extension, to which
10 days later, he did actually file the appeal. (Finally!)
Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions for
Extensions were denied by the court, and to his dismay, received a copy of
the resolution denying the appeal all together. However, instead of
informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides to forward the resolution of
denial of the appeal some 7 months later, which greatly angered his client,
pushing him to file for his disbarment.
ISSUE
Is Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct, tantamount to
violation of his oath as a lawyer, which warrant his disbarment?
HELD
Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.
The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption that
each motion will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of
informing himself of the Court's action thereon, constitutes inexcusable
negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the
petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate attempt to
salvage the appeal.

Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of judgment or misuse court proceedings." While pressure of
work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a
motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that
his motion for extension of time will be granted. Motions for extension of
time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie in the
sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for
extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of
the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court.
Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for
which he will have nobody but himself to blame.
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should
inform the client and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to
enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who can study
the situation and work out a solution.
To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time he
received a copy of the Court's resolution to inform complainant of the same.
He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that respondent
humbly admitted his fault in not immediately informing complainant of the
status of the case.
Arroyo-Posidio v. Viran, A.C. No. 6051
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:Facts:
In August 1996, Atty. Vitan contacted Celia Posidio and showed her
documents consisting of taxdeclarations of properties purportedly forming
part of the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman-Arroyo, butwere not included
in the Inventory of Properties for distribution in Special Proceeding No. C525. Heconvinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in
the alleged undeclared propertiesand demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees
therefor. After several months, however, Atty. Vitan failed toinstitute any
action. Celia Posidio decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for
the return of theP100,000.00, but Atty. Vitan refused despite repeated
demands.Consequently, Celia Posidio filed an action for sum of money and
damages against Atty. Vitanbefore Branch 81, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Valenzuela City which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7130.The judgment
of the Branch 81 MTP Valenzuela is rendered in favor of the Celia Posidio
and against theAtty. Vitan.Atty. Vitan appealed to the Regional Trial Court
which affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Courtdecision. Thus, Celia Posidio

filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was granted

onMarch 19, 2001.To satisfy the judgment against him, Atty. Vitan issued
Prudential Bank check number 03387425dated May 31, 2001 in the
amount of P120,000.00 in favor of Celia Posidio. However, upon
presentmentfor payment, the check was dishonored for the reason:
ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite a written notice ofdishonor and demand
dated September 3, 2001, Atty. Vitan. refused to honor his obligation.
Atty. Vitan. denied complainants allegations. He admitted having received
the amount of
P100,000.00 but claimed that the same was partial payment for his
services in Special Proceeding CaseNo. C-525. Further, he alleged that he
had already paid complainant the amount of P150,000.00 asevidenced by
a Receipt & Quitclaim7 dated August 10, 2000.On March 1, 2004, the case
was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) forinvestigation,
report and recommendation. On January 15, 2006, the Investigating
Commissioner
submitted his Report8 finding respondent guilty of violating the lawyers
oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility in defrauding his client and issuing a check
without sufficient funds to coverthe same.
Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Vitan should be disbar

Held:
In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as
legal fees for filingadditional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de
Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute anaction, thus it was
imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon
demandtherefor. Having received payment for services which were not
rendered, respondent was unjustified inkeeping compl
ainants money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount.
His refusal to
do so despite complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of
his oath where he pledges not
to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good
fidelity to his clients.A lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain, he abuses ortakes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client. A lawyer should be scrupulously carefulin

handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a

high degree of fidelity andgood faith on his part is exacted.A lawyer is
obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to
hispossession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the
funds of his client separate andapart from his own and those of others kept
by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purposesuch as for the
registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and
fees for thetransfer of title over real property under the name of his client if
not utilized, must be returned
immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure to
return the money of his client
upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said
money in violation of thetrust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer
[of] funds entrusted to him by his client is a grossviolation of professional
ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.It is clear
from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the exacting moral and
ethical
standards imposed on members of the legal profession. Respondents
refusal to return complainants
money upon demand, his failure to comply with the lawful orders of the trial
court, as well as theissuance of a bouncing check, reveal his failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance withthe strictures of his oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.It cannot be overemphasized that
membership in the legal profession is a privilege. Whenever itis made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
the public, itbecomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court,
which made him one of its officers and gavehim the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege