Multi-vendor Experiences with

IEC 61850 Installation, Testing,

Configuration, Diagnostics, and
Upgrades
David Dolezilek
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

Copyright SEL 2008

Practical Uses of IEC 61850 Protocols

and Synchrophasors

GOOSE in a Centralized Remedial Action

Scheme (CRAS)

GOOSE versus hard-wire protective trip

RTU I/O collection via GOOSE

Diagnostics tools for GOOSE virtual wiring

Recent Global IEC 61850 installations

Improving RAS with synchrophasors

Remedial Action Schemes

OOSESouthern California Edison (SCE)

Tested Digital Communications Speed

13.3
13
Strive to mitigate thermal overload and
instability throughout
transmission territory

RAS Round-Trip

Detect

Decide

Trip

Performance Criteria: Detect, Calculate,

React 50 ms To / From any Location
Test starts when Monitor
detects Contact Input 1

Central Processor sends

decision alarm

Monitor chooses action to take

Mitigator receives decision alarm
Monitor sends monitor alarm
Mitigator chooses action to take
Central Processor receives
monitor alarm

Mitigator closes trip output contact

Central Processor chooses

action to take

Monitor detects mitigation trip output

as Monitor Contact Input 2

RAS enabled in Central Processor?

Scope measures difference

between Contact Input 1 and 2

Yes

Initial Testing Verified Time Budget

Using Three IEDs 740 Km Apart

Next: Arming via SEL an Dell Computers

Multiple Devices Demonstrated for

WECC RAS Committee

Within One
Hour, Five
New
Devices
Were
Digitally
Wired

Typical: GOOSE Trip Tansit 1.50 msec

Central Processing Time 2.083 msec

Monitor is 60 miles distant. Mitigators are local to CP.

Mitigation GOOSE transit, subscription, output - 3 msec or 11 msec

Jim Bridger Power Plant

Simultaneous, Independent Operation

RAS C

RAS D

DNP Gateway

DNP Gateway

IEC Logic
Controller

IEC Logic
Controller

IEC Logic
Controller

IEC Logic
Controller

IEC Logic
Controller

IEC Logic
Controller

I/O
Modules

I/O
Modules

I/O
Modules

I/O
Modules

I/O
Modules

I/O
Modules

Input

Input

Input

Input Voting

Crosspoints Voting

Output Voting

Output

Three Levels
of Voting

Jim Bridger Substation

RAS Uses Crosspoint Switch

f

Trigger
Inputs

Crosspoint Switch
Preloaded and Ready to Go

CB
Opens

Output Remediation

Contingency
Trip G1

N1
N2

N3

Trip G2

Trip G3

Trip G4

Bypass
C1

Bypass
C2

X
X
X

N4
N5

Tripping
Outputs

Designed to Handle Multiple, Closely

Timed Events
First Event
Example1

Example 2

Time (s)

t=0s

N-Events
System State

t=5s

IN1 IN6
N=1 N=20
S1

S1

IN6
N=6
S2

PacifiCorp / Idaho Power Remedial Action

Scheme Eliminates Congestion
Fastest control
system in the
world

Stability improvements increase capacity 50%, avoid blackouts

Training / Testing / Playback Simulator

Test Simulator Plugged Into RAS C

Protection-Class Features

Deterministic, high-speed, peer-to-peer

protocol used between RAS controllers

No backplanes to fail

No auxiliary power supplies

MS Windows NOT used in RAS controller

All controllers embedded

Identical logic in all six controllers

Floridas International
Drive 1999 Project:
Distribution Automation
at Transmission Speeds

Switching With a Recloser

Recloser + Control Without Communications

Manual Switching = 1 hour

Switching w/Recloser = 10 seconds

vs. Distribution at Transmission Speed

SEL & S&C for International Drive

SEL-351S + Communications

Smart Switching = 0.1 second

Multivendor IEC 61850

CFE Parque Eolico La Venta

Existing Generators at Wind Farm

Biggest Wind Farm Project in Mexico

CFE expects to generate close to 3 GW

by 2014 in La Ventosa

Substation Expansion - New Generators

SEL - MX060018 Project Satisfies

Newest SICLE Design With IEC-61850

SICLE is Spanish Acronym for

Integrated System For Substation Local

Control

CFE Specifies SICLE for integration of high

voltage substations, SISCOPROMM for low
voltage

CFE Decided to Build Small but

Meaningful Substation

CFE wanted to prove 61850 was real

Include as many vendors as possible

Add other redundant IEDs in parallel

Demonstrate true functionality on the

network

Prove multi-vendor interoperability

Proven. Reliable.
Complete.

Worlds First Multisupplier

IEC 61850 System in Service
Since 2006

This is, without any doubt, a great

advancement for the integration of control
and protection systems, and for integration
of the IEC 61850 International standard.
David Lancha, Project Manager, IBERINCO

Wind Farm Under Construction

La Venta II Substation
Protection Requirements
87L
21PP
79
50BF

50BF

50BF

87B

51PHS

RD

87T
51PHS
51NHS
51NLS

Design #1 Used IEC 61850 Part 5, SEL Methods

in IEDs, IEC 61850 in SCADA Gateway
230KV
230KV Line
LVD93100 Autotransformer
LVD92010

230KV Tie
LVD97010

SEL-451-4

SEL-451-4

SEL-451-4

SEL-451

SEL-451

SEL-451

SEL-387E

SEL-421

SEL-311L

230KV Bus
Diff
LVDDB9

Redundant
HMI

SEL-3351

Redundant
SCADA
Gateway

SEL-3332

SEL-3332

SEL-487B

SEL-3351

Information Processor Serves DNP/Conitel as

SCADA Gateway and OPC to HMIs

CFE Requested IEC 61850 in all IEDs

SEL ACSELERATOR Architect

SEL-2411 Automation
Substation Configuration Language
Controller
SEL-751A Feeders
(SCL) Engineering Software
SEL-710 Motors

SEL-3351 Rugged Computer

SEL-421 Distance

SEL-451-4 Bay Control

SEL-311L Current Differential
SEL-387E Transformers

SEL-451 Distribution

SEL-487B Buses

Meet CFE Substation Protection

Requirements Using IEC 61850

Conventional wiring and IEC 61850 GOOSE

Test performance of conventional wiring vs.

GOOSE for protection functions

Determine if all relays will interoperate and

perform as desired

IEDs approved by CFE

Design #2 Used IEC 61850 Part 8,9 in the IEDs

IEC 61850 From SEL for Every Application in Bays
230KV
230KV Line
LVD93100 Autotransformer
LVD92010

230KV Tie
LVD97010

SEL-451-4

SEL-451-4

SEL-451-4

SEL-451

SEL-451

SEL-451

SEL-387E

SEL-421

SEL-311L

230KV Bus
Diff
LVDDB9

Redundant
HMI

SEL-3351

Redundant
SCADA
Gateway

SEL-3332

SEL-3332

SEL-487B

SEL-3351

Next CFE Chose to Demonstrate Multivendor Interoperability

System integrates devices from multiple

vendors
SEL

Siemens

GE

ZIV

RuggedCom

Team ARTECHE

Other vendors invited but did not have

IEC 61850 available or not approved by CFE

Two Different Engineering Groups

Working in Parallel to Integrate IEDs

HMI LN reporting and bay level

GOOSE IEC 61850 integration
being done by Iberdrola

SCADA Gateway LN reporting and

station level GOOSE IEC 61850
integration being done by SEL

New Products for CFE : Bay Control, SCADA

Gateway, and IEC 61850

SEL Scope: Panel Design for Parque Eolico

Wind Farm and Intertie Substation

Design #3 Used IEC 61850 Part 8,9 in the IEDs

Added IEC 61850 Devices From Other Vendors
230KV
230KV Line
LVD93100 Autotransformer
LVD92010
GE F650 BC

230KV Tie
LVD97010

230KV Bus
Diff
LVDDB9

Redundant
HMI

Redundant
SCADA
Gateway

ZIV BC

SEL-451-4
ZIV HMI
SEL-451

SEL-451

SEL-3332

SEL-451

ZIV CPT
SEL-387E

SEL-421
ZIV HMI

GE T60
GE F60

GE F35
Siemens 7SJ62
Siemens 7SJ61

SEL-311L

GE L90

SEL-487B

Panels Ready for Installation

System Architecture
Remote HMI
DNP
ZIV CPT

Conitel

ZIV HMI

ZIV HMI

Router
+ Firewall

SEL-3332
SCADA Gateway
GPS

SEL-487B 87B

SW-1
SW-5

Fiber-Optic
Ring
RuggedCom
SW-2

SW-4

SW-3

SEL-451-4 BC

GE F650 BC

ZIV 6MCV BC

SEL-451 50BF, 25, 27

SEL-451 50BF, 25, 27

SEL-421 21, 67

SEL-387E

SEL-279H 79

GE T60 87T

SEL-451 50BF, 25, 27

GE F60 50, 51HS

GE L90 87L

GE F35 50, 51TZ

SEL-311L

Siemens 7SJ62 50, 51LS

Siemens 7SJ61 50, 51N

SEL Construction, Factory Acceptance

Test (FAT), Training, Commissioning

IEC 61850 SCL Replaces Wired

Connections With Logical Connections

GOOSE Messages for Protection

CFE wanted to see performance

comparison between wired and GOOSE

CFE chose to test breaker failure

protection scheme using GOOSE

Primary protection trip

Breaker failure relay retrip

Breaker failure relay trip

Breaker failure trip reception by bus

differential relay

Trip to all breakers in bus

Customer Factory Acceptance Test

GOOSE Retrip Operation 12.5ms Faster

Than Parallel Hardwire at La Venta
GOOSE Breaker 21 TRIP A

Wired Contact Breaker 21 TRIP A

12.5 ms Difference
Between Inputs

86FI Operation: GOOSE 8 ms Faster

CFE Project Results

Retrip test; GOOSE three-fourths cycle faster

Breaker failure scheme; GOOSE half-cycle

faster wiring scheme still has to go through
physical lockout (86) relay, which adds 6 to 8 ms

Configuration and troubleshooting made simpler

with sequential events recorder (SER) and
event reports

Traffic did not affect performance of SEL

devices

Project Engineering Revealed

Necessary Communication Parameters

Time synch method - chose SNTP

Sacraficed accuracy to use Ethernet

Changed back to IRIG later

Number of client associations chose 6

Two redundant HMIs

Remote and local engineering workstations

Two redundant SCADA gateways

Interlock and Automation Projects

Dictated GOOSE Requirements

Number of outgoing GOOSE messages eight

Number of incoming GOOSE messages - 16

Number of incoming GOOSE bits

Bay control 128

Relay 16, 128 depending on application

Parque Eolico La Venta II

PP&L Modernized
From PLCs to IEDs

Eliminate
programmable devices

Digital transducers

PLCs

Eliminate other
components

24 Vdc supplies

Interface relays

External fault detectors

Streamline, Reduce
Complexity With
IEC 61850 Design

Reduce Hardware Components With

IEC 61850 Design
Design

Computers

Substation
PLCs & Comm.
Processor

PLC

22

24

16

75

NGS

24

30

Bay
PLCs

Relays

Metering
IEDs

Ethernet
Switches

SER

Total

Display Redundant Data Sources via HMI

L2 P disagrees with other IEDs

Faulty L2 P manually removed

Using IEC 61850 Methods for RTU

Replacement and Distributed Automation

RTU Vendor Went AWOL

No New Units, No Product Support

Over 400 pad-mounted switchgear in service

50 to 100 new each year

Three switch configurations controlling

one to six circuit taps or ways

Desire to simplify configuration, add

engineering access, and improve logic

Numerous I/O Configurations Must Fit

in Fixed Small Space
DNP3 serial over radio to SCADA Master
changing to DNP3 / TCP in future

RTU Real-Time Values via Internal and

External Communications Connections

RTU Replacement Network Could Also

Connect I/O of Relays and Meters
SCADA
Master

Example system database

192.168.0.20
PAC_MASTER

DNP3 Serial

Ethernet
Switch

32 AC analog inputs

2 DC analog inputs

24 digital inputs

16 digital outputs

GOOSE Messages

PAC_Slave_A

PAC_Slave_B

PAC_Slave_C

192.168.0.15

192.168.0.25

192.168.0.30

Data Flow Acts the Same as Distributed

RTU I/O Panels But Performs Better
SCADA Master

Field Inputs
GOOSE Inputs
DNP3 Response
DNP3 Command
Contact Output
GOOSE Outputs

Multi-vendor Configuration Requires

Stand-Alone Tool Specifically for 61850

Alternate traditional UCA2 method of

proprietary settings makes multivendor systems difficult

Configure IED via International Standard

Substation Configuration Language, SCL

Start with IED capability

description, ICD file

Create configured IED

description, CID file

Edit only what you

choose

No accidental changes

Minimize verification
testing

Load File in IED, or Send to Colleague Via

email to Add Future IED Subscriptions

Best Practice Provides Contextual

Names Generic Names Less Useful

Generic

Specific

Best practice provides specific names whenever possible

Exceptions include generic logic points, unnamed contact I/O

Use Unique Name and Revision Control

Ask IED Directly to Verify Present Configuration

Solicit identification report from IED

IED name reveals file name and revision

ConfigVersion reveals default SCL file that

configuration was developed with

IED GOOSE Reports Are Essential

Review receive and

transmit configuration

Quickly review network

settings

Analyze GOOSE statistics

and diagnostics

Immediately pinpoint
source of problem

Identification (ID) Reports Provide

Source / Destination of Virtual Wiring
Mismatched Configuration Explains Failure
ID shows incorrect revision of PAC configuration

Once corrected, GOOSE report shows correct

revision as part of GOOSE reference name

Analyze Contents With Knowledge

of Configuration File

Failed GOOSE, Other Alarms Displayed

and Sent via Email, Voice, Text Message

Cigre
Multivendor
System
of 12
Vendor
IEDs

Support 8 Unique GOOSE Publications,

16 Subscriptions, 24 for Complex
Interlocking
SEL-451-4

SEL-421

ZIV
IRV-A

Team
Arteche

Toshiba
GRZ100

Areva
P444

Sisco software
IED on PC

GE D60
Siemens
7SA525

Siemens
6MD669

Siemens
BC1703

GE
F650

Second Generation Modernization

Began in 2006

Complete modernization
of 30 substations ranging
in voltage level from
13.8 kV to 138 kV

Elektro Network
Includes IEC 61850,
Telnet, FTP, and
SEL Protocols

Substations:
Guaruj 2 first modernized
substation energized June 12
2007 seven complete
2008 eight complete

Guaruj 2
Guaruj 3

Sao Paulo State,

Brazil

Fiber Optics Replace Copper

KONYA Industrial Park

Chooses SEL and IEC 61850

500 large to mid-size electricity-dependent

tenants: plastics, machinery, pharmaceuticals

Park management responsible for infrastructure:

electricity, gas, water, traffic, security

One 100 MW transformer and three 33 kV

tie lines from National Grid

65 MW maximum demand increasing by 15%

every year

8 Switching Stations, 99 Feeders

SEL-3401
GPS-Clock
42-Inch LCD
Monitors

Server 1

Operator
Station 1

Operator
Station 2

Server 2

Printers
Switch

3 Tie Lines (6 Future)

Front-End 2
Substation
Computing

Front-End 1
Substation
Computing

SEL-2407
GPS-Receiver
Clock

6 x SEL-311L
Switch

Station 1

Station 2

Station 3

Station 4

Station 5

Station 6

Station 7

54 SEL-751A Relays and 38 SEL-311L Relays

Station 8

Control Center
Manages 165
Distribution
Substations

24 km redundant
fiber-optic ring

Future distribution
automation
additions

Use Modern Communications for

Diagnostics FTP, Telnet, email

GEESE Migrate to Africa

Stations Include IEC 61850 MMS and GOOSE

City Power Pennyville 19 bays , 2 bus

sections, 3 transformers

City Power Khanyisa similar to above with

36 bays

City of Cape Town 2 complete substations

Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality

Three new substations in 2008

Each based on IEC 61850

City Power Johannesburg

Harley Street Substation
Control Center
IEC 60870-5-101
SEL-1102
SEL

SEL-2410

SEL-2410

Switch

Fdr 1

Switch

Fdr 29

SEL-1102 Gateway, 2 SEL-2410s, 36 Bays With SEL-451 Relays

Electricity of Vietnam (EVN)

State-owned utility established 1995

Generation, transmission, and distribution
for whole country
4 transmission
companies
79,800 km of
distribution lines

Growing Electricity Demand

Forecasted growth 17% per annum until 2025
600
500

Terawatt-Hours

400
300
200

Production

100

Sales
0

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

First Phase Substation Modernization

Began in 1999

First computerized 220 kV substation

commissioned in Ho Chi Minh City

This success resulted in digitizing more

substations through 2003

Early Substation Modernization

Conventional protection and control using

DNP3 serial and hardwired connections

Problems with incompatibilities between

multiple manufacturers IEDs

Second Phase Standardization

To improve IED compatibility, EVN issued

specification for substation automation based
on UCA2
Based on this, first large-scale substation
automation system (SAS) was implemented

220 kV Thu Duc Substation

Upgraded
Protection
System
Architecture

220 kV

66 kV Busbar

Phase 1

Phase 3
Phase 2

220 kV

110 kV

Phase 1

Phase 3

Phase 2

Third Phase IEC 61850

IEC 61850 Part 10 approved Oct. 2005

EVN standardized for future projects

new and retrofit

All 500 kV
backbone
substations
upgraded by
2010

New System Requirements

Dual redundant fiber-optic LAN with no

single point of failure

IEC 61850 for all substation communication

IEC 60870-5-101 for SCADA

Standard System Hardware Architecture

Host 1

Engineering
(Bridge to SCADA)

Host 2

HIS Server

Router to WAN

Fiber-Optic
Ethernet
100 Mbps

LAN 1
LAN 2

Main
NIM

Backup
NIM

Main
IED

Backup
IED
GPS Clock
Bay Cubicle

Main
IED

Backup
IED

Main
IED

Backup
IED

Bay
Devices
Option 2

Bay Cubicle

Bay Cubicle

Bay
Devices

Bay
Devices
Option 1

Computerized Control and Monitoring

Redundant system
servers running on
Windows 2000 or Linux

Local HMI,
engineering console,
and historian

Old Protection Panels Replaced

Microprocessor-based relays perform

protection, control, and monitoring

Outdoor Cubicles Reduce Cabling

Existing Copper Cabling

Binh Long Substation

Copper
Cabling
Reduced

@STATION System Overview

HMI1

HMI2

ENG
HIS

GW

LAN / WAN

IEC 61850
Meter
Relays / BCUs
Hardware
Connections
Primary Equipment

Legacy Device Gateway

Rugged Computing Platform

SCADA Gateway

Test Results
User Interface Feature

Required by
EVN

Tested

Display Response Time

<1s

<1s

Data Entry Response Time

<1s

<1s

Display Update Rate

<2s

<2s

Update Completion Rate

<1s

<1s

Test Results
User Interface Feature
Alarm/Event
Response Time
Alarm Acknowledge/
Delete Time
Report and Logbook
Response Time
Display Color Printout
Response Time

Required by
EVN

Tested

<1s

<1s

<2s

<2s

< 0.5 min

< 0.5 min

< 0.5 min

< 0.5 min

Test Results
Required by
EVN

Tested

<2s

<1s

<2s

<1s

Failover Time Between

Main 1 and Main 2

0s

GOOSE Exchange Time

< 10 ms

< 8 ms

User Interface Feature

Console Inhibit Time for
Display Hardcopy
Analog Data
Collection Rate
Status Indication
Collection Rate

Benefits of IEC 61850 SAS

Faster system integration with IED

interoperability
Reduction of copper cabling and
hardwiring

GOOSE for peer-to-peer data exchange

Outdoor cubicles adjacent to feeder or bay

System malfunctions reduced by nearly

50%

What is a Synchrophasor?

Time Waveform
and Phasor Representation

v(t)

A
0

Reference

wt

A
2

Absolute Time Synchronization Has

Fundamentally Changed the World
Satellite

GPS RCVR

GPS RCVR

IRIG-B

PMU 1

IRIG-B
Mag/Ang

Mag/Ang

PMU 2

Direct State Measurement

SYNCHROPHASORS

GPS provides common time reference

Measure state vector

Measure currents, too

Synchronously!

Every second

Every cycle

Synchrophasors Provide a Snapshot

of the Power System
P= |V1| |V2|sin / X

V10

= sin-1(PX / |V1| |V2|)

V2

Increase Stable
Power Transfer

Relays Are Right for Synchrophasors

Phasor measurement and control unit

(PMCU) PMU

Minimal incremental cost

Reduced current and voltage connections

High-accuracy measurements

High reliability and availability

Future control applications

Relays are everywhere

What Operators Did Not See Aug. 14th

64 Minutes

Utilities Are Operating Closer to the Edge

Margin
Margin
1.0

Operating
Point
Bifurcation
Point
0.5

0.0
PU Nominal Load

1.0

1.3

1.5

1.7

Long Island: Monitor Angles Between

Transmission Distribution Buses to
Detect & Prevent Voltage Collapse

Vr
V S 0

ZL = R

+ jX

S=P+

jQ

Smax

1 sin() Vs
2 cos( )2 X

Apply Remote Synchronizing

230 kV
Bus

SEL-421

115 kV
Bus

13.8 kV
Bus
SEL-421

Improved View:
Synchroscope
and Freq Plot
make it easier
for operators

The MRI of Power Systems

NERC press release on
Florida outage Feb. 26,
2008:
Synchrophasors are Like
the MRI of bulk power
systems

SCE Uses C37.118 From

Relays and PMU
SCADA
Master
DNP3

Information
Processor

IEEE C37.118

Harris 5000/6000,
IEC 60870-103,
Modbus, SEL Fast
Message, Telegyr
8979, Conitel 2020,
CoDeSys, OPC,

Distributed Generation Creates

Islanding Problems
Transmission
Network

SEL-3378
DG

Synchrophasors Detect and Correct

Islanding Problems

Defensive Strategies Working Group

New York State Reliability Council

NYSRC asked SEL to propose solutions

Mitigate impact of major disturbances on the

New York electric system

Blackout mitigation and prevention

Separate into islands using transmission

system fault protection relays

SEL Synchrophasor Total

Potential Worldwide!
Europe / Asia
4,115 units
Canada

North America
142,085 units

Asia
Pacific
45,793 units

South America
15,903 units
Africa / Middle East
5,085 units

Real-World Example Line Repair

Error Detection

Synchrophasors Make
CFEs Grid Smarter

Relay-to-Relay
Synchrophasors for
Generator Shedding

Load Shedding Based on Angle

400 kV

Synchrophasors

400 kV

Trip
Generator
900 MW

National
System

Chicoasen

Sabino

Angostura
Tapachula
City
400 kV

115 kV Network
Southern Region Load

Detect and Control Adaptive Islanding

Transmission
Network

SEL-451
Relay / PMU

SEL-3378 SVP

Distribution
Network

Unintentional
Islanding

SEL-451
Relay / PMU

Over Angle Protection Holds System

Together
Link 1
Area 1
Heavy
Load

Link 2

SEL-421 Synchrophasors

Area
2

SEL-421

Trip
Generation

Area 3
Light
Load

(Chicoasen Angostura) > 5 Trip Generation

Today: Most Processing Is at the Master

Master

Finds topology

Purges bad data

Estimates state

Asynchronous
Scan

RTU

RTU

~5 seconds per scan

. . . can have partial

information from
two or more
physical systems
due to faults, switching,
swinging, tap changes.

One Utilitys View of Several Data

Streams
Bus Voltage

Instantaneous
Phase Angles

Line
MVA

Frequency

PMU ID

Trended
Phase Angles

Local Calculation of Line Temperature

Improves Power Transfer Reliability

Line Temperature = f (Ambient Temp, Current, Line Orientation, Season)

IEEE Synchrophasors Compatible

With IEC 61850 Networks
Possible Future GOOSE or 9-2 Extension

IEEE C37.118,
Telnet, tunneled
serial

Verify CT wiring,
phase rotation,
settings

Determining the State of a Power System

V2

V1

V3

V4

I231
I12

I34
I232

I12 V1
I V
231 Y 2 State Vector
I232 V3
I V
34 4

Traditional RAS Clearing Time Budget

Relay

Relay
Detects
Fault

-1 Cycle

I/O Module

Computer

Relay Trips/
Asserts Contact
Output

0 Cycle

I/O Module

RAS Controller
Issues Gen
Breaker Trip

1 Cycle

Relay

Relay Receives
Trip Command
and Trips Gen
Breaker

2 Cycles

Breaker

Breaker Trip
Time

3 Cycles

Total RAS Clearing Time

6 Cycles

SVP RAS Clearing Time Cycle Faster

Improving RAS with Synchrophasors

Direct state measurement is now practical

because of the widespread availability of
Synchrophasors

The SVP performs local direct state

measurement and control

Wide area RAS schemes are improved

because synchrophasors reduce the amount
of information communicated to the master
station

What Does a Future Worst-Case

Scenario Look Like?

Detect potential unstable operating conditions

Control islanding

Detect system oscillation before criticality

Minimize problems automatically

Synchrophasors Empower the Future