PROCEEDINGS

OF THK

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NEW

SEKIES.

VOL.

XXII.

Containing the Papers read before the Society during the

Forty-third Session, 1921-1922.

PUBLISHED BY

WILLIAMS AND NOKGATE,

14,

HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON, W.C.

1922.

Price Twenty-five Shillings

netl.

2.

B
M

PRINTED

IN

GREAT

BRITAIN,

CONTENTS.
PAGE
1

II.

NOVELTY. THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

SCHILLER

AN

INDIAN

By

F. C. S.
1

DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION AND ERROR.

III.

By F. W. THOMAS
ON THE LIMITATIONS OF A KNOWLEDGE OF NATURE.
By JAMES JOHNSTONE

IV.

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPERSPACKS,

V.

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKA2IA.

VI.

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES

By

F. TAVANI...

By H, J. PATON
ART.

IN

...

III.

IV.
VIII.

IX.

X.

XL
XII.

INTERPRETATION

I.

OF

By H. WILDON CARR
By T. P. NUNN...
By A. N. WHITEHEAD
By DOROTHY WRINCH

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

By

123
127
130

134
S.

N. DASGUPTA

SOME BYWAYS OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLE"

...

157

By MARGARET MCFARLANE...
GEOMETRY AND REALITY. By THOMAS GREENWOOD...

REALISM AND VALUES.

" HISTORIOGRAPHY."
BENEDETTO. CROCE'S

XIV.

173
189

By DOUGLAS
205

THE, PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF

RELATIVITY. By A. N. WHITEHEAD

IN

139

By

AINSLIE

XIII.

55

69

105

THE IDEALISTIC
DISCUSSION
EINSTEIN'S THEORY.
II.

43

By A. H.

HANNAY
VII.

23

MEMORIAM

Miss E. E. CONSTANCE JONES

MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE FORTY-THIRD SESSION

ABSTRACT OF THE

215

224

THE
...

226

JOINT SESSION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, THE BRITISH

...
PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, AND THE MIND ASSOCIATION

229

THE SPECIAL

231

SESSION OF THE SOCIE"TE" FRANCHISE DE PHILOSOPHIE

233

FINANCIAL STATEMENT
LIST OF OFFICERS AND

MEMBERS FOR THE FORTY-FOURTH

SESSION.

234

PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY.

iesi less.
Meeting at 21, Gower

Street,

W.G.

1,

on October 10th, 1921,

at 8 P.M.

NOVELTY.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

By
SINCE you have chosen

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

me

to be

your President for this Fortythird Session of our Society, and since this honour imposes on me
the duty of delivering a Presidential Address, you may fairly be
said to have asked for
let

you

You

off.

it.

And

I,

of course,

are going to have

have done, most

it

all

am

not the

right,

and

man

to

expect

have had your patience

you
is yours, not mine, if we have
But
the
fault
tried.
severely
to-night to consider the most detested of subjects, which runs
that, before I

of

will

odiously counter to every instinct and every habit of every

Even a desperado like myself
being, animate and inanimate.
would hardly have dared to intrude it upon a gathering of
respectable philosophers, if he could not quote precedents and
claim support if, that is, the greatest of living metaphysicians
had not so effectively pleaded for a revision of the old Eleatic
;

verdict, to

which nearly

all

philosophers have assented with

such uncritical docility and unthinking enthusiasm, that no

place need be made for Novelty in our philosophies, because
Novelty is as such ultimately unthinkable and impossible.

Perhaps M. Bergson's greatest achievement is to have shaken

this prejudice, and to have made Novelty a good philosophic
problem. It is no longer mere impertinence to inquire into
Novelty, to ask philosophers to recognize

its existence, to

beg

F.

them

to analyse

SCHILLER.

S.

they hate

why

whether they hate

C.

it

and won't, and

to insist that,

or not, they have got to have

it

If I do-

it.

not suffer the fate of Pentheus, Galileo, or Bruno, before I have-

may perhaps persuade one

we are all so con-

sufficiently elucidated these points, I

or two that since Novelty

structed

as

generating

to
it,

it

ineluctable and

is

experience it, and the world is continually

may be more reasonable, or at least more

than to try to ignore

sensible, to try to understand it

For the benefit

My

this paper.

of these few, let

aim

will be not so

paradoxes, to ventilate novelties of

it.

me outline the scheme of

much to dazzle you with
detail, or to advocate new

solutions for secular problems which have proved impervious

philosophic penetration for the past

3000

years, as to

to>

examine

Novelty in principle, and to determine the conditions under which

it

may hope

reality.

to obtain recognition in a rational conception of

I propose to

show

exists, or rather occurs

normal attitude

It is

that Novelty, really and naturally,.

that hatred of

II,

it exists,

III, that this hatred is natural,

reasonable, but that IV,

Novelty.

I,

and

is

man's

and in a sense

should not goad us into denying

better to make the best of it, and of the con-

sequences of recognizing

it

it,

in V, Logic, VI, Metaphysics,

and

VII, Keligion.
I.

The short proof of the existence of Novelty consists of

pointing to an obvious, all-pervasive psychical fact which isfamiliar to every one, and will, I suppose, be equally distasteful
to the refined philosophers

who

feel it

an insult to their

intelli-

be asl^ed to recognize the reality of a mere fact, and to

gence
the sturdy heretics who have found no use for mind in their
to

philosophizing.
incredible,

The

former will

and therefore impossible

"

subjectivism."

Still

it

is

it

unintelligible,

the latter will decry it as

a simple psychical fact that our

experience never quite repeats

same," and are tempted

declare
;

itself

in

what we

call

to regard as a recurrence of the

"

the

same

NOVELTY.

may always be

experience, differences

Even

attend to them.

detected,

if

that an experience had occurred before would

For the

first

time

if

we choose

to

there were no others, the mere fact

make

a difference.

was accompanied by a feeling

this
feeling is lost, and its place
repeated,

it

came

it

of

is
novelty when it is
taken by a growing sense of familiarity with infinite gradations
;

We

of intensity.

know

in

advance what

it

will feel like

and

it with pleasure or repugnance, hope or apprehension,

with interest, indifference, or tedium thus the very fact that
"
new " introduces a new factor.
an experience is no longer

anticipate

Even
will

"

we have more

if

come back

remember

it,

"

there

or less forgotten the first -experience,

to us the second time,

is

it

and whether or not we

reason to believe that the course of events

will in all cases proceed differently in consequence of the past,

is ever wholly forgotten and as though it
indeed there would be no conceivable proof of

and that so nothing

had never been

such total oblivion except just this, that the course of events
did repeat itself completely. And this does not appear to be
Instead it appears to be an ultimate fact that every
the case.

mind which apprehends a fact has had a history, and this history
makes a difference and affects its apprehension of the fact.
What is true of the mind holds moreover, no less, though
less manifestly

and indisputably,

of the rest of reality.

Its

history too does not repeat itself absolutely, but only with a
The flow of reality sets in one direction only, and
difference.
it its whole past
everywhere the very fact that
"
"
the way it happens the
affects
before
occurred
has
something
next time. This, ultimately, is the reason why the past is

carries

with

irrevocable and
versible.

It

is

the course, even of

the reason also

why

physical change,

the future

is

is irre-

never quite

exactly calculable.

We

may

say then that

all

and have become what they

been through. Their history
"

essence,"

and until we

things are what they have become,

are, in virtue of

what they have

is thus always relevant to their

have ascertained it, we must not take

B 2

F.

C.

S.

SCHILLER.

too seriously our definitions of the latter, and the inferences

drawn from it. Aristotle made a gallant attempt to bring out
this relevance of history to definition in his TO TI fy elvai, but

have too often failed to see that this clumsy

"
"
phrase embodied a truth that was lacking to their eternal
his successors

essences.

Now practical

psychologists have, of course, long been aware

They have known that, to forecast a man's action

of all this.

with any precision, it was vain to appeal to general principles,

and necessary to know him, and his past, and if possible that of

In these days the other sciences are being forced

The zoologist could never understand

his ancestors.

to similar admissions.

the nature and relations of living beings, until he took to

working out their history now he explains the present by the
past, and solemnly tells us that we have five fingers because we
:

have retained the primitive pentadactylism of the vertebrate

The astronomer nowadays is not content to speculate
stock
!

"
about a " primitive nebula out of which our solar system was
condensed he extends and confirms his theory by conceiving it
;

as a special (and very rare) case in the processes of "stellar

evolution," and classifies the stars according to the stage in it

which they have reached.

The

geologist is successfully con-

necting the character of his minerals with their history, and

determining their age (and incidentally providing data for that
of the earth)

by the varying amounts

"

With

of their

"

radio-activity."

"

the discovery of
isotopes
history has become relevant
to chemistry, and chemists are growing chary of predicting how a
given sample of a chemical element will behave and of declaring

what

it

"
is,"

given piece of

until
"

for a
they have ascertained its history
"
"
"
"
or
uraniummay be thorium-lead
:

lead

more probably, a mixture descended from both these

"
"
will be affected by its ancestry.
parents," and its properties

lead," or,
"

seems

that

all

the "elements" will be

found to be mixtures of isotopes.

In short, as we probe deeper,

all

the objects of

Ultimately,

it

likely,

scientific

NOVELTY.

immensely more complicated,

interest are turning out to be

individual, nay unique, than any one suspected

"

sweeping affirmation of universal

to all things, is being

laws,"

the simple,

"

"

prescribed

eternally

more and more plainly revealed as a

method, which the sciences assumed in

convenient postulate of
the hope of controlling their material, and which encourages
them to sustain their struggle with the facts. But actually our
"

"

laws

are

human inventions and cannot survive

of human fiction.
Keality, as we get to

always

without large doses

know it better, is displaying a character, nay a will, of its own,

and a large measure of recalcitrance to our intellectual demands.
Of this recalcitrance Novelty is a conspicuous feature, and one
that

is

intimately bound up with the

rest.

II.

Here then

our

reason for hating Novelty.

It is a
good scientific reason, and proves that the reasons for our hatred
are n<5t all disreputable.
But of course we have others, still

more

is

which we cannot take such

potent, in

In the

first

first

place

we

pride.

are all the creatures of Habit.

Habit

the greatest force in nature, and the natural enemy of

Novelty. All the stability that can be traced in the flux of
is

reality

may

be ascribed to

we have

it.

All the

Laws

of Nature, in so

upon formulas that really hold, and are not

fictions of our own invention and subjective conveniences of
far as

hit

The

calculation, are objectively the habits of nature.

of these habits

is

(more or less)

basis for our predictions

events.
it,

and preparations

safety.

made up of
Those who

conservatives
"

"

liberals,"

fact,

"
;

habits,

stability

and the

sole

for the course of

naturally, therefore, tend to idealize

and to resent the intrusions of Novelty.

Furthermore, the rule of Habit extends

too are

"

We

an empirical

and exaggerate

to ourselves.

and ensconce ourselves

in

them

We
for

are conscious of this fact call themselves

those

who

radicals," or

are not

even

"

may imagine

revolutionaries."

themselves

But they

F.

too cannot

SCHILLER.

S.

help being conservative cm fond, simply because

they too have habits.

Fundamentally then

good and

C.

human nature

is

conservative

for

which pervades
human institutions, and tips the

It engenders a conservative bias,

evil.

and

all social structures

all

balance against novelties of (almost) every kind.

Novelty
because

is

normally painful

demands an

it

ment, thought, doubt, experiment, uncertainty,

and,

failure.

possibly,

painful

psychologically

infraction of habit, an effort, a re-adjust-

Inertia,

laziness,

difficulty, strain,

custom,

timidity,

Habit and Ignorance, combine

stupidity, the whole brood of

They always succeed

their forces to repulse the new.

at

first,

and are never routed without a severe struggle.

Of course this is not to assert that all novelties are always
detested in every department of

life.

There are exceptions, or

apparent exceptions, notoriously; but they "prove the rule,"

and

their analysis is very instructive.

The most
realm

striking case, probably,

under the

of fashion is

is

"
that of fashion."

spell of the

The

The new

new.

is

habitually valued as better than the old, and imposed on all who
would be " in the fashion." And who would not ? For to be
"

old-fashioned

"
is

to expose oneself to ridicule

and contempt.

"

To be arrayed in what " is not worn is a more heinous solecism

than to do what " is not done." At bottom, however, both of
these social tabus have a
social habit.

merely
matters

of

fashion

common

root in custom,

and custom

is

This prerogative position of Novelty in

is

not,

however, a wholly spontaneous

growth. The mutability of fashion is provided for by an

elaborate organization which is the product of an advanced

In a primitive society the fashions

civilization.

of

dressing

and tattooing one's body do not change. They are

habits, and it would bring calamity upon oneself and the

one's hair
tribal

whole tribe to innovate upon them in the slightest degree.

Why? There does not yet exist a class of specialists whose
business

it

is

to

change the fashions, and who are interested in

NOVELTY.
their

Chez nous the fashions change

good for the trade of milliners and

continual renovation.

because this

-annually

is

They plunge us from one extreme

tailors.

any woman may

in order that

less fortunate rival is still

last year

woman

And

tell

at a glance whether her

wearing a dress that

know

"

Hence the
novelties

"

"

last

men

and refuse

are

their power.
for the

"

last

Men's fashions do not change so rapidly,

of Paris.

instinct,

Hence

of the feminine soul is

cry

because

was fashioned

no self-respecting

full well that

they
can bear to be out of fashion.
!

into the opposite,

more

resistant to the suggestions of the herd

who

to follow the behests of their tailors,

therefore wisely do not insist on an annual change.

The human appetite

for

"

news

"

seems another objection to

the contention that novelty is not beloved. This is a fairly

complex craving, but in the main 'it may be regarded as an
We must somehow adapt ourselves to a world
adaptation.
that engenders novelties.
Also life is actually such that nearly
are always hoping and looking for news of a better.
What

all
is

surprising, therefore, is that

Of

stronger.

news

the craving for

is

not

course, however, these remarks do not exhaust

the philosophy of the

The apparent love

"

"

newspaper
of

change

We

similar explanation.

and

for its

its social functions.

own

try to escape

and may even be driven

sake

may

receive a

from a reality that

do

is

"

anything for a
change," despite proverbial warnings against leaping from the

unsatisfactory,

frying pan into the

A more

serious

to

fire.

example

of a

department of

life

which seems

to look with favour upon novelty is science.

In the last
have
or
of
human
societies
two
a
number
century
quite

developed quite a considerable enthusiasm for new discoveries

in science, and are no longer disposed to accept as final the

wisdom

of

explicable.

their

It has

service of man,
gratify

human

But

ancestors.

grown up

made

this

since science

sentiment

for

quite

was enlisted in the

itself technically useful,

desires

is

material goods.

and

set itself to

As

there are a

F.

multitude of

C.

S.

men

things

SCHILLER.

do not

but

desire

possess,

they

welcome anything new that holds out a prospect of giving them

what they want.
But of course it should be noted that
novelties do not break through in science without a struggle.

There

is

and

old

always a conservative party which will not scrap the

resists innovation, often to the death, and is only

vanquished by the perfecting of the new invention and itsmanifest working, or, in extreme cases, has to be left to die out.
has

Philosophy
Accordingly

no

half a dozen really

it,

new

to

welcome novelty.

The actual history

doesn't.

it

exhibits very little of

way

such motives

of

philosophy

in proportion to its length.

ideas

seem ever

to

Hardly
have forced their

into its tradition, to infuse fresh blood or to put a

new

complexion on the mummy cases of its problems. I cannot stop

to enumerate them now, but there is no need to wonder at the
unprogressiveness of philosophy, which its typical votaries are
wont to mistake for an assurance of its eternal truth.
It

is

clear then that the

human

attitude towards Novelty is

not quite uniform. It varies according to the subject. But

our fundamental bias is always hostile, and our concessions to
novelty are always extorted. Mostly by the force of fact.

For Novelty exists and is all-pervasive. We cannot avoid it,

try as we may but we can deceive ourselves about its existence
;

and disguise our acceptance

of

it.

nothing new under

And

so

we do

We

declare

And we

prove our
never
true, by
accepting a new truth until it is old and
has been licked into shape.
So a really new and important
truth will bear " discovery" over and over again, for centuries.

that "there

is

the sun."

dictum

The

it.

dozen times or so

first

next,

it is

By

not listened

to,

it simply is not comprehended, the"

"
because the times are not ripe for

the time they are,

it

can always be shown not to

really shocking because not really

new

at all

be-

and some one

can always earn a living by expounding the ancient sages who

discovered it long ago and were forgotten for their pains.

Thus the Copernican Eevolution was nothing new, because

it

NOVELTY.

had been, vainly, urged by Aristarchus of Samos. Darwinism

was nothing new, because it was anticipated by Anaximander.
Kelativity is nothing new, because it is embraced in the great
principle of Protagoras, from

whom Humanism

also

may

In short, any novelty worth worrying about

be discovered over and over again, like America.
descent.

its

trace

may

A novelty, therefore, like a parvenu, can always be provided

with a pedigree, once it has succeeded. This is very comforting;
but it is only part of the social camouflage which blinds us to
the occurrence of the new.
III.

To the same system

of devices belong at

bottom the methodo-

assumptions by which we render calculable the course of

"
events and construct stable " objects for the sciences to conlogical

template.

It is traditional to erect these into idols for philo-

sophic worship under such

names

as

"

a priori necessities of

evade the paradox that the road to

thought,"
scientific truth is paved throughout with postulates and fictions.
Scientific novelties also are reached by first pretending that they
in

cannot

order

to

then adjusting to the facts the calculations

exist, arid

Such

based on this false assumption.

practical necessities,

recourse to
of
its

them

is

"

like a politician

On

propaganda."

fictions are

and the philosopher who

who

everywhere
have

will not

scorns to avail himself

the enormous extension of this procedure,

indispensability and value,

need not, happily, enlarge it

Als Ob, and
;

will suffice to refer to Vaihinger's great study of the

to proceed at once to the task of showing how

dure justifies the human hatred of Novelty.

more progressive

Scientific procedure, as the

now

scientific proce-

logicians are

a sense) rest on a negation of

the
that is, the object of its
new,
Novelty.
"explains"
"
"
"
"
law or
the
it
as
a
case
of
old, whether
inquiry, by taking
recognizing

it

to be, does (in

It

"object."

something already known, and

It thus refers it to

assumes that

it

is

"

"

essentially

the same, and

may

be treated

10

C.

F.

It is plain,

Accordingly.

novelty evaporates.
to be "immaterial,"

It is

abstraction that the

Now

if

new

however, that in this proceeding its

taken to be irrelevant to its " essence,"

In

not unreal.

if

abstracted from, even

SCHILLER.

S.

other words,

is

it

not denied outright, and it is by this

is triumphantly reduced to the old.

what right have we

do this

to

Certainly none that

flows from the duty of correct or complete description.

vital
feature of the actual fact is arbitrarily excised and deliberately

Can we

ignored.

It

is

rest

our claim, then, on a necessity of

of ours to bolster

an easy and easy-going habit

thought
up our desires by alleging necessities, the tyrant's plea in philo-

sophy as in politics. But here this plea is manifestly false.

For we recognize the existence of Novelty even in the act of
"

"

our case
is
abstracting from it
plainly a new case of the
old.
are intellectually capable, then, of perceiving its actual
character it is untrue that we cannot think novelty.
:

We

The

real truth is that

Why

it.

boycott
comes.

We

it

we do not want

to recognize

it,

and

Because we do not want to take reality as

want

to control

it.

We

want

to alter

We

it.

adapt ourselves to it. We want to prepare for it. We

want to connect it with our desires and aims. Our cognitive

want

to

processes, in short, are part

and are only

and parcel of our

intelligible in this connexion.

treat the actual fact in the high-handed

Now
it,

it

is

vital purposes,

This

way we

is

why we

do.

easy to see that to manipulate the new, to bend

eventually, to our will,

we must somehow

get a hold on

it.

If

were wholly new, utterly unprecedented and unlike anything

we had ever known, this would be impossible; we could not

it

lay hold of

it,

we could do nothing with

it,

we could make

nothing out of it. We must assume therefore that its nature is

not thus intractable. We must explore it for points of likeness

something already known. We must test it by applying to

"
laws (old and approved formulas), and observe whether

to
*'

will "obey," that is

know

in

conform

advance whether

it

to,

will

them.

but

if

it
it

Of course we do not
it

does not,

we simply

NOVELTY.

11
"

"
the
try another formula, until we discover one that works
principle that there must be some way of coping with the new
is methodological, and cannot be renounced.
The actual hypo:

we use has always

thesis

to be confirmed empirically

by the
"

but the principle that inspires our search for a " true
hypothesis is not empirical, but volitional, and drives us, when
event

we have

fresh experiments with other laws, other

failed, to

analogies, hypotheses and

with

similarities.

the recalcitrant novelty, until

it

Thus do we grapple
has been successfully

placed in our intellectual cosmos, and we have triumphantly

enrolled the intruder in the great army of precedents. Thus is

the discrepant novelty tamed and reduced to order and conformity with the cosmic order, which in its turn stands as a
us (of

to

pledge

questionable value) that

it

will

not

be

intractable.

This then

method

to

humanize

it

the reason

is

it is

why

it

is

reasonable for scientific

order to tame and

Novelty,
evident that it affords considerable excuse for

from

abstract

human repugnance

in

to the

new

as a disturber of the cosmic

order, though hardly a justification for the insaner excesses of

our conservatism.
IV.
All this however
conclusion of the

is

not

first part.

the whole

story,

For once the new

but only the

been

fact has

broken in and tamed and assimilated to the old order, science

It
can, and indeed does, repent it of the violence done to it.
undoes therefore

its

abstraction from the novel features

it

had

"
ignored, and proceeds to recognize the individuality of the case,"
its differences from the cases previously on record, its unique
significance, and the additions it makes to our knowledge. In so

-doing

it

revises its statement of the function of

"

"

"

laws."

It

law it applied was not a rigid instrument of

absolute prediction, but a flexible formula to be adjusted to the
facts, fitted with blanks that can be accommodated to the

admits that the

12

F.

C.

S.

SCHILLER.

variable circumstances of an infinity of " cases."

it

never necessitates, or

be possible only

absolutely identical with those of the old

repeating

go on

can

of history

But

itself.

new

the "variables" in the

if

Consequently
which would

justifies, absolute prediction,

whereas the course

ever

without

novelties,

engendering

cases were*

the novelties have become intelligible.

Some sciences indeed go further.

Biology, for example,,
under Darwinian inspiration, has actually devised an expedient
for systematically

attributes

It

apprehending Novelty.

the

origination of varieties, the source of supply for the differences

to be sifted out for survival

Accidental variation

variation."

factor in its
as most.

scheme

And

"

accidental

thus made an

essential

by natural
is

selection, to

of explanation, in fact a

yet what

is it

category," as good

but creative chance

re-statement of the fact of Novelty, and

its

"

its

It is a

whole value

mere

lies in

recognition of this fact.

It does not follow, therefore, that scientific

new

to recognize the

and makes an end

seemed

to do this

as such,

method

and really reduces

it

refuses

to the

old,,

The methodological procedure which

was a fiction, and only a preliminary to the

of

it.

proper placing of the new, and to an evaluation of its contribution to our growing world, and our growing knowledge.
Theabstraction from Novelty, then, can, and must, be undone, and
does not incapacitate our thought from recognizing Novelty. In
short, for science, the negation of Novelty is only provisional

and methodological it does not justify our human hatred of

Novelty and the denials and disguises of Novelty to which this
:

hatred goads

us.

V.

Our concern
its

existence

so far has been with Novelty uberhaupt, with

as a

fact,

and

its

conceivability as

endeavour has been to show both that Novelty

conceivable, and

judice against

be

overcome.

it,

such.

My

exists, that it

is.

scientifically manageable, and that our prethough natural enough, both can, and should,,

Let

me

next try to draw out some of the

NOVELTY.

consequences which the recognition of Novelty carries for some

of the philosophic sciences.

I will begin

with Logic

than with Metaphysics,

rather

now multiplying far too

without logic they are
them,
many
like plants without roots, and can at best lead a saprophytic
because, though metaphysics are just

freely and we have

far too

of

existence.

Logic, however, in spite of its fundamental position,

present

very much

of a science in distress.

is

at

Most philosophers

have either despaired of it, or else made it into an impenetrable

mystery. I cannot approve of either attitude both seem to me
:

and indeed, for my purposes, practically coincident.

Both, moreover, seem to spring from one and the same blunder,
an obstinate and inveterate refusal to recognize Novelty, really
to be wrong,

and

fully, in Logic, as elsewhere.

there
is

is

no reason either

for

Once we consent

do

to

mystery or for despair.

this,

Novelty

as vital to Logic as to every science that is concerned with

occurs in

life,

it

as plainly

and inevitably as anywhere else, and

simple and natural way.

is explicable in it in a perfectly

We

can easily understand how novelty gets into logic, if we

will deign to observe that Logic is a failure if it cannot deal with
.actual

human

thought, that every train of thought is purposive,

logical processes can only occur in trains of thought.

and that

Hence they only occur when a thinker believes that by reasoning he can achieve some cognitive aim, and get to something he
does not yet possess that is, can attain new truth (" new,"
;

perhaps to

all or

"

to science," but at

truth familiar to him to others, to

convey

instruction.

any rate

to

him) or impart

whom it will be " new," and

Unless one of these conditions

will

is fulfilled,

there will not normally be any thinking or reasoning consequently there will not be produced any material for logic to
;

"

evaluate.

Thought

is

"

Novelty or nullity is the first law of Thought, if

not to be divorced from thinking, and Eeason from

reasoning.

This truth should not be hidden from us by the fact that

14

C.

F.

SCHILLER.

S.

a good deal of futile and superfluous thinking

An

may

inquirer

An

old.

"

laboriously

instructor

may

discover

teach what

is

"

what

is

may go
new

not

on.

but

no news to his hearers.

men make

mistakes.
But if the result of a thoughtthe
not
new,
process was superfluous while a reasoner
process
us
who habitually tells
nothing we did not know before is-

All

is

merely a

bore.

It is plain, therefore, that

real sense rational,

if

logical process is to be in

must conduce and conduct

it

any

to novelty,

and that a theory of logical proof which leaves no room for

novelty cannot be right. It is fatuity, or at best verbal trifling.

Yet

it is

have

an astonishing

though a sort

fact that

2000 years of

logical reflexion

impotent to account for novelty in thought, even

left logic

of recognition of it

was from the

involved in

first

demand that the conclusion must prove something

than what was stated in the premisses. This postulate,
in Aristotle's eyes, would perhaps have been satisfied by any
Aristotle's

"

other

"

verbal variant

position of being

does not get Logic out of the absurd

"
"
prove the truth of anything new,

still it

unable to

or to admit the novelty of anything true.

now

This absurdity has

lasted for well over 2000 years, and Logic shows little

desire to extricate itself

tial to its

claim to

The reason

"

from a muddle that seems

"

for this

ideal

"

be essen-

formal validity."

embarrassment

have divorced reason from reasoning.

imagine an

to

of

Eeason

so high

is

merely that logicians

They have chosen to

and holy that

it

excludes

human reasoning altogether, and renders it unintelligible and

impossible. They have become so enamoured of it that not even
the discovery that they had inadvertently reduced their own
"
"
"
"
forms of proof," the
ideal
system," to
syllogism and the

unmeaning nonsense has been able to deter them. Yet a child

can see that there must be something wrong with a form of
reasoning which only "proves" what has already been ascertained otherwise, or else assumes the very point it pretends to
"
This flaw in the syllogism has often been discovered,"
prove.

NOVELTY.

and never been met yet

;

it

remains

"

15

new " enough

to be repeated

once more.
(1) If in a syllogism the
sion," it is manifestly false

if,

major premiss

is

"

taken in exten-

in asserting that all

men

are mortal.

no provision has been made for immortals like Tithonus, Elijah,

the Struldbrugs and the Wandering Jew while if these casea
:

have been proved mythical, what novelty, or point, can there be

examined

in re -asserting the mortality of one of the cases already

before the major premiss could be formulated ?

"
(2) If we do not wish either to deny that certain

men "

have miraculously evaded death or to sacrifice our major premiss

to these exceptions, it is easy to take it as a definition, and so
to exclude Elijah, Tithonus

and Co. from the

not become a tautology that all

But,
and what novelty can the conclusion convey ?
if so,

has

it

class of

men

"

men."

are mortal,

we

try to take the major premiss in intension,

law of nature/' we speedily come upon the
same dilemma as before. We have merely to raise the question
(3)

If, lastly,

"

as a statement of a

whether the
is

"

case

"

really a

to

case in point.
"
"

law

that the

upon the

"

we

which we are arguing in the conclusion

For it is by no means certain in advance

are trying to apply

is

the right one to use

"

"

a case in point and not a

or that, though a good enough case in a

case," that the case is

deceptive imitation
general way, it is therefore a case for the special purpose of our
;

argument. If we assume all this, we shall be assuming the very

point to be proved while if we are in a position to know that
ours is a case in point, our conclusion will once more have failed
;

to attain to novelty.*

And
all

reasoning brings out nothing new, why reason at

If our premisses are already known to be as true as trite
yet

if

can be before

we use them, and

if

our conclusion

is

implicit in

them, the syllogism seems a silly farce. It is a superfluity, unless

And nothing but
it gets to something not otherwise accessible.
*
Cf.

Formal

Logic, ch. xvi.

16

C.

F.

an old

S.

SCHILLER.

logical prejudice prevents us

from so taking

it.

It is

perfectly possible to conceive this syllogism, as it occurs in real

thought,

and

alone

as

can occur

it

therein,

as

thought-

experiment with reality which forecasts the course of events

we are entitled to expect on the strength of past experience.

But we do not know whether our expectation will be fulfilled.

The rightness or wrongness of our anticipation is the news we
learn from the event.

If our conclusion

comes true in actual

fact, the reaction on our syllogism is to confirm our belief in

if not, we
its correctness and in the truth of its premisses
;

infer that there is

some flaw

in the premisses.

Clearly on this

interpretation the premisses must be taken as hypotheses whose

truth
to

is

come

not assured
true,

happen in

similarly the conclusion, though

it

ought

logically must if the premisses hold, need not

When therefore it does come about, we learn

and

fact.

that our premisses were so far true, and

that logical reasoning has availed to predict the actual course of
Of course this interpretation implies, what nonevents.

something new,

viz.,

openly avows, that reasoning does not start

from certainty but from doubt, and reaches not absoluteness but,
syllogistic reasoning

at best, adequacy to the actual problem considered.

It

means

from the psychological side of

and must be abandoned. And

also that the attempt to abstract

reasoning is wrong in principle,

why resent this? For why should

it

be denied that every

thought requires a thinker, and every thinker needs a motive ?

The need for Novelty then establishes itself even in the interpretation of the Syllogism.*

VI.
Logic, then, not only pronounces a nihil olstat
for Novelty,
itself

* The ideal

on to Metaphysics associates
Metaphysics however has plenty of

but in passing

with the demand.

of

"

system

"

upon the need

it

must accommodate
"

"

itself similarly.

For

if

and impervious to novelty, it

closed
the system is conceived
"
becomes a fallacious argument in a circle." Cf. my paper in last year's
as

Proceedings.

NOVELTY.
prejudices of

its

own.

17

It has long been

accustomed

to take it

Being must be a constant quantity,

on the absolute truth and self-evidence of the

for granted that ultimately

and

relied

maxim Ex

venerable

nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.

anything seems to arise or to pass away, this must be an

illusion
or else whatever behaves in so inconsiderate and
If

way cannot be

inconceivable a

cannot grow

For that which truly

truly real.

Nor can Being

really change in
and
For
is
any way.
Becoming,
Becoming is unthinkchange
able.
It is an impossible union of Being and Not-Being, and
is

Being cannot but

Has not all

all at

more.

less or

be,

while Not-Being cannot be at all.

sound ? Has it not imposed on us

this a familiar

some time

Yet

principles masquerading

is

it

only a string of methodological

as absolute necessities of thought.

If

we were really resolved to consider the matter dispassionately

and without prejudice, should we not soon discover that in

We

the bare notion of Being assures us of nothing ?

It contains no
not know that reality conforms to it.

itself

guarantee of
thing

now

eternity

must endure

been, and
is

own

its

(or seems to be)

is

its

mere

no proof that

The

for ever.

a hypothesis like

Being
determined by

for the

is

any

other,

it

fact that

must

do

real

some-

have

also

validity of the notion of

and

its

value has to be

application to experience.

quantitative constancy of Being cannot be

assumed a priori. Abstractly three alternatives would seem to
be equally conceivable. Either Being may be constant, or else
The first
it may progressively increase, or, again, diminish.

Similarly the

hypothesis

has

simplest and

always try

it

the

methodological advantage of being the

work with which is the reason why we

easiest to
first,

and cling

to

it,

despite appearances to the

For appearances not infrequently suggest the other

contrary.
alternatives, which intrinsically are quite as plausible, and
empirically there

is

much

to be said for

them.

Thus

to all

appearance psychic being tends to exemplify a law of increase

it

progresses and grows

richer,

ampler and

in tenser

as

it

18

C.

F.

SCHILLER,

S.

accumulates experience until mental decay sets in. Physical

It is
being on the other hand tends for ever to evaporate.

The flow of change is ever downmechanical nature seems to be running down like a
This is repugnant to our prejudice, so we insist
gigantic clock.
"
that the physically real does not really pass away but " only
subject to a law of decay.

wards

But

passes into an imperceptible form, not into nothingness.

when

"

"

"

"

and energy is
energy
"
"
"
into
heat," they are surely lost to us, and
dissipated
as
in
our world. The explanations given by our
disappear
agents
matter

dissolved

is

into

untoward process seem to be merely ways

loss, and of saving the face of the postulate

physicists of this

of

of
concealing this
the constancy of Being.
similar self-deception has probably
exaggerated the value of the empirical support of this dogma

certainly recent discoveries have done

much

to

discredit its

We now know that

validity.

to prove the

"

the ordinary chemical experiments

"
indestructibility of matter were not nearly fine

The chemical

enough.

stable structure

grips with

it,

less slowly.

it

"

atom

was taken

"

is

by no means the ultimate and

wherever we can get to

to be

we find that it is dissolving or disrupting, more or

Hence if we realize that the ordinary propositions
the behaviour of

of physics are statistical results concerning

thousands of millions of the constituents of

"

matter," and are

atoms form an approximately stationary

and stable population, there is nothing in the chemical facts to
confute the suggestion that atoms, like men, may be generated
willing to suppose that

and destroyed.
The empirical aspect
with the falsity

or rather

of the world, then, is quite compatible

the

of
it

nothing
a point, and not of others.
;

maxim

that

seems to hold

of

nothing arises out of

some

things, or

up

to

Of the others some appear to arise

out of nothing, and others to pass away into nothingness.
These appearances may be illusions, but Metaphysics is hardly

entitled

to

assume

monism should not

this,

and the presumptions

of

deter us from investigating them.

cheap

NOVELTY.

19

Metaphysics should rather consider carefully whether it is not

bound to declare that in principle Novelty, wherever it occurs,

must necessarily he conceived as

arising out of nothing so that

of nothing, so far from being
out
Novelty
origination
an impossible paradox, would be about the commonest and most
;

is real,

if

The argument

familiar process in nature.

for this contention

might be worded thus

It is true that nothing ever arises out

of absolutely nothing.

There

always something out

is

But that does not explain it wholly.

grows.
account for the new in it. It is only in so far as
over again, that

old, or the old

grew out

In so far as

of.

it

is

new,

is

it

which

it is still

the

accounted for by what it

remains unaccountable,

it

unpredictable, uncontrolled, undetermined, free.

it,

of

It does not

it

therefore, has arisen out of nothing,

That factor in

and Novelty as such

means, Creation out of nothing

In view of the length of this paper I will abstain from
criticizing this argument and remark merely that it may be true.
!

After

upon

we do not always

all

reality

succeed in forcing our postulates

may be such a world as it

so after all our world

appears to be, a

world in which being

and time and change are

real,

is

not constant

and

stable,

and devour what they have

engendered.

VII.
I

come

at

length to

for Eeligion, a

Novelty
few hints.

Religion

institutions, in

which

is

my

last

theme,

theme on which

viz.,

the import of

I can only

throw out a

perhaps the most paradoxical of human

the contradictions of human nature are

all

embraced and concentrated.

For at one and the same time

it

seems to be morally the embodiment of all man's highest

aspirations and the asylum for his maddest and most brutal
superstitions, politically the

most conservative and most revolu-

tionary of social forces, intellectually the creation of his crudest

and his subtlest thought, practically his final effort to transcend

the limits of his being and yet the supreme support conditioning
c 2

20

F.

C.

S.

SCHILLER.

relation to theology is no less

seems a mere excrescence
theology
paradoxical.
sight
on religion, devised to amuse the leisure of idle priests and yet
religions all generate theologies, and theologies not infrequently
his

life

within them.

At

Its

first

have lessons

for philosophy.

We

So here.

have slowly forced our way to a point where

a theological doctrine has all the appearance of a saving revelation.

Originally the doctrine of the world's creation out of

nothing was bound to seem mere philosophic foolishness.

was a denial

of

"

It

out of nothing nothing." It had a most disIt arose out of sectarian zeal, and a blunder

creditable history.
of

Philo of Alexandria invented

translation.

it

in order to

prove that the God of Genesis was superior to the God of the
Timaeus.
The Platonic "myth" had pictured the latter as

forming

the

(sensible)

world out

having as his models the eternal

"

of

empty

Ideas

":

space,

and as

so Philo thought

he could go one better by declaring that his God created the

He supported his contention by misworld out of nothing.
translating

the

first

Jewish adaptation

of

chapter of Genesis, which was really a

Babylonian myths describing how Bel,

the Sun-god, slew Tiamat, the Dragon of the Deep, or Ea, the
"
Fish-god, fished the earth out of the waters of the Abyss."
correct translation would have brought out the fact that in the

Hebrew
"

version also these

creation,"

"

and that the God

waters
of

"

were a presupposition of

Moses

also

made

the cosmic

order out of chaos, and not out of nothing.*

It was a further difficulty about the notion of creation out

most languages refused

not evolved the means of expressing
of nothing that

to recognize
it

at

all.

it,

It

and had
had not

occurred to their makers to distinguish between making or

"
"
creating de novo.
shaping, out of pre-existent material, and

In French, for example, crSer has to do duty for both these

English and German are peculiar in making the

ideas.

Cf. C.

M. Walsh, The Doctrine of Creation.

21

NOVELTY.

even they exhibit the difficulty of making it, by

The English create
specializing different words to express it.
distinction, but

originally

word

meant

to

"

generate," the

German

schaffen is the

same

"

as our

shape."
Clearly the doctrine of creation out of nothing was in every
respect in a precarious state, and it is a marvel that the

Christian Church adopted

Yet we have found that the

it.

A
Christian Church was right, and philosophy was wrong.
world that generates novelty is creating itself out of nothing.
It must be pronounced capable of arising out of nothing
only
;

we must add

that the creative process

Moreover

it

is

is still

continuing.

clear that this process has great religious

world of which the being is constant and fixed has

one great and irremediable defect. It cannot change for the
It is already, and
better, because it cannot really change at all.

value.

for all time,

as

it

can

and despite

be.

leaves no

room

the table, and

We

or leave

it

or repudiate

"

Tout

for hope.

it.

heaven

and a

or a

All the cards are on

its

worth playing.
value here and now, and take

Whether we decide
it, it

no future.
"

donnd.

est

we can judge whether our hand

can therefore decide upon

it

lias

appearances to the contrary, as good

Also as bad. It disappoints no expectations, but
all

for it or against,

has no halo of

It is essentially
"

hell

"

(as

may

"

is

approve

possibilities, of romance.

of

It

eternal," fore-doomed to be a

be)

and, in either case, a prison

bore.

On

the other hand, a world

which

is

still

"evolving,"

creating, and re-creating itself, has room for the realization of

It can become better, and even, conceivably, comall ideals.

pletely good.

Thus there

is

no

finality

about

its evils.

Nor

of

We

need never
course about the judgments passed upon it.
and
intelliour
will
of
good
despair of it, if we do not despair

For that it is becoming what it becomes may in part

on
what we will and what we do and how we determine
depend
gence.

its

indeterminations.

be of our

own

Some

invention

of the novelties

it

generates

may

22

NOVELTY.

But

of course the choice

between these two worlds

will not

be agreed upon alike by all. Some will prefer the one, others the
The conservative will opt lor the world whose evils are

other.

customary, known, and calculable. So will the pessimist, unless

he really thinks he is living in the worst world possible. The
optimist will prefer a world capable of betterment, because he
instinctively hopes for the best

and

possibilities of deterioration will

not be realized.

turous also will welcome a world that

trusts that the sinister

is

The adven-

more fun and promises

and will trust themselves to cope with them.

In short this whole issue as to the ultimate validity of

novelties,

Novelty seems to resolve itself into a question of valuation.

Two opposite valuations seem possible, both starting from the

"

Creation."*
equation Novelty
value it as "divine," and shall say

we approve

If
"

Novelty

of

it,

Creation

we disapprove of it, and are keenly sensible

insecurity, we shall have an equal right to declare
= Creation =the Devil."
If

we

shall

God."

of its fiendish

that

"

Novelty

Between these alternative valuations each of us must choose.

Each of us will choose the one that appeals more to him, the
one more consonant with his nature and tastes, and no one can
presume

to dictate

his choice.

For values are not only

themselves, but the ultimate determinants of

recognize,
of

all.

and

Hence

amenable

all

so questions of valuation are the

the

"

facts

by

logic or

fact.

by

"

we

most ultimate

differences in valuations are irreducible,

to coercion

facts

They

and not

attest

man's

ultimate control over his experience whatever it may be, he

has the last word, and even at his last gasp, like Prometheus
:

agonizing on the rocks of Caucasus, he can defy Zeus, and pass

judgment on the world.

his

* Another
"
interesting equation to investigate would be
Novelty =
and
the
interest
of
the
in
this
is
obvious.
But
Miracle,"
religions
limitations of space forbid me to follow out its consequences here.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower

November 2lst, 1921, at 8 P.M.

W.C.

Street,

1,

AN INDIAN DOCTEINE OF PERCEPTION AND

II.

ERROR.
By

IT seems advisable

which

to

which

it

system
Vaiseshika system, a
the

1.

Prefatory.

the discussion of the matter

preface

It

arises.

is

combination

known
two

of

of

the

the Nyaya-

as

inde-

originally

which the one, the Nyaya, contributed

doctrines, and the other mainly ontological and

schools, of

logical

It

physical theories.
realist

W. THOMAS.

have in view with a short characterization

in

pendent

F.

and

may

atomistic.

be described as scholastic, pluralist,

It affirms a plurality of souls,

which

all omnipresent and everlasting, a material world constructed of atoms, differing in kind through what is called

are

speciality or ultimate differentia

(visesha), real

com-

objects

posed of these atoms, and a real time and space.

It

admits a

deity, and as regards transmigration of souls, liberation by

knowledge and so forth it is in agreement with the general

Indian views.

The expositions usually commence with

a list of categories,

or classes of entities, of which seven are recognized, namely,

substance, quality,

and negation.

action,

The

universality,

the categories are not in any

categories, such as potency

way deduced, and

and

sometimes admitted that the

optional.

The

first

The

first

genus

"

six of the

summum

existence

inherence

is

other possible

indefinitive

it is

and partly

seven are qualified as positive.

genus.

"

existence

"
(sattd),

The recognition

"

(denied

known

similarity, are discussed

list

three are credited with

described as the

speciality,

history of this classification is not

by Aristotle)

which

is

of a highest

hardly calls

for

24

W. THOMAS.

F.

explanation

which

but attention

may

be drawn to the manner in

By some

appears in the system.

"
"
existence
does not differ from
it

should include the universals

however,

That,

genus.

"

positivity

effect that

account for loss of existence

the

made

is

attempt

"

existence

that

show that

"
is

required

virtue of

in

is

"

which

existence."

this is not incompatible

with

eternal "existents," such as atoms, time,

recognition of

space and

to

and therefore

accordingly they deny it as a

the orthodox view.
An

substances, qualities and actions can cease to be

An

was held that

was not

argument was drawn to the

to

it

"

Indian logician argues that,

something occurring in both eternals and
non-eternals, the possibility of the latter occurrence is something
souls

in

whereas existence

which

qualifies it

the

fact

is

even in the former.

his usual procedure in defining

"

existence

"
lie

This

genera

consonant with

is

but in the case of

plainly has the special object of distinguishing

physical existence.

The epistemology
various

of

subject

deals

first

definitions,

with "truth" (pram a), the

all describe
it as an

which

The means
experience we might therefore call it knowledge.
to truth (pramanas) are most commonly considered to be four
:

number, namely perception, inference, analogy and communication, of which, however, the last two are admitted to be
in

dependent upon the second.

truth

their validity

is

to individual

"

experience

of being

pramanya), which term

true cognitions.

"

being

The property

is

means

to

also applied

All four are distinguished, as

(anubhava), from memory.

2.

Perception.

"
According to the old definition perception was cognition
arising from contact of sense-organ and thing, inexpressible and

unerring,

include

"

consisting

of

affirmation."

In order however to

God's perception," and also for other reasons, prefersubsequently given to a definition in the form

ence was
"

cognition

not

instrumented

"

by cognition

and

it

was

PERCEPTION AND ERROR.

25

explained that inference, analogy and communication are

excluded as being instrumented by cognitions of subsumption,
similarity

and meaning

respectively.

we inquire why a

If

upon an enumeration of the sense-organs is not

"
the
God's percepreason, apart from the case of
preferred,
definitions
will
be
of
the
that
the
tion,"
sense-organs are made
definition based

depend upon that

to

of perception.

The sense-organs are the

eye, ear, skin, tongue, nose,

the mind-organ (manas).

In the

first

place,

it

five usually recognized,

and

What

is

these,

plainly

called
?

was held necessary to posit an organ

are

they

bring cognitions also

under

such as desires,

soul,

for our

It

cognized.

accordance with the system, which rejects

to

namely
is

the purport of this addition

which should report occurrences in the

feelings and so on, i.e., should account
since

which

also a sixth,

this rubric.

awareness of

was quite

in

"

self-luminosity,"

As

a result,

we

have three kinds of procedures in the soul, namely cognitions,

desires and feelings, which are brought to consciousness by
a single organ.
Consciousness, however, is not the best word
For plainly the idea is in exact
to be used in this connexion.

correspondence with that which Professor Ward expresses by

"
the term
attention."
Some philosophers explained the
varying area of attention

by a power

of

contraction

and

expansion in this mind-organ. But the orthodox view regards

Its second function was to account for
the organ as atomic.
the fact that, while
world,

we attend

to

all

them

the senses are in

contact with

the

severally.

As

we

regards the objects apprehended by the exterior senses,

may cite a brief statement from a manual,* as follows
:

"

The

field of

smell

is

odour, also odourness and so forth.

[is

the field] of the tongue, and sound

"

Similarly savour
of the ear.

Siddhanta-muktavali, 53-7.

D 2

26

F.

"

The

W. THOMAS.

the eye is appreciable colour.

Substances
and
the
several
same,
number,
possessing
ty
disjunction and
field of

conjunction, priority and posteriority, viscidity, fluidity and

size, action and genus in appropriate occurrence, inherence

under the same condition the eye apprehends through

connexion with light and appreciable colour.
"
Substance having appreciable touch and appreciable
touch
for

itself

are the field of the skin

Here

being seen, except colour.

also

what

suitable

is

also colour

is

the

cause of perception of substance."

The
and

gist of this is that smell

their genera, whereas sight

and taste reveal only

and touch reveal

qualities

also substance,

Accordingly we should understand that,

when we taste a thing, there is a combination of two senses,

action and so forth.

taste

and touch

What may
substances,

i.e.,

an apparently reasonable view.

be

the

things,

correct

doctrine

as

regards

seeing

through connexion with light and colour,

am

not prepared to state. But at any rate it is a prima facie

experience that we see riot only colour, but also extension, and
that may be enough
moreover, a joint prerogative of sight
I

and touch over the other senses

is

in this respect, I believe,

The curious doctrine that colour

conceded.

mentioning.

is

cause of the

one which we might be shy of

It was due to a desire for a single cause of such

tactual perception of substance

is

perception, and was connected with a view that air is known

need hardly mention
not by perception, but by inference.

We

that

it is

as cause

and not

as object of perception generally that

"colour" was selected by these realists.

"
moderns."
criticized and rejected by the

We

The doctrine was

will not go into the physical explanations of vision, or

understood by " conjunction with

the eye and light," or what is stated in this connexion as to
Sufficient has been said to show that in
action at a distance.

what

in the case of sight

is

their treatment of perception these Indian philosophers were at

PERCEPTION AND ERROR.

least

27

on a level with the Greeks and with the scholastics

own middle

of our

They even attained the notion that

ages.

all

perception and cognition were due to a connexion of intelligence

with a skin, a notion, which seems to be endorsed by modern

What

science.

is

known

the case of such pairs

and by some

"

long

denied,* as

"

"

as the

"

relativity

and

we may

"

short

"

of perception in

was

also find in

also considered

modern psycho-

logical works.

Process

3.

As

and Analysis of Perception.

a practical exemplification of the stages recognized by

we may quote a particular

Indians in the process of perception

(Jain) statementf as follows

"

Originating with a seeing, which occurs immediately

upon conjunction of object and subject and which takes in

we have

apprehension of a thing
this is notice.'
qualified by intermediate generic forms
existence only,

first

'

"

Next comes

noticed
"

this is

'

speciality

of

the

thing

curiosity.'

retention

From

or

of

'

this is

The same, when

'

"

the

for

Next, ascertainment of the speciality of the object

the curiosity
"

desire
'

apperception.'

it

has attained a confirmed condition,

is

'

contemplation.'
'

curiosity

doubt

'

is

distinguished

by

being

preceded thereby.
"

Although

all

these are in a

different designations in

way

the same, they have

virtue of being special develop-

ments.
"

Owing to being experienced without confusion, even

when they occur in incomplete form, owing to their
revealing

severally unanticipated

* Tattva-cintamani, Vol.

I, p.

developments of

560.

t Pramana-naya-tattv-alok-dlankara, II, 7-18.

the

28

F.

thing,

and owing

W. THOMAS.

to their successive origination, these over-

pass each other.

"

In some cases the succession

unobserved by reason

is

of rapid origination."

The Nyaya-Vaiseshika philosophy

is

usually content for

two

purposes to distinguish in perception

stages,

which I

its

will

"unquestioning" (nirvikalpaka) and

The literal meanings "without
"definitive" (savikalpaka).

by the terms

represent

"

and

"

with alternative," while indicating the nature

of the distinction, are unsuitable for use, and for the second

alternative

a synonymous term vyavasaya (apperception) which is

rather literally rendered by "decision." This important disthere

is

crimination will justify a rather extensive quotation*

"

Immediately upon conjunction with the eye there does

not arise a cognition in the form 'pot/ as a something
qualified by 'potness/ by reason of the previous nonexistence of the qualification

'

'

potness

awareness of a qualified cognition

And

tion.

is

for the cause of

cognition of a qualifica-

comes to pass a cognition not

qualified as between pot and

so at first there

penetrating to a being

potness and it is this that is the unquestioning.' And

For a cognition not penetrating to a
this not perceived.
is
not
perception, since that presents itself
being qualified
'

as

'

I cognize a pot.'

by way

light

cognition

which
tion

'
;

Here

in the self a cognition

of being a determination

comes to

[thereof], in the

the pot 'potness/

That
again 'pot/ and
the determination, the same is called a qualificain

'

is

in the qualification the further qualification is called

the delimitant of the being that qualification.

cognition
of
the
for
the
delimitant
determination
being of a
having
qualification is cause of the qualificand's being qualified

Now

in

the

unquestioning
*

determination

Siddhanta-muktavall, 58.

such

as

PEKCEPTION AND ERKOK.

29

'

'

potness is wanting hence in that cognition a glimpsing

of the qualification of the pot, as qualified by potness, is
;

'

not possible. Without the determination potness there

can be no cognition of what is qualified as pot/ because of
the rule that cognition of a thing other than a genus is
'

'

determined by some attribute."

The upshot of this is that there is in perception a stage at

which the thing is indeed apprehended, but without discrimina"

tion of its

where put.

thisness

"

from

"

its

essence," as the matter

is else-

At

that, the unquestioning, stage it is held that

the cognition is really suprasensual and not subject to the
alternative of truth and falsity.
But what is the point of
?
What appears to be
not that the thing, but that the cognition is not
In other words, we perceive,
perceived, i.e. by the mind-organ.
but do not perceive that we perceive. Furthermore, the cogni-

calling such a cognition suprasensual

meant

is

tion

infallible, so that error, if

is

Epicureans held, with the

At the

any, must come

in, as

the

Trpoo-Soga^o/jievov.

we qualify the object by

a generic term, recognizing that the pot is a pot.
According to
our system this implies a thinking of the genus itself, and we
second, or definitive, stage

have to show how this comes about.

demands that the genus must be

In

its

realism the system

there, in order to be thought

accordingly it is said to be apprehended by a non-mundane

contact (alaukika-sannikarsha), which is designated sdmdnyalakshand,

may

"

having the generality for mark."

indulge in a quotation
"

Here,

if

by the word

we
is

Here again we

*
'

mark

'

self-identity is intended,

'

get the meaning, a presence of which the self-identity

an universal.' And this is to be understood as by way

of a

determination in a cognition having for object the

Thus, where
thing connected with the sense-organ.
*

Siddhanta-muktavall, 63.

30

F.

W. THOMAS.

conjoined with the sense-organ

is

smoke,

aiul

object the cognition 'smoko' has come

with that for

to pass,

in

that

'

cognition there arises the determination smokeness,' and

with contact <ji< smokeness a cognition 'smoke' having
'

'

for ohject all smokes.

"

Conjunction with the sense-organ

mundane

as

(normal), and

be understood

is to

the case of exterior

In the case of the mind-organ merely the

sense-organs.

universal by

in

this

of being a determination in the cognition

way

Hence, "when by verbal communication and

so forth we are made aware of some ghost, a mental aware-

is

'presence.'

ness of

all

ghosts

is

accounted

for.

"Furthermore, generality means 'being common' and

that is in some cases eternal, smokeness and so forth, in
'

'

other

'

'

cases

non-eternal,

and so

pot

Where

forth.

cognized as being, by conjunction, on the

ground or, by inherence, in its parts, thereupon there arises
a cognition of all the grounds, or of all the parts, having
is

particular pot

that pot.

"

In perception nothing is presented without a contact

and so without generality-mark how would there be a
;

'

'

presentation of
fire

this

should
of all

all

smokes qua smoke and

of all fires

'

'

qua

Nor

accepted.
why generality-mark
be asked what harm 'there is in non-presentation
fires and smokes
for, inasmuch as in regard to the
is

is

it

perceived smoke a connexion with tire has been apprehended and other smoke is not given, there is then no
'

accounting for the doubt whether smoke

'

'fire';
all
'

whereas on

smoke

smoke

'

is

my

view, since

given, a doubt

is

is
'

by

possible

at other times in other places

overlapped by

generality -mark

is

as to

'

whether

overlapped by

'fire.'"

We

are

now, perhaps, in a position to seize the whole

PERCEPTION AND ERROR.

doctrine which
doctrine,

what

is

meant

is

first

31

be conveyed.
According to this
presented is a particular object in its
to

undivided entirety.
But in point of fact the object consists
of an universal inherent in its material
and this universal
;

emerges to the view of the soul, which has contact with it in

a suprasensual manner.
But the universal, as such, inheres
equally in

all

particulars

except as inherent,

all

and,

since

the particulars

it

has

come

Even a

in

existence

some way into

act as an universal in

contemplation.
particular may
view of the different other objects to which

same

no

it

stands in the

relation.

There

we must
we know that

however, yet another factor of which

is,

take account.

When we

sweet, a fact which

see a

lump

we

of sugar,
"

explain by association of ideas."

other systems) will have it that we
perceive the sugar to be sweet, and it admits another nonmundane contact under the name " cognition-mark " (jnanait is

The Nyaya (but not

laJcshand).

all

Since, however, the

object

is

clearly

legitimate,

namely, the distinction of the inherent universal from the

associated, we need not quarrel with the way of putting the
matter or discuss the arguments.
far

Probably the most interesting feature in the theory as so

expounded is its attitude to the universals, which it holds

to be involved in the perception.

this Society

we heard

thing involves in a

it

way

It is not so long since in

maintained that the perception of a

a consciousness of

all its

congeners.

some further observations, partly from the

The particular functioning as
Indian side, may be in point.
an universal has already come before us. But there is another
Possibly, therefore,

Indian system, that of the Jains, which deals more formally

*
with the subject. Here also we may make a quotation
:

"

Generality

is

of

two kinds, crosswise generality and

vertical generality.

Pramdna-naya-tattv-dlok-dlankdra, V, 3-5.

32

F.

"

Crosswise

several

W. THOMAS.
is

generality

particulars

similar

development

'

for

example,

ox-ness,'

in

in

bodies

spotted and brindled.

"

Vertical generality

posterior developments
'

'

armlet,'

ring/ and

is
;

substance

common

for example,

'

to prior

and

gold/ persisting in

so forth."

In thus discriminating two kinds of universal, of which

one depends upon difference of individual and the other upon

difference of time, the Jains would seem to have the support
of a passage in Mr. Bradley's Logic (I, c. VI,
30 sqq.). But
the Vaiseshika tenet seems to regard the individual even in
its single occurrence as an universal, since it stands in various
spatial relations.

This, however, does not go for

much, because

their view was clearly that what is perceived is a particular,

constituted by an universal inherent in certain matter.

Perhaps in this connexion I may venture to dwell upon

a consideration which is certainly apposite.
How far are we
constituted

capable of apprehending the strictly individual

May it not be said that the sense-organ always
apprehends an universal, since it has no power of apprehending

at

all

Just as a gun would impart precisely the

anything else ?
same motion to every projectile having the same shape, size,
and mass, and just as any other machine will function upon
similar material to precisely similar effect, so the sense-organ
is

incapable of discriminating between precisely similar objects.

know, in fact, that beyond a certain degree of similarity

We

it loses

this is

of

the power of distinguishing and, if it is argued that

only a matter of a variable limit, and that the existence
;

two absolutely similar things

hypothesis,

we may

is a disputable, or a false,
that
the actuality, but the mere
not
reply

possibility of such similars suffices to enforce the lesson that

what we perceive

is

not the inner

self

of the object, but a

semblance which might recur elsewhere and is therefore in its

nature an universal.
On this view the particularizing factor

PERCEPTION AND EKUOK.

would be simply the junction

"
"
here and now."

33

two also general conditions

of the

"

What

ignored in this argumentation is the historical

Can we not say that, failing other means, the
consideration ?
is

Two
history of the object gives a definite identification.
cannon-balls may be as indistinguishable as we like
but they
;

and their parts carry always

traces of

and probably physical,

the different situations in which they have taken a
theoretical,

Even things which are actually classes may become,

when we include the historical aspect, particulars for example,
man as a historical actuality is a single phenomenon. Upon
part.

view the individual would be constituted by a crossing

two universals, one dependent upon similarity and the other

this
of

upon temporal sequence, the

of the Jains.

and the

cross

If it is rightly said that

we

vertical universals

are always dealing

"

with a specious and not an absolute present, and that " iron
cannot in an atomic instant exist, it is clear that the time

must always be included

the logical view.

But
plainly no combination of universals can ever yield more than
a relative individuality; and, if we require the absolutely
factor

individual,
it

we

in

have to apply

shall

be said that after

between the universal

all
"

there

to the mystics.

is

Socrates

"

some

Or might

essential difference

and the universal

"

man,"
"
man to be in some way definable,
namely, that we suppose
that is to be composed of a finite number of universals, whereas
"

in regard to the individual

we have

a feeling that his essence

But
hardly to be expected that even
this hypothesis would command assent ; for, while it is clear
"
that
man " need not imply any of the peculiarities which

is

inexhaustible

it is

distinguish Socrates from Plato,

the view that "

man

"

also

is

we should have

something

to deal

with

of infinite potentialities,

including those very idiosyncracies which distinguish Socrates

and

Plato.
I

must not imply that the Indian

the matter in this light.

In

fact,

logicians

had discussed

they certainly did not do

34
so,

W. THOMAS.

F.

But

but found in their atoms an absolute differentiation.

"

"
and a
crosswise
admitting both a
"
"
vertical generality, had taken a step which might ultimately
So far
render questionable the very idea of an individual.

clearly the Jains,

in

from being the fact, as has been alleged, that the Indians
were unacquainted with the concept.
is it

The Post-apperception (anu-vyavasaya.}

4.

The completed perception

in

of

cognition

"

this

"

object being really qualified

But these

determined.

results according to the

Nyaya

as qualified by a universal, the

and the cognition correspondingly

philosophers

recognized

further

which the mind becomes by mental perception cog-

stage, at

nizant of

its

cognition.

No

doubt, their opponents in general

admitted such a stage in thought.

as

differences

to

its

But there were

character and

essential

Some

indispensability.

philosophers held that the original cognition was suprasensual

"
and inferred from a resultant " known-ness in the object.

But the main contention was with the upholders

"

of

These maintained that the cognition in

luminosity."

self-

itself

without "post-apperception" was sufficient to lead to appropriate action and to the objection that desire also should be
;

autonomous they replied that

similarly

this

was nugatory,

What

since for all action they posited cognition as a requisite.

they mean by

"

"

self-luminosity

consciousness, and
*
follows

some

of

them

is

that all cognition implies

state their

view formally as

"
all

The proof

presentations have at their origination the form

nize

this/

For

of self-luminosity is perception itself.

tracing

cognized, wherein

out a cognizer, a
the

self

is

cognition,

glimpsed

as

'

I cog-

and a

agent,

the

cognized as object of the act, and the cognition as action

* Tattva-cintdmani, Vol.

I, p.

788.

PERCEPTION AND ERHOR.

35

so that the cognition is experienced as including in its

proper reference the cognizer and the cognized."

The point

What

the

of

debate

is,

no doubt, a

the opponent really maintains

is

little

obscure.

that all cognitions are

form of a revelation of their object to the subject and

not susceptible of error: as the connexion between a cognition
and its (true) object he names a " special kind of own nature,"
in the

which he says

is established by experience, although it cannot

be conveyed by any single word. The Nyaya denies that all
cognitions are in the form "I cognize this," and claims that
"
this
experience proves that factual certitude in the form

silver"

sufficient to elicit response.

is

be mistaken

Both admit that the

but, while the

response may
Nyaya holds that
this is the fault of a wrong perception, the opponent considers

that

it

due to a

is

failure to distinguish

thing perceived and something

5.

Coming now
recall

to

Truth and Error.

the matter of truth

how anxiously

between the

desired.

the later schools of

and

error,

we may

Greek philosophy

were occupied with the question of the non-illusory perception.

The whole dispute between the Stoics and the later Academy
centred about this point.
appearance which could

The
not

Stoics laboured to
deceive,

their

define

an

Kara\Tj7rT/crj

fyavradia, and even appealed to the goodness of Providence,

which would not have created two exactly similar things;

while the

Academy based upon

the view that any appearance

might be false its doctrine of the probable. At a much earlier

period some of the Sophists denied the possibility of error On
the ground that a false statement was simply a different
statement, wherein, of course, they were considering merely
the content of a judgment and ignoring the real question,

which concerns

its

reference.

In the Nyaya-Vaiseshika view perception does, as we have

36

F.

apprehend a real

seen,

W. THOMAS.

object,

and the process consists of a

and an universal and then

distinguishing therein a "this"

attributing the latter again to the former.

Inasmuch, however,
admits that perception may be true or false, it has to
explain what truth and falsity are, how they arise, and by
as

it

what means the

latter

To the question
would reply that

can be cured.

"

it

what
is

"

truth

is

most Indian schools

identical with true experience.

An

absolute truth independent of experience does not seem to be

contemplated and if it were asked what is the truth of the

statement " Caesar is dead," apart from anyone's experience of
;

it,

of

they would probably reply that it was a factual coexistence

"
what is denoted by " Csesar
with what is denoted by

"

namely Caesar's factual death.

Within the experience doctrine there were, apart from the
extreme position of those who held that all experiences are
dying,"

true,

many

varieties of definition,

some

by an opponent and refuted as follows

"Truth

of

which are

set forth

*
:

not experience corresponding to fact.

For
is
the meaning of the word "corresimilarity, which
sponding," does not hold between a cognition and a pot

and

so on

is

and moreover mere similarity has

to be

used in

treating of error.

"Nor

is

it

experience

generated

negation of

by a

quality

or

defect, since these

experience generated by
two are not invariants, and since they themselves require
to be de-marked by truth and untruth.'
'

"

Nor

is it

'

'

unprecluded experience, since preclusion

is

truth of contradictory.
"

Nor

which
is

is

consonant experience, since being consonant/

being accordantly traced out by another cognition,
'

is it

common
*

to error.

Tattva-cintdmani, Vol.

I,

pp. 381, sqq.

PERCEPTION AND ERROR.

"

Nor

37

experience generative of accordant response,

since this does not comprehend truth which is indifferent
is it

and since the accordance requires

'

be

to

demarked by

truth.'
"

Nor

is

it

nothing there

'

experience of a
is

same would apply

if

of

what

is

there were, the

to error."

The disputant goes on

the view of those

to refute

that all objects are such in virtue of an

'

objectivity,"

"

particular objects have particular

the theory that truth

since

that,'

no presentation, and,

objectivities,"

who hold
and that

which leads to

an experience having a determination

is

"
coinciding with the particular objectivity."*
Among these varieties of opinion we may find some

adumwhat we should recognize as a correspondence doctrine,

a pragmatist doctrine, and a consistency doctrine. The Nyaya
bration of

own

replies with its

definition, as follows :f

"

Truth is experience of a thing where it is, or experience

with determination A applied to what possesses A."
"

tion

Error

with

possess
"

is

Or

cognition of a thing where

determination

applied

it is not,

to

or cogni-

what does not

A/
else truth is experience, given a being other

than

error as so defined.
"

And

'

having for determination

a being qualified

by A/

of qualification A.'

or a

'

'

is

'

having

for object

being generated by a cognition

"

This, perhaps, requires a little elucidation.

If, it is said,

we

cognize

another person's cognition and also its object, e.g., a pot, we may still
doubt whether he cognizes it qua " pot " it may be presented to him
under some other aspect, e.g., missile. Accordingly, we suppose that a
thing has some proper, or correct, aspect in presentation, and this is its
"
"
Each thing has its objectivity, and
objectivity or value as an object.
in cases where this is realized we have truth of perception.
:

t Tattva-cintamani, Vol.

I,

pp. 401-2.

38

F.

W. THOMAS.

The purport of this definition is to recognize in the thought

and the thing an element not merely of correspondence, but of
This the Nyaya finds in its universal. It argues that
"
"
earth
the concept
undeniably h^s a content, or determinaidentity.
"

tion,

and, holding

earthness";

existent in all

"

"

that

earthness

frame

earth," it is entitled to

"
is

really

its definition in

We may say that its method consists in discontent which cannot be distinguished from its
and it formally asserts that both perception and

the stated form.

covering a
actuality

conception are contacts with a reality.

should like to ask

whether from their point of view these systematists were not

Once admit that in the thought of a universal it is
justified.

and

possible to distinguish content

have some sort of

act,

then the content must

independent existence (which

may

indeed

sometimes be nothing more than a having been thought by

some one on some other occasion); and, if the universal is
applicable to the perceived particular, then

economy demands
same as the

that the existence in conception should be the

existence in perception, and

either

of

we have

things conceived and

Tt

a fundamental identity

perceived or of the
the contents are

things

if

is

only
corresponding operations.
entirely under our control in thought that
to import

them

seems possible

into perceptibles to which they are initially

extrinsic.

Other Indian

existence

"

called

it

which

systems,

conventional,"

would

ment;

and perhaps the philosophy

regard

the

contents

universal

as

of

admit a form
elude

this

of

argu-

language would also

having

conventional

existence.

As regards error of percention also the Nyaya has to deal

with various opponents. Its own doctrine is that error is

When

I perceive mother-of-pearl as silver, what

an
that
happens
independently presented cognition of silver
associates itself with the perception, which is thereby falsified.

mistake.

is

What

is

insisted

upon

is

that the concept of silver qualifies the

object perceived in precisely the

same way

as

would in true

PERCEPTION AND EUROR.

"

perception the concept

drawn up
"

as follows*

mother

of pearl

39

"
;

and a syllogism

is

cognition having for determination

'

'

silverness

and

wish for silver and applied to

the
mother-of-pearl ^qualifies
mother-of-pearl, because it is
begetting response due

to

like
cognition entailing response to the mother-of-pearl
the cognition begetting response to mother-of-pearl by one
;

requiring mother-of-pearl."

The opponent admits that the idea

way

of recollection or association,

of silver is present by
but denies the qualification.

He

holds that the perception of the thing and the remembrance

of the silver are present in the mind together and that the

wrong response

is

due

namely a non-

to a negative something,

apprehension of difference between the two.

We

have here

material for a pretty discussion, in which the case of silver and

together mistaken for mother-of-pearl and

The strong point
plays a prominent part.

.mother-of-pearl
silver

together

opponent is that his non-apprehension of difference

accounts for the response in the case of true perception of silver
In reality, however, he does not admit error of
as silver.
of

the

perception

at

all

and in

fact

he openly asserts

that

all

and that they can be

whereas the Nyayaonly in practice

cognitions are in accordance with fact,

made to appear false

Vaiseshika endeavours to get the error into the actual percep;

tion,

and

finds

experience of

Another

"

an analogy in recognition, which he explains as

thatness

"

in the perception

consideration

itself.

the

urged by
ISTyfiya-Vaiseshika
"
"
based upon the doctrine of the second intention
(anu-vyavasdya), wherein the percipient becomes aware of his

disputant

is

he says, the original perception were not

infected by, but only associated with, a false idea, then the
"
I cognize this and
second intention would be in the form
perception.

If,

Tattva-eintamanij Vol.

I, p.

443.

40
whereas

silver,"

is

it

silver," or rather,
'

W. THOMAS.

F.

"

form "I cognize

really in the

'

I cognize a present thing as

silver,'" since in the

this
'

this

as

and as

second intention the original object can

appear only via the original cognition.

to

Truth and error being as defined, their causes have next

be examined, and they are stated as " quality" and "vice"
"

(or

defect ")

Neither of

respectively.

regarded as a

genus

each

is

however,

these,

is

a manifold established separately

by induction.*
"

'

For truth universally there is not a single invariant

rather have we for such and such truths
quality
'

perception] contact of the

sense-organ with more parts of the object, [in inference]
cognition of a real mark, [in analogy] cognition of simirespective

qualities,

[in

e.g.

communication] cognition of meaning, all as

In the case
established by concomitance and divergence.
larity,

of

[in

such and such untruth, where

we have perception
when we see

infected by the vices of [distance], bile [as

a white shell as yellow] and so forth, error as to mark,

seeing of

confirms

a differentia

is

also quality, since

the

etc.,

result

it."

Closely connected with the question of the causation of

truth in perception is that of its mediacy or immediacy.
the upholders of immediacy there are beside those who
maintain that all cognitions are true some who consider that

Among
it is

something produced by the cognition -producing apparatus,

it is produced by an additional factor

some who consider that

and some who held that

is

a special

"

knownness

"

or qualifica-

And they all urge against the mediacy

tion in the cognition.
The Nyayadoctrine the objection of regressus ad infinitum.
Vaiseshika replies as followsf

Tattava-cintdmani, Vol.

I, p.

t Siddhdnta-muktdvali, 135.

327.

PERCEPTION AND ERROR.

"

If the truth of a cognition

were

41
apprehended, then

self

in regard to a cognition at the non-recurrence stage there

For then,

would not be doubt.

the cognition

if

cognized, while

its validity also is

if

is cognized,
the cognition is not

cognized, then, as the thing to be doubted

how can there be doubt

is

matter of inference.

because

so.'
'

earth-ness

should

'

is

earth ness

applied to what has

be asked whence comes the

it

what

is

not

so,

This cognition having the determination

truth, because it is cognition with deter'

'

mination

not cognized,
Hence the validity of a cognition
Thus
This cognition is truth,
is

gives rise to accordant response

it

does not do
'

Nor

odour.

cognition of the
'

'

For the having the determination earthness is

self-apprehended, and, as odour is apprehended of that, the
middle.

application to the thing having odour

should

it

be asked

beforehand

for in

obvious.

is

how the major being

'

the cognition

'

truth/

is

Nor
known

'

a being truth

this

is

self-apprehended."

As regards the regressus ad infinitum it is observed that we

come sooner or later to a certitude of which invalidity is not
apprehended we do not entertain doubt of everything and
;

Accordingly the view is that validity is

matter for inference, that we go back as far as there is doubt,
that

is

enough.

and that ultimately there are cognitions, such

"
this," of which the truth is self-evident.

On

the whole

it

disputants there

is

the

"

unquestioning

would appear that

in the

as the cognition

view of

all

these

a stage (in the Nyaya-Vaiseshika system

") in

perception which

differ as to its

error.

They

known

to consciousness

In cases such as that

of

is

not susceptible of

character and discuss whether

it is

and in what manner error creeps in.

"
"
"
"
some
the distant stump
or man

admitted a perceptual doubt, just as in the case of conflicting

middles some posited an " inference of doubt." But the Nyiiya
"
"
denies that the
exists prior to the
apparatus of doubt

PERCEPTION AND ERROR.

42

perceptual judgment

and clearly perceptual doubt must be

due to imperfection somewhere, unless we are prepared to

"
admit the actual existence of " doubtful
objects which can
"

"
"
develop upon inspection into either posts or men."
The scholastic character of these discussions is apparent.

What
how

I should like to inquire of the Aristotelian Society

far

modern

they bear upon the real problems. It seems that

psychology admits in perception a large repre-

sentational

element.

If

take

for

the distance which turns out to be

"

horse

is

"

part

is

representational.

horse something in

a cow, presumably the

But much more

is

ulti-

mately representational and the ultimate presentational

element may be merely a dark patch in a field. Apparently
every element may be illusory, and more particularly the
last,

which may be a spot on the eye or some defect in the

If truth of perception were normality with

visual apparatus.

reference either to the individual or the race or (by aid of

a proportion) to all percipients, then normal illusions would

be true (perhaps they are

"

seeing of

indefinite

more parts
stretch

of

"

differentia

quietus.

many

However,

while,

and so
time,

becomes relative or an
"

?)

if

it

verification, the

is

on, the process

in

some

cases

may

ages,

require an

and truth
"

ideal,

errors

although through

may

verification,

successively

seeing

receive

of

their

combined with the notion of

a content, seems to imply something more than consistency of

appearances for, if the awareness is a simple factor, invariant
in all the appearances, the consistency must be on the side of
;

the content, and this consistency would signify a "being "in

the thing.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower

on December 5th, 1921, at 8 P.M.

Street,

W.C.

1,

ON THE LIMITATIONS OF A KNOWLEDGE

III.

OF NATUKE.
By JAMES JOHNSTON E.
SOMETIME about the beginning

of the eighteenth century, and

last
of
his
the
ten
lifetime, Newton spoke to
during
years
a friend about his work " I know not," he said, " how it may
:

seem

to the

world but, as to myself,

seem

to

have been only

and diverting myself

as a boy playing on the seashore,

and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier

in

now
than

shell

ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered

before

These words,

me."

take

admission of cessation of individual

it,

in

were,

effort.

By

a way, an

reason of his

and disciplined imagination, his genius for experiment

and the mighty mathematical weapons that he had made,
resolute

Newton had found

He

a way.

thought about truth as lying

and waiting to be discovered

and the means whereby that discovery was to be made were
known to him. He knew that what he had found was only an
there, spread

out, so

to speak,

infinitesimal part of all that

his

But there

methods.

is

quality in any man, a little

was accessible by application of

only so much dynamic mental

more

from each other, and this can be

"

or a little less as

intended

tion of nature, the pursuit of pleasure

wealth, and

Newton,

like

it

can be exhausted.

his great predecessor,

creative energy,
of truth

By

was

In

"

we vary

to the investiga-

or the acquisition of
little

over forty years

Descartes, had spent his

and the undiscovered, but discoverable ocean

still there.

the time that these words were spoken the course that

physical and natural science was to follow during the next

century and half had already been marked out by three great

men

Galileo, to

an extent which has only been appreciated by

F

44

JAMES JOHNSTONE.

some

of us as the result of the relativity discussions of the last

few years

which, as Clerk Maxwell said,

who had found

himself,

and half one seems

scientific

"

Descartes, by the exercise of an

"

knew no bounds

inventiveness
"
;

"

and Newton

Throughout that century

or no really creative
little

the way.
trace

to

thought but only a successful working out of the

From these came our

great ideas of the seventeenth century.

conceptions of matter, inertia and force the laws of motion

the theory of universal gravitation the description of the
;

the notion of the ether as the locus and

system
substance of physical change
the ideas of illimitable space
and uniformly flowing infinite time the Cartesian mechanism
Solar

of

and the restricted theory

life

of

relativity.

About the

middle of the nineteenth century new ideas did come

the

notion

know

of

natural

perhaps we had in that idea, the

between
does not

et

seem

biological science.

fully

And

to

be

whom

work that was

perhaps
do not

clear distinction

a distinction that

and employed in
later, we had from the

realized

then, a little

mathematical investigators, of
type, the germinal

first

and individual results

statistical

was really new

selection

J.

Clerk Maxwell

is

the

to bring about a revolution in

knowledge.

Throughout those two centuries

the

inventions

of

Galileo,

scientific

Descartes and

men employed

Newton.

Physics

and natural science (which* has always clung to the skirts of

physics) explored the seashore, described and catalogued the
pebbles and shells and

now and then ventured

out on the

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries elaborated

the methods of the seventeenth, employing them in ways

ocean.

that were certainly unanticipated by Descartes and

Newton

one wonders what the great French philosopher would have

thought about the modern mechanistic conception of life, as it
It has been noted that as
has been stated by Jacques Loeb
the methods of the seventeenth century became exhausted so
!

did the materialistic science of the nineteenth seem to approach

THK LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

finality

ami tend

sense.

Perhaps one

if

45

become complete and rounded-off,

to

may

be quite wrong but

in a

does appear as

it

the natural science of the latter third of the last century

framework

sound and entirely satisfactory and

suggestions of that kind from some of Huxley's
What was the good of quarrelling about the unknowits

regarded
one gets
essays.

as

The speculative game was drawn and what was left for
Science was the work of strengthening the framework and

able

the details.

filling in

Perhaps this hard nineteenth century materialism had

work to do in the evolution of social and political liberty.

had

to assert itself as a

"

destiny

nature

of

passage

man.

of

"

way
and

of interpreting the

meaning

searching out the

of

Medieval doctrines

its

It

of the

and

origin

and economic

of social

be destroyed. Perhaps that work is not yet

fully accomplished and while that is so science will remain
materialistic.
There is still a fraudulent and grotesque

had

privilege

spiritualism

to

to

be

detected

muddled

vitalism

to

be

replaced by something sounder and a prematurely formulated

Eugenics/' that may be utilized to maintain caste and social

disability,

to

be sifted clear from humbug.

We may

leave

materialistic biology to these tasks.

Two

centuries later than

Newton

modern thinker,* writing

while a revolution in scientific thought was being effected, refers

"
to
the passage of nature which is only another name for the
"

"

This operative presence he says,

"
which is now urging nature forward must be sought for throughout the whole, in the remotest past as well as in the narrowest
creative force of existence."

breadth of any present duration.

realized future.

well

as

in

the

Perhaps
future

Perhaps also in the unwhich might be, as

also in the future

which

will

be.

It

is

impossible

to

* A. N.
Whitehead, in The Cvncept of Nature, Cambridge University
Press, 1920, p. 73.

JAMES JOHNSTONE.

46

meditate on time and the mystery of the creative passage of

nature without an overwhelming emotion at the limitations of

human
I

intelligence."

place this saying over against the well-known words of

utterances illustrate very well the

Newton because the two

change in our attitude towards what

But

discovery.

must make

it

clear

is

meant by scientific
I mean by the

what

"

"

passage of nature because this is a notion far less subtle than

that indicated by Mr. Whitehead.
And I think that a candid

and impartial survey of the speculative biology of the late

nineteenth and twentieth centuries must force one to the
recognition of a twofold passage of nature.

Perhaps

this is

indicated even in Huxley's contrast of the cosmic and ethical

processes but

it

Bergson's vital

is

expressed,

utmost clearness, in

with the

impetus as opposed to the tendency of matter to

I take it that the

pass into the inert condition.

concept of physical science

fundamental

the second law of energetics

is

and

the

assume (though it is
difficult to be sure) that nothing in the most modern results of
mathematical relativity tends, in the least, to weaken this great

universal augmentation of entropy

conception.

such that

all

Nature, then, has direction, or passage, whicli is

that we recognize as physical change tends con-

tiually to

diminution

mechanism

is

defending.

This

one that
is

the

is

Universe, regarded

running down,

as a physical

or in Bergson's term,

the one aspect of the passage of nature.

can only be one aspect. I am

well aware that the entropy-increase law is a statistical one and

To the

that

it

biologist,

however,

it

can only hold true for organic entities which are above
for Maxwell's demons the law

certain limiting magnitudes

would have a double sign and the entropy of an isolated system

The
would increase or decrease with equal probability.

must recognize

even in organic systems, entropy

tends always towards augmentation but surely he misunderstands the meanings of reproduction and adaptation if he does
biologist

not see that what he calls

that,

life is

the incessant attempt of certain

TIIK

LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

47

physico-chemical systems that we call organisms to resist the

There is, therefore, a passage of nature

increase of entropy.

which

not that tending to inert-materiality (that is, to

statistical inertia) but which is the
opposite to this passage and
is what one must understand
life
in the physical sense.
I
by

am

is

not sure whether

we ought

to

insist

on

this

two-fold

passage of nature or, perhaps, regard it as a double aspect, in

some way or other, of the same condition. Is life something
that resists the passage of inorganic

nature, or is inorganic
nature already inert and extended, while living systems pass
through it ? Perhaps one inclines to think about a two-fold

passage because of some mental constraint that tends always to

a dualism of one kind or another.

suppose that biologists must accept the main result of

"
the differentiation of the one quality of
generalized relativity
I

extension into time and space," but I confess that it is very

difficult to do so.
It seems to me that for speculative physiothe x, y, z and
logy space-time cannot be completely isotropic
^-dimensions cannot be of the same quality.
I take it that our
notion of space rests entirely on our degrees of freedom of bodily

move backwards and

I can

mobility.

to side with equal facility

upwards and downwards.

in the x, y-plane

round a vertical
facility
is

forwards, and from side

but not nearly so easily can I move

And the equal freedom of mobility

only possible because I can turn my body

(2)-axis in one direction or the other with equal
is

but even then the turning movement from

not quite the same as that from right to

left

left to right

but differs in

some subtle way.

And, of course, the difficulty of generating

the ^-dimension depends on the condition that our freedom of

mobility

Only

is

since

restricted because we move in a gravitational field.

we have become enabled to dispense (in thought)

with the gravitational field as something physically unique has

our space become truly isotropic.

Such as we

space-dimensions are not

entirely isotropic and far less so is the ^-dimension when
F 2
are,

however,

the

48

JAMES JOtfNSTONE.

compared with the

x, y,

The quality

-ones.

of duration I take

from the others and we must, I think,

with Bergson, as the cumulative continuity of life.

to be entirely different

regard it,
It is a passage as well as the persistence of that which, in a
It is life-extension but it does not seem to
sense, has passed.

me

to be capable of

sense.

"

The passage

extensive abstraction
is

"

in

Mr. Whitehead's

not a uniform one (though I confess I

find it difficult to say exactly

what

is

meant by uniformity

in a

durational passage).*

Obviously we do not obtain the conception of a moment of

organic duration by the method of extensive abstraction, for
this

"

moment

"

depends on what Bergson

calls the

"

rhythm

of

duration": thus the "event-particle" in the conscious life of a

boy of fifteen is not the same as in the man of fifty, nor does it

appear to be the same in the ephemeral insect as

The matter, however,

long-lived reptile.
to be pursued here.
It is

is

much

it

is

in the

too difficult

also necessary that

should deal with the purely

In general we mean by a

biological conception of variability.

variation a deviation from a morphological type, but I generalize

the notion so as

to include

also

deviations

of

functioning,

and mentality, perceiving no essential differences between these organic activities.

The organic " type,"
whether it be that of form, or behaviour, or mentality is, of

acting, response

course, only a convenient abstraction, but the general notion of

"
"
types has brought with it the conception of variability. It is

very convenient, in our description of nature, to speak of

specific types and then of variations or departures from them.
"
Observations and experiments, we say, " ought to give unique
values but for the accompanying errors of methods.

"

So, also,

* "Time" in the sense of life-extension I

regard as "humped" in the
"
neighbourhood of a conscious entity in somewhat the same way as

Mr. Eddington regards space as being " humped

neighbourhood of a material particle.

"

"
or " peaked
in the

THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

we

49

postulate organic types which are accompanied by varia-

same way that experimental results are attended

Then we search (rather unsuccessfully, it must be

tions in the

by

error.

admitted) for the

"

cause

ception of variability

is

"

Obviously, this conthe consequence of our adoption of the

of variability.

logical category of determinism.

Now

there are organic activities that have all the appear-

ance of spontaneity whether these are truly spontaneous or

not I do not argue but there are also many activities which
we call responses to events that occur " in the environment."

These we can investigate and we can endeavour to establish a

between

relation of functionality, in the mathematical sense,

the environmental

would be

"

stimulus

easy, I think, to

"

and the organic response.

make

a series of

It

such responses,

beginning with tropistic ones, passing through reflexes in the

decerebrate animal, reflexes in the intact one, and ending with
those responses which

terms of such a
one

may
extreme we
if

ality

we

call

"

In the various

intelligent."

series there will be

"

more

or less

"

determinism,

say so without being misunderstood.

At

the one

find (as in a tropism, or taxis) a degree of function-

which approximates closely

needle in a variable magnetic

to the

field,

behaviour of a compass

and at the other we

find that

apparently capricious behaviour or functioning which must be

so annoying to physiologists.

be determinism, or
reject

the validity

suppose that there must either

no determinism, and so I have simply

of

this

concept (except

as

to

working

method, of course) even at the risk of being exposed to the

dreadful accusation of throwing overboard scientific method
altogether

One

distinction
"

"

other thing I

must endeavour

to

make

clear

the

between the organic variations that are called

"
by biologists and those others that are called

fluctuations

The former are individual and acquired while

are congenital and are transmitted by heredity

mutations."

the latter

they are not acquired.

In the lower animals fluctuations, or

JAMES JOHNSTONE.

50

acquirements, do not materially influence the process of

transformism and what are of significance from that stand-

In man,
point are mutations, which do lead to transformism.
of course, certain fluctuations persist by reason of tradition
:

they are not bodily variations but

means

of action

tools

by
most general significance). Now
the distinction between fluctuations and mutations is evidently

(using the term

"

tool

"

in its

one that depends upon our distinction between a racial and

Life is, of course, a continuous career
individual life-passage.

what

discontinuous in

in the morphological sense

personal passage which

and responsibility sin,

marked by memory, blame, merit

you like. The mutational variation

is
if

is

it

is

the

belongs then to the racial passage and it is an acquirement of

the fluctuating variation arises in
this continuous life-career
;

the discontinuous personal life-passage, or career.

this digression, to the saying of Newton.
undiscovered knowledge must, to him, have been
like the material oceans explored by the voyagers of his

I return

The ocean

now, after

of

century they were unknown but whatever was there did

not depend, in itself, in the least upon the vessels and
it was only revealed by those
instruments of navigation
:

methods.

Newton, physical laws were there waiting to

to speak, but even if they were to remain

So, to

be discovered, so

undiscovered they would still be there. Without doubt he

could have made most of the discoveries of the eighteenth
century and perhaps those of the nineteenth up to the time of

Clerk Maxwell had he been capable for a long period of that

mind of which he spoke, for (I take it)

sustained intension of

those discoveries were implicit in the creative

work

of his early

lifetime.

But were the later physical and biological results of the

later nineteenth and the twentieth century there in the same
sense

as

dynamics

were,
?

for

Were

the

instance,

quantum

planetary

theory

hypothesis of

and

radiation

tidal

and

THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

51

our present-day notions of atomic structure present already in

Newton's undiscovered ocean of truth ? Could these conceptions have been deduced by
of

mind

from

relationships

the

known

him by a

mathematical,

him

to

I take it

sufficient intending

physical

and that only by the creative thought

of

and dynamical

that they could not

Newton's nineteenth

century successors did these parts of the ocean of truth actually

come into

existence.

Otherwise

it

would appear that there was mental deter-

minism and that Clerk Maxwell, Hertz, Planck, Einstein,

J. J. Thomson and others thought as they did think because
Newton's mind worked in the way it did. And nothing in the
I have
results of modern biology seems to suggest that.
referred already to the

with

all

way

in which mutations of form arise

the appearance of spontaneity or lack of causation.

must have occurred

to

biologists to

many

attempt

It

to predict

the evolutionary career of some

organic stock or other but

beyond suggesting that certain specific forms are in process of
extinction, or that some bodily parts of an organic species are

becoming

vestigial

and tend

to disappear nothing of the sort

No

has, I believe, been attempted.

biologist has ventured to

predict the appearance of a mutation

process of transformism.
plexity of the

Now

the essential step to a

one admits the incredible com-

physico-chemical systems in which such muta-

and we may well despair of laying bare the physical

antecedents of a mutation supposing that there are such.

tions arise

But the overwhelming impression that most

thinking about
of

biologists have, in

these matters at all, is that of the spontaneity

appearance of the mutation.

admit that there

is

evidence

expose an
organism to some environmental stimuli and mutations may
arise but what we have to deal with here are active, functional
that environmental changes

may

induce mutations

adaptations of the organism, ways in which it responds to the

But that the particular nature of the response
external change.
is

a function, in

the

mathematical sense, of the particular

52

JAMES JOHNSTONE.

change in the environment does not seem to be established, nor

do I think that it is likely.
"

"
in the widest
Probably we must generalize
responses
I have argued elsewhere that the most various
possible way.

kinds of behaviour are of essentially the same organic nature.

An "adaptation," I take it, is not merely a change in colour or

form that renders an animal

prey, or confers
shelter, or

it

upon

less

conspicuous to

some useful means

hypotheses of the

enemies or

These changes are of much

of transformism and so

of avoiding its foes.

significance in

its

of finding food or

means

they are the things that we usually think about when we speak

But temporary

of adaptations.

variations of functioning (such

when one becomes warm) are also

behaviour of a man who takes an

as the process of sweating

So

adaptations.

the

is

umbrella with him on an unpromising morning, or that of the

skipper of a vessel when he shortens sail in anticipation of bad
weather.

and

Again the invention and use of a new tool is an adaptation

so also is the discovery of a new mathematical device (say
It is quite true that

tables of logarithms).

modes

of behaviour are transmitted

some

of these organic

by heredity

so that they

become integral in the life-processes of the race while others

would disappear on the death of the individual in which they
are evolved.

because the one kind of adaptacharacteristic of the racial life passage (it is

That, however,

tion (mutations)

is

is

germinal) while the other appears in the individual life-passage

It would disappear if it were not preserved by
(it is somatic).
tradition.

So

logical

changes

can

or
of

discoveries.

make no

adaptations

organic
of

between morphofunctioning and those

essential distinction

"

"

of

mental operation that we

ways
The strengthening

call

scientific

of the muscles of the fingers

and wrists of a pianist the formation of a skin callus on some

part of the hand in consequence of the persistent holding of a tool
;

manual dexterity

in

some repetitional mechanical operation;

THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

work

facility in arithmetical

the finding of

53

some new mathe-

(say Maxwell's four thermodynamio

and
so
all
these seem to me to be processes that
on
potentials)
have the same significance. In each of them there is something
creative or new, some means whereby the organism becomes

matical

relationships

better able to oppose the tendency to inert-materiality.

the

This

of course,

is,

pure Bergsonism

functions or the Christoffel

"

Maxwell's thermodynamic

tensor analysis

"

are

means

of

Sooner or later, someone endeavours to give

acting on nature.
even the most abstruse of mathematical results a " physical

meaning" and sooner

cations

"

in

or later also, these results receive

All

industry.

"

intended

"

thinking,

"

appli-

take

it.

aims at establishing inter-connexions between events in nature,

All general discoveries are mental adaptations
something
really

new

And

in organic behaviour.

that

if

is

so

we must,

I think, regard

truth as amorphous in structure.

discovered in

it

are only in

existence with the

it

Newton's ocean of

The relations that are

in the sense that they

come

thought that makes the relations.

to be

into

Our

a knowledge of form
Eddington says,
knowledge
and not of content, but even the form is carved out from a
of nature, as

nature that

is

may have any forms or as many as are implicit

human mind. At any moment in

within the limitations of the

human
is

history, then, our description of nature

what more

to say,

to be

made by

us.

in it than that

is

I feel that, as I

something paradoxical in

it,

but

is

which we

complete, that
know has still

have stated

my meaning

this there is

will, I

trust,

be

plain.

Finally, I return to

which

Mr. Whitehead's saying

urging nature forwards

is

the present and past

is

perhaps that

in the future as well as in

and in the future that may be as well as

The
I take this to be literally true.

in future that will be.

impetus

is

certainly in

present, since
"

"

passed

we

inherit

the remotest past as well as in the

modes

of acting

only in the sense that they

on nature which have

came

into existence one

THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

54

after the other in

"

time," but which nevertheless endure in that

The impetus

they constitute our present life-mechanisms.

the future that will be, surely, because

many

is

in

of the things that

we do

are done in order that some change, or condition clearly

thought about but which has not yet happened, or does not yet
exist, will

wolf

come about

we have bred

as the result of our acting.

the sheep dog and

we

So from the

are rearing rustless

wheat and potatoes that are immune to disease. These organisms

were not discovered in nature nor did they exist there in the
they were made, if my interpretation of the
meaning of mutations is a right one. The impetus is in the
future that may be, because in seeking for something we make
literal

sense

something else. There is an ideal communistic state that may

be and that is ardently desired by some.
In seeking to make it
our present-day idealists

are,

society, the form of which

is

without doubt, making some other

not discoverable.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Grower Street, W.C.

on December 19th, 1921, at 8 P.M.

1,

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPEKSPACES.

IV.

By

F. TAVANI.

I.

SHALL consider space under two aspects: 1. As object of perception, and by this I mean the physical space in which are the
I

objects with qualities which

we

perceive.

Such a space

is

to

frame in which they either move or are at rest.

Besides such space, perceived with and through the bodies

objects like a
2.

it contains, we have also the idea of a space possessing

the means for fixing and determining the position of a body
with respect to another body. Space as the locus of entities,

which

by means
mined,

is

of

which the position of something in it is deterto which a percept may but

a concept, a concept

not necessarily correspond.

does

The study

to analytical

concept belongs chiefly

three, four, ..., n dimensions.

The properties

of this space,

as a

of space

geometry

of

two,

one,

taken in their most general

become such only

expressions, are not objects of perception, they

the particular case in which the dimensions are

for

three.

Thence the distinction between dimensions and hyperdimensions

space
4, 5,

tion

while they are all concepts, to those concepts within the

of three dimensions perceptions correspond, but for

...,

n dimensional

corresponds.

spaces nothing in the world of percep-

Hyperdimensions

entities suggested, not

thus

remain

by perception, but by the

generalizing the properties of

abstract

possibility of

the three-dimensional space to

which a perception corresponds.

The
space

is

object of this paper

physically real,

space defined by

is

to

show that hyperdimensional

meaning by hyperdimensional space a

the characteristic that through any of

its

56

F.

points

TAVANI.

we can draw more than

another.

three lines perpendicular to one

physically real I

By

mean an

entity the existence

measured by time and determining or occupying a

such
that we can always fix two points A and B in
C
position
the physical space so that a moving point P cannot pass from
of

which

to

is

without passing through C.

The proof is contained in a relation binding together the
This fact is an hypertwo expressions of a physical fact.*
acceleration,

which

is

a physical fact as

much

as the velocity

of which the hyperacceleration represents the change

within an interval of an infinitesimal order higher and higher
The analytical expression of itf
than that of the velocity.

itself,

represents

this

fact

decomposed into

its

elements.

These

elements are physical facts themselves, as their addition has for

result the whole of the fact itself. They are directed quantities,
their directions being for the first three elements, three directions perpendicular to one another in the ordinary space,
for the other

them has

and

components from the fourth upwards, each

of

a direction perpendicular to all those which precede

All this is mathematically

order of the sequence.
established in the theorem embodied in the relation (2)*
The
it

in the

meaning of the terms

of this relation is

very plain for the

three terms, they are quantities physically real.

first

The others

from the fourth upwards are also physically real, because they are
elements of a fact which is so, and which would lose its integrity

and become another phenomenon altogether, if the terms from the

if they were not such that when

fourth upwards were not real, and

added together they would not form a fact physically real. The
hyperdimensional terms (4tb, 5th, ..., nth) are not in ordinary
space, still as elements of a physical fact they

must be connected

with physical space. Such connexion is, as already mentioned,

such that we can fix two points, A and B, of the ordinary space,

* See note at the

end, formula (2).
t See note, formula (1).

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPERSPACKS.

57

correspondent respectively to the beginning and the end of the

infinitesimal interval (dt) n (n expressing the infinitesimal order:
4, 5, 6,

...,

n), so

that the point

P moving from A

to B,

with a

law admitting hyperaccelerations, according to the conditions of

must occupy during the said interval the positions

determined by the hyperdimensions.
Thus by a mathematical reasoning alone we are led into the
the theorem,

presence of physical entities, which, while they possess the

characters of physical reality upon the evidence of a logical
the only evidence available in this case, still are
unperceived. Are these entities still real or do they turn into
This
shadows of reality since they cannot be perceived ?

process,

problem, which is strictly one in the domain of philosophy,

must be met by the mathematician, who, led by the logic of
mathematics, is brought in contact with such entities. While

hyperdimensions were only mathematical abstractions chosen

and made without any reference to physical reality, but only
for the sake of giving generality to the methods and theorems
of analytical

geometry and mechanics of three dimensions, then

knew the realm of such entities they did

the mathematician

But

not belong to this world, they existed in a fairy land.

when we meet them in the analysis

then, if we want to keep our faith

of a physical

which has been such a powerful instrument

must consider
are

bound

to

phenomenon

in mathematical analysis,

we
we
home

of discovery,

their claim in the physical world, even

if

modify our conception of reality in finding a

for them.
II.

From

meaning which

the

physically real,

it is

have fixed

evident that this

is

of

something

defined in terms of

time and physical space, taken as the highest terms, without

passing the limits or touching the question as to the reality of
these terms.
reality of

intend to avoid any inquiry concerning the

time and space, and of

widest sense.

assume

"

what

"
is

physical reality in the

reality

in

its

meaning given

58

F.

above; to

it

TAVANI.

belong the dimensions of ordinary space, and,

by the relation (2), the fact

according to the theorem expressed

and hyperdimensions belong to

the physical world upon the same evidence, which is the evidence

is

established that dimensions

attached to the conclusion of a mathematical reasoning.

The said relation links, so to speak, the three dimensions of
the ordinary space to the hyperdimensions in the expression of

the same physical fact, and through

is

them the

reality of this fact

seen to continue beyond the boundaries of the perceptual space.

The evidence of their physical reality is the same for

dimensions and hyperdimensions, as far as this evidence is

given by the logical process which forms the proof of the
ordinary dimensions possess also the
evidence derived from the perception corresponding to them.
Obviously the evidence from perception adds itself to that
Besides

theorem.

this,

from the mathematical reasoning, without either increasing

the strength of the other in establishing the final conclusion

aimed at by both of them. They remain independent from

one another, each one sufficient to itself, to establish the
the fact, I

reality of
light, if

should say, with an equal amount of

any doubt of error in the

they are sufficient to expel

process with which they evolve from their respective sources.

It is only where the probability of error affects either of these

two processes that they support each other in establishing the

final

conclusion

Thus

if

common

to both.

me, the evidence that

derived from such a principle that

I see this table in front of

someone has put it here, is

there is no need of any perception to confirm it.
Logical
evidence is not the only one which applies to unperceived
objects, there is also another kind tending to establish the
physical reality of unperceived objects.

perceiving process

logical process have both in common the same prerogative

The object or
of being what may be termed a sign of reality.

and a

fact pointed
is

by them has evidence

pointed by these signs.

of reality only in so far as

it

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYl'KKSl'ACES.

59

good or bad relatively to the siyn being

good or bad or rather correct or mistaken, and if we could, by

The evidence

is

some means, reach a

we could

criterion of correctness of these processes

through them the reality of the object

indicated by them.
Perception as a sign of reality points
define

an object which

is either actually given in the act of peror

with the latter that the content of
so
connected
ception

to

actual perception would lose the

meaning

of the reality

which

otherwise possesses, and the act itself of perception would

remain disconnected from the conditions by which its con-

it

Thus

stitutive elements are real.

if

in perception

we

perceive

an object occupying space and lasting in time, with the moment

in which its timely existence is given, there is given also with
an evidence equally convincing, that the object has existed in
some way through a series of previous moments, and it is
connected in some way with a space which is not actually
perceived.

physical

Our conceptions
such

reality are

of

as

time and space as assumed in

not to allow any distinction

between the value of evidence given as to the existence of an

object actually perceived and as to its existence in space and
time essentially connected with the space and moment within
the act of perception.
In other words if we admit something
to be real at a certain

moment

goes beyond the limits of

the evidence of that reality

that moment, and affects all that

which I have defined as physically real. Thus if we consider

the space described by a moving point P, taking motion merely
as a correspondence between a determined interval of time,
however small

it

may

be,

and a determined

space, locus of the

during the said interval, if at the moment that

perceived, there is a correspondence between a real

positions of P,

motion

is

interval of time and a real tract of space, the reality of these

two elements points

correspondence, without which the actual

impossible.

So that

interval of time,

moment of the
moment would be

to a reality at a previous

if

real

space corresponds to a certain

this may be, a real space must

however small

G 2

60

TAVANI.

F.

correspond also to any previous or smaller interval of time

contained in it. To admit that the properties or characteristics

which are recognized within an interval dt of the

motion, are the same as those within an infinitesimal interval
of higher order, cannot be assumed as an axiom, and if accepted
of space

can be done, only provisionally, while there is

It is just against such postulate that the
reason against it.

as a postulate
110

it

theorem in question directs

how

its

consequences.

far lies the probability that in

It

shows

also

motion in general there

is

an instant in which the body is at rest or moves uniformly.

To make an assumption of this kind is to fix a characteristic of
the motion.
acceleration
of

This is what Newton did by assuming that the

was constant and that therefore within an interval

time equal, to

(dt)

time, however small this

is

We

moved uniformly.
cannot
the motion within an interval of

the body

make any hypothesis about

may

given by the law which

motion within infinitesimal

it

be,

while the nature of motion

follows.

It is to this analysis of

of infinitesimal intervals that the

theorem lends

itself.
Before I give a description of the process
followed in the proof I will briefly state the works and results
of a few of the most eminent mathematicians, and I will
try to

approximate their results to mine, in order to see whether and

how

it

constitutes a really

new

step forward.

Ill
Mathematicians have built logical models of space
taking
move from the characteristics of perceptual space and

their first

by means of mathematical analysis have reached general concepts

of which the three-dimensional
space, the one to which
percep-

tion corresponds,

is

only a particular case.*

The researches on

An idea of the large number of researches on this subject can be

gathered from the valuable monograph of Professor Gino Loria, "II
presente ed il passato delle teorie geometriche." From Gauss's
Disquisitiones, are inspired the memoirs of Riemann, " Ueber die
Hypothesen
welche der Geometric zu Grunde liegen/' and of
and for
Beltrami,

sixty

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPERSPACES.

this

61

subject are independent of perception, they

concept of space, and

if

these general concepts,

aim at the

perception has any relation at all to

is only that of an unnecessary fact

it

correspondent to the concept of ordinary space, without any

claim to ratify or strengthen the conclusions reached by mathematical analysis.
At the side of this movement there is also a

tendency to adhere strictly to the perceptual space, limiting

geometry within the boundaries of experience and carrying out
any possible progress only in harmony with the evidence

These two currents have no meeting

supplied by perception.
point, one remains within the boundaries of mathematical
analysis, the other within the evidence of perception
this situation

it

follows that, so

mathematical

mechanics

hyperspaces have remained

system of analytical
was
hyperspaces
nothing else but a similar
the three-dimensional mechanics developed on the

Any

for

extension of

same

far,

abstraction.

and from

lines as the

geometry of hyperspaces.
which could serve as a link between the analytical
theory of hyperspaces and the physical world had not been
The mathematicians did not start from the expression
found.

A fact

of a physical fact, nor did they look in the physical world for a

confirmation of their theories, a confirmation which was not

needed so

far as the

soundness of their reasoning was concerned,

but only went on exploring in order to see what would the

space be if the boundaries of the three dimensions were crossed,
leaving the physical world behind, entirely closed within the
three dimensions.
Therefore, a real progress is marked beyond
this situation

member

by the theorem

of relation (2)* in

which the

represents a physical fact and the second

expression of the same by

relation throws,

so

to

member

means

speak, a

first
is

an

This

of hyperdirnensions.
bridge between the physical

years the production of researches seems to point out wider and wider
fields of research.
large portion of this branch has been cultivated by

Italian geometers.
* See note at the end.

G 3

62

F.

TAVANI.

world and the hyperspaces the bridge which was needed.

Moreover as the second member contains for the three first
dimensions, those of the ordinary space, so

dimensions

three

of

the

ordinary

^-dimensional space.
Let us compare the method.

it

space

It is

connects also the

to

those

an

of

the same as that to

which Eiemann ascribes the greatest success for explaining

He decribes it in these terms " The questions about
nature.
:

what
it

is

indefinitely great are useless for explaining nature,

quite different for the question on

is

small.

what

is

but

indefinitely

upon the exactitude with which we follow the

in what is infinitely small that our knowledge of

It is

phenomena

their relation of causality essentially rests.

recent centuries in the knowledge of the

The progress of the

mechanism of nature

depends almost entirely upon the exactness of the construction,

which has become possible since the invention of the infinitesimal analysis." The theorem under consideration is a good
illustration of the success of this method applied in exploring

what happens

to the

motion when the infinitesimal interval of

time not only becomes indefinitely small, but infinitesimal of an

To this method I have added a
infinitesimally small interval.

new

step, I

have used a pure concept

the characteristics of space,

it is

of

dynamics

for exploring

something like the inversion

of

the ordinary process, in which from the study of space we

The law of the motion,
derive the character of the motion.

which
system

is

generally the solution of some differential equation or

of equations, is obtained after

assuming that the ordinary

space is the seat of the motion. This assumption, however,

does not leave to perception the last word about the nature of
space, but it simply means that perceptual motion takes place

within perceptual space. It leaves thus as being also true that

the perceived motion is not the real motion, even within the
For instance the motion of a
limits of the perceptual space.
billiard ball describing a straight line on a billiard table is far

from being the real motion even within the boundaries of the

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPERSPACES.

63

If the motion of the ball is referred to the

perceptual space.
centre of the earth the motion is helicoidal, if referred to the

centre of the sun

Each

it

has a more complicated path, and so on.

is expressed by a relation or law ol

these motions

of

motion, and

this relation

if

which admits a

is

an analytical function of time,

and determined derivate of an order

finite

higher than three, then, according to the theorem, the whole

motion does not take place within the three dimensions of the

ordinary space, but

space, and

it

to

continues

itself

express
higher than three are necessary.

perceptual side

which

beyond the perceptual

in its integrity, spaces of dimensions

it

So the whole motion has a

perceived through one, two or three

is

dimensions of the ordinary space

and part

of

its

reality is

hidden, so to speak, in a space of higher dimensions

space belonging

also

the

to this

physical dimensions in which the

All this is expressed and established by

is perceived.
the relation (2) of which the first member represents a physical
fact, viz., what happens of the motion during the interval of

motion

time (dt) n and the second member represents this same fact
expressed in a space of ^-dimensions, of whicli the first three
dimensions are those of the perceptual space in which the
,

perceptual part of the motion takes place.

Once having obtained a relation fixing the conditions whicli
space must satisfy in order that a physical fact may take place
"
Whether space,
in it. we have an answer to the question
characterdefinite
must
have
some
of
perception,
independent
:

And

istics ?"

in

our particular case,

"

Whether space must have

number of perceptions?" a question which obviously

cannot be answered by perception, nor by any conception of
In this
space assumed previously to any analysis of motion.
a definite

way we

obtain a

new view

of the relations

between experience

space, a point on which Eiemann

The answer
himself declined to give any definite answer.
"
an hyperwith
a
motion
order
that
In
is
theorem
given by my

and the characteristics

of

acceleration of the n\\i order

may

take place,

it

-is

a necessary and

64

F.

sufficient

TAVANI.

condition that the space in which such motion happens

should possess n dimensions," and as such motions do really

happen, so the space really possesses n dimensions related to
one another like the dimensions of the perceptual space.
IV.

Let us consider the order followed for establishing the

I begin by considering an ^-dimensional space,
theorem.

assuming it as an hypothesis which experience neither confirms

nor contradicts. From this hypothesis I simply derive a series
of magnitudes, representing lines, such that each one is perpendicular to all those which precede

immediately follows in .the order of

introduce the idea of

moving

and

it

to

the one which

the sequence.

Then

point, independently of

any

system of co-ordinates the point moves in the physical space

and during its motion the ordinary dimensions are represented
;

by the tangent

to its path, the

normal and the binormal.

Then

strictly following the operations of infinitesimal analysis,

and

replacing in the results thus obtained expressions containing

the quantities of the set of

n perpendiculars

to

one another,

the relation of perpendicularity being simply expressed analytically, I arrive at

an expression of the hyperacceleration decom-

components, referred to a sytem of n dimensions.

The process consists essentially in passing from an hypothesis

posed into

its

found and expressed through such

nothing else but the scientific process by

which

to a physical fact

hypothesis, and this

is

is

which we extend the knowledge of our physical world. When

possible, perception comes to confirm the reality of the physical
fact

however,

this,

of the fact stands

is

not strictly necessary where the reality

beyond doubt, as

is

the case

when

the fact

is

established upon a rigorous reasoning or stands on a principle

the truth of which does not require any assistance from

perception.

From
tion,

the expression of the physical

by means

of

hyperdimensions,

it

fact,

the hyperaccelera-

is

evident that these

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPERSPACES.

65

belong to spaces which cannot be reached except by motions

following a certain determined law, viz., when the law of motion
expressed by a function of time admitting a finite or determined derivate of order greater than three. In this case the
smaller the infinitesimal interval of time within which takes

is

place the change of the acceleration or the hyperacceleration,

the greater

is

the

number

of dimensions of the space reached

Time seems

by the motion.

to be the only principal variable

bringing into evidence their existence,

sions

the

are

directions of

and as the hyperdirnen-

the components

acceleration in the ordinary space

and

the

of

hypereven

in hyperspaces, so

the generation of a straight line can be referred to motion only,

dimensions is
thus " a straight line in a space of three, four,
. . .

the path of a point moving with a law expressed by a function

of

time,

possessing finite and

second, third, fourth,

As from

determined derivates of

first,

order."

. . .

the idea of acceleration

we can deduce

a whole

system of dynamics, so from the idea and expression (2) of

the hyperacceleration we can deduce a whole system of hyper-

dynamics

hypermotive

force,

energy in

hyperspaces,

etc.,

having a correspondent physical fact in the

wofrld
not less real than their analogy in the space
physical
these

entities

of three dimensions.

But

to develop these ideas

is

beyond the

scope of the present paper and I will consider only a side

which is strictly connected with the philosophical aspect of
space thus conceived.

V.

seems

be a strong
reason for confining hyperdimeusions to the realm of mathematical abstractions, so that although I have established their
It is the absence of perception that

to

physical reality by a mathematical reasoning free from any

help of perception still we must examine whether the absence
of perception is a

Here again

good reason against their physical

must

reality.

state as clearly as possible the limits of

66

F.

TAVANI.

any other more general question

which from this point might become visible.
Perception is a sign of reality and a reality in itself or an

my

inquiry, leaving untouched

From both points of view it

a moment and as pointing to a

event.

is

connected with time,

as
reality existing in time.
a sign of reality it is also related to space inasmuch as this
determines a place for the perceived object. In short, perception as an event is a physical fact and as a sign points to
physical reality. Anything that perception shows to us it
viz.,

As

shows

are

entities

determined

as

it

us

to

given

in

and time.

space

through

two

which time and space meet as a conwhat they are beyond that meeting point. The

moment

reality of this, at the

as connected along the time

Its reality,

that

of that

moment with

fact,

the

is

given, asserts itself also

and within the space

beyond the act of perception,

in the perception itself, something

reality

the

the perceived

in

reality,

tinuation of

given.

as

perception

co-ordinates of a plane which determine a point

physical

These two

in

which

it is

as suggested

is,

which we connect with the

we connect time beyond that

Time
itself, and place with place.
as

just

moment

and space before they meet to form the event of perception

and the reality of the object perceived, meet to form what may
be called the history of that event and of the perceived object.
The reality of such history is pointed out in the act of per*
ception, so that it cannot be disconnected from it without
affecting the reality of the fact as it

perception

even

itself.

through

impossible,

and

this

which
with

if

its

we

are

bound

is

given in the act of

to follow

up that history

moments in which perception was

bound to find an interpretation of it,

those
are

impulse
it

We

is

given from the act

itself of

asserts something real, asserts

existence in some

it

so,

perception,

as connected

way through time and space beyond

moment of perception. Time and

their reality asserted at the

space might not be real, still there is a stage in our knowledge

what is real, a stage in which they are assumed as such.

of

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPERSPACKS.

This

is

the boundary of

my

inquiry, this

is

67

sufficient for recog-

nizing the reality of the physical world, with which I am here

chiefly concerned in proving the physical reality of hyperspaces just as

accepted for physical space.

it is

So that recapitulating the points just considered

I may say
real
be
not
physically
though
perceived or
something might

its existence is
is physically real if
the
not
a
logical reasoning, though
perceived.
consequence
Hyperspaces are physically real though not perceived if their
cannot build the
existence is proved by a logical reasoning.

It

perceivable.

of

We

world without admitting the truth of the

of
perception and if we admit the truth of a judgment
judgments
of perception at one moment there is a series of judgments of
reality of the physical

perception which are equally true about something which

becomes later the event of perception and its object, connected
in
it

some way with the reality which is perceived and completing

so as to become the reality actually given in perception.

Thus,

it

if

moment
to

is

true that the light of the sun

that I see

it,

and

admit that the sun as

if

it

by a

is

shining at the

is

logical reasoning I

now

am bound

existed before any vision of

any kind could have taken place, then it is also true that the
sun was shining at that time. It is only after recognizing that
this judgment is true that we try to find out how that was, and
in physics

we

attribute to the

word

light such a

meaning

as to

lend itself to agree with the truth of _such judgment. We

construct the idea of light so that there was something real
before vision and

we

identify that something with an essential

element in the perception

their existence

even

if

we

is

of light.

By

analogy, hyperspaces,

if

mathematically proved, are physically real,

;

are all born blind to

them or our present organs

of

perception do not answer to anything in the world of perception

correspondent to the concept of hyperspace. On the other

hand the mathematical proof

of their existence consists in this

that the hyperacceleration, a physical event

itself,

takes place

in a space of a number of dimensions equal to the order of the

PHYSICAL SPACE AND HYPERSPACES.

68

hyperacceleration.

This fact cannot be either included in nor

established by Newton's dynamics, which, to the analysis of

motion, presuppose already a notion of space, about which the

first

and

last

word

is left

entirely to perception.

Concluding these few remarks about the proof and meaning

theorem here analysed and the claims to reality of anywhich
is proved to be so, independently of perception, I
thing
of the

do not hesitate to say that through the veil of the perceptual

space which perception throws round us from all parts, probably

through a phenomenon of resonance, which surroundings have

worked upon our senses, we see by means of this theorem,
higher dimensions hidden from us by the threedimensional space, but revealed to our mind by motions which
penetrate their depth, their perception remaining perhaps a
spaces

of

probable fact for more developed senses.

NOTE about

the mathematical expressions of the theorem

studied in the paper (see Philosophical Magazine, April, 1921).

where

i <Mn,
=\

(1)

I n are quantities of

Ii, Is, Is, I* ...

which the

first

three

represent respectively the tangent to the path

described by the moving point P, the normal and the binormal
Ii,

I2

I 3,

and the others

I4 T 5
,

...

expressed, that each one of

I n verify the condition, analytically

them

is

perpendicular to

all

those

which precede it and to the one which immediately follows in

the sequence. <i, $ 2 ... $n are elementary functions of the
velocity of the point, P, and curvatures of the path.
n

fjnp

^=2 <M,
ai

(2)

d n P/dt n represents the hyperacceleration of order n of

the point, P, moving with a law expressed by P =/(), such
that f(t) admits a derivate determined and finite of order, n.

in which

Ii,

I 2 I 3 represent the

14,

15

. . .

In

dimensions of the ordinary space, and

represent the hyperdimensions.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower Street, W.C.

on January 16th, 1922, at 8

PLATO'S

V.

THEORY OF

By H.
IT

is,

I suppose, universally

Republic which deals with the

most important passages, if

J.

1,

P.M.

EIKASIA.*

PATON.

admitted that the portion of the

line and the cave is one of the
it

not the most

is

passage, for a proper understanding

of

important

Plato's position with

problems of knowledge. Yet it is almost

impossible to get a coherent account of this fourfold division
It is
or of the reasons which can have led Plato to make it.
regard to

not

the

uncommonly supposed

difference

their

between

objects,

but

the

many

that

there

is

no

fundamental

highest activities or between

of those who recognize that Plato

two

was sharply distinguishing the mathematical sciences and their

objects from philosophy and its objects, yet fail to observe any
similar distinction as regards the lower part of the division.

They have no use for a distinction between el/caaia and irla-r^.

To them as to the Sophist a shadow is as real as the object
which casts it, and we find for instance the American critic
Mr. Shorey boldly asserting that flitaala, and the etVo^e? are
"
"
"
for the sake of
symmetry." It is
playfully thrown in
surely a strange reading of the character of Plato as a seeker
after truth to maintain that in the very heart of his greatest

the very core of the problem of knowledge he

should disturb and confuse those who are seeking to under-

work and

at

"
playfulwholly uncalled for
should be for the sake of "symmetry."

stand his doctrine with a

ness" even though

my debt to Professor J. A. Smith who originally

the line of reflexion on this subject which I have

must express

suggested to

endeavoured

me

it

little

to follow.

70

H.

J.

It is strange that in a place

who

tense emotion of one

PATON.

marked by the suppressed but

setting forth the very essence of

is

that he has thought, there should occur without the least

hint or warning a passage which has no counterpart in his

all

thinking, which

misleading.

and

at its best superfluous

is

at its

It is stranger still that in a later dialogue

worst

The

the very turning point of the argument, the question

Sophist
of the possibility of error and of sophistry, should rest
upon a
similar meaningless distinction expressed in almost identical

we have any respect at all for Plato as a thinker

we must put this down as grotesquely improbable; and the
words.

If

mere incapacity

understand his doctrine will

of the critic to

not be for us a sufficient proof that there

is

no doctrine to

understand.

The interpretation which we seek

the four sections
cognitive activity,

to

uphold

the line represents

of

and the objects

that each of

is

a different kind of

of these different activities

are different objects.

To

establish this

comes

immediately

trying

to

and

we must hark back

establish

before
a

the

argument which

division.

We

are

between

distinction

Aoa

&r*CTi7fM? or knowledge.

to the

fourfold

is

86fa or opinion
supposed to be between

ignorance and knowledge, and its objects are supposed to lie

between the objects of ignorance and those of knowledge. To
establish the distinction we consider the character of Swdpeis,
i.e.,

faculties, or better, powers.

according to
e<'

o5

re eo-ri

its different

One power

objects

and

its

differs

The power

teal o aTrepyd^erai,.

from another

different function*
of sight has the

function of seeing and its objects are colours.

The power of
has
the
function
of
and
its
hearing
hearing
objects are sounds.

Now

knowledge,

this is
fallible.

if

it

is

very important

That

is

to say

really knowledge,

must be

infallible

while opinion as it is mere opinion is

because the functions of the infallible

477

d.

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

and the

Such

must be

different
knowledge and opinion are
and
therefore
Swdpeis,
they have different objects.
Plato's argument, and whether we regard it as sound

fallible

different
is

71

or not there can be no doubt that he accepted the conclusion.

Having established the necessity of difference in the objects

to ask what these different objects are. The SiW/if?

we proceed
of

between ignorance

lies

Sofa clearly

and knowledge.

It

which

is

as

it

simply nothing
than ignorance, but not so clear as knowledge.

must

between the objects

lie

knowledge.

Now

of course

is

were clearer
Its

objects

and the objects of

ignorance which is nothing

of ignorance

the objects of

what

are ttiemselves nothing, or simply

is

We

not.

cannot

philosophically speaking be ignorant about anything.

Ordinary
statements of that kind imply some sort of cognition of an
Ignorance is mere blankness or
object in some sense real.
darkness and

it

cannot have an object.

Its objects literally

do

not exist.

The
real

objects of knowledge on the other

TO Travrek&s bv TravreXw? yvwa-rov.

timeless, intelligible

realities,

which

and are never other than they

We

expect them to
Sofa
and what is
the object of ignorance
We find them in the world of ra

objects of

They

are the

eiSrj

the self-sufficient, self-dependent, perfect,

or true universals

are,

hand are the truly

are,
are.
lie

and are what they

What

then are the

between what

is

not-

the object of knowledge.

yiyvo/jieva, the

things of
sense and change, things which are never themselves, but are
continually passing over into something else, things which in a
"
sense are and in a sense are not,
tumbling about between

being and not- being."

we

are

seeking.

It is in this sphere that

we

find

what

These objects are between the objects of

ignorance and the objects of knowledge. They have a greater

clearness and reality than that which is merely a blank nothing,

but they have far

less

clearness

and

reality than

the

real

intelligible objects which we grasp by reason apart from sense.

whether he was right or wrong
Clearly, then, for Plato

H 2

72

H.

PATON.

J.

the objects of Sofa are very different from those of

This difference
of the different

We

different.

is

objects

and hearing were, we saw,

Svvdpew
But this
see colours and we hear sounds.
of seeing

as nothing to the difference of

difference is

The

the greatest difference possible.

the objects

of

opinion and knowledge. In comparison with this second difference these minor differences become negligible. In comparison

with this second difference seing and hearing and their objects
become similar, and we class them both under the SiW/u? of
Sofa, which

opposed to the SiW/u?

is

Consider

now our subsequent

of

cTnarri^.

procedure.

darkness into
first

which

of

We

light.

divide

it

in

two unequal

Sofa and the second

is

We

take a line

we may

stretching, as from the allegory of the cave

guess,

from

sections, the

The

eVto-T?;//,??.

first

presumably the shorter as having less

then subdivide these two sections in the same

section, that of Sofa, is

We

reality.

proportion, which

gives

division of el/cavta

and the larger division

us

in

the

first

the smaller

section

and in the

of TTIO-TIS,

second section the smaller division of Sidvoia and the larger

We thus establish a
division of VQT)GI<$ or eV^o-r^/A?; proper.

mathematical proportion, Sofa

Sta^ota

v6ij(rt,s

eTTLcmj/uirj

or eTnarrj^r] proper.

eltccuria

iricms

Again, keeping

to the

same terminology (though Plato varies), elfcacria Sidvoia =

Note further* that this proportion holds not
7rtc7T<9 vorja-is.
:

only between the activities, but between their objects. Ova La or

being, the object of eTriarijfjLij yeveais or becoming, the object of
Plato expressly refrains from drawing
Sofa
eirHTTrjfjLr) Sofa.
:

out the proportions between the subordinate divisions* and

their objects, rrjv e<j> ols ravra dvakoylav in order to avoid many
words.

Surely that

is

to

say clearly that

this

proportion

certainly exists.

What

are

we

what we can say

to

make

of these proportions

of the relations of eVtcrT?;/-^

534a.

Clearly that

and Sofa and

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

their objects can be said also in

relations of the subordinate divisions

we have shown

in the first place,

and Sofa are

different

73
degree of the

different

and

their objects.

Now,

that the objects of eTna-Typy

from one another; and therefore

it

is

probable that the objects of the subdivisions are also different

from one another. Further, as eTricrrri^rj is clearer than Sofa

and

more

objects are

its

of

each division

power
which precedes

it,

than those of Sofa, so the

real

clearer than the

is

and the

objects of

power

of the division

each power are more real

than the objects of the power which precedes it. That is to

say, we are mapping out in the first place the different cognitive

powers of the human

spirit,

the different forms in which

it is

it passes to full knowout

the
different objects of
mapping
The difference of the powers goes side

manifested, the different stages by which

And we

ledge.

are also

these different powers.

by

side with a difference in the objects.

clearly

by

Aristotle, Nic. Eth.,

different objects
of the soul, if as

7T/H>9
r)

erepa

teal

we

The

TVJS

difference in the

tyv^s
KaO'

What

is

powers

O/JbOlOTrjTO,

stated

yap ra

TO* yevet,

TO

TlVa Kal OiKeiOTIJTa

is,

as

is

we have

what

is

seen, a difference

for Plato the

of course in a sense real.

It is a

thing, a

first of all

is

and

The wildest dreams and

But within

find different kinds or degrees of reality.

the whole real

same

Everything that

the most absurd delusions in some sense are.

we

IT/ao?

fjbopLwv erepov

difference in intelligibility (oXq&ta).

real

is

to generically

the difference in the objects

difference in reality, or

known

principle

For

virdp^ec avrofc.

in clearness.

is

"

know them."

are able to

row

KarpOV 7T6(f>Vtc6^ L7Tp

yv&cns

The
b:

must correspond generically different parts

we hold, it is in virtue or some kind of like-

ness or kinship that

rq> yevei,

1139 a

We

this

separate

into ra ovra on one side (the things

which in a special sense are, and are real and intelligible), and
ra yiyvopeva on the other (the things for ever changing,
tumbling about between what is and what is not). Within TO.
ovra we make a further subdivision into ra paGy panted, the

74

H.

J.

PATON.

objects of Sidvoia or the mathematical sciences, real indeed in

comparison with the changing objects of sense, but unreal in

comparison with the elbr], the true realities, the objects of
or

voij(7i<t

similar

in

some

e7ri,aTr)fj,r)

the

subdivision,

sense

So within

proper.

but

real,

ret yiyvo/jLeva

we make

ei/coves

or

shadows or reflexions

unreal

in

comparison with the

and manufactured

objects of 7n'o-Tt9, the actual animals, plants,

among which we
which we seek to maintain

articles

lead our
is

waking

life.

The

that this lower division

is

thesis

in no

sense less important or less significant than any of the other

divisions,

and that

it

indicates our first objects

and our

first

activity in our difficult path towards the real.

we proceed

But-before

we may be asked what

is

attempt a justification of this view

the relation between these so-called
to

and again between these so-called different

and how is it ever possible to pass from one to

different activities,

kinds of objects,

Our reply

the other.

is,

in the first place, that

we have

to

determine what Plato meant before we can pass on to criticize

his meaning and, in the second place, that we shall try to deal
;

with these

difficulties in

regard to the special section which we

Yet we may say here that although

are attempting to consider.

the general relation between the different kinds of object

course a special and unique form of relation,
it

we may

is

of

describe

variously and inadequately and metaphorically as the relation

the sign to the thing signified, the symbol to the thing

symbolized, the relation of the appearance to the reality, or,
of

though not in the

The

relation

is

scientific sense, of the effect to the cause.

apparently not identical for the objects of the

different sectors, but the analogy or parallelism

The

always holds.

between the objects of eiKaaia and those of Trier is

is given (Republic, 510 a) as TO bpoiwdev
TT/JO? TO u> da/to laOy, i.e.,
the relation of the copy to the original. In the cave it is
relation

described as the relation of the shadow or reflexion to the thing

which

casts

it,

and the same view

in the tenth Book.

is suggested by the theory of

In 511 a a similar relation is said

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

75

between the objects of irl<rris and those of ^lavoia. The

objects of TrtVrt? which have images or copies of themselves
under eltcaa-La are themselves only images or copies of the objects
to exist

of mathematics,
/jieva

and

are like the

a commonplace that all 7671/0or are copies of the elBrj.

Still we must

of course

e'iSrj

it is

remember that all this is metaphorical, and if taken too literally

is misleading and even false.
Plato himself shows this in the
Parmenides as regards the relation between the ^i^vofieva and
If it holds literally at all, I think it holds between
the ei&ij.
the actual changing individuals which are the objects of TrtVn?
and the more real unchanging individuals which are the objects

This

of Sidvoia.

is

possibly suggested by the fact that

to hold, the second

is

of the line

proportion
segment
the same size as the third segment.
But perhaps this
press too far

if

our

must be
is

to

what may merely be an accident without any

definite philosophical meaning.

Summing up
reasonable

is

certainty

far,

we have

fully

the fourfold

borne out by the allegory of the cave.

proof or confirmation can only be obtained

the objects are and

any two

discovered with

the general principles of

a difference of power involving a difference of objects.

division

This

our advance so

how they are

different.

Further

by considering what
To do so as regards

of the subdivisions will, of course, in itself

immensely

increase the probability as regards the other two subdivisions,

that

is

to say in our case

if

we can show

Sidvoia and of eV^rnj/LM? proper or

voij<ri<;

that the objects of

are different,

i.e., if

the

mathematics and those of philosophy are different,

we have indefinitely added to the presumption that the objects

objects of

Needless to say we
hold very definitely that the objects of Sidvoia and eTria-Tij/jirj

of el/cao-la

and

Trtcrrt?

are also different.

are in Plato's view different, as Aristotle expressly said, and

But for this purpose at

that Plato was right in thinking so.
present we can only refer to the limited justification in Adam's
Edition of the Republic and also to some remarks in Burnet's

History of Greek Philosophy.

76

H.

We

J.

PATON.

pass then to our special discussion of elfcaaia and the

and of how they differ from via-ris and the

objects of elKcurla,
Objects Of 7ROTJ9.

Let us

first of all

sum up what

are to be our conclusions.

ingenuous and intuitive vision of the real.

It makes no
Its object is simply what appears, TO ^>aiv6^vov.
For it there
distinction between the different levels of reality.
EtVacrta

is
if

is

the

is

first

no distinction yet made between the real and the unreal, or,
you prefer it, real and unreal do not mean anything to it. It
cognitive and has an object, but

that

is,

it

it

does not claim to be true.

does not affirm or deny

Truth and Falsehood,

Eeality and Unreality, Fact and Fiction, these are distinctions

which have not yet arisen. It is identical with that afoOqcrt?
or Intuition of the first part of the Theaetetus

which

is

supposed

by the Sophist to be knowledge, but which cannot be in contradiction with any other aladirjo-^ because it does not yet judge,
i.e.,

because

it

does not yet lay claim to what

There

Truth.

is

no word for

it

is

called Objective

we may

in English but

call it

Imagination or the cognition of images, or again Intuition or the

mere looking
Its
lKGt)v

at objects.

object as

we might expect from

We must

or image.

in the dangerous

not, however, call

language

of

Nor again may we

psychology.
to a mental image.

in

it

call it

is

the

a mental image,
logic

and

a real image as opposed

It is not subjective as

mean anything mean

and

derivation

modern writers on

nor objective as opposed to subjective.

unreal,

its

opposed to objective
These phrases when they

a distinction between the real and the

this first stage of consciousness,

must be from within, that

examined as

distinction has not yet arisen.

it

Still

less can we say that it is mistaking the image for the thing, the
unreal for the real. That is mere error, it is not el/caa-ia. For

i/ca<ra

we

repeat again there

is

no distinction between the

and the unreal, and consequently there is no

mistaking one for the other. There is no claim
consequently there can be no

possibility of error.

real

possibility of

to truth,

and

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

We

and

detail,

we hope
"

now proceed

can

an indication

of its objects in

these appear to be of no metaphysical importance

if

to

to give

77

show

The images* are

later that this is not so.

firstly shadows, secondly reflexions in water

are close grained and smooth and bright and

and
all

in things that

similar things

"

irpwrov fj>v ra<; (r/cias, evretra ra ev rot? vSacri (^avTaa/jLara

KOI kv rot? oaa TTVKVCL re KOI \ela /cal <f>ava (rvveo-TTjtcev ical TTOLV
TO TOiOVTOV.

This

is not further developed in the present passage as

concerned with higher themes, but we learn from the
tenth book that the artist also holds a mirror up to nature, and

Plato

is

he appears to createf animals, plants and manfactured

we

(the very things

articles

shall afterwards find belong to TTLQ-T^) as

well as the earth and the sky and the gods and all things in
heaven and in the House of Hades beneath the earth, but in

mere ^avrao-fia or el/cav of these things.

We find exactly the same view in the Sophist. We have on
the one hand the things^ made by God, not here the et'S?; as in

reality he offers us a

and inanimate substances,

and water and the like, and on

the Republic, but animals, plants

animals and their elements,

the other hand

fire

we have the

other manufactured articles.

made by man, houses and

things

All this

is

of course the object of

But we must set against these the images made by

the images made by man. The description is similar
"
The images made by God are the
that in the Republic-.

Trio-Tis.

God and
to

images or appearances (^avrda-^ara) which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, e.g., a shadow when darkness comes in
the light of the

fire,

or in cases

where a double

light,

that

external to an object and that belonging to it, comes together

about bright and smooth objects, and creates a shape giving us
Ta re ev
a sensation the reverse of what we ordinarily see."
rot9 VTTVOIS Kai

oaa

OTav ev

510 a.

fieO'

rj^epav

^avrda^ara

avro<f)vf)

TO> irvpl o~fcoro<; eyyiyvTjrai,, Si7r\ovv Se

t 596

c.

265

c.

\eyTcu>
rjviic av

2666.

>

78

H.

</>o>9

oltcelov

crvve\6ov

re KOI d\\07piov 7T6pl

T}9

e/jLTTpoadev

reflexion in this passage

TO,

el(t>6via<$

Now

irape^ov eZSo? airepyd^ijTat,.

'

PATON.

J.

it is

XcLfJUTTpa

KOI \eta

evavriav

oS/reo)?

eZ? ev

alcrdrjcnv

whatever be the theory

clear that the things here

spoken

of
of

the images made by God are the same as those of the Republic,
the shadows and reflexions of real things with the addition of the
objects which appear to us in dreams.

the doctrine and

language of the

The addition

ciently remarkable.

surprising in itself,

when

e.g., 4:14(1,

and

in the

of

The

similarity of this to

Republic

is

dreams

is

in

itself suffi-

not in the least

it is

clearly suggested in the Republic,

myth

of the three natures, gold, silver

and bronze, Plato asserts that this early education of the

guardians was just a dream below the earth and when he
describes the fyiKodedpoves* as dreaming.

And we may

note

here incidentally for the complete parallelism of the line that

as we in elKacrLa appear to be dreaming about yiyvo/jueva, so the

mathematician!

is

said to be

dreammg, dreaming about TO ov

o'veipWTTOVCTl, fJLV 7Tpl TO OV, VTTdp $6 dSvi'dTOV avTCLL? ISeiV.

So far we have the images made by God, but we have also

made by man as in the tenth book of the Republic.
Not only do we make real houses, but the artist will paint for
the images

us another house,!
for those

who

are

"

which

awake

It is this fact of the

possible for us to track

"

is

a sort of dream created by

olov ovap

avOpannvov

image made by

down

man

eyprjyopocriv

man which makes

it

the Sophist to his lair and to

-show the nature of error.

Surely this would not be possible if

the doctrine were of no metaphysical importance, and if we
shrink from putting art under the first
activity of the soul, we

must not

On

let this

this point also

profoundly

We

stand in the

we

way

of recognizing the truth.

shall maintaip that Plato's doctrine is

true.

have now got as the objects of elKacrLa shadows and

* 476

c.

f 5336.

266 c.

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

reflexions, the

dreams of the

79

and the dreams

sleeper,

the

of

artist.

Let us turn to the

character of

all

Theaetetus to

the

perceive

common

Here we have a preliminary stage

this.

of

consciousness set against thinking about the world, set against

what is here called Sofa. This preliminary stage is called
aio-Orjo-is,

sense or intuition.

no right

to

el/caaia.

The use

It

may

be objected that

we have ^

Sofa with Trio-ris and afoflr/o-t? with

words shows that we are dealing

identify

of different

with different things. To this we reply that the use of

different words shows no such
Anyone who is
thing.
acquainted with the works of Plato

is

aware that in

spite

and consistency of his thinking he is not at

Even in this
careful about what we may call terminology.

of the precision
all

particular part of the Republic with

which we are dealing he

but never his argument

varies his terminology

as far as

we

can see for no reason unless possibly for reasons of rhythm.

Thus Sofa is first of all distinguished from yvwcrw or eTrtanj^rj
using these words indifferently, e.g., 478c, 4770. Later, 510-511,
he divides

and

eVtoT?;/-*,??

vorja-is.

When

into the subordinate divisions of Siavoca

he comes back to

534

this in

v6r}<Ti<;

is

the word for the whole section with Sidvoia and

eV^m;/^

as

more frequently

of course

he

its

subordinate divisions.

Still

language according to the particular point with

which he is dealing. Thus in the Republic he speaks of the
varies

his

objects of Sofa as

TO.

jiyvo^eva in order to mark them

off as

comparatively unreal from the elfy or ra ovra. This does not

prevent him in the Theaetetus from calling the objects of Sofa

ra ovra, i.e., real in comparison with the objects of aia0r)<ri$. v

For ourselves we can only say with Plato ov irepl ov6fj,cnos
afjL(fncr^T7ja-^.

different

Now

If

name, we
it is

he chooses to

call

the same thing by a

shall not refuse to see his meaning.

clear that in the Theaetetus he

is

describing two

knowledge and two stages which are below the level

In the Republic and in the Sophist
of Sidvoia and eTriartj^'Tj.
stages in

80

H. J.

(though

we

PATON.

have to return

shall

Sidvoia in

much

than that

especially

to

same doctrine

appears to set forth the

the

Sophist

he

later)

two stages below

What more probable

as to the

same language.
we are right in setting the Theaetetus
between the Republic and the Sophist the two stages described
in the three dialogues are the same ?
If we find that the
.same doctrine

is

the

if

apparently taught about these two stages the

will not prevent us from accepting it

name

change in the
as one.

The Sofa

the

of

TTio-Ti? of the Republic

e.g.,

an

Theaetetus

and

certainly appears to be the

appear to be the same,

a manufactured article) as such

its objects

he mentions a wagon (i.e.,

I do not think anyone will
object.

identifying

than

these.

We

el/caaia.

find

But alV^o-t? may appear

in

difficulty

to

be wider

do indeed get certain things classed under

which we might naturally expect to find. Thus we get

what is before us in dreams as we have had already in the
and also what is before us in diseases* generally and
Sophist
it

in

particularly
elicaa-ia.

But

madness.

in addition

So far we appear to be
and this is our difficulty

in

still

we

get

the whole of
of

reality

alo-Orjo-ts, the whole ingenuous unthinking vision

whether in memory or in imagination, and in

we ordinarily call pure sense,

which does not as yet involve judgment.

addition, all that

all

aio-Orjais

What we
intuition

more
it

is

detail,

suggest is this, that this general aiad^a^ or

the same as el/cao-ia, but we now get it described in

and only now

is

the full extension

and meaning

of

made clear.

Note that this is exactly what we should expect from

the purpose of the different dialogues. Both in the Republic
and

in the Sophist

In the Republic

we

we

are dealing with particular problems.

are dealing with the character of philosophy

and the training which must precede

* 157

it.

In the Sophist we

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

81

and

error.

In

both we merely allude to our doctrine in regard to the

first

the

of

activity

we have

point

the nature of sophistry

with

are concerned

mind

knowing

in

There

before us.

order

to

elucidate

the

no reason in either for

is

giving us a comprehensive account of this activity for

its

own

sake.

In

the Theaetetus

it

is

Here we are

otherwise.

quite

primarily concerned with the lower stages only.

I take

it

that

the primary purpose of the Theaetetus is by an examination of

these lower stages to show that they cannot give us knowledge.

We

we can only

knowledge when
any intelligent disciple of Plato would

are allowed to infer that

we come

to the

be sure to do.

el'S?/,

as

It is ludicrous to say that in the Theaetetus Plato

gives up the doctrine of the

etSrj.

Yet just because we

through.

find

That theory

is

implied
are not concerned with

all
it

primarily, but with the lower stages, we naturally get a fuller

account of these stages than we get elsewhere.

In the

first

place then,

what

is

the broad general character

of this first stage of cognitive experience

but

this

is

It

psychologist.

is

rather, as

and intuitive vision

imagination as that

It

is

called ai<r0rj<ris,

the sensation nor

neither

we

of the soul
is

the perception of the

have said, the first ingenuous

whether in sense, memory or

We have here

before thinking begins.

the bare or immediate object, presentation or apjDearance.

And secondly, what is Plato's doctrine about it ? He appears
rather to accept than to reject the sophistical account of

About

it

he seems to urge three main points

other objects not got at in this

(2) that

(1) that
if

we

it.

we have

consider

it

becomes simply what we

stream of separate unrelated images i.e., what
naturally be described as the etVo^e? which are objects of

in this

should

may

way

way

apart from thinking

it

call a

elfcaaia and (3) that if in this the mind is merely passive the
stream of images becomes simply the flux of Heraclitus in
which we can find no foothold and in which it is impossible to
;

have any object before us at

all.

82

H.

It

is true,

el/ccov.

PATON.

indeed, that he does not use the

we may hazard

If

J.

a conjecture this

word

eltcaa-La

or

might be because

not concerned to show that the appearance is in any

sense like the natural object, as the natural object is like the

here he

is

his

eI5o5

identify aio-Orjcns

eV

<f)d<rfj,aTa

TJ/JULV

phantoms which appear

7ra0o9

surely near enough for

of elfcav in the Republic

and

one place as ^da^aral

a word which is, of course, used of the

eiSwXov in the Sophist

of

is

of the objects either as (fravrda/jLara^

word which he uses alongside

?a
*

with <j>avTa<ria* which

and bespeaks

our purposes

But he does

contention in the Republic.

great

'

or in

He

in dreams.

also uses the

word

to indicate at least the comparative passivity of the soul.

Note particularly that

is

alcrOrjcris

not sense or sensation

though it includes it. Its object is simply TO ^aivo^evov, that

which appears, and is what it appears, whether in dreams or
maolness, whether in sense,
is

called
"

phrase
It is

and

"

an idea

"

The Association

now

that

memory,

or imagination.

modern

in the works of

It is

what

logicians, as in the

of Ideas."

we begin

to see its metaphysical importance

was not without good reason that Plato

It is often suggested by cominto the Republic.

to realize that it

introduced

it

mentatojs that eiKaaia indicates no special and separate way of

knowing, but there have been many philosophers who have held
that
,i

it is

possible.

the only
It is

way

and that nothing more

of knowing,

what Hume, who understands

is

far better than

it

-?>

average supporters, calls the stream of impressions and ideas.

By the agnostics of all ages from Protagoras to Hume it has
been identified with the whole of knowledge, and its objects

its

have been identified with the whole

of reality.

appearances is everything, everything

seems what it is. It is reality for me.
of contradiction or of error.

There

and no such thing as Philosophy.

* 152

c.

t 1676.

is

is

what

it

of

seems and

no possibility
such
no
thing as Truth
There

Memory,

The world

155

a.

is

sense, imagination,

1666.

'

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

and

all

that

and that

we

is

call

83

Thinking or Knowledge are on one dead level,

is described by Plato under the

the level which

heading of el/caaia.
So far we have simply been trying to determine what Plato
as a matter of fact classed under eltcacria.
We must now

endeavour to understand

why

he did

so,

and

this should enable

We

us to grasp his position more clearly.

hope it will also
enable us to justify it. It will probably be generally agreed
both that it is natural to class hallucinations, dreams, and

perhaps even imagination under

el/cao-la,

as offering us a special class of objects.

and

to consider these

Any

doubts that are

<

entertained about the reasonableness of Plato's position will

most probably be felt (1) in regard to sense and its objects

and (2) in regard to the activity and products of the artist.
But before going on to examine these two questions in detail
necessary to state, more or less dogmatically, what are the
objects and the activity of iricrr^, in order that we may have a

it is

clearer understanding of

The
the
on,

the

difference

objects of TrtVrt? as indicated

between

Tr/crrt?

and

by both the Republic and

Sophist are the_things made by God, animals, plants, and so

and the things made by man, namely, manufactured

articles,

houses and chairs and what not.

These are

distin-

made by God, shadows and reflexions

and dreams, and from the images made by man, as, for instance,
In other words, what we have here are real
in painting.

guished from the images

We

prefer to call this

things, the things of our ordinary world.
the actual world, rather than the real world, for the word real
strictly speaking, belongs

The

activity of TTIO-TIS

only to the
is

e'ISr).

Plato says in the Theaetetw*

"

"

The soul,"
when thinking appears to me to

best called Judgment.

be just talking, asking questions of herself and answering them,

When she has arrived at a decision,
affirming and denying.

190

a.

84

H.

PATON.

J.

by sudden impulse, and has at last agreed

and does not doubt, that is her opinion or Soga," and we may
add her belief or Tr/crrt?. ToOro yap poi, tVSaXXeroa biavoeither gradually or

OVK a\\o

TI

77

SiaXeyeo-Qai, avrr) eavrrjv epoDTQHra KOI

vr), teal <l>do-/cov(ra

etre fipaSvrepov elVe ical

(frdafcovcra.

orav 8e opio-aaa,
rj&r) <j)fj KOI

o^vrepov eVafacra, TO avrb

Sofav ravrrjv ride^ev

Sio-rdfy,

fjurj

xal ov

From

avrfjs.

we

the Sophist

get the clear statement, fully borne out by the general argument both of the Sophist and the Theaetetus, that the characteristics of

(2) that

Judgment

it is

are: (1) that

affirms or denies;*

it

and

true or false.f

Further there

is

present in

it

two elements

an element

of

taken as identical with etnaa-ia and an element of

aiaOrjo-is

This element of thinking

apparently be
either the inferior thinking of mathematical Sidvoia or the

pure thinking.J

thinking of philosophy.

superior

It

is

may

element which

this

leads us on from TT/CTTK? to pure thought about ra ovra,

is

the combination of the element of

alaQ^cri^

and

and that

it

of

thinking which renders error

False opinion lies

possible.
neither in the intuitions in relation to one another nor in the
thoughts, but eV

rrj

o-vvdtyei,

alo-drja-ews TT/OO? Sidvoiav, in the

combination of intuition and thinking.

out by the Sophist.

The

This

is

fully borne

then is Judgment. It is Affirmative or

It involves an element of alerter t?
or
False.
True
Negative,
and an element of thought. This element of thought grasps
activity

other things ovaia\ or being or reality, and this implies

that it affirms or denies the existence of its object.
Every

among

judgment
are

able

is

to

an existential judgment. By thinking alone we

distinguish between the real and the unreal,

between being and not-being

exist for elicaaria.

263

And we now

distinction

t 2636.

e.

Th. 195

c.

which does not

understand how the objects of

J
||

Th. 1946.

Th 186

e.

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

judgment are the ordinary things

of

the

85

actual existent or

so-called real world.

That

say like eliuurfajirfoTi? has under

and we must not narrow

objects

given

to

is

by Plato

comprises
to false,

in a

down

it

special connexion

the

in

it

many

to tire instances
It

Republic.

which claim

to be true as opposed
which
actual
are
and objective as
yiyv6/j,va
unreal and subjective.
It comprises in a word all

all

and

assertions

all

opposed to
that is not aia-Q-rjcris on the one hand or pure mathematics and
philosophy on the other. It is a posteriori or empirical knowledge, yvaxris

Kara

rrjv

It

alaOycriv*

includes all empirical

'

science and all history as well as the ordinary judgments of the

ordinary man, ra rwv 7ro\\wv TroAXa

KCLI

z/o/u//,a

icakov re Trepi

rwv aXXtov.

Having now indicated the nature of irians we may return

with more insight to our two main problems in regard to
elrcaaia (I) the question of sense
and (2) the question of art.
:

The question of sense and its objects is exceedingly difficult,

and we may be unable to thread our way successfully
through all its mazes, but we note in the first place that
this view is not so
strange to the view of the Republic
as

might at

first

sight

practically identifies
of the artist

or

imitate the bed

In the tenth book Plato

appear.

the sensible appearance with

the

elicmv

the mirror.
The artist is indeed said to
made by the craftsmen, but that actual bed is

one and yet it appears different from different points of view.

There is a difference between what it is and what it appears,t
ola GCTTLV

and ola ^aiverai.

Note incidentally how

out the complete parallelism of the line.

bed to the many actual beds in which it

each actual bed to the

many appearances

As
is

is

this bears

the eZSos of

manifested, so

of it in sejise.

is

But

note especially that these appearances of the bed to sense are

called

^avrda-fjiara or

* Th, 1930.

eta)\a.\

It

t 598 a.

is

these

appearances to

5986.

>

86

H.

sense,
artist,

work

J.

PATON.

and not the actual bed, which are imitated by the

and these c^avrdo-^ara or etSa>A,a are actually like the

The appearances

of the painter.

to sense are on exactly

the same level as the shadows or reflexions or images whether

made by God
we get a clear

or

especially sight

is

made by man.

confirmation

included

in

Again

Rep.

the view that

of

under

eiKao-ia.

all

We

602 cd

aiardvjo-i?

are given a

simple case of the passage from the appearances to a reality or

Plato points out that so far as sight is
actuality behind them.
concerned,

may appear bent in water and straight

may appear concave when it is convex and

things

outside, a thing

convex when

concave, and again

is

it

if

we have two

things

equal in size they appear different in size to the eye according

These appearances we suggest

as they are near or far away.

are

we take them merely at their face

making them clear to
and do not seek to go behind them, we are in

elicove*;,

and

so long as

we

value, so long as

ourselves

There

elfcaa-ia.
so.

appear
about it.

we

get at

are satisfied with

so far

is

no question

The things do

of error.

just different

and that

is all
Every appearance
if
want
know
But
we
what the thing actually is,
to
it by counting and weighing and
measuring, so that

is

not the apparent size, shape and quantity may rule in our
souls but rather the, actual size, shape and quantity determined

by mathematical measurement

or calculation
TO ^erpelv /cal
this
l<TTavai*
means
we
Kal
By
pass to irLar^, to
apiOpelv
the actual world of solid bodies in fact to animals, plants,

and manufactured

articles.

This means clearly that as far as

compare Theaetetus, 154 a

secondary qualities are concerned

we must always be

satisfied

with eltcaaia or

what they seem and they may seem

men or to the same man at different

are

qualities are on a different level

* R. 602

d.

aia-Qrja-is.

They

different to different

times.

in regard to

But primary
them we can

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

87

distinguish between the merely apparent which is given to

eiKaa-ia and the actual which is determined by Tmm?.

And

surely in this Plato

reflexion

these

is right.

Like any other image or

appearances of sense are mere appearances.

what they seem and they seem what they are. Each
They
Svvaju? gives us its proper objects, we see colours and we hear
sounds, but TCL /coiva* sameness and difference, likeness and
are

unlikeness, and above all ova-la or being cannot be got through

Thus alaQ^cris apart from thinking has no part in
sense.
ou<rta,t an(^ therefore it has

no part in truth. Clearly it must

but under etVacrt'a, though there

be classed not under

TTLO-TIS

are certain difficulties

which we

will recur to later.

no use saying that the objects of sense perception are

distinguished from those of dreams or imagination by following
It

is

upon what
el/ccicrta

is

called

an external stimulus.

Apart from the

means, we are here describing

not from within but from without. We can indeed

difficulty of

come back

knowing what

this

to el/caa-la afterwards

with a knowledge of mathe-

matical science and with an explicit metaphysic and we can

distinguish its objects in this way, but el/caa-ia itself knows

nothing of external stimuli for the first stage of cognition all

objects are on the same level of reality, and it makes no
;

distinction of less

and more

reason that

that most consistent of

Hume,

real within them.

It is for this

all sceptics

and that

subtlest defender of eifcavia as coextensive with the whole of

knowledge, refused to distinguish impressions from ideas by

reference to an external reality, and distinguished them only

by

less or greater

degrees of vividness, though in so doing he

ignored the fact that the images of our dreams are often
vivid than those of our waking
that

that
"

Hobbes
"

sense

is

life.

more

It is also for this reason

in the first chapter of the Leviathan informs us

in all cases nothing but original fancy,"

their appearance to us is fancy the

* Th. 185-6.

and again

same waking that dreaming."

t 186

e.

88

H.

We

now

are

in

PATON.

J.

understand

to

position

relation between the objects of elKaaia

It

only on

is

actual which

The

the level

is

the.

of TTLO-T^.

to

pass

the

consciously distinguished from the apparent.

typical case of

primary qualities

we

irians that

of

better

and thsse

the determination of the actual

this is

by some

sort of

mathematical measurement

or thinking, 6/070 v \oyio-TiKov, R. 602

e.

Into the exact character of this mathematical thinking we

need not enter in detail that would belong to a discussion of

and we are primarily concerned only with eitcaaia.

not simply a matter of measurement. The actual

TTtcrri?

But

it is

size of

any object we never can see at all.

The size of any object

to us in el/cacrla.

concerned

is

never twice the same.

will appear a

mere

the heavens.

This applies as

we

are

infinite series,

it

is

as far as elrcacrla

If it is far

near enough

much to
When we say

rule as to anything else.

long

if

point,

can never appear

It

enough away
it

is

it

will blot out

a measure,

e.g.,

that an object

is

a foot
a foot

not merely stating an equation between two

we are not merely saying that if we have the

apparent object and the apparent foot rule in juxta-position

whether near the eye or far from it they always have the same
apparent size. We do not think that either the foot rule or
the object actually becomes

On

eye.

and

is

the contrary,

unvarying

sizes.

reasonable theory capable

When

one

reflects

This
of

it

recedes from

their actual size

always relatively in the

actually

sense.

smaller as

we think

is

same proportion

the

unvarying
to

other

to be the only
our
explaining
experiences in
is

believed

on the extraordinary amount

of

subtle scientific thinking involved in reaching this conclusion

thinking in comparison with which the discovery of the law of

gravitation is mere child's play and when one remembers
that

it is

one

is

done by

all of

us in the

first

few years

of childhood,

impressed with a profound respect for the intellectual

attainments of even the meanest of the human race.
This brings us to another point, that the objects of

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

as
i.e.,

89

opposed to those of el/cacrla are wholly unperceivable,

they can never be given to us in sense. We have seen
unperceivable and that we
with no one of the infinite apparent

that the actual size of any object

can identify the actual

size

The same obviously

sizes.

is

applies to all solid shapes what-

we take even such an elementary figure as a solid

regular sphere we can certainly never see it. All we can see is
an infinite number of apparent hemispherical shapes varying
soever.

If

both in colour and in

size.
By thinking about these
we conclude they can only be explained by the
hypothesis that behind them is a solid sphere unvarying in

infinitely

sensations

size

and incapable

of being seen,

i.e.,

that they are the

many

varying appearances of one solid sphere. When one comes to

the theories of the scientists
who of course are only carrying

on the same process more systematically this becomes still

more clear. The atoms and electrons of the scientist are
believed

but they can certainly never be seen.

is meant to be a defence of so-called realism

in,

Our view then

against the idealists of the Berkeleyan school, a defence of the

ordinary man's belief in the existence of a solid and relatively

It is also an
things in space.
attempt at least partially to justify the claims of science to be
that science
like Benedetto Croce
true against those who hold

permanent world

is

a mere

of

invention

actual

or

The actual

convenience.

fiction

made by

us for purposes of

solid bodies of ordinary consciousness

and science are no doubt an invention, a construction they are

not and cannot be given in sense but if their existence is the
only reasonable explanation of our experience in sense and is
the condition of our having such an experience, we are justified
believing in their actual existence and in rejecting the
unworkable theory of idealism which involves itself in hopeless

in

difficulties as
detail.

On

soon as

it

tries to

the other hand Plato

understand our experience in

is surely right in calling our

cognition of such objects mere faith or irian,? and not knowledge.

We cannot

know

certainly anything but

an

intelligible necessity,

'

90

H.

which excludes

of itself

J.

PATON.

any possible

alternative.

we

This

are

about the general

theory that actual solid bodies exist or about any particular
attempt to work out that theory in detail. And of course we

never in a position

to assert positively either

must admit that the

solid bodies

relation

at first so simple

and

to

involves perhaps insurmount-

we attempt to reverse the process

understand how ether waves or chemical

able difficulties, especially

of transition

between our sensations and actual

if

changes in the brain can become for instance a sensation of red.

But here we may be asking ourselves wrong questions or
difficulties

creating

for

and

ourselves,

in

any case these

not greater than those which meet the idealist

he denies the existence of solid bodies altogether. Plato

difficulties are

when

would perhaps put down these difficulties to the positively

unreal and unintelligible character of all ryiyvopeva.

We

would add here that these

possibility of

communication between

worthy instance of this

most cases the

the

for

different spirits.

A note-

Croce's intolerably confused account

is

Nor

of the extrinsecation of art.

in

arise

as soon as he tries to explain the

as for the realist

idealist

difficulties

idealists

is

appear

an accident. Although
assume the existence of

this
to

other spirits besides themselves, they have no real reason for

doing so which would not equally justify them in assuming the
existence

of

actual

solid

matter of reasonable faith

Both assumptions are a

and not of knowledge, and indeed

bodies.

they appear to be bound up with one another. We pass to

other spirits by a kind of syllogism in the sphere of Trlo-ris.
These variously coloured appearances are, we say, explained by
the

movements

of

an actual

solid

human

body.

These move-

ments in turn can be explained only by the volition

eternal spirit.

body

is

This appearance

the sign of a

is

the sign of a body.

of

an

This

Thus we pass from heard sounds or

which is their source.
The second

spirit.

seen colours to a spirit

stage of the argument involves some sort of philosophic thinking
as opposed to the mathematical thinking of the first stage, but

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA

it

seems to depend on the existence of the

case the reasoning

If

we

91

first stage,

and in any

same general character throughout.

judgment, we ought logically to reject the
of the

is

reject the first

second.

We

are prepared then on our doctrine to accept the truths

of the scientist as a

matter of reasonable

faith,

but we are not

without an answer to him when he goes on to maintain that

these unperceivable objects his atoms and electrons
are

and the only reality, or when he stupidly denies the ^

existence of spirit by what is nothing more or less than a con-

reality

tradiction in terms.

We

do not say that he

is

wrong

in attri-

buting to his atoms a greater reality and intelligibility than

belongs to the things of sense and in holding that the things of
sense are only intelligible in the light of them.
do not even

We

say that the things of sense are after all in some sense real, and
that what he calls his knowledge is only reasonable faith or

probable hypothesis.

What we

do

say

is

this.

He

has

arbitrarily stopped in the soul's journey towards reality at a

stage

which can never

can never be intelligible in

He

man, which
always in some

satisfy the divine spirit of

itself

and which

is

with the ayd\/jLara of the cave as

these are visible in the light of an earthly fire.
His objects are

sense unreal.

is satisfied

and unreal. They are in perpetual flux and

become
other than they are.
The source of their
continually
and
lies
in something
even
for
the
scientist
reality
intelligibility

still

unintelligible

other than themselves, and he continues for ever in an unending

process of explaining them as the effects of some cause which is

equally unintelligible and unreal. The very relation of

cause and effect he does not profess in any way to understand.
itself

His objects are still tumbling about between being and notIf he is to attain reality or truth he must continue the
being.
journey upon which he has only entered. Just as he sought
the one unperceived reality behind the many appearances, the
one relatively permanent body behind the many fleeting and
transitory images, so he

must again seek the one

intelligible

'

92

H.

non -spatial

reality behind

,T.

the

PATON.

many

things of space, the one

Once more he must

eternal reality behind the flux of bodies.

pass from the sign to the thing signified, from the conditioned
to the condition, from his many objects to the meaning which

behind and explains them he must pass in short from the

many to the one, from the changing to the eternal, from the
unreal to the real, from the individual to the universal, from the
lies

This second transition he must make,

yiyvofjievov to the etSo?.

not

by

the easy methods

of

and weighing

counting

and

measuring, but by the more difficult method of dialectic though

may be prepared for this, perhaps he must be prepared for

he

by mathematics. And in this process he may never rest

he passes to the absolute one which lies behind and explains

this,
till

the

many

one which

eiSrj,

is

the unconditioned condition of all things, the

reality itself

self-intelligible, self-real

and more than

reality, self-sufficient,

the Idea of the

Good

itself.

We

have said enough on this topic at least to suggest the

importance of Plato's thought. If our view is a right one, we
have made good at least a plausible case
between the two kinds of objects, and what
so doing established a

for a real difference

more, we have by
most remarkable parallelism or analogy
is

between the different segments of the line and their objects.

To both of these points we shall return later, but at present we

must pass

to

our second question, the question whether Art

properly to be included

Our

first

is

point

under
that

question in the affirmative.

is

this section.

we have already answered

Until we have a reference to

the

the

no distinction possible, as Plato suggests

in the Theaetetus, between sense, memory and imagination.
This view is fully confirmed by David Hume.
We are only

actual world there

is

able to distinguish these from one another because

we

consider

their relation to an actual world, sense having an actual object

immediately behind it, memory having had an actual object behind

it in the past, and imagination
having no actual object behind
it

at

any

time.

That

is

to say,

when we come

to TTIGTIS

and look

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

93

back upon el/cao-ia, we can make certain distinctions within it,

but from the point of view of the man in el/cacria these distincImagination qua imagination takes no
account of the difference between the apparent and the actual
and is therefore properly included in eiKaaia.
tions simply do not exist.

If

we admit

this in regard to imagination,

we have admitted

already in regard to the artistic activity as a whole. For the

function of the artist qud artist is nothing more and nothing

it

than imagination, i.e., the making images clear or express

to himself. Art is not at all the communicating of these images
less

instruments or wrought stone or air-waves

Art is the
or chemical substances disposed upon a canvas.

by means

of musical

inner vision and the inner vision alone, whether obtained

as

say afterwards from the vantage ground of iria-Tis in mere

imagination or by hearing sounds from an actual instrument or

we

seeing colours suggested

by an actual canvas.

the vision depends solely upon

its

own

The beauty

of

internal character as an

appearance, and not upon these subsequent irrelevant and nonThe artist is a dreamer or maker of
sesthetic considerations.

His work

dreams.

awake, ovap

is

dream made by man

for those

who

are

eypTiyopoaw.
has surely all the marks of the stage of el/caa-ia.
He bids farewell to truth yaipzlv TO a\rjde<^ kda-avres and
He does not assert or deny anything, it
therefore to falsehood.

The

av6p(*>Trt,vov

artist

impossible to contradict him, what he says can only be called

true or false by departing completely from the aesthetic stand-

is

point.

He

is

merely looking at his object and making

or clear to himself.

which belong

it express
All these characteristics are precisely those

to el/caala

and distinguish

it

from iriar^.

As

far

it is wholly indifferent
whether the originals of his etVoi/e? exist or not.
satisfied with his appearance and with his appearance

as esthetic considerations are concerned,

to the artist

He

is

alone.

That

mind

is

development of the
The savage and the child

this stage is the earliest in the

borne out by experience.

94

H.

J.

PATON.

alike are occupied chiefly with the life of sense

and the

life

of

Indeed, they are said not to distinguish clearly

imagination.

between what they see and what they imagine, which means of
course that they have not yet got a secure hold upon TTIO-TIS.
In the history of literature also

it

has been observed as a curious

paradox that poetry precedes prose, and in general that art

precedes science and history. This paradox we are now in a
position to understand.

much

too

of

this

On

the other hand,

we must not make

confirmation from experience.

In actual

experience things are inextricably confused, and the temporal

order is a very imperfect indication of the logical order.

So far we have been able to justify Plato's position, but

only fair to add that there are certain difficulties in regard

it is

which we are not in a position at present to

have still to take into account the fact that Art

to his doctrine

surmount.
is

is

we
he

We

not passive, and that, although it must always be sensuous, it

not confined to objects which are given to us directly in what

The

call sense.
is

latter point I think Plato admits, although

inclined to ignore

think quite

it.

His attitude

to the

former

is

not I

clear.

In regard to the former point that Art

is

not passive,

we

not passive either, but that

it definitely involves an
activity of the soul. There must be an
immediate element in it, for otherwise we should have nothing

might naturally reply that sense

before us at

present,

and

once again

on the other hand, we must always have

the soul in holding together the past and the

all,

the activity of

is

but,

also in distinguishing

we should have nothing

say, in addition to the

and comparing
before us at

immediate element

all.

objects, or

That

of sense there

is

to

must

be some sort of active intellectual element, an element which,

although not reflecting upon likeness or unlikeness, sameness or

difference, is yet making the objects or appearances clear to
itself

by an implicit recognition

of their presence.

Such indeed

appears to be the argument of the Theaetetv* in regard to

that if you take it as mere sense you are reduced to
,

95

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA

contradiction and absurdity.
his favourite
objects,

we

Plato there brings forward again

argument that different powers have different

and hear sounds,* but just as we cannot

see colours

see sounds or hear colours, so

we cannot

see or hear likeness

and manyness, and

and the ugly,
kind
beautiful
the
any
the good and the evil. In a word ra KOIVCL must be seen by the
soul itself and without the aid of these, pure cdaOi}<n/s is
or unlikeness, sameness or difference, oneness

again being or value of

apparently impossible, though in Th., 186 c, he seems to

Instead, however, of going on to explain
suggest the contrary.
how these may enter into aia-Qrja-is without its becoming Sofa,

he passes straight to an examination of Sofa, which we have so

far identified with TTLO-T^. Obviously, however, if el/cao-ia is the

same
in

it,

and

as alaBrjai^,

we must

give some

and how that

if

it

is

remain distinct from

to

TTIO-TIS,

sort of account of the intellectual element

is

possible without its immediately

becoming

TrtVrt? or 86 fa.

However dangerous then the admission may be

theory, we must insist that even in what we call sense

to

our

there

is

an activity of the soul, and without this activity of the soul

which recognises the implicit likeness and unlikeness of its
seen colours and heard sounds,
or hearing at

If
of

we

view

The

all.

the soul in sense

we could not have

sophistical

we must simply

either seeing

view which denies activity to

reject.

take up this position in regard to what from the point

of 7r/<7T^9

we

we must do

call sense,

so still

more

in

what from the same point of view we call art. In so

as art is and always must be sensuous it involves the

regard to
far

intelligent activity of the soul

its objects

whole.

which

from one another and

But

art is

is

necessary to distinguish

to hold

them together

more than merely sensuous.

in one

Plato, indeed,

the painter merely imitated or recreated one of

the innumerable ^avrdo-^ara or sensible appearances of a bed,

speaks as

if

* 185

a.

96

H.

J.

PATON.

but he also speaks of the tragedian as imitating a good or bad

?7#o9,* although he insists a trifle grudgingly that it is very
difficult to imitate a good rj6os.
However that may be it is
clear

from

this

and many other passages, and, indeed, from the

briefest consideration of the history of literature, that art

can

we should

say create, a good or bad character,

The artist
which, of course, can never be given to sense at all
imitate, or as

can indeed imitate

Hades beneath the

Hence
bodies

it

and

"

all

thingsf in heaven and in the

House

of

earth."

when we have risen to the solid

value, we can fall back to the
judgments

appears that
to

of

ingenuous point of view about them and dream about them as

artists, so that they in turn become to us appearances or
Even
shadows, about which we ask no further questions.

mathematical figures and

into

el/caa-la

so

far

as

character or situation.

universals

philosophic

may

enter

they help
express an individual
It is only because we have learnt to
to

distinguish the apparent from the actual, and to understand

our actual human life, that we can dream about individual
intelligible characters as,

in novels

e.g.,

and

plays.

It seems

nonsense to say that the character of Hamlet is less intelligible

to Shakespeare than the character of Julius Caesar is to

Mommsen.
but
is

it

Art is still distinct from philosophy and history,

has a comprehension of the universal in so far as that

implicit in an imagined individual character.

All this, however, does not alter or affect our main contentions

The dramatist

in regard to elfcaala.

anything or denying anything

the painter.

He makes

is

not

asserting

any more than the musician or

no claim to truth, and, therefore,

He is concerned only with

cannot be charged with falsehood.

his individual object,

and

for

him the

distinction

between the

apparent and the actual, or, again, between the yiyvopevov and
the elSo?, cannot be said to exist.
He is concerned with his
*

If.

604

e.

t 596

c.

PLATO S THEORY OF EIKA2IA.

object, not

as

reproduction of

97

an instance of a philosophic truth, or as a

an actual fact, but as an appearance and an

appearance alone.

The
artist is

when

The

distinction in regard to the objects also remains.

not dealing with the same thing as the historian, even

his

characters

have had historic

Shakespeare's Julius Caesar.

as a matter of fact,

originals,

as,

e.g.,

in

Shakespeare does not assert that,

his famous speech, or

Mark Antony made

even that he actually was that sort of person. He is dealing

not with the real Mark Antony but with a shadow or reflexion
cast

by him.

The excellence

internal structure, and not

of his

work depends upon

upon

its

its

own

resemblance to actual

If there is any merit in such a resemblance

would be a merit which was definitely not aesthetic. The
only verisimilitude we have a right to ask from the artist is

historical events.

i-t

that

his

work should be

like

itself,

i.e.,

that

it

should be

internally coherent, or, in a word, aesthetically good.

Again, in spite of what

we have

universal in art, and the necessity of

its

said

the

of

presence,

if

implicit

we

are to

have an individual object at all, the object of the artist is an

imagined individual and an imagined individual alone. He is
concerned only with making clear to himself the individual and
unique lineaments of his immediate object, not with determining what actual object lay behind it and suggested it, nor with
generalising about it, nor again with working out its mathematical implications or philosophic conditions.
There can be

no greater error about art than

generalities or universals, or worse

communicate them

to us

The artists
appearances.
word, are not artists at all.
anything other than
itself.

of art,

through the medium of individual

who do that are bad artists, or, in a

To the

itself.

Whatever may be the

it may seem

whatever

imagine it begins with

still with facts, and seeks to
to

artist art is not the sign of

Bather

it

is

wholly satisfying in

logical implications of the

to

work

be afterwards to the philos-

opher, the scientist, or the critic, for the artist

is

just this, this

'

98

H.

J.

PATON.

unique and individual child of his fancy, and nothing else in

the whole world.

We
stitions

must indeed be on our guard against

which throw doubt upon

this doctrine.

certain super-

It is

maintained

owing to the very constitution and character

can express only the universal and never the
this were true it would indeed be fatal to our

for instance, that

of

language

individual.

it

If

Mr. Bradley,

theory.

Principles of Logic, p. 47-9, says,

e.g.,

we can never

following Hegel, that

express the individual, even

although he admits the extraordinary consequence that we

always say something different from what we mean. The word
"

"

he asserts to be a universal, which he

"
curiously describes as a symbol whose meaning extends to and
But this is surely a confusion.
covers innumerable instances."
this

for

The word

"

instance

this

"

torn from

its

actual context and placed in

order in the frigid pages of a dictionary may possibly be

But living as it does in the actual
described in such a way.

speech of men, unique in

its

context and

its tone, it

does express

unique object and nothing else in heaven or earth. The

applies to all the words of the poet in the actual poem,
whatever be the case with the quite other words of the

its

same

grammarian and the lexicographer. It is ridiculous of the

scientist to vivisect a work of art and then to complain that it
is

not

alive.

The same considerations

imaginative people

who

are a sufficient answer to the un-

declare that

if

you examine the words

poem you will see that they do assert or deny something.

Of course if you refuse to consider a poem as a unique and
indivisible living thing, and abstract from it certain dead things

of a

which you call words with fixed meanings, you can say anything
about this dead abstraction that you please. Any sentence in
a poem might, in a different context, be an assertion of actual
fact.

That does not

nothing

of the kind,

and individual

alter the fact that in its living reality it is

but

eltcoov

simply the expression of a unique

on appearance.
If we wish to know
is

whether any particular expression is in eUaa-la or TTLO-T^, we

must take it not as an abstraction but in its full and living
reality,

and ask whether or not

to be true.

We may
to offer

an

the line,

not

If it does, it is

claims to assert anything or

and it is not Art.

it

el/caa-la

observe here that our theory, although

it

appears

intelligible interpretation of the general theory of

not without certain difficulties in regard to the

in the Republic.
These difficulties arise

is

language used by Plato

especially in regard to our contention that eltcacrla cannot be

true or false, but

fair to

that
is

"

is

it

eoiicev.

"

He

TO o^oiov TO>
is

would be

fatal to

//,?;

is

which we know to

thing which is like

the same thing as that

d\\' avrb

o/J,oiov

referring to those

beautifuls for the one beautiful.

it

It is only

that a

thinking
not really like it but

something
which it is like

with appearances alone.

of these difficulties are.

he says, in regard to dreaming*

Firstly,

be eiicavia

elvat,

is satisfied

mention what some

who mistake

If this is to be

rfyrJTOit,

the

many

taken literally

our position, but we must reply that it is a

but as it would

description of this stage not as it is in itself,

appear to one who stood on a higher plane. The <j)i\oded paves

have not really made the distinction and confused between the
things distinguished

have

failed to

make

that would be an error in Sofa

they
the distinction altogether and can only

loosely be said to be mistaking one thing for another.

With

a similar looseness of terminology he describes the poet

Trumst and opOrj Sof aj about his object if he obeys

the person who uses the object imitated.
That would strictly
mean that the artist could have a false 86a, which is impossible

as having bpOr)

Indeed we know that the artist cannot

have
properly speaking
any Sofa or TTIO-TIS at all. If anything
is clear in Plato that is clear, and when we add that he
speaks
to

him

as an artist.

of the userj of the thing having

he

is

eTria-Ttj/jnj,

we

see at once that

not using the words in their technical sense, but

* 476 c.

t 601

e.

602

a.

is

merely

100

H.

J.

PATON.

leading us up to the conclusion* that the artist imitates only

He imitates a thing as it appears, generally,
appearances.

Plato suggests, as it appears beautiful to the many and the

ignorant, but that even if it were true does not alter the fact
that he

an appearance and not

Plato is condemning him is

just imitating or creating

is

In fact the reason

judging it.
why
just because he does not judge, he is blaming the artist for not
being a scientist or an historian.
of the cave appears to suggest that

Again the allegory

men

most

Perhaps Plato actually thought

as
he
apparently thought the will of most men was
they were,
mere desire or eTnOv^nKov, which in our view is bound up with
are always in elfcaaia.

elicacria, as tftyxoet&e? is

with Trla-r^ and Xoyio-riicov with

VOTJO-I,?.

Most men

are satisfied with the seeming good and don't go

behind

On

it.

men do

the other hand all

go behind appearances

to actual animals, plants

and manufactured

therefore, in TTLO-TL^.

the

If

allegory of

because no allegory can

suggest this it is

articles

and

are,

the cave does not

be perfect in

all

details.

in

Again

516c we are told that the men

in the cave not

not merely look at present appearances, but remember past

appearances and guess about future ones. This is probably the
ordinary meaning of etVafe^, to guess without real understanding.

If Plato

about what
called

means a mere pleasant

may happen

l/caa-''a,

but

if it

exercise of the imagination

in the future, this

is

quite properly

involves any claim to truth,

TrtWi? and we must put

it

down

to the difficulty of

it

is

really

making an

allegory exact.

Lastly

we may

note

Plato's

statement as regards

tendingf in the law-courts about the

the images which
aiciwv

rj

cast

d<ya\fjLdra)v

the

wv al

been concerned with justice

* 602

b.

shadows

of justice

con-

and

Trepl rwv rov Sircalov

The philosopher who has

shadows,
cnciaL

itself at first finds it difficult to

517

d.

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASH.

talk about the ayd\fiara of justice,

But what are the shadows

acts.

actual just laws and

i.e.,

cast

101

by these

They are

perhaps the purely imaginative pictures drawn by rhetoricians

and politicians not so much from a desire to mislead that

would be mere lying

on the emotions

of the

but from a desire to please and to workGreat Beast. Incidentally this bears out

our view that the artist

is

concerned

not

only

with the

shadows or appearances of actual objects in sense, but that all

things in heaven and earth, historical facts and even philosophic truths

may

cast

shadows with which the

There are no limits

artist

may

to the objects of art

except that
with making clear a mere appearance or
shadow and does not ask about its truth or reality.
deal.

Art

satisfied

is

But we must pass on

position,

and

to a

general

summing up

of

our

a brief examination of the general objections to

We

began from Plato's argument about Soga and tTricmjfjLrj,

and from his insistence
and the difference of their objects

it.

on the proportion between the smaller segments of the line

and these two fundamental ones we suggested that the objects
of

the

different segments

in the case of

case of

must be

These objects

different.

the two lower segments and especially in the

the lowest of all

we have examined, and have made

out at least a plausible case for their difference both as regards

are of course
sense and as regards imagination or art.

We

prepared to

and

VOTJO-K;,

do the same for the superior segments of Sidvoia

and, as we have already pointed out, success as

regards the lower two segments indefinitely strengthens our

case as regards the upper, and vice versd.
It

Plato's

must be observed further

insistence on the

that,

although

we began from

proportion and inferred from

it

sharp difference in the objects, our examination of the objects

venture to suggest, thrown a flood of light on what is

meant by the proportion itself. We have come across a series
has, I

most remarkable

parallels in regard to the different tranin

this
involved
account of knowledge. If Plato begins
sitions

of

102

H.

PATON.

J.

with a sharp distinction between, e.g., the one eZ8o9 and the
many beds, nothing is more natural that he should find a

remarkable parallel in an equally sharp distinction between

the one bed and its many appearances.
The advance from
eltca&la

to

Trwrr/s,

advance from the

from Sidvoia

from Sofa

that

like

many

to

eVtcrr?;/^, is

an

Similarly, the advance

to the one.

an advance from, e.g., the many

mathematical ones which are ael ovra to the one eZSo? or
oneness

to vorjcris is also

Each

itself.

intelligibility,

transition

is

towards greater reality and

and each upper segment requires the presence

an element given by the lower segment, although it is not

Even in regard to the
primarily concerned with that.
of

unfortunate use of

the object

fii^a^

imitate the object of

TrlaTis

of

does

eifcaaia

any more than the

not

yiyvo/juevov

These are mere phrases intended to lead

imitates the elSos.

the pupil up to a grasp of the true relation.

As regards the Bwdfjue^, he appears to be arguing that they

ure
x
really different (1) as having different objects; and (2) as
:

having different functions.

That

to say,

you may develop

any one of them indefinitely you may rise, for instance, from
mere sense to the highest products of art but you will never
in this way pass into the higher SiW/u?.
Art could never

become science or

is

history, science or history could never

become

a priori mathematics, and a priori mathematics could never

become philosophy.
previous one as

its

Each
basis,

of the higher

but

it

must

segments requires the

definitely

make

a fresh

start.

Now
to

it

may

be contended that such a view

is

derogatory

Art, and that such sharp breaks or transitions cannot

exist.

As regards the
really

so.

first

point,

we must answer

that

it

is

not

Plato indeed was unkind to art, at least in the

of his remarks appear to be both bigoted and

even
here, what he attacks are the errors due
stupid, though

Republic,

and some

to substituting art for philosophy or history, that is to taking

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASIA.

We

art as true.

Art really
Plato's

is

must have the

we are to avoid

it'

in

errors

must continually go back

to it for refreshing

and new

it,

and we

life.

opponents

We

clear on this, that it

less

is

It is the

is

of this doctrine

by insisting on a gradual
merely an inferior kind of

of art, for

would make

and philosophy,

given to us through

is

though Plato

good and satisfying in itself.

who are the real contenmers
transition they

pollution.

general position is in no way

Eutacrta is a necessary stage in cognition,

derogatory to Art.
our material for thinking

also,

knowing what
But whatever be

<f>dppaKov* of

his

detail,

all

would add

103

art

be completely swallowed up and

superseded with the advance in knowledge. This would make
the value of art lie in something other than itself, in the philohistory

to

sophical or general truth that

conveyed or in the historical

facts which it represented.
Our view, on the other hand, can
the
of
this
recognise
autonomy
activity and maintain that the
value of art

As

lies in

it

nothing other than

itself.

regards the objections to sharp breaks or transitions,

we

have already pointed out the danger of the mere continuum

theory, the result that all the lower cognition would have to be

We

superseded as worthless.
involves ultimately a
all

more

still

suspect

also

that

it

really

terrible disaster, the denial of

spiritual activity or growth, the reduction of everything to

the lowest that

we know.

Plato's view, on the contrary, admits

the possibility of real growth, the coming into existence of

something new.

much comfort

More
in

generally

still,

the philosophy

we cannot pretend

whose ultimate

to find

principle

appears to be that, after all, things are pretty much of a muchWe suggest, on the contrary, that the world must be full
ness.
of real differences,

if it is

really to be a unity,

and not a mere

welter, or chaos, or pure blank.

On

the other hand

concessions.

We

we

are not unwilling to

recognize

that

5956.

there

are

make

real

certain

difficulties

PLATO'S THEORY OF EIKASJA.

104

remaining both as regards our attempts to explain Plato's

meaning and as regards our attempts to defend it. Yet we
may suggest that our attempt to explain has at least one
merit

we have not been

afraid

supposing that he had

of

a real meaning to explain, nor of risking the possibility of

So many of the
error in an attempt to make this clear.
critics

appear to begin with the assumption that Plato was

and that they will sufficiently

explain him if they talk more or less at random too. We
can only say that we have tried to do justice to him as a
talking

more

or less at random,

philosopher, even

him

as an

As

It

artist.

would be likely

sometimes we

if

is

may have misunderstood

a form of offence which he himself

to forgive.

regards our attempts to defend

we admit even

greater
Plato certainly generally tended to speak as if
there were were a sharp opposition between the ^i^vo^vov and
difficulties.

the eZS09, but

view, and
If

we

it is

give

it

is

still

doubtful

if

this

more doubtful

up or modify

was

if

it

really his ultimate

can ultimately stand.

this ultimate opposition,

we must

of

course equally give up or modify our similar sharp distinction

between the apparent and the actual. But we do insist that
.both in Plato's eyes

and

in reality, these distinctions have at

It is only by making them that we

can lead ourselves and others up to the ultimate and true view
which lies behind them. If we have not learnt them we have

least a didascalic truth.

learnt nothing.

Ultimately they

may

be necessary moments

what you will, but even if we have

the unity which lies behind and explains these

in every act of cognition or

still

to

find

differences,

we venture

illuminate and not

than destroy.

to

express

annul them, that

the
it

belief

will

that

it

will

explain rather

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Grower Street,

London, W.C. 1, on February 6th, 1922, at 8 p.m.

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

VI

By

A. H. HANNAY.

I.

IN his Romanes Lecture entitled Criticism and Beauty which he

delivered at Oxford in 1910, after expressing in a characteristic

manner

dissatisfaction with the results

which had hitherto been

obtained by aesthetic inquiry, Mr. Balfour declared that there

was

any rate one point in aesthetics which had been definitely

decided " The attempt to limit aesthetic expression by rules is
at

seen to be

futile.

The attempt

to find formulae for the creation

new works of beauty by taking old works

and noting how they were made is seen

of

still

why

."

this

beauty to pieces
to be more futile

of

He did not, however, go very deeply into the reason

kind of criticism had become antiquated. He just

pointed to the general agreement that

it

had not worked.

more searching analysis might have led him

positive definition of the nature of the beautiful.

As

it

more

to offer a

was, he

stopped at the implication that if there is an objective beauty

For the rest he expressed sincere
it is not amenable to rules.

doubt whether beauty could be said to possess objective worth,

whether aesthetic pleasures were not really incommensurable

and

In fact he had no definite principle

totally subjective.

which would serve in the place of the system of rules and

standards and was therefore driven by the force of logic in the
direction of subjectivism.

Mr. Balfour's case

is

fairly typical of the average

contem-

porary discussion of the problem. It represents a stalemate in

aesthetics
either rules and standards and objectivity or no rules
:

and standards and

subjectivity, or

more

correctly, arbitrary

106

A.

taste

and

caprice.

H.

HAN NAY.

Neither alternative

yet no third possibility

is

envisaged.

quite acceptable and

because of this lack

is

And

of a third possibility it is not quite true to say that the criticism

by

rules

is

obsolete.

For the ideal of that criticism

still

survives and impels to a continual reaction, sometimes open,

sometimes concealed under new phraseology, to the dogmas of
laws, rules
"

and standards.

It survives in

Mr. Balf our's thinking.

can judgment about beauty be made

"
what title has the opinion of
amenable," he asks, and again
in
to
matters
aesthetic
authority
why should men
experts

To what

objective test

endeavour

to

make

their feelings

into the

patterns

it

pre-

He

regards the standard of objective excellence

as ideal, but unrealizable.
Elsewhere and often in the most en-

scribes.

."

governing ideal behind the

theory of rules still dominant, but also the systematic formulation
of rules is being vigorously pursued. The Director of the National
lightened quarters not only

is

this

Gallery, for instance, Sir C. J. Holmes,

styled The Science of Painting.

is

the author of a work

Although he

explicitly denies

intention of short-circuiting invention and originality, he

any

nevertheless aspires to

"

a complete

all

embracing theory which

will enable artists to be peaceable, art patrons to be confident,

and

art

critics

to

be unanimous," in fact to abolish both

and patrons and to set up in their place a single

unshakeable, unchangeable scientific instrument. To this end
he prescribes a whole series of rules as to design, composition,

criticism

shadow, colour, etc., which hover, uncomfortably

between the exalted position of universal norms or standards

spacing,

which

artists will neglect to

position of

may

be of

their undoing,

and the humble

mere generalizations from past works of art which

use to artists who have the same kind of individual

content to express. Of course the artists had much better

refer to the actual individual works from which they will be
able to draw something of the living spirit, instead of studying
a skeleton.

In current journalism the problem of standards and of sub-

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

107

and objectivity in art enjoys a periodical emergence and

invariably debated on the basis of rules or standards and

jectivity
is

objectivity

and no rules or standards and

subjectivity.

The

was raised in a leading article in the

Manchester Guardian in June, 1920, and being of a liberal and
problem, for instance

freedom-loving temper and unable to supersede the two alternatives this newspaper advocated the view of criticism as the
expression of personal enthusiasm which may convey a sense of
values personally felt but cannot arrogate to itself any objective
Or again a translation was recently published of a
validity.

book by a French writer, Jules Lemaitre, who practices the kind

advocated by the Manchester Guardian. This trans-

of criticism

lation

review

on

was reviewed by an eminent critic in the Observer and his

is an admirable instance of the
perplexity of the times

He

this subject.

French

critic

strongly disagreed with the attitude of the

he thought that there

difference in value

between works

is

of art,

a real and appreciable

and that there do

exist

Equally strongly, he
scientific method which

certain apposite criteria of judgment.

deprecated the application of the

formulates laws. Nevertheless, he reflected,

they must be capable

of

if

criteria

do exist

discovery by generalization

from

admitted masterpieces but this would be a very dreary task

which had better on the whole be left to the Germans. In fact
;

he glimpsed a third possibility, but in the effort to define it he

fell back upon a new disguise for the old scientific method, and
himself half perceiving the disguise, decided to relegate further
research to persons with a predilection for rather pedantic
studies.

It

seems that the dissolution

standards, canons and laws has

while lip service

is

systems of rules and

a temporary void and that

of the old
left

often paid to the current philosophic dictum

unique and indefinable and is either experienced

or not experienced, there still exists a deep rooted desire for
that beauty

is

some more tangible and constructive

and uniformity

assistance towards clarity

of esthetic perception.

Philosophy, which
L 2

is

108

A.

H.

HANNAY.

usually eyed askance as adding to the difficulties of

invoked in order to simplify and make easier. It
that

if

only we could

life, is

is

discover wherein beauty consists,

in future both achieve

and perceive

here

assumed

we

could

without any failure or

it

In no other province of human activity, except

contretemps.
that of morality, is the demand for standards so strong and
Science,

persistent.

which

laws in nature,

itself finds

not in

is

a tearing hurry to find laws for its own process of thinking and
It can get on quite well without.
The logical
discovery.
of
of disscientific
is
the
outcome
rather
method
analysis

But

interested curiosity than of an urgent practical demand.

and in morals the everyday practice and the consciousness of axioms and standards are held to be much more closely
in art

have never seen

it stated that the thought of

we
tend to be neglectful of the
because
to-day
degenerate
syllogistic rules, but it is constantly alleged, firstly, that we are

interwoven.

is

to-day morally and artistically degenerate and disorderly, and

secondly, that the reason is that we have discarded the traditional standards

In

and have nothing with which

to replace

them.

crudest form at any rate the conception of a standard

to
involve a vicious circle. The process, as I see it, is
appears
as follows.
like or dislike a work of art and either do not
its

We

feel sure

of

our

own judgment

or

we

find

someone

else in

complete disagreement with us. Unable to reach any

by concentration on the actual work we look around for some
decision

mediation and we finally refer the work to something else conceived independently of it, which, by analogy with the footrule,

we

conform
versd.

call

If the

a standard.

to this standard

But

if

this

we

standard

connected with beauty,

work

is

itself

an individual

individual.

it

to

is

good,

and

vice

be even remotely

must have been reached through an

But, however elusive it may be, beauty

it

examination of beauty.
does not exist in the Platonic abstract,
in

found to resemble or

is

agree that

setting,

it

is

it is

itself

always experienced

essentially

something

Thus the standard must have been extracted from

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

109

some individual experience (or object of experience) admitted to

be beautiful. Thus the would be instrument of judgment, the
standard, itself presupposes an aesthetic
dition of its

From

own coming

judgment as the con-

into being.

two important consequences follow. In the

first place, apart from the rather questionable profession of
this new middleman, if, as is always alleged, there is such
constant and violent disagreement on the subject of taste or
this fact

we have seen precedes and conditions the

standard, then the validity of the standard will be equally a
matter of disagreement. Being founded on the quicksand of
intuition, which, as

taste,

In the
the standard enjoys only a counterfeit stability.
and early nineteenth century, for instance, the

late eighteenth

Guido

favourite Italian painters were the Caracci, Caravaggio,

on these were replaced by Raphael, Michel

and
Leonardo
da Vinci, and still more recently there
Angelo,
has been a decided reversion to the more primitive painters
Reni.

Later

such as Duccio, Giotto, Masaccio and Antonello da Messina.

Which

the correct standard and tradition

of these provides

and how can

be demonstrated

it

to

be

correct

In the

second place the judgment by means of a standard is not

a judgment of general likeness or simi-

itself aesthetic; it is

Once we have accepted a

larity.

drama
e.g.,

rule as to the unities

in

or a standard in respect of subject in art generally,

that the subject

restricted

sense

of

must be
the

dignified

word,

it

is

and

"

beautiful

not difficult to

"

in the

detect

divergence from or conformity with these criteria in particular works of art.

The statement that Shakespeare's plays
are not good art because they ignore the unities is no more an
aesthetic
is

judgment than the judgment that a certain

faulty because

it

footrule

disagrees with the prescribed standard of

measurement.

In a certain sense,

of course, it is true that the aesthetic

also is a recognition of similarity or

judgment
The statement,

"

think

that this

is

even of identity

beautiful," involves a

110

A.

in the

H ANN AY.

new experience

recognition that the

or

H.

participates in the form

which we have given the

qualities
however a recognition, not by means of

quality or

to

name of beauty. It is
a middle term but by direct confrontation and a recognition of
likeness in a particular direction, that of beauty.
does not upset the previous argument
if the implied premise is accepted that the standard is not
The rule as to
itself, taken in its bare generality, beautiful.
This

fact, therefore,

devoid of beauty the recognition that

a particular drama observes this rule is not therefore a recognition of beauty.
Similarly with the more complex ideal
the unities

is

itself

standards which are obtained by combining and attenuating

certain kinds of individual expression, for instance the ideal

drawn

from

which was

art

classic

circulated

by Lessing,

Winckelrnanii and other promoters of the neo-classic revival

in the eighteenth century.
Only if the standard were to

some particular
But to
beautiful.

coincide, without attenuation or deviation, with

work
set

of art could it be regarded as itself

up some

mean

particular

work

as a criterion for all others

to kill absolutely all original creation

multiplicity of art purely numerical.

And

and

would

to render the

the vicious circle of

the standard as an independent objective criterion would be

complete.
If,

then,

we consent

to the final rejection of all standards

which are obtained by the

the individual

features

isolation

of

and extraction

generally

of certain of

accepted masterpieces,

what exactly is the effect of this upon criticism and aesthetics,

what kind of form must they take and what kind of validity
and persuasiveness will they enjoy ? Emphasis has been laid
beauty and on the need for what

on the individuality

of

called originality, for

new

is

creation, the bringing into existence

what was not there before and could not be anticipated. If

this is a correct definition, it follows that no mediating
of

up which will enable persons- to perceive

and appreciate the individual and new features of a work of
criterion can be set

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

However

Ill

and universally valid these features

may be, they must be perceived immediately, we must grow
into consciousness of them and judge them on their own

art.

objective

intrinsic merits.

meant that the original work has

with the past and is a discrete unit. On

It is not

absolutely no link
the contrary, only the artist

eschews the past or what

and a danger.

Whether

is

who

lacks any real inspiration

called tradition, as a temptation

Genuine originality can dominate the

new work there

can be said that in every

it

past.
is

in

some sense immanent the whole preceding art, or only ^ome

portion of it, namely that particular style by which the artist
has been influenced, is a problem with which I do not propose

But there are two

to deal here.

In being influenced by another

points which I
artist, living

want

to

make.

or dead, an artist

not influenced by a generalization, but by the whole concrete

and individual achievement. He does not merely study a
method and a technique, he studies or rather one should say,
is

merges himself in the whole inseparable unity of vision and

emotion and technique. Secondly, however much of this old
intuition reappears in the

there

must

new

vision or intuition.

anticipated

thumb.

and the

new work,

if it is genuinely new
with and dominating the whole,
It is this new unity that cannot be

also be felt, fused

by any standards,

It is
first

still less

by any cruder

rules of

only arrived at after struggles and hesitation

stages of appreciation will be almost as slow

and

difficult as those of the actual creation.

On

the above thesis might be thought to

constitute a triumph for or rather a surrender to subjectivism,
as it apparently leaves the field quite clear for the invasion of
all

the face of

it

kinds of personal and individual emotions, enthusiasms and

It provides no sure road to agreement and permits

tastes.

everyone to rely on his own individual intuition. In fact it

throws overboard the ideal behind the whole search for rules

and standards.
any

For

it

maintains that there ought not to be

code which will enable us to dispense

fixed, static scientific

112

A.

H.

HANNAY.

with the uncertain struggling and experiment of the indiBut while it does fall back on taste, its

vidual judgment.

depends altogether on the character

relation

to subjectivism

which

considers this faculty taste to possess.

it

To come

to the point quickly, it is precisely this

which has started

taste

maligned
an ideal code as well as

this quest for

other quests for objectivity. For it is itself a striving

after universality, after the best and highest of which it is

all

It

capable.

even

no

if

is

final

an unceasing movement towards agreement,

agreement is ever reached. And it is due to

the very eagerness with which agreement is sought that an

attempt has been made to devise short cuts in the form of

ready made rules,

etc.

seeds of objectivity,

If taste did not contain in itself the

were not

itself the unfolding of these

be
no
there
could
seeds,
question of objective validity in art,

because

would be hopeless to try to superimpose on an

material an epiphenomenal universality.
Taste

it

intractable

must

if it

and through objectivity in the process

of becoming or through and through wayward caprice.
It is
the custom to assume in disputes about taste that it is
either be through

essentially the latter.

But the only

basis in experience for

"

this

view

But

so do opinions differ even in the sphere of science,

the fact that tastes

is

differ,

chacun a son gout."

which is

considered to be the inner shrine of certainty and objectivity.

To draw the direct inference from the fact of difference of
tastes

that

travesty of

"de gustibus non est disputandum "

The purely selfish and
reasoning.

an a priori creation, the

is

a gross

capricious

a posteriori is that
taste is a constant effort at judgment and is precisely one of
those matters about which everyone does dispute and argue
taste

is

fact

and get incensed, however unreasonable

grounds.

Nor does

history

by any

assertions of the subjectivists as

to

this

means
its

in the region of art, productive neither of

gible discord.

may

be on a priori
bear out the

unending cacophony

harmony nor

intelli-

History shows a regular and unabated process

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

of sifting of

113

good from bad and in each generation very much

There are always a number of artists

the same process recurs.

who

gain a great deal of ready praise, only to be dismissed

on as insipid or insincere or as betraying some other
undoubted defect. And the great majority of them never

later

The agreement about them

is complete and
enduring.
in
few
Others, comparatively
number, are either popular from
the first and firmly established as big artists or gradually win

reappear.

recognition after a period of neglect.

Occasionally some of
these classics become temporarily submerged and all of them
are liable to fluctuations in point of reputation.
None are
invested with a petrified and immutable value and about none

can

it

They

be legitimately stated that the last word has been

are in fact

history has
choice

its

still

living

own

and developing and each period

particular

made from

is

favourites;

nevertheless

a comparatively restricted

that taste both creative and critical

ideal of Tightness, of

it is

of

the

number

survivors in the struggle of taste.

If therefore it is true, and I feel convinced that

ment towards an

said.

of

true,

always a definite movebeing not merely taste but

is

good taste, then the overthrow of the rigid pseudo-scientific

ideal inspiring the rule-and-standard-makers does not mean
anarchy and disruption. For the failure of the ideal is so to
also

speak the failure

of-

What

taste itself.

one

it

of the foraging parties sent out

does

mean

is

that the quest

by
must be

continued unflaggingly and without hope of a final and closed

system, a paradise of effortless and unchanging appreciation.

But curiously enough

this

imagined paradise resembles very

closely that very inferno of arbitrary

into

which

all

suppress

genuine

it is

we

and capricious tastes

For if we

shall be plunged.

the serious enterprise which animates our most

artistic

superficial

asserted that

and

impulses and surrender ourselves to the most

reflex

impulses,

effortless

monotony which

For these

reflex impulses will be

is

we

shall

attain just

that

the chief quality of the ideal.

simply the

final results of all

L 3

114

A.

the serious efforts

made

made, no new

are

And

change.

HANNAY.

and

in the past,

reflex

permanent agreement

II.

impulses will

if

no further

efforts

be required and so

will be reached, because there will be

no

did not our analysis of the standards and rules

which were supposed to embody the ideal show that they were
simply a residuum of past works of art, of past efforts, which is
precisely what arbitrary, subjective taste also turns out to be ?
It is the usual case of the coincidence of opposites.

II.

But

the experiment with rules and standards has proved

if

a failure and has had to be discarded, the process of experiment

And the question still remains to be answered
still continues.
as

what exactly

to

the character

is

of

this

process.

The

It has been seen

question has already been partly answered.
that the process is a creation of or a direct confrontation

with a new experience the individual content of which cannot

be anticipated beforehand. Further, both in the case of the
artist and of the critic and appreciator an effort is being

made

constantly

to attain

some kind

of truth of vision.

What

then constitutes precisely the difference between an effort

which succeeds and one which fails ? To put the question in a
concrete form, there

published
falls

and yet
poetry
It
is

great
of

deal

which

short of being genuine poetry.

therefore

it

is

nowadays, much

is

is

But

poetry

written and

very accomplished yet

it is

something.

something which is superficially

not poetry, and how do we know what

is

is

is

of

this

What

so like poetry
it is

and what

conceivable that the most obvious and easiest answer

also the truest

actually

is.

and completest. But I do not think that

easiest answer is that good poetry has

The

the quality which is called beautiful and that the bad poetry
lacks it, and that this "quality is just itself, unique and indefinable,

and

is

either perceived or not perceived.

perceived, the only

remedy

is

If it is not

to look or listen or read

again

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES

and again.

This seems to

Even a unique and

me

115

IN ART.

to be a dangerous half-truth.

indefinable quality exists in the society of

must be some connecting links and

To discover these relations is in a
relations between them all.
sense to define.
Side by side with the category of beauty and
and
often encroaching upon it there exists that of truth
other indefinables and there

within truth there are normally considered to be the subdivisions of history, science, philosophy. If the differences and
relations

between these categories could be

strated, this

might enable us

to explain

satisfactorily

many apparent

demon-

conflicts

Or again the view which has been maintained

art does not brook any rules or external
that
paper

of opinion in art.

in this

standards, that

and the new,

it is

is itself

essentially the creation of the individual

a partial definition of the unique element

beauty.

Moreover, the theory of

between

consciousness

and

simple mirror-like relation

beauty does not provide any

the

explanation of the difficulty experienced in getting a clear view

of beauty, and of the many mistakes which are made in the
attempt, or finally, of ugliness. It is at bottom based on an
analogy between the consciousness of simple elements such as
colours.

Even

these are not so simple as they are thought to

Imagination has a good deal to do with our perception of

colours, which are by no means devoid of the faculty of

be.

But to liken beauty to a colour,

development and change.
considered more or less from a physical point of view, is to
assume that it can be plastered on to things, that a poem can
have beauty superimposed upon it.
Whereas, actually, the
whole
of
the
is
and
process of thinking and
part
parcel
beauty
The conaspiring and speaking which makes up the poem.
sciousness

much

of

beauty, in fact,

is

as a mirror-like intuition,

a constructing, a process as

and

this fact is recognized in

current usage in the close connection which is assumed to exist

For the term imagination
between imagination and beauty.

connotes a constructive process.

116

A.

H.

HANNAY.

Modern

criticism of art will be found to have penetrated

the
mere dogmatic assertion of intuited beauty and
beyond

ugliness

replete with pointed psychological explanations

is

it

what has happened in the

of

would-be poet's mind.

poet's or the

It will contend, for instance, that he

had a moral doctrine

to

preach, which should have been put into the form of an essay,
or that he had no real emotion and was simply straining after

the

memory of
someone

of

had produced a garbled imitation

work and had contributed nothing original of

one, or that he

else's

own.

Judgments of this kind bristle with concepts and

arguments, and they do indubitably involve a definition of art
and an explanation of its process. A theoretical scaffolding has
his

been erected round

But

structure.

it is

taste, or rather discovered

implied in its
equally definitely not the old scaffolding of

and standards. The latter interfered, so to speak, with

the actual building material, they endeavoured to inflate the
The new
contingent and the particular into universality.
rules

definitions are also in search of universality,

they are also trying to anticipate.

As

the content or the material.

and in

this sense

But they do not

anticipate

contrasted

therefore

with

and standards they might be termed principles.

The
are
two
illustrations, one of a judgment by a standard,
following
rules

the other of a judgment involving a principle.

"
One of the poems on which much praise has been bestowed
is

Lycidas

of

which the diction

and the numbers unpleasing.

is

therefore seek in the sentiments

rhymes uncertain
beauty there is we must

harsh, the

What

and images.

It is not to be

considered as the effusion of real passion for passion runs not

and obscure opinions.
Passion plucks
;

after remote allusions

no berries from the myrtle and ivy, nor calls upon Arethuse and
Mincius, nor tells of rough satyrs and fauns with cloven heel.

Where

there

is

leisure for fiction there is little grief."

Samuel

Johnson.
"

Can any candid and

intelligent

mind

hesitate in deter-

mining which of these best represents the tendency and native

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

117

character of the poet's genius ? Will he not decide that the

one was so written because the poet would so write, and the
other because he could not so entirely repress the force and

grandeur of his mind, but that he must in some part or other

Coleridge on Words-

of every composition write otherwise?"

worth.

Samuel Johnson has

the time at the back of his

all

ideal standards in respect

But Coleridge

subject-matter.

mind

rhymes, diction, numbers, and

of

traces the direction in

which

Wordsworth's imagination is really moving and points out

where it gets inhibited by mistaken motives. He analyses the
forces working in the poet's mind and explains how in certain
cases they do not

Now

make

for poetry.

fairly evident that while a critical and psychological judgment of this kind does not presuppose any fixed
standard in point of content or technical method it does preit

is

suppose some previous experience of art. Otherwise whence

the conception of the poetic imagination ? It could not have

been obtained merely from reflection on the faulty work in

question, since ex Jiypoihesi the

work

lacks this quality.

It

must therefore have been derived from a study of good poetry.

Undoubtedly the critic and the aesthetic philosopher must
possess a real acquaintance with art, and the more intense and
extensive this acquaintance is the more likely are their critical
But here again the
principles to be profound and pertinent.

same question

arises as in the case of the standard.

Does the

experience of good poetry precede the principle or vice versd, or

And if the
are the two inseparable and born together?
experience, the taste precedes the principle, what is the function

and value of the

or the actual

latter

creation,

Can

and

the discovery of principles

itself to attain to its

own

if

is

subsequently affect the taste

cannot, how can it be said that

it

it

the outcome of the effort of taste

truth

would be misleading, and it would be equally

Evidently
misleading to speak, as I have done, of the old systems of rules
this

118

H ANN AY.

H.

A.

as being the actual creations of taste in its striving for univer-

For these systems would be purely intellectualist constructions imposed upon taste, which can attain to universality
sality.

by

its

own methods and

does not require the assistance of any

theory whatsoever.

Now

this

view

true one, and

tion that I

is,

it is

I believe, generally accepted to-day as the

only recently and with considerable hesita-

have come to doubt

its essential correctness.

attractively neat

and

between the two

different faculties, the imaginative

theoretical,

and

its

independent task.

and

lucidity

It is

clear cut, with its absolute distinction

and the

each faculty of a separate

assignation
It has been maintained with great weight
to

by the famous

Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce,

both in his original Estetica and in his more recent Breviario di

And he gives a practical application of it in his essay
Estetica.

on Ariosto, where he writes

"
:

However unanimous,

simple,

and

imrestrainable be the aesthetic approbation accorded to the poem

of Ariosto, the critical judgments delivered upon it are just as

and laboured, and indeed this is one of

those cases where the difference of the two spiritual moments,
discordant, complicated

intuitive or aesthetic, the apprehension or tasting of the

art,

and the

work

of

intellective, the critical and historical judgment,

stands out so clearly as to seem to be almost spatially divided,

so that one can touch it with one's hand.

and sing the verses

thing
understand him." This means that
to read

and

works

of

It is one

a poet and another to

it is

possible to appreciate

without possessing any critical principles which are of their very nature explanations of a fait
accompli.
They neither create nor condition nor accompany
to create

taste,

of art

but follow upon

it,

for ever enshrouding

it

in a scaffolding

of intellectual formula?.

On
mass

the face of

of general

it,

this

view accords very well with that

common-sense conclusions which we arrive

at

pressure of practical exigencies and are

"
rather too prone to designate as facts of experience." When
provisionally under

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES

the poet writes a

119

IN ART.

poem he does not simultaneously

critical principle or

an

construct a

system in a logical form, and

he
first of all surrenders himself
poem

aesthetic

when

the critic reads the

to it

and afterwards develops his

The

criticism.

theories of

There is little of real value

great artists are often negligible.
in Leonardo da Vinci's essay on painting or in Hogarth's quaint
Moreover, it is usually the
theory of the line of beauty.
second-rate artists
theories,

who

all theory.

The

and

artists profess a fine

is

for

and

not reciprocated by artists in respect

is

criticism.

Of course, negatively, theories

that

contempt

pathetic faith of the critic in the value

the importance of artists

of critics

consciously put into practice aesthetic

and the majority of

may

be of the greatest value,

to say in upsetting other theories.

If artists are inclined

by wrong principles, and undoubtedly they are

inclined, the only way of putting them right is to

to be influenced

sometimes so

convince them of the error in their theory.

seethes with theories of art and

it is

The modern world

difficult

to see

how any

cultured nation can avoid producing them. It is not meant

that they are needed in order to provide us with ready made

judgments, but they are an inevitable part of any attempt at a

systematization of values and an understanding of human
If taste does not require aesthetic principles
society and history.
philosophical inquiry does and the result reacts upon taste.
But a negative function also implies some positive function.
;

scarcely possible to refute a theory without indicating,

refutation of the theory
however vaguely, an alternative.
It

is

behind modern vers

advocacy

and

libre

of metrical verse

would carry with it a defence and

an attack on the theory of cubism
;

of non-representative pictorial art

would

at the

same time

an argument in favour of representational painting.

the
mere opinions that metrical verse and representaAlthough
tional painting were proper art forms would not in themselves

constitute

provide a means for the production either of a poem or a

picture, they might serve to canalize the imagination and

120

A. H.

H ANN AY.

encourage a certain kind of creation and

And

profess a contempt for theory, scarcely

may

artists

taste.

although

any

artist

nowadays has not indulged in a certain amount of speculative

Nor is there any reason why artists should eschew
thinking.
it

as a source of contamination

if

they exist at

work

all,

even

of art

with greater

self

if

must

and a

The true

peril.

principles,

and implicit in a
any
the artist is not himself aware of them, and
at

rate be latent

knowledge would come greater precision and

of self criticism.

power
Thus while

it

may

be true that taste can be completely

divorced from theory and logically precedes it in time, this

divorce is logical rather than actual it is to-day inoperative
and a thing of the past. Even if at the moment of imagining
;

or tasting

ness and

we

are not theorizing, at the back of our conscious-

in fact encircling our taste there will be found

some

theory previously conceived and awaiting confirmation, modification or development.

But

is it

really true that taste or imagination can be isolated

manner and

it logically prior to any theory or

does
not follow upon theory, but it
Certainly
principle
might be contemporary and complementary instead of being a
precedent condition. It will have been observed that on the
basis of the distinction drawn between taste and theory there

in

this

is

it

are two parallel series of continuous changes or developments

taking place ; one covering the changes of art and of taste, the

other covering the changes of theory and criticism.

Frequently
two farther distinctions are drawn between creative and
recreative taste

and between criticism and

aesthetics, I

agree

however with Croce in discounting these subsidiary distinctions.

For that, between the creative act and the recreative taste,
although concerning quite a real difference, nevertheless lies
within the same kind of activity. And if criticism is to be
altogether separated from aesthetics it will become simply a
literary expression of taste and will therefore go over into that
category.

There remain therefore

just

the

two

series

of

121

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

qualitatively distinct activities, of
is

the condition of the other and

which the one, that

is

reconstituted in

of taste,

it,

but on

the other hand can exist by

independently.
History, however, does not altogether corroborate this view.
For ft should be possible to trace in the course of history,
itself

variations in taste and then corresponding adapta-

first of all

tions in aesthetic criticism

of creative art

and periods

and theory.
of criticism

There should be periods

and reputations should

be definitely established before criticism comes upon the scene

with its explanations. But such hard and fast demarcations

and periodic successions do not actually

occur.

Admittedly

there have been constant variations both of taste and theory

and admittedly each new phase of

ment and clarification of principle.

art involves

some develop-

But the interweaving and

interlocking of taste and principle is so complex and intricate
that it is impossible to say which started which.
Moreover
almost universally expected to guide public opinion
in matters of taste.
Taste, in fact, is not considered to be
criticism

is

completely formed and organized until it has become articulate

In his essay on Shakespeare Croce states
in a critical form.
"
that
criticism of Shakespeare, like every criticism, has
followed and expressed the progress and alternations of the
philosophy of art, or aesthetic." But it has also represented

and constituted the progress and alternations

Croce's

of the imaginative

own

essay itself affords

an admirable illustration of this, as a reviewer in the Times
appreciation of Shakespeare.

Literary Supplement pointed out with an unconscious irony.

"
"
is that we cannot do
Croce's implied thesis," he stated,

without philosophy in the experience of

art,

and he maintains

by showing how philosophy removes obstacles to that

There are many who suppose that for sensibility
experience.
to works of art we need nothing but sensibility, and that
confronted with a work of art we 'must not think, but need

it

Another and very pertinent illustration is to

."
only feel.
be found in Croce's essay on Corneille. At the opening he
.

122

STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES IN ART.

remarks that "if there exists a poet who stands outside the
taste and the preoccupations of our day (at least in France) it
is Corneille.
The greater number of lovers of poetry and art
confess without reserve that they cannot endure his tragedies,

which have nothing to say to them. The fortune of Corneille

has declined more and more with the growth of the fame of
Shakespeare, which has been correlative to the formation and

growth

of

modern

aesthetic

and

criticism."

The whole burden

of Croce's essay, which is an admirable piece of analysis, is that

Corneille has a real, though somewhat elusive value and the

merit of the essay

is

that by

and enhances,

focusses

if

it

means
does

of its lucid reasoning it

not actually awaken our

consciousness of this value.

Stated briefly my suggestion is that the process imagination-principle or taste-explanation is not a passage from one
independent activity to another, but a development which
requires from the start the presence of both activities and in
which a modification in one means a modification in the other.

The imagination, or

to use Croce's terminology, the individual

never an entity in

itself and does not precede the universal

or the consciousness of the individual character of the indi-

is

vidual.

principle

And

is always accompanied by a consciousness of a

and a purpose, however terse and rudimentary.
applies not only to the taste of the critic and

It

this

The latter
generally of the public but also to the artist.
a
few
he
them
to an
reduces
possesses
working conceptions,
absolute minimum, he deliberately keeps them practically
but they do exist in a conscious form and not
and implied.
In his work he emphasizes
merely
absolutely to the utmost the imaginative element and on his
side the critic emphasizes to the utmost the universal element,
inarticulate,

latent

the principles involved, the correlation of the

the rest of

life

work

of art with

nevertheless in doing so he attains to a clearer

consciousness of the actual aesthetic value and significance of

the imaginative work itself.

W.C.
Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower Street,
P.M.
at
8
1922,
20th,
February

1,

on

Chairman: VISCOUNT HALDANE.

VII.

DISCUSSION THE IDEALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

:

T. P. NUNN, A. N. WHITEHEAD, and

DOROTHY WRINCH.

By H. WILDON CARR,

(The papers have not been written consecutively as

Symposium.

The

stated

thesis

in

submitted to the other writers, who

pendently their criticisms of

I.

in

paper has been

have formulated inde-

the

first

it.)

By H. WILDON CARR.
Thesis.

Einstein's theory is a scientific interpretation of experience

based upon the principle of relativity. This principle is in
complete accord with the neo-idealist doctrine in philosophy,

and

in complete disaccord with the fundamental standpoint of

every form of neo-realism.

Explanations.

So far as

my

thesis is concerned, I

make no

between the special and the generalized theory

The principle

of relativity is not a theory of the nature or origin

of the subject-matter of the natural sciences,

which a

distinction

of relativity.

scientific reality

but a principle by

can be constituted and laws of nature

formulated, without any assumptions, hypotheses, or presuppositions, whatever, as to the substance or cause underlying senseexperience.

The

principle of relativity

is

therefore in the literal

of the terms anti-metaphysical and methodological.

Neo-realism I take to be the philosophical standpoint that

meaning

124

H.

knowledge requires us

WILDON CARR.

to presuppose existence,

and that in some

sense a universe exists in space and time, the entities within

which are discoverable by minds, which themselves are accorded

a place therein on equal terms with the entities they discover.
Neo-idealism

is

the philosophical standpoint that reality in

fundamental and universal meaning is mind or spirit. Mind,

in this universal meaning, is not an abstract thing opposed to
its

nature, or

and

an entity with

in time,

it

is

its place among other entities in space

concrete experience in which subject-object,

mind-nature, spirit-matter, exist in an opposition which is also

a necessary relation. Apart from their relation the opposites
are meaningless abstractions.

Experience does not present us

with entities existing independently of their relation,

example,
(object),

sun.

men

(subject)

see

constituent

and

is

as, for

(external relation) the sun

but with concrete wholes,

Experience

activity

who

as, for

example, eye-seeinganalysable but cannot be dissociated into

elements.

Moreover,

experience

is

essentially

The standthought thinking, mind as

process, not passive contemplation.

point of neo-idealism, therefore, is

pure act, reality as eternal history.

Neo-idealism therefore

differs

widely from the empirical

idealism of Berkeley according to

which the objects of the

It
external world exist only as ideas in the perceiving mind.
differs also from the transcendental idealism of Kant according

which mind gives form to the matter presented to it, which

matter is therefore only known as phenomenon though existing

to

It comes much nearer to the idealism of the

as noumenon.
"
seventeenth century, to Descartes's principle, I think therefore

I am," to Spinoza's infinite

modes

of God,

and especially

to

Leibniz's system of the monads.

t

Argument.

The principle which Einstein follows in physics is based on

the recognition that the phenomena which constitute its subjectmatter are presented in the form and only in the form of sense-

EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

125

Ultimately and fundamentally the qualities of

In this he avows himself the
physical objects are sensations.
experience.

follower of Mach.

A science

of physics implies

an objective world common

to

individual subjects of experience, and the intercommunication

To constitute such a

of subjects.

science the only safe rule to

deduce everything from empirical facts and to eschew

transcendent causal agencies.
In this scientific principle of

follow

is to

economy Einstein

also follows

The application

Mach.

of it

leads to the principle of relativity.

The

classical

mechanics

laid

down

as the necessary basis of

science the affirmation of an existence independent of sense

which the subject of experience referred his

sensations, and perceptions engendered by
them, were then taken to be subjective appearances and science
to be truth concerning the reality which in its existence was

experience to

The

sensations.

independent of the appearances by which

The

It accepts

reality

it

was revealed.

principle of relativity completely reverses this method.

what were

called the appearances as themselves the

and as the only

reality with

It affirms that to constitute a

which science

common

object

it is

is

concerned.

not necessary

that object outside experience and

to place the existence of

independent of it, all that is necessary is that one individual

should be able to refer to an object in his experience which
corresponds point to point with the object in another individual's
experience.

There cannot be between the two objects a subown and

stantial identity, because everyone's experience is his

not another's

and there

is

All that physics requires

intercommunicability in

no need

to

assume a causal

identity.

correspondence in the object and

the subject in order to work out
is

uniformities.

The

principle of relativity therefore rejects in physics the

metaphysical principle of materialism which presupposes an
objective transcendent cause of experience.
in

mathematics the metaphysical principle

It equally rejects
of intellectualism

126

WILDON CARR.

H.

which presupposes pure reason, enlightenment, discernment, as

the transcendent subjective cause of experience. That is to
say, it rejects the view that in mathematics the mind, endowed
with reason, contemplates eternal truth.

This takes the form

of the denial of a universal geometry.

Following Kiemann, Einstein rejects the method of founding

geometry on the properties of absolute space, whether assumed
as the

real

framework

The

necessary ideal.

rejection

that every spatial system

freedom, and

the universe

of

is

postulated

as a

made on

the empirical ground

in fact relative to a degree of
is

freedom cannot be determined for

this degree of

any system from within.

or

Every

spatial

system therefore

is

absolute from the standpoint of those attached to it.

The type
of equation which Einstein uses in geometry is consequently
the exact opposite of that of Euclid. For a point to be common
to

two

spatial systems the co-ordination will be the

same but

the axes of co-ordination will be different in each system.

The
of Einstein's method is to replace the conception of an

outcome

having absolute direction in space and time,

with the conception of a universe which is finite but yet
unbounded. But it is the constitution of this new universe

infinite universe

which

is

important for the argument.

The universe

is

a four-dimensional space-time continuum.

The point-instant

It is constituted of events.

determined
co-ordinates

in

its

position

in

the

of

an event

is

by the four
But the axes of

universe

three of space, one of time.

co-ordination are different for every system in relative movement, uniform or non-uniform. There is no absolute space-time

system

or,

what

is

the same thing, every space-time system

absolute for those attached to

there

is

Consequently in the universe

neither simultaneity nor fixed spatial relation in any

meaning which
of

it.

is

will

imply universality.

any moving point-event

is,

when

The world-line

co-ordinated from

or track
its

own

standpoint, a straight line, whatever curvature or deformation

it may have in other systems

EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

In this argument

set

aside

127

the empirical

reason

for

rejecting absolute space-time-matter, viz., the negative results

I also set aside the very important
of the experiments.

application of the principle of relativity in biology and the

strong support which biology gives to the confirmation of the
I confine attention to

principle.
itself as

That

formulated for physics and for mathematics.

principle in appealing
fact

the principle of relativity

does,

the.

recognize
It is this

experience.

of necessity,

subjective-objective

and

in

constitution of

which distinguishes the empirical from the

materialistic principle.

system must

experience must

to

It also recognizes that every space-time

of necessity have,

active, co-ordinating, centre

and

and in
its

fact has, its subjective,

subjective axes of co-ordina-

This means that so far as anything is real, that is, exists,

that is, is thing-in-itself, it is a centre of perceptive activity,
co-ordinating from the standpoint of itself as absolute the

tion.

universe mirrored in

This I claim

is

it.

in essentials the Leibnizian conception.

The

principle of relativity proposes in science precisely the methodo-

which Leibniz proposed in philosophy when he

The monads are the real atoms of nature."

logical reform
"

said,

II.

The

By

T. P.

NUNN.

his opening
principle of relativity, says Professor Carr in

paragraph,

standpoint

is

"in complete disaccord with the fundamental

form of neo-realism." If this uncom-

of every

promising pronouncement were true, some of us should feel

I confess that it has made me scan
very uncomfortable.
Professor Carr's argument anxiously to find the places where
realism comes into such unhappy collision with the doctrine
I hope that it is not the blindness of prejudice
which has prevented ine from seeing them, nor an envious
Carr has secured
spirit which
suggests that Professor

of relativity.

128

T.

Einstein's exclusive

P.

NUNN.

patronage only

his

by misrepresenting

opponents' character.
I hasten to admit that his formal definition of the stand-

point of neo-realism is unobjectionable. What I complain of

that in order to prove the incompatibility of that standpoint

is

with the principle of relativity, he implicitly identifies

with

it

"

classical mechanics."
the standpoint of materialism and the
For as a matter of fact, the rejection of the materialism of the

older physics

is

the very essence of the neo-realist position.

From
the

the beginning neo-realists would have nothing to do with

notion that sensations are mental events caused by

"

physical objects," but (like Einstein) declared that physical

objects are but syntheses of, or constructs from, sense-data.

Moreover (again

have taught explicitly that

like Einstein) they

"

"

the varying appearances of the

same thing
to different
observers are not diverse mental reactions to an identical
material cause, but are correlated sense-data or

"

events

"

be-

longing to a single historical series. In other words, they have

professed the view which Professor Carr seeks to convey by his
"
explanation that what makes an object

point correspondence
observers.

common

between the experiences

"
is

of

point to
different

Thus, before the doctrine of relativity had risen

above their horizon, neo-realists had already gone a long way

meet it. Some (e.g., myself) were restrained from going

to

farther because they shrank from breaking with the traditional

beliefs

about space and time which they shared with the

of their day.
But in 1914 Mr. Bertrand Eussell

idealists

carried neo-realism right into the

declaring that

"

two places

camp

of the

every sense-datum, namely the place at which

place from which

take

particular

it is

perceived."*

interest

relativists

of different sorts are associated

in

And

it

is

by

with

and the

Professor Carr should

Mr. Eussell's further statement

Eussell, Mysticism

and

Logic, p. 158.

EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

129

that this idea leads to a theory " closely analogous to Leibniz's

monadology."
Professor Carr has probably overlooked these facts.

has not,

how can he maintain

in face of

them

If

he

that neo-realism

in complete disaccord with the theory of relativity

is

Only, I
submit, by reading into that theory a tenet which has no necessary place in it, but happens to be the crucial point of
difference

between the creeds

principle of relativity, he says,

of idealism
"

must

The

and realism.

of necessity,

and

in fact

does, recognize the subjective-objective constitution of experi-

ence,"

and

"

also recognizes that every space-time

and in

of necessity have,

system must

fact has, its subjective

active co-

If
ordinating centre and its subjective axes of co-ordination."
mark
an
these statements are meant (as no doubt they are) to

essential difference

between the new physics and the

respectfully deny

their truth.

no more account

of the

the physics of Newton.

The physics
"

"

subjective

old, I

must

of Einstein takes

in experience than did

It is true that expositions, especially

popular expositions, of the doctrine of relativity make numerous

"
But that is not because the
references to the
observer."
"

"

than the Newtonian

Einsteinian physics is more
empirical
it is simply because the older physicists believed that all

by whomsoever made, could be referred to a single

while the modern physicists know they
framework,
space-time
The frequent mention of the observer is merely an
cannot.
observations,

expository device to keep this vital fact before the reader's

mind.
When we examine the actual substance of the new
physics,

we

no more

find

"

"

subjectivity

Einstein than in the equations of Newton.

modern view

of

in the equations of

In other words, the

the physical universe, while implying, as all

science implies, that observations have been made,

committed as the

classical

is

as little

mechanics to any special doctrine

about the nature and import of experience.

For confirmation of this statement I refer to the recent
writings of

Professor Alexander and

Professor Whitehead,

130

A.

N.

WHITEHEAD.

company of philosophers will feel more

the technical applications of the theory of

writings with which a

at

home than with

Both these authors have given accounts

tensors.

of space, time,

and matter, which are in consonance with the principle of

relativity, and both have been scrupulously careful to avoid
"
confusing the issue by irrelevant references to
experience."
That is to say, they have dealt with nature, so to speak,
relativistically,
"

and

as a

Whitehead)

yet have treated

complex of

entities

it

(I

quote Professor

whose mutual

relations

are expressible in thought without reference to mind."

It will be noted that I do not return

the charge he brings against neo-realists.

to assert that the principle of relativity
idealism

The

only to deny that

upon Professor Carr

I

am

not concerned

incompatible with
incompatible with neo-realism.

it is

is

have mentioned tempt one to take up a

more positive position than this, but I refrain from exploiting
historical facts I

them.

The

truth, as I see

it, is

that the principle of relativity

leaves the issue between idealism

was.

It has furnished

of philosophers to

no

and realism exactly where

it

important new truths for the rival sects

into their systems, but it has produced

work

final criterion of their claims.

The quarrel must be continued

on the old grounds.

III.

By

A. N. WHITEHEAD.

The necessary association of the physical theory of relativity

with any form of idealistic philosophy is not at all evident to
me. "Why should a realist be committed to an absolute theory
of space or of

time

Again,

why

reject any assimilation of space

should he be constrained to

and time

relative theory of space necessitates that

spaciness of the ultimate substance of nature

theory of time necessitates that

this substance.

we

also

we admit
and a

the

relative

admit the time-iness of

Accordingly the ultimate fact of nature must,

KINSTEIN'S THEORY.

on this theory, be an event.

Carr. But I cannot see why a

There

swallow events.
theory.

In

fact,

So

131

agree with Professor

realist should choke at having to
far, I

nothing wrong with them on his

as to any form of idealism come

is

my own doubts

from the very difficulty of conceiving any very close association

with mind of byegone ages, when the granite was formed or
when the sun first blazed. We now cognize them by their
space and time with events which

direct relatedness in
directly perceive as

qualified

by

contingent characters.

we
But

the contingent characters of the remote events are only surmised

by us as the outcome of doubtful inferences. Yet we know that

some such characters they must have had. Accordingly we

know of events whose connexion with any mental process, as
we know it, appears to be doubtful, incomplete, and extremely
unessential to them.

That

on mind

reason for being very shy of leaning too heavily

in any endeavour to express the general character of

reality.

It

ing,

and

is

my

comes

to this, that there has

that, so far as

we know,

there

is

been so much happennot enough mind to go

round.

In
of

fact, relativity

On

the realist.

actually removes a difficulty from the way

the absolute theory, bare space and bare

time are such very odd existences, half something and half
They always remind me of Milton's account of the
nothing.
Creation, with the fore-paws of the lions already created and
their hinder quarters
"

still

unfinished

The tawny

lion,

His hinder

parts,

pawing
..."

to get free

much

simpler to sweep all this odd assortment

of existences into the mind; and then all their contents have to
It

seems so

follow them into the same dust-bin as being nothing else than
the outcome of the diseased mentality of existence.
The point
that I am endeavouring to make is that relativity lends a

uniformity to

the type of

existence

as

disclosed in

sense-

132

A. N.

WH1TEHEAD.

awareness, a uniformity very welcome to the realist, who was

rather perplexed by the curious entities he was committed to.

Again, the modern rejection of a unique meaning for simultaneity

is all

to the

The

of the realist.

advantage

realist

was

at least he ought to have been

the past or

the

very puzzled by the idea of

future as non-existent.
For the modern

relativist all events,

Where

reality.

of

they

same order

qua events, belong

to the

differ is that certain

contingent characters

an event can only be expressed in terms

of its relations to

contingent characters of other events belonging to

past,

and do not depend upon such characters

either are co-present with

The characters

it

of

its

essential

of events

which

or belong to its essential future.

am

thinking of are the things immediately

I am not thinking of the
perceived as implicated in events.
I

conjectural characters of physical science, which stretch

away

into the future and are called the laws of nature.

Unless these laws of nature are sufficient to determine

conditions for appearance in the future, there

is

all

nothing in the

events ^ preceding A, which

necessitates any apparent character to be attached to an event,
B, in the essential future from A.
Accordingly, unless for

character of any event

or of

not any more

bound to adopt determinism than he was before, but again he
has got rid of puzzling distinctions among realities.
other reasons he desires to be

I hold

that so far as

under the problems

so,

modern

the realist

is

relativity has

of realism, it is all to the

any influence

advantage of such

philosophical systems.

The

fact that different observers

of relations as the spatial relations

may cognize different sets

within nature and different

temporal relations as the temporal relations in nature creates no

The relations observed are in every case dependent
difficulty.
what
upon
happens to the body of the observer within nature.
All

the

entities,

relations

disclosed

are

relations

between

natural

and the conditions which determine the choice are

particular

characters

of

relations

between

natural

also

entities.

133

EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

The whole

and yields no

set of conditions lies within nature

impugning its reality. To give point to Professor

Carr's argument on this heading, he ought to show that the
conditions lie without nature.
For example, he should show
for

ground

that a

man in love necessarily measures

man given over to avarice.

space and time differently

from a

The

realist's

main

difficulty

the apparent world

is

however, not removed. Nature

is,

but after

appearance

all,

is

essentially

and knowledge is a different order

of being from mere nature.
There is a desperate attempt by
nature
into
appearance and a cause behind the veil
bifurcating
appearance for knowledge,

For
independence from mentality.
reasons which I have argued elsewhere, I do not believe that
to save for causal nature

is tenable.
Accordingly it would seem that
an abstraction from a more concrete reality which

such bifurcation
nature

is

To a large extent I am here

calls knowledge.
Carr.
with
Professor
He writes " experience is
agreement
analysable but cannot be dissociated into constituent elements."
Lord Haldane

in

By

this I

understand him to

mean

that the constituent ele-

more abstract than the experience.

in
But Professor Carr
claiming this conclusion from neoments

of the analysis are

idealism, pushes

am

me

over the edge where I do not want to go.

of nature to mind,

haunted by the seeming indifference

which I discussed at the beginning of this paper. Lord Haldane's

"
term " knowledge also rather alarms me. I should like him
so to explain

make

it

it

as to tone

down

its

sheer mentality, in fact to

look more like old red sand-stone.

What

whether there is any term sufficiently

embrace the ultimate concrete fact. It seems

I really doubt is

comprehensive to

impossible to obtain a term with positive content which does

not thereby exclude.

nothing

to

abstraction,

exclude.

But

in speaking of ultimate fact there is

Our

analysis

is

always

thus we have Bergson's urge

knowledge, Berkeley's mind, and

so on.

of

Some

by way

life,

of

Haldane's

of these

terms

are better than others as being less misleading, but they are

134

DOROTHY WlilNCH.
too narrow.

all

Against the background of the becomiugness

we can

only project the various abstractions which

are the product of the differing modes of analysis

of existence

The ages pass with splendid fires

Trailing along their shadowy tread.
Behind the curtain of the dead
Life sits alone and still desires.

By DOROTHY WRINCH.

IN.

The theory

<

of relativity

is

a part of physics and shares with

other theories which make up modern physics certain wellunderstood and well-established assumptions. The theory is of
outstanding interest in physics mainly because of the intricacy

which are involved, but in no respect what"

"
"
the theory " idealistic
or
in any sense in
realistic

of the deductions

ever

is

which any other branch

us

is

then, in fact:

of physics is not.

Is physics in accord

interpretation of the external world

The question before

with the

idealistic

The Legitimacy of Analysis.

High up on the
tions of physics

list of

and

assumptions which form the founda-

of the theory of relativity is the

tion of the legitimacy of analysis.

the

In science

we

assump-

believe that

which we deal are capable of analysis; we

that the facts have constituents in the sense that

facts with

believe

identical terms can form part of different facts.

This identification of terms, occurring in different facts which come to our
Unless the
notice, is the main stimulus to scientific thinking.

same term arrested our attention

we

in several different

complexes

we

could not attempt to build up science. For in science

collect together the facts at our disposal with a view to

of fact,

discovering general propositions.

large part of

scientific

thought consists in the building up of probability inferences of

various kinds.
for

example,

is

The material required

propositions of the type

for inductive inferences

EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

(1) a,
f,

and

135

have the properties/ and g, and z has the property

under certain circumstances,

b, c

this proposition enables us,

to assign a probability value to the proposition

(2) z has the property g.

The theory of relativity is no

The powerful generalization that
(3)

where

and
type.

if

this

respect.

the mass, v the velocity, c the velocity of light,

Q is the mass when at rest, is essentially of the same
General propositions of this kind can have no possible
is

we

consider the meaning of

Whatever a may

the property

world are analysable.

this proposition, it becomes

facts of the external

plain that in asserting it

(4)

in

m=mol(l-tf/<ty

meaning unless the

For,

exception

we are making an
be,

if

assertion of the form,

a has the property

/ it

also has

g.

involving physical concepts such as mass,

the legitimacy of analysis in

All propositions

velocity, or length, presuppose

the same way.

The assumption
preted

it, is

very

of the legitimacy of analysis, as I

closely allied to the

assumption

have inter-

of the exter-

nality of relations.

Now

The Nature of Concepts.

in the proposition (3) which gives the relation between

mass and velocity in the theory of relativity we are employing

The status of concepts is a matter upon which
concepts.
Concepts are essentially construcphysics takes a firm stand.
tions in the sense that propositions in which they occur are
universal propositions of the form

terms which have the property /, and

the property
(5) If

And

(4).

for

writing

for the

terms which have

g, this proposition reads,

is

it is

also a

D,

or alternatively,
(6) C's are D's.

Moreover, science which indeed seeks to correlate properties,

as in the proposition (4) above,

must attach a meaning

to the

DOROTHY WRINCH.

136

resulting propositions

which

is

relevant to the external world.

be drawn

from these generalizations of

relativity deal with particular terms, and the whole meaning

The deductions

to

for physics of propositions such as (6)

term which

is

occurs,

we can

or (3)

say that

it

that

is

is

when a

D also

or to

take the specific example of (3), that when a body is moving

with velocity v, we may substitute for its mass in terms of
this velocity according to (3),

and

so

deduce other particular

example, its path in space. The theory of

takes
as
its data the particular facts of the external
relativity
world and arranging and collating them in general propositions
facts

about,

by means

for

of probability inference

interprets its results in

terms of the deductions which can be made from certain facts

which are known, to other particular facts which may or may

not be known. Correlation between different facts is the only

and

would certainly be true to say that it is

correspondences between data which alone are required (p. 125).
The reality of these facts which form the material of physics is

aim

of science,

it

not questioned. They are] the reality with which science is

concerned and indeed the only reality. And the assertion that
these facts are the only reality, leads at once to the view of the

concept taken by science. Concepts are employed merely as

the arrangement and collation of the
which
are
facts
themselves the only reality.
particular

abstracts to facilitate

The advances made by the theory

sidered in the light of these remarks.

of relativity

The concept

may

be con-

of mass, for

example, has been fundamentally modified. Logically speaking,

it was found that the facts in question could be grouped more
satisfactorily in universal propositions of a different

the concept

the class

was amended.

name

second example

concept of length, introduced at a

has been severely modified.

work

of

form and

for terms having certain properties

may

be taken.

The

very early stage in physics

In Weyl's developments and in the

is used in such a way

Eddington, the concept of length

that the unit of length

is

a function of the three space co-ordi-

EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

nates and of the time co-ordinate.

not constructed for

all

times and

137

In fact the unit

all places

of length is
but on the contrary,

each point of space time has its own gauge system.

In the work of Eddington which has put forward the latest
developments from a strictly methodological point of view, an
"
assumption is put forward called the
Comparability of
Proximate Eelations." This postulate is introduced to bridge

the gap between the gauge systems of discrete points and asserts
the comparability of neighbouring gauge systems.
It is introduced at present tentatively, as the simplest way of building up
a common system from the gauge systems of the points of space
to require.
From the standpoint of
of
this
the
introduction
physics
assumption or of a similar one

time,

is

which physics seems

entirely justified.
Conclusions.
It

must be mentioned

explicitly that

the

correlation of

the most important business of science, for the

proposition of relativity and other branches of science can all
"
"
If
be reduced to propositions of this kind.
is
causality
characters

is

involved in science,

it

tions of these types

must accordingly be present

otherwise

assertions as to the nature of

"

it

is

cause

in proposi-

irrelevant.

In making

employed

in relativity

"

one should, I think, reduce the propositions under

It will then be a
discussion to their fundamental forms.

theory,

But I
comparatively simple matter to decide the question.
would like to stress the fact that whatever is said about the
subject

must be reduced

to questions

of

the

correlation of

characters, and that indeed there is no further question of

whether relativity uses the notion of " substance or cause
"

underlying experience (p. 123).

The constructed concepts of relativity enable us to group
together masses of facts and the investigation of the relatire
merits of alternative concepts for this purpose this constitutes
a large part of the work of Weyl and Eddington
is an

important part of

scientific theorizing.

EINSTEIN'S THEORY.

138

To its view that the concept is an abstraction, science will

The mind is not in a privileged position,
allow no exception.
but like other concepts is constructed to facilitate the description of the world and the correlation of facts.
It is part of
the business of psychology to discover all the factors which are
involved in the propositions in which the concept occurs. But,

formally and methodologically, we have here a study not

essentially different from the investigation of the factors in-

volved in the notion of mass in physics. But it cannot be

is concrete experience
(p. 124) in any

allowed that the mind

sense

in

which

the

assertion

the abstract character of

would be inconsistent with

the concept.

In psychology, as

in other branches of physics, the sensations are the data from

which we

start,

and progress

consists in linking together different

facts of sensation,

The theory

of relativity has

made

great advances because

it

has put forward important modifications of the concepts curIt has in particular suggested that
rently employed in science.
the older idea of length which attempted to build up quantitative physics

on the basis

of

one unique unit of length

the most useful concept to employ.

length which, though

space time in which
in the status of the

it

not

is

It substitutes a concept of

depends on the precise neighbourhood of

it

mind

is

applied, does not imply

as used in science.

any change

New variables

are

involved in propositions about length, beyond those previously

thought to be relevant. The recognition that the temperature was a factor to be considered in propositions about length
was an advance, methodologically of the same type. It would
therefore, I think, be unjustifiable to conclude that the

new

relativity allow any deductions whatever to be

concepts
The theory of relativity
made as to the nature of mind.
and physics as a whole takes up its stand on the reality of
of

sensations and gradually constructs the concepts which are most

suitable expressions of the correlations
facts of experience.

between the various

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower

on March 6th, 1922, at 8 P.M.

VIII.

Street,

W.C.I,,

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

By

S.

THE word Vedanta means

K DASGUPTA.

concluding parts of the

Vedas* also called the Upanisads, of which the earliest ones
An extremely conwere composed probably about 500 B.C.
literally the

densed exposition of the purport of these earlier Upanisads

was attempted by Badarayana probably about 200 B.C., and
this

work

is

called

the Vedanta

siltras.

on and interpreted in

totally different

sophers of later times.

The

tary

now

available

is

It

was commented

ways by many philoand best-reputed commenthat which was attempted by Sankara in

the eighth century A.D.

earliest

The view expressed by Sankara as the

Vedanta sutras and the Upanisads

correct interpretation of the

was further elaborated and supplemented in dialectical arguments by succeeding generations of his followers down to
the seventeenth century A.D.

It is the

view of the Vedanta

propounded by Sankara and his followers which will form the

I shall try to show the course of
subject matter of this paper.
the development of the logical position of the Vedanta in its

growth in relation to, and in contrast with,

the Buddhist philosophy and the realism of Nyaya-Vais'esika
different stages of

philosophy, with which it was always contending.

Though individual exponents from sectarian interests have

always held that the Upanisads preach a consistent and fully

developed system of philosophy, it is by no means certain that
* The Vedic literature
comprises of the four Vedas (collections of
hymns), the Brahmanas, ritualistic commentaries on the hymns, containing many kinds of other speculations, and the Upanisads (secret
doctrines) which are separate treatises forming the concluding portions
of these Brahmanas.

140

S.

N.

such a contention can be

DASGUPTA.

But a study

justified.

the

of

Upanisads makes it clear that certain lines of thought are very

much more emphasized than others. Sankara laid emphasis on
these,

and sought

conflict

to explain

with them.

We,

away

thought

from these as the

therefore, start

nucleus of the Vedanta thought.

is

other texts that came in

all

The mean feature

sages that the highest ultimate and absolute truth, the

(lit.

of

this

a sort of inspired belief or conviction of the Upanisad

great)

is

the inmost self in us.

by a process

of

logical

inspiration of the

This truth

is

reasoning, but

it

is

But what

is

this self

moment.

Brahman

not arrived at

realized as the

that the

Upanisads describe as the highest and supreme reality

kinds of

In a

certain passage five

material body, self as vitality, self as will, self as conscious states
and self as bliss, and it is held that this last is the true self, true
self are distinguished, self as gross

reality.

The Upanisads do not seem

tion of this ultimate truth

to think that

is possible,

for

it

thing else and all else falls far short of it.

only be pointed out as not this, not this, but

cannot be explained in terms of anything

told that a certain person

went

is

It
its

any

defini-

beyond everycan therefore

positive nature

The story

else.

to a teacher of

is

Vedanta and

wished to be instructed about the nature of this highest truth,

but the teacher did not say anything, and when the pupil
repeated his question for a number of times, the teacher replied
that he (the pupil) could not understand him though he (the

him from the very beginning by his

It may no doubt seem very
truth was silence.

teacher) was instructing

silence, for

mystical that no positive definition of the highest reality could

be given and that it should be regarded as inexpressible. But
the Upanisad hypothesis was such that there was no

way

of

defining the highest reality by the enumeration of any of its

The highest reality was not a matter of mere
characteristics.

abstraction for

it

was

felt as

immediate and concrete, and was

believed to be directly given in experience.

The

difficulty of

giving a definition was of a methodological character, for as

it

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

141

was the highest and the absolutely unchanging truth, and as it

could not properly be translated and interpreted in conceptual
"

could only be pointed out negatively as " not this

"
not this until by such negative exclusions the attention could
be directed to the right experience of this highest self which

terms,

it

"

though ever existent yet often remains unnoticed owing to our

want of knowledge as to where it may be

lack of training and

for.
Yet no mystical absorption, meditation or method
described by which this reality can be experienced it is hot

looked
is

produced by any particular course of conduct or process, for it is

ever existent in all our experiences and this alone is the highest
truth and when this is known all is known. It is said that just

when we know clay, we know all that is made out of it, or

just as when we know iron, we know all that is made out of it,
so when the Brahman, the self, is known everything is known.
What we call a jug or a plate are but names and forms only,
the truth in them is the clay. The forms and names have no
as

from the material, and so nothing else has any

reality apart from Brahman all else are but names and forms.
But the status of the world as a whole or of any other thing in
reality apart

relation to

Brahman has never been

seriously discussed in the

The main emphasis was put on the supreme reality

Brahman and the question of the philosophical status of
the world did not attract much attention and was often simply
Upariisads.

of the

passed over. The main criterion of the real and the true was
that it should be absolutely unchangeable, and nothing else was
considered to be so except the self.
The sage Yajnavalkya says
thus,

"

He

atman

the

is

not this nor

for he cannot be conceived

this.

He

unchangeable, for

is

he

inconceivable,

is

not changed

he cannot suffer by a
untouched,
nothing touches him
"
stroke of the sword for he cannot suffer any injury (Br. IV,
for

5, 15).

which
cannot

Again
is

in the

Katha Upanisad

it is

described as

"

That

inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which

be

tasted

end, greater

nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or

great, the fixed" (Katha, III, 15).

than the

N 2

142

S.

N.

DASGUPTA.

This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure

He
subject-objectless consciousness, the reality and the bliss.
is

hearing and the

not seen, hears but is

the seer of all seeing, the hearer of

all

He sees, but is
of all knowledge.
not heard, knows but is not known. He is the light of all
He is like a lump of salt with no inner or outer, which
lights.
knower

and through entirely

consists through

embodied

is

affected

by pleasure and

do not touch the bodiless

returns back to
"

it.

self."

Thus, in

This body

of savour.

the support of the deathless and the bodiless

The

self.

is

self as

and pain
Everything comes out of it and

Mund

pain, but pleasure

1.1.7, it is said

As a spider ejects and retreats (the threads)

As the plants shoot forth on the earth
As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,
So from the imperishable

all

that

is

here.

As

the sparks from the well-kindled fire,

In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands,
So, my dear sir, from the imperishable

Living beings of many kind go forth

And again return unto him."
(Deussen's Translation.)

It

is

said that in this infinite

and true

self

there

is

no

difference, no diversity, no meum and tuum. It is like an ocean

in which all our phenomenal existence will dissolve like salt in
"

Just as a lump of salt when put in water will

disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately, but in
whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitreyi,
water.

does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting only of

pure intelligence manifesting

existences) vanish in them,
"

knowledge
logical

as

of

this

It is

Upanisad

all

is

view.

main

The

the assumption that that which

is

basis

absolutely

the highest reality; the sages regarded the

unchangeable, and therefore considered it to be the

unchangeable
self

(Br., II, 4, 12).

position

seems to be

these (phenomenal
then no phenomenal
difficult to ascertain the

itself in

and there

is

highest reality.

They distinguished the

self as

unchangeable

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

from the

self that thinks, feels,

as

define

and

it

wills

it,
they thought
expressed in our conceptual experiences.

It

is

but they could not

be translated or

that

the criticisms of Pali

special consideration.

It definitely challenges

at

exactly

Buddhism deserve

not

could

143

this

point

the Upanisad doctrine of the self and asserts that there

self

what appear

mental

is

no

as self are but changing sense-data, feelings,

and consciousness

states, concepts,

it

is

to

wrong

suppose that in any of our experiences we ever perceived the

self, for we are, at any particular moment, aware of certain sensedata,

mental

states, or emotions,

person or

abiding

unchangeable

which can

self

reality.

and beyond them there

be pointed out as

Thus the Buddha

is

no

is

represented in

the

the

"
Samjutta Nikaya as saying, When one says I what he does
is that he refers either to all the khandhas (groups of mental
'

'

combined, or any one of them,

and deludes himself that that was I.' Just as one cannot say

states, sense-data, emotions, etc.)

'

that the fragrance of the lotus belongs to the petals, the colour,
or the pollen, so one cannot say that the rupa (sense-data) is
1

1,

or that the

khandhas is
'

I am.'

"

'

I/

We

vedana
There

is

(feeling) is

nowhere

'

I,'

to be

can never affirm that there

or any of the other

found in the khandhas

is

anything permanant
anywhere, there are only the phenomena such that some of them

happening others also happen. With the Upanisads the

absolute and unchangeable ground and cause of all things is the
self,

and

all else

are but mere

points out that what

we

names and forms, but Buddhism

experience are but the changing

phenomena which are so related that when some of them

happen, depending on them others also follow. Apart from
this causal sequence of

phenomena nothing

else is experienced

which can be pointed out as being permanent.

these phenomena was further investigated

The nature

of

by Niigarjuna

(100 A.D.) the great Buddhist dialectician, who sought to prove

that all phenomena are self-contradictory and have therefore no
essence, truth, or reality in them.

He

took, one

by one,

all

the

144

N.

S.

DASGUPTA.

important categories that were then known to the Buddhists

and showed that they were inexplicable and self-contradictory.
one example, we find that Nfigarjuna denied the
All
possibility of origination or the happening of an event.

To

'take

a thing can neither originate by itself

nor
nor by others,
by a cooperation of both, nor without
For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again
reason.
false, for

is

origination

To suppose that

originated by others would

also mean that the origination was of a thing already existing.
If again, without any further qualification, it is said that

by

itself.

it

is

depending on one the other comes into being, then even from
since a thing could not originate
light we conld have darkness
;

from

could not also be originated by a

by others,
combination of both of them together.
thing also could not
itself or

it

originate without

any

cause, for then all things could

come into

In this way he proceeded to demonstrate

no truth, no essence in any phenomena that appear,

being at all times.

that there

and

as

is

the

phenomena have no essence

produced nor destroyed

They

they really

are merely the appearance of

voidness does not

some kind

mean pure

they are neither

come nor go.

neither

maya

negation, for

or illusion.

that

is

This

relative to

simply means that none of the

appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own. His
disciple Aryyadeva also followed his line of reasoning, and held
of

It

position.

that whatever depends for

its

be proved to be illusory

all

existence on anything else

may

our notions of external objects

on
and
notions of part and whole, and
depend
space perceptions
should therefore be regarded as mere appearance.
;

It may not be out of place here to mention that, in spite of

the great difference between the positive parts of the conclusions

of

Mr. Bradley and Aryyadeva and Nagarjuna, there is much

is common between them, so far as the refutation of the

that

appearance

is

concerned.

which Aryyadeva seeks

is

The main

principle

to distinguish the illusory

according to

from the

real,

that the former depends for its existence on something else,

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

and

"

I conclude that

says,

and not

self-subsistent
is

real

as

it

Mr. Bradley also

not self-contained or self-subsistent.

is

must be
is

real

what

is

real

qualified

qualified from

must be self-contained and

from outside .... whatever

itself,

and that means that so

must be self-contained and

it

145

far

self-subsistent."*

Nagarjuna examined some of the most important categories

and showed that in whichever way they were interpreted,
defined or expressed, they would have to depend on others for

making themselves understood, and these again would depend

on others, and so on in whichever way they are examined they
are fraught with contradictions. Mr. Bradley also follows the
;

same method

in showing the contradictions in the appearance,

but he contends that since each and every appearance is

dependent on others, individually each is false, but when they

are taken in the totality we have the reality
"

Thus every part is full of vice,

Yet the whole mass a paradise."t

With Nagarjuna this alternative does not arise at all, for

each and every phenomenon is essenceless and illusory, there
no possibility that

if

is

these individual illusions could give us a

reality, for if they are individually illusory and if the fact of
there being a collection is illusory, we can never have a reality

.out of

all

them.

We

have

Upanisads asserted that the

but
they did not demonstrate how
highest reality
all the worldly phenomena
could be regarded as unreal.
Buddhism, as propounded by Nagarjuna, not only demonstrated
seen

that

was the

the

self,

self, but showed that nothing whatever could be said to be real as things are mutually dependent,
and hence fraught with contradictions. But the question arose

the illusory nature of the

that

if

such were the case, then

phenomena be explained at
*

all

how

Appearance and Reality,

t Ibid., p. 571.

could the rise of the

The Vijmlnavadin
p. 570,

1908.

(idealistic)

146

S.

DASGUPTA.

N.

Buddhists tried to explain them on a wholly idealistic basis.

They held that all qualities and substances were but imaginary

There

constructions of our minds.

we

so-called external world as

We

construct

it

is

no movement

suppose, for

it

in the

does not exist

ourselves and then are ourselves deluded into

it exists by itself.
Our understanding is composed of two categories called the pravicayabuddhi and the

thinking that

The praviTikalpalaksanagrahabhinive^apratisthapikabuddhi.
cayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either
of the following four ways, namely, that they are either this or
the other, either both or not both, either are or are not, either

eternal or non-eternal.

But

in reality

none

of these

can be

affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of

that habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities

and arranges them in a logical order

and predicate, causal and other

of subject

knows the nature

that there

is

of these

of diverse relations

He who

relations.

two categories of the mind knows

of matter, and that they are all

no external world

experienced only in the mind. There is no water, but it is the

sense-construction of smoothness that constructs the water as

an external substance

it is

the sense-construction of activity

or energy that constructs the external substance of

fire.

In

is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is

our
constructive
only
imagination that builds up things as
perceived, with all their relations and ourselves as perceivers.

reality there

It is simply a convention to speak of things as

ever

we

is

known.

What-

mere speech-construction and

designate by speech
In speech, one could not speak of anything without
relating things in some kind of causal relation, but none of
these characters can be said to be true
the real truth can

unreal.

never be referred to by such speech-construction. When pressed

further, these idealistic Buddhists would not agree to the truth
or reality of

only relative

mind

as well, for the existence of the

to its constructions,

existence of even the

mind was

and apart from them the

mind could not be

affirmed.

Thus, in

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

spite of their idealism, the

whole situation with reference to the

phenomena was not more improved by them than

origin of the

what we

147

phenomena were all false

them
could be experienced,
illusory,
nothing beyond
we could neither explain the nature and cause of the phenoIf the

find in Nfigarjuna.

and

and

if

mena, nor discover anything which could be called real or

Buddhism by

its

true.

dialectical logic resulted in absolute scepticism

or nihilism.
It was at this juncture that first of all Gaudapada and later
on Sahkara and his followers sought to discover a new solution

by reverting
all

to the Upanisads.

interdependent and

tively

and

false,

If individual

phenomena

then they cannot be true collec-

we ourselves are conversant only with the phenomena,

in them we can nowhere be in touch with reality or
we must then be wholly unfamiliar with its nature and
is no means in our hands by which we could affirm

if

truth,

there

The reason

that the accumulated whole could be called reality.

why

are

same

the

dialectical

criticism

which rendered

all

the

phenomenal manifestations futile could not be applied to the

whole was due to a methodological difficulty, namely, that
assuming such a whole the logician is silenced by the very
hypothesis that whatever inconsistencies may be pointed out

in

within the whole and reconciled within

are held
finite

and limited things are

no grain

of truth in

them

To meet

false

and

them, how can we

illusory

and

it.

If

if

there

all
is

discover the truth with

this difficulty Mr. Bradley assumed that all

have
a
partial degree of truth so far as they are
phenomena
But this truth would be no truth at
with
the
Absolute.
joined
all

for it is only relative,

and according

to

the fundamental

principle of the dialectical logic it falls to the ground.

truth

is

firm rock

to be discovered
it

If any
on which we could stand as on a

must be found beyond

or outside the relativity of

the infinite series of interdependent phenomena.

The Vedanta

as interpreted by Sankara and his followers did not try to find

the reality in the whole as Ramanuja did, but it maintained

N 3

148

phenomenon we

that in every

and

distinct

unreal.

which

an association of two different

find

the real and the

categories,

relatively real or

our concepts and ideas there is one element

In
immediate and direct but not conceptually an object
all

is

This immediate and direct element

of knowledge.

but

DASGUPTA.

N.

S.

the self-luminosity of

and content that

knowledge

This was what

revealed.

it

as apart

is

nothing

from the form

it

called pure

itself and
(cit), which existed independently by
did not depend for its manifestation on anything else. The

consciousness

the Vedanta

outlook of

logical

Buddhists in

that

this,

self-subsistent

permanent

it

from that of

differed

maintained

that

the

was

there

and self-contained element

in

a
all

phenomena and that these could not therefore be regarded as

wholly relative, interdependent and false. In all cognitive
states this self-subsistent entity

is

directly revealed as the illu-

Apart from this

none
of the characimmediateness, revelation and illumination,
teristics of finitude or relativity could be associated with it.
mination and revelation of consciousness.

This self-subsistent entity is what is also called the

the Brahman by the Vedantist. But by whatever

may

be

reality,

self,

and

name

it

the only permanent and unchangeable

which underlies all phenomena, mental or physical.
called

is

it

Though any phenomenon taken

truth, yet

in itself cannot give us the

not wholly false for

it is

basis the pure

and

it

its ground and

Brahman. What-

has for

self-subsistent spirit of

ever appears to us, be it an undeniable physical law, a thing

upon my table, or the most grotesque illusion and fancy, has
So on the one hand,
in it as its basis the spirit, the reality.
since nothing but spirit

are

wholly true,

Brahman

of

phenomena
union
to

of

reality

Vedanta

real,

there are no

phenomena which

other, since they all have the

The
they are never wholly false.
us
a
curious
to
thus
present
world-appearance

their

as

is

and on the

is

later experience

basis,

said to be true
;

An

and unreality.

and

it

if

it

experience according
not contradicted by

is

maintains that

all

other experiences

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

149

are contradicted some time or other, whereas the self-revealing

ever present with us and is never contradicted by
There are no degrees of truth
any other later experience.
and reality in the sense in which Mr. Bradley uses the word

Brahman

is

but between one phenomenon and another there

difference that the falsity of one may be discovered
than that of

the

Thus the

other.

illusion of

be this

may
much

later

a mirage

is

broken when one

goes nearer to the place of illusion ; the

but
illusion of a dream breaks only with the break of sleep
;

the illusion of world-appearance will not break until one has

reached perfection. But it believes that if we lead the perfect

life of a saint and cultivate the true philosophy of the Vedanta,
a time will come when we shall realize that the Brahman alone
is

the reality and everything else

is false.

The question naturally arises, what does Vedanta mean by

regarding the phenomena as false ? Does it mean that they
do not exist at

all

that they are pure essenceless negation

The answer that Vedanta

gives to

it

is

that

we must

dis-

tinguish between two categories, viz., that whicli is absolutely

self-subsistent and that which is
real, unchangeable and

changeable, dependent and only relatively real as appearance.

The latter category is not absolutely negative, but it depends

on the Brahman, the

howsoever persistently

real, for
it

getting itself manifested,

may appear

and

as real throughout the

our world-experiences, there comes a time in the

of a saint or a seer when it is found in its own nature as

course of
life

unreal

since

experience,
existing,

and

it

persists throughout the course of our worldcannot be said to be negative or absolutely non-

it

but since

it is

not self-subsistent or self-contained

to be illusory

and

It is the category of the

un-

since the experience of the seer finds

false, it

cannot be called

knowable and the

diversities

of

the

real.

indefinite

and

world are

it

all creations of

due to

it,

the manifold

and these appear

temporarily as real on account of their association with the

When the Nyaya realists challenged the
real, the Brahman.

150

S.

N.

DASGUPTA.

Vedantists and tried to demonstrate that pure consciousness

was as much a result of collocating agents as any other thing

when they maintained that

was, and

the categories of our

ordinary experience had nothing indefinite or indescribable
about them, the Vedanta dialecticians, Sriharsa and Citsukha

them by examining all their

whatever way we might try to

replied to

that in

all

gories of ordinary experience,

relation, quality, difference, etc.,

concluded that

it

definitions,

and showed

define

of the cate-

any

such as time, space, causality,

we came

to contradictions,

and

proved that their nature was relative and

indefinable, and that they were thus nothing but the manifestations of the irrational and the unknowable. These categories are

refuted in great detail, and

it is impossible to give any adequate

within the compass of this brief paper. I may,
however, just give one example, the examination of the

idea of

it

notion of difference, just to show the method of their discusThus Sriharsa says that four explanations are possible of
sions.
the notion of difference:

appearing in its

own

(1) difference

may

be perceived as

characteristics in our experience

(2) dif-

ference between two things is nothing but the absence of one

in the other (3) difference means divergence of characteristics
;

may be a separate quality in itself. Taking the

alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth

(4) difference
first

represent in themselves by their very form and existence their

mutual divergence from each other. But if by perceiving the
cloth we perceive only its difference from the jug as the charac-

then the jug also must have penetrated into

the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the
cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug ?
That
teristic of the cloth,

is, if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by

the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference
from something else, such as jug, etc., that from which the

perceived must also be perceived directly in the

But if the perception of difference
perception of the cloth.
between two things has penetrated together in the same idendifference

is

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

151

then the self-contradiction becomes apparent.

Difference as an entity is not what we perceive in the cloth, for
tical perception,

means difference from something else, and if that

from
which the difference is perceived is not perceived,
thing
then how can difference as an entity be perceived ? If it is
said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug,

difference

and that

this is indicated

the nature of the jug

by the

jug, then

If the difference

we may ask what

is

from the cloth be the

very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in
the nature of the jug.
If it is said that the jug only indicates
that

it

is

from which difference

a term

is

intended to be

conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we

imagine that there is a term which is independent of any
association of its difference from other things, and is yet a term

which establishes the notion

difference,

it

of difference

cannot be independent of

its

term of

If it is a

relation to other

If its difference from

things from which it is differentiated.
the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty

comes

from the cloth would involve the

in, for. its difference

cloth also in itself

and

if

the cloth

also be the character of the cloth,

identity results.
of the jug, the

but this

is

Moreover,

two

if

involved in the nature of

is

same manner the jug would

and hence not difference, but

the jug as its quality, then by the

a cloth

will appear to be

is

perceived as a character

hanging one over the other,

never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is

if qualities have any relation with
things

to ascertain

difficult

if
they
have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere,
everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a

relation

between these two, then that relation would require

itself with that relation, and that

another relation to relate

would again require another

relation,

be said that

and that another, and

when

the jug,

so

are seen

may
Again,
without reference to other thing, they appear as jug, etc., but
when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc., they appear

on.

it

as difference.

But

this

cannot be

so, for

etc.,

the perception as jug

152
is

S.

entirely different

N.

DASGUPTA.

from the perception

of difference.

It should

also be noted that the notion of difference is also different

from

the notions of both the jug and the cloth.

It is one thing to
that
are
and
and
there
another
cloth,
say
quite
jug
thing to say
that the jug is different from the cloth.
Thus a jug cannot

appear as difference, though

it

may

be viewed with reference to

The notion of a jug does not require the notions of

other things for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the

cloth.

jug is different from the cloth, I never mean that difference

an entity which is the same as the jug or the cloth what
;

mean

is

that the difference of the cloth from the jug has its
limits in the jug, and not merely that the notion of cloth has a
is

reference to jug.

This shows that difference cannot be the

characteristic nature of the thing perceived.

It is needless to give here the examination of the other

alternatives of the criticism of the category of difference, for

my intention is only to give an example of the manner in which

the dialectical criticisms of Sraharsa and Citsukha against the
realistic

definitions of the categories of experience

by Nyaya

were directed.

Though not
find

so definitely stated, yet

when we

that Nagarjuna held that no worldly

look deeper

we

phenomena could

be called either positive or negative he called them essenceless

or indeterminate. This was with him a logical category which
;

was neither positive nor negative, but indefinite.

But Nagarjuna

did not acknowledge the existence of any other category.

The Vedanta of Sarikara accepted the category of the positive and
the negative, as well as that of the indefinite. All phenomena,
so far as they were only relative and self-contradictory, were of

the same nature as illusions, and could not be called either

positive or negative.

They are

to be

subsumed under a

different

The
category, viz., the category of the indefinite.
admission of this category indicates that the law of excluded
middle is not fundamental. The logic of change and of illusion,
logical

of relativity

and movement, seems

to support the

Vedanta view,

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

153

that side by side with positivity and negativity, the indefinite

has a place in human thought, and that much confusion has

occurred in philosophy by trying to solve all philosophical

problems by a reference to the dual division of the positive and

the negative.
Philosophers who have not definitely admitted
the existence of this category have often been forced to such
difficult corners that, in spite of their great dialectical skill,

they could hardly explain themselves without unconsciously

accepting the indefinite as a possible logical category. The
objection that

often

is

made

against this theory

is

that

is

it

But the answer that Vedanta

unintelligible and inexplicable.

may best be put in the language of Mr. Bradley

theory may contain what is unintelligible, so long as
contains it and not to know how a thing can be is no
gives

that
it

"

really

disproof

knowing that it both must be and is." The old Vedanta

the Upanisads was satisfied only in pointing out that there

of our

of

was a

positive element in our consciousness

highest

and the greatest truth

to

inquire

all

that

is

the

into

status

logical

outside the supreme

challenged

the

existence

it

of

of

reality.

this

which was the

did not concern

the

itself

phenomena,

of

But the Buddhists

permanent

reality

and

phenomena were but relative and

there
was no permanent reality in them.
The later
a
Vedanta proposed
compromise that all phenomena showed
themselves to be a combination of two categories the positive
the permanent, and the indefinite
the changeable.
But
maintained

that

the question

still

all

arises as to

how

there can be any union or

connexion between these two opposite categories

Vedanta reply
arises,

is

that

it is

impossible to say

how

To

this the

the connexion

all phenomena most of that

and dependent and does not
is not self-subsistent and self-

but the fact remains that in

which appears

is

only relative

represent the reality by

contained, and

is

itself,

full of self-contradictions,

and

if

we do

not

admit any further permanent and self-subsistent reality, we are

landed in absolute scepticism and we have to ignore the

154

S.

N.

DASGUPTA.

testimony of our consciousness in which we feel that we are

somehow in touch with reality and the search of which is the
ideal of all our scientific

and philosophic inquiry.

It

may

not

be out of place here to point out that when Mr. Bradley after
dealing with the self-contradictions of appearance turns to the
problem of reality, he argues the existence of reality from the
fact that in judging things

Thus he
criticize,

says,

and

"To think

to criticize is

we apply a

criterion of

reality.

judge, and to judge is to

to use a criterion of reality ... in
is

to

rejecting the inconsistent as appearance, we are applying a

Ultimate
positive knowledge of the ultimate nature of things.
reality is such that it does not contradict itself

absolute criterion."*

here

is

an

But a criterion cannot give us any informa-

tion either about the nature of the reality or that

it

exists at

remains as an instrument by which we can test

whether any particular thing is false or not. But whether there
is anything which can stand the test of the criterion, or what
It only

all.

be the nature of such a thing, the criterion is unable to

Mr. Bradley himself admits the justice of this criticism
solve.

may
and

"

says,

The

criterion

is

a basis which serves as the founda-

but since this basis cannot be exposed, we are

but able to stand on it and unable to see it. And hence, in
tion of denial

us nothing, though there are assertions which it

This objection, when stated in
does not allow us to venture on.
effect, it tells

such a form,
I

am

may seem

prepared to

plausible,

admit that

it

is

and there
valid."f

is

a sense in which

But not only

is

the

criterion unable to tell us the nature of the reality, but the

Vedanta maintains that the

reality

which has

criterion in order to establish itself is

therefore not self- valid

moreover

if

depend on a
dependent on it and

the reality

and

to

is

not immediate

If
self-revealing, the criterion cannot prove its existence.
there is any reality, it must be direct, immediate, self-contained

Appearance and Reality, 136.

t Ibid., 139.

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

and

Any

self-valid.

reality

155

which would require a criterion

to

would according to Vedanta be only a relative truth,

and so belong to the realm of the category of the indefinite.
establish

it

Vedanta, therefore, maintains that the definition of reality is

that it is immediate, but not an object of any cognitive act
Such an
(avedyatve sati pratyaksavyavahura-yogyatvani).

element can be experienced in all our conscious mental operation

This self-revealing
self-revealing nature of thought.

and the

pure consciousness is self-manifested and self-valid it has no

form or variety and is hence beyond the range of
Whatever may be the variety of forms through
relativity.
;

definite

it itself is never
changed and is never
for
on
else
its
manifestation.
When the
anything
dependent
Vedanta says that the self or the Brahman is the highest truth,

which

it

it is

does not

manifested,

mean by

self

what we ordinarily understand by

it,

the ego, the I, or the subject, for these are all relative and
are hence the joint product of the reality and the category of the
viz.,

indefinite

The

the Vedantic self

which manifests

sciousness

principle, however,

thought, but

it is

is

is

the

itself

pure self-revealing conall our mental states.

not only a subjective principle of

the underlying reality of all phenomena.

definition or criterion of reality as

only an external one.

criterion in the field

some

relative truths,

in

want

The

of self-contradiction is

When we

seek to discover truth by this

of the phenomena we can only discover
of

which

will stand uncontradicted for a

much longer time than others. But in the seer's experience

they will all be contradicted, and the element of the category
of the indefinite which forms their stuff will be
to him,

when

made apparent
Brahman is

he will discover that nothing but the

the truth.

Popular interpretations of the Vedanta based only on

Sankara without any reference to the works of his followers do

an

to

injustice

phenomena
being at

it

when they

explain

it

as holding that all

are absolutely illusory, that they have no sort of

all,

and that the

Brahman

alone

is

real.

This

THE LOGIC OF THE VEDANTA.

156
statement

is

indeed literally true, but

misleading, unless-

it is

the logical status of the category of illusion

with

is

explained along

The problem before the Vedanta is not scientific, but

and ontological. Science deals with the laws about the

it.

logical

sequences of phenomena and not with their logical status.

There may be atoms or electrons, mere sense-data or some
other thing which scientists of a later age may be disposed toIt does not concern the Vedanta and it is indifferent

believe.
to

it.

maintains that whatever

It

be the stuff of the

may

has logically the same status as illusion, it only

phenomena,
presents phases of relativity and change, and if we look at it
it

apart from

its connexion with Brahman, there is nothing in it

which can be described as the unchangeable reality.
We
cannot escape from the region of relativity and change, by

simply taking all the phases together in one whole it can only
be done by admitting the category of the indefinite and the
;

indefinable as a separate category of existence which appears

to

be invested with

reality,

its

by

What

identity with the Brahman.

association

and seeming

the Vedanta means by

false, is that its appear-

saying that the world-appearance is

ance is relative, changing, and is such that it can be said to be
both "is" and "is not"; it belongs to a wholly different

from

category

logical

the

real.

To

admit

phenomena

as wholly relative would be to

scepticism,

and

to accept

them

the

jump

as wholly real

worldly

into absolute

would be

to-

ignore the elements of change, relativity and illusion. The

real and its contradictory cannot indeed be associated, but the

world

is

the real,

not unreal, in the sense that

it

is

it

so only in the sense that

is

it

contradictory to
is

indefinite

(i.e. f

neither real nor unreal), and Vedanta holds that there can thus

be an association between the indefinite and the

of

which

the

real

phenomenal as the

appears

real.

as

the

by virtue
phenomenal and the
real,

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, at 21, Gower

W.C. 1, on March 2Qth, 1922, at 8 p.m.

IX.

Street,

SOME BYWAYS OF THE THEOEY OF

KNOWLEDGE.
By

K. F.

ALFRED HOERNLE".

FOR the vagueness of my title I owe, perhaps, some apology to

members of our Society. Frankly, I could think of no phrase,
both concise and fitting, in which to sum up the topics which I
wish to discuss. Hence it seemed best to select a title which,
at least, gives fair

warning that

I shall avoid, as completely as

and object, of thoughts

problems
and things, of mental and non-mental, of the analysis of the
"cognitive relation" and the nature of "cognitive acts," and
I can, the technical

many more

of subject

which meet us on the high road of

The problems to which I want to draw

like these,

current discussion.

attention in this paper are either not examined at

all,

or else

are disposed of with an obiter dictum.

distinction

between

"

"

ledge by description

They touch the current

"
"
knowledge by acquaintance and knowon the one hand, and, on the other, the part

played by language in knowledge. I am constantly impressed

"
"
I might almost say
worried
by the fact that a student of
more
than
philosophy, perhaps
any other kind of theorist, lives
in a world of books.

that the

And though

company of great books

it is

a consolation to reflect

company of great minds, and

that the same world of which these great minds render in these
is

books their experience and interpretation, is open also to my

experience, still the fact remains that I am introduced, in the
first

instance, to a world of words, a world of symbols,

and that

the meanings which I give to the words may diverge indefinitely

from the meanings which the writers sought to express. Indeed,
the relation is more complicated than this.
For we must
distinguish between understanding

what the author means and

o

158

R.

believing

may

it,

agree with

him

stood

may

And

him

to

it

And

as true.

these two things

misunderstand the author and therefore

him where

correctly.

I misunderstand

ALFRED HOERNLE".

accepting

i.e.,

fall apart.

fail to

F.

have agreed, had I underfalsely agree with him because

I should

may
mean what

I hold to be true,

though

it

not what he sought to express. But apart from these

complications which could be pursued into much more detail,
the broad fact is that to every student the vast bulk of his
is

knowledge comes through books or, more generally, through

words and other symbols which inform him in proportion as he
is able to interpret them, i.e., to fill them with
meaning. In
turn, the researcher or discoverer, be

it

new

observation that

he wishes to record or a new principle that he wishes to

propound, can only add it to the stock of knowledge by
expressing it in words or other symbols that he himself (on a
later occasion)

and others can understand.

Thus the

situation

from two complementary points of

view.
We can (a) begin with the symbols and ask what is
involved in understanding what they mean or express
and

demands

to be looked at

(6)

we can begin with what

is

to

be expressed and ask what

is

involved in translating this into a set of symbols. Somehow,

these two processes must meet if self-communication and com-

munication with others are to be possible, but in actual use

these processes function imperfectly, and hence arise problems,

some

of

Let

which are

to

be briefly discussed in this paper.

"
go back to the terms knowledge by

us, to begin with,

"

acquaintance

and

"

knowledge

by

description."

On

their

by Mr. Eussell,* we are

not to enter, nor on an examination of the criticisms of
Mr. Eussell's position by Professor Stoutf or by Dr. Bosanquet.J
technical analysis, as attempted,

But

if

we

are right in taking

refer, in fact,

e.g.,

"

"

knowledge by description to
to
always
knowledge conveyed by words or other

* See Proc. Arist.

Soc., vol. xi (1910-11).
t See Proc. Arist. Soc., vol. xv (1914-15).
J The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 145.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Ia9

symbols and consisting in the apprehension of what these words

or symbols mean, then it would seem that we must agree with
Mr. Russell's thesis that " knowledge concerning what is known
by description

is

ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning

known by acquaintance," or that " every proposition

which we can understand must be composed wholly of constiI take this to mean
tuents with which we are acquainted."*

what

is

that wherever knowledge is to be conveyed by words or other

symbols, the meaning of these words or symbols must be understood,

i.e.,

it

must be known

"

in the

way which Mr.

Questions of technical analysis

Russell calls

and technical

acquaintance."
terminology apart, is there on this point any real difference of
"
We cannot suppose
opinion ? When Dr. Bosanquet, e.g., says
that a man blind from birth can ever make [or understand]
:

judgments involving

the

illustrates the

which a

way

in

quality

of

colours,"

man who

or

when he

has never seen the

JEgean Sea solves the problem of understanding a description

of it as a deep-blue sea under a cloudless sky, studded with
rocky islands, by using recollections of sea and sky at Torbay
and of the island-studded waters of the Hebrides,t he seems to

Words are meaningless, convey nothing,

express the same view.
unless from present or past experience we can fill them with
meaning.

But
on

"

"

experience

"

here

is

a vague term, and hardly improves

Can we make somewhat

acquaintance."

clearer to ourselves

it may help if we
what we mean by
go back to the passage in James's Principles of Psychology,
through which most of us, probably, were first made acquainted
it ?

Perhaps, at this point,

with the distinction between

"

"

knowledge-abotit

(as

"

James

"

knowledge by acquaintance
called

"
it).

and

There are two kinds

"
* See loo.
I am taking
cit.j p. 117.
description "i in a somewhat wider
who
sense than Mr. Russell
analyses it technically into phrases of the
form " the so-and-so " or " a so-and-so." But for my argument this
is, I think, negligible.
t Logic, 2nd edit., vol. i, pp. 40 and 69, 70.

difference

o 2

1-60

R.

F.

ALFRED HOERNLE".

of knowledge, broadly and practically distinguishable

them

call

we may

respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-

I know the colour blue when I see it, and the flavour of
when I taste it I know an inch when I move my finger
through it a second of time, when I feel it pass an effort of
attention when I make it; a difference between two things
when I notice it but about the inner nature of these facts, or

about.

a pear

what makes them what they

I
are, I can say nothing at all.
cannot impart acquaintance with them to anyone who has not
I cannot describe them, make a blind
already made it himself.

man

guess what blue is like, define to a child a syllogism, or tell

a philosopher in just what respect distance is just what it is,

and

my

differs

from other forms of

friends, go to certain

relation.

places and

these objects will probably come.

At

most, I can say to

act in certain ways,

and

All the elementary natures

of the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of

matter

and mind, together with the kinds of relation that subsist

between them, must either not be known at all, or known in

dumb way

this

minds able

to

acquaintance without knowledge-about. In

speak at all there is, it is true, some knowledge
of

about everything. Things can at least be classed, and the

times of their appearance told. But, in general, the less we
analyse a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the
less

we know about

and the more our familiarity with it

The two kinds of knowledge
type.

the acquaintance

it

human mind

therefore, as the

is

of

are,

practically exerts them, relative

the same thought of a thing may be called

in comparison with a simpler thought, or
knowledge-about
acquaintance with it in comparison with a thought of it that is
terms.

That

is,

it

more

articulate

and

explicit still."*

Now,

a careful reading of

James is really drawing the distinction

between the two kinds of knowledge in two different ways
(a) he connects it with the presence or absence of language
this passage reveals that

* Vol.

i,

pp. 221-22.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDdK.

when he

contrasts the

"

dumb way "

161

of acquaintance with all

"
"
"
"

that knowledge-about enables us to

describe
tell,"
say,"
(b) he connects it with the presence and absence of analysis,

and makes
nature

"

it

we apprehend the " inner

At the same time, he
thing.

turn on whether or no

and the

"

relations

"

of a

makes two further statements which are very

easily reconcilable with the first two,

viz.

striking, but not

(c)

he apparently

holds of everything in the world that we must either know it by

acquaintance or else not at all and (rf) that the difference
;

between acquaintance and knowledge-about is relative. Without considering further whether James's account can be made
consistent with

itself, I

and use them at once

from

shall take the points elicited

to define

it

the position which I wish to

advocate.
1.

In the

first

place, I suggest that

we cannot

distinguish

between acquaintance and knowledge-about either by the

of language or

by the

test of analysis.

Consider,

e.g.,

test

a botanist

who, having prepared a series of microscopic sections,

is

now

and pari passu in drawing diagrams*

of the structures revealed, and in formulating and writing down
his theoretical conclusions.
Granted that in his work he is

engaged in studying them,

using a great deal of previously acquired knowledge granted,

too, that when he first entered on his botanical studies, his
;

"

acquaintance was

and poor

dumb

"

for lack of a technical vocabulary,

in discrimination of structures

of training in observation illuminated

as there

is

progress in

knowledge

can we intelligibly say that

it

acquaintance tojmowledge-about

and relations

by theory.

But

for lack

in so far

in the course of such research,

consists
?

Does

in

an advance from

it

not rather consist

in a steady expansion of acquaintance towards greater fullness

and completeness

If this is the correct view,

we can

appreciate

* It is an
interesting question which has not, so far as I am aware,
been considered on its merits, how the distinction between " acquaint"
"
ance
and " description
applies to diagrams, sketches, photographs,
"
maps, models, and other kinds of reproductions."

162

E.

ALFRED HOERNLE\

F.

who

that the investigator

observes and theorizes at first-hand

has the advantage over those who merely read his account and
have to construct as much as they can of his meaning out of the
botanical knowledge which they possess already, aided by his

diagrams and illustrations.

and

If they wish to check

test his

reports and conclusions, they must for themselves repeat his

experiments and observations. They must personally traverse

the path of his research they must acquire the same intimate
acquaintance with the facts. The authority of his first-hand
observation and theory can be overthrown or confirmed only
:

by other
2.

first-hand* testimony.

In short, I

between

am

suggesting that current

"

"

"

"

distinctions
"

and
description
(or
knowledge"
between "immediate experience
and "thought/'
should be supplemented by the distinction between knowledge
which, for want of a better word, I must call first-hand and
acquaintance

about"), or

knowledge which
is

is

The main point

second-hand or vicarious.

that first-hand knowledge, as I would use the term,

restricted to

"

"

acquaintance
or

to

"

immediate

is

not

merely dumb

so far as that is
"

"

if

or
"

immediate

unanalysed,
experience,
once more means experience before it has been worked upon by
On the
discrimination, comparison, analysis, interpretation.
contrary, there need be no limit to the

amount

of analysis

and of

expression through words and other symbols which "first-hand

knowledge" may cover, provided always that our thinking is
"
from the
done, in Koyce's phrase,

that

we

life," or, to

put

it

differently,

possess our meanings fulfilled, or realized, as abundantly

as possible.

series of illustrations

"A man who

may

serve to

has been in love

may

make

the point clear.

philosophize upon his

passion, but no amount of intellectual sharpness could tell a

man what it is to be in love who did not know."* " Know " here

obviously means
*

"know by

Edwyn

acquaintance,"

know by being

Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity,

p. 35.

in

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
love.

It

would be irrelevant

163

to object that it is possible to be

without knowing that one is in love. For the point here

simply that one who had never even in the faintest degree

in love
is

been in love, could neither understand the language in which

poets or philosophers have expressed that experience, nor could
he have anything himself to express.
love," he would quite literally not

If

he were to use the term

"

know what he was talking

be as helpless and unintelligent in this field
as the cougenitally blind man is in the world of colours.
But,
on the other hand, acquaintance with what it is to be in love, or,
about.

He would

as

we should

of

many degrees and forms, and the limitation

rather say, first-hand knowledge of

it, still

of

admits

one's

first-hand experience will inevitably affect the extent to

own

which

one can possess, in fulfilled form, the meaning of Plato's

Symposium, or the whole range and depth of Dante's love for
In any case, however, being in love, even though
Beatrice.

we

an

call it

"

immediate

nor unanalysed.

It

Even

"

is certainly neither dumb

includes manifold utterance and

experience,

commonly

mere Erlebniss, it is yet a most complicated form of experience, opening up not merely new ranges of
in short, it
sensation and emotion, but of thought and action
self -analysis.

as a

"

"

hardly to be contained within the limits of acquaintance

"
or immediate experience," as these terms are usually underis

stood, yet it is genuine,

enjoyment

Now,

of

meanings

and first-hand throughout

and fulfilments hoped for.

vivid,

fulfilled

the passage quoted just

an argument to the
religion

and

is

effect that

an

now concerning love is part of

much current thinking about

poor thinking, not from lack of logical acumen, but

from poverty and

narrowness of religious experience. Eeligious experience, here,
The argubeing acquainted with religion = being religious.
is
an
is
that
ment, then,
indispensable presuppobeing religious
from lack of data with which to think

sition for philosophizing

some curious points

on

This example suggests

First, shall we not philoso-

religion.

for reflection.

phize better for exploring and practising at first-hand the various

164

E.

forms

ALFKED HOERNLE".

F.

of religious experience

The reading

of James's Varieties

no adequate substitute for cultivating one's own

life.
If so, what of the detachment of many modern
religious
not
thinkers,
only from official church membership, but from
surely,

is,

the traditional vehicles of religious feeling, thought and action ?

If we do not pray, if we do not worship, if we do not participate
in religious ceremonies with living faith, do

acquaintance with what

much

the

religion

more poorly

it is

qualified for thinking justly

It is certainly a curious

we not thereby lose

and are we not so

to be religious,

and truly on

that philosophers,

phenomenon

along with the educated classes generally, should everywhere

be drifting away from religion at the very time when the
ontological
"

argument

the meaning of

God

is

being restated by

in

human

logians lay down, as the

first

way

of developing

experience,"* and when theocanon for the study of Christ's

teaching, the necessity of getting at the experiences behind the

"

term

GoH/'f

Another point

for reflection raised

we may be acquainted with

by

this

example

is

that

religion, as with all other forms of

expressive behaviour, in two ways: (a) from the spectator's stand-

point

who

studies, at first-hand, the

behaviour which he observes,

including the language which forms part of

it

and

(b)

from the

view who knows, at first hand, what it feels

like thus to behave and to use that sort of language.
Now,
agent's point of

though both these ways

hand,

knowing the phenomena are firstnot the second incomparably more vital and complete ?

is

of

acquaintance with religion we would, surely, need the

worshipper's knowledge much more than the spectator's. The

For a

full

example

of anthropologists

The European observer

beliefs,

its

ceremonies.

may

serve to emphasize this point.

studies a native tribe,

He

description of a religious dance as he sees

Cf.,

e.g.,

W.

it,

its

customs,

its

say, a careful

takes snapshots and

E. Hocking's book under this

Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, ch. x.

t Cf.
T. Glover, The Jesus of History.

we

records, shall

title.

See also

my

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
perhaps motion-pictures of

it,

165

collects the musical instruments

The
phonographic record of the music.
"science" the best that science can do. To the

employed, takes a
result

is

scholars at

make

home

pictures

the facts

and phonograph,

accessible

verbal description
their

(e.g.,

will still

than

better

how could

so

the

as they go,

i'ar

most

accurate

the music be described

?),

but

be inferior to that of the original

knowledge
who saw the whole performance in its full setting
scene and circumstance.
And his knowledge, in turn,

observer

of
is

incomplete compared with that of the participants, whether as

merely enjoying the expression

their feelings or

of

believing in the significance of the dance, be

it

as

also

as magic, be-

it

as an act of worship.

Another example to illustrate the value of the insider's firsthand knowledge it is noticeable how constantly Dr. Bosanquet,
:

in
"

various

his

writings

on Political
"

experience," generally qualified as

Philosophy, appeals to
"
"
or
special
genuine," in

support of the principles he lays down, and as an aid in their

And

interpretation and application.*

to theorize about matters social,

we

are acquainted at

first

if

we are poorly

economic and

qualified

political, unless

hand with the handling

of

men and

we shall also be poorly qualified to philosophize about

art, if we have no genuine and trained power of aesthetic
appreciation, or about science if we have not something of the
mathematical, physical, biological habit of mind from personal
affairs, so

work

in these fields.

education,

it

Such a programme for a philosopher's

end by being not unlike the

will be noticed, will

The Philosophical Theory of the State, 3rd edit., p. 181 sq.

on a pretty house as an element in the best life " Who could
"
He meets his critics very
doubt it who knows what home-life is
largely with the suggestion that either their experience is inadequate, or
<?/., e.g.,

or

p. 184,

'I

"
Experithey fail to make full use of it in their theories.
here = whole attitude as citizen, the whole way of feeling,
This must be of the right
thinking, acting towards the community.
else that
"

ence

sort, if it is to yield

a sound theory.

166

R.

ALFRED HOERNLE*.

F.

advanced education which Plato proposed for his philosopherkings between the ages of 20 and 35.
But, perhaps, there are limits to the value of the first-hand
knowledge to be got by doing or suffering a thing ? Something
like this, at least, seems to be the point of that curious
passage

which Plato suggests that it will help a

"besides acquiring scientific knowledge," he has
himself "suffered from every malady" and is "not constituin the Republic* in

doctor

if

must not experiment

with every kind of wickedness, but have "knowledge of it,
"
but not personal experience
(eVto-Tj//*?? OVK e^Treipia olfcela,
With
Plato's
point about doctors we should
tcexprjjjuevov).
tionally very healthy," whereas a judge

Certainly, a

hardly agree nowadays.

knows that

disease,

know

can possibly

of knowledge, for all

that

it

is

language

is

systematic
doctor

too,

first-hand,

in

general

of

In so far as our

sensations, a
especially of organic
a disease from the victim's point of view
in understanding a patient's attempts at

description

who knew

helped
describing what he
(the

setiology,

is

but this sort

poorly equipped with terms for the accurate and

might be
disease

which no doctor

in

value either for science or for cure.

little

from a disease

sufferer

in a

way
who has not had it

by having
it

it,

pathological

even

would, by

feels.

the

itself,

best

But on the actual nature

processes

record

of

hardly throw any

acquaintance what

it

of

the

the tissues), and its

sensations and feelings

in

Thus, knowing by
feels like to have a certain disease
light.

might help a doctor to a more sympathetic understanding of

the patient's state of mind, but would hardly make him a
scientific physician.

him

Turning

to the judge,

we

find that Plato

and crime

the
knowledge
which
and
is
one
with
crimes
knowledge
indulging
committing
in vice
on the ground that such knowledge would prevent the
"
"
character, which a judge
building up of the upright,
just
denies

* 408

first-hand

409 B.

The

of vice

translation quoted

is

A. D. Lindsay's.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

167

In short, an undiscriminating appetite for

experience in all directions is beset with moral

ought to have.
first-hand

There are ignoble curiosities. There are desires for

knowledge which it is wisdom not to indulge. A colleague
tells me that, in the course of W.E.A. lecturing, he came
dangers.

miner who prided himself on having,

across a

person,

made

in

his

own

a comparative study of the experiences of getting

drunk on various kinds of

liquor.

The analysis by

this authority

of the characteristics of champagne-intoxication versus sherry-

intoxication

is

said to be particularly instructive

and amusing.

That many of the more elaborate and perverse forms of sexual

vice are due to a desire to increase both variety and intensity
of an almost agonizingly pleasurable experience will be acknow-

Thus our seeking for knowledge at first-hand is subject

to the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate curiosities,
though the line between them may be drawn differently by

ledged.

At any

argument about the

doctor and the judge suggests that the emphasis on the value of
first-hand experience, as the agent, not the observer, has it, must
different

people.

not be overdone.

rate,

Plato's

There are kinds of first-hand experiences

on moral grounds, best to be without. And the

which
is an observer's, experience is both more complete
doctor's,
and practically more useful than the patient's. We can hardly

which

it

is,

skill, acquired by long practice and reenforced by instruments, like the stethoscope, and by the study
of the pathological processes in the body, gives a knowledge of

deny that diagnostic

by

diseases,

first-hand

observation,

which

is

much more

exhaustive and relevant than the knowledge of

first-hand

suffering.

But

there

is

one

field in

which the best knowledge

of

an

observer will not match the knowledge of a performer.

This
is the field of skilled bodily movements.
Anyone will appre-

who has tried to learn, or even merely to understand,

from
a book.
However minute and careful the descripgame
tion, acquaintance with it in the form of watching the game
ciate this

168

R.

ALFRED HOKRNLE.

F.

played, or the stroke performed, will be conceded to carry the

knowledge acquired from the description a good deal further.

And

yet a further stage

is

reached

when acquaintance

takes the

form of playing the game, or performing the strokes oneself

"
practice and with learning by experience."

and improving by
Professor Pear
skill,

is

quite right

when he

"

points out* that

bodily

or the ability to deal with the world

muscles, joints, and tendons, carries with

kinsesthetic knowledge," a

character

which

is

"

it

by mean's of one's
a specific and unique

knowledge which in

its

own

wordless

yet form a basis for conceptual thinking, and

as incapable of perfect translation into the terms of

may

another sense as

is

music into colours or words."

How

largely

performance depends on knowing by past experience

what the intended movement feels like, and being able to

skilful

reinstate the feeling

as also

how

when

required, Professor Pear points out

verbal

descriptions can help for lack of a

vocabulary with which to express the differences with which

we

little

are acquainted in this kin aesthetic field.f

It
In the
to

first

introduce,

section of this paper the attempt has been

of

the

made

of

concepts
alongside
"knowledge by
acquaintance" or "immediate experience," the supplementary
concept of first-hand knowledge which shall include mediate

and descriptive elements and thus transcend immediacy or

acquaintance, considered simply as dumb or unanalysed, whilst
same time it shall resemble immediacy in the fulfilment

at the

* " The Intellectual

Respectability of Muscular Skill," British Journal
vol.
xii,
of-Psychology,
part 2, Oct. 1921.
t In a very different region of skill, the same general principle
obviously applies. We can learn to play chess from Capablanca's Chess
Fundamentals, but the fullest study of the principles of the game, even
as illustrated by diagrams and analyses, does not, as Capablanca rightly
insists, give the knowledge which comes only with practice, i.e., with
first-hand experience of the use of the principles in endlessly varying
situations.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
or realization which

its

whether successful or
different,

though

philosophizing

is,

knowledge-getting
or

language,

expressed

I propose to turn

be granted that genuine

realm, such a process of first-hand

allied, topic.

in its

as

From this attempt,

now to a very

meanings possess.
not,

own

If it

have sought

169

to

describe,

what

in

terminology, should its results or findings be

In other words, I wish to direct attention to the

puzzling fact that, in stating their findings

even concerning the

same subject-matter, philosophers use a variety of alternative

vocabularies, which are mutually more or less incompatible, and
which occasion the proverbial disagreements and divisions into
"
schools."
I want to raise the question, whether there is any
determining which of these languages

way

of

fits,

or expresses, the facts

is

which

the best

most accurately.

Concerning the existence of a variety of philosophical lanBut the choice of a terminology is

guages, there can be no doubt.
a momentous matter, and terminological disputes are not mere
squabbles about words.
question of
ideas

that

"
is

Hylas argues that it is purely a

a "name" whether the "Power" which "affects us with

to be called

makes

it

When

all

Matter or

Spirit,

Philonous rightly replies

the difference, for Matter

is

inactive

and

extended, Spirit is active and unextended.* Similarly, it makes

all the difference whether we talk of colours, smells, temperatures,
or,

at

any

etc.,

sensations or

physical

as sense-data or sensa,

"

and therefore as physical

non-mental, or whether we talk of them as

rate,

ideas of sense,"
to

things

and therefore as mental.

be described

as

"

collections

(Berkeley) or "classes of sense-data" (one of

later dialects), as non-perceptible

of

Are

ideas

"

Mr. Russell's

somewhats which cause sense-

data to be presented to our minds (one of Mr. Russell's earlier

dialects), or as

"

products of the synthetic activity of thought

"
of sense (Kant) ?
on
the
manifold
Is the mind to be
working
"
"
"
spoken of in terms of acts enjoyed as distinct from objects
*
Berkeley, Third Dialogue between Hylas
Works, vol. i, pp. 456, 7.

and

Philonous, in Fraser,

170

R.

"

F.

ALFRED HOERNLE\
"

"

(Alexander), or in terms of an

experient or
"self" who perceives, thinks, feels, etc. (James Ward), or in
terms of the "stream of consciousness" with its constituent

contemplated

"

"

or

processes

"

events

"

language of consciousness

choice

like

altogether, just

chemistry has

as

alchemy and astronomy that of

insinuates
his whole philosophy by the
Bergson

dropped the language

?

astrology

?
Or are we, with
John Watson, to drop the

(William James)

the extremer behaviourists,

of

language in the opening

What do we find ? " he asks.

his

of

"

Evolution.

seem more innocent.

"

presently,

we

"

of

pages

No

Creative

question could

I find that I pass from state to state," and,

find that, for a conscious being, to exist

mature

is

to

oneself endlessly."

on creating
to
this
and
Agree
you have
language,

committed yourself

to Bergson's philosophy.

change, to

change

is

to mature, to

then to extend this language to the

progresses,

it

may

be, in the

manner

is

to go

You

are ready

"

The whole

universe

of consciousness.

Organic evolution resembles the evolution of consciousness."

But why should we adopt, in the first instance, this rather than

any other terminology for expressing "what we find" ? Again,

Professor Whitehead has recently given us a whole new
a fresh analysis and description of, precisely
which has been surveyed with a greater variety of

terminology
that field

for,

i.e.,

technical dialects than any other,

"

viz.,

"
the field of " nature or

perceived by the senses." Even in the most abstract

topics of philosophy we do not escape this multiplicity of
Witness the interesting symposium of this Society
languages.

what

is

on the language

to

the

this

course

reminder

of

be used in talking of

"

cognitive acts," and in

symposium Professor Broad's opportune

of the alternative
"

alternative languages) in
(i.e.,
has
been analysed by different
which the
But enough of examples, which could be piled up
thinkers.*
Obviously, the choice of language is crucial. For
indefinitely.

ways

cognitive relation

* Froc.
esp. p. 142.

"

Arist. Soc., vol. xxi (1920-21)

on " Cognitive Kelation,"

see

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

171

What language are we to use ? is the same as the

What meanings are we to affirm ? And this again
"
is one with the questions,
What are we to think of the object ?
in
is
it
?
What are its nature and relations ? Thus
What,
fact,
the question,

question,

the choice of a terminology, because

settles

what we
"

"

reality

and

"

shall claim to

"

a choice of meanings,
know," what will be for us
it is

truth."

Now, definition does not help in this predicament at all.

The framing of definitions is very valuable for the elaboration
and the

use of a technical language, but the

At
applicability of the language is not thereby determined.
least it is curious to observe how often precisely those thinkers
self -consistent

take most trouble to define " what they mean," end their
Is there such a thing ?
defining labours by asking gloomily
In other words, Does the definition apply to anything ? Can

who

the meaning defined be predicated of anything that actually

Can it be referred to reality ?* Well may
exists or occurs ?

we sigh for ontological arguments to help us attach once more

our supposititious meanings to actual reality
On the other hand, does it help to go back to the " facts " or
"
"
"
the data," to the
experience behind the words ? Hardly
!

for "raw, unverbalized experience," as

to judge

side

by

by the variety

side

indifference.

choice, guided

called

it,

which

seems

flourish

with equal patience and

The individual thinker will, no doubt, make his
to

suffer

dialects

all

by some obscure sense

preference, the motives for which

consciousness,

James

of philosophical dialects

and he

because somehow

it

may

of
lie

or by some
hidden in his sub-

fitness

will reject the

language of his opponents

does not render for him the total impres-

tye has gathered cumulatively from all his first-hand

But whilst he can proclaim his
use of his own experience.
disagreement, and give to himself in his own language good

sion which

reasons for preferring

* For
"

examples

of

Cognitive Acts," passim.

that
this

language to his opponent's, as

predicament,

see

the

Symposium on

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

172

expressing more truly the nature of things as he sees them, he

cannot demonstratively compel his opponent to acknowledge
that his vision and his language are better.

Of course, a philosophical language, like every other language,

has to be learnt by practice practice in the use of it, in thinking
To what extent our disagreements and misunderin its terms.
standings are due to not practising one another's
How,
sufficiently, is a question well worth asking.

language
e.g.,

one to express, in one of the several dialects of

ought

realism,
"

"

Mr. Bradley's theory of the divorce of " idea from " existence ?
And, if it cannot be realistically expressed, what conclusion
follows for the truth of Mr. Bradley's theory, on the one side,

and the truth

on the other

of the particular realism in question,

At any

rate, such experiments in expressing the same point in

the languages of rival philosophies might help towards a more
reasonable choice.
Further, the familiarity which comes with

practice

will

do

much

to

remove the

unintelligibility

and

unconvincingness which belong at first to a strange philosophical

The practice of different languages and, through
language.
them, of different points of view, might be made a much more
definite feature of the training

our Universities receive.

which students

And,

in

general,

of
it

philosophy at
would be a

valuable contribution to philosophical technique

if

the

main

The
philosophical languages were systematically formulated.
result, I suppose, would be not unlike alternative sets of
definitions, axioms,

and

postulates, such as those with

which

The gain
amply repay the labour,* and

Spinoza prefaces the successive books of his Ethica.

in clearness would, I believe,

might even reveal grounds for a rational preference.

* The
only attempt in this direction
very successful attempt with which I

fragmentary and not

is hidden under the
"
title
Relativitatstheorie und euklidische Geometric," in an article by
Dr. Christoph Schwantke, in the Annalen der Naturphilo&ophie, vol. xiv,
I owe the reference to Dr. H. M. Sheffer, of Harvard
1, pp. 35-48.
University.

and

am

this a

familiar

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower

on May 1st, 1922, at 8 P.M.

X.

Street,

W.C. 1,

REALISM AND VALUES-.

By MARGARET MCFARLANE.
I.

"

IN his essay on
Realism, a Study in Art and Thought/'
Mr. A. McDowell draws attention to the fact that alike in Philo-

sophy and Art there has in recent years been a tendency to"
dwell upon " values rather than " ideals.'' The change is not
one of terminology, merely, but expresses a change of attitude.
Ideals are constructions of the intellect embodying in abstract

form what ought to be values express an actual relationship to

"
the purposes of the concrete living subject.
You may conceive
an ideal perfection and regard it coldly but it becomes a value
;

if

embodies what you really feel" (p. 251).

The study of values is one of the "growing-points" of

it

philosophy at the present time, and a glance at the literature o

the subject

ment

is sufficient

to

show that there

is

as yet little agree-

as to analysis or interpretation of the facts

which come-

under consideration. Differences in treatment depend partly

on the general philosophical standpoint of the writer and partly/
on the complexity of the value situation itself.

What,
find

then, are the factors to be distinguished

In the

"values"?

are present in

object known.

first place,

whenever

any cognitive process, viz., a knowing mind and an

Over and above these are the features peculiar

to the value complex,

not merely a knower, but.

not merely a thing known, but is

the subject

is

an agent the object is

which satisfies a want, or fulfils a purpose of
knower. Accompanying these relations of the subject to
is

also

also a thing

object

is

wt?

there are the elements which

the?
the-

the peculiar feeling tone which characterizes the worth

situation,

MARGARET MACFARLANE.

1Y4
In

the

kind

simplest
"

"

dislikings

of

mere

values,

these elements are clear

"
e.g.,

"likings"

and

I like peaches

"

It
implies a knowledge of the fruit through sense perception.
means also that peaches satisfy a want which I feel from time

to
"

and

time,

in so doing,

Peaches are delicious

slightly

"

have value for me.

The statement

same

set of facts in a

fruit,

that

characterizes the

more permanent way.

It implies, as above, that I

my

desire,

know

and in addition that

the

for

me, at

it

satisfies

always has

least, it

In other words, by attributing universality to the

conditions which are found to give satisfaction, those conditions
this value.

"

Delicioustend to be regarded as a quality of the object itself.

"
ness
comes to be thought of as a property of peaches. No
one making this statement, however, would seriously challenge

an opponent who disagreed with him the fact of disagreement

would merely serve to bring home the subjectivity of the
"
Chacun a son gout." But quite
judgment to both concerned
;

-a

different attitude

?the

beauty

would be taken

scientific doctrine, for in

-holds for all

upon

such cases

minds and at

isuch universality

to the

man who

challenged

Demeter, or the truth of a well-established

of the

The answer

we claim

What

all times.

to this

that the value

is

the ground of

question will depend

the philosophical standpoint of the thinker.

It

is,

I think, a question of particular interest to thinkers

of the realist school.

external one

For

and reality

realists the cognitive relation is

of

is

mind.

an

Values,

independent
however, are stubbornly subjective, and yet they are no less
How then does realism deal with values ? As a matter
real.

of fact, there
in

Dr.

is

great divergence

what follows
G-.

among

wish to discuss

realists themselves,

the accounts

given

and
by

E. Moore, Professor E. B. Perry, and Professor Alexander

as typical of attempts which this school of thought

to deal with the problem.

is

making

REALISM AND VALUES.

175

ii.

Perhaps the most thorough-going attempt to treat values

He boldly maintains that
objectively is that of Dr. Moore.
values

to

belong

objects

apart from mind, and are

Ideas of goodness, truth and

quite

unaffected by minds or wills.

"

beauty are indefinable.

my

answer

Or

matter.

is

that good

if

am

If

am

'

How

is

answer

that

is

cannot be defined

it

'

asked

good and that

is

asked

good

What

'

is

good

the end of the

is

to be defined

'

my

"

(Principia Ethica, p. 6).

"
Again, If we set ourselves seriously to find out what things
are good, we shall see reason to think
that they have no
.

other

common and

property both

this goodness

that in fact there

is

peculiar to

no criterion

them
of

besides
"

goodness

Further, this unique quality belongs to objects

and is not dependent upon judgments of

(pp. Io7-138).

or situations as such

When arguing against Sidgwick's restriction of the

ultimate practical end for man to Goodness, Perfection or
minds.

Excellence of

human

existence, Dr.

Moore puts an extreme case

He

point.

bids

us

existence,

imagine

lovely in form and colour

ugliest world

i.e.,

to

characters, of

human

as illustrating his

world exceedingly beautiful,

and harmony.

Then imagine the

it be a heap of filth containing

most disgusting for whatever reason.
He bids us then compare these two worlds. " Supposing them
quite apart from any possible contemplation by human beings;

possible, let

everything that

still is it

is

to us

irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful

world should exist than the one which

His answer
world

is

is

that the only rational view

is

"
is

(p. 84).
ugly ?
that the beautiful

in itself better than the ugly one,

that however

many

may enjoy it,

may be than it is

beings

better their enjoyment

"

then

it

follows

and however much

itself,

yet

its

mere

existence adds something to the goodness of the whole it is

"
not only a means to our end,jbut is also itself a part thereof
:

(p.

85).

Value being

intrinsic in certain objects is as inde-

p 2

MARGARET MACFARLANE.

176

pendent of knowing minds as are secondary qualities

not in any

and

is

be regarded as correlative to a desiring

way
It
is
not
the
same thing as to say that any being or
subject.
set of beings has towards it any mental attitude whatever

either an

to

attitude of

or

desiring or of

of

thinking
saying that a thing is
intrinsically good, it means that it would be a good thing that
the thing in question should exist even if it existed quite alone
"
without any further accompaniments or effects whatever

something about

it.

feeling,

And

"

again,

By

In his earlier writings Mr. B. Eussell takes a

also points out that it is no more possible to

(Ethics, p. 65).

He

similar view.

"

"

than to analyse " redness."

analyse goodness and badness
The nearest we can come to an explanation of it is to say that
"

"

"

good when on its own account it ought to exist

and bad when on its own account it ought not to exist"
a

is

thing

"

(Philosophical Essays,

Again,

5).

Good

and

bad

are

which belong to objects independently of our opinion

as round and square do and when two people

qualities

just as

p.

much

whether a thing is good only one of them can be

"
right though it may be very hard to know which is right (p. 11).
Because the idea of good is thus simple and ultimate, it is

differ as to

illegitimate to

which

in

of this

it

evolution
"

is

kind
is

Goodness

draw any conclusions involving

An

not expressly stated.

is

made when

it

is

held

a ground for belief in

"
is

it

from premises

illegitimate inference

that the

the goodness

an ultimate concept and

is

doctrine of
of

things.

not in any

way

deducible from evolution.

In Mr. Russell's later writings there are indications of a

change of attitude toward this question. In the Introduction
to Mysticism
"

I feel less
"

and Logic there occurs the

significant statement.

convinced than I did of the objectivity of good

(p. 8), and most of the essays in that volume urge

devotion to a purely scientific standpoint as the right attitude
"
the
of philosophy, ethical ideals being valuable only as
indication of some new way of feeling towards life and the

and

evil

REALISM AND VALUES.

177

world, some ways of feeling by which our own existence can

acquire more of the characteristics which we most deeply
desire" (p. 109).
In other words, Mr. Russell has given up the
doctrine of the Independence of Values.

The views
extreme

of

Dr.

Moore and Mr. Russell represent one

If
the attempts of realism to deal with values.
this view were tenable it would have the great advantage of

in

avoiding confusion between the subject, and the valued object,

the value would lie wholly in the latter.
Again, the distinction between the

act of judging a value, and

the value

would be clear; the act would be like any

and the value would belong entirely

itself

act of judging,

The

object.

conception

this view,

difficulty of

of

who

value

which

is

to

the very
independent of a

me,

wholly

other
to the

lies in

To

say that it is better that the

subject
beautiful world shpuld exist rather than the chaos of ugliness
which Dr. Moore pictures does surely reintroduce the idea of
a

mind

"

for

values.

whom "

As an example

it is

better.

of a totally different

method

of treating

the problem in accordance with principles of realism, a method

which leads to the opposite extreme, I turn to an article by
Professor R. B. Perry, entitled

"

Realistic

Theory

of Inde-

pendence." This paper is Professor Perry's contribution to

the volume entitled The New Realism. Here he maintains
not the part of realism as such to reject off-hand,
subjective existence, but rather to be more critical of it, and
above all to avoid hypostatising subjective facts into subthat

it

is

stantive existence.

realm

In this paper he devotes a section

of subjectivity (pp. 136-144).

which come within

other factors,

He

to the

finds that all cases

realm are complexes, including among

No such complex is subjective
consciousness.
this

or
through and through but may be analysed into elements
such
are
which
complexes
Among
objective.
complexes
Values are essentially a function of desire and
are values.

lesser

have

reality only in the fulfilment of interests.

MARGARET MACFARLANE.

178
"There

no quality or combination

is

qualities that is

of

inherently valuable; or incapable of possessing value; or

exclusively valuable in the sense that things would be valueless
Such interest as that of desultory curiosity or
without it.

promiscuous acquisitiveness

may invest anything with value; and

would not disappear

if all needs and likings and aspirations were extinguished."*
The value of an object then depends upon a desiring subject, but
there

is

nothing so precious that its value

not necessary that the subject should know that he is

In fact, he urges,
desiring to constitute the object valuable.

it

if

is

interest did cognize value the value

would be not the

fulfil-

but a quality of the object as Mr. Moore regards

ment
"
In so far as I find traces of
it.
This he considers untenable.
of desire,

what some regard

as irreducible feeling qualities, they localize

body or not at all in proportion as I distinguish and examine them they lose all semblance of that presence
in the object which becomes increasingly clear and unmisthemselves in

my

takable in the case of colour and sound.

effort at localization,

whereas

it

In short the attentive

unites the secondary qualities

with the object, dissociates the alleged tertiary qualities and

tends to unite them with the sentient."t

The attitude
which

it is

of interest

directed but

then does not cognize the value upon

it constitutes

the value.

It is important therefore for clearness in discussion to dis-

This
tinguish between &fact of value and a judgment of value.
distinction is brought out most clearly by Professor Perry in the

In the statement

following example.

"

I like the

Monna

Lisa

was painted by Leonardo," there are included two

because
(1) "I like the Monna Lisa" which is a
separate judgments
it

judgment

of value.

It reflects, he says,

more immediate

experience of the fact than does your statement that I like the

* B. B.
Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 333.
B. Perry, "The Definition of Value," Journal of Philosophy,
t

vol. xi, p. 153.

REALISM AND VALUES.

Monna
"

no other sense different from

Lisa, but it is in

Leonardo painted the picture

(2)

judgment

179

of value, but in this case

"

which

is

to

happens

And

it.

evidently not a

be the condition

In addition to these two judgments

of the existence of a value.

the complex state of mind which contains his liking of

"This is the central fact but it is no more
picture.

there

the

is

judgment than

my entering the Louvre to see the picture. It

but does not judge it; it determines the truth
or falsity of the judgment that I like it, but is not itself true or
is

constitutes value,

false

"(p. 161).

What

then

is

the real nature of this "liking" which is the

It would seem that
?

central fact of a value experience

ultimately nothing but an attitude of the

through

bodily

changes

in

(tertiary qualities) appear to

or

response

me

the body.

not an immediate

but

is

and

felt,

(p. 153).

lies in

mode

of the

"They

object.

modes

of attitude

sensory qualm which are

conclude that interest is

...

cognition of

subject exprc-

an

to be either

impulses and thus motor or

localizable in

to

value

qualities in its object

organism enacted, sensed and

possibly

qualifies the object through being a response to it'"

Such being the nature of value the cognition of value

the observation and recording of different interests and

determining their relations to one another and to their objects.

The judgment of value is a judgment about interest but is
otherwise like any other judgment.
Professor Perry allows that it

is

repugnant to our ideas to

admit that the bare psychological fact of a particular liking is in

Human thought demands a criterion
itself a guarantee of value.
by which superiority and inferiority shall be assigned
values themselves.

Perry

idea of a quantitative scale of interest fulfilment.

serves to the fulfilment of

permanent

to the

himself finds such a criterion in the

more

interests, or

satisfaction is better than that

That which

to their

which results

more
in

less fulfilment.
"

It

is

certainly

more plausible

to

argue that value

is

MARGARET MACFARLANE.

180

restricted to the satisfaction of one's whole

fied or not,

impulse.

self,

whether objecti-

but in any case distinguishable from the momentary

Good would then be that which satisfies a person

thoroughly or fundamentally or permanently after every interest

has had an opportunity through reflection of making its claims

But

count.

one asks

if

why

this sort of

interest

fulfilment

deserves precedence of the fulfilment of isolated or momentary

impulses, for my part I can find only one answer. It is because
a more conserving, fruitful fulfilment of an aggregate of

it is

interests than

The

is

when

possible

these interests are unorganized.

organized fulfilment of a self

is

better than the disorderly

impulses on the ground that the

fulfilment of interest as such is good, and therefore the more the
indulgence of

better" (p.

several

its

157).

And

again:

''There

is

no

specific

kind of

interest, personal, social, or metaphysical, that can be said to

determine value exclusively, or even preeminently, save in so

far as it sums or enhances the fulfilment of unlimited interest"
(p. 159).

Even

those interests which expressly contain a ground beyond

themselves are amenable to the same criterion.

floral

admire the

decoration of a certain dinner table assuming the roses to

have come from the greenhouse.

ground

that

it

the' liking or desiring is

out to be made of
decoration at

does cure

my

my

will cure

open

cold.

may

to verification.

silk I shall cease to

least),

and

desire medicine on the

In such cases the ground

admire them

(as table

If the

medicine

their value ceases.

cold, its value is felt to

of

If the roses turn

be well-grounded and

becomes greater;

for, as Perry points out, in getting the

medicine I should have got two things I desired, the medicine
and the cure. "A valuation that is undisturbed and fortified by

increased light
value.
prolific
(p. 160).

is in

a special sense a true valuation or a genuine

founded on truth is hardier and more

... A value
and there

is

the truth value in itself to be added

"

REALISM AND VALUES.

181

III.

In his account of values* Professor Alexander has

much

in

common with Professor Perry, and would, I imagine, to a large

extent agree with him.
Alexander's treatment is particularly
as
here
we
have
the
valuable,
subject brought into close relation
to the rest of a realist system, exhibited in fact as the crowning
point

of

metaphysical

structure

built

upon

realist

foundation.

Throughout

his

system Professor Alexander works with the

idea of evolution, and he finds the hint of what at a later stage

becomes value proper, in the principle of adaptation to environment.

Natural Selection, so far from ignoring values, as is
sometimes urged,

is

but a name for the way in which values are

The process may be detected

established.

evolution as the chemical elements

That a particular type

clear.

as

low in the scale

in the organic world

of plant or

of

it is

animal flourishes in

given surroundings while other types die out means that such
an environment is good for such a type, and, vice versd, the type
is good for the environment.
Among the higher animals, where
the creature actively seeks or rejects objects in fulfilment of

value shows itself

its instincts,

satisfies

still

more

clearly;

the object

term

only to be

an interest in the subject.

But value

in the fullest

meaning

of the

is

found at the stage where reflective consciousness has developed.

Throughout the development of his argument in Space, Time,

ami Deity up to this point, Professor Alexander has exhibited

we

system of complexes of space-time, some of which

Minds share the characthings and others minds.

as a

reality
call

teristics of

being

but the cognitive relation in no way affects the

In the realm of values, however, the
apprehended.

conscious
tiling

things and possess the further property of

relation

between minds and the rest

here mind
*

may

of reality is very different

"
Values are unlike the
be said to be creative.

Alexander,

S.,

Space, Time

and

Deity, vol.

ii,

p.

236 /.

MARGARET MACFARLANE.

182

empirical qualities of things, shape or fragrance or

of the object with the

imply the amalgamation

ciation of

... We have

it.

respect of the

knower and known,

of

totality of

this

is

and object which

of subject

appre-

knower and known

Strictly speaking it

"

they

values or tertiary qualities in

whole situation consisting

in their compresence.

life

human

is

true or good

Perry it would
seem that value arises then in a particularly intimate connexion
or beautiful

(p.

238).

between minds and

others

ugly

For Alexander as

Certain things seem beautiful,

certain
good and others bad

objects.

certain

acts

judgments true and others

for

false;

because of a tendency of mind

to seek satisfaction in certain directions.

The

satisfaction of

the tendency to learn, the desire to do, and the desire to express
ourselves in outward form gives rise to the tertiary qualities.
It will be found that what satisfies the tendency in each case is

coherence within

the

object

sought.

inventing a quality of satisfactoriness

of the object

of the object.

new

must beware

or of imagining that coherence itself

The

minds with things

of

We

situation brought about

in the

level of

realm

reality

of

which may be predicated

a quality

is

by the union

of

of values is literally the creation

and the attribution

term

of the

valuable either to the subject or object presupposes this higher

complex (p. 302).

Truth is reality as possessed by minds the assertion that
such and such belongs to space-time. It is therefore embodied
in a judgment.

The act

against its object which

"

is

of judging or believing stands over

an assertion or a proposition.
a relation which I perceive

going down the street is

going down the street" is the same
is

judgment

relation judged.

the percept dissected and reconstructed

"

"

A's

is

"The

it is

not

merely a perspective of reality but a perspective containing an

"
That
assertion I shall say an asserted perspective (p. 250).
;

thus judged is a " fact." Now concerning facts we

may not ask whether they are true or false they are neither
for they are real.
But we may legitimately ask whether they

which

is

REALISM AND VALUES.

The

are truly facts as they claim to be.

truth

"
?

may

183

bear one of two meanings.

It

"

What is
"
may mean What

old question
"

propositions must I believe in order to have truth ? In this

case the answer is supplied by the sciences.
Or it may mean
"
"
What makes truth true ? Alexander's answer to this is as
follows

"

Any

particular

reality

an occupation of space-time in a

is

configuration.

call

that

its

internal

structure.

Truth and error depend in any subject matter on

whether the reality about which the proposition is conversant
admits or excludes that proposition in virtue of the internal
structure of the reality in question

this truth is

apprehended

through intercourse of minds of which some confirm the true

proposition and reject the false and the truth is the proposition
so tested as thus related to collective judging" (p. 252).

The

test of truth

then

is

not correspondence to reality but

True proones introduce elements from

the coherence amongst themselves of propositions.

positions belong to reality

elsewhere

false

they are found to be incoherent with true ones and

True propositions, however, are

are rejected by us.

real facts

and except for their truth (i.e., being possessed by mind) they
The only reality error possesses
are the same as reality itself.
is

as the object of the judgment.

Whereas coherence among

minds which believe them
reality itself,

wills

true propositions and

among

the

determined by the nature of

in the realm of practice it is coherence among
is

which primarily determines what

which we produce

is

good in so far as
"

who

is

"

good.

The

reality

coherently the
The objects of will are

it satisfies

bring it about (p. 274).

or
connexions of fact which we seek to bring about
propositions
In
in the external world, e.g., a certain journey is to be taken.
persons

order to bring about what I have thus first in idea, it is essential

to be guided in my action by the nature of the particular bit of
external reality in which I find myself, including existing social
I must for example fit my actions in with the
institutions.
local

railway time

table.

But the primary

fact

is

that

MARGARET MACFARLANE.

184
conscious

mind

wills

an object and the realization

of

that

Human beings
willing involves changing the external world.
are essentially social in character. Hence in some cases, they
co-operate with one another to bring about the objects of their
willings in other cases they compete with one another for the
;

realization of incompatible ends.

of agents.
institutions

Out

of this ceaseless conflict

"

"

goods approved by the general body

These are conserved in various moral and social

there emerges a body of

and become the standard by which either an agent

"
is judged.
The characters are good which act

or his action

in the spirit of these institutions,

and the various types of their

The non- mental facts

goodness are the virtues of character.

which are the purely external aspect

of the institutions are not

good in themselves but only as securing in certain fashion, that

coherently, the satisfactions of the passions of the persons
"
engaged (pp. 277-8). Since moral institutions and laws are

is,

concerned to secure the coherent distribution

among

do

individuals, evil is the failure to

of

satisfaction

this.

Evil deals

with the same conditions as good, viz., human nature and the
but handles them amiss
satisfaction is not

external world,

achieved by the wrong person, or in respect of

the wrong objects. Evil is therefore the moral counterpart of

achieved, or

is

error.

f
In the case of the third type of tertiary quality, beauty
and its un value ugliness, the connexion between minds and

When an object is judged to be

things is still more intimate.
As
beautiful a part of the object itself is supplied by the mind.
with
a
the
is
beautiful
object
illusory,
compared
perceived thing,
for it does not exist in the

But

as

compared with an

erroneous because

it is

form in which

it

is

illusion the beautiful

apprehended.
object is not

not attributed to any .real object outside

the sesthetic experience itself it is a new sort of reality brought

into being by the mind itself in combination with objects.
;

If

the sesthetic semblance were taken to be real

become cognitive

illusion

and cease

to be aesthetic; for

it

would

example,

REALISM AND VALUES.

we thought they
disappear.
of elements,

"

"

the figures in Botticelli's

185

express movement, but

Spring

if

really moved, the aesthetic effect would at once

Beauty in an object means the harmonious blending

some existing in reality and some supplied by the

mind

itself.
But it means more also. It distinguishes those
minds which do see beauty in the object from others which fail

"

to do so.

Coherence in the internal constitution of beauty is

among the minds which appreciate it, and

coherence

also

exclusion of other

minds"

(p.

Such persons who do

294).

this is only possible

appreciate beauty become standard minds
because the beautiful percept is the result of a judgment. " Just
'

'

because such judgments, I see this alive/ I see this form

solid/ are implied in the beautiful work, it is possible for others
to take note of my attitude and at once to- find the same object
beautiful

and

and me in

to share

my

my attitude

to

pronouncement that

approve both the beauty,

it

is

beautiful

"
(p.

295).

The propositions we deal with in judging beauty are different

from the propositions of truth and goodness. They are neither
ordinary external propositions, nor are they mental propositions,
but they are propositions in which mind and the non-mental

combined.

This account of the appreciation of beauty

not
to
works of art but equally to natural objects.
applies
only
In the case of a natural object Professor Alexander maintains,
are

when its beauty is felt it is incorrectly perceived

added to or selected from reality in the process.
This view seems to

me

we may read our moods

wind over dried stems
sadden us;
"lonely,"

mode

to be full of difficulty.

into a scene (p. 289)

of

we do

so

is

admit that

the whistling

dead grasses on the

but when we describe the

something

hillside

may

scene as "dreary,"

knowing well that the "dreariness"

of ourself not a quality of the landscape.

is

In other cases

where we admire the beauty of a landscape or the grandeur of

mountain scenery, I fail to see that mind does add features to
the

object

in

the

admiring a landscape

way
it

Professor Alexander suggests.

would seem that

it is

In

the form of the

MARGARET MACFARLANE.

186

various objects, the wealth and blending of colours, which call

out immediately the response of human appreciation. These

same if I stood on the

"
"
the
but
modified features are mere appearance in
Professor Alexander's sense of the term, and are due to external

features would undoubtedly not be the

hill itself

not to mind.

reality,

The blueness

mountains and their

of the

rugged outline, the blending of the purple and gold of the heather
and gorse, which are the elements I consider beautiful are undoubtedly due to the distance from which I

am

viewing them, but I

cannot see that in judging them as beautiful mind has added
anything more to them than in judging them as distant. When
the mountain
true

and

if

judged as distant the proposition claims to be

the claim is coherent with all other true proposiis

mountain then

tions about the

the mountain

is

When

distant.

and

reality is of this character,

the mountain

is judged to be
Alexander lies in the

beautiful, then its beauty according to

judged presupposes another proposition

in which the mind has in some way united itself with the
fact that the proposition

In each case the

mountain.

"

"

judging

must be a bare

act of

These assertions are distinguishable the one from

the other only by their objects which are in the first example

assertion.

an assertion about external reality as such, and in the second

an assertion about external reality combined with mind.

One cannot help

no account

enjoyment

of a

feeling that this treatment of values gives

How

the experiencing of value.

of

judgment

of truth differ

does

the

from the enjoyment

of

a judgment of beauty ?
Yet as experiences they are certainly
Would Professor Alexander agree with Professor
different.
"
"
central fact of value experience as
Perry in describing the
"

modes

possibly

of attitude
felt

and impulses,"

mode

of

the

or

"

as an enacted, sensed, or

organism," or

is

there

no such

"central fact"?
Professor Alexander's account of truth
difficult.

among

find

still

more

It is asserted that the criterion of truth is coherence

propositions,

i.e.,

assertions about reality

but

if

truth

REALISM AND VALUES.

187

thus follows reality and is determined by it what is gained

by denying coherence to reality itself ? (see p. 258). Unless
"
"
truth about reality be so ?
reality itself be coherent how can
It

would seem that by thus refusing

to

admit that

it

is

the

nature of reality to be coherent, Alexander is driven, in spite

of himself, to treat truth as a subjective character of minds,
is compelled to admit that a fact which is true to-day
be
false to-morrow (p. 263) or even that contradictory
may
facts may be true for two minds at the same time if they live

for

he

under different conditions.

"

The once

true proposition

may

turn out even to be erroneous for the newer knowledge, while

it remains true and real as such witfrin the narrower range of
ancient revealed fact."

Professor Alexander's criticism of the

pragmatic view of truth is that it gives no account of the

"
nature of reality but states simply
Truth is that which
"
himself would go a step further and say, Truth
"
works because it is determined by the nature of reality

works."

He

but for a satisfactory theory of truth one must I think under"

"
in a more drastic sense than
determined by reality
stand

Alexander himself

From

does.

the point of view of his theory there can be no dis"judgment of fact" and a "judgment of

tinction between a
value," for every
feels,

judgment must be of the

however, that there

is

While goodness and

predominantly subjective in reference, even

universal in form, truth

is

One

a real difference in status between

truth and the other tertiary qualities.

beauty are

latter type.

essentially objective.

when

Goodness and

beauty are determined primarily by the efforts and interests of

truth is determined primarily by the
individual subjects
;

nature of reality
course

itself.

and

Acts of believing or judging are of

in character;
but truth

transient

subjective
and unchangeable in and
possesses a form of reality timeless
through which the world of changing existence is revealed
to us.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower

on June 12th, 1922, at 8 p.m.

Street,

W.C.

1,

XL GEOMETKY AND EEALITY.

By THOMAS GREENWOOD.
FOR many

centuries,

geometry and mechanics had the most

brilliant fortune as rational sciences. But the discovery of nonEuclidian geometry, and the momentous revolution brought
about in the field of natural philosophy during these last years,

have thrown strong doubts on the self-evidence of the funda-

mental concepts of geometry, and the basic notions

mechanics.

of

Newtonian

It is argued now, that only sesthetical considera-

and psychological reasons of formal economy and utility

could justify the privileged position of the axioms of these
tions

The

sciences.

marked
is

practice, for

example, of seeing in a distance two

positions on a practically rigid

body

lodged deeply in our habit of thought.

is

something which
are accustomed

We

further to regard three points as being situated on a straight

if their apparent positions can be made to coincide for

line,

observation with one eye, under suitable choice of our place of

observation.
If, in pursuance of our habit of thought, we now

supplement the propositions of Euclidian geometry by the single

proposition that two points on a practically rigid body always
correspond to the same distance or line-interval, independently
any changes in position to which we may subject the body,

of

the propositions of Euclidian geometry then resolve themselves

into propositions on the possible relative position of practically
rigid bodies.*

One

is

led then to suppose that the truths of geometry

and

mechanics reach a unique level. As Professor Painleve says,

there is no essential difference between geometry and mechanics;!
*

Einstein, Relativity, Chap. I.

La Me'canique, in Me'thode des Sciences, vol.

t Painlev6,

i.

190

THOMAS GREENWOOD.

both are experimental sciences, although their developments

have been different the axioms of pure geometry are nothing
else but the refined form of the properties of natural bodies.
;

And Bocher

writes

"
:

natural sciences, and

Geometry becomes the simplest

axioms are

of the

nature of physical
to
be tested by experience and to be regarded as true
laws,
only within the limits of the errors of observation."*
its

of the

Professor Einstein has a different opinion,

when he

writes in

"

"

book on Relativity that the concept

true
does not tally
with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word
his

"

true

"

we

are eventually in the habit of designating always

"

the correspondence with a " real

object geometry, however,
is not concerned with the relations of the ideas involved in it
;

to objects of experience, but only

the
"

ideas

among themselves.f

with the logical connexion of

Poincar^ had already said:

not an experimental science experience forms

merely the occasion for our reflecting upon the geometrical
ideas which pre-exist within us."J
is

Geometry

And
it is

Professor Eddington answering the question whether

"
true to say that
any two sides of a triangle are together

greater than the third side/' says he

whether

continues,

"

the axioms

from certain other propositions

;

if

axioms are not

my

true, the proposition

province to consider.

profess to understand,
in Euclidian

"

I can deduce

still

is

he

is

true

if

the

not true universally

cannot say, and it is outBut for reasons which I do not

not, I

my friend

geometry and

is

it,"

more elementary,

these are true, the proposition

whether the axioms are true or

side

quite unable to say

is

this proposition is true or not.

the physicist

is

more interested

continually setting us problems

in it."

All

these

conflicting

opinions

are

unilateral.

* Bulletin Amer. Math. Soc.

For

[2], 2 (1904), p. 124.

t Einstein, Relativity^ Chap. I.
" Foundations of
Geometry," in Monist, 9 (1899), p. 41.
|

Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation, Chap.

T.

the

GEOMETRY AND REALITY.

I'.M

contention of physicists that no system of geometry can be taken

as true is based on the fact that they consider geometry with
reference to natural phenomena, and

independent

We must

universe.

fail

take

to

as

it

an

science, formally irrelevant to a description of the

remember

here, that truth has

a formal and a material aspect.

when

proposition

two aspects

is

said to be

terms are not contradictory, or

when it can be deduced, by means of reasoning, from a coherent
system of primitive notions and axioms relatively to which it is
formally true, either

said

its

The material aspect

to be true.

complex character

for

we have

of truth is of a

more

deal here not only with

to

thought, but also with facts, that is to say with data of intuition
and experience. Material truth requires the agreement of

thinking with experience, while formal truth

self-agreement of thought.

caused by the
It follows that a proposition can be
is

formally true and materially false for instance, when we say

"
that the hypervolume of a hypersphere is equal to its volume
;

"

multiplied by one-fourth of its radius this statement is formally

true, but it is not verifiable by experience and is therefore

This distinction between the two aspects of

truth is of great importance, because it gives the clue to the
and applied mechanics.
specific difference between pure geometry
materially

false.

we take truth in the scholastic

intellectus ; but we extend the meaning

It will be observed also that

sense of adequatio rei

of the

word

"

res

"

et

not only to objects of the external world, but

also to objects created

by thought.

Now, although the ultimate basis of geometry is empirica^

it must be acknowledged that the active rdle of experience
ceases when the primitive notions and postulates of geometry are
Geometry belongs then to the conceptual order
"
and constitutes what is called axiomatic geometry," a kind of
established.

As such, pure geometry sets

hypothetico-deductive system.
"
"
out from certain primitive notions, such as
point,"
straight
"

line,"

able to

which are not defined and with which we are

associate more or less definite ideas, and from certain

plane,"

Q 2

THOMAS GREENWOOD.

192

simple propositions or axioms, or postulates, which, in virtue of

these ideas, we are inclined to accept as respecting the laws of

These axioms state certain relations between the

thought.

primitive notions, which are thus supplemented and universally

characterized.
When, on the basis of a logical process common
to

sciences, the justification

all

compelled to admit, all

of

which we

feel

remaining propositions are

ourselves

shown

to

follow from those axioms, they are proved.

But

there

if

no

is

about the truth of a geometrical

difficulty

proposition deduced from a coherent set of axioms, what about

the truth of the axioms themselves ? This question is unanswerable

by the methods

of

geometry

but

it is

not in

Without going

without meaning, as Einstein says.

we can say

essence of geometrical axioms,

itself entirely

far into the

that they are true

between primitive
geometry, but having a

in so far as they express possible relations

notions, undefined in the

realm

of

limited field of indetermination by reason of the intuitive data

which preside at their formation. Geometrical axioms are true,

because in the conceptual order, thought binds

results of its

The case

normal

itself

with the

activity.

axioms is different, for they are always

some discussion and susceptible of being overthrown
or contradicted by some new discoveries, while geometrical
of physical

subject to

axioms are immutable in themselves.

The reason

of the revisi-

bility of physical postulates lies in the

science.

Having

very object of physical

natural
a
of
observed
series
phenomena, the

his observaphysicist has to classify them in order to stabilize

tions and deduce from them the laws which are to constitute
science.

But the external world does not give our senses any

presentations of natural laws.

How

is

it

Like the ancient Sphynx, nature

the mind has to guess them.

away her secrets

How do
done ?

does not give

we proceed

successfully from

the
particular observations to those universal laws presenting

harmony

of the universe

based on analogies

form hypotheses
imagination, human mind can

The only way is

by an act

of

to

GEOMETRY AND REALITY.

193

suppose between the observed facts some possible relations

which are tried afterwards by means of experimentation. Thus
Kepler, led by metaphysical considerations, thought that the
must obey certain laws in their motion and only much
later was he able to verify that his observations coincided with
stars

the constructions of his imagination.

There

is

no

difficulty

about the truth of what we observe

and what we experience because of the simplicity of senseThe whole question of truth, in physics, lies then
perception.
the

modality of the hypotheses.

Although a
physical hypothesis is an act of imagination, and therefore
subject to the laws of thought, it is by no means a free creation

entirely

of

For

the
if

in

mind, a convention similar to geometrical axioms.

the latter have only to be coherent between themselves

in a definite system,
tation, the former

far

and are irrelevant

must

more complicated

sarily lead

to the

through which

it

to their actual interpre-

satisfy a further condition,

physical

explanation of

hypothesis
the

group

developed, and also of the

which

is

must neces-

of

phenomena
new phenomena

which observation

will bring in that group.

Nature cannot
fancies
the
of
our
to find out her
we
have
obey
imagination;

own laws and obey them

geometry deals with formal

relations between indefinable concepts without considering the
first.

If

content of these concepts, the physicist has especially to care

about that content itself. He is not at liberty to play with

mathematical symbols; for he has to struggle with a reality

which sets limits, wide enough however, to his imagination.

For instance, the compression

of gases is at first proporbut then, parting with its

mathematical expression, it becomes smaller and smaller. In the
same way, it is always possible to increase steadily the speed of a

tional

to the

train

but the stability of the railroad, the strength of the

exerted pressure;

materials in use, the structural elements of the engine, impose

an irrefragable limit upon the practicability of the calculations.

Then again, mathematics can build up a most wonderful

194

THOMAS GREENWOOD.

theory of hyperpolyhedra, but there is no matter to which the

conclusions of such systems can be applied.
It is a truism that
the science of the possible is infinite but it is the sanction of
reality which gives a material value to an hypothesis.
Let us illustrate with a general example the contrast between
;

geometry and physics. By means of the Euclidian geometry

and the Galilean system of co-ordinates, Newton, considering
space and time as two absolutes, had been able to give a mathematical expression to his immortal law of gravitation. Now
the evolution of science has led Professor Einstein to give a
different
law of the universal attraction, by means of

Minkowski's four-dimensional Universe and Eiemann's generalization of the Gaussian system of co-ordinates.
The difference
the

of

two laws may be expressed

analytically,

in

polar

co-ordinates for a particle of gravitational mass, m, as follows:

Any

moves

particle of light pulse

interval, ds, between two points

is stationary where

ds 2

-di*

considering that 7

Which

r 2 d0 2

rW + ydt* (Newton),

ydt (Einstein),

2m/r.

then by the factor multiplying the term

corresponds to the external world ? Three crucial

The two laws

dr2

so that the integral of the

of its path, in four dimensions*

differ

tests were predicted by Einstein to meet this question

(1) the
determination of the discrepancy of the perihelion of Mercury,
:

(2) the deflection of a ray of light passing near a great

mass

like the sun, (3) the displacement of the lines of the spectrum
The story of these
towards the red in a gravitational field.
with
certain
restrictions for the
historical tests is well known
;

third one, they all verify Einstein's law, which

considered as the true law

is

but a limiting case

Relativity.

of

of gravitation, while

Einstein's

General

is

then to be

Newton's law
Principle

of

GEOMETRY AND REALITY.

But

if

195

these laws are considered as logical consequences of

two

hypothetico-deductive systems starting with different

and their difference
postulates, both of them are formally true
but
a
of
is
the fundamental conceptions underlying
consequence
;

Newton's and Einstein's mechanics, which, however, in themselves are also true.

It is the content of experience, expressed

by these laws, which influences their material truth.

The contrast between the methods of geometry and physics
based on the distinction between formal and material truth,

shows easily how meaningless

geometry

the

is

question of the

true

of the universe.

From
cians

Lobatchefski to Einstein, a long series of mathematithought it possible to determine the geometry of the

universe.

For them the question

According

to the

laws of

what geometry do the natural bodies behave ? has a precise

meaning which could be worked out by experimental tests. In
other words, the question whether Euclidian, or Lobatchefskian,
or Biemannian geometry corresponds to the external wo rid, can be

answered experimentally, within the limits of errors of observaWe must only assume that light propagates in a
tion.

and

every measure of length, whether

geodesic or astronomical, is to be calculated by means of the
straight

line,

propagation of

that

light.

The experiment imagined by Lobatchefski and Bolyai, the

"
astral geometry," was
originators of what Schweikart calls

By measuring

very simple.
triangle, they
less

or

thought

the three interior angles of a large

whether that sum is equal,

to verify

greater than two

right

angles.

In the

first

case,

space would be Euclidian; in the second case, it would be

Lobatchefskian and in the third case, it would be Kiemanniau.
;

And, as Legendre proved it, the

must stand good for any other

verification

for

one triangle

Gauss had already

triangle.
while
Kant
a
similar
was endeavourexperiment
attempted
ing to show the psychological character of spatial intuition,
:

and deduce

its

physical meaning, Gauss had undertaken more

THOMAS GREENWOOD.

196

accurate geodesic measurements of triangulation in the Hartz

Valley.

But

all

these observations proved negative

space presented
Nevertheless there was an idea amongst

itself as Euclidian.

men

of

that

science,

more accurate observations and

the

development of the mechanical consequences of non-Euclidian

geometry with regard to astronomical problems, would certainly
favour the legitimacy of non-Euclidian postulates as physical
This was done by Einstein, when he built up
hypotheses.
theory of Kelativity by means of Riemann's geometrical
As a matter of fact, without the wonderful
conceptions.
his

development

of

non-Euclidian geometry, Einstein's

ment would have been

But are we

impossible.

with him, that the geometry of the universe

This affirmation

is

simply too bold

no real import.

And we must

logical considerations

portion of his

to

achieveconclude,

not Euclidian

is

and premature,

for it

has

confess that Einstein's cosmo-

on this topic are the

least convincing

work.

Euclidian geometry, says Einstein, must be abandoned,,

because in a system of reference rotating relatively to a system
at rest, the geometrical behaviour of the bodies, which are
Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction, does not
In simpler words, the path
of moving bodies in nature is never a Euclidian straight line,
because of the action of gravitational fields, which is always,
affected

hy

the

correspond to Euclidian geometry.

effective

The

the universe therefore,

fallacy of this

argument

is

not Euclidian.

is

easily seen,

that because the path of a

if

we point out

influenced by the
moving body
of
it
does
not
follow
at all that
gravitational fields,
presence

the Euclidian straight line path

is

is

not there.

As

a matter of

although not actually followed by the moving

Let us consider for a moment a photograph of the solar

fact, it is there,

body.

We

see plainly the magnificent curve,

May, 1919.
described by the rays of light of remote stars passing near the
sun but at the same time, we see that there is a Euclidian
eclipse of

GEOMETRY AND REALITY.

197

very stars and the point

where their rays of light touch the earth. It is not followed
by these rays of light, because, according to the Principle of

straight

between

line path

Least Action, the shortest

temporal continuum

is

And

these

way between two

points in a spatio-

influenced by the presence of gravitatrue

tional

fields.

which

causes the gravitational field in

this

is

so

far

that

this case,

further and further away, the path of these

the

if

sun,

were taken

same rays

of light

would have a decreasing curvature, thus tending asymptotically

towards a Euclidian straight line. That path would be adequately
if per impossibile the sun and
were removed from the universe.

Euclidian,
fields

all

other gravitational

Another argument familiar

to relativists is that the geometry

cannot be Euclidian, because Einstein's theory
based on Riemannian geometry, where space is curved and

of the universe
is

the straight line illimited but

looked

its

This argument, however,

proportion, means only that

finite.

adequate
more convenient than any other for the
In fact, there is a principle in the
description of the universe.

through
Riemaim's geometry

is

theory of groups of transformations, called the Principle of

Equivalence, which enabled Poincare, Klein and others to
transpose any

By means
an

of

appropriate

system of metrical geometry into any other.

a biunivocal correspondence, illustrated with
vocabulary,

Eiemannian concept,

between

for instance, is

two

shown

geometries,

any

to be equivalent to

a Euclidian

It follows then, that the group of

concept.
natural phenomena explained by the theory of Relativity can
be interpreted by means of Euclidian geometry as axiomatic
:

geometry alone
to

makes no

affirmations on the reality accessible

geometry completed with

possible, whatever be the nature of

experience, but only axiomatic

physical propositions,

it is

keep Euclidian geometry. Geometry [G] does not

enunciate anything on the behaviour of real objects, but

reality, to

geometry together with the sum [P] of physical laws it is the

sum [G -f- P] which can be checked by experience. It is then
;

198

THOMAS GKEENWOOD.

always possible to take [G] as Euclidian and make appropriate

assumptions with reference to some parts of [P] it is only
;

necessary

[G + P]

[P] such as the sum

in agreement with
In the case of
experience.

to take
is

the remainder

Eelativity, however,

it is

of

more convenient and

to describe the universe as Riernannian.

the condition of

we must draw
physical science,

Epistemology.*
the accidents
:

untouched by

the choice

the

the

of

attention

the

to

less complicated
Convenience is then

world's

word

geometry

and

"

"

description

in

which has the profoundest significance for

Because a description is always by means of
the

essence of

the

described

thing

is

left

this operation.

Now we
With

all

come to the ontological aspect of our argument.

the essential difference between the object and method

of geometry and of physics, there

between these two

must be a
Because,

disciplines.

close connexion

on the one hand,

physical sciences cannot reach their actual degree of certitude

without the help of mathematics, and on the other hand,

mathematics would be useless

if

it

considering also that its origin

is

empirical.

had no practical value,

In

fact,

when

the thinking person stops to reflect upon the fact that the
existence of Neptune was pointed out to the astronomer before
his telescope

when he

had noticed

this

wanderer in the remote heavens

learns that the mathematician by a theory related to

the solution of the problem of finding the roots of an algebraic

equation, is able to say that there are not more than thirty-two
distinct types of crystals when he remembers that the existence
of wireless telegraphy is due to deductions of Maxwell by means
;

of theorems that depend

upon imaginary quantities when, to

a
last
he
considers
that the abstruse non-Euclidian
instance,
give
geometry

of

Eiemann and the tortuous theory

of

absolute

"
* D.
Wrinch, On certain Methodological Aspects of the Theory of
and B. Russell, Introduction to MatheKelativity," in Mind, April, 1922
;

matical Philosophy.

GEOMETKY AND REALITY.

differential calculus of Ricci

work out

and Levi-Ci vita enabled Einstein

momentous law

his

199

of gravitation,

which

to

as says

is,

Sir J. J. Thomson, one of the highest achievements of

human

he will

undoubtedly endeavour to penetrate this

riddle
has perplexed all the great seekers
which
mysterious
the
of
unknown
How is it possible that geometry and mathethought

matics in general, which are constructions of the

in

independent,

their

structure

and

human mind,

development,

of

all

experience, adapt themselves so wonderfully to the objects of

reality

Is

Reason able

to discover

very properties of the existing universe

By denying

by

the

its sole activity,

the reality of matter for the benefit of extension,

Descartes was led to the conclusion that geometry and mathematics in general (because of his invention of analytical

geometry) are the science

of Reality, the science

penetrate the ultimate essence of

be completely

known when

its

object

which could

and Nature would

the edifice of mathematics would be

completed. And the modern style logicist, with all the restrictions he makes in the Cartesian doctrine, still holds that Reason
is

the ruler of things as well as the ruler of thought.

For him,

mathematics, mechanics, physics and every science which uses

mathematical expressions are a developed aspect of logic so
that there is no incompatibility between the laws of chemistry,
;

for instance,

calculat fit

and the laws of thought, as Leibniz

said,

Dum

Devx

mundus.

But on the other hand, we must remember that when

mathematician tries his creative power of imagination
on ideal constructions, he does not think of any practical
While to the physicist
utilization of the results he obtains.
the

mathematical systems are operators enabling him to act more

successfully on matter, to the mathematician the construction
of

an abstract theory

applications.

As

is

an end in

itself

independently of

its

Professor Bouasse says, the creator of new

his inventions

mathematical forms does not care whether

correspond to some

reality.

The forms

in themselves interest

200

THOMAS GREENWOOD.

him more than anything

reckoner

whether

else,

mathematical

of

in a near or

for

forms.

remote future, physical phenomena will

The

consent to lodge in those structures.

advance sets

moulds which

of

they enlarge the readyIt is another question

algebraist prepares in

will be utilized

by the physicist
But he does not think of that

to his convenience.

according
convenience when he makes them

although history shows us

times
the
solution
of
a
many
physical problem has led
to
invent
new
mathematical
forms, as for example,
physicists
;

that

when

Maxwell

the ideas of Faraday led

to the mathematical

exposition of the electromagnetic theory.

The

of

independence

shown by the

mathematicians

fact that a great

number

reality.

of

We

reality

is

mathematical and

do not tind

specially of geometrical constructions

cannot have a corresponding

towards

or

rather

have mentioned the

which has no application in nature.

is impossible to give an adequate geomea flower.
Nature is far more complicated

theory of hyperpolyhedra

In the same way

it

trical description of

than geometry and mathematics so that if we are to describe the

external world, mathematics must be supplemented with qualita;

It is certain

tive principles.

co-extensive with reality

by

its imprevisibility

by them by

all

then that mathematics are not at

On

the one hand, reality outruns

and on the other hand,

it is

all

them

overstepped

the distance between existence and possibility.

always possible to reconcile the real with

that overwhelming creation of virtual relations.
For Reason,
however disinterested one may think it, has a utilitarian

However,

it

With

is

same

deduces a proposition from other propositions, and relations between natural

function.

phenomena.

If

the

activity, reason

quantitative relations,

which are the object

mathematics, agree with the laws of nature as well as

with the laws of thought, it is because of the conformity of the

of

order in nature and the order in thought.

our environment, to the world in which we
as to

make

We

are adapted to

live, in

such a

way

possible not only our material living, but also our

GEOMETRY AND REALITY.

intellectual development.
intellect could attain their

201

Neither our sensible organs, nor our

normal development if there were

an incompatibility between human mind and the external

world, if our previsions, based on undeniable observations, led
us to untrue conclusions with regard to similar observations.
If science is power, it is because our reason, in its attempt to

comprehend nature, gives us thereby the necessary means to act

on it.
We are therefore convinced that the universe has
its

laws and that we are able to penetrate them

we

are

convinced that the external world cannot change its laws, in the
same way as we cannot change the laws of thought we feel, so
;

with

to speak, that Keality binds us

it,

in an insuperable circle.

In this stage of reflection, the thinker has to face a

aspect of the problem,

the alliance

which

by
between mathematics and physics

does science explain things as they are

reality

identical

The great

physicist,

science can explain everything.

last

most alarming.

far the

is

is

Are

If

undeniable,
science

and

Duhem, denied

that

For him, a physical theory

is

but an attempt towards a symbolic representation of Keality,

and not an explanatory inquiry about the real. " A physical
theory," he states,
classifies

"

is

an abstract system which sums up and

logically a group of experimental laws, without pre-

tending to explain them."*

An

eminent mathematician and

philosopher, Professor Le Eoy, goes further, when he says that

not only physical theories are symbolic and conventional, but

that

scientific

facts

themselves

are

mere creations

of

our

For him, science is made up of conventions, whence

apparent truth. But scientific facts, and a fortiori scientific

mind.
its

laws, are artificial creations of the scientist himself.

therefore, cannot teach us anything about reality

it

Science,

can only

be used as a rule of action.

We

could hardly expect any other from a distinguished

Yet at the same time we maintain that it

follower of Bergson.
*

Duhem,

La. TMorie Physique:

Sa

Structure.

THOMAS GKEENWOOP.

202

is impossible for science to be anti-intellectualistic

science must
be intellectualistic, or it will not be at all. We take science as
:

means

a logical classification of facts, as a

of putting together

certain observations which are apparently separated, although

they are really linked by some hidden but natural necessity.

But a logical classification is an explanation by the natural
causes

because

its

object

not to reveal to us any order in

is

nature, save the order existing in things, the intimate relations

between objects of

reality

possible the plan of nature itself.

if

It is not the privilege of reason to create physical laws,

only to utilize

them when

We

discovered.

but

cannot pretend

however, that science gives us the comprehension of the true

If we get every day nearer and nearer to
essence of things.
the knowledge of reality,
that

we

are

still,

we must

same time,
the ultimate mechanism of
confess at the

with respect to
of an engineer towards a machine of

things, in the position

which a few organs only are

The reason

inaccessible to him.
it

is

visible, the

the materiality of

of

remainder being

our ignorance

human means

of

is

still

simple:

perception, which

hinders our comprehension of the ultimate nature of things.

Besides, whatever has relations to things distinct from itself,
could not be what it is, if those different things did not exist

and therefore we cannot know a thing

all its

as

it is,

unless

we know

relations to all the other things in the universe.

We

cannot hope then to penetrate adequately the essence of

things, although we must be convinced, with the great
mineralogist Lappnrent, that science progresses by successive
approximations towards an adequate explanation of the
relations

between sensible things.

be considered

as

asymptotic,

character of scientific theories.

therefore, congruent

nature of things

Scientific

certitude

may

because of the

hypothetical
Science and reality are not,

the evolution of our knowledge and the

are in the relation of a science-curve to its

reality -asymptote.

But

at the

same time, we must acknowledge that every day

(;KOMKTRY AND REALITY.

we make

new conquest over

203

the unknown, which remains for

us a definite acquisition. Although scientific theories cannot be

looked upon as an adequate knowledge of Nature, because
Eeality

is

necessarily refracted by the mental factors of our

general constructions, yet our knowledge of particular facts and

even of limited groups of facts related between themselves, can

be materially true, independently of the scientific theories with

which they may agree. If then, the evolution of the various
physical theories from the early Greek philosophers up to the present day seems to prove a constant failure of theoretical science,

we must realize that, amongst what are considered to be ruins in

an old physical theory, there remains a certain invariant which
makes the very value

subject to gravitation

is

new theories. Light, for instance,

Newton knew it and gave the figures

of the
;

for the deflection of rays of light grazing the sun.

means

of a

new

Einstein,

theory, corrects Newton's formula, as

But whatever be the exact amount

of that deflection,

by

we know.
whatever

be the primitive assumptions of the theories predicting that

deflection, the fact is there

the deflection of the rays of light

grazing the sun is an invariant which subsists whatever be the

fortune of the physical systems which try to account for it.
So,

by calling a

fact

"

or

"desoxydation"

we do not change the fact as such

altered.
The same again, we may call
Euclidian circumference

"

or a

"

its

"phlogisti cation"
is

expression only

a geometrical entity a

Eiemannian straight

line

"

in

In other
the antipodal system, without altering its very nature.
when
its
a
does
not
of
the
essence
words,
thing
change
meaning
is

expressed in English, in French or in German.

do not go, however, as far as to say that science

We

well-made language, as

Locke contends

is

for us, science is not

only a nominalistic system of coherent relations between

indefinables, but the expression of true relations between real
"
"
Sensible things, for which the word object has been
objects.
invented, are really objects and not fugitive and unseizable
appearances. When we ask then what is the value of science,

GEOMETRY AND REALITY.

204

we do

not

mean does

science enable us to

essence of things, but does

relations of

And

things

it

prove the stability of

its

comprehend the very

enable us to understand the true

science has lived long

particular constructions.

enough

to

As Poincar^

says, through the evolution of scientific systems, there

is

some-

thing which is always there, always present, definitely acquired,

and that something is the essential.
It could not be otherwise. For changes do not happen in the
laws of nature or in natural facts, but in the way in which we

and

conceive

express

them.

is

Eeality

immutable;

our

interpretations of it are, however, conditioned

and the adequacy

of

One may argue here

to make mistakes in

the data on which

that,

if

the world

the expression of

is

its

we

by the necessity
base our solutions.

rational,

laws.

we ought not
if we know

But

thoroughly the laws of our mind, we are not quite sure about the
laws of nature. The materiality of our being is an obstacle to
our immediate knowledge of things as they are. We have to

about appearances, and, naturally, commit errors.

convictions, even reasoned, are not a sufficient guarantee

reason

Our

first

of truth.

We

conclude, then,

independently
is

by saying, that science has a value

The reality of the external world

of our reason.

certainly independent of the eyes which see

which touch

it,

of thought itself.

and by empirical experience

prior to experience.
of science

is reality.

annihilated, science
its

content would

performance

Eeality

exists

it,

of the

hands

not created in

ready-made outside and

In that sense, we can say that the content

So that if, per impossibile, mankind were

would undoubtedly disappear as such. But

nature would continue its
be there

still

according to the

would be missing.

it

is

same laws

the spectators only

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower

on July 3rd, 1922, at 8 P.M.

Street,

W.G.

1,

BENEDETTO CKOCE'S "HISTORIOGRAPHY."

XII.

By DOUGLAS

AINSLIE.

1.

IN

Benedetto

"

Philosophy of the Spirit," as it

appears to me, the West looks the East full in the face and
then deliberately turns its back.
Life is Reality lived as
has been lived in Europe during historical
The mystical Reality of the Vedanta and other Indian
it

traditionally

time.

Croce's

systems is the illusion. This point of view finds expression in

the work on the nature of History and of History writing now
before us, where it is maintained that History is equal to

Philosophy and identical with

with the particular.

What
is

that

is

of

it,

as the universal

identical

is

the chief problem of modern philosophy ? Surely it

solving the dualism between nature and spirit,

between the known and the unknown, between subjective and

But the dualism seems often to persist.
objective reality.

With Bergson,
side

by

side

respect he

any

for instance, the vital

with

life

appears to

impulse

is left

standing

and leads to a dualism, and in this

step backward behind Hegel, who at

rate sought the constant surpassing of the fact

by the act

in the logical synthesis of his categories.

Croce and Gentile

Croce has said that

for to his long discussions

we owe

with Gentile

the original conception of the

and History, afterwards worked out and

much developed in the present volume regard the concretions
of reality as being all comprised in the act of the spirit, which

identity of Philosophy

knows nothing but

history,

which

is

itself,

includes

within

itself

its

whole

divine history, realizing in the expression of

DOUGLAS AINSLIE.

206
itself

every

every thought,

fact,

doing and

all

all

thinking, for

they are one.

developed in the three hundred and odd

pages of the Historiography. But here in the actual writing of
his book, Croce shows how widely he differs from Gentile and
This notion

is

him and headed by

the school of Absolutists proceeding from

De

Croce says somewhere that he

Kuggiero.

methodologist, and it
his sense for what

is

is

essentially a

largely in Croce's sureness of vision, in

in

its

the world as

that

logically,

is

place morally, aesthetically or

a living whole will find its

For Croce the Spirit consists of certain eternal

categories, of which History is one of these and is identical
with philosophy " Spirit which is the world is the Spirit which

advantage.

and

develops,

therefore both one and diverse, an eternal

is

and an eternal problem philosophy is

sciousness, which is its history, or history which

solution

each

sophy,

sciousness

substantially

is

with

identical

the

its

is

is

con-

to say,

and thought."

as life

it,

philo-

other

identical with self-consciousness, that

both distinct from and one with

self -con-

its

He

goes on to say that we are able to recognize ourselves in the

thoughts of other men, which are also our thoughts.

What

is the difference between contemporary and past

Croce replies to this with one of his celebrated

history.

paradoxes involving the discovery of a truth by declaring

simply that all history is contemporary history. He does not
arrive at this position without a good deal of hatchet

myth and
chronicle, which

the brushwood of

ment

of

History

history.

is

is

dead until

defined

as

historian's

mind.

This distinction

taught

at

chronicle

college
first

is

The opposite

to say, truly real.

is

the

case:

in

treat-

temporarily dead

lived again in thought,

is

it

and every history becomes chronicle until

is

work

allegory, and an exhaustive

it

is

revived in the

a formal distinction, that

of

what most

of us

were

comes

first,

then

history

the living being, then the corpse, which can

be breathed upon by the Spirit and again

filled

with the

BENEDETTO CKOCE'S
breath of
of

with the

life

since

philosophy,

life

"

HISTORIOGRAPHY."

of history

philosophy

which

conditions

is

207

also the life

the

history

of

For although philosophy always appears as the

antecedent
of the history of philosophy, it must also
necessary

philosophy.

always be understood as knowledge of the history of philosophy,

since, as Gentile says, it

He

philosophy.

must prepare and condition actual

also meets the objection that

we

are here in

the presence of a vicious circle, with the remark that closer

shows that

reflection

this circle is not vicious,

following Zabarella (of the

like
is

it,

From

solid.

clear that

XVth

but as Rosin in i,

century), declared of others

this identity of philosophy

we cannot

and

history, it

distinguish between a historical and a

systematic treatment of philosophy.

I remarked a little way back that Gentile had been the

views as to the identity of History and

Philosophy expounded in this volume. But although this is
perfectly true in general, yet Croce maintains that philosophy
of

instigator

is

the

the methodology of history, since

which constitute

for the categories

it

furnishes the explanation

and

historical judgments,

is

always in proportion to the philosophical capacity of the

historian.
It is to be understood that what is fundamental
historically is not

suggests

that

Croce

transcendentalism,

no

subject to chronological process.

for

does

not

himself

altogether

Gentile
escape

although he maintains that there

is

general philosophical problem, yet he

himself cannot avoid distinguishing a secondary and episodic

fundamental

or

part from a principal and fundamental part (as in Nuovi Saggi,

Croce would certainly reply to this that such a
p. 104).
distinction

didactic

as

value.

he

there

makes has merely an episodic or

that the unity which fornis

Gentile insists

the basis of philosophy and of history is philosophy and nut

historiography, the universal and not the particular, in which
the

intellectual

activity

would be convertible,
sophy.

manifests

itself.

for Gentile there is

For

Croce

they

primacy of philo-

Gentile talks of the real unity underlying the apparent

208

DOUGLAS A1NSLIE

distinctions

the

in

of

the

concept of art as
holds that Croce's concept of art is
developing as he criticizes the various distinctions, and that
described by Croce.

development

He

development is the only problem of aesthetic, analogous to

the only problem of philosophy in general.

this

II.

A great

part of the Historiography

is,

as I have said, hatchet

work among the brushwood.

Thus of the philologists he
remarks epigrammatically that they ingenuously believe themselves to have locked up History in their archives, like
Scheherazade of the Arabian Nights Entertainment, and that
they are really writing history when they pour the contents of
one book into another. With the intention of defending their
fortress, they have created an atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty in their conclusions, which they ingenuously believe to
be for that reason peculiarly wise and satisfying. But this fear
of pushing criticism as far as it will go in the search for truth
intelligence disguised as moderation which
the edges from the antitheses which it fails to solve."
Thought should always and everywhere be audacious it should

is

"

really lack of

chips off

never fear

itself.

remedied by
grading subjects according to the criterion of values ? Croce
says, No, since history is always a history of values, and thus
Is

this

of thought,

agnosticism of

philological

history

independent of and indifferent to feeling, which is

But the personal element in

essential in the sphere of poetry.

this
so,

shape of feeling must be banished from true history.

however, that imagination which

historical synthesis, the imagination

is

of

Not

inseparable from the

thought active with

In the search

itself in determining a given concrete situation.

for

historical

truth all

those

feelings

that

may have been

upsurging in our breasts but a short time before,

must vanish

before the light of truth attained by the historical judgment.

Is there anything to be said in favour of writers such as

BENEDETTO CROCE'S "HISTORIOGRAPHY."

Buckle and the

who wish

to

make

history

what they

and measures, or as they term

observation and experiment ? No, for they would reduce

call scientific, a
it,

Positivists,

209

of

thing of weights

history to its pale derivative, natural science.

History being

eternally contemporary, will yet eternally fail to satisfy us,

because, as

we

construct

it,

new

facts,

by our very treatment, asking a new

With

new

situation, is elicited

solution.

this refutation of the possibility of natural scientific

coupled the refutation of philological and

None of these forms can be destroyed,
history.
because they are errors, and therefore not facts. They are nega-

may

history

be

poetical

tive

moments

of

the spirit in

its

dialectic.

Error

is

not an

but an Ariel breathing everywhere and inciting to its own

death, from which comes forth another error perhaps, yet even
evil,

more beautiful and stimulating than the one that has given it
and has by it been slain.
The best example of this
eternal formation of truth from error is our own personal
birth

history

when

dealing with historical material.

We

feel

our

sympathies and antipathies aroused by the narrative and by

the behaviour of the different personages that cross and recross
the scene

this is the poetical

moment, which may be followed

by a rhetorical moment reflecting our own practical tendencies

then may ensue a philological moment, if we are inclined to

dwell upon the accuracy or the reverse of narrative. All these

forms are in time superseded, and having done this, we reach " a

new and mere profound

An

historical truth."

excellent example of the fruitfulness of hypercrititism

is

the application of it to the notion of a Universal History.

Such a history would eventually lead to the madhouse, for were

we

to

imagine

all possible historical

questions answered, others

from these and we should enter upon a

"
of
progress to the infinite, which is as wide
vertiginous path
as the road to hell, and if it does not lead there, certainly does
infinite

would

arise

lead to the madhouse."

So we come back to the concrete, to

that concentration upon one vital point which offers a definite

B 2

DOUGLAS AINSLIE.

210

problem for solution and

contemporary history, whether it

occurred to-day, last year, or prior to the birth of Buddha.
As regards the philosophical universal in its distinction from
is

the above use of the term in ordinary parlance, history must

be regarded as thought, thought of the universal in its concrete-:

always determined in a particular manner. The

notions of subject and predicate which appear in the historical
ness,

which

is

judgment must give way

to the notion of thought, in which

the true subject of history becomes the predicate and the true
predicate the subject," the universal is determined in the
"

judgment by individualization.

Thus

is

destroyed the false

dualism of truths of reason (philosophy) and of fact (history),

contained in the distinction between knowing and understandsupposed to occupy separate compartments of the mind, as
though one should be able to know without understanding, or

ing,

Thus

inversely.

and with

is

abolished the notion of universal history,

that of universal philosophy, in the sense of a closed

it

system.
TTT
j.ij..

Deterministic history

is

at first sight opposed

to, the

so-called

philosophy of history, but they are found inevitably to call forth

one another, because the determinist must stop somewhere in
his search

for
is

causes in order to

transcendental, whether

make
it be,

This

beginning.

found in the inter-

beginning
play of atoms or in the Unconscious or elsewhere. Call them
what we will, they are conceived as external to the spirit,

which

what

is

helpless before these apparently opaque entities.

are these entities called facts

displeasure of the philosophers from Aristotle to

answer

is

that as facts they do not exist at

which makes the external

But

which have incurred the

all.

Kant

The

It is the spirit

facts in its search for causes, thus

employing a procedure not different from that of natural science

which analyses and classifies reality abstractly.

Let us look these brute facts in the face and what do we
see?

We

see

"the light of thought resplendent upon their

BENEDETTO CROCE'S "HISTORIOGRAPHY."

"

foreheads

this is the true point of departure

point of arrival,

for

construction but in

which

211
is

also the

brute facts are history not only in

its self-construction.

its

corollary to
that from the days of the Greeks (to use a conventional phrase)

We

history has ever been growing richer.

civilization as little as did the Greeks, but

civilization better

than they knew

tli

know
we know

we know, for

it

an eternal form of the human

the causes of
the theory of
instance, that

and

this they did

poetry
spirit,
not know or only understood obscurely. And so on through
various phases of transcendentalism and false immanence until
is

we come

to the philosophy of history fashionable to-day, that of

progress and civilization, which by

some

is

believed to depend

upon the discoveries of natural science.

But the philosophy of history always

carries

with

it

transcendental element, something external to it, and it is not

whatever substance it may be composed, is
that
destroyed,
philosophy of history dies, to be immediately
until this veil, of

born again

as,

This leads to the consideration

simply, history.

What are these ?

problem
For Croce they cannot be taken separately but if combined
yield circularity, which is perpetually identical and perpetually
of the

of progress

diverse,

and decadence.

and thus constitute the notion

too, there

is

no attainment

of a positive

of development.

time or only as
is conceived

to itself conceived as attainable

either

infinitely to be approximated, but

where the end

in

as internal, that is to say, as development,

is

attained and a

new

Thus,

end in history external

we must hold

that

prospect not yet attained at every instant.

Finally, progress from evil to good or decadence from good

evil must be taken as really the passage from good to better,

which

it

to
in

"

the good itself seen in the light of the better/'

omit for reasons of space the illustrative proofs of this given
by Croce in which, for instance, he shows how the middle ages
evil is

really represent

an advance upon antiquity, although at the

was believed.

period of the Renaissance the opposite

Should history take sides

Yes,

it

should take loth sides

212

DOUGLAS

AINSLIE.

and give by thought a judgment upon

Where

lived.

life

that has once been

patriotism or other practical elements appear

we

cannot have altogether unbiassed history, and it is probable that

history contains some element of the practical.
History

all

cannot be said even to have begun until all feelings of partisanship have been superseded and at least an attempt is made to
see that the particular epoch or event in question actually did
contribute to the period during which

and

all

it

events are productive of something, and

progress in respect of their predecessors

difficult, for instance, to

All epochs

appeared.

though

all

it is

represent

admittedly

discern the progress of say the Ninth

Century A.D. as compared with the Fourth Century B.C.

It is

perfectly true that every particular person, institution, work,

and thought

is

destined to perish and that the truth which

represented will also perish,

though many

people are apt

it

to

attach themselves so strongly to what interests them that they

"attribute the immortality which belongs to the spirit in
universal to one of

its

tout lasse, is true in

one sense

the universal

who

in the

beginning

Tout passe, tout

the empirical

of

Alcmason

it lives

of Crete is

casse,

false in the other

for history does not die like

words

re\ei Trpoad^jrai,

particular forms."

the individual

unable

rrjv

ap^v

TO>

eternally because "it always joins the

to the end."

IV.

Are there

certain facts

must be banished from

believed

historian.

its

of history

and others which

content, as Hegel

and others have

worthy

No, each and every fact may be of value to the

There is no logical criterion of choice, " for the

by knowledge of the
actual situation."
History must not be here confounded with
erudition and the methods of the one transferred to the other.
criterion is the choice itself conditioned

There

is

no fear

of

being overwhelmed with details because the

problem of every historian is prepared for him on every occasion

"
by life and is always solved by thought which passes from the
confusion of

life

to

the distinctness of consciousness

"

in a

BENEDETTO CROCKS "HISTORIOGRAPHY."

manner

213

similar to the appearance of art emerging from the

obscurity of mere feeling to the clarity of representation.

The conception of History as that which has its end ;ml

explanation not outside but within itself, which is not external

to philosophy but coincides with philosophy, amounts to an
identification of History with thought itself which is always

Thus

both philosophy and history.

like

an invalid set free from

the props and plasters of the doctors history rises

time in the course of history

to its

own

templates philosophy face lo face as equal

full

for the

iii-st

height and con-

and identical with

it.

But the objection may here be made You have truly freed
history from its trammels, but what is now left for us, since the
:

individual

shown

is

absorption in

mysticism

to be equivalent to the universal, other th.m

The answer

mysticism ?
by nature negative,

is

distinctions,

God

it is

to this

is

that

the negation of empirical

which certainly leave thought

free of illusions but

not yet full of itself. Mysticism is a violent reaction from

naturalism and transcendentalism but retains traces of what it

has negated.
really efficacious negation of the above thesis
is brought about not by mysticism but by idealism in the unity

which
the

is

distinction.

spirit

between
will,

as

The

act of thought

self-consciousness

"

object

and

subject,

and

is

the consciousness of

this implies

theory and

practice,

distinction

thought and

universal and particular, imagination and intellect, utility

To think is to judge, and the two terms of which

and morality."

such thought consists are not two discreet realities but are the
one reality of dialectical unity. Thus when the will-o'-the-wisps

empiricism have been extinguished, darkness does not

supervene, because the light of the distinction is to be found in

of

history itself,
its

which

is

the intrinsic knowledge of facts.

Here

unity with philosophy becomes yet more evident, because

"the better philosophy penetrates its own distinctions, the

better it penetrates the particular, and the closer its embrace of
the particular,
conceptions."

the closer

its

possession

of

its

own proper

214

BENEDETTO CROCE'S
Since there
to

opposed

is

"

HISTORIOGRAPHY."

DO such thing as general or universal history

special

histories,

the distrust of so-called pure

is explained, for
that these individuals, owing to their one-sidedness,

philosophers, pure politicians, pure economists,

it

is felt

understand even their own speciality, which they have

reduced to the form of a skeleton by abstracting from it the
flesh and blood of life.
Hence the demand that historians shall
fail

to

acquire

universal

perforce they will

universal.

minds, and that their histories, although

omit very much, shall be also in a way

Read

at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society, the British

Psychological Society,

and

Mind

the

Association at Hi'///'

Hall, Manchester, July Wth, 1922.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE

XIII.

PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY.
By
THE most

A. N. WHITEIIEAD.

obvious contribution of

the

scientific

Relativity to the problems of philosophy

is

doctrine

of

to strengthen the

type of argument on which

Berkeley relied. Accordingly,

those systems of philosophy which rely on this type of argument
thereby receive additional support. I will endeavour to explain

meaning, but I am painfully conscious that it would have

been better to have had the grounds of this evening's discussion laid out by an adequately trained philosopher.

my

presume that the fundamental position of idealism is that

reality can be construed as an expression of mentality.

I
all

For example,
for

him mind

suppose that Mr. Alexander is a realist because

is one among other items occurring in that

evolution of complexes which

On

is

the very being of space-time.

the other hand, Mr. Wildon Carr

is

an

finds ultimate reality in the self-expression of

The

test,

reality

therefore,

apart from

of

idealism

is

the

idealist because

he

monadic mentality.

refusal

explicit reference to some or

conceive

to
all

of the

may be either thought,

or experience, or knowledge, or the expression of valuation in
the form of a historical process, the valuation being both the
characteristic processes of mentality, it

cause of the process. Now Berkeley's

argument in favour of this central position of idealism is that
efficient

and the

final

when you examine

the objects of sense-perception they are

He enforces by a variety
of illustrations the doctrine that there is nothing left when you

essentially personal to the observer.

have torn the observer out of the observation.

The

planet,
s

216

A. N.

which

WHITEHEAD.

no bigger than a sixpence, is the observer's planet,

and he walks off with his own property.
is

It stands to reason that

modern

relativity strengthens this

argument, since previously there were

two elements

in our

experience which the argument did not touch, I mean Space

and Time. Berkeley's argument rests on the basis that appearances in space and through time are personal to the observer.

But space and time were left as common facts. But now it
has been shown that space and time cannot be excluded from
Accordingly you can no

the scope of Berkeley's argument.

longer meet the argument by showing that there are exceptions

Hence so far as idealism is concerned with the facts
to it.

and

of nature

it

must be concerned with them

its

charac-

argument has been strengthened by the recent

type
The realist is now left hugging the multibombshell.
scientific
of

teristic

plication table as the

immediate expression
no good to a realist.

and out

of space

of

common

fact untouched by each

But the multiplication table is
shuts him up with Plato's ideas, out

sole

of mind.
It

time, which

is

just where he does not

Poor man, like Wordsworth and the rest

he wants to hear the throstle sing.

want

to be

We

seem

of us,

to be left then with the idealist position that

nothing else than a common expression for diverse

I do not believe that this is the sole
processes of mentality.
been
I
have
choice;
trying to sketch in a few sentences

nature

is

the line of thought according to which Eelativity strengthens

the argument for idealism. But, before proceeding, the immediate moral that I

want

to

draw

is

that Berkeley

must be

The presupposition of the

stopped at the very beginning.
whole line of argument must be challenged. Later on there is
no resting

place.

Let us now begin again and scan carefully the main point
of Berkeley's

He

argument.

attacks the presumption that we observe subjects as

by attributes, subject and attribute being independent

qualified

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY.

He

of ourselves.

which

it

is

establishes this

the scope of this argument

to

include

which we ought

form

the

as

so

science,

exact conclusion
that

and

widened by the modern doctrine of relativity

is

physical

is

ridiculously easily

easily

point so far as it goes,

217

of

thought of

to

in

The

time and space.

draw and must draw

a two-termed

of

relation

predicate to subject imposed by the Aristotelian logic

is

not

adequate to express the immediate deliverance of observaA wider relativity is necessary in the sense that the
tion.
fact of nature observed

the crimson cloud, to take another of

Berkeley's examples cannot be expressed in terms of the two

"
"
and " cloud." In other words, the procrimson
factors
"

position

form

the cloud

of expression

factors

are

crimson

and

is difficult for

is

"
is

in reality a highly elliptical

meaningless unless the suppressed

In practice these suppressed factors

supplied.

always are supplied

exposing the

is

in truth they are so obvious to us that

us to believe that language has shirked

its

it

job of

fact.

Furthermore, everyone would agree that in some sense the

suppressed factor includes the observer. Berkeley's argument
is that it stands in the essential nature of the case that
Accordingly, in
be
there
can
observed
the realm of things
nothing common to
diverse observers.
Accordingly, there is no common realm of
different observers perceive different things.

things observed, whose interrelations can be expressed apart

from reference to observers. Accordingly, the only common

ground for observers is the common stock of abstract ideas

which they individually apply to their diverse experiences.
Furthermore, these diverse experiences now lose all claim
to any objectivity other than that of being phases in the
process of the self-development of the observer.

Now

I see

concept of an

no escape from
"

observer

"

this

argument provided that the

not ambiguous.

Unfortunately, it
very ambiguous. Berkeley tacitly presupposing the Aristohas thereby presupposed that in the fact
telian logical forms
is

is

s 2

218

A. N.

WHITEHEAD.

observed there can only be the two-termed relation of predicate

"
crimson to cloud." Accordingly, for
to subject, for example,

him

must be something under-

the additional factor introduced

lying and in a sense creating the realm of the observed.

This

accordingly (for Berkeley) the mentality of

the observer which is expressing itself in these observations.

additional factor

is

In other words, for Berkeley the observer is mind, and therefore

Berkeley is an idealist. But when a realist admits that as
above the suppressed factor includes the observer, he is (or
"
observer" in a quite different
should be) using the term
sense.
He is thinking of the observer's body. I do not think
that
"

for

observer

the
"

because, after

all,

realist

position
it

the

term

to start with,

put
Berkeley started the whole train of thought,
in,

the initial phraseology

development of the argument.

the idealists are entitled to

so that

which

the

of

exposition

at all well-chosen.

is

line

their

suits

of

But whereas Berkeley puts in an additional factor, namely,

mind, which underlies the whole realm observed, the additional
factor

added by the

realm observed.
observer,

and

realists consists of other items within the

Among

this is

these other items

why

is

the body of the

a realist carelessly, and in a loose

unsatisfactory sense of the term,

may

assent to the statement

that the additional factor includes the observer.

But note that now the

"

proposition,

the cloud

is

has admitted that the simple

crimson," is a meaningless statement

realist

about nature unless other items of nature are implicitly included

In other words, a fact of nature cannot be
in the proposition.
.

expressed in the simple two-termed relation of predication

which is the standard form of the Aristotelian logic. In
allowing that it is essential to add other items of nature
to crimson and the cloud in order to express the immediately

apparent

fact,

he has admitted that .the essential facts

of

apparent nature involve irreducible relations of more than two

terms.
Owing to the influence of training and custom,- as

embodied in the phraseology

of

philosophical

literature,

it

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY.

habitual to us

219

presuppose that all relations even

they are not that of predication are two- termed, and

is

to

if

to

acquiesce in arguments which tacitly make this presupposition.

Accordingly, it is the more necessary for me to emphasize
this point, since I consider that, apart

irreducible
full force of

this admission of

no escape from

is

tin;

Berkeley's argument.

you ask how many other items

If

from

many- termed relations, there

of nature enter into the

we must answer that

it.
At first sight, this

relation of crimson to cloud, I think that

every other item of nature enters into

would appear

human

to

make knowledge
But we can

beings.

impossible for poor finite

classify grades of relata in this

term that of crimson to cloud. The

multiple relation which
lowest grade sweeps all nature into itself. It is the grade of
relata whereby all nature expresses its patience for this
I

relationship of crimson to cloud.

crimson lone and by

time,

and the same

There

is

no such thing as

apart from nature as involving spacetrue of cloud.

The crimson cloud is

itself
is

essentially connected with every other item of nature

by the
and the proposition, " the cloud is
has no meaning apart from this spatio-temporality.

spatio-temporality of nature,
"

crimson

In this way

nature

all

is

swept into the net of the relation-

ship.

You may put

it this

way, nature as a system

between the items

cannot know that nature

is

of a system.
Accordingly, you
a system unless you know what

these systematic relations are.

systematic

relations

enumeration of

all

by any

presupposed

But a system means systematic

in the crimsonness of the cloud.

relations

is

Now we

cannot

observational

the items of nature.

know

these

method involving

It follows that

our

knowledge must disclose a uniform type of relationship

which reigns throughout the system. For if we do not know
and there is simply nothing to talk
that, we know nothing
partial

about.

there

is

For example, we should have no reason to believe that

an interior to the earth, or any lapse of time apply-

220

A. N.

ing to

We

it.

WH1TEHEAD.

ask whether this interior

condensed matter or

is

empty, and whether

is

this

we know

or .cold, solid or gaseous, because

occupied with
matter be hot

that the uniform

systematic spatio-temporal relations must supply entities which

have the status of forming the interior of the earth.
I call this principle by which a systematic nature is known

is

of

Accordingly, in contrast to

grade.
its

for example, the crimson-ness of

items in the relationship "crimson to

entirely lacks the uniformity which attaches to the first

Another grade
cloud

signifi-

disclosed to us as expressing the patience of nature for

every item of our experience

the cloud.
"

This uniform

uniform significance of events.

to us, the

cance

"

contingency."

The

"

uniformity," I will speak of

principle of the contingence of appear-

ance means that a set of items of nature are presupposed in the

relationship crimson to cloud, whose status in the relationship
detailed

requires

examination

each particular instance;

make a shrewd guess at

in

though the laws of nature enable us to

But there

the types of status which are possible.

in

this

almost

contingent grade which

a whole grade

deserves

observer's

body.

It is

is

so

pre-eminent

to

an empirical

seems to enter into the character

is

itself.

fact,

of

which

one item
that

mean
in

it

the

no way

knowledge as

such,

that our knowledge of nature consists of knowledge of those

relationships for which our bodies are important members of

The cloud is crimson, as perthe contingent grade of items.

ceived by a person B, because B is aware of a certain multiple
relationship involving processes within his body and other items

We

may put it in this way, that B is aware of

nature from the standpoint of his body. Thus the relativity to
an observer is dominated by the physical state of the observer's
of nature.

body.

It

is

therefore relativity to his body.

Apart from the empirical fact that it so happens, I cannot

convince myself that the character of awareness of nature
In
necessarily involves this reference to the observer's body.

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY.

the

221

first place, it is

quite easy to imagine an infinite observer,

whom

in this connexion I call infinite as

being

such as God,

impartially aware of all relationships of items within nature.

Each one of us is a finite observer because we are only aware
of that selection

among

But

by our body.

the relationships which are dominated

I cannot see that idealism

would gain even

can imagine that
the perceptions of the sociable archangel, as he chatted with
Adam and Eve in the garden, were not from the standpoint of

if

this reference to the

We

body were absent.

had no body, but that his selection of

relationships observed was made on some other principle.
his body, because he

What

is

an argument for realism [under this

that the relationships observed should

as

essential

of relativity]

is

heading
form a closed system, whose characters refer to each other.
There is a process of nature which is obstinately indifferent to
mind.

This

is

why

I feel difficulty in assigning to mind, or

knowledge, or consciousness any essential role in the flux of fact

mean, beyond the roles played by other abstractions

flux, such as chairs and tables.

essential, I

from that
I

cannot persuade myself that relativity in any way weakens

It simply shows that
indifference of nature.

this obstinate

there are

more various

relationships within nature than

we had

no new discovery, for every advance of science

adds to the complexity of nature. If Einstein had established the affirmative answer to Pope's question, "Shall
gravitation cease as you go by," he would have done something
anticipated

to

advance the claims of idealism.

to

make

more

But

all

he has done

us

to

with those of the inhabitants

of

Mars, entirely owing

difficult

circumstances over which

we have no

compare
control

is

our watches

for

it

and

also

to

he

has produced a law of gravitation more complicated than that

of Newton
but, again, this law depends on circumstances over

which we have no
to

bend space

in the ether.

control.

now than

it

was

I don't see

how

any easier
and stresses

it is

to alter the strains

Accordingly, I cannot appreciate what accession

222

A.

N.

WHITEHEAD.

there has been to the arguments on behalf of idealism.

We

mental processes faced with an obstinately independent

nature, so that the correlations of mental processes with natural
still

find

processes appear as unessential for the course of natural events.

am not denying that there are such correlations, or that when

they occur the natural and the mental are not the same fact
with different aspects of it emphasized. But what I am denyI

is. that

ing

some correlation with mentality can be proved to be

I will summarize

essential for the very being of natural fact.

the foregoing discussion by saying that the

relativity is

calculated

to

modern doctrine

of

hearten idealists by emphasizing

it does not essentially

certain of their lines of argument, but that

touch the validity of the controversial arguments as between

the two sides.
I should, however, not like it to be concluded that I

am

maintaining that relativity has no philosophical importance.

The

of its importance arises from the

throws upon relatedness. It helps philosophy resolutely to turn its back upon the false lights of the
Aristotelian logic.
Ultimate fact is not a mere aggregate of

character

general

emphasis which

it

independent entities which are the subjects for qualities. We

can never get away from an essential relatedness involving
a

multiplicity

of

relata.

Every

factor

A, discerned as an

entity within fact, expresses in its very being its capacity for

the relationships into which it enters, and requires that all

other factors of fact should express their capacities as relata in
relationships
factor

A is

involving

it.

This

is

the

doctrine

significant of the relationships into

and that conversely

all factors

which

that
it

any

enters,

within fact must express the

patience of fact for A.

The more
philosophy

is

special aspect of the importance of relativity in

its

treatment of space and time, particularly

Space and time can never be mere side-shows in

Their treatment must colour the whole subphilosophy.
time.

sequent development of the subject.

The

relational treatment

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY.

of space is a well established principle,

relativity has

made much

are concerned.

But

of

time

is

now

doubt whether

difference here, so far as philosophers

has

made an immense

The unique

treatment of time.

gone by the board

it

and

I'L

difference to the

serial character of

time has

also a thoroughgoing relational treatment

necessitated and

made

possible.

am

told

Am

that there are phrases in Aristotle which look that way.

I right in recollecting that he defines time as an
ordering or
disposition of events in respect to each other

Furthermore,
of

the

the

fusion

of

time with

seriality involves

space and

the

the

dropping
unique
necessity of
on
fact
a
ultimate
as
process.
Accordingly
looking
essentially
"
has been lost, we are dealing
wherever the idea of " process
with a very advanced type of abstraction. This is why, in
treating this subject, I have always insisted that our lowest,

whereby we express the

must be regarded as " events," meaning
factor of fact which retains process.

most concrete, type

of abstractions

diversification of fact

thereby a partial
Now I conceive that nothing of this

is

really

It is as old as the hills.

new

But

in philo-

I still think

sophical thought.
that a scientific doctrine which enforces consistent emphasis on

these ideas has the utmost importance for philosophy, even

although it does not settle the established controversies between

realism and idealism.

224

XIV.
MISS

IN MEMORIAM:

E. E.

CONSTANCE JONES.

of Girton College, who

home at Weston-super-Mare, had been
for many years an active Member of the Aristotelian Society.
She joined us on December 19th, 1892. Her chief interest

Miss CONSTANCE JONES, former mistress

died last April at her

was

in

theory,

logical

and she was the author

of

several

manuals and primers on Logic and Ethics for the use of

students.
She translated, with Miss E. Hamilton, Lotze's
Microcosmus, and had been engaged, since her retirement from

Girton College, in translating Hegel's " Larger Logic." Her chief

work, and that on which she claimed to have made a distinct

and

original advance in logical theory,

Thought and

its

Logical Bearings.

is

entitled

It is a small

New Law of

monograph

of

only 75 pages, published by the Cambridge University Press,

and containing a Preface by Professor G. F. Stout in it is
concentrated the argument she had been expounding for a
;

long time.

The

point for which she contended is indeed

out
brought
clearly in the first paper which she read to the
essential

"

Society,

The Import of Categorical Propositions" published in

the Proceedings, Old Series, Vol. II.

categorical proposition of the form
"

Identity of Application of the

Signification!'

In the analysis of every

S is P there is, she says,

two-terms and Diversity of

view

Describing this as the Identity-in-Diversity

she then applied it to the Laws of Thought, and particularly to

Lotze's treatment of the judgment of Identity, and to his

attempt to justify the categorical judgment as the consequent

of an antecedent hypothetical judgment. In 1911, she presented
41

The

New Law

"

of Thought

as a thesis, at the International

IN

MEMOKIAM

MISS

E.

K.

CONSTANCE JONES.

225

Congress of Philosophy at Bologna, and shortly afterwards

published the little book with that title.

She was a member

to 1916.
of

She

will be

of

our Executive Committee from 1914

remembered by all who had the privilege

for the charm and gentl<

knowing her and working with her

ness of her disposition.

character, and

Intellectually, she

when she took

had great force of

part in philosophical discussion

she could defend her thesis with a tenacity which derived its
strength from her firm and comprehensive grasp of the

problem.

The following

which they were

was her interest

list of

read, will

her papers, with the dates on

show how continuous and constant

"The Import

of Categorical Propositions,"

December

4th,

1893.

"The relation
March 19th, 1894.
"

of

The Eationality

Language

of

to

Thought" (Symposium),

Hedonism," December 3rd, 1894.

"

Some Aspects of Attention," April 13th, 1896.

"Are Character and Circumstance Co-ordinate

Human

Life,

or

is

either

Subordinate

to

Factors in

the

Other

"
?

(Symposium), April 27th, 1896.

"
The Paradox of Inference," January 17th, 1898.
"
Lotze's Theory of Concept and Judgment," February 27th,
1899.*
"

A Eefutation

of Dualism,"

"

The Meaning

of Sameness,"

"

Professor Sidgwick's Ethics," January 4th, 1904.

February 19th, 1900.

March

25th, 1901.

"

Logic and Identity in Difference," February 4th, 1907.

"

A New

"A New
"

Law

of Thought,"

May

Logic" (Dr. Mercier's),

The Import

of

29th, 1911.

December
"

Propositions

(Symposium), July 5th,

1915.
"Practical Dualism,"

May

16th, 1912.

6th, 1918.

226

ABSTRACT OF THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS

OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
FORTY-THIRD SESSION.

October 10th, 1921.

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, President, in the Chair.

The President delivered the Inaugural Address on " Novelty "

and invited discussion. The following members took part in the
Prof. Wildon Carr, Mr. Joad, Prof. Nunn, Prof.
discussion.
Whitehead, Mr. Hannay, Dr. Thomas, Mr. Cator, Mr. Ainslie
and Mr. Mead.

November

7th,

Chair.

1921.

Prof. J.

Prof.

Dawes

Hicks, Vice-President, in the

H. Leuba read a paper on "Intuition in

Experience and in Philosophy."

Stephen, Mr. Raknes, Mr. Mead,

In

the

discussion

Mrs.

Mr. Davies, Mr. Ainslie,

Dr. Kramerisch and Prof. Whitehead took part.

November

1921.

Dawes Hicks,

Vice-President, in the
read a paper on " An Indian Doctrine
of Perception and Error/'
Mr. Cator, Mr. Mead and Mr.
in
took
the
discussion.
Hooper
part
21st,

Chair.

December

Dr. F.

5th,

Prof.

W. Thomas

1921.

Prof.

Dawes

Hicks, Vice-President, in the

James Johnstone read a paper on " The Limitations of a Knowledge of Nature.'*'

Prof. Nunn, Prof. Wildon
Carr, Mr. Mead, Mr. Joad, Prof. Gates and Mr. Greenwood
Chair.

Prof.

took part in the discussion.

December

19th, 1921.

Dr.

F.

C.

S.

Schiller, President, in the

Mr. F. Tavani read a paper on "Physical Space and

Hyperspaces." Mr. Bertand Russell, Dr. Wrinch, Miss Sinclair,
Chair.

Mr. Greenwood, Prof. Wildon Carr, Mr. Shelton, Dr. Jeffery

and Dr. Goldsbrough took part in the discussion.

January

9th, 1922.

Dr. F.'C. S. Schiller, President, in the Chair.

The President read a paper on

"

Mr. Russell's Analysis of Mind."

Mr. Joad, Prof. Hoernle, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Ginsberg,
Dr. Goldsbrough and Miss Stebbing took part in the discussion,
and Mr. Bertand Russell replied to the criticisms of his book.

227
January 16th, 1922. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, President, in the Chair.
-Mr. H. J. Paton read a paper on " Plato's Theory of /\?.<r,;.
In the discussion

Dean

Inge, Mr.

Leon and

Prof. Da\\--s Hi. k^

took part.
Prof. Wildon Carr, Vice-President, in the
February 6th, 1922.
Chair.
Mr. A. H. Hannay read a paper on "Standards and
In the discussion Mr. Ainslie, Mr. Joad,
Principles in Art."
Mr. Mead, Mr. Leon, Mrs. Roberts, Mr. Cator and Prof.

Plimpton Adams took

February 20th, 1922.

Chair.

part.

Viscount Haldane, Vice-Presidenl, in the

on " The Idealistic Interpretation of

A Symposium

Theory" by Prof. Wildon Carr, Prof. Nunn,

Whitehead and Dr. Dorothy Wrinch was read. The
discussion was opened by the Chairman, and Mr. Joad,
Mr. Mead, Dr. Jeffery and Prof. Nicholson took part.
Einstein's

Prof.

March

6th,

1922.

Prof.

J.

S.

Mackenzie, in the Chair.

Prof.

N. Dasgupta read a paper on " The Logic of the Vedanta."

In the discussion Prof. Wildon Carr, Dr. Thomas, Prof. Shastri
and Mr. Mead took part.
S.

March

20th, 1922.

Prof.

Dawes Hicks,

Vice-President, in the Chair.

" Some
Prof. R. F. A. Hoernle' read a paper on
Byways of the
Theory of Knowledge." In the discussion Miss Stebbing,

Mr. Joad, Prof. Wildon Carr, Mr. Cator and Mr. lonides took
part.

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, President, in the Chair.

April 10th, 1922.
Dr. G. E. Moore opened a discussion on "Dr. McTaggart'.-

Nature of Existence."
Oakeley took part.

May

Miss Stebbing, Mr. Powell and Miss

MiProf. T. P. Nunn, Treasurer, in the Chair.

1st, 1922.
McFarlane read a paper on "Realism and Value." Prof. Wildon
Carr, Miss Sinclair, Mr. Davies, Mrs. Duddington, Mi
Hazlitt, Mr. Burns, Dr. Goldsbrough and Mrs. Roberts took
part in the discussion.

228

May

Miss H. D. Oakeley, in the Chair. Prof. Nunn

a
on "Prof. Whitehead's Enquiry into the
discussion
opened
Natural
Knowledge and The Concept of Nature.'''
Principles of
16th, 1922.

Wildon Carr, Miss Sinclair and Mr. Joad took part, and
Whitehead gave an account, in reply to the criticisms on
his books, of the relation of his work to the new theories in
mathematics and physics.
Prof.

Prof.

June

12th, 1922.

Prof.

Dawes Hicks,

Vice-President, in the Chair.

Mr. T. Greenwood read a paper on

"

Geometry and Reality."

Edmund

Husserl of Freiburg, Dr.

Thomas, Mr. Constable, Dr. Jeffery, Dr. Tudor Jones and
Prof. Wildon Carr took part.
In the discussion

July 3rd, 1922.

The Eeport

Prof.

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, President, in the Chair.Committee for the Session, and the

of the Executive

Treasurer's Financial Statement, were presented and adopted.

of the Officers of

The nominations by the Executive Committee

the Society for the Forty-fourth Session were approved, and

Prof. A. N. Whitehead was declared elected President ; Prof.

Miss L. S. Stebbing, Librarian ; and

;
H. Wildon Carr, Honorary Secretary and Editor. The
following six members to serve on the Executive Committee
were elected: Mr. Delisle Burns, Rev. W. F. Geikie-Cobb,
Prof. G. Dawes Hicks, Mr. C. E. M. Joad, Miss May Sinclair
and Dr. W. F. Thomas. Mr. Douglas Ainslie read a paper on
T. P. Nunn, Treasurer

Prof.

In the discussion the

"Benedetto Croce's Historiography"
President and Prof. Wildon Carr, Miss Sinclair, Prof. Brough,

Mr. Mead, Miss Stebbing, Mr. Hannay and Mr. Cator took
part.

229

JOINT SESSION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, THE

BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY AND THE
MIND ASSOCIATION, HELD AT MANCHESTER,

JULY

14TH-17TH, 1922.

In Hulme Hall at 9 p.m. Sir Henry A. Miers, ViceChancellor of the Victoria University, Manchester, in the
The Right Rev. William Temple, Bishop of ManChair.

July 14th.

"
gave the Inaugural Address on
Symbolism as a
A
discussion
followed, in which
Metaphysics."

chester,

Basis

for

Wildon

Prof.

Carr,

Prof.

Lindsay,

Mr.

Richardson,

Mr. Brosnan, Prof. Taylor, Dr. Schiller, Mr. Milburn and

The Bishop of Manchester
Sir Leslie Mackenzie took part.
replied.

July 15th. At the University Arts Building at 10 a.m. Prof.

A Symposium on " Are History
S. Alexander in the Chair.
"
and~!Scienee different Kinds of Knowledge 1
by Mr. R. G.
Collingwood, Prof. A. E. Taylor and Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, was
Discussion was opened by the writers of the

discussed.

In the general discussion, Prof. Plimpton Adams,

Canon Green, Prof. Powicke, Mr. Brosnan, Mr. Richardson,
Dr. Moore and Mr. Ainslie took part.

papers.

In the Psychological Laboratory at the same hour a meeting

was held

the discussion of subjects of experimental

T. H. Pear in the Chair.
Dr. C. S. Myers
Prof.
psychology.
"
read a paper on " Experiments on Musical Appreciation ;
"
Mr. F. C. Bartlett,
Experiments on the Process of Conven"
"
tionalization ; Mr. R. H. Thouless,
Experiments on Contrast
for

Effect in a smoothly graded Disc"; Mr. Eric Farmer, "The

"
Value of Curves of Output ; and Messrs. S. C. Jackson and
" The Effect on Mental
S. Wyatt,
Fatigue of varying duration

and quality

At
Chair.

of

Rest Pauses."

In Hulme Hall. Prof. T. H. Pear in the

The Chairman referred to the great loss sustained by

9 p.m.

Psychology and Philosophy in the death of Dr. W. H. R.

whose participation in the present Congress had been

Rivers,

part

of

the original arrangements.

The

meeting

rose

in

230
silent expression of sympathy.
A Symposium on "Is the
"
Unconscious a Conception of Value in Psychology ?
by
Mr. G. C. Field, Dr. F. Aveling and Prof. J. Laird, was dis-

Dr. Mitchell, Dr. William Brown, Mr. Shand,

Mr. Benjamin Rand, Mr. Thouless, Mr. Leonard Russell and
Mr. Heath took part.
cussed.

At Hulme Hall at 10 a.m. Prof. Wildon Carr in the

The discussion on the Unconscious was resumed in

July 16th.
Chair.

order to consider the subject with special reference to the

concrete facts of psycho-therapy.
Dr. William Brown gave
some typical cases, and indicated the theory of the unconscious which explained them.
Prof.
Laird, Mr. Field,
Sir Leslie Mackenzie, Mr. Milburn, Mr. Thouless, Mr. Heath,
Mr. Ainslie, Mr. Rand and Dr. Schiller took part in the

and Dr. Brown replied.

At 2 p.m. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller in the Chair. A Symposium
on " The Relation between Sentiments and Complexes," by the
discussion,

W. H. R. Rivers, Mr. A. G. Tansley, Prof. T. H.

Dr. Bernard Hart, Mr. A. F. Shand and Dr. C. S.

late Dr.

Pear,

Myers was discussed. Mr. Shand, Prof. Pear and Dr. Myers
opened the discussion, and Mr. Bartlett, Dr. Noble, Mr. Wheeler
and Miss Iken took part.
At 5 p.m. Prof. A. N. Whitehead in the Chair. Prof.
G. F. Stout's paper on " Mr. Alexander's Theory of Sense
"
Perception was discussed. Prof. Stout opened the discussion,
and was followed by Prof. Alexander.
At 8.45 p.m. Prof. Wildon Carr in the Chair. Prof.
" The
A. N. Whitehead read a paper on
Philosophical Aspects
The discussion was opened by
of the Principle of Relativity."
the Chairman, and continued by Prof. Taylor, Mr. J. E.
Turner, Prof. Alexander, Dr. Moore and Prof. Stout. Prof.
Whitehead

replied.

In proposing the thanks of members to Mr. Nicklen, Warden of

Hulme Hall, and to Mrs. Hogg, of Ashburne Hall, for.; the
hospitality offered to the Congress, and for the comfort of the
arrangements, Prof. Wildon Carr announced that the Societies
had received and had accepted an invitation from Prof. A. Robinson,
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Durham, to hold the Congress
in

Durham

in 1923.

231

THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SOCIfiTfi FRANgAlsi

DE PHILOSOPHIE, HELD AT THE SORBONNE, PAKI>.
2731 DECEMBER, 1921.

The following members accepted the invitation of the Soci< tYFra^aise and attended the Session Mrs. Beer, Prof. Wildon Carr,
:

N. Dasgupta, Mr. T. Greenwood, Mr. C. R. S. Harris, Prof.

R. F. A. Hoernle', Sir Leslie Mackenzie, Miss H. D. Oakeley, the
Hon. Eleanor Plumer, Dr. W. D. Ross, Mr. Leonard Russell,
Prof. S.

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, Prof. J. Seth, Prof. J. A. Smith, Prof.

Sorley, Dr. Jessie White, and Dr. Dorothy Wrinch.

W.

R.

The following Members contributed papers which will be

printed in the Bulletin of the Special Session Prof. Wildon Carr,
:

"

The Nature of Scientific Knowledge " Mr. T. Greenwood,

Nature and Function of Geometrical Concepts"; Prof. R.

"

The

F. A.

"

Berkeley as the Forerunner of recent Philosophy of

Physics"; Miss H. D. Oakeley, "The Derivation of Value";
Dr. W. D. Ross, "Plato's Later Development of the Ideal Theory";
"
Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, " Reality, Fact and Value
Prof. J. A. Smith,
Hoernle,

"The 'Economic' Theory

"La Notion de 1'Etat et

of
les

Experiences

Dorothy Wrinch, "Relativity."

The Session was organized in four
I.

II.

Logique

sections.

et Philosophic des Sciences

Metaphysique
III.
Histoire de

et Psychologic

W.

R. Sorley,
"
Contemporaines ; Dr.

the Concept"; Prof.

The sections were f

M. P. Painleve
M. Henri Bergson

President,

President,

la Philosophic
President, Prof. LeVy-Bruhl ;
There were
IV. Morale et Sociologie President, Prof. C. Bougie.
four general Sessions, one for each section ; the sections meeting

separately in the morning on each day.

The Session opened on December 27th in the Amphitheatre
Michelet at 10 a.m. with an address of welcome to the Delegates of

the American, Belgian, English, and Italian Societies, by M. Xavier

Leon, President of the Soci^te Franchise de Philosophic. M. Le*on
"
Brunschvicg followed with an impressive Hommage aux Morts."

The first general Session was held at 2.30. M. Bergson presided.

The subject of discussion was "Theory of Knowledge," and the
theses submitted were by Prof. Wildon Carr and Dr. Schiller.
T

232
V

The second general

Session,

Prof. LeVy-Bruhl.

The

on December 28th, was presided over

"
subject of discussion was The Relations
of Philosophy with the Sciences from the beginning of the Eighteenth
Century." The theses presented were by Prof. W. T. Bush and

by

Prof. F. Enriques.
The third general Session,

by M.

Form

Painleve'.

of the

on December 29th, was presided over

" The
most recent
subject of discussion was
of Relativity." The theses presented were by

The

Theory

Miss Wrinch, Prof. P. Langevin, and M. Painleve.

The fourth general Session was on December 30th.

Prof. C.

was " Raison et Societe."

Bougie presided.
The theses discussed were by M. Chardon and M. Vermeil.
There were receptions at the Rapprochement Universitaire, at the
Sorbonne by the Rector and members of the Council of the
University, and by M. Xavier Leon at his home in the Rue des
Mathurins. On the evening of December 30th the Delegates were
entertained at dinner at the Club de la Renaissance Fra^aise by
the Societe Franchise de Philosophic.
M. Painleve' presided. Prof.
Wildon Carr on behalf of the English Societies, Prof. R. B. Perry on
behalf of the American Societies, M. Dupre"el on behalf of the
Belgian Societies, and Prof. Enriques on behalf of the Italian
Societies returned thanks to the President and Members of the

The

subject of discussion

Fra^aise for the successful organization of the Session and

most generous hospitality.
The theses and a report of the discussions will be published in a

Societe'

for their

special volume.

233

,;

<*

oo -i ~<

a-.

5 S t:

-.stf

Ia.f,

w O
flO

00

X5

OO

.;

00 CO

ifi

lei
III

p*

234

LIST OF OFFICERS

AND MEMBERS FOR THE

FORTY-FOURTH SESSION,

1922-1923.

THE COUNCIL.
PRESIDENT.
A. N.

WHITEHEAD,

D.Sc., LL.D., F.E.S.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

BEENAED BOSANQUET,

M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1894-1898).

G. F.

STOUT, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1899-1904).

VERY REV. DEAN HASTINGS EASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A.

(President

1904-1907).

HALDANE

OF CLOAK, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.E.S.

F.B.A. (President, 1907-1908).
S. ALEXANDEE, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1908-1911).
HON. BEETEAND EUSSELL, M.A., F.E.S. (President, 1911-1913).
G.
HICKS, M.A., PH.D., LiTT.D. (President, 1913-1914).
EIGHT HON. THE EABL OP BALFOUE, O.M., E.G., LL.D., F.E.S., F.B.A.
EIGHT HON. VISCOUNT

DAWES

(President, 1914-1915).

H.

WILDON CAEE,

D.LiTT. (President, 1915-1918).

MOOEE, Sc.D., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1918-1919).

JAMES WAED, Sc.D., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1919-1920).
G. E.

VEBY EEV. W. E. INGE, D.D. (President, 1920-1921).

F. C. S. SCHILLEE, M.A., D.Sc. (President, 1921-1922).
TREASURER.
PEOF. T.

London Day Training

PEECY NUNN,

College,

Southampton Eow, W.C.

LIBRARIAN.

Miss

L.

S.

STEBBING,

27, Belsize Park,

N.W.

3.

EDITOR AND HONORARY SECRETARY.

PEOF. H. WILDON CAEE,
Church Street, Chelsea, S.W.

107,

ME.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.
ME. C. E. M. JOAD.
Miss MAY SINCLAIE.
DE. F. W. THOMAS.
HICKS.

DELISLE BUENS.
W. F. GEIKIE-COBB.

C.

EBV.
PBOF. G.

DAWES

3.

1.

235

HONORARY MEMBERS.
F. H. BRADLEY, M.A., LL.D., Merton College, Oxford.
W. E. DUNSTAN, M.A., LL.D., F.B.S., 38, Cranley Gardens, S.W.

Prof.

JAMES WARD,

Prof.

Sc.D.,

LL.D., D.Sc., F.B.A.,

Selwyn Gardens,

6,

Cambridge.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
MARK BALDWIN,

Prof. J.

New

c/o Harris

Forbes

&

Co., 56,

William

Street,

York.

HENRI BEKGSON, 32, Eue Vital, Paris.

Prof. J. M. CATTELL, Garrison, New York.
Senator BENEDETTO CHOCE, Trinita Maggiore 12, Naples.
Prof. JOHN DEWEY, Columbia University, New York City.
M. H. DZIEWICKI, 11, Sczcpanska, Cracow, Poland.
HARALD HOFFDING. Carlsberg, Copenhagen.

Prof.

Prof. E. B. TITCHENER, Cornell University, Ithaca,

New

York.

MEMBERS.
Elected.

1915.

DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A., Athenaeum Club, S.W. 1.

Prof. S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., Vice-president,

1922.

24, Brunswick Eoad, Withington, Manchester.

G. ANDERSON, M.A., 552, Lonsdale Street, Melbourne.
H. M. ANDREWS, 9, Harcourt House, Cavendish Square, W. 1.
Rev. H. DOUGLAS ANTHONY, M.A., B.Sc., The College, Richmond,

1913.

Rev. FRANCIS

1885.
1919.
1921.

Surrey.

W.

AVELING,

Brondesbury Park, N.W.

1916.
1908.
1912.

1915.
1915.

D.D.,

Ph.D.,

The Mission House,

6.

Prof. J. B. BAILLIE, M.A., D.Phil., Ladyhill, Bieldside, Aberdeenshire.

Right Hon. The EARL OF BALFOUR, KG., Vice-president, 4, Carlton
Gardens, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
Prof. SURENDRA NATH BARAL, M.A,,Gaurisankar-Sffiter Lille-Elvedalen,
Norway.
Miss B. C. BARFIELD, Bicknell, Athenaeum Road, Whetstone, N. 20.
F. C. BARTLETT, B.A., 32, St. Barnabas Eoad, Cambridge.

1893,

EGBERT J. BARTLETT, St. Hilda's, Christchurch Avenue, N.W. 6.

Mrs. MARGRIETA BEER, M.A., 65, College Court, Hammersmith, W.
E. C. BENECKE, 182, Denmark Hill, S.E. 5.

1913.

Col. E.

1888.

H.

1919.

1907.

18, Hyde Park Square, W. 2.

M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.

H. BETHELL,

W. BLUNT,

1913.

Prof. A. BONUCCI, Perugia, Italy.

1921.

Prof. J. E.

1886.

Prof.

1890.

A.

1919.

W.
W.

1919.

BOODIN, M.A., Ph.D., Carleton College, Minnesota, U.S.A.

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A.,

President, The Heath Cottage, Oxshott, Surrey.
BOUT WOOD, Charity Commission, Whitehall, S.W. 1.

Vice-

E. V. BRADE, B.A., 34, Kingsmead Eoad, Tulse Hill, S.W. 2.

O. BRIGSTOCKE, B.A., Royal Societies Club, St. James's, S.AV.

T 2

1.

21)6
Elected.

1917.

BROAD, M.A., D.Lit., The University, Bristol.

BROUGH, LL.D., Hampden Club, N.W.I.
WILLIAM BROWN, D.Sc., M.D., 5, Norham Gardens, Oxford.
Miss ELSIE M. BRYANT, B.A., Mayfield Hostel, Arbroath Road,

1919.

J.

1914.

1889.
1908.

Prof. C. D.

Prof. J.

Dundee.

BUTLER BURKE, M.A., Royal

S.W.

Societies Club, St. James's Street,

1.

1921.

L. D. BURLING, 47, Parliament Street, S.W.

1913.

BURNS, M.A., 3, Keats Grove, Hampstead, N.W.

E. H. BUTT, M.A., Lower School of John Lyon, Harrow.

1921.

1.

C. DELISLE

3.

1906.

Rev. Preb. A. CALDECOTT, M.A., D.D., D.Lit., Great Oakley Rectory,

Harwich.

1920.

Prof.

MARY WHITON

CALKINS, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.,

U.S.A.
1918.

Prof. E. T.

1881.

Prof.

1921.

WILLIAM CATMUR, 23, Terrace Road, South Hackney, E. 9.

GERALD CATOR, 9, Holborn House, Baldwin's Gardens, E.C.

1918.

1918.
1908.
1918.
1920.

1912.
1907.
1895.
1913.
1921.
1920.

1920.
1922.

1921.

CAMPAGNAC, M.A., G-reengate, Dingle Lane, Liverpool.

H. WILDON CABR, D.Litt., Vice- President and Hon. Sec.,
107, Church Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
1.

Prof. G. C. CHATTERJI, B.A., Central Training College, Lahore, India.

E. C. CHILDS, M.A., 68, North View, Westbury Park, Bristol.

Miss M. E. CLARKE, M.A., Lynwood, Weymouth.

Miss H. CLERGUE, Albemarle Club, 37, Dover Street, W. 1.
Prof. ALBERT A. COCK, B.A., University College, Southampton.
F. J. O. CODDINGTON, M.A., LL.M., 42, Bank Street, Sheffield.
STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W. 7.
G. D. H. COLE, M.A., 13, Bramerton Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
R. G. COLLINGWOOD, M.A., Pembroke College, Oxford.
F. C. CONSTABLE, M.A., Grenville, Lansdown, Bath.
F. C. COULTER, M.A., Royal Societies Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1,
F. G. CROOKSHANK, M.D., 41, Wimpole Street, W. 1.
.Mrs. P.

M. CROSTHWAITE,

Highfield, King's Langley.

1917.

Right Rev. C. F. D'ARCY, D.D., Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of

1920.

Ireland,
Prof. S. N.

1912.

Prof.

1916.

1921.

The Palace, Armagh.

DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D., Chittagong

WILLIAM

L.

College, India.

8, Queen's Gardens t
Aberdeen.
Rev. A. E. DAVIES, M.A., 48, Blenheim Gardens, Cricklewood, N.W. 2,
Countess DE LA FELD, 1, Carlos Place, Grosvenor Square, W. 1.

DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D.,

1918.

E. T. DIXON, M.A., Billy Dun, Half- Way Tree, Jamaica.

Miss L. DOUGALL, Cutts End, Cumnor, Oxford.
Rev. JOHN DRAKE, M. A., B.D., 19, Furnival Street, E.C. 4.

1918.

JAMES

1896.
1912.

DREVER, M.A.,

B.Sc.,

D.Phil.,

Roselea,

Gullane,

East

Lothian.
1899.
1911.

J. A. J. DREWITT, M.A., Wadham College, Oxford.

Mrs. N. A. DUDDINGTON, M.A., 13, Carlton Terrace, Child's

N.W.

2.

Hill,.

237
Elected.

1910.

Miss BEATRICE EDGELL, M.A., Ph.D., 15, Lyon Road, Harrow.

1917.

Rev. A. E. ELDER,

1921.

GILBERT ELLIOT, M.A.,

1919.

Prof. J.

1914.
1920.

G-.

1914.

Miss
Miss

1919.
1922.

1918.

Oakfield Villas, Cobham, Surrey.

87, Victoria Street, S.W. 1.

H. FARLEY, Lawrence College, Appleton, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

ERIC FARMER, M.A., Royal Societies Club, St. James's Street, S.W. 1.
Prof. A. S. FERGUSON, Q.ueen's University, Kingston, Ontario.

1912.

1920.

1,

C. FIELD, M.A., D.Sc.,

MART FLETCHER,

The

13,

University, Liverpool.

Ladbroke Terrace,

W.

11.

FLINN, Ormond College, Melbourne.

Mrs. FORMAN, 18, Drayton Gardens, S.W. 10.
Miss E. MARGERY Fox, County School for Girls, Beckenham.
Miss MADGE FULLER, 69, Lansdowne Road, W. 11.
I.

1914.

Miss MARJORIE GABAIN, The Manor House, Bushey, Herts.

1919.

E. GARCKE, Ditton House, near Maidenhead.

1916.
1919.

1897.
1918.

Miss H. GAVIN, 27, Belsize Park, N.W. 3.

W. F. GEIKIE-COBB, D.D., 40, Cathcart Road, S.W. 10.
Prof. W. R. BOTCE GIBSON, M.A., Lichfield, Wallace Avenue, Torrak,
Melbourne.
Mrs. MARY H. GIBSON-SMITH, Ph.D., 13, Fox Hill, Selly Oak,

Rev.

Birmingham.

1921.

M. GILLESPIE, M.A., The University, Leeds.

MORRIS GINSBERG, M.A., Teacher's Guild Club, 9, Brunswick Square,
W.C. 1.
G. F. GOLDSBHOUGH, M.D., 125. Herne Hill, S.E. 24.
Prof. FRANK GRANGER, D.Litt., 37, Lucknow Drive, Nottingham.
THOMAS GREENWOOD, L. es L., University College, W.C. 1.
D. M. GREIG, M.D., 1, Queen Anne's Gate, S.W. 1.

1921.

J.

1918.

ALBERT GRESSWELL, M.A., M.D., Louth, Lincolnshire.

Prof. DANIEL GRIFFITHS, Granville House, Pontypool, Mon.
Rev. Canon F. GURNHILL, B.D., East Stockwith Vicarage, Gains-

1911.
1913.
1900.
1912.

1920.

1921.
1922.

Prof. C.

Y. T. GREIG, M.A., Armstrong College, Newcastle-on-Tyne.

borough.

1920.

M. A. HAFBEZ, M.A., 9/2, Kyd Street, Calcutta.

HAGUE, M.A., London Day Training College, Southampton Row,
W.C. 1.

1912.

J. C.

1883.

Right Hon. Viscount HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.R.S.,

F.B.A., Vice.President, 28, Queen Anne's Gate, S.W. 1.

1917.

HALDANE, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Cherwell, Oxford.

S. ELIZABETH HALL, 6, Prince Arthur Road, N.W. 3.
H. F. HALLETT, M.A., The University, Leeds.
Miss M. HAMMOND, The University, Birmingham.
THOMAS W. HAND, The Librarian, Public Library, Leeds.
A. H. HANNAY, B. A., 28, Thurlow Road, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
Rev. R. HANSON, M.A., B.D., 30, Holroyd Road, Putney, S.W.
R. P. HARDIE, M.A., 13, Palmerston Road, Edinburgh.

1915.
1921.
1920.

1920.
1920.

1919.
1913.

J. S.

Miss

15.

238
Erected.

1921.

C. R. S.

1919.

3, Devonshire Terrace, Hyde Park, W. 2.

Miss VICTORIA HAZLITT, M.A., Bedford College, N.W. 1.
A. E. HEATH, M.A., 22, Abercromby Square, Liverpool.
Principal H. J. W. HETHERINGTON, M.A., University College, Exeter.
Prof. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., rice-President, 9,
Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
Rev. EDWARD W. HIRST, Lynton Villa, The Firs, Bowdon, Cheshire.
Prof. R. F. A. HOERNLK, M.A., B.Sc., Armstrong College, Newcastle-

1918.
1918.
1915.
1890.

1919.
1912.

Mrs. E.

HARRIS, M.A,, All

Souls' College, Oxford.

THURLOW HARBISON,

on-Tyne.
1918.

1916.
1921.

1916.

MICHEL

G-. HOLBAN, British Empire Club, St. James's Square, S.W.

HOOPER, M.A., The Rectory, East Horsley, Surrey.
Miss A. A. HORNE, 119, Ebury Street, S.W. 1.

S.

Very Rev. Dean

St. Paul's,

1913.

1919.
1911.

B.C.

W.

R. INGE, D.D., rice-President, The Deanery,

4.

C. IONIDES, jun., 34, Porchester Terrace, W.

N. ISAACS, 53, Hunter Street, Brunswick Square, W.C. 1.

ALEXANDER

2.

Principal L. P. JACKS, M.A., LL.D., D.D., Shotover Edge, Headington,

Oxford.

JAMES, M.A., D.Lit., Brynhjfryd, Andover Road, Southsea.

1918.

Rev. J.

1921.

Prof. G. B. JEFFERT, M.A., D.Sc., 365, Pinner Road, Harrow.

Principal F. B. JEVONS, M.A., D.Litt., Bishop Hatfield's

1904.

1915.

1918.
1920.

1919.

G-.

Rev. TUDOR JONES, M.A., Ph.D., 14, Clifton Park, Bristol.

Miss E. F. JOURDAIN, D. es L., St. Hugh's College, Oxford.

1912.

J.

1916.

Prof. J. LAIRD, M.A., 4,

1881.
1911.

Hall,

Durham.
C. E. M. JOAD, M.A., 4, The Gables, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
C. B. JOHNSON, M.A., 2, King's Bench Walk, E.G. 4.
R. F. JOHNSTON, M.A., The Forbidden City, Pekin.
Prof. JAMES JOHNSTONE, D.Sc., The University, Liverpool.

1912.

1911.

1.

E.

N. KEYNES, D.Sc.,

6,

Harvey Road, Cambridge.

Cranmore Gardens, Belfast, Ireland.

A. F. LAKE, Wvangaton, Sundridge Avenue, Bromley.
Prof. GEO. H. LANGLEY, M.A., Dacca, Bengal, India.

ROBERT LATTA, M.A.,

D.Phil., The University, Glasgow.

Southampton Buildings, W.C. 2.

1898.

Prof.

1921.

JOHN ARTHUR LAW,

1919.

S. C.

1915.

1908.

Miss MARJORIE LEBUS, B.A., 11, Netherhall Gardens,

Captain A. E. I. LEGGE, Kingsmead, Winkfield, Windsor.
P. LEON, B.A., University College, W.C. 1.
Rev. R. H. LIGHTFOOT, M.A., New College, Oxford.
Prof. A. D. LINDSAY, M.A., The University, Glasgow.

1897.

Rev. JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., B.Sc., D.D., Annick Lodge, by Irvine,

1912.

Ayrshire.
Prof. THOMAS

1918.
1921.

1921.

1920.

1921.

29,

LAZARUS, B.A., The University, Melbourne.

KW. 3.

LOVEDAY, M.A., University College, Southampton.

Rev. A. A. LUCE, D.D., Trinity College, Dublin.
Miss JULIA LYON, B.Sc., 18, Mecklenburgh Square, W.C. 1.

239
Elected.

1916.

WM. MACDOUGALL, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., Harvard University,

Cambridge, Mass.
C. A. MACB, B.A., Ivy Lodge, Dereham Koad, Norwich.
Prof. E. M. MclVBB, M.A., The University, Toronto.
Miss E. M. MACKAY, Skucritten House, Oban, Scotland.
Prof. J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt.D., 56, Bassett Road, North Kensington,

1910.

Sir

1911.

1916.

1912.

1918.

Prof.

S.W.

10.

W.

LESLIE

MACKENZIE, M.A.,

M.D.,

14,

Belgrave

Place,

Edinburgh.
1918.

Prof. A.

1917.

ABDUL MAJID,

1919.
1919.

Miss JESSIE A. MALLETT, 29, Launceston Place,

B. K. MALLIK, B.A., 22, Farndon Road, Oxford.

1922.

HENBI E.

1916.

Rev.

W,

1918.

MABIN, 3, Rue Cimarosa, Paris (16).

MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D., King's College, Strand, W.C. 2.
Miss MARGARET MCFABLANE, B.A., 50, Southwood Lane, Highgate.

1921.

J. C.

McKEBBOW,

1918.

MAIE, M.A.,

26, Parkfield

1914.

1912.

Oudh,

India.

W. 8.

C.

R.

34, Cartwright Gardens,

WM. MONTGOMEBY McGovEBN,

Finsbury Circus, E.C.

1899.

Road, Princes Park, Liverpool.

B.A., P.O. Daryabad,

W.C.

1.

Ph.D., School of Oriental Studies,

2.

LEWIS MclNTTBE, D.Sc., Abbotsville, Cults, N.B.

G. R. S. MEAD, B.A., 27, Clareville Grove, S.W. 7.
Rev. S. H. MELLONE, M.A., D.Sc., 44, Ridgeway, Golders Green,

J.

1889.

N.W.ill.
E. MILLEB, M.A., 33, Oxford Mansions, Oxford Circus, W. 1.
R. E. MITCHESON, M.A., Charity Commission, Whitehall, S.W.

1921.

Prof.

1919.

1915.

Rev.
G. E. MOOBE, Sc.D., LL.D., F.B.A., Vice-President, 17, Magdalene
Street, Cambridge.
Mrs. G. E. MOOBE, 17, Magdalene Street, Cambridge.

1910.

Prof. C.

1920.

1896.

1.

WALTEB H. MOBEBLEY, M.A., The University,Birmingham.

WILFBED Moos, B.A., Ph.D., Piazza Minerva 74, Rome (19).

LLOYD MOBGAN, LL.D.,

F.R.S.,

5,

Victoria Square, Clifton,

Bristol.

1913.

J.

1912.

C. S.

1904.

Prof. T.

MUBBAY, M.A.,

1919.

1903.

Montagu Square, W.

D.Sc., Treasurer,

Southampton Row, W.C.

1.

London Day Training

1.

Miss HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., 97, Warwick Road, Earl's Court,

S.W.
1918.

Sc.D., F.R.S., 30,

PEBCY NTJNN, M.A.,

College,

1908.

Christ Church, Oxford.

MYEBS, M.D.,

5.

HEBBEBT J. PAGE, 97, Cadogan Gardens, S.W.

HEBBEBT J. PATON, M.A., Queen's College, Oxford.

Mrs.

3.

Miss E. A. PEABSON, Moxhams, Bradford-on-Avon.

RICHABD PHILLIPS, M.A., D.Ph., D.D., St. John's Seminary,

1921.

Rev.

1916.

W.

Wonersh, Guildford.
A. PICKABD-CAMBBIDGE, M.A., Worcester College, Oxford.

240
Elected.

1917.

GEOBGE PITT-RIVERS, Hinton St. Mary, Dorset.

Hon. ELEANOB M. PLUMER, M.A., Mary Ward Settlement,
Place, W.C. 1.

1921.

Rev.

1922.

HANS PRESSBURGER,

1913.

Prof. A.

1918.

W. POWELL,

Hill,

1916.

Tavistock

M.A., B.D., 34, The Avenue, Hitchin, Herts.

Ph.D., University College, W.C. 1.

S. PHINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A., 16, Church

Edinburgh.

Miss M. PUNNETT, B.A., London Day Training College, Southampton

Row, W.C.

1.

1922.

OLA RAKNES,

1914.

ADAM RANKINE,

1889.

Very Rev. Dean HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A.,

President, The Deanery, Carlisle.
M. B. RAT, M.D., 11, Seymour Street, W. 1.
Rev. H. MAURICE RELTON, D.D., The Vicarage, Isleworlh.
C. A. RICHAEDSON, M.A., 51, Dene Avenue, Lemington-on-Tyne.

107,

dower

Street,

W.C.

1.

Newstead, Monkham's Avenue, Woodford Green,

Essex.

1922.
1918.

1918.
1921.
1920.

1895.
1920.
1919.

Mrs. RIDDEL, 15, Mount Street, W. 1.

Mrs. UBSULA ROBERTS, 19, Woburn Square, W.C.

Vice-

1.

ABTHUB ROBINSON, M.A., D.C.L., Observatory House, Durham.

Miss VESA A. ROSENBLTJM, M.A., The University, Melbourne.
Mrs. MABGABET Ross, 2, Belgrave Crescent, Edinburgh.
Prof.

Burma.

1908.

Prof. a. R. T. Ross, D.Phil.,

1921.

LEON ROTH, M.A., Exeter

1919.

Miss E. M. ROWELL, M.A., Royal Holloway College, Englefield Green,

1912.

SATIS

Rangoon College,
College, Oxford.

Surrey.
1896.

CHANDRA ROT, B.A., P.O. Ramna, Dacca, Bengal.

Hon. BERTBAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S., Vice- President,
Street, S.W. 3.

31,

Sydney

1921.

E. S. RUSSELL, M.A., D.Sc., Fisheries Laboratory, Lowestoft.

LEONARD J. RUSSELL, M.A., Brousterland, East Kilbride.

1905.

F, C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., D.Sc., Vice-President, Corpus Christi College,

1920.

Prof.

1921.

Oxford.

CONRAD ALFRED SCHIEMER,

1146, Reaney Street, St. Paul,

Minn., U.S.A.
1912.

1921.
1918.

1892.

1917.
1917.
1901.

1911.
1910.

W. SCOTT, M.A., D.Phil., University College, Cardiff.

Miss ELIZABETH SCOTT, The University, Birmingham.
W. E. G. SEKTI, M.A., Anibok Chambers, Cape Coast, Gold Coast,
Prof. J.

West Africa.
ALEXANDEB F. SHAND, M.A., 1, Edwardes Place, Kensington, W.8.
G. BERNARD SHAW, 10, Adelphi Terrace, W.C. 2.
Mrs. G. BERNARD SHAW, 10, Adelphi Terrace, W.C. 2.
A. T. SHEABMAN, M.A., D.Lit., University College, Gower Street,
W.C. 1.
H. S. SHELTON, B.Sc., 151, Richmond Road, Twickenham.
Miss F. ROSAMOND SHIELDS.. M.A., 289, Cambridge Road, E. 2.

241
Elected.

1917.
1907.

1919.
1916.
1908.
1917.

1920.

Miss MAY SINCLAIR, 1, Blenheim Road, St. John's Wood, N.W. 8.

W. G. SLEIGHT, M.A., D.Litt., 16, Eardley Road, Streatham, S.W. 16.
HENRY H. SLESSBR, 11, King's Bench Walk, Temple, E.G. 4.
E. SHAEWOOD SMITH, M.A., The Grammar School, Newbury, Berks.
Prof. J. A. SMITH, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
Prof. NOEMAN K. SMITH, D.Phil., LL.D., The University, Edinburgh.
Rev. T. J. SMITH, 76, Coppin Street, Melbourne.

1908.

W. R. SOELEY, M.A., Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A., St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
K. J. SPALDING, M.A., Stoneways, High Wycombe.
Miss H. M. SPANTON, 1, The Paragon, Black heath, S.E. 3.

1911.

Prof.

1886.
1908.

Prof.

CAROLINE F. E. SPURGEON, D.

N.W.
1910.

1912.
1918.
1919.

1887.

1915.

1912.
1915.

1904.

1908.

Gate Gardens,

Miss L. S. STEBBING, M.A., Librarian, 27, Belsize Park, N.W. 3.

Mrs. ADRIAN STEPHEN, 50, Gordon Square, W.C. 1.
Rev. C. R. SHAW STEWART, M.A., 6, Queen's Elm Square, S.W. 3.
J. McKELLAR STEWART, B.A., D.Phil., The University, Melbourne.
Prof. G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., Vice-President, Craigard,

Andrews, Scotland.

St.

1918.

es L., 19, Clarence

1.

ALIX STRACHEY,

41, Gordon Square, W.C. 1.

OLIVER STRACHEY, 41, Gordon Square, W.C. 1.
E. H. STRANGE, M.A., 25, Leicester Road, Wanstead, E. 11.
Prof. KOJIRO SUGIMOBI, University of Waseda, Tokyo, Japan.

Mrs.

F. TAVANI, 92, Loughborough Road, S.W. 9.

Prof. A. E. TAYLOR, M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A.,

9,

Dempster Terrace,

Andrews, N.B.

St.

W. THOMAS, M.A., Ph.D., The Library, India Office, S.W. 1.

W. H. THOMPSON, LL.D., St. Stephen's Vicarage, West

1915.

F.

1919.

Rev. Prof.

1917.

J.

Baling,

W.

13.

1921.

M. THORBURN, University College, Cardiff.

ALGAR L. THOROLD, M.A., 55A, Ebury Street, S.W. 1.
M. N. TOLANI, M.A., 25, Rathmore Road, Cambridge.
C. J. TURNADGE, 13, Acacia Avenue, Wembley, Middlesex.

1917.

W.

1919.
1918.

EUGENE DE VIRPSHA, 2, Longridge Road, S.W. 5.

Miss F. VOISIN, B.A., 3, Wymering Mansions, W. 9.

1918.

Miss

1920.
1902.

Hampstead, N.W. 3.
Rev. LESLIE J. WALKER, M.A., Campion Hill, Oxford.
JOSEPH WALKER, M.A., Wooldale, Thongsbridge, Huddersfield.

1908.

SYDNEY

1916.
1922.

E.

URWICK, M.A.,

9,

Pakenham Road, Edgbaston.

MARION E. WAKEFIELD, M.A.,

P.

58,

Belsize Park

WATERLOW, M.A., Parsonage House,

Oure, Pewsey,

Wilts.
1919.

FRANK WATTS,

1890.

Prof.

CLEMENT

M.A., The University, Manchester.

WEBB, M.A., Holywell Ford, Oxford.

C. J.

Gardens,

242
Elected.

1896.

R.

Prof.

M.

509, East

1907.
1915.

1919.
1919.

1900.

WENLEY,

Madison

Street,

M.A.,

Ann

D.Phil.,

D.Sc.,

Litt.D.,

LL.D.

Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.

Mrs. JESSIE WHITE, D.Sc., 49, Gordon Mansions, W.C. 1.

Prof. A. N. WHITEHEAD, D.Sc., LL.D., P.E.S., President, 259A, King's
Road, Chelsea, S.W. 3.
T. NOBTH WHITEHEAD, B.A., 14, Carlyle Square, S.W. 3.
Miss A. L. S. WISE, 16, West Kensington Gardens, W. 14.
Prof. A. WOLT?. M.A., D.Lit., 12, Kewferry Koad, Northwood,
Middlesex.

1919.
1920.

Rev. A. WOOD, D.D., St. John's Seminary, Wonersh. G-uildford.

Miss CHABLOTTE WOODS, 13, Cowley Street, Westminster, S.W. 1.

1917.

Miss E. M. WOETHINGTON, 75, West Cromwell Road, S.W.

Miss DOROTHY WEINCH, D.Sc., Grirton College, Cambridge.

1910.

Sir

1918.

Mrs. ZAECHI, B. A., 75, Clifton Hill,

1918.

FEANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND,

Litt.D., 3,

5.

Buckingham Gate, S.W.

1.

N.W. 8.

LIBRARIES.
ABMSTBONG COLLEGE, Newcastle-on-Tyne.
COLOEADO COLLEGE, Colorado Springs, U.S.A.
Dr. WILLIAMS' LIBEAEY, Gordon Square,

W.C.

1.

OXFOBD UNION SOCIETY.

UNIVEESITETS BIBLIOTEK, Uppsala.
UNIVEESITY COLLEGE, Exeter.
UNIYEESITY COLLEGE, Reading.

(July, 1922.)

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