PropertyBlocher1

1.INTERDEPENDENCEOFPROPERTYRIGHTS
Normative/Theory/Tensions
ConceptualizingandStudyingPropertyLaw
I
A. CoreFunctions

ofpropertylaw
(1) Defineswhatpropertyis
(2) Defineswhatwecandowithproperty
(3) Createsasystemthatbalancescompetingrightsandresponsibilities
ii.
Defi
n
eswh
atpropertyis
anythingofva
luethatthestateprotects
(1) Propertyishugelypolitical
(2) Propertyisnotanindivisiblewholebundlesofentitlements
(3) Coreentitlementstoexclude,touse,totransfer,immunityfromloss.
(4) Notenoughonlytoaskwhoownstheproperty;needtoresolvecompetingdemandsof
ownerw.otherswhohaveinterest.
iii.
Def
ineswhatwecandow/property
(1) Tensionslimitingthecoreentitlements.
(2) Balancingpropertyinterestsofeachowner.
iv. Cr
eatingasystemtha
tbalan
cescompetingrightsandrespon
sibilities.
(1) Propertylawderivesfromasocialcompact,whichleadstosovereignmandate.
(a) Atthebase,peopleagreetosubmittoaformofgovt.
(2) Sovereignsetsgroundrulesonpropertysystem.
(a) Hastodefinerights,rightsdeterminewhatwillbeprotected.
(b) Anytimetheresaclashofentitlements,thestatehastoresolvethatdispute.
(i) Nondecisionsequallyassignificantasdecisions.
(3) Propertyinterestsoperateattwolevels
(a) Intersovereign
(b) Withinsovereignsystem(coreentitlements;everyonehasacounterentitlement.)
(i) Righttoexcludev.rightofaccess
(ii) Privilegetousev.securityfromharm
(iii) Powertotransferv.powersofownership
(iv) Immunityfromlossv.powertoacquire
(4) Sovereignholdssomepropertyrightsforthepublicstreambeds,navigablewaters
(5) Individualshold2setsofpropertyrights
(a) Publiclyheldb. Privatelyheld
(6) Propertyonanindividualleveliscombinationofrights/responsibilities.

II Core Entitlements / Tensions

III
IV Bundle of Sticks Property Rights
Possess

Alter/Destroy

Transfer/Dispose

PropertyBlocher2
EnjoyFruits/Profits/Benefits

Exclude

Use

1) CoreEntitlement/CoreTensionswithinthePropertySystem
a) Righttoexcludev.Rightofaccess
i) Privacyandfreeassociationnormsv.equalitynorms
b) Privilegetousev.Securityfromharm
i) Ownersnotfreetoharmneighborspropertysubstantially/unreasonably(negative
externalities)
c) Powertotransferv.Powersofownership
i) Freedomofdispositiongivesownerpowertosell,giveaway,writewilltotransfer,
imposeconditionslikeonlyresidentialuse,etc.
ii) Butcannotimposeconditionsthatviolatepubpolorundulyinfringeonlibertyinterests
offutureowners(onlytransfertosomeoneofsamerace,voteDemocrat,etc.)
iii) Freedomofdisposition,freedomofownerstomoveandpromoteefficienttransferof
propertyinthemarketplace,freedomoffutureownerstousepropertyastheywish,
freedomofcontract
d) Immunityfromlossv.Powertoacquire(eminentdomain)

Calabresi&MelamedTheory

1. LegalrulesthatcreateprivateCoA(orclaimsforrelief)canbesortedintotwokinds:
a. Rulesthatentitletheclaimanttoaninjunction.Associatedwithpropertyrights,socall
these"propertyrules"
i. PropertyRules:
1. Howitworks:Propertyrulesfixanabsoluteentitlementeitherto
engageintheconductortobesecurefromtheharm.
2. Inotherwords:
a. Thepricetoengageintheconductiscompletelydeterminedby
thepartyholdingthepropertyright(thewinner).Holdergetsto
decidevalue,andholdercannotbedeniedvalueunlessshe
consents.
b. Theother(losing)partywillhavetotrytobuyoutthewinnerin
anegotiation.Someonewhowishestoremovetheentitlement
fromitsholdermustbuyitfromholderinavoluntarytransaction
inwhichvalueofentitlementissetbyseller.
3. P(Entitlement)Injunction(PropertyrightheldbyP)
4. D(Entitlement)Dismisscomplaint
b. Rulesthatentitletheclaimanttodamages.Associatedwithtortorcontractualliability,
socallthese"liabilityrules"
i. Liabilityrule:Courtdeterminesvalue.
1. Howitworks:Liabilityrulesprohibiteachpartyfrominterferingwith
theinterestsoftheotherunlessthepartyiswillingtopaydamages.
2. Inotherwords:Thewinnercannotgetaninjunction.Thelosingparty
alwayshastheoptionofpayingdamagesandinterferingwiththe
winnersinterests.
ii. P(Entitlement)damages(Courtdetermined)
2

PropertyBlocher3
iii. D(Entitlement)purchasedinjunction(Courtrequiresit)
c. Injunctions/damageshavedifferenteffectsonfuturebehaviorandnegotiationofclaims.
2. Inalienabilityrule:entitlementsthatcantbetradedordeniedevenifconsentedto
a.
InalienabilityRules:
i. Howitworks:Inalienabilityrulesassignentitlementsandforbidtheirtransfer.
ii. Inotherwords:Thelosingpartyisprohibitedfrominterferingwiththewinners
interests,evenifthewinnerwantstosellthepropertyright.
3. Formofentitlementwhichgivesrisetoleastamountofstateintervention:
a. Onceinitialentitlementisdecidedupon,statedoesnottrytodecidevaluebutpartiessay
howmuchitsworth,givessellervetoifbuyerdoesntofferenough.
b. Propertyrulesinvolveacollectivedecisionastowhoistobegivenaninitialentitlement
butnotastothevalueoftheentitlement.
c. Wheneversomeonemaydestroyinitialentitlementifheiswillingtopayanobjectively
determinedvalueforit,entitlementisprotectedbyaliabilityrule.Thisvaluemaybe
whatitisthoughttheoriginalholderoftheentitlementwouldhavesolditfor.Butthe
holder'scomplaintthathewouldhavedemandedmorewillnotavailhimoncethe
objectivelydeterminedvalueisset.Thus,liabilityrulesinvolveanadditionalstageof
stateintervention:notonlyareentitlementsprotected,buttheirtransferordestructionis
allowedonthebasisofavaluedeterminedbysomeorganofthestateratherthanbythe
partiesthemselves.
d. Anentitlementisinalienabletotheextentthatitstransferisnotpermittedbetweena
willingbuyerandawillingseller.Thestateintervenesnotonlytodeterminewhois
initiallyentitledandtodeterminethecompensationthatmustbepaidiftheentitlementis
takenordestroyed,butalsotoforbiditssaleundersomeorallcircumstances.
e. Inalienabilityrulesarethusquitedifferentfrompropertyandliabilityrules.Unlikethose
rules,rulesofinalienabilitynotonly"protect"theentitlement;theymayalsobeviewed
aslimitingorregulatingthegrantoftheentitlementitself.
f.

Alienablerightsenforceablebyinjunctionsrequirelessstateinterventionthaninalienable
rightsonlyenforceablebydamageawards.

Rightprotected
bypropertyrule
Rightprotected
byliabilityrule

Fairness
Utility
Fairtoimposecostof
activityonplaintiff

UseRight
Enjoin(harm
outweighsbenefit)
paysdamages
(benefitoutweighs
harm)

UseRight
Nonuisanceusecontinues
Enjoinuse(forcethemmove)but
awardthemdamagestodoso
(occurswhenthehasmovedto
thenuisance)

Activitybenefitssociety
Fontainebleau:nonuisance;
entitlementprotectedby

Activitydoesnotbenefit
society
Webb:purchasedinjunction;s
entitlement,protectedbya
3

PropertyBlocher4

Notfairtoimposecost
ofactivityonplaintiff

propertyrule
Boomer:damages;s
entitlementprotectedbya
liabilityrule

liabilityrule
PageCounty:nonuisance;s
privilegeprotectedbyproperty
rule

CoastTheorem/EfficiencyTheories
1. Offerpricev.askingprice
a. Priceofthingsinornotinyourpossession
b. Overvaluethingsinyourpossession
c. Factorydoesntinternalizethosecostsbutcreatesexternality
d. Forcingpeopletointernalizeexternalitiesefficiency?
2. Efficiency:
a. Paretosuperiority:Someonegains,nooneisinjured.
b. Paretooptimality:NofurtherexchangescanbemadethatwouldbeParetosuperior.
c. KaldorHicksefficiency:Thisiswealthmaximization.Aslongasthewinnerswinmore
thantheloserslose,asituationisefficient.
3.
TheCoaseTheorem:
a. Describeeconomicefficiencyofeconomicallocation/outcomeinpresenceof
externalities.
b. Theorem:iftradeinanexternalityispossibleandtherearesufficientlylowtransaction
costs,partieswillbargain,andbargainingwillleadtoanefficientoutcomeregardlessof
theinitialallocationofproperty.
i. Costsarereciprocal
ii. Assumesperfectinformation
iii. Legaloutcomedoesntmatterbecausepartieswillreachanefficientsolution
c. Efficiencyisachievedbygivingtheentitlementtothepartywhovaluesitmost,with
valuemeasuredbywillingnessandabilitytopay.
d. Buttransactioncostscannotbeneglected,initialallocationofprop.rightsoftenmatter.
e. OnenormativeconclusiondrawnfromCoaseispropertyrightsshouldinitiallybe
assignedtoactorsforwhomavoidingthecostsassociatedwiththeexternalityproblem
arethelowest.
i. Inreallife,nobodyknowsexantemostvalueduseofaresource,andalsocosts
involvingthereallocationofresourcesbygovernmentalsoexist.
f. 2ndnormativeconclusionisgovernmentcreateinstitutionsthatminimizetransaction
coststoallowmisallocationsofresourcestobecorrectedascheaplyaspossible.
g. Version1:Acleardelineationofprivatepropertyrightsisanessentialpreludetomarket
transactions.
h. Version2:Aslongasprivatepropertyrightsarewelldefinedunderzerotransactioncost,
exchangewilleliminatedivergenceandleadtoefficientuseofresourcesorhighest
valueduseofresources.
i. Version3:Theallocationofresourcesisinvarianttotheassignmentofprivateproperty
rightsunderzerotransactioncostandzeroincomeeffect.

j. ProblemswithCoastTheorem:
i. Spiteandmalice(Fountainbleu)
ii. CompetitionmightwanttoNOTnegotiate

PropertyBlocher5
iii. Transactioncosts
1. Bargaining,litigation
2. Timedealingwithdispute
3. Informationdoesntcomefree
iv. Multipleparties
v. Information
vi. Offer&askdifferentpsychologicaleffects
vii. Costsofliquidity(interestratesonloans.Takeloanfornowinterst)
viii. Courtsbadatcalculatingdamages.Damagingpartydoesntgetbetter.
k. Pollutionofariverimposesamarginalsocialcost,MSC,onthevictimandprovidesa
marginalbenefit,MB,tothepolluter.Theefficientamountofpollutionistheonethat
makesMSC=MSB.
l. Intheexamplepictured,thisis4tonsperweek.Why?
m. Ifthepolluterownstheriver,thevictimwillpay$400toavoidpollutionbeyond4tons.
Ifvictimownstheriver,thepolluterwillpay$400fortherighttodump4tonsperweek.
n. Ineithercase,theresultisthesame.
4.
CritiquesofTransactionCostAnalysis:
a. Definevaluebyreferencetowillingnessandabilitytopay.Thosewithmorewealthhave
greatervotes.
b. Posner:justifiesuseofwealthmaximizationasameasureofbothsocialwelfareand
justice,henotesthatrelianceonwillingnesstopayasacriterionofvaluemay
sometimesconflictwithachievingaresultthatmaximizessocialutility.
c. RonaldDworkin:wealthdoesnotconstituteavalueinandofitself.Sinceefficiencyisa
functionofthedistributionofwealth,itisincompleteasacriterionofjusticewithouta
defenseoftheexistingdistributionofwealth.Economicanalysiscannotitselfprovide
suchajustificationsinceitdeterminesvaluebywillingnessandabilitytopay,whichin
turnisdeterminedbyaninitialdistributionofwealth.
d. Itisthereforecirculartodefinepropertyrightsbyreferencetothebargainspeoplewould
makeintheabsenceoftransactioncostsbecausewhatbargainstheyarelikelytomake
dependspartlyontheinitialdistributionofpropertyrightsbetweenthem.

JuralRelationships(TheGeniusofWesleyHohfeld)

Right
NoRight
Right
Duty

JuralOpposites
a) Eight
basic
Power
Immunity
legal
Disability
Liability
rights:
JuralCorrelatives
i) 4
Privilege
Power
Immunity
NoRight
Liability
Disability
Primarylegalentitlements(rights,privileges,powers,andimmunities)
ii) Theiropposites(Norights,duties,disabilities,andliabilities)
iii) Rights:claims,enforceablebystatepowerthatothersactinacertainmannerinrelationto
therightholder
(1) NoRights:doesnothavethepowertosummontheaidofthestatetoalterorcontrolthe
behaviorofothers
Privilege
Duty

PropertyBlocher6

b)
c)

d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)

iv) Privileges:permissionstoactinacertainmannerwithoutbeingliablefordamagestoothers
andwithoutothersbeingabletosummonstatepowertopreventthoseacts
(1) Duties:absenceofpermissiontoactinacertainmanner.
v) Powers:stateenforcedabilitiestochangelegalentitlementsheldbyoneselforothers
(1) Disabilities:absenceofpowertoalterlegalentitlements
vi) Immunities:securityfromhavingonesownentitlementschangedbyothers.
(1) Liabilities:absenceofimmunityfromhavingonesownentitlementschangedbyothers.
Conceptofopposites:Onemusthaveoneortheotherbutnotbothofthetwoopposites.
Conceptofcorrelatives:Legalrightsarenotmerelyadvantagesconferredbythestateon
individuals.Aytimethestateconfersanadvantageonsomecitizens,itnecessarily
simultaneouslycreatesavulnerabilityonthepartofothers.Legalrightsarenotsimply
entitlementsbutjuralrelations.Correlativesexpressasinglelegalrelationfromthepointofview
ofthetwoparties.
Importanttothinkabout:(1)whohastheentitlement(2)againstwhichspecificindividualsdoes
theentitlementrunand(3)whatspecificactsareencompassedbytheentitlement.
Ifyouhavea Someoneelsehasa
Claim
Duty
FirstOrderRight
Privilege
Noright
FirstOrderRight
Power
Liability
SecondOrderRight
Immunity
Disability
SecondOrderRight

j)

Restatement826
a) InjunctionsareavailablewhereDsconductisunreasonable(moresocialharmthangood)and
causessubstantialharmtoP
b) DamagesareavailablewhereDsconductisreasonable(moresocialgoodthanharm)butcauses
substantialharmtoP(i.e.,Boomer)
c) PurchasedInjunctionsareavailableifDsconductisunreasonablebutitisfairtoimposecostof
shuttingDdownonP(forexample,ifPcomestothenuisance)

PropertyBlocher7
d) NoRemedyif(a)harmtoPisnotsubstantial;(b)Dsconductisreasonableanditisnotunfairto
imposecostsonP;(c)imposingdamageswouldtotallystopDsactivity,resultinginnetsocial
loss

RecurringThemes/FactorstoConsiderinEvaluatingPropertyLaws
a)
SocialContext
i) Differenttypicalmodelsofpropertydependingonwhetheritisownedindividuallyorjointly,
amongfamilymembersornot,private/governmentalentity,profitable/charitablepurposes,
residential/commercialpurposes,opentopublic/privateuse
(1) Analyzepropertyrightsasrelationsamongpeopleregardingcontrolofvaluedresources
everyentitlementislimitedbythecompetingrightsofothers.
(2) Examinerolepropertyrightsplayinstructuringsocialrelationsandthewayinwhich
socialrelationsaffectaccesstoproperty
b) Formalv.informalsourcesofrights(whichshouldprevail?)
i) Formal:deed,will,lease,contract,governmentgrant
ii) Informal:oralpromise,courseofconduct,actualpossession,familyrelationship,oralgift,
longstandingreliance,socialcustomsandnorms
c)
Alienabilitydilemma
i) Fundamentaltenetofpropertylawsystemisthatpropertyshouldbealienablemeaningit
shouldbetransferablefromonepersontoanother.
ii) Propertyshouldbealienable,whichallowsamarkettofunctionandenablesefficient
transactionsandpropertyuse
iii) Promotesindividualautonomybyallowingownerstosellorgiveawaypropertywhenthey
pleaseontermstheyhavechosen
iv) Cons:
(1) Ifownersareabletodisaggregatepropertyrightsatwill,itmaybedifficultto
reconsolidatethoserights
(2) Ifpropertyrightsaredisaggregatedamongtoomanyowners,transactioncostswill
greatlyincrease
v) ManyrulesofpropertylawlimitKfreedomsoparticularbundlesofproprightsconsolidated
insameownersotensionbtwnpromotingalienabilitybyconsolidatingrightsinownersand
allowingownerstodisaggregaterightsintouniquebundles
d)
Contractualfreedomandminimumstandards
i) Freedomtodevelophumanrelationshipsw/ogovtintervention,createdesirablepackagesof
entitlementsbuttherearecertainminimumstandardsoncontractualrelationships(i.e.
evictionprocessforlandlord/tenants)
e)
Socialwelfare
i) Pro:ownerscanobtainresourcestosatisfytheirneeds,encouragesproductiveactivity
f) Justified/ReasonableExpectations

i) Ownersjustifiablyexpecttousetheirownpropertyfortheirownpurposesandtotransferit
ontheirownterms
ii) Bcpropertyuseoftenaffectsother,itmustbelimitedtoprotecttheexpectationofothers
g)
Distributivejustice
i) Wealthisunequallydistributedbetweenclassesofrace,gender,age,etc.sopropertylaws
shouldseekawaytoequalizethewealthdistribution
h)
Precedent
i)
JusticeandFairness

PropertyBlocher8
i)

Rightstheoristsarethereindividualintereststhataresoimportantfromamoralpointof
viewthattheydeservelegalprotectionthatoverridesmoregeneralconsiderationsofpublic
policy
ii) Naturalrightstheoristsrightsareinthenatureofhumanbeings
j)
Utility
i) Whataretheconsequencesofalternativelegalrules?
ii) Whatwillcreatethebehaviorthatissociallydesirable?Willitcreateamoreefficient
market?
iii) LandUtilizationWilderness
iv) Predictability
(1) Allowspeopletoavoidcourt,canbasetheiractionsonpredictableresult
k)
CompetingRights
l)
Po
sitivisman
dleg
alrealism
i)
Positivismequatelaww/rulesfromgovtforreasonsofsocialpolicy(protectindividual
rights,increasesocialwealth,etc.)
(1) Separatelawfrommoralsalthoughmoralargumentsmightunderlierulesoflaw,they
arentfullyenforcedlegalsanctions.
ii) Legal

realismthelawiswhatofficialswilldoinresolvingdisputes.
m)
PropertyRightsNotBeingAbsolute
i) ShackRightsarerelativeandtheremustbeanaccommodationwhentheymeet
ii) Shackonespropertyshouldneverbeusedtoinjuretherightsofanother
n)
Waste
i) TragedyoftheCommons,Hardin
(1) Whentherearesharedresources,anindividualwhoincreaseshistotalshareby+1offset
everyoneelsessharesby(1).
(2) Theindividualgainsthefullutilityofhisincreaselessthedistributedlosswhichburdens
everyone.
(3) Becausetheindividualgainsmorethanheloses,herepeats.
(4) Thiscausesourcommonresourcestoslowlybedepleted&destroyed.
(5) Solution:turnthecommonsintoprivatepropertysoindividualscannotdestroythem.

LaborTheory
1) JohnLocke:Propertyrightsfromrightsofindividuals(negativerightsthatmaynotbetaken)
i) Weownourselvesweownthingsthatwecreate(LaborTheory)
ii) LaborTheoryofbodypointstoparents(genetic+physicalmaterials)
(1) PointsustowardRegressionTheory
iii) UnderLockeantheoryyoucandowhateveryouwantwithyourbody
a) Lockeantheoryofthecommons
i) Youcanclaimwhateveryoumakeuseofwhateverisbeyondthisbelongstoothers
(efficiency)
b) Lockestheorydoesnotworkwellforcertaintypesofresources:
i) Competingclaims
ii) Claimsonthingsthatarenotunclaimed
c) TheoryworksbestforIPandruraleconomies,unclaimedresources.
d) NationalParks:
i) Leavinglandfallowisnotproductiveusepeoplelosetitletolandthattheydontdevelop.

PropertyBlocher9
e) TakeHome:Theoryisaboutproductiveuseofresourcesanditenvisionsaparticulartypeof
society.
i) Mostattractive:abundantassets,lowpopulation(suchasearlycolonies)
f) Narrowlibertarianview:Governmentshouldprotectpropertyrights,provideaforum,protect
infringement.

V Political Theory and Property

VI
I. PRINCIPLE

A. ProtectionofprivatepropertyisthefundamentalpurposeofGovernment
becausethereisadirectcorrelationbetweenpropertyandliberty.
II. DEMOCRACY(responsiveopengovt,individualrights,ruleoflaw(objective
application))
A. Propertyrightsreinforcetheseprinciplesbecausetheyareaboutcontrolofresources
(i.e.power).
1. Ifyouhavecontroloverthingsthatpeopleneedthenyouhavepowerover
them.
2. Classicmovetorestrictminoritiesistotakeawayproperty(repressive
authority).
a. See1938Reichsgesetzblatt(Germanlawpassedthattookawayall
Jewishpropertyrights)
3. Ifyoucanaccumulateresources,youcanaccumulateproperty.
III. PROPERTYandLIBERTY(veryimportantforemergingnations)
A. Capitalism/Socialism
1. IfStateownsallthepropertythenitcanmakedemandsonpeopleforbasic
rights.
2. Allaboutaccesstocapitalandtomarkets.
3. Friedmansayseverydemocracyhasbeencapitalist(butnotviceversa)
4. ThiscreatesalternativecentersofpowertotheStatepromotesliberty.
B. PowerofDiffusion
1. Middleclasswillleadtogreaterliberty.
2. Stablepropertyrightsensurestability.
C. Toleranceissuesofdistribution
1. Peoplearealwaystornbetweenbigideasandindividualproblems
2. Extremismislimited;peoplearemorelikelytosettleissues.
3. EUwasacoaltradingunion(France&Germany)
a. Linkingtheireconomiesforcedthemtonegotiatewitheachother
insteadofgoingtowar(WTOGATT)
4. Singlemostimportantaspectofupwardmobility:accesstocapital.
5. Moderndemocracyisareactiontofeudalismandslavery.
a. Ownyourselfandyouhavearighttobargain.

PropertyBlocher10

2.
CommonLawofTrespassandPublicPolicyLimitsonRighttoExclude
Thegiftofanactionoftrespassisinfringementontherightofpossession.WalkerDrugCo.v.LaSal
OilCo.(Utah1998).
1)
CommonLawTrespass:Unprivilegedintentionalintrusiononpropertypossessedbyanother.
a) Unprivileged
b) Intentional[voluntaryact(walking)notintentionallyonanothersland.mistake=trespass]
c) Intrusion
d) Onpropertyownedbyanother
e) Infringementontherightofpossession
2)
WhenCanTrespassBePrivileged?
a) Whendoneoutofnecessitytopreventfurtherharm.
b) Whenentryisencouragedbypublicpolicy.
c) Whendonewiththeconsentoftheowner.
i) Consent,evenifthroughfraud,iseffectiveifitdoesntinterferewithsecurityorprivacyor
interferewithunderlyingpropertyinterest.
ii) Whileimpliedconsentisfraudulent,stilleffectivebcofimpliedpublicpolicyofaccessto
property(testers,restaurantcritics,butnotokaytostealtradesecrets)
iii) FoodLionv.ABC:Consentwasjustforinitialentrybutnotforwhathappenedafter
videotapingmeatpackingpractice.
3)
Remedies
4)
a) Damages:nominal,compensatory(whatittakestorepair;fairmarketvaluev.presentvalue),
punitive
5) b) Injunction:legalorderthattrespassermuststayoff.
a) Declaratoryjudgment:establishingright/norighttogoonproperty
b) Criminalremedies
Statev.Shack(N.J.1971)PublicPolicyCriminalTrespass
1) F:Shack(D1)attorneynonprofitfundedbyOfficeofEconomicOpportunitypursuanttoactof
Congress.Tejeras(D2)fieldworkerfornonprofitfundedunderact.Orgsprovidemedical,legal
assistancetomigrantfarmlaborers.TejerastoenterTedescospropertytoadministermedical,legal
helptolaborerwhoneededstitchesremoved.Shacksoughttoprovidelegalhelptootherlaborer,w/
Tejeras.Tedescodemandedvisitsconductedinofficeandrefusedunsupervisedaccesstolaborersin
livingquarters.ShackandTejerasrefusedleaveTedescosproperty,convictedtrespass,fined$50
2) H/R:Tedescospropertyinterestdidnotextendtorighttoexcludeindividualsprovidingaccessto
governmentalservicesforbenefitofmigrantfarmlaborers.Notrespass.
a) Darglaborcampsameascompanytown,so1stAmendmentrighttoentertoaidlaborers.Court
rejected,heldcampwasnotanalogousbcnotopentopublic.
b) Amansrightinhisrealpropertyisnotabsolute.
c) Necessity,privateorpublic,mayjustifyentryuponthelandsofanother.
d) Compromisebtwncompetingneedsinlightoftherealitiesoftherelationshipbetweenthe
migrantworkerandfarmer.
e) Alaborcampisnotrequiredtokeepitspropertyopentogeneralpublic.
f) Employermayreasonablyrequireavisitortoidentifyhimselfandstategeneralpurpose.
g) Employermaynotdenyworkerprivacyorinterferewithopportunitytolivewithdignityandto
enjoyassociationscustomaryamongcitizens.
3) PubPol/Theory:
10

PropertyBlocher11
a) Propertyrightsservehumanvalues.PropertyrightsareBELOWhumanneeds,rights
b) Titletorealpropertydoesnotincludedominionoverthedestinyofpersonstheownerpermitsto
comeontothatproperty.Theirwellbeingmustremaintheparamountconcernofasystemoflaw.
c) Partiescannotcontractawaywhatisdeemedtobeessentialfortheirhealth,welfare,ordignity.
4)
NotesfromClass:
a) Constitutionality:
i) FirstAmendmentRights:(Beingviolatedbystatestatute)
ii) StateactiondoctrineConstitutiononlyappliestogovernment(generally13th)
(1) Here,Tedescoisaprivateactor,butcaselawMarshv.Alabama(US1946)if
propertyopentopublic,onlydifffromcompanytownandpublictownisthatcompany
towntitleincorporation(Darglikegovernmentcompanytown)(stillgoodlaw)and
Amalgamatedv.LoganValleyPlazaopentopublic(mall)notgoodlaw
(2) Favorable:BothMarshandAmalgamatedLoganPlazaprivatebutfunctionlikepublic
open.Likeacompanytown.
iii) SupremacyClauseConstitution/Federal/TreatySupreme,trumpsstatelawcontrary
(1) Favorable:
(a) Scopeoflaw
(b) CRLSpurposeoflawistoaccessaidtomigrantpopulation
(c) Iffederallawisconstitutional,thenstatelawinterfering/overridingwillbetrumped
(2) Unfavorable:statelawdoesnthavetohelpfederallaw.Federallawnottotallyin
conflict
b) NOTRELEVANTHERE:DidnotlookintoConstitutionbutPROPERTYRIGHTSviaNJState
Lawpolicyinterpretedviastatelaw(Williams,Scottish)
i) PublicPolicyconsiderationsanimatingmigrantworkingconcerns
ii) Somerightstoofundamentalforemployees/peopletocontractaway
iii) Migrantworkersunequalbargaining,communicationlimitations(phone,etc.)
iv) Lackofchoice
v) Tedescolostcontroloverrighttoexcludepartiallyvisitorsnotinterferingwithbusiness.
Pressgivenreasonableaccess.Membersofthesegroups,theirownvisitors.
vi) Canexclude:merchants,solicitors,competitors,violentpeople,andcanaskforID
vii) Fundamentalrighttoassociation,solandlordcannotstoptenantfromassociations
th
Desnickv.AmericanBroadcastingCompanies(7

Cir.1995)POSNER!PublicPolicyCIVIL

1) P:DesnickEyeCenter,ophthalmicclinic,and2ofitssurgeonsGlazerandSimon
2) D:ABCtelevisionnetwork,ProducerofPrimeTimeLivenamedEntine,reporterDonaldson.
3) F:EntineinformedPmakingprogramoncataractpractices.EntineaskedifhecanvideoPclinic,
assuredPnoambushinterviews/undercover,processwillbefairandbalanced.Pagreed,butD
sentundercoverpatientstoDsotherclinics,interviewedpatientsatclinic.ProgramshowedP
suggestingcataractsurgeriestoelderlypeoplewhowerecoveredunderMedicare,eventhoughmany
ofthesepeopledidntevenrequirethesesurgeries.
4) PH:Psuetrespass,defamation,andothertorts.Lowercourtdismissedcomplaint.

11

PropertyBlocher12
5) H:Whenlandownerpermitsentrytohispropertybasedonothersmisrepresentationsoramisleading
omission,willNOTalwaysconstitutetrespass.
a) Toenteruponanotherslandwithoutconsentistrespass.
b) Thoughapersonmayenterlandwithdifferentintentionthanwhatownerbelieves,trespasswill
notoccuruntiltherehasbeenaninterferencewithownership/possessionofland.
c) Undercovervideosofprofessionalcommunicationsdoesnotinterferew/o/pofland.
d) Here,clinicopentoanyone.
e) DdidnotrevealpersonalinfoofP,onlyrevealedprofessionalconductofP.Noworkwas
disturbed,noembarrassinglyintimatedetailsrevealed,notradesecretsstolen,soPcannothavea
claimundertrespass.
6)
NotesfromClass

:
a) Consenteither(a)implicitmeterreader,business;(b)explicit(invitation)
b) Lineisdrawnbywhatintereststrespassmeanttoprotectinviolabilityofthepersons
property,security,integrityofperson
i)

Restaurantcritic:objectionwouldbetowhathewrote,nottohisentry,andsincepeoplehave
arighttoeatandopinate,cannotlimitthisright.Similartodocumentary

ii) Falsefriendviolatepropertyinterest?No,friendshipisdifficulttodefine.Whatyouwanted
wasadinnerguestsoyougotoneevenifthatpersondoesntactuallylikeyou
iii) Investigativejournalistsisaslipperslopethough?Everyonehasablog.
c) Definingtheboundariesoftrespass:
i)

Looktounderlyinginterestforintent/interest(toexclude,privacy)thenseeifalleged
actoftrespassexceededthescopeofthisinterest

ii) Scopeofconsent?=Desnick
iii) PublicPolicy=Statev.Shack(Necessity)
(1) Obstruct,interferewithownershipoforpossessionofland
iv) Fraudulentlyobtainedconsentcanbetrespass

12

PropertyBlocher13

FoodLion,Inc.v.CapitalCities/ABC,Inc.(4thCir.)CountertoPub/Pol
1) Facts:ABCPrimetimeairedprogramaboutfoodhandlingpracticesofFoodLionundercover
reportingofinvestigativereporters.FoodLionsued,notdefamation,butunfairtradepractices,fraud,
breachofcontract,bcreportersgainedaccessbygettingjobsatFoodLionstoresbasedonfalse
resumes(nomentionre:employedbyABC).DistrictcourtFoodLionwon.
2) Decision:
a) Reportersnotcommittedfraudbutbreacheddutyofloyalty
b) Reporterstrespassed;thoughinitialentrywasallright,secretlyvideotapingexceededscopeof
invitationsotrespass.
c) ABCnotresponsibleforlostprofitsincurredbyFoodLion.
d) FirstAmendment:claimsABCmadeonprogramweretrue,notdefamatory,regardlessofhow
informationattained.
e) Dsnotguiltyoffraudbccontractsigneduponemploymentexplicitlystatedthateitherparty
couldterminateemploymentatanytimeandforanyreason,soFoodhadassumeriskofearly
departure,thefalsepretensesunderwhichtheywerehiredwererenderedirrelevant.
f) Initialentrywasconsentedto.
Questions!

Iamhavingtroublereconcilingthetrespassandscopeofconsentcases.Iunderstandhowto
distinguishDesnickandFoodLion,butI'mhavingtroublereconcilingFoodLionandMoorev.
Regents.IknowMoorewasmeanttoillustratethelabortheory,butitfeelssomuchlikea
trespassandconsentcase.

ForFoodLion,theinitialentrywasnotatrespass(thoughentrywasconsentedtobasedonfalse
pretenses),butthetapingwasatrespassbecauseitexceededthescopeoftheconsent.Inclass,we
talkedabouthowthisholdingfocusedprimarilyonthereporters'jobdutiesforFoodLion?Ifso,
thatseemslikethecourtusedaformalisticdelineationtoachieveadesiredresultratherthan
formingaworkablerule.Forexample,whenanemployeesetsupacameraintheirownoffice
(onemployer'sproperty)andtapesinteractionswithasupervisorwithouthis/herknowledge(i.e.
becausesupervisormaypotentiallysexuallyharass),thenthatemployeehasdonesomething
outsidetheirjobdutiesandwouldnotbeprotected.Idon'tknowiftheFoodLioncourtwillwant
toreprimandthatemployee.Also,thedisgruntledpartywouldlikelybemostlycontestingthe
content(revealedinformation)andlessthetrespass.ItalsoseemsliketheFoodLionrulepunted
theactuallegalissueofwhethervideotapingisoutofthescopeofconsentandreliedonthe
employmentcontext.Whataboutthemeterreaderwhovideotapeshis/herinteractionsfor
protectionsincethatpersonisenteringstrangers'homes?

IknowthemajorityinMoorefocusesonhowMoorediscardedhisbodytissue,essentially
abandoningit,sotherefore,hispropertyinterestwasnottrespassed.However,thisfeels
unsatisfactory.MooreseemstooclosetoFoodLion.ForMoore,Mooreconsentedtoboththe
initialentryandthetakingofhispersonalproperty(bodytissue).DoesMoorecomeout
differentlyfromFoodLion,becauseinMoore,theentryandtakingwerebothperformedwithin
thescopeofthedoctorpatientrelationship(unliketheemployeedutiesinFoodLion)?Butthen

13

PropertyBlocher14
thedoctorpatientrelationshipalsoincludesthislegaldutytoinform,sowouldn'tthatmake
Moore'sconsentineffective?

Shouldtrespassesbyinvestigativejournalistsbeprivilegedbecausetheyfurtherastrongpublic
policyofprotectingconsumersfromharmfulproductsandservices?

Punitivedamagesaregenerallylimitedtocasesinvolvingoutrageousoregregiousconduct.

ArepunitiveswarrantedineitherDesnickorFoodLion?

Atenantinathreeunitapartmentbuildingletshisgirlfriendmoveinwithhim.Thelandlord,
whooccupiesanotheroneoftheunits,saysno.Whowins?

Compensatory

Injunctive

Expectation

SpecificPerformance

Punitive

Declaratory

Nominal

Sanctions

1)
TrespasstoChattels
a) Unprivileged
b) Intentional
c) Injurytopropertyordispossessionorintentionalusingorintermeddlingwithproperty
d) Onpropertyownedbyanother
e) eBayIncv.BiddersEdge(NDCal2000)(YES.Dinternetbasedauctionaggregatingsite
accessedPsinternetauctiontradingsitethroughautomatedprogramthatsent80k100k
informationrequestsperdaytoPssitebydiminishingthequalityorvalueofeBays
computersystemsbyconsumingatleastaportionofeBaysbandwidthandservercapacity)
f) IntelCorpv.Hamidi(notrespasscouldbeshowninabsenceofdispossessionunless
communicationdamagedrecipientscomputersystemorimpaireditsfunctioning).

14

PropertyBlocher15

3.
RightofReasonableAccesstoPropertyOpentothePublic
1)
2)
3)
4)

Privateproperty(righttoexcludestrongest)
Privatepropertyheldopentopublic(medium;rightofreasonableaccess)
Publicproperty(rightofaccessabsolute).
Rightofreasonableaccess:Youcantbeexcludedforanarbitraryordiscriminatoryreason
havetohaveagoodreasonforkickingyouout.
a) Norestrictionsbasedonrace/color/creed/nationalorigin
b) Analysis:casebycase,lookatfactsandwhypersonwasexcluded.
c) Isthererightofreasonableaccess?
d) Weretheyexcludedonarbitrarygrounds?
5) Whoissubjecttotherightofreasonableaccess?
a) Traditionalrule:justinnkeepersandcommoncarriers
i) Innkeepers&CommonCarriers(planes,trains,buses)
(1) Dutytoservemembersofpublicunlessthereisagoodreasonnotto
(2) Publicdoeshavearightofreasonableaccess
ii) AllOtherBusinesses
(1) Absolutepowertoexcludefornearlyanyreason
(2) Butnotelimitationsonpowertoexcludeonthebasisofrace
iii) Areinternetcarriercommoncarriers?DCCircuitstruckdown.
b) Minorityrule:allestablishmentsheldopentothepublic
i) Rightofreasonableaccessappliestoallbusinessesholdingthemselvesouttothepublic.
(1) Exclusionmaystillbejustified,butmustbereasonable.
6) Whyinnsandcommoncarriers?(Commonunderstanding)
a) Necessity
b) Morelikelytobemonopoly
c) Holdouttopublicandpublicrelyonthem
Ustonv.ResortsInternationalHotel,Inc.,(N.J.1982)MinorityRule
d) F:DexcludedPfromblackjacktablesinitscasinobcPisexpertcardcounter.Casino
ControlCommissionuphelddecisionsayingappellanthadcommonlawrighttoexcludefrom
premisesanyone,solongastodosowasnotviolationoflaw.
e) R:Whenpropertyowneropenpremisestogeneralpublicinpursuitofproperty
interests,norighttoexcludepeopleunreasonably.Statev.Schmid(NJ1980).
i) Ownershaverightanddutytoexcludewhodisruptregularandessentialoperationsof
premisesorposesecurityf
(1) Statev.Schmid(NJ1980):constitutionalrightliteratureonprivateuniv.campus.
ii) Dutynottoactinanarbitraryordiscriminatorymannertowardpersonswhoenter
premisesAppliesnotonlytocommoncarriers,innkeepers,ownersofgasolineservice
stations,ortoprivatehospitals,butallpropertyownerswhoopenpremisestopublic.
iii) Pdoesnotfitcategory,notdisruptiveanddidnotinterferewithregularfunctioningof
casino,notdangerous/securityrisk.Ppossessesrightofreasonableaccesstocasino.
iv) CasinoControlCommissionrulingallowingappellantcasinotobarappellee.
(1) CasinoControlActN.J.Stat.Ann.5:121to152keptappellantfrombarring
appelleefromcasino.Actprevailedoveranyotherprovisionoflawinconflictor
inconsistentwithitsprovisions,includingcommonlawrule.
(2) Actgavesolecommandtocommissiontoregulategamblingtoassurevitalityof
casinooperationsandfairoddstoandmaximumparticipationbycasinopatrons.

15

PropertyBlocher16
(3) Italonehadtheauthoritytoexcludepatronsbasedupontheirstrategiesforplaying
licensedcasinogamesortochangetherulesofblackjack.
(4) Appelleehadnotviolatedanycommissionrule,nordisruptedthefunctioningofany
casinooperation.
Question!AlargedepartmentstorelocatedindowntownBostonhasbecomeagatheringplacefor
homelesspersonsduringthewintermonths.Shoppersareuncomfortablebecauseofdisheveled
appearancesandworriesofmentalillness.Therehavebeennoproblems,butworrieshavebeendeterring
customers.Managementdevelopspolicythatanyoneappearinghomelessisaskedtoleave.Oneperson
sues,arguingthestorehasadutytoservepublic,andcanonlyexcludeforcause.Massachusettshasthe
traditionalrule.ShouldthecourtadopttheminorityruledescribedinUston?Ifso,wouldtheexclusionof
homelesspeoplebeokay?

16

PropertyBlocher17

4.
ThePublicTrust,

pp.5669
1. TraditionalPublicTrustDoctrine:
i. Air,water,sea,shoresarecommontoallmankindAntidemocraticdoctrine
ii. Landsareheldbythesovereign[thestate]forthebenefitofeveryone
b. AreaCovered:navigablewaters;tidelands/forelands
c. Uses:HistoricallyIncluded(ienavigationandfishing)
d. Conception:PublicRightcreatedbySovereignDuty;preexistingencumbranceonthe
land;noprivateinterestsinvolved
2. PublicTrustDoctrineunderAvon(BorohoNeptuneCityv.BorohoAvonbytheSea,NJ1972)
a. [L]andcoveredbytidalwatersbelongedtothesovereign,butforthecommonuseofall
thepeople.(Avon,p.58)
b. Area:Extendedtodrysandbeachimmediatelylandwardofthehighwatermark.
c. Uses:Extendedtorecreationaluses,includingbathingandswimming
d. Conception:StilltiedtoSovereignDuty,butemphasisonlandbeingmunicipallyowned
showsanawarenessofpotentialfutureconflictwithprivaterights
3. PublicTrustDoctrineunderMatthews(NJ1984)
a. AreaCovered:Extendedtoincludedrysandareaownedbyquasipublicbody
i. Factorsinconsideringwhatdrysandmustbeopened(p.60):
1. (1)Locationofdrysandareainrelationtoforeshore
2. (2)Extentandavailabilityofpubliclyowneduplandsandarea
3. (3)Natureandextentofpublicdemand
4. (4)Usageofuplandlandbyowner
b. Uses:Extendedtoallowcrossingbeachtogettowater
c. Conception:Aninterestheldbythepublic,notanencumbranceonland;balance
publicsrightandprivateinterests(newconception!)
4. Argumentsinsupport:
a. Wanttogivepublicaccesstolimitedresourceswhereitsimpossibletogiveeveryonea
privateshare.
b. Protectlandsfromexploitation.
c. Shouldntgiveparticularlandstojustafewpeople.
d. Hasalwaysbeenreliedon,traditionalrule.
5. Argumentsagainst:
a. Privatepropertyrightswillleadtobestuseoflandpropertyputtobestuseofland,
avoidtramplingbypublic.
b. Societyhasevolvedfromtimewhenrulecameabout.
Matthewsv.BayHeadImprovementAssociation(N.J.1984)
1. Publicmustbegivenbothaccesstoanduseofprivatelyowneddrysandareasasreasonably
necessary,byallowingmembershipintheassociationtobeopentothepublicatlarge.
2. Facts:InBayHead,privatepropertiescornerbeach,6parcelsownedbyBayHeadImprovement
Association(D),anonprofitassociationwhosepurposeisimprovingandbeautifyingBayHead
bycleaning,policing,etc.Beachonlyaccessibletomembersoftheassociationwhopayfees
restrictedtopropertyownersandresidentsofthetownofBayHead.
3. PH:PointPleasantbroughtactionassertingDpreventedPointPleasantresidentsfromaccessing
beachcontrarytopublictrustdoctrine.
a. Precedent:publicrightsindrysandareaslimitedtobeachesownedbyamunicipality.

17

PropertyBlocher18
b. [T]hepublictrustdoctrinedictatesthatthebeachandtheoceanwatersmustbeopento
allonequaltermsandwithoutpreferenceandthatanycontrarystateormunicipalaction
isimpermissible.
4. Held:Dactivitiesparalleledthoseofmunicipalityinoperatingbeachfront,somembershipmust
beopentopublicatlarge
a. Publicrighttousetheforeshorewouldbemeaninglessiftheonlyfeasibleaccessroute
cutoff,effectivelyeliminatingrightsofthepublictrustdoctrine.Nothingsaidthatall
privatelyownedbeachfrontpropertymustalsobeopened.Caseappearstoturnonthe
quasipublicactivityoftheDefendantassociation.Ifpublichastherighttousethe
beaches,buthasnowaytoaccessthewaterbecausethebeachissurroundedbyprivate
property,thenprecedentwillbeuseless.
b. Therefore,thect.stated:recognizingtheincreasingdemandforourStatesbeaches
andthedynamicnatureofthepublictrustdoctrine,wefindthatthepublicmustbegiven
bothaccesstoanduseofprivatelyowneddrysandareasasreasonablynecessary.
c. Inthecurrentcase,aquasipublicorganizationisinvolvedanditcanexcludepublicfrom
itspropertyonlywhenexclusionislawfullyexercisedinfurtheranceofthepublic
welfarerelatedtoitspubliccharacteristics.
d. ThepracticesofDinthiscasearenotfurtheringanypublicgood.
e. Dwillhavetoopenupitspropertyforpeopletoreasonablyaccesssandandwaterfront.
f. Parguesthatallofprivatepropertyshouldbeopenedtothepublic.Butthatisnot
necessaryatthistime.IfDsellsallitspropertytosomeprivateentity,thenitwill
becomenecessarytodecideontheissueofwhetherprivatepropertyshouldbeopenedto
public.Butatthistime,itisnotnecessary.SoheldforP.
3comm
onlawdoctrines(otherthanpublictrust)tograntrightsofaccesstopublic:
1. Dedicationgiftofrealpropertyfromprivateownertopublic.
a. Requiresofferbyownerandacceptancebypublic,mustbeunequivocalact,clearintent
forpublicuse.
2. Prescriptionifpublichasusedpropertypossessedbyanotherforcertainpurposeforalong
time(measuredbySoL),publiccanacquirerightsofaccesspermanently,eveniftheyneverhad
theminthefirstplace(orifhadbeenlimitedbyprivateownership)
3. Easementpermanentrighttodosomethingonsomeoneelsesland.
a. GenerallycreatedbyagreementBUTiflandownerfailstoexcludetrespassersfrom
property,shemayloserighttosuethemunderSoL
b. Rightofpublic:prescriptiveeasement
4. Traditionally:mostctsrefusedtoallowpublictoobtaineasementbyprescription,buttodaymost
willrecognizesucheasements.
Righttobesomew
hereandproblemofhomelessness
a. Pottingerv.CityofMiami
i. ACLUsuesMiamibcofsweepofhomelesspeoplebefore1988OrangeBowl
Parademanymorehomelesspeoplethanwhatcouldbehandledinshelters.
ii. Judgeorderedpolicetostoparrestingpeopleforinnocent,harmlessand
inoffensiveacts:eating/sleeping/bathing/sittingdowninpublic.
b. Tobev.CityofSantaAna
i. CASupCtupheldmuniordinancethatbannedcamping/storageofpersonal
propertyinpublicareas,despiteevidencethatshelterswere2,500bedsshort.
ii. Saidordinancedidntinevitablyconflictw.constitutionalprohibitions.

18

PropertyBlocher19
iii. Ordinancedidntpunishindividualsforbeinghomelessbcitregulatedconduct,
notstatus.Noconstitutionalobligationtomakeaccommodationson/inpublic
propertytofacilitatehomelesspeoplesexerciseofrighttotravel.

19

PropertyBlocher20

5.
ObligationsRe:QuietEnjoyment:UnreasonableLandUse,[p.36884]
1. Nuisance:
a. Anunreasonableactoromissionwhichcauses
b. Substantialinterferencewiththeuseorenjoymentofland
2. Restatement(Second)ofTortsdefineslanduseasunreasonablewhenthegravityoftheharm
outweighstheutilityoftheactorsconduct.
a. Toevaluatethegravityoftheharm,courtsaretolookat:
i. Extentoftheharminvolved
ii. Characteroftheharminvolved
iii. Socialvaluethatthelawattachestothetypeofuseorenjoymentinvaded
iv. Suitabilityoftheparticularuseorenjoymentinvadedtothecharacterofthe
locality
v. Burdenonthepersonharmedofavoidingtheharm
b. Theevaluatetheutilityoftheconduct,courtsaretolookat:
i. Socialvaluethatthelawattachestotheprimarypurposeoftheconduct
ii. Suitabilityoftheconducttothecharacterofthelocality
iii. Impracticabilityofpreventingoravoidingtheinvasion
3. RighttoUsev.RighttoEnjoy/Use=NuisanceLaw
a. Useyourpropertysoasnottoinjureanothersproperty.Alotofbalancing.
b. Remedy?Moneydamagesorinjunction
i. Substantialinterference
ii. Unreasonableinterference
iii. Useandenjoymentoflandharmed
4. Intentionality:mustbeintentionalnotintenttodoharmbutintenttodoact
a. Strictliability:nointent,whetherornotyoutookutmostcare.Ultrahazardousactivity
5. Nuisanceisaflexi
b
ledoctrine:
a. Typically:activitiesthatareoffensive,physically,tothesensesandwhichbysuch
offensivenessmakeslifeuncomfortablesuchasnoise,odor,smoke,dust,orevenflies.
b. Ex:vibration/blastingdamagingahouse,emissionofpollutants
(smoke/dust/gas/chemicals),offensiveodors,andnoise.
6. Generalruleforwho
youca
nsu
e:
a. Liabilityonanyactorwhomateriallyparticipatesincausingtheharm.
b. Dsconductmustbeasubstantialfactorinbringingabouttheallegedharm.
7. Trespass:differentinterestsunderlying(possessoryinterest)
a. Indirectinvasion,likesmoke,notphysicalinvasionperse
b. Noteasytodistinguish
c. Somectsdistinguishtrespassfromnuisancebyarguingtrespasshastobedirect(bullet
firedacrossland;thereforepollutionisnuisanceb/cparticlescarriedbywindisindirect
invasion)andphysicalobjectshavetobelargerthanmicroscopictoconstitutetrespass
i. Moderntrendistorecognizeinvasionbyparticlesasbothtrespassandnuisance
andtoallowPtorecoverunderboththeories.
ii. Bradleyv.AmericanSmelting&RefiningCo.(trespassandnuisanceclaim
againstfactoryemittingarsenicandcadmiumthatfellonPsland)
1. Tcanonlyoccurifparticlesfelltoground(remaininginairinsufficient).

20

PropertyBlocher21
2. DliableforTonlyifPcanprovesubstantialdamagereconciling
interestsofmanywhoareunaffectedbypossiblepoisoningw/fewwho
areaffected
8. Negligence:unreasonablilityofconduct
a. Nuisance:unreasonableeffect
b. Unreasonab
leinvolvessubstantialharmthatanownershouldnthavetobearforthe
goodofsociety.t
c. Rightprotectedbynuisance=quietenjoymentofonesland.
d. Negligenceimpliesjudgmentthatreasonablepersonwouldhaveforeseenharmand
preventedit.
e. Nuisancefocusesonresultofconductratherthanconductitselfwhetherinterference
wasunreasonable.
9.
Pe
rmanentv
.TemporaryNuisance
a. Permanent:irreparablyinjurespropertyorisofsuchacharacterthatitislikelyto
continueindefinitely.SoLforbringingclaimstartsattimenuisancebegins.
b. Temporary:canbealleviatedbychangesinDsconduct.SoLrefreshesw/eachnew
injury.
10. Privatev.Public(Enforcedbypublicofficial)
a. Nuisanceperaccidens=lawfulnuisance
b. Nuisanceperse=unlawfulnuisance
11. Hypersensitiveuse:aboveaverageuseofproperty(PageCounty)(normalcystandard)
a. Argumentagainst:unfair,socialutility,efficiency,insufficientjuryinstruction
12. Definingunreasonablelanduse:
a. Determinewhatinterestsfallunderuseandenjoymentofland.
b. Howseriousmustinterferencebefornuisancetobepresent?
i. Traditional:substantial:tobeprotected
c. IfDhassubstantiallyinterfered,howdowedeterminewhetherharmisunreasonable
d. Canfocusonrights(Psrighttosecurityv.Dsrighttofreedomofaction)orfairness
e. Socialutility/welfareanalysiscostsv.benefitsofprovidingremedy.
f. Rightsconsiderations
g. ConflictsbtwnDsrighttofreedomv.Psrighttosecuritymainbalancingtestin
opinions.
i. Somestatesdeemactivitynuisancebcconductisdisfavored(spitefencestopiss
offneighbors)
ii. Somestatesdeemactivitynuisancewhentypeofharminvolvedisonethat
ownersshouldnthavetobear,atleastw/ocompensation.
1. Nuisancespersecriminalactivity(drugmanufacturing/sales).
2. Activitiesnotcustomarytoareaprobablynotprotected.
3. Certainactivitiesnotnuisancesb/cregulatingthemrestrictsfreedomof
actiontoomuchandregulationwillcauseunfairsurprise.
4. PageCountyAppliancev.Honeywell,Inc.(TCshouldhaveletjury
decidewhetherAppCenterwasdevotingitspremisestoanunusually
sensitiveuse)
iii. Someactivitiesnotnuisancesbcharmfulactivitywastherefirst.
1. Pscomingtonuisancenotabsolutedefenseoperatingfactorymaybe
wrongifitseventuallysurroundedbyhomes.
iv. Somestateshaverighttofarmstatutesthatprotectfarmersfromliabilityfor

21

PropertyBlocher22
nuisanceiffarmswereestablishedbeforesurroundingresidentialpropertywas
built.
1. NB:onectstruckdownthislawongrounditunconstitutionallydeprived
Psofrighttosuefornuisance.
13. SocialwelfareconsiderationsinNlaw.
a. Utilityfactors:Socialvaluethatthelawattachestoprimarypurposeoftheconduct
i. Suitabilityofconducttocharacteroflocality
ii. Impracticabilityofpreventingoravoidinginvasion
b. Fairness:characterofharm,distributiveconcerns,andfault.
c. Welfare:costsandbenefits,incentives,lowestcostavoider.
14. Vegetationinnuisance(traditionallynotaddressedintrespass)
a. Fancherv.Fagella(sweetgumtreeruiningneighborspropertywasitanuisance,and
couldthectgrantequitablereliefinthecaseoftheexistenceofanuisance?
15. Remedies
a. Twoseparatequestions
i. Whichpartyhasbasicentitlement?
ii. DoesPhaverighttobefreefromtheharm,ordoesDhaverighttoengagein
thatactivity?
iii. WhatremediesforNaction?
b. Propertyfixabsoluteentitlementeithertoengageintheconduct(noliability)ortobe
securefromtheharm(injunctiverelief).Fixedbyprivatebargainingratherthancourt
order.
c. Liabilityprohibiteachpartyfrominterferingw/interestsoftheotherunlessthepartyis
willingtopaydamagesdeterminedbyacourtoflaw.
d. IfPprotectedbylaw,Dhastopaydamages.
e. IfDcanengageinactivity,PwontbeentitledtoinjunctionunlessitcompensatesDfor
stoppingactivitypurchasedorconditionalinjunction.
f. Inalienabilityassignentitlementsandprohibitthemfrombeingsold/exchanged.
PageCountyApplianceCenter,Inc.v.Honeywell,Inc.(Iowa1984)
1. Synopsis:Personresponsibleforanuisancemaybeliableeventhoughthatpersonhasusedthe
highestpossibledegreeofcartopreventorminimizetheeffect.
2. Facts:1953,PageCountyApplianceCenteroperatedappliancestore,noreceptiontroublewith
displayTVs.Jan.1980,customerscomplainedTVsbad.ITTcomputermanufacturerandvendor
(Honeywell)providedelectronicservicestonearbytravelagency.ITTcomputerplacedattravel
agencygeneratedinterference,leakingradiation.Computerwasinstalled,maintainedby
Honeywell.Honeywellengineersmademanyunsuccessfultripstofix.Bothsaynotresponsible.
3. PH:Pagesuednuisanceandtortiousinterferencew/businessrelations.Pwonboth,awardedby
jury$71,000compensatory$150,000punitive.TrialawardedITTfullindemnity.BothDsappeal.
4. H:
a. Apersonsuseofpropertyshouldnotunreasonablyinterferewithordisturbaneighbors
comfortableandreasonableuseandenjoymentofhisorherestate.
i. Nuisanceisdefinedasasubstantialandunreasonableinterferencewiththeuseor
enjoymentofland.Restatementversion?!
b. Pageallegedprivatenuisanceanactionableinterferencewithapersonsinterestinthe
privateuseandenjoymentofhisorherpropertyNuisanceperaccidensalawful
activityconductedinsuchamannerastobeanuisance.

22

PropertyBlocher23
c. Thetestofwhetheroperationoflawfulindustryisnuisance(Restatementversion):
i. reasonablenessofconductingit
1. inthemanner,
2. attheplace,and
3. underthecircumstancesshownbytheevidence
4. Also:priorityoflocation,characterotheneighborhood,natureofthe
allegedwrong,characterandgravityoftheresultinginjuryismajor
factor.Balancinggravityofwrongandutilityandmeritoriousnessof
conduct.
ii. notaffectedbyintentionofcreatornottoinjureanyone.
iii. Eachlandownerstimeofarrivalwillbegivenweight.
d. Apersonresponsibleforanuisancemaybeliableeventhoughthatpersonhasusedthe
highestpossibledegreeofcartopreventorminimizetheeffect.Notbasedonnegligence.
e. Rightbeingprotectedbyanuisanceclaimisrighttoquietenjoymentoftheland.Notan
absoluteprotectionbecauseharmmustbesubstantialandinterferenceunreasonable.
Fancherv.Fagella(Va.2007)
1. Facts:Fancher,Fagellaneighbors.DFagella,largesweethumtreerootsystemdamagedand
displacedretainingwall.RootsystemdamagedPspatio,blockedsewer+waterpipes,impaired
foundationofhouse.Fancherattemptedselfhelpbutcontinuestoworsenhisproperty.
2. Held:
a. Encroachingtreesandplantsmayberegardedasanuisancewhentheycauseactualharm
orposeanimminentdangerofactualharmtoadjoiningproperty.
b. Whenencroachingtreeonlycastshade,dropsflowers,orfruitonadjoiningpropertythat
isnotconsideredanuisance.
c. Personhasarighttouseandenjoymentofhisproperty.Whensomethinginfringesupon
thatrightitisconsideredanuisanceanddamageswillfollow.
d. Ifthereisnoactualdamagetotheproperty,theonlyremedyisselfhelp.
e. Ifthereisdamagefromrootsandbranchesthecourtstreatthetreeastrespassingupon
anotherpersonspropertywhichisactionable.
i. Selfhelpremedyisstillgood,butowneroftreewillberesponsibleforcutting
downencroachingbranchesandrootsifitcausedamagetohisneighbor.
f. Onlyreviewedcasesinruraltimesandutilizedpersuasiveauthoritytooverrule
precedent.
g. OtherPrecedent:
i. VirginiaPrecedent:selfhelpbutalsoifnoxiousandcausesubstantialinjury,
thengetmore.Butwhatdoesnoxiousmean?Badunworkabledefinition
ii. Massachusetts:Selfhelponly(outdatedre:urbanization)
iii. RestatementRule:artificialv.naturalvegetation.Ifnatural,thenselfhelponly.
Ifartificial,thengettodomore.Setsweirdincentivesthough.Ifyouletyour
treesandweedsgowildthatsokay,butwelltendedgardengetsstrictreview.
Alsowhatisnaturalversusartificial?
iv. Hawaii:Ifcauseactualharmorposeanimminentdangerofactualharm,then
ownerisliableforthatharm
1. Trespassandnuisanceusedinterchangeability

23

PropertyBlocher24

6.
ObligationsregardingQuietEnjoyment:LightandAir[p.384403]
1. Onemustusehispropertysoasnottoinjurethelawfulrightsofanother
a. (sicuteretuoutalienumnonlaedas).
2. Generally,noUSprecedentforrighttolightandair.
a. FontainebleauHotelCorp.v.FortyFiveTwentyFive,Inc.(Usingpropertytoasnotto
injurethelawfulrightsofanotherwasnotviolatedinthiscasebcthereisnolegally
protectedrighttothefreeflowoflightandairfromadjoiningland,thereforetheconstruction
ofthebuildingcreatesnocauseofaction.
3. EconomicAnalysisoftheLaw
a. Descriptiveanalysis:explainexistinglegaldoctrineassetofrulesthatpromoteefficiency
b. Prescriptive/normativeanalysis:usingeconomicefficiencyasvaluetodeterminewhatthe
legalrulesshouldbe
c. Economicanalysisoflawcostbenefitanalysis
i. Costsandbenefitsmeasuredbymarketvaluehowmuchwouldyoupayforit,or
howmuchyouwouldhavetobepaidtogiveitup.
4. Evaluatinglegalrules:whetherachangefromonelegalrule(baseline)toanotherwillincreaseor
decreasesocialwealth.
a. 3elements:initialdistributionofpropertyrights,offerpricebynonowner,askingpriceby
anowner.
b. Mustdetermineinitialdistributionofwealthandinitialallocationofentitlement
c. Boomerv.AtlanticCementCo.(1970):Neighborscomplainedthatcementfactorywas
billowingblacksmokeanddepositingsootonanearbyresidentialcommunity.
i. Entitlements:righttopollutev.righttobefreefrompollution.Assumethateither
factoryhasinitialrighttopolluteorresidentshaveinitialrighttobefreefrom
pollutionthenmeasurecostsandbenefitsdependingonwhohastopay.
5. Traditionalexternalitiesanalysis:costinternalization
a. Externalitiescostsimposedonthirdpartiesbylegalactorsthatarenottakenintoaccountin
actorsownrevenuecostdetermination.
i. EX:pollutioninBoomerunlesslawintervenes,factorywonthavetotakethiscost
intoaccountindeterminingwhetheroperationsareprofitable.
b. Wanttochooselegalrulesthatgiveactorsincentivestochooseactivitieswhosebenefitsto
societyoutweightheircostsgoalofefficiencyanalysisistoincreasesocialwealth.
i. EX:Factorywouldhavetointernalizeitsexternalcostsaccounttosocietyforharm
itcauses.
6. JusticeBrennanthosewhoprofitfromanactivityshouldbearitscosts
a. Arguedthateconomiccostsincidenttolanddevelopmentshouldbebornebythosewho
engageinU!
b. suchprojectsforprofit,ratherthanadjoininglandowners.
7. Rightsargumen
t:thosewhobenefitfromanactivityshouldntimposecostsofothers;propertycant
beusedtounfairlyharmlegitimatesecurityinterestsofneighbors.
8. Socialwelfareargu
ment:economicactorsshouldinternalizetheirexternalcoststopromote
efficiency.
9. CoaseTheorem
a. Part1ofCoaseTheorem:Iftherearenotransactioncosts,itdoesntmatterwhichlegal
ruleischosenbecauseanylegalrulewillachieveanefficientresult.
i. EX:Fontainebleaucase:inabsenceoftransactioncosts,partieswillagreeforsome
sumbetween$6and$10milliontoallowprojecttomoveforward(pg.391).
24

PropertyBlocher25
b. PartIIofCoaseTheorem:Inthepresenceoftransactioncosts,thechoiceofentitlements
bythecourtsmayhaveaneffectonefficiency.Thecourtsmayincreaseefficiencyby
assigningentitlementstothepartieswhowouldpurchasethemintheabsenceoftransaction
costs.

Rightprotected
bypropertyrule
Rightprotected
byliabilityrule

Fairness
Utility
Fairtoimposecostof
activityonplaintiff
Notfairtoimposecost
ofactivityonplaintiff

PropertyRules

Liability

UseRight
Enjoin(harm
outweighsbenefit)
paysdamages
(benefitoutweighs
harm)

UseRight
Nonuisanceusecontinues
Enjoinuse(forcethemmove)but
awardthemdamagestodoso
(occurswhenthehasmovedto
thenuisance)

Activitybenefitssociety
Fontainebleau:nonuisance;
entitlementprotectedby
propertyrule
Boomer:damages;s
entitlementprotectedbya
liabilityrule

Activitydoesnotbenefit
society
Webb:purchasedinjunction;s
entitlement,protectedbya
liabilityrule
PageCounty:nonuisance;s
privilegeprotectedbyproperty
rule

Phasentitlement
Landlordresponsible

Dhasentitlement
Landlordnotresponsible

PcangetinjunctionagainstDlandlord,otherwise
DhastopayPtoallowdrugdealerstostay/cost
ofrelocating/damagetopropertycausedby
dealers Psgetinjunction

Landlordhasentitlement,can
renttowhoeverbutcangive
entitlementawayifPsare
willingtopay nonuisance

PscangetdamagesfromDlandlordbutnot
injunction;depreciatedvalueofproperty,Dcan
continueharmifhepaysoffPs,allowdrug
dealerstostay Psgetdamages

PscanstopDsconductifP
paysDforcostofkickingdrug
dealersoffpurchased
injunction

Boomerv.AtlanticCementCo.(1970)
1. Oneoffirstmostinfluentialinstancesofcourtapplyingpermanentdamages.
2. Facts:Landownerswithpropertyadjacenttoacementplantsued,allegingdirt,smokeand
vibrationissuingfromitconstitutednuisance.Trialcourtagreed,awardeddamages,butrejected
requestforaninjunctiontocutoffproblem.
3. Opinion:
a. Whereanuisancehasbeenfoundandwheretherehasbeenanysubstantialdamage
shownbythepartycomplaining,aninjunctionwillbegranted.
b. Thatwouldresultinclosingtheplant;courtsoughttoavoid"drasticremedy"
c. Insteadengagedincostbalancinganalysis,contrastingtrial'sfindingtotalpermanent
damagesdonetoplaintiffs$185,000butinvestmentinplant(>$45,000,000)&350+jobs

25

PropertyBlocher26
d. "Thepartiescouldsettlethisprivatelitigationatanytimeifdefendantpaidenough
moneyandtheimminentthreatofclosingtheplantwouldbuildupthepressureon
defendant
e. [G]rant[ing]theinjunctionunlessdefendantpaysplaintiffssuchpermanentdamagesas
maybefixedbythecourtseemstodojusticebetweenthecontendingparties.
i. Alloftheattributionsofeconomiclosstothepropertiesonwhichplaintiffs'
complaintsarebasedwillhavebeenredressed...[andi]tseemsreasonableto
thinkthattheriskofbeingrequiredtopaypermanentdamagestoinjured
propertyownersbycementplantownerswoulditselfbeareasonablyeffective
spurtoresearchforimprovedtechniquestominimizenuisance.
f. ConceptofservitudeonlandServitude,inpropertylaw,tiesrightsandobligationsto
ownershipoflandsothattheyrunwiththelandtosuccessiveowners.
i. Majoritydescribedthedamageimposedbythecementplantasaservitudeonthe
land.Claimedthatpaymentofpermanentdamageswouldconstitutefull
compensationfortheservitude
g. Outcome:Courtgrantedinjunctionagainstcementplantfornuisance,butpermitted
planttopaypermanentdamagesafterwhichthecourtwouldvacatetheinjunction.
h. Inessence,courtpermittedplanttopaynetpresentvalueofitseffectsandcontinue
polluting.
4. Dissent:Imposingaservitudeonlandwhereimpairmentcontinuesforaprivateuseis
unconstitutional.
a. Stateconstitution:privatepropertyshallnotbetakenforpublicuseremarkingthatit
doesnotmentionprivateuse.
b. thepermanentimpairmentofprivatepropertyforprivatepurposesisnotauthorizedin
theabsenceofclearlydemonstratedpublicbenefit.
FontainebleauHotelCorp.v.FortyFiveTwentyFive,Inc.(Fla.1964)
1. Facts:2hotels,FontainebleauandEdenRoc,nexttoeachotheronbeach.Fontainebleaumaking
ittaller,butblocksunafter2PMonEdenRoc.Edensoughtinjunction,additionwouldrender
beachunfitforenjoymentofitsguestsandchoicetobuildmotivatedbymalice.Temporary
injunctiongrantedinlowercourt.
2. Held:
a. Doctrineofsicuteretuoutalienumnonlaedasdoesnotmeanthatonecanneverusehis
propertyinawaythatwouldhurthisneighbor.Itonlymeansthatonemustusehis
propertysoasnottoinjurethelawfulrightofanother.
b. Thereisnolegalrighttoairandsunlight
c. Whenastructureservesausefulandbeneficialpurposeitdoesnotgiverisetoaction
undernuisancefordamages/injunctionundermaxim,evenifitcausesinjurytoneighbor.
d. Nocommonlaw,statutory,contractualruleforlegalrighttofreeflowoflightandair
acrossadjoininglandofaneighbor.
e. Bestlefttolegislature.Nocommonlaweasementforlightorair,butlegislatureimposed
heightrestrictions.
i. Heightrestrictionsraisetakingsandjustcompensationissues.
ii. Courtstatesdutytointerpretandnotenactnewlaws.
iii. Ifconstructionagainstpublicinterest,legislaturecreatestatute/zoningreg

26

PropertyBlocher27

II.ACQUISITIONANDAPPORTIONMENTOFPROPERTY
10.ConquestandDistributionbytheSovereign,pp.97114,120121
RELATIVITYOFTITLE!
Johnsonv.M'Intosh(U.S.1823)
1. TribeshadnopowertotransferfeesimpletotheirlandtoanyoneotherthanUSgovt,onlyto
grantanduserightssubjecttotriballaw.
2. So,privatecitizenscannotpurchaselandsfromIndians.
3. UShasexclusivepowertoextinguishtheIndianrightofoccupancy.
a. AllthatOpinionholdswithrespecttoaboriginaltitleisthatitisinalienable,aprinciple
thatremainswellestablishedlawinnearlyallcommonlawjurisdictions.Restdicta
b. DidNOTholdtribalpossessionoflandhadnolegalrecognition.
4. Facts:ThomasJohnson,oneoffirstSupremeCourtjusticesboughtlandfromPiankeshawNative
Americantribesin1773and1775.PlaintiffslesseesofJohnson'sdescendants,whohadinherited
land.DefendantM'IntoshsubsequentlyobtainedlandpatenttolandfromUSfederalgovt.
a. IllinoisandPiankeshawnationssoldlandtononIndianpurchasers.Subsequently,US
transferredthoselands,titletowhichitreceivedfromIndians,toMIntosh.
b. MIntoshwassuedforejectmentbytheoriginalgranteeswhotracedtheirtitlefromtheir
directpurchasefromthetribes.

5.

6. Opinion(Marshall,unanimous)Affirmdismissal.
a. LengthydiscussionofhistoryoftheEuropeandiscoveryoftheAmericasandthelegal
foundationsoftheColonies,eachEuropeanpoweracquiredlandfromindigenous.
b. Problematicjustifications:
i. Incompatibilityoftwocultures
ii. Highspiritedandviolent
iii. Neverownedproperty(nomadic)
iv. Didntmixlaborwithlandsonotefficient
c. Marshalltracesoutlinesof"discoverydoctrine"namely,aEuropeanpowergains
radicaltitle(alsoknownassovereignty)tolanditdiscovers.
d. Asacorollary,discoveringpowergainsexclusiverighttoextinguish"rightof
occupancy"ofindigenousoccupants,whichotherwisesurvivedassumptionof
sovereignty.
e. WhendeclaredindependencefromGreatBritain,USinheritedBritishrightof
preemptionoverNativelands.

27

PropertyBlocher28
f.

LegalresultisonlyNativeconveyancesoflandwhichcancreatevalidtitlearesalesof
landtofederalgovt.
7. ByholdingonlyfederalgovtpurchaseNativelandssystemofmonopsony,avoidedbidding
competitionbetweensettlers,enabledacquisitionofNativelandsatlowestpossiblecost.
TeeHitTonIndiansv.UnitedStates(U.S.1955)

RELATIVITYOFTITLE
1.
Rule:

Wh
ileIndiantitleisarecogn
izedpropertyrightunderfederalcommonlaw,
itisnot
propertywithinthemean
ingofthe5thA,butalicen
sethatcanberevo
kedatwillbytheUS
w/ocompensation.
2. Facts:Ps,Alaskantribearguehavefullownershipofdisputedpropertynationalforestbc
theyresidedthereforcenturies.Psarguerighttounrestrictedpossession.USgovtusestimber
fromforestandsellsit.Psclaimthattheyhavearighttobecompensatedforuseoftheirlandand
soldtimberunder5A.ParguedCongresshadsufficientlyrecognizeditspossessoryrightsinthe
landsoastomakeitsinterestcompensable.
3. Held:StatutesPcitesdonotindicateintentionbyCongresstograntPpermanentrightsinland.
a. Congressonlygaverecognizedpossession
i. WhenCongressgrantsauthorizationtooccupyitdoesnotautomaticallyand
simultaneouslygrantapermanentrighttoland.
ii. WhileCongresshasauthoritytograntpermanentright,theymustdosoexplicitly
ordemonstratesomedefiniteintentiontograntthepermanentright.
b. CongresssgrantofoccupancydoesprotectPslandfrominterferencefromoutside
partiesbutnotagainstFederalGovtitselfasinterferingparty.Pnorighttocompensation.
c. IndianssayneverbeenconqueredbyRussia,andUSboughtfromRussia.Whyare
RussiaandFrenchdifferent?DotheyneedtoproveconquereverytribeorjustIndians
overall?

11.FirstPossession:AnimalsandNaturalResources,

pp.152167
1. Whydoespossessionmatter?
a. Investment,clarity,efficiency
b. Whysuspicion?Peopletakethings,ifresourcesarescarcemustbeusedefficiently,if
monopolyexists,iftoomanypeople
2. PossessionversusLabor?
a. Possession,Pros:Lesslawsuits,confidentinvestment,clearrules,efficiency
b. Possession,Cons:incentivizeproof?
c. Labor,Pros:Incentivizeslabor,nofreeriderproblem,extendswhatyoucanpossess(like
intellectualproperty)
d. Labor,Cons:Hardertopindown,Onedefinitionoflaborhard,Divisibilityisdifficult,
Howdoyoudecidehowmuchlabor?Whatkindoflabor?Sometimesgoodtoconserve
(oil,gas,water)andownershipisbetterforthis.
3. Whatcountsaspossession?
a. DeclaringintentGatherhounds,horse,gunReleasehoundsArriveonsiteSpotting
foxPursuitClosinginwithreasonableexpectationWoundingMortalwounding
KillingGrabbing
28

PropertyBlocher29
b. Holding:Mortalwounding,depriveofnaturallibertylikeconstructivepossession,
becauseeffectivelyinyourcontrol.
Piersonv.Post(N.Y.1805)
1. Facts:LodowickPost,afoxhunter,waschasingafoxthroughavacantlotwhenPiersoncame
acrossthefoxand,knowingitwasbeingchasedbyanother,killedthefoxandtookitaway.
2. PH:PostsuedPiersonactionfortrespasstochattels.Postarguedhehadownershipoffoxas
givingchasetoananimalinthecourseofhuntingitwassufficienttoestablishpossession.Trial
courtfoundinfavorofPost.
3. Opinion(FutureVPTompkins):
a. MerepursuitgavePostnolegalrighttothefox,butthathebecamethepropertyof
Pierson,whointerceptedandkilledhim.
i. Inordertoobtaintitletoaferaenaturae(wildanimal)apersonmusttakeit.first
tokillandcaptureisthesuperiorruleoflaw.Evenpursuitwithwoundingisnot
enough.Mustbemortallywounded,sufficientsincethiswouldhavedeprived
theanimalofitsnaturalliberty.Ponlyabletoshowpursuit
b. Citesancientprecedentindecidingthecase:Justinian'sInstitutes,andFleta,adopt
principlethatpursuitalonevestsnopropertyorrightinthehuntsman;andthateven
pursuit,accompaniedwithwounding,isequallyineffectualforthatpurpose,unlessthe
animalbeactuallytaken.SameprincipleisrecognizedbyBracton;Puffendorfdefines
occupancyofbeastsfernaturtobeactualcorporealpossession;Bynkershoecksame.
c. Courtreasonedthatgiventhecommonlawrequirementtohavecontroloverone's
possessions,merelygivingchasewasnotsufficient.Somethingmorewasneeded,
otherwiselawwouldcreateaslipperyslope.
4. Dissent(FutureSCOTUSBrockholstLivingston):Notsatisfiedbyauthoritiesused.
a. Insteadpursuitshouldbesufficient,asitservesausefulpurposeofencouraginghunters
toridthecountrysideofthat"wildandnoxiousbeast.
i. Bothmatterofpublicinterest(noxiousbeast)andencourageoflabor(efficiency)
b. Possessioninrelativetermswherecontinuedchasemaymerelybeaformalityofthepre
existingcontrolalreadyexertedbythehunter.
c. Dissent:Propertyinanimalsferaenaturae(wildinnature)maybeacquiredwithout
bodilytouchormanucaption,providedpursuerbeinreach,orhaveareasonableprospect
oftaking,whathehasthusdiscoveredwithanintentionofconvertingtohisownuse.
5. BergernotesinIt'sNotAbouttheFox:TheUntoldStoryofPiersonv.Postdisputereallyabout
useofthelandonwhichthefoxwascaught,partofthecommonsinwhichPierson'sfamily,like
otherdescendantsoftheoriginalsettlersofBridgehampton,hadspecialrights.
Keeblev.Hickeringill
1. Facts:Keebleownedlandwithapondequippedwithduckdecoys,netc,etc.forhuntand
Hickeringilldischargedagunsothattheduckswouldbescaredawayfromthepond.
2. Issue:WasitunlawfulforDtoscareawaytheducks?
3. Propertyrightatissue:Ducks
a. HowHgottheducksisveryimportantIftheduckshadsimplypreferredHspondthen
hedidntdoanythingwrong.
b. HinterferedwithKspropertyAgunisnotOKbutadecoywouldhavebeenOK.
4. Held:AlthoughKsaidHtooksomethingthatwashis,theCourtsaidthatitdependedonhow.
a. Thedecisiondependsontheachievementofacertainsocialend.

29

PropertyBlocher30
5. TakeHomeisaboutcompetition:
a. Unfaircompetitionshouldnotbeencouraged.
b. Faircompetitionshouldbeencouraged.
c. Propertyrulesareusedtoencouragecertaintypesofbehavior(likegoodcompetition).
d. Achievesacertainsocialend.

Popovv.Hayashi(Ca.Sup.Ct.2002).
-

Facts: Popov (P) and Hayashi (D) Bonds record home run baseball. Popov
caught ball, mob engaged in violent and illegal behavior. Popov buried,
intended to establish and maintain possession of ball but it left his glove.
Hayashi involuntarily forced to the ground. While on the ground Hayashi saw
the loose ball and took it but committed no wrongful act.

PH: P brought suit for conversion, trespass to chattel, injunctive relief and
constructive trust.

Holding and Rule: Conversion: wrongful exercise of dominion over personal

property of other
o

If actor undertakes significant but incomplete steps to achieve

possession of abandoned personal property, effort interrupted by
unlawful acts of others, actor has legal pre-possessory interest in
property.

Hayashi argues for complete control (Gray)

Popov argues for intent to control and manifest intent by

stopping forward motion of ball without full control (Bernhardt &
Finkelman)

Court adopts Grays rule of complete control, BUT also hold that
Popov has a pre-possessory interest. This pre-possessory
interest constitutes a qualified right to possession that can
support a cause of action for conversion.

Whoever has property has presumption of ownership so burden

on Popov.

Must be actual interference with Ps dominion.

30

PropertyBlocher31

If person entitled to possession of personal property demands

return, unjustified refusal to give the property back, withholding
is interference, so yes conversion.

Act constituting conversion must be intentionally done.

BUT no requirement D know property belongs to another, D

need not intend to dispossess true owner of its use and
enjoyment.

Injured party may seek specific performance to regain property or

monetary damages.

Trespass to chattel, in contrast, exists where personal property has

been damaged or where the defendant has interfered with the
plaintiffs use of the property.

Actual dispossession is not an element of the tort of trespass to

chattel.

Conversion does not exist unless baseball rightfully belongs to Popov.

Before it was hit it belonged to Major League Baseball. At time it was
hit, intentionally abandoned. First person who came in possession
became new owner.

An award of the ball to P would be unfair to Hayashi (premised on

unsupported assumption Popov would have caught ball). Award of ball
to D unfairly penalize Popov (unsupported assumption Popov would
have dropped ball).

Popovs COA for conversion sustained only as to his equal and

undivided interest. Each man has a claim of equal dignity as to the
other and both P and D have an equal and undivided interest in the
ball. Ball sold and profits divided equally.

OilandGasRights
(analogsforallrulesinwaterrightsaswell)4rulesindifferentjurisdictions
1) Traditionalabso
lutistrule
a) Yougetabsoluterighttoanythingyoucanextractfromyourland
2) Correlativerightsrule
a) Variationonabsolutistconceptabsolutesharedrighttoproportionofpoolthatisproportionateto
yourland.
b) Mainproblem:doesntincentivizecapturingresources

31

PropertyBlocher32
3) Ruleofca
pture
a) Naturalresourceislikeawildanimal,youdontownituntilyoucaptureit.
b) Mainproblem:leadstowaste(inefficientformarketbcitdrivespricesdown,andhasty
extractioncreatespossibilityofhugedisastersthatcouldendresourcesforeveryone).
4) Reasonab
leuseru
le(ExtensionofRuleofCapture?)
a) Youcanextracttotheextentthatitsreasonable.
b) Mainproblem:lowpredictabilityineachcase,ctwilllooktoseeifyouwerereasonable(huge
leeway).
c) Elliffv.TexonDrilling:negligentlywastinganothersnaturalresourcesdeprivesapersonofher
propertyrightsinthoseresources,includingtherighttoprofitfromthem.Wastershould
compensateinjuredpartyforherloss
i) 2questionsintheanalysis:
(1) Didpetitionershavepropertyinterestinthegas?
(2) CtsaysNObcTXhasruleofcaptureandtheydidntcaptureit.
(3) Didrespondentshavedutytoactnonnegligently?
(4) CtsaysYES,evenifnopropertyright,stillcantactnegligently.
(5) Ctcombinesthesetogettoreasonableuserulebalancinglibertyinterestw/safety
interest.
5)
Traditionalrule:RuleofCapture
a) Pros:Certainty,Investment(indiscoveryandextraction)isprotectInternalizesthebenefitsof
capture,freeriderproblemnotissue,encouragesfirstmovertoinvestandfind,easierregulation
b) Cons:Slantdrilling,commonpoolissue,encouragesbadcompetition,safety,encouragesquick&
inefficientdrilling,andquickextraction,environmentalimpacts,canharmmarket(fastextraction
causessurplussupplyandmarketcrash.Absoluterightv.ruleofcaptureinconflict.
i) 2bigproblems:
(1) Whenyoudrilltooquicklynaturalpressurelessensandtheoilislostsocietyisactually
worseoff
(a) Ifpullpetroleumouttoofast,cantgettoALLofoil,soleaveabunch.More
efficienttodocollaboratively.
(2) TragedyoftheCommons:
(a) IfBpumpsquickly,Amustpumpquicklyissueaboutmaintenanceofthemarket
(b) Negativeexternalitieshurtprice
c) Neighboringownerscanextractasmuchastheywantregardlessofthelandtheyown,butno
slantdrilling.
i) Abinfimususqueadcaolum
ii) Nosystemoperatesbyoverlandownership
6) Solutions
a) Stateregulationprorationingregulation(tokeepoilatagoodprice)whereGovtstepsin.
b) Unitizationsortoflikeshareholding
i) Whenparticular%ofownersagreesonplan,statecanorderholdoutstocomplybylaw.
c) Wellspacingonlyacertainnumberofwellsperarea
i) Reduceswildcatsbutisnotacompletesolution.
7) Newproblem:Fracking(hydraulicfracturing)
a) Horizontaldrillingtechnologytogetnaturalgastheresactually4xmorenaturalgasin
economythan10yearsago
b) ItsillegalinNCbecausetheconcernwastrespasswithouttheownerknowingit

32

PropertyBlocher33
c) Insomestatesthelandtitlesystemisbasedonsplitestates/mineralestates
i) Subsidencecancausehousestocollapse.
Elliffv.TexonDrillingCo.210S.W.2d558(Tex.1948)
-

KeyFacts:Landownersownedsurfaceandcertainroyaltyinterestoflanduponwhicha
producingwellwaslocated,aswellasmineralestateunderlyingland.Whileoilcompanieswere
engagedindrillinganoffsetwell,offsetwellblewout,caughtfire,cratered,resultedin
destructionoflandownerswellanddrainedlargequantitiesofgasanddistillatefromtheirland.

ApplicableLaw:TX:landownerhasabsolutetitleinseveraltytooilandgasbeneathland.
o

Oilandgaswillmigrateacrosspropertylinestowardslowpressureareacreatedby
productionfromcommonpool.Migratorycharacterofoilandgasgivenrisetoruleof
capture:owneroflandacquirestitletooilorgaswhichheproducesfromwellsonhis
land,thoughpartoftheoilorgasmayhavemigratedfromadjoininglands.Hedoesnot
needconsentanddoesnotincurliability.(firstcome,firstserved)

Nonliabilitybasedontheorythatafterdrainage,titleorpropertyinterestofformerowned
isgone.Eachownerwhoselandoverliesthebasinhasalikeinterest,andeachmustof
necessityexercisehisrightwithsomeregardtotherightsofothers.

Butcourtimposesadomesticationofruleofcapture:Noownershouldbepermitted
tocarryonhisoperationsinrecklessorlawlessirresponsibility,butmustsubmitto
limitationsasnecessarytoenableeachtogethisown.

Lawofcapturedidnotabsolvetheoilcompaniesfromliabilitybecausethenegligent
wasteanddestructionofthelandownersgasanddistillatewasneitheralegitimate
drainagenoralawfulorreasonableappropriationofthem.

Underthecommonlaw,theoilcompanieswerelegallyboundtouseduecaretoavoid
thenegligentwasteordestructionoftheminerals,andtheyfailedtodischargethisduty.

Courtdidnotthinknonliabilityruleshouldapplytonegligentwaste/destructionofoil.

Appellatecourtwithoutauthoritytopassuponproprietyofthemeasureofdamages
adoptedbytrialcourtbecausenosuchassignmentwaspresentedtoit.

Wouldthishavebeendifferentifnotwastebutaboutjusttakingallthegas?

12.FirstPossession:Finders,Singer,pp.168177

33

PropertyBlocher34
1. TypesofUnpossessedProperty
a. Abandoned:Propertythatanownerformsintenttorelinquish.
b. Lost:Propertythatanowneraccidentallymisplaced
c. Mislaid:propertyownerintentionallyleftsomewhere;thenforgotwhere
d. Questions:
i. Awatchisfoundinajewelrystoreafteritsbandbrokeanditfelltothefloor
withoutitsownernoticing.
ii. Awatchisfoundinajewelrystoreaftertheowner,noticingitsbandwasbroken,
tookitoffandlaiditonthecounterintendingtopickitbackup.Shelefthaving
forgottentodoso.
iii. Awatchisfoundinajewelrystoreafteritsownernoticeditsbandwasbroken,
setitonthecounter,declaredIneverwanttoseethischeapwatchagain,and
leftthestore.
2. Conflictsbetweentrueownerandfinder
a. Iflostormislaidtrueowner
b. Ifabandonedfinder
3. Conflictsbetweenfinderandthirdparties
a. Iflostormislaidtrueownerstillwinsoverfinderandappraiser
b. Ifabandonedfinderwinsovertrueownerandappraiser
4. Conflictsbetweenfinderandlandowner
a. Iffinderistrespassinglandowner
b. Iffinderisnottrespassing:
i. Inaprivatehomelandowner
ii. Inapublicplacecourtsaredivided.Somecourtsdistinguishbetweenlostand
mislaid:lostpropertytothefindertorewardher,andmislaidpropertytothe
ownerofthepremises,becausethetrueownermayreturntoclaimit.
c. Ifpropertyisembeddedinthesoillandowner
d. Ifpropertyisatreasuretrove(gold,silver,ormoney)finder
5. FINDINGRULES:3RuleOptions
i. Findergetsit
1. Incentiveforpeopletolie,incentiveforthieves
2. Itsnoteasytoadminister
3. Makespeoplemorecarefulwithgoods
ii. LocusOwnergetit
1. Ifitwasmisplacedthenyouknowwheretogogetit.
2. Findersmaylieaboutfindingthings.
iii. Splitthedifference
b. Rulesconflict:youmustdecidewhichpolicygoalyouwanttoencourage.
c. *Focusontherelativityoftheclaimdependsonthenatureofthegood.
i. Onlythepersonwholosttheitemknowsintent
ii. Courtmustusejudgmenttodeterminewhattheownerthought.
6. NativeAmericanGravesProtectionandRepatriationActof1990
a. Fedstatute,Indianculturalobjectsontribalorfederallandsbelongtotribehaving
strongestconnectionw/them.Doesntapplytoobjectsfoundonprivateproperty.
1) RELATIVITYOFTITLE
a) F1,F2,F3withawatch:thecloseryouaretotheoriginalowner,thestrongeryourclaimis.
34

PropertyBlocher35
b)
c)
d)
e)

ItsnotthecourtsjobtofindF1ifF2suedF3
Originalowner,F1,isusuallyoutofthepicture.
F2isthetrueownerifF1isoutofthepicture.
Conflictingpolicyconcerns:
i) Trueownertrueownerbonafidesalepurchaser
ii) Youcannotprotectpriorpossessionandbonafidesales
f) CommonLawRule:Priorpossessiontrumps.
i) Problemwithchattelisthatthereisnoproof.
ii) Priorpossessionruleavoidslitigation.
iii) Cheapandeffectivemeansofestablishingownership.
Wilcoxv.Stroup(4thCir.2006)
- BriefFactSummary.PWillcoxfound444documents,fromadministrationofgovernorsof
SouthCarolina,involvedincivilwarandwishestosell.DStroupwishestopreventsaleclaiming
documentsownedbystateofSouthCarolina.
- Held:BCofappellee'sfamily'spossessionofpapers,presumptionthatfamilyownedpapers.
o Absentevidenceofsuperiortitle,lawpresumedinfavorofpossessor,forpossession
aloneprimafacieevidenceofagoodtitle.
o Presumptionofprivatepossessiondidnotfrustratepublic'sinterestbecausecopiesof
paperswereavailableonmicrofilm.
o AppellantshadnotrebuttedthispresumptionbecauseitdidnotestablishthatSouth
Carolinalawattherelevanttimetreatedgubernatorialpapersaspublicproperty.
o Purposeforstandardishelpcourtwithundeniablelimitationsthatoccurwithlackof
evidence,andforgoodpublicpolicytopromotestability.
o Fair?:Stateclaimownershipofallhistoricaldocumentsifpossessordidnthaveproof
o Notunfairbcpresumptionrebuttable.Standardofreview=preponderanceofevidence.
Charrierv.Bell(1986La.App.)
- SynopsisofRule:Objectsfoundinburialplotsarenotabandonedproperty;instead,theybelong
tothedescendantsandcannotbeacquiredovertheobjectionofthedescendants.
- Facts.Charrieramateurarchaeologist,foundsiteofIndianvillage,3yrexcavating,knewhedid
nothavepermissionfromlandowner.Bchewasunabletoproveownershipoverartifacts,could
notsellcollection.Soughtjudgmentdeclaringownerofartifacts,orinalternative,compensation
undertheoryofunjustenrichmentforhistimeandexpenses.Trialcourtdeniedbothclaims.
- Held.Judgmentaffirmed.
o ThoughIndiantribeclaimingownershipofobjectscannotprovideperfectchainoftitle
thattracesancestorstoburiedinvillage,enoughevidencetoprovedescent
o Thoughtribemovedfromlocation,theydidnotabandonproperty.Objectsthatareburied
aredonesowithintentionthattheyremaininground.Anotherpersoncannotclaim
ownershipofthoseobjectsbysimplyexcavatingthem.
o Forclaimofunjustenrichment,Pmustprovehesustainedimpoverishment(occurswhen
Pwasnotatfaultornegligentordidnottakeactionathisownrisk.Charrierknewacting
atownriskoroutofnegligencebcheknewdidnothavepermissionfromlandowner.
Questions!
1. Youaretaskedwithcomingupwithalegalregimetogovernthesalvageofshipwrecks.What
kindofaruledoyouinvent?

35

PropertyBlocher36
2. Ispropertyputoutonthecurbintrashbinsabandonedproperty?
3. Childrenwereplayinginthewoodsbelongingtoaneighborwiththeneighborspermission.
Whiledigging,theyfoundmoneythathadbeenplacedinthesoilbysomeone.Theyreportedit
andgaveittothepolice.Whoshouldreceivethemoney?
4. ArcheologistgetpermissiontodigonprivatepropertyinGeorgia.Shefindssome300yearold
Cherokeeobjects.

13.Family:SupportandInheritance,p.14652
Wealthv.Income:
Income:Measureofwhatyouearn,eitherthroughworkorthroughuseofyourwealthtogenerate
morewealth.NouveauRichehavehighincomes.
Wealth:Measuresthevaluablepossessionsandpropertyyoucurrentlyhave.Itsyoursetof
assets.OldMoneypeoplearewealthy.
Wealthisheavilyassociatedwith(nottosayidenticalto)wealthoftheirparents.
Onereasonforthisisthatthelawpermitspeopletopasswealthdirectlytotheirfamilies
whentheydie,throughinheritance.
Distributionofwealth:
Therichest1%ofown35.4%ofthewealth.
Thenext19%own53.5%ofthewealth.
Thebottom80%own11%ofthewealth.
Thisdistributionmeansthatthe85richestpeopleintheworldhavethesameamountof
wealthasthebottom50%oftheglobalpopulation.
TheWaltonsiblingsalonehavenetworthmuchofitfromthecompanytheyinherited
greaterthanthebottom30%ofAmericans($160billion).
ThebottomquarterofAmericanshavezeroornegativenet.
Thus,ifyouhavenodebtsandhave$10inyourpocketyouhavemorewealththan25%
ofAmericans.
Givenyourstudentloans,manyofyouareinthebottomquarter.

36

PropertyBlocher37

Gifts,Inheritance,Wills,andEstates
Electedshares:Proportionofestatewhichsurvivingspouseofdeceasedmayclaiminplaceof
whattheywereleftindecedent'swill.
Topreventfromfallingintopovertyandbecomingaburdenoncommunity.
Amounttobereservedforaspouseisdeterminedbystatewhereestateislocated.
Inmoststates,electiveshareisbetweenandofallthepropertyintheestate,though
manystatesrequirethemarriagetohavelastedacertainnumberofyearsfortheelective
sharetobeclaimed,oradjustthesharebasedonthelengthofthemarriage,andthe
presenceofminorchildren.Somestatesalsoreducetheelectiveshareifthesurviving
spouseisindependentlywealthy.
Candisinherityourchildrengenerally
Gift:Transferofpropertyfromonepersontoanotherwithoutpayment.
Intervivosgifts:transfersfromonelivingpersontoanother
Testamentarytransfers:transfersatdeaththroughavalidwillorinheritance
Possibilities:
Destroyit
Buryitw/testator
Treatasunownedandallowfreeforall
Allowgovttoconfiscateit
Honortestatorswishforconveyingit.
Firsttwoarewastefulanddontmaximizetheutilityof the
wealththetestatorcreatingduringhis/herlifetime(butcould
createincentivessothatpeoplegetridoftheirpropertybefore
death).
#3and4seemthemostfair.
Strongestargumentsforprivatetransmission
Autonomyofdecedentpeaceofmind
Efficiency
Familyties,preventsneedforstatesupport.
Encouragecaretakerspeopleareawaretheycouldbedisinherited.
Incentivizeshardworkduringlife,incentivizessaving$.
LawofGifts

Requires

:
Intenttotransfertitle
Deliveryoftheproperty
Generallyphysicalexchange
Butconstructivedeliveryrecognizedifowneroflockedboxgaveonly
keytodone.Somecourtsonlypermitifdeliveryinconvenientor
impossible.
Today,deliverycanbeaccomplishedbywriting.
Manystatesallowgifttobemadethroughformaldeedoreveninformal
writingthatindicatesapresentintenttorelinquishpossessionandto
transfertitletothedone.
Presentintenttotransferownershipdoesnotnecessarilymeanphysical
exchange.Lifeestateinpiano,butpianokeptatownershousetildeath.
Acceptancebythedonee.
Propertytransferredatdeatheitherbywrittenwillor(initsabsence)bythetermsofstatestatute

37

PropertyBlocher38

intestacy

statute
Limitsabilitytocompletelydisinheritaspouselawsineverystategrantsurviving
spousessomeportionofthepropertyownedbythedeceasedspouseatdeath.
LawinUSallowsparentstocompletelydisinherittheirkidsEUtakesdifferent
approach,giveskidssamerightsasspouses.
Wedd
ingring
s:Becauseweddingringisgivenunderunderstandingthatpartieswouldbe
married,mostctsrequireringtobereturnedifengagementiscalledoff.
Somectsrefusetoinquireintowhosefaultitwasthatthemarriagewascalledoff.
Somectswontallowyoutorecoveraringifyoubreakoffengagementw/ojustification

Hypothetical:
InEyermanv.MercantileTrustCo.(Mo.Ct.App.1975):Johnsonswilldirectsexecutortoraze
herbeautifulhouse,selltheland,anddistributeproceedstobeneficiaries.Neighborsobject.
Shouldtheprovisioninthewillbeenforced?Willitbeenforced?
Courtagreedtoinjunctionfindingthewillprovisionorderingthehousetobedestroyed
bothtobeeccentricandtoviolatepublicpolicy.
Destructionofhomeharmstheneighbors,detrimentallyaffectsthecommunity,causes
monetarylossinexcessof$39,000totheestateandiswithoutbenefittothedead
woman.
Judicialtaking?
CHILDSUPPORT
1) Generally,childrenofdivorcedchildrenentitledtobesupportedatleastaccordingtothestandardof
livingtowhichtheyhadgrownaccustomedpriortotheseparationoftheirparents.Pascalev.
Pascale(NJ1995).
2) Statesevenlydividedonquestionofrequiringnoncustodialparentstopayforcollege19requireit.
a) Somectsinterpretlegislationsettingageofmajoritytoliberateparentsfromdutiesofsupportat
thesametimethatthechildisliberatedfromparentalcontrol
b) FL:anydutytopayforchildscollegeeducationisamoralone,notlegalonemarriedparents
havenoduty,sowhyimposeitondivorcedones?Deniesdivorcedparentsequaltreatmentunder
thelaw.
3) Lang
beinarguesthatgivingcollegeeducationismajormechanism(otherthaninheritingfamily
home)bywhichwealthistransferredbtwngenerations.
Baylissv.Bayliss(Ala.

1989)overturned
1. Synopsis:Childrenofdivorcedparents,whoareminorsatthetimeofdivorce,aregiventhesame
righttoacollegeeducationbeforeandaftertheyreachtheageofmajoritythattheyprobably
wouldhavereceivediftheirparentshadnotdivorced.
2. Facts:PatrickBaylisssonofCherryBayliss(P)JohnBayliss(D),divorced.Whenheturned18,
hismothersoughttohaveDhelpherpayforhiscollegeeducation.
3. Held:Parentsofpostminoritysupportchildrenhavetopayforthecollegeeducationofchildren
ifthemarriagewasterminatedbydivorce,iftheparentswouldhavepaidforithadtheystayed
together.
a. Generally,adivorced,noncustodialparenthasnodutytocontributetosupportofchild
afterthechildhasreachedtheageofmajority.
i. Expandingexceptiontogeneralruleforcollegeeducationbyexpanding
definitionofchildrenbeyondjustminorchildren

38

PropertyBlocher39
ii. Changingtimes:Collegeincreasinglyimportanttoday,soneednewdefinition
iii. Precedentfordisabledchildrentoincludethoseaboveageofmajority
b. Moneymaybeawardedoutofpropertyandincomeofeitherorbothparentsforpost
minorityeducationofachildofadissolvedmarriage,whenapplicationismadebefore
childattainsageofmajority.
c. Factorsthatwillbelookedatincludethefinancialresourcesoftheparentsandthechild
andthechildscommitmenttoandaptitudefortherequestededucation.
d. Fairnessrationale:Childrenofdivorcedparents,whoareminorsatthetimeofdivorce,
aregiventhesamerighttoacollegeeducationbeforeandafterthereachtheageof
majoritythattheyprobablywouldhavereceivediftheirparentshadnotdivorced.
i. Childrenofdivorceatadisadvantageascomparedtootherchildren.

39

PropertyBlocher40

14.LaborandInvestment:Cells/Organs[p.23141]
1. ElementsofaPatent
a. (1)Patentablesubjectmatter
i. Machine
ii. Methodofmanufacture
iii. Compositionofmatter
iv. Businessmethod
v. Geneticsandcells?
b. (2)Novel
c. (3)Nonobvious(morethanaminorobviouschange)
d. (4)Useful/Utility(easytoshowitwillhavesomebenefit)
1)Justifications/Rationales
a) IncentiveJustification:Allowsinnovatorstoexclude
i) Butmeritdependsontheareaofpatent.
b) Funding:Cantget(venturecapital)fundingwithoutit.
i) Apatentisproof/validationofnoveltyofanidea.
ii) Butthepatentofficeisnotperfecttheydoputoutfalsepositives.
iii) Patentsprovidesignalsthatacompanyiswellorganizedandsomethinginterestingis
goingonwithinthecompany.
c) MarketsforTechnology
i) Ifnotforpatentseveryonewouldkeepthingsastradesecretsandthemarketwouldbe
injured.
d) PatentRaces
i) Techrisesmorequicklybutmaybeduplicativeresearchoccurs.
2) CommonLawexceptionspatentablesubjectmatter:abstractideas,lawsofnature,productsof
nature
3) PhilosophicalBasesofIP:
a) Utilitarian
i) Encouragesinvestment(oysterbeds)butdoesnotoverrestrictideas.
ii) Youcanprotectyourownworkbutexclusiverightsalsoraisecosts.
iii) Cumulativeinventionproblem.
iv) Butwouldideasevencomeabout?
b) LaborTheory
i) Youreapwhatyousew.
c) PersonhoodTheory
i) Alotofthingsthatwecreatearepersonalandpossessive.
ii) Patentsdontfallinthiswellitsaboutprotectingpersonsidea(theirproperty).
d) DistributiveJustice(Equity)
i) CommonHeritageofMankindfallsintothis.
ii) Likenaturalresources/biodiversity/pharmaceuticaldrugs.
iii) Therearecommunalpropertyrightsthatthelawshouldprotect.
Moorev.RegentsUniv.ofCA(Cal.1990)**Blocherdoesntthinkthisisawellreasonedopinion!
1. Synopsis:MooreunderwenttreatmentforhairycellleukemiaatUCLAMedicalCenterunder
supervisionofDr.Golde.Moore'scancerwaslaterdevelopedintoacelllinethatwas
40

PropertyBlocher41
commercialized.HeldMoorehadnorighttoanyshareoftheprofitsfromcommercializationof
anythingdevelopedfromhisdiscardedbodyparts.
2. Facts:
a. MoorevisitedUCLAMedicalCenterafterlearninghadhairycellleukemia.Golde
confirmed,recommendedspleenremoved.GoldeinformedMoorethathehadreasonto
fearforhislife,andthattheproposedsplenectomyoperationwasnecessarytoslowdown
theprogressofhisdisease.
b. BasedonGolde'srepresentations,Mooresignedconsentauthorizingsplenectomy,
hospital"disposeofanyseveredtissueormemberbycremation."Moorereturnedat
Golde'sdirectionandbasedonrepresentationsvisitsnecessaryandrequired.
c. Goldewithdrewblood,serum,skin,bonemarrowaspirate,andsperm.Mooretraveled
fromSeattle.
d. Differentconsentsaid:"I(do,donot)voluntarilygranttotheUniversityofCaliforniaall
rightsI,ormyheirs,mayhaveinanycelllineoranyotherpotentialproductwhichmight
bedevelopedfromthebloodand/orbonemarrowobtainedfromme",refusedtosign,
turnedovertoattorney,whodiscoveredpatent.
e. DconductingresearchonMoore'scells.Goldeestablishedcellline,negotiated
agreementsforcommercialdevelopmentandproductsderivedfromit,$330,000over
threeyears,includingaproratashareofGolde'ssalaryandfringebenefits.
3. PH:
a. MooresuedGolde,RegentsofUC,Quan,researcher,GeneticsInstitute,andSandoz
PharmaceuticalsCorporation.
b. CourtfoundMoorehadnopropertyrightstodiscardedcellsorprofitsmadefromthem.
c. Courtconcludedresearchphysiciandidhaveobligationtorevealhisfinancialinterestin
thematerialsharvestedfromMoore,andthatMoorewouldbeallowedtobringaclaim
foranyinjurythathesustainedasaresultofthephysician'sfailuretodisclosethose
circumstances.
4. Held:(Panelli,47)
a. Onconversionissue,Moorearguesthathecontinuedtoownhiscellsfollowingtheir
removalfromhisbody,atleastforthepurposeofdirectingtheiruse.
i. Toestablishconversion,Pmustestablishactualinterferencewithownershipor
rightofpossession.
1. Nocourthaseverupheldconversionliabilityforthis
ii. Mooredidnotexpecttoretainpossessionofhiscellsfollowingconversion,sohe
musthaveanownershipinterestinthem.
iii. Subjectmatterofthepatent,thecellline,cannotbeM
b. Moorereliesonprivacyrightsandunwantedpublicity.Thisisnotpropertylaw,anda
conversionclaimmustbebasedonpropertylaw.
i. Lymphokineshavethesamemolecularstructureandfunctionineveryhuman
being.Itisnotlikeanameoraface,sincetheyarenotuniquetoMoore.
ii. Theseinterestsalreadyprotectedbyinformedconsent.
c. CAstatutorylawdrasticallylimitsapatient'scontroloverexcisedcellsforpublichealth
reasons.Canbeusedforresearch,butifnotusedforresearchtheymustbediscarded.
i. Courtnotedlawsthatrequiredthedestructionofhumanorgansassome
indicationthatthelegislaturehadintendedtopreventpatientsfrompossessing
theirextractedorgans.
ii. Legislatureshouldmakethisdecision.
d. Courtfearedextendingpropertyrightstoorgansleadtochillingeffectonresearch.

41

PropertyBlocher42
i. Laboratoriesdoingresearchreceivealargevolumeofmedicalsamplesandcould
notbeexpectedtoknowordiscoverwhethersomewheredownthelinetheir
sampleswereillegallyconverted.
ii. Wedon'twanttothreatencivilliabilityformedicalresearchforthoseresearchers
whohavenoreasontobelievethatuseofaparticularcellsampleisagainsta
donor'swishes
e. PropertyatissuenotMoore'scellsbutcelllinecreatedfromMoore'scells.
i. Patentedlinefactuallyandlegallydistinctfromcells.Patentrewardsinventive
effort(labortheory),notjustdiscoveryofnaturallyoccurringrawmaterial.
ii. "[Thecellsare]nomoreuniquetoMoorethanthenumberofvertebraeinthe
spineorthechemicalformulaofhemoglobin."
f. Courtdiscussesdisclosureissuesaysdoctorwasrequiredtodiscloseresearchinterests.
i. Moore'scomplaintstatesacauseofactionforbreachoffiduciarydutyorlackof
informedconsent,notconversion.
5. Concurrence(Arabian):Strangehahahahaha.
a. Pwantsustorecognizeandenforcearighttosellonesownbodytissueforprofit.He
entreatsustoregardthehumanvesselthesinglemostveneratedandprotectedsubjectin
anycivilizedsocietyasequalwiththebasestcommercialcommodity.Heurgesusto
comminglethesacredwiththeprofane.
b. Doesitupliftordegradetheuniquehumanpersontotreathumantissueasafungible
articleofcommerce?Woulditadvanceorimpedethehumancondition,spirituallyor
scientificallybydeliveringthemajesticforceofthelawbehindplaintiffsclaim?
c. Totreatthemsimplyasissuesoftortlaw,susceptibleofjudicialresolution.
6. Concur/Dissent(Broussard):
a. ClearunderCAlawthatbeforebodypartisremoveditispatient,ratherthanhisdoctor
orhospital,whopossessesrighttodetermineusetowhichbodypartwillbeputafter
removal.
b. If,asallegedinthiscase,P'sdoctorimproperlyinterferedwithP'srighttocontroltheuse
ofabodypartbywrongfullywithholdingmaterialinformationfromhimbeforeits
removal,Pmaymaintainaconversionaction.
7. Dissent(Mosk):
a. Argumentthatthisisadecisionforthelegislatureiscrap;thewholepointofhaving
commonlawisthatitcanmorphtochangingneeds.
b. Commercialexploitationisnotscientificuse,soshouldn'tbecoveredbystatute
permittingscientificuse.
c. Evenifitdidincludecommercialuse,itdoesnotfollowthatPdoesnothaveaproperty
rightforpurposesofconversion.
d. Manycaseswherelawforbidsexerciseofcertainrightsovercertainformsofproperty.
e. Patentabilityhassignificantlyreducedthefreeaccessofresearcherstonewcelllinesand
theirproducts.
f. Applicationofthelawofconversioninthiscasewillnothinderresearchbyrestricted
access.
g. ItisinequitableandimmoralthatPshouldnotbecompensatedwhenwithoutMoore's
cellstheprofitablecelllinewouldhaveneverbeencreated.
h. Moorecouldhavebeendeniedsomepropertyrightsandgivenothers.
i. AtleastMoorehad"righttodowithhisowntissuewhatDsdidwithit."
ii. Thatis,assoonasthetissuewasremovedMooreatleasthadtherighttochoose
tosellittoalaboratoryorhaveitdestroyedsononeedtoholdlabsstrictly

42

PropertyBlocher43
liableforconversionwhenpropertyrightscanbebrokenuptoallowMooreto
extractasignificantportionoftheeconomicvaluecreatedbyhistissue.
i. InordertoprovedamagesfrominformedconsentMooremustproveboththathewould
nothaveconsentedtotheprocedurehadhebeenproperlyinformedandthatareasonable
personwouldnothaveconsentedtotheprocedureiftheyhadbeenproperlyinformed.
ThusMoore'schancesofprovingdamagesthroughinformedconsentareslim.
j. Finally,Moorecanonlysuehisdoctorandnobodyelseforfailingtoadequatelyinform
him.ThusMooreisunlikelytowin,couldnotextracttheeconomicvalueofhistissue
evenifherefusedconsentandcouldnotsuethepartiesthatmightbeculpablefor
exploitinghim.
8. Calabresi/Melamedlens.Whyshoulditbeapropertyrule?Isitmoreefficientasaliabilityrule?
Whatmightgetinthewayofthemarketefficientlypricingpeople'scelllines?Ifthecelllinegets
aliabilityrule,shouldtheresulting"invention"bepatenteligible(i.e.,allowedapropertyrule)?
Questions!
Shoulditbelawfulforpeopletoselltheirbloodtobloodbanks?
Shouldbloodbanksbeabletooffermoneytoinducepeopletodonateblood?
Coronerremovesdeceasedmanscorneasforusasanatomicalgiftswithoutconsentofwife.
SixthCircuitfindsthatwifehadpropertyright.WouldCaliforniareachthesameresult?

43

PropertyBlocher44

III.PROPERTYANDSOCIALORDERING
15.FromTrespasstoAdversePossession,P.281311
1. Adv
ersepo
ssession:actualpossessionofanotherspropertyinamannerthatisexclusive,
visible(openandnotorious),continuous,andwithouttheownerspermission(adverseor
hostile)foraperioddefinedbystatestatutebynonownerthattransferstitlefromtrueowner
(formaltitleholder)toadversepossessor.
a. IfpossessionlastsformorethanperioddefinedinrelevantSoL,ownerisbarredfrom
bringingactioninejectmentagainstpossessor.
2. ElementsofAdversePossession:
a. Forthestatutoryperiod:
i. Actualpossession
1. Physicalcontrol
a. Somestatestatutesdefinewhattypesestablishactual
possession.
b. Inabsenceofstatute:ordinaryusetowhichlandiscapableand
suchasanownerwouldmakeofit.
c. Purposeproductivity
2. Coloroftitle(deedisdefectivebcformalitynotcompliedwith).
a. AriseswhenAPorwhohasdeedpurportstotransferlandin
questionbutisineffectivetotransfertitlebcofdefectindeedor
inprocessintransferringit.
b. Cangetentireparcel,butyouneedthedeed(landareadescribed
intitleusedasconclusiveevidenceofpropertythatisbeing
adverselypossessed).
c. Romerov.Garcia(deedwasdefectivebutPssuedbasedonAP
formorethanstatutoryrequirementundercoloroftitleand
paymentoftaxes;deedwasntvoidforwantofproper
description,ifsurveyorcanascertainboundariesw/deedand
extrinsic evidenceontheground).
3. Claimoftitle(claimingpropertyoutsideofaformaldeed)
a. APoronlygetsportionhesclaiming.
b. Brownv.Gobble(Dsmayhavehadownershipofthetractof
landviatheAPoftheirpredecessors,throughtackingtheory,
eventhoughasurveyrevealedthattractwaspartofPs
property)
ii. Exclusive
1. Oneofthestickstrueownerwouldexcludeandsoshouldthe
adverseowner(actlikeyouownit)
2. Useisofatypethatwouldbeexpectedoftrueowneroflandinquestion
andthatadverseclaimantspossessioncantbesharedw/trueowner.
3. APorspossessjointlymayacquirejointownershipascoowners
iii. Visible(open&notorious)
44

PropertyBlocher45
1. Nosecretuseoflandmustbeconspicuous.
2. Whatareasonableinspectionwoulddisclose(objectivetest,averageuse)
3. Purpose:Helpsprovidenotice.
iv. Continuous
1. Occupylandforentirestatutoryperiodoftime.
2. Dependingontypeofproperty,extendedabsencesmaynotdefeatclaim.
a. seasonaluseofsummercabinreliedoncustomaryuse,how
reasonableownerwouldusesummercabinNome2000v.
Fagerstrom
3. Tacking:succeedingperiodsofpossessionbydifferentpeoplecanbe
addedtogethertoestablishcontinuity.
a. Successorscanaddoriginaladversepossessorsholdingperiod
onlyiftheyareinprivityw/oneanotheroriginaladverse
possessorformallytransferstitletothepropertytothesuccessor
w/ointerruptioninthechainoftitle.
b. Successiveadversepossessorscancounttheprioroccupierstime
towardsthestatutoryperiod,aslongasthereisprivity
c. Privityexistswhenthereisatransferofpropertyundercolorof
title,butifnocoloroftitle,privityreqisstricter.
d. Privityrequiresjudgetodeterminethatdeedformally
transferredtitle,whetherornotdeedwasimperfectorifprocess
wasimperfect.
v. Withoutownerspermission(adverseorhostile)
1. TrueOwnersStateofMindmustnothavegivenconsent.
a. CtsatleastagreeAPmustproveusewasnonpermissive
b. Ctsgenerallyholdpresumptionthatpossessionofanothers
propertyisnonpermissiveifownerhasntsaidanything
c. Ifcoowners,needstatementofintenttotakepossessionand
sendtocoowner(ouster)
d. Presumptionofpermission(pros/cons)
i. Tortliabilityiftrespasser,lessliability
ii. Willgetridofalotofadversepossessionclaims
iii. Burdenonrecordowner
iv. Fitswithintenttoexclude(backgroundpresumption)
v. Burdenonpersontonottrespass
2. Estoppelinproperty
a. Ifownerallowsanothertopossesspropertyforlongtime,
possessorreasonablyreliesonpermissiontoinvestinland,may
begrantedpossessoryrightsbcownerisestoppedfromdenying
continuedpermission.
3. Adversepossessorsstateofmind4approaches
a. Objectivetestoflackofpermissionoverwhelmingmajority
ofjurisdictions.
i. APorsstateofmindisirrelevant,onlythingthat
mattersisthatAPorlackedpermissionfromtrueowner.

45

PropertyBlocher46
b. Claimofrightmusthaveintenttoappropriateanduselandas
hisowntotheexclusionofallothers.
i. Moststates:APoractstowardthelandasanaverage
ownerwouldact,neednotbeexpressbutcanbeimplied
byclaimantsconduct(essentiallytheobjectivetest).
ii. Subjectivetest:APorsintentiontoappropriateanduse
thelandashisowntotheexclusionofallothers
(essentiallytheintentionaldispossessiontest).
c. Intentionaldispossession***
i. APormustbeawareheisoccupyingpropertyownedby
someoneelse,mustintendtooust/dispossesstrueowner.
ii. MistakenoccupationcantgiverisetoAPifAPorhas
nointentionoftakingoverpropertyshedoesntown.
iii. Normallylimitedtoboundarydisputes
iv. Rejectedbyvastmajorityofctsandscholarsbcit
rewardswrongdoersandfailstoprotectinnocentswho
havemistakenlyoccupiedland.
d. Goodfaith***
i. OnlyinnocentAPorscanacquireownershipbyAP.
ii. SomestateshaveshortSoLifnotingoodfaith.
iii. Argumentthateventhoughmoststatesrejectgoodfaith
test,inpracticetheygrantAPonlytogoodfaithAPors
bymanipulatingelements.
e. ***Thesearedisfavoredtestsbcitshardtoestablishstateof
mind.
4. MaineDoctrine:Theremustbeintentnomistakesareallowed.
a. Yougetintoevidentiaryproblemsshowingintentsincethereis
anincentivetotestifyfalsely.
i. Itshardtoproveinurbanenvironmentsbecauseyou
wouldhavetogetasurveyortocomeouteverytimethe
boundarywasquestioned.
b. Rewardstheruthlesstrespasseroverthemistakentrespasser!
5. IntentisnotimportantItdoesnotmatterwhetheryouknewornot.
b. APoperatesasastatuteoflimitations.
c. TheresasenseofabandonmentwithAPLaw.
d. Forthestatutoryperiod.
i. Varieswidely:540yr
ii. ManystatestollSoLiftrueownerisunderdisability(infancy,insanityor
incompetence),statuterunsstartingafterdisabilityends,shortingSoLperiod
oncedisabilityremoved,orsettingmaxperiodlongerthannormalSoL.
3. TypesofAPClaims:
a. EjectmentAction:calloriginalowneratrespasser.
b. QuietTitleAction:clearallpreviousclaimants.
i. Claim:askscttograntdeclaratoryjudgmentthatadversepossessorhasbecome
ownerofdisputedpropertythroughadversepossession.
ii. Canalsobedefensetotrespassorejectmentclaimsbyrecordholders.

46

PropertyBlocher47
c. UnderColorofTitle:Documentedbasisbutitsfaulty/fraudulentandtitleitselfcant
standinCourtactingingoodfaith
i. ThiswasveryfrequentintheWestwheretitledwereofteninaccurate(leapsand
boundswereimprecise)
d. NotUnderColorofTitle:Ruleisthatconstructivepossessiondoesnottrumpactive
possession.
i. Hypo:Ownerhas100acrefarmin1960andthenAentersundercoloroftitlefor
40acresandimproves/occupiesforstatutoryperiodof20years.Agetsonlythe
40acres.
ii. YOUGETWHATYOUPOSSESS.
4. DoctrineofAgreedBoundaries
a. Supersedestitle/deed;requiresactualstatementsthatcannotbeinferred.
5. Claimsagainstgovernment
a. CtsnormallyholdthatAPclaimscantprevailovergovtpropertythosewho
use/possessgovtpropertycantacquireprescriptiverights.
b.
Govtentity=absolutedefensetoAPclaim.
6.
a. Significantnumberofstateshavestatuteslimiting/abolishinggovtimmunityfromAP
b. FedstatuteallowsAPoffederallandincertaincases,ifAPorhasoccupiedpropertyfor
20yearsingoodfaithrelianceonaclaim/coloroftitle,andhaseithercultivated
land/constructedimprovements
c. Governmenthasalreadydecidedonthebestuseofthelandforproductivityssake.
d. Publiclandsarealreadyinservice:ThereisnoadversepossessionagainsttheCrown.
e. TeeHitTon.Indiantitlenotokay
f. Governmentnotexpectedtoactliketypicalprivateindividualowner.Notfeasible.
7. Hypothetical:
a. Statuteoflimitationsis21years.
b. Recordownerleavespropertyin1980
c. Adversepossessorentersin1990
d. Suitisbroughtin2002
e. Changingthefacts
f. AdversePossessorAoccupiedthepropertyfrom1980to1989
g. AdversepossessorBoccupiedthepropertyuntilthetimeofsuit
h. Assumetackingisavailable
8. JUSTIFICATIONFORAPLAWS
a. Theyareineverystateandtheyendurebecauseof:
i. PersonhoodTheory:Overtimeyoudeveloparelationshipwithapieceof
property.
ii. LaborTheory:Productiveuseofland.
iii. Discouragespeoplefromsleepingontheirrightsmoretransactioncosts.
1. Sometimesconservationbetterforsociety
iv. Cooter&Ulen:byquietingtitleandclosingoffstaleclaims,APlowersthecost
ofestablishingrightfulownershipclaimsbyremovingtheriskthatownership
willbedisputedonthebasisofthedistantpast.
v. Uncertaintyinhibitstransactionsorincreasescosts(loweringprofitability)
1. Butoutdated:nowadays,therearemodernrecordingsystemsandability
tousescientificsurveyingmethodstofixtheboundariesofpropertyand

47

PropertyBlocher48

vi.

vii.
viii.

ix.

clearownership.Alwaysmoreefficientandeconomicaltorelyon
boundariesfixedintherecordtitletoidentifytherecordownerthanitis
toconductalawsuittodeterminewhetherthecomplicatedandconfusing
elementsofadversepossessionhavebeenmet.
Posner:Personlosesattachmenttopropertythatheregardsasnolongerhisown
andtherestorationofthepropertywouldgivehimthereforeonlymoderate
pleasure.Marginalutilityofincome.APwouldexperiencegreaterdeprivationof
propertyasadiminutionofhiswealth.
Holmes:ProtectexpecattionsofAPwhohascometoshapehisrootstohis
surroundings,andwhentherootshavegrowntoacertainsize,cannotbe
displacedwithoutcuttinghislife.
Radin:Anobjectisfungibleifitisperfectlyreplaceablewithmoney;itis
personalifithasbecomeboundupwiththepersonhoodoftheholderandisno
longercommensuratewithmoney.APsinterestisinitiallyfungiblebutbecomes
moreandmorepersonalastimepasses.Thisrequiresamoraljudgment.
Whygivelandtolandpirate?Restingongoodfaithtoounpredictableandmore
litigation(hardtoprovegoodfaith),failureforownertoobjectislike
abandonment,SoL.

Brownv.Gobble(W.Va.1996)
1. Facts:Dsboughtpropertyin1985,propertyhadfenceenclosed2ftofland,disputedland.P
purchasedneighboringproperty1989,surveypropertyrevealed2ftoflandenclosedbyDs
fenceinfactPs.Psdidnotraiseissueuntil1994whenPsdecidedtobuildroad.Dsclaimtitle.
2. PH:Putativeownersfiledactiontopreventadversepossessorsfrominterferingwithplansto
buildroad.Adversepossessorsclaimedtitlebytacking.Trialheldadversepossessorsfailedto
proveclaimbyclearandconvincingevidencethatuseofpropertywasadverseandcontinuous.
Dpresentedevidencethatpriorownersfrom19371985believedownedtractandtreatedas
own.
3. Rule:Toestablishtitleunderdoctrineofadversepossession,mustmeetelements:
a. Thathehadheldthetractadverselyorhostilely
b. Thatthepossessionhasbeenactual
c. Thatithasbeenopenandnotorious
d. Thatpossessionhasbeenexclusive
e. Thatpossessionhasbeencontinuous
f. Thatpossessionhasbeenunderclaimoftitleorcoloroftitle.
4. Opinion:
a. Dbeliefthat2ftoflandtheirsdoesnotdefeatrighttoclaimunderthisdoctrine.
b. Forcontinuous,tacking,Dpresentevidencethatpredecessorsfencedlandsince1937
meetsstatutoryrequiredperiod.
c. Forhostileandadverse,Dsevidencepredecessorsfencearoundandclaimedownership.
d. Foractualpossession,Devidencepredecessorsregularlyplantedflowers/mowedgrass.
e. Foropenandnotorious,Devidencereputationincommunitytheirsandpredecessors
f. Forexclusive,Dtestifiedsince1937,theyhadexclusiverightto2ftofland.
g. Preponderancestandardfallsshortofmeetingdemandsoffairnessandaccuracyinthe
factfindingprocessintheadjudicationofadversepossessionclaims,weholdthatthe
burdenisuponthepartywhoclaimstitlebyadversepossessiontoprovebyclearand
convincingevidenceallelementsessentialsuchtitle.

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PropertyBlocher49
Romerov.Garcia(N.M.1976)

1. Facts:IdaGarciaRomeroPanddeceasedhusbandpurchased13acresoflandfromhusbands
father,AntonioGarciaD.Mrs.Garciadidnotjoininconveyance,makingdeedvoid.Romero
andhusbandbuilthomewithparents'assistanceandlivedonlanduntil1962,whenhusband
diedandshemovedtoColorado.
2. PH:Romerofiledaclaimtoquiettitletothe13acresagainsttheGarcias,claimingadverse
possessionformorethan10yearsundercoloroftitle.ThetrialcourtfoundinfavorofRomero.
TheGarciasappealed.Whataboutpropertytaxes?
3. Held:Affirmed.Voiddeedhadsufficientcoloroftitle.
a. Dclaimdeedinsufficientforadversepossessionbcfailedtoadequatelydescribeparcel
oflandwhichcanbeascertainedfromthegroundBUTheldthatdeedwillnotbevoid
forwantofaproperdescriptionifwiththedeedandextrinsicevidence,asurveyorcan
ascertaintheboundariesofthelandintendedtobeconveyed.
b. Also,subsequentactsofthepartiesinbuildingahouseandpointingtothelandwere
adequatetoestablishtheboundaries.
c. Formerdaughterinlawpaidtaxesineachcasebeforeataxdeedwasissuedtothestate.
Nome2000v.Fagerstrom(Alaska1990)
1. Facts:Nome2000(P)recordtitleholderofparcel.Fagerstroms(D)usednorthernparcel
seasonallynotsuitedforwinterforactivities,housingcampertrailer,plantingtrees,building
picnicarea,outhouse,fishrack,reindeershelterfrom19441987butdidnotbuildahouseonit
until1978.Nometriedtoarguethatsincehomeonlyonlandfor9yearscouldnotmeetadverse
possession.Fagerstromsonlyusedsouthernparcelforrecreationonpreexistingtrailsand
pickinguptrash.Fagerstromsallowedotherstouseentirepropertyforactivitiessuchaspicking
berriesandfishing,butmanyincommunitytestifiedthoughtFagerstromsownedproperty.
2. PH:Nome2000filedsuittoejecttheFagerstromsfromtheproperty.Fagerstromsfiled
counterclaim,statingtheyacquiredtitleviaadversepossession,statutoryperiodof10years.
Nome2000filedMDV.Juryfoundadversepossessedentireparcel.
3. Rule:Whetheraclaimantsphysicalactsuponthelandofanotheraresufficientlycontinuous,
notorious,andexclusivedoesnotnecessarilydependontheexistenceofsignificant
improvements,substantialactivity,orabsoluteexclusivity.
a. Hostilityhasnothingtodowithpossessorsbelieforintent,butratherhostilityis
whetherthepossessoractstowardthelandasifheweretheowner.
b. Useconsistentwiththeusebyasimilarlysituatedownerissufficienttoestablisha
claimbyadversepossession
i. Thenatureofthelanddefinesthecontinuityofitsuseandhowareasonable
ownerwouldinteractwithland
4. Trialcourterredinitsdenialoftitleholder'sMDVastosoutherlyportion.Adversepossessors
notentitledtoentiredisputedparcelbecauseuseofsoutherlyportiondidnotprovidea
reasonablydiligentownerwithvisibleevidenceofexerciseofdominionandcontrol.

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PropertyBlocher50

16.PrescriptiveEasements,p.311319
1. Servitude:Legaldevicethatcreatesarightoranobligationthatrunswiththelandorwithan
interestintheland.
a. Runswiththeland:passesautomaticallytosuccessiveownersoroccupiersoflandor
interestinlandwithwhichtherightorobligationruns.
b. Affv.Neg.
i. Affirmative:rightdosomethingonsomeoneelsesland
ii. Negative:righttostopsomeoneelsefromdoingsomethingwiththeirland
1. Options:negativeeasements,restrictivecovenants,equitableservitudes
c. Easements,Covenants,EquitableServitudes:
i. Easementsirrevocable;canbetransferredbygrant,giftorwill
ii. Covenantscontractualagreementsbywhichownersagreedtorestricttheuseof
theirownlandforthebenefitofeithertheirlandlordorneighboringowners.
iii. EquitableServitudescreatedtorelaxsomeofthetechnicalrequirementsand
imposinglanduserestrictionswhenitseemedfairtodoso,evenifthose
restrictionshadnotbeenformallycreatedaccordingtotraditionallegal
requirements
iv. Moderntrend(R3d)Proposal:
1. Abolishtermnegativeeasementandequitableservitude
2. Instead:
a. negativeorrestrictivecovenants:ALLobligationsrestricting
whatonecandowithonesownland
b. easements:ALLaffirmativerightstodosomethingonsomeone
elsesland
d. Domv.Serv
i. Dominantestatereceivesthebenefitoftheservitude
ii. Servientestatebearstheburdenoftheservitude
e.
Licensev.Servitude
i. Licenserevocable;cannotbetransferredorbequeathed,sonotservitudes
1. Canbecomeirrevocablebecauseofarelianceinterestgrantedoveruse
overaperiodoftime
2. Issuesinlawofservitudes:
a. Whatareformalrequirementstocreatearightorobligationthatwillrunwithland?
i. Whenareinformallycreatedexpectationsenforceableby/againstsubsequent
landowners?
b. Whenmeaningofservitudeisunclear,howshouldambiguitiesbeinterpreted?
c. Whataresubstantiverequirementsforvalidityofservitudes?
i. Both(a)determiningwhenlanduserestrictionsareimmediatelyvoidasagainst
publicpolicyand(b)determiningwhenrightsorobligations,althoughvalidas
contractsbetweenthepartieswhoagreedtothem,willnotbeallowedtorunwith
thelandbindingand/orbenefitingfutureowners.
d. Howcanservitudesbemodifiedorterminated?

TypesofEasements

1. Affirmativeeasement:Righttouseanother'spropertyforaspecificpurpose
2. Negativeeasement:Righttopreventanotherfromperforminganotherwiselawfulactivity

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PropertyBlocher51
3. appurtenantrunswiththeland
4. ingrosspersontotheholder,nottheland
5. WhatKindofEasementisit?
a. Express?
b. Prescriptive?
c. Estoppel?
d. Impliedbyprioruse?
e. Impliedbynecessity?
PrescriptiveEasement
1. Prescriptiveeasement:easementuponanother'srealpropertyacquiredbycontinuedusewithout
permissionoftheownerforaperiodprovidedbystatelawtoestablishtheeasement.Donotshow
upontitlereports,andexactlocationand/oruseoftheeasementisnotalwaysclearand
occasionallymovesbypracticeorerosion.
2. Elementsessentiallysameasadversepossession.
a. Forthestatutoryperiod:
b. Actualuse[insteadofpossession]
c. Exclusive
i. Moststatesdropthisrequirement
d. Visible(open&notorious)
i. MoredifficultthanAPclaim
e. Continuous
f. Withoutownerspermission(adverseorhostile)

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

g. Significant#statesrequirePEclaimantproveacquiescencebytrueowneraselement
i. Acquiescence:
1. Ownerdidnotassertrighttoexcludebybringingtrespassaction(so
duplicativeandunnecessaryrule);OR
2. Independentelement:landownermusthaveknownabouttheuseand
passivelyallowedittocontinuewithoutformallygrantingpermission.
3. Knowncanbewouldorshouldhaveknownofuse(duplicativeofopen
andnotorious)
Presumptionthatuseisadverse.(unlessusedbygeneralpublicpolicyreasoningtomake
peoplesharetheirland).
Traditionallypubliccouldnotacquireaprescriptiveeasement,butstrongtrendofmoderncases
ispublicmayacquireprescriptiveeasements,presumptionthatpublicaccesstoprivatelandis
permissiveintheabsenceofclearevidencetothecontrary.
RESULT:PEcreatesapossessoryinterestinland,similartoadversepossession
a. BUTPEinterestclaimedleadstoaNONFEEINTEREST(APisinfee)
b. Righttocontinuekindandamountofusethatpersistedduringstatutoryperiod(as
opposedtoAPwhichtransferstitle).
c. Canbuyandselleasements(shoppingmall?)
CannotgetnegativeprescriptiveeasementinUS.FontainebleuauHotel.Merefactthatonehas
enjoyedlightandairononespropertyformanyyearswillnotcreateaneasementforlightand
airthatpreventsonesneighborfrombuildingonherproperty.
a. Hardtohavenoticerequirement.Calcifylanduse.
ClaimofRight:useisnotpermissivebutisengagedinbyPEclaimantregardlessofwishesof
trueowner.
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PropertyBlocher52
a. Duplicativeofrequirementthatusebenonpermissive.
b. Somecourtsinterpretthis:stateofmind(subjective)knowingyouretrespassing
c. Moststateshavepresumptionthatusebynonownerisnonpermissiveasw/AP(exists
bcitshardtoprove)
d. BUTfairnumberpresumethatuseispermissive,neighborlygesture,morejustifiedin
assuminglimitedusesarepermissiveratherthanoccupationbeingpermissive.
8. Goodfaith?
a. Warsawv.ChicagoMetallicCeilings,Inc.(Cal.1984):CommunityFeedcitedthis:
adverseuserclearlyknewtrespassing,Psplannedconstructionoflargecommercial
buildingontheirpropertybutleftinsufficientspacebetweenedgeofbuildingand
propertyline,sohadtomovetrucksonothersland.Dsplannedconstructionontheir
property,andPsuedforPE.Dconstructedonstripofland.Pwon.Awardedtrespassing
partyandownnegligenceinbuildingnegligently.
CommunityFeedStore,Inc.v.NortheasternCulvertCorp.(Vt.1989)
1. Facts:PownsfeedstorenexttoDsbusiness.ParceloflandcoveredwithgravelnorthofPsmill.
Vehiclesturnongravellot.Dboughtin1956,didnotrealizeuntil1984thatgravelareadidnot
belongtoP.Feedandpredecessorsusedlandfrom1929untilNorthfoundoutitownedpartoflot
andbuiltabarrierin1984.DerectedbarrierpreventedPsuseoflot.
2. PH:Feedsueddeclaratoryjudgmentforprescriptiveeasement.Northcounterforejectment.Trial
foundforNorthbcFeedfailedtoprovew/sufficientparticularitywidth/lengthofeasementand
useofareawasw/permissionoflandowner.
3. Held:Reversed.InVT,toestablishaprescriptiveeasement,establish:adverseuse/possession
whichisopen,notorious,hostileandcontinuousfor15yrs,andacquiescenceinuse/possession
bypersonagainstwhomclaimisasserted.Possessorthenreceivesnonfeeinterest.
a. Open/Notorious/Continuouselementsmet:Usedbyvehiclessince1920sand
uninterrupteduntilbarrierin1984.
b. Pprovedmettimeperiodoffifteenyearsbydoctrineoftacking.Thechainoftitlefrom
1929showedareahadbeenusedbypredecessors.
c. Feedevidenceofgeneraloutlinesofprescriptiveeasementwithreasonablecertaintysoit
metitsburden.Generaloutlineofconsistentuseissufficient

17.Easements

Imp
liedfromPriorDealingorCreatedExpressly
CreationbyIm
plication
1. TypesofEasements
a. EasementbyestoppelWhereapartyrepresentsexistenceofaneasement,oracquiesces
inuse,itcannotlaterdenythateasement.(Holbrookv.Taylor)
i. EbyE:convertsalicenseintoaneasement,immunefromrevocation
b. Easementbyprioruse(quasieasement)Wherelandownerhasusedsinglepieceof
propertyinparticularway,subdividesland,thensellspart,courtsmaytreatitasifhe
intendedtoconveyaneasementpreservingthatuse.(GranitePropertiesv.Manns)
c. EasementbynecessityWhereaparcelislandlockedandaneasementisabsolutely
necessarytoreachit,courtswillcreateone.(Finnv.Williams)
2.
DoesImpliedEasementRunWithLand?
a. Isfutureownerobligatedtoalloweasementownercontinuedaccesstoorcontrolover
herlandundertermsoforiginaleasement?

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PropertyBlocher53
b. Implication,necessity,estoppel,andprescriptiveeasementsaregenerallyheldtorunw/
landif:
i. Intendedtodoso(normallyheldtobethecase)AND
ii. Arereasonablynecessaryforenjoymentofdominantestate.
3. Easem
entsbyestoppel
a. Types:IrrevocableLicensesorOralEasements
b. Maypreventownerfromrevokinglicenseifownerhasgrantedlicenseerighttoinvestin
improvingproperty,orotherwiseinduceslicenseetoactinreasonablerelianceoflicense.
c. Ownerestoppedfromdenyingcontinuedaccesstohislandforwhateverperiodis
deemedjustundercircumstances
d. Convertsrevocablelicenseirrevocableeasement
e. Key:AcquiescenceofD(sufficesforprescriptiveeasements)
f. Holbrookv.Taylor
g. Recognizedprinciplethatrighttouseroadwayoveranotherslandscanbeestablished
byestoppel.
4.
ElementsofEasementsImpliedbyPriorUse
a. Commongrantorpreviouslyownedthetwoparcels
b. Servientparcelwaspreviouslyusedforthebenefitofthedominantparcelinamanner
thatwasvisibleandcontinuous(thisisthepriorusethatmatters)
c. Useoftheservientparcelisconvenientorreasonablynecessaryforenjoymentofthe
dominantestate(doesnotneedtobeabsolutelynecessary)
d. Impliedeasements:recognizedinparticularkindsofrelationshipsdespiteabsenceof
expresscontracttocreateaneasement.
i. Sometimescarryoutintentofpartiesasmanifestedbyconduct.
ii. Sometimescontradictactualintentofparties,butimpliedbylawasaresultof
publicpolicyjudgmentaboutfair/efficientallocationofpropertyrights(estoppel
relationship).
iii. GranitePropertiesLimitedPartnershipv.Manns
e. Inabsenceofexpressagreementtothecontrary,transferimpartsgrantofpropertyw/all
benefitsandburdenswhichexistedattimeofconveyance.

f. Easementsbygrant&reservation
i. Easementbygrant:Granteegainsaneasementoverpropertyretainedbygrantor
ii. Easementbyreservation:Grantorretainsaneasementovertheproperty
conveyedtothebuyer
5.
ElementsofEasementsbyNecessity
a. Acommonownerseveredtheproperty
b. Easementisstrictlynecessaryforegress/ingresstolandlockedparcel
c. Necessityforegressandingressexistedattimeofseverance
d. Grantedtoowneroflandlockedparceloverremaininglandsofgrantortoobtainaccess
toparcel.Finnv.Williams
6.
Policy(forImpliedEasements)
a. Fillingintermsofdealthatwerenotexplicitlyaddressedcannotexpectallpartiesto
reasonablyaddress(effectuateintentofparties)
b. Createopportunitiesforeitherfraudorunfairlydeprivingintereststhattheownershave
nottransferred

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PropertyBlocher54
c. Createsuncertaintytosaythereareinformallycreatedeasements;requiringthemalltobe
inwritingmakesiteasiertodeterminewhetherornotthereisaneasement
d. Effectuatestheownersintentbecausetheneighborshavebeenactinginacertainwayfor
acertainperiodoftime
e. Efficientuseofland
f. Publicpolicyjudgmentaboutthefairandefficientallocationofpropertyrightsinthe
contextoftherelationshipestablishedbytheparties
g. Cons:Maycontradictactualintentofparties
CreationbyExpressAgreement
1. Easementsthatarespecificallycreatedbysigneddeed,conveyingeasementorproperty
burdened/benefited.
2. KindsofExpressEasements
a. Appurtenanteasement:Runswiththeland.Intendedtobenefitwhoeverownsthe
dominantparcel,andisenforceablebyfutureownersofthatparcel.
i. Theyaretransferable.(Note4,pg.461)
ii. Thesearenotseverablefromtheland.(Note3,pg.461)
b. Easementingross(personaleasement):Doesnotrunwiththeland.Belongs
personallytothegrantee,notinconnectionwithhisownershiporuseofanyparcelof
land.
i. Thesearenottransferable.(Note4,pg.461)
3. RunningWithTheLand
a. Expresseasementsrunwithlandtoburdenfutureownersofservientestateif:
i. Theeasementisinwriting(StatuteofFrauds);
ii. Theoriginalgrantorintendedtheeasementtorunwiththeland;
iii. Subsequentownersoftheservientestatehadnoticeatpurchase
1. Actual:Subsequentownersinfactknowabouttheeasement
2. Inquiry:Therearevisiblesignsofusebynonowners
3. Constructive:Titlesearchwouldleadtodiscoveryofthedeed
4. Doesbenefitrunwiththeland?(appurtenantv.ingross)
a. Appurtenanteasement:ifbenefitrunsw/land,itstreatedasifitwereattachedtothat
particularparcelofland.
i. Ctshaveconstructionalpreferenceforappurtenanteasementssomesaythereis
apresumptionthateasementsareappurtenantratherthaningross
ii. Favorablebclimit#ofpeoplew/easementsoverthelandtothenumberof
neighboringparcels
iii. Easementsingrosscreatemoreuncertaintyaboutlanduserightsthan
appurtenant.
iv. Ctsgenerallyholdthatappurtenanteasementcannotbeseveredfromtheland
passautomaticallytowhoeverownsdominantestate.
b. Easementsingross:ifbenefitdoesntrunw/land,itisntattachedtoparticularparcel
oflandandthereisnodominantestate.
c. Testfordistinguishingthe2typesistheintentofgrantorcanberecitationindeed,
butproblemariseswhenitisambiguouslystated/unstated.
d. Greenv.Lupo(whenlanguageofintentisambiguousindeed,ctmayconsidersituation
involvingpropertyandparties,surroundingcircumstancesattimeinstrumentwas
executed,andpracticalconstructionofinstrumentgivenbypartiesasprovedbytheir
conductoradmissions).

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PropertyBlocher55
i. GrantingofeasementbyDsforingress,egress,andutilitiestotheownersof
adjacentlandisevidenceofanintentthattheeasementbenefitthegrantees
adjacentland,therebybeinganappurtenanteasement.
1. Willfollowpossessionofdominantestatethroughsuccessivetransfers,
evenifdominantestateissubdividedintoparcels.
ii. Appurtenanteasementscanonlybeenforcedbythepersonwhoownsthe
dominantestate,socantbesoldseparatelyfromland
ModifyingandterminatingEasements
1. Easementslastforeverunlessterminatedby:
a. Agreementinwriting
i. Releaseofeasementbytheholder
b. Theirownterms
i. EX:ifdeedconveyingeasementexpresslystatesthatitistolastfor10yrs.
c. Merger
i. Holderofservientestatebecomesownerofdominantestate.
d. Abandonment
i. Ifitcanbeshownthattheowneroftheeasement,byherconducthadintentto
abandoneasement.
e. Adversepossessionorprescription
i. Byownerofservientestateor3rdparty.
f. Frustrationofpurpose
i. Findingthatthepurposeoftheeasementhasbecomeimpossibletoaccomplish,
orthateasementnolongerservesitsintendedpurpose.
g. Marketabletitleacts
i. Enactedbymanystates,requirethateasementsandotherencumbranceson
propertyinterestsbererecordedperiodically(every3050yrs)tobebindingon
futurepurchasers.
ii. Purpose:limithowfarbackabuyerhastolookinchainoftitletodetermine
validityofsellerstitleandexistenceofencumbrances.
1. Failuretocomplyw/Actmayleaveeasementownerunprotectedfrom
subsequentpurchaserofservientestatedependingonlanguagein
statute,maybeentitledtobuypropertyfreeofburdenofeasement.

I.

Easements by Estoppel
A. Rule[Holbrook]
i. Thepartymustshow(1)heinvestedintheland(2)basedonareliancebytheowner
thathecouldusetheland
B. Policy
i. IftheTOgrantspermissionforaneighbortouseandimprovehisland,heshouldnotbeable
torevokeuseofthelandbytheimprover

Holbrookv.Taylor(Ky.1976)EasementbyEstoppel
1. Synopsis:Iflandownerletsanotherimprovepropertyandreasonablyrelyonaccesstoproperty,
ownerwillbedeemedtohavecreatedeasementbyestoppelandnotabletodenyimproveraccess

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PropertyBlocher56
2. Facts:1942:Holbrooksboughttractofland.1944:permissiongrantedtosomeonetocutroadon
Holbookslandtohaulcoal.1949:roadwaynotusedasmuch;roadclosed.1957:Holbrooks
builtatenanthouseandtenantsusedtheroadagain.1961:tenanthouseburnsdown.1964:
appelleesTaylorsbuylandadjacenttoHolbrook.HolletTayusetheeasement(haulroad)to
movestuffin,watchedastheyimprovedonroadbywideningit.Afterappellantsconstructed
newhome,continuedtouseroadwayasbefore.Onlyafterappelleesimprovedroadof
egress/ingresswasthesuitforquiettitle(alreadyinvested$500),asHolbrookwantedTaylorsto
signaformrelievingHolbrookofallliabilityontheroad
3. Held:
a. Norighttoaneasementbyprescriptionbcusenotadverse,continuousoruninterrupted.
b. BUT,righttouseroadonlandofanothermaybeestablishedbyestoppel.
c. Whenalicenseincludesrighttomakeimprovementsatlicenseesexpenseonthelandas
wellasarightofentry,licensormaynotrevokelicense.Licensebecomesirrevocable.
d. Licenseisagrantthroughestoppelbcitwouldbeunconscionabletorevokelicensewhen
licenseehasmadeimprovementsandusedlandinrelianceonlicensorspromise.
e. UseofroadbyAppelleesandimprovementsdonewithconsentofAppellants,solicense
maynotberevokedeasementbyestoppel
f. Thecourtlookedtotheintentofthepartyaspartoftheprescriptionclaim.
II. Easements Implied by Prior Use
A. Rule[Manns]
i. Thedominantandservientparcelswerepreviouslyundercommonownershipanda
subsequentconveyanceortransferseparatingthatownership
ii. Theearliercommonownerusedpartoftheunitedparcelforthebenefitoftheotherpart,and
thisusewasapparent,obvious,continuousandpermanent
(1) Themorepronouncedthecontinuousandapparentuseis,thelessthedegreeof
convenienceofuseisnecessary
iii. Theclaimedeasementisnecessaryandbeneficialtotheenjoymentoftheparcelconveyedor
retainedbythegrantorortransferor
iv. Importantcircumstancesfromwhichinferenceofintentiontocreate/reserveaneasementmay
bedrawn:[Restatement]
(1) Whethertheclaimantisaconveyorortheconveyee
(2) Thetermsoftheconveyance
(3) Theconsiderationgivenforit
(4) Whethertheclaimismadeagainstasimultaneousconveyee
(5) Theextentofnecessityoftheeasementtotheclaimant
(6) Whetherreciprocalbenefitsresulttotheconveyorandtheconveyee
(7) Themannerinwhichthelandwasusedpriortoitsconveyance
(8) Theextenttowhichthemannerofpriorusewasormighthavebeenknowntotheparties
GranitePropertiesLimitedPtnrshpv.Manns(Ill.1987)EasementsImpliedbyPriorUse
1. Facts:Servientestate(takenadvantageof)ownerofadrivewayusedbydominantestate(taking
advantage).DominantestateGranite/Pownedtractofpropertyincludedshoppingcenter,
apartmentcomplex,each'srespectivedriveway.GranitesoldtoManns(Ds)(servientestate)tract
betweenapartmentandshoppingcenter.DrivewaysonlandconveyedtoManns,Mannsknew
thiswhenboughtproperty.DrivewayswereusedbyGraniteforyearsbeforeitconveyedlandto

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PropertyBlocher57
Manns.DrivewayAtoshoppingcenterusedfordeliveries,trash.GranitetestifiedDrivewayA
necessarybcnotenoughroomotherwisefordeliverytruckstoturnaroundandexit.DrivewayE
tolotofapartmentcomplex.NootherfeasibleplacetoputparkinglotandDrivewayEonlyway
residentscouldaccesslot.AfterMannsboughtthetract,toldGranitetostopusingdriveways.
2. PH:GranitesuedManns,stopinterferingdriveways.CourtruledagainstGranitere:DrivewayA
butinfavorofGranitere:DrivewayE.AppellatecourtruledinfavorofGraniteonboth.
3. Holding:
a. Easementimpliedfromapriorexistinguse,oftencalledquasieasement,ariseswhen
ownerofentiretractoflandoroftwoormoreadjoiningparcels,afteremployingapart
thereofsothatonepartofthetractoroneparcelderivesfromanotherabenefitor
advantageofanapparent,continuous,andpermanentnature,conveysortransferspartof
thepropertywithoutmentionbeingmadeoftheseincidentaluses.
b. Easementmustbe1)commonownership2)easementmusthavebeenusedinan
apparent,obvious,continuous,andpermanentwaybeforethepropertywastransferred3)
necessaryandbeneficial
c. Courtfound(1)drivewaysinquestionhadbeenusedbydominantestateowneror
predecessorsintitlesincerespectivepropertiesdeveloped,(2)drivewayspermanentin
character,beingeitherrockorgravelcovered,(3)servientestateownerswereawareof
thedrivewayspriorusesbeforepurchasedparcel.
d. Restatement(1944):8importantcircumstancesfromwhichtheinferenceofintentionto
createorreserveaneasementmaybedrawn(seeabove)
e. Here,problematiconesare:(1)claimantistheconveyor(2)easementnotabsolutely
necessarytothebeneficialuseandenjoymentoftheland.
f. Butimpliedbyprioruseneednotbeabsolutelynecessarybchaveimpliedbynecessity
asoption,sorequiredextentofnecessitylesshere.ThetestthenisREASONABLE
NECESSITY(reasonablyconvenienttotheuseofthelandbenefited,flexibletest)
i. Thinkofitlikeimportanttotheenjoymentoftheconveyedquasidominantor
quasiservientparcel
III. Easements Implied by Necessity
A. Rule[Finn]
i. Whereanownerofthelandconveysaparceloflandwhichhasnooutletexceptoverthe
grantorsland,awayofnecessityoverthegrantorsremaininglandiscreated
ii. Awayofnecessitymaylaydormantthroughseveraltransfersoftitleandstillpasswitheach
transferasappurtenanttothedominantestate
Finnv.Williams(Ill.1941)EasementsImpliedbyNecessity
1. Facts:CharlesWilliamsownedalargetractoflandandconveyedapartofittoThomasBacon.
Finns(Ps)eventuallyacquiredtitletothisconveyedpart.ZilphiaJaneWilliams(Williams)(D)
inheritedremainingpartofCharlesWilliamsland.Onlymeansofgettingtonearesthighwayand
marketfromtheFinnslandwasbycrossingoverWilliamsslandorthatofastranger.Williams
refusedtogivetheFinnspermissiontocrossoverland.
2. PH:Finnsbroughtthisactionseekingdeclaratoryjudgmentgrantingthemaneasementby
necessityoverWilliamssland.LowercourtheldPsownersofrightofwayeasementof
necessityoverDsonehundredacres
3. Held:SincetherewasatonetimecommonownershipofthelandsofPandD,aneasementby
necessitywillremainoverthelandsoftheoriginalgrantor.

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PropertyBlocher58
a. Therightofwayoverthelandistreatedhashavingbeendormantthroughthetransfersof
title,andcanbeusedatanytimebyoneofthelandownerswhennoothermeansof
accesstoaroadexist.
b. Theeasementisbasedonstrictnecessity,soitdoesnotmatterthattheclaimdidnotexist
whenthelandwereunified.
c. Buyerswillnotbuypropertyunlesstheyhaveguaranteedaccesstoitbyaneasement
overaneighboringland.
d. Grantingaccesseffectuatestheintentoftheparties.
e. AsPs'landwasentirelysurroundedbypropertyofstrangersandlandofDfromwhichit
wasoriginallysevered,arightofwayeasementofnecessitywasnecessarilyimpliedin
theconveyanceseveringthetwotracts.

IV. Express Easements

A. Rule[Green]
i. Theeasementrunswiththeonlyif:
(1) Theeasementisinwriting
(2) Theoriginalgrantorwhocreatedtheeasementintendedtheeasementtorunwiththeland
(a) Theintentionofthepartiesisdeterminedfromthelanguageoftheinstrument
(b) Wherethelanguageisambiguous,thecourtmayconsider
(i) Thesituationofthepropertyandtheparties
(ii) Thesurroundingcircumstancesatthetimetheinstrumentwasexecuted
(iii) Thepracticalconstructionoftheinstrumentgivenbythepartiesconductor
admissions
(3) Subsequentownersoftheservientestatehadnoticeoftheeasementatthetimeofthe
purchaseoftheservientestate
(a) Actualnoticeownersweretold
(b) Inquirynoticesomethingonthelandwouldsuggesttherewasaneasement
(c) Constructivenoticenoticebasedontheoriginaldeedsfoundintherecordingoffice
B. Policy
i. For:thereisastrongpresumptioninsomestatesthateasementsareappurtenanttosome
particulartractoflandbecauseitiseasiertodiscoverexistingeasements
ii. Against:wewanttolimitthenumberofeasements,soitwouldbebesttoexpirethemwith
people
Greenv.Lupo(WashCt.App.1982)
1. Facts:Greens(Ps)ownedtractofland.Lupos(Ds)boughtparcelofland(thenorthtract)from
Ps.Whiletheywerestillpayingforthatland,Dsrequestedadeedreleasetoasmallsectionofthe
northtracttoallowfinancingfortheconstructionofahome.Psagreedinreturnforapromiseof
aneasementalongthenorthtractwhenDseventuallyobtainedtitle.Partiesenteredintoawriting
abouttheeasement,butitdidnotstatewhethertheeasementwasingross(personal)or
appurtenant(runwiththeland).ButwhenDsobtainedtitle,theyrefusedtogranttheeasement.
Psbroughtanactionforspecificperformance.
2. Held:Aneasementisnotpersonalifthereisanythinginthegranttosuggestthatitwasintended
tobetiedtotheland
a. Presumptionofeasementappurtenantandifappurtenantpresumptionitrunswiththe
landforsubdivisions.

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PropertyBlocher59
b. Parolevidencewasproperlyadmittedtodefinescopeofeasement.
c. Writtenagreementthatcreatedeasementwasambiguousbecauseitevidencedan
easementthatwasbothappurtenanttothelandandpersonaltotheeasementholders.
d. Therewasastrongpresumptionagainstpersonaleasements.
i. Trialcourterredbcevidencedidnotsupportitsdeterminationthateasementwas
personal.
ii. Evidenceofanappurtenanteasementoutweighedevidenceofapersonal
easement.
e. Trialcourtabuseditsdiscretionwhenitenjoinedallmotorcycletrafficontheroad
createdbytheeasementbecauseitdidnotproperlyconsidertheban'seffectonthe
easementholders'useoftheeasementandbecausethebanunreasonablyinterferedwith
theiruseoftheeasement.
Hypotheticals:
BenandCalebownadjoiningparcels.Bensparcelbordersahuntingpreserve.Knowingof
Calebsloveofhunting,BenconveyedarightofwayeasementtoCalebacrosshispropertyto
thepreserve.Caleblatersubdividedhisparcelinto50separatelots,conveyinghiseasementin
thedeedstotheindividuallotowners.Manyofthelotownersarenowinvitingfriendsandusing
theeasementdailyduringhuntingseason.Often,theygatherattheedgeofthereserveto
socializebeforeandafterhunting,causingsignificantnoiseanddisruption.
o BenwantstopreventeveryonebutCalebfromcrossinghisland.Advisehimonhis
possibleclaims.
Davidboughta40acreparcelofpropertyandbuiltahouseonthenorthernedge.Hisonly
accesstoahighwaywasviaasmalldirtdrivewayonthepropertythatledsouth.Elizabeth,
Davidsneighbortothenorth,hadaccesstoamuchmoreconvenienthighway.Aftergettingto
knowDavid,Elizabethallowedhimtouseherdrivewaytoaccessthishighwaytothenorth.
DavidbegantouseElizabethsdrivewayregularlyforingressandegresstohisproperty.
o Thereafter,Daviddividedhispropertyintotwolotsandsoldthenorthernhalf(withthe
house)toFrank.FrankassumedDavidhadaneasementacrossElizabethsdrivewayto
accessthehighwaytothenorth.ButElizabethputupalockedgatetopreventFranks
use,havingonlyintendedforDavidtousethedriveway.Davidalsoputupalocked
gate,toprohibitFrankfromusinghisdrivewaytoaccessthehighwaytothesouth.
Accordingly,Franknowlacksaccesstohisproperty.
o AdviseFrankonhisclaims.

18.CovenantsandCommercialOrdering,p.475501
Eq
uitableServitudes(writing,intent,touchandconcern,notice)
1. Covenantthatregardlessofwhetheritrunswiththelandatlaw,equitywillenforceagainst
theassigneesoftheburdenedlandwhohavenoticeofthecovenant.
2. Injunctionistypicalremedyagainstviolationofthecovenant
a. IfPwantsaninjunction,mustshowthatthecovenantqualifiesasES
3. Requirements:

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PropertyBlocher60
a. Writing(unlessnegativeimplied)
b. IntenttobindSuccessors
c. TouchandConcern
d. Notice
e.
(d
o
ntneedprivity)
Covenants
1. ElementsofaCovenant
a. Writing:Mustbewritten.
b. Notice:Ownsofburdenedpropertymusthavenoticeofrestriction.
c. Intent:Grantormusthaveintendedrestrictiontorunwithlandonbothsides,binding
futureownersofservientestateandbenefitingfutureownersofdominantestate.
d. TouchandConcern:Restrictionmusttouchandconcernbothservientanddominant
estate.
e. PrivityofEstate:Theremustbeprivityestatebetweentheoriginalcovenantingparties
(horizontalprivity)andbetweenthosepartiesandtheirsuccessors(verticalprivity).
2. Modernapproachtoanalysis
a. Privity=relaxedverticalprivity
b. T&Cmodified
c. Reasonableness/PPanalysisdoneasseparateanalysis
d. RemedynotdeterminedbyformalrequirementsofC/ESbutbycircumstancesofcase
i. DavidsonBros.,Inc.v.D.Katz&Sons,Inc.
3.
TypesofNotice
a. Actual:actuallytoldaboutthecovenant
b. Inquiry:anyconditionofthepremisesindicatedthatthepropertywasburdenedbya
covenant
c. Constructive:ifcovenantwasrecordedintheregistryofdeedsalongwiththedeedor
leasecreatingthecovenant(or,asintheSuddenValleyexample,ifadeclaration
containingtherestrictionwasrecordedpriortothesale)
4. Touchesandconcernstheland
a. Mustbesatisfiedonburden&benefitside
i. Burdenmustrestrictorsomehowregulateuseofland
ii. Benefitmustincreasetheenjoymentorfairmarketvalueoftheland
b. ModernapproachgetsridoftouchandconcernsandlooksatreasonablenessPP
i. Whetherthecovenanthadanimpactontheconsiderationexchange
ii. Whetheritisreasonableconcerningareaandduration
iii. Whetheritviolatespublicpolicybecauseitconstitutesanunreasonablerestraint
ontradeorotherwiseinterfereswiththepublicinterest
5. Thegrantorintendedtherestrictiontorunwiththelandonbothsides
a. Expressintentintentisshownifcovenantrecites(1)thatismadetothegrantoror
granteeandtheirheirsorassigns;(2)isbinding/intendedtobindfutureowners,is
intendedtorunwiththeland
b. Presumedintentcourtsgenerallypresumetheretobeintentifittouchesandconcerns
theland
6. Noticeoftherestrictiononthepartyagainstwhomenforcementissought(onlyforequitable
servitudes)
a. Actualnoticebuyer/lesseewasactuallytoldaboutcovenant

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PropertyBlocher61
b. Constructivenoticecovenantwasrecordedinregistryalongwithdeed/leasecreating
covenant
c. Inquirynoticeconditionsonthepremisesindicatedthatthepropertywasburdenedbya
covenant
7. Privityofestateexistsbetweentheoriginalcovenantingpartiesandbetweenthoseparties
andsucceedingparties.Horizontalprivitybetweenoriginalpartiesandstrictverticalprivityof
estate(originalpartytothecovenantandthesubsequentowner)
a. HorizontalPrivityregulatestherelationshipbetweentheoriginalcovenantingparties;
whetherornotownershaveaninterestineachothersland.Atthetimeoriginalparties
enterintoagreement,partiessharesomeinterestinthelandindependentofcovenant
(landlord/tenant,mortgagee/mortgagor,holdersofmutualeasements).
i. TypesofHorizontalPrivity:
ii. Simultaneousprivity(alsoknownasmutualprivity)twoownershavea
simultaneousinterestinthesameparcelofland(landlordtenant,owner
appurtenanteasementoverland)
1. Easiestexampleofthisisthelandlordtenantrelationship.
2. Tenanthasapresentpossessoryinterest.
3. Landlordhasareversion(therighttogetpropertybackatend)
iii. Instantaneousprivitycovenantattachedtobothparcelsifitiscreatedatthe
momenttheownerofoneparcelssellstheotherparcel(throughasaleor
conveyance)
1. Existswhentherestrictionwasimposedatthemomentpropertywas
transferredfromonetotheother.
iv. Excludedrelationships:
1. Agreementsbetweenneighborsnotpartofaseparateconveyance
becauseneighborsnotinprivity
2. Agreementsbetweengrantorsandgranteesnotmadeatthesametimeas
theconveyanceofthepropertyburdenedorbenefitedbytheproperty
v. Note:Canjustusestrawbuyersothisrequirementisalittleunnecessary
b. VerticalPrivity:Relationshipbetweenoriginalpartytocovenantandsubsequentowner.
Tobeboundbythecovenant,successormustholdtheentireestateinlandheldbythe
originalparty(strictverticalprivityofestate).
i. Becausestrictverticalprivityrequiredforaburdentorun,lesseecouldnothave
burdenenforcedagainstthem.Butbenefitedpartycouldsueownerofreversion
ofestate,andownercouldpossiblysuethelesseeforwaste.
ii.
TypesofVerticalPrivity:
iii. StrictVerticalPrivity(traditional)
1. Grantorcannotretainanyfutureinterests.
2. Forexample,verticalprivityispresentwhenanownersellsaproperty
butnotwhentheownerleasesit.
iv. RelaxedVerticalPrivity(modern)
1. Imposesbenefit/burdenonanyfuturepossessor.
2. Imposestheburdenonanyfuturepossessorofburdenedlandandbenefit
ofcovenantonanyfuturepossessorofthebenefittedland
3. ThisistheRestatementrule.
4. Excludedrelationships
a. Successorsininterestwhohaveanestateoflessordurationthan
thepriorowner(landlord/tenant)

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PropertyBlocher62
b. Neighborswhoarentsuccessorowners/possessorsoftheparcels
ownedbythecovenantingparties
c. Priorpurchasersfromagrantorwhoimposedrestrictionson
subsequentlysoldparcels
i. Courtscreatedverticalprivitytoensurefutureowners
hadnotice
ii. Rightsandobligationsoforiginalcovenantingparties
1. Generallyallowenforcementbytheoriginal
covenanteeiftheagreementcontainsexplicit
languagetotheeffect
2. Restatementallowsthebenefittobeenforcedin
grossbutonlyifthepersonseekingenforcement
candemonstratealegitimateinterestin
enforcingtheservitude
3. Whilepriorownersarenotresponsibleforthe
actionsofsubsequentowners,landlordsare
responsiblefortheactionsoftheirlessors
8. Policy:Developedasaflexibleapproachtocreateprivatearrangementsbetweenparties;contract
lawwasinsufficientbecauseitcouldnotbeassignedtosubsequentowners
9.
Tensionbetweeninterestsofbuyers&interestofowners
a. Buyerswanttodowhattheywantandnotbeboundbyanythingtheydidntagreeto
b. Ownersbuyinrelianceofrestrictionsandhaveactedaccordingly
10.Reasonsforcovenants
a. Thoughttobolsterpropertyvalue,givessecuritytoexistingowners
b. Peoplearefreetochoosetoliveonapropertythathas/doesnthavearestrictivecovenant
c. Decreasestransactioncostsbecausepeoplewillnothavetocontractwithallexisting
ownersinanareatodowhatrestrictivecovenantscanotherwisedo
11.Retainingtouchandconcernrequirement
a. For(Futureowners)
i. Enhancesfreechoiceandcombatsdeadhandbylimiting
ii. Althoughfutureownersarefreedombound,currentownersarefreedom
enhancing
iii. Futureownersarenotcurrentpropertyowners,theirinterestsarenotas
importantascurrentowners
iv. Futureownerswillhavenoticeofcovenants
b. Against(Currentowners)
i. Collectiverestrictiononthecurrentownersfreedomofchoice/contract
ii. Favorsfutureownersinterestsovercurrentowners
iii. Constructivenoticeissufficient
12.Remedies
a. Injunctionsallowbetterbargainingrightsbetweenparties;damagesmaybeunableto
captureidiosyncraticvalueoftheparties(equitableservitudes)
i. Grantingofinjunctionsalwaysbeendiscretionary.
ii. BenefitsofInjunction:
1. Partiesgettobargaintodeterminewhovaluesentitlementmostandto
setappropriateprice.
2. Avoidtimeandexpenseoflitigation.
3. Avoidinaccuracyofdamageawardssetby3rdpartywholess

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PropertyBlocher63
knowledgeableaboutbenefitsofnoncompeteCsandvaluetoparties
b. Damagesmoreappropriateforcommercialpropertiesbecausethemeaningoflandis
notasgreataswithpersonalproperty(covenants)
i. Damagesoftenthoughttobeinadequatebcofuniquevalueattachedtolocation
oflandanddesiretouseparticularuniquestructures.
ii. Benefitsofdamages:Litigationcanproduceresultwheretransactioncostsmight
preventpartiesfrombargainingtomutuallybeneficialresult.
c. Moderntrendtowardcasespecificremedies
WinnDixieStores,Inc.v.Dolgencorp,Inc.(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2007)
1. Facts:WinnDixie(P)anchortenantgrocerystoreinplaza,itsleasegaveitexclusiverighttosell
groceriesinplaza,butotherstoresinplazacouldsellgroceriesifdedicated<500sqfttoit.Lease
providedallprovisionsinleasecovenantsthatranwithland.Shortformofleaserecorded.
Dolgencorp(D)becametenantandsoldgroceries>500sq.ft.
2. Held:Covenantranwithlandandtenanthadconstructivenoticeofitunderrecordingstatute,and
impliedactualnotice(experiencedcommercialtenanthadobtainedsuchcovenantsforitselfso
obligedtomakeinquiry/examinelandlord'schainoftitletodeterminewhetherexclusive
covenant)
a. Dolgencorparguedthatagreementwasacontractandthattheywerenotliabletouphold
thecontractonlytheshoppingplazawas.Courtdisagreed;thesetypesofcovenantshave
longbeenheldtorunwiththeland.
b. Whenacovenanttouchesandconcernstheland,andcreateshighervalueormakes
somethingmorebeneficialfortheparties,thencovenantrunswithland.Agreementstates
itwillrunwithlandandthatallusersofthispropertymustfollowthiscovenant.
WhitinsvillePlazav.Kotseas(Mass.1979)
1. Facts:In1968,Kotseas(D)conveyedparcelto122Trust,ownedbyWhitinsvillePlaza(Plaza/P).
DeedincludedlanduserestrictionsandcovenantsboundKotseasandTrust,prohibitedKotseas
fromusingadjoiningland,whichheowned,tooperatebusinessincompetitionwithdiscount
storeTrustplannedtooperateonland.Trustopeneddiscountdepartmentstore;in1975conveyed
land,subjecttocovenant,toPlaza.KotseasleasedportionofadjoininglandtoCVSforuseas
discountdepartmentstore.Leaseexpresslysubjecttodeedrestrictions.

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PropertyBlocher64

2.
3. Held:ReasonableanticompetitivecovenantsareenforceableinmoststatesexceptMass,soMass
needstochange.ItwouldbeunfairnottoenforceanticompetitionclausebcPprobablypaid
extramoneyinreturnforrestrictionsandrestrictionwasonereasonTrustboughtland.
a. Reasonablecovenantstocompetemaybeconsideredtorunwiththelandwhenthey
serveapurposeoffacilitatingorderlyandharmoniousdevelopmentforcommercialuse.
b. Anenforceablecovenantwillbeonewhichisconsistentwithareasonableoverall
purposetodeveloprealestateforcommercialuse.
DavidsonBros.,Inc.v.D.Katz&Sons,Inc.(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1994)
1. Facts:Davidson(P)supermarketdowntownNewBrunswick(GeorgeStreet)thenacquired2nd
supermarket2miaway.ClosedGeorgeStbclostsalestonewstore.SoldGeorgSttoKatz,subject
tocovenantthatnooneuseGeorgeStasgrocery.Closingcreatedsignificanthardshipsfor
downtownresidents(elderly)didnothaveaccesstocarandcouldnotgettostore.Georgeonly
areadowntownsuitableforgrocerystore.NewBrunswickHousingAuthority(NBHA)acquired
GeorgepropertyandleasedtoCTown,provideditusedasgrocerystore.
2. Held:Covenantadverselyimpactedpublicinterestsounenforceable.
a. Hardshipsoncitizens,lostonlyreasonablycloselocation.Prestrictionimpeded
relocationofanothersupermarket.ContrarytopublicpoliciesinNewJerseyUrban
EnterpriseZoneAct.Ascorchedearthpolicythatundercircumstanceswasunreasonable
b. Anoncompetitioncovenantwillbeenforcedagainstasubsequentpurchaserwithactual
noticeifthecovenantisreasonable.
c. ReasonablenessFactors
i. intentionofthepartieswhenthecovenantwasexecuted
ii. ifconsiderationwaspaidinexchangeforthecovenant
iii. whetherthecovenantclearlyandexpresslysetforththerestrictions
iv. whetherthecovenantwasinwritingandrecorded
v. whetherthecovenantwasreasonableintime/duration
vi. whetheranunreasonablerestraintontrade
vii. whetherinterferedwithpublicinterest

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PropertyBlocher65
viii. whetherchangedcircumstancesnowmakecovenantunreasonable
1. thehardshipwhichenforcementatthepresenttimewillimposeon
thecovenantor(orhissuccessor)hassubstantiallyincreasedsince
thetimeofthecovenantduetounforeseencircumstances
2. thebenefitwhichenforcementwillgivetothecovenanteehassub.
Decreased
13. Hypothetical:Supposetheleasemerelyincludedtherestraintoncompetitionanddidnotinclude
thelanguagemakingthecovenantrunwiththeland.Shouldthecourtpresumethatsucha
covenantwasintendedtobebindingonsubsequentlesseesorpurchasersofthedominantestate?

19.CommonInterestCommunities,p.53240
1. CommonInterestCommunity
a. Residentialareaswhereahomeownersassociationexiststoenforcecovenantsor
restrictions.
2. Homeown
ersAssociationsandCondos
a. Createdbyadeclarationfiledbythedeveloperbeforethefirstsale.
b. Noprivitybutweallowthemtoenforcecovenantsbecausenoticeandinterestsareso
intertwinedalsoassociationistheagencyofthedeveloper,eventuallybecomesthe
agencyofthehomeowners.
c. HAempoweredtoenforceCsorrestrictions,bringlawsuitstocompelcompliance
d. EachownerismemberofHA;ownersempoweredtovoteformembersofaboard.
e. ONLYOWNERShavevotingrightstenantsandotherfamilymembersdontgetto
vote.
f. Votesmaybeunequal,basedonlotsize.
g. R.3d:Developerscantusepowertoamenddeclarationinawaythatwouldmaterially
changethecharacterofdeclaration,unlessitfairlyputsbuyersonnoticethatthepower
couldbeusedinthatway.Cantviolatenoticeprinciplesbymateriallychanginggeneral
developmentplanofsubdivisionw/ofairwarning.
3. Condominium
a. Essentially,commoninterestcommunities(CICs)inapartmentstylebuildings.Eachunit
isownedinfeesimple;eachcommonareaisownedcollectivelyastenantsincommon
(whichwelldiscussmoresoon).Acondoboardplaystheroleofthehomeowners
association.
b. Everyownerisamember;ownershipinterestsusuallyproportionalto%ageofbuilding
takenupbyindividualunit.
c. Statecondorulesregulatethembyestablishinggroundrulesfororganizingcondo
normallyprohibitpartitionofcommonareas,definebasicstructureofCA,requiring
declaration,bylaws,supermajorityvotesforcertaindecisionsofCA.
4. Cooperative:
a. Wholebuildingisownedbyasinglenonprofitcooperativecorporation,inwhich
individualownersbuystockandthenleasetheirunit.Thereisasinglemortgageforthe
entirething

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PropertyBlocher66
b. Ownershipvestedincorpentirecoopwillbefinancedbysinglemortgagethatcoop
takesout.
c. Soifindividualownerfailstomakemonthlypayment,otherownershavetomakeup
differencetoavoidforeclosure.
d. Overall:muchgreaterfinancialinterdependence.Muchlesscommonthancondos
5. Communitylandtrustsbuyandholdcheapland,thenseparatethelandfromthebuildingby
givingalongtermgroundleasetoadevelopertopossessthebuildinganduseitinawaythat
lowincomepeoplecanafford.
a. Forexample,theDurhamCommunityLandTrust!www.dclt.org
b. Nonprofitcorp,normallyw/electedBoDandopenmembership.
c. Buysandholdstitle,usuallybybuyingcheaplandindepressedarea/subsidizedby
governmentloans.
d. Retainstitle,sellsbuildinglocatedonittopoorbuyer/groupofbuyers
i. Calledground

lease(leasebuildingforlongtime,often99yrs,oftenrenewable).
e. Thisisokbecause
i. Trustretainstitletoland;sells/leasesbuildingonly.
ii. Nonprofit:purposeistoprovideaffordablehousingratherthanmaximize
profits/returns.
iii. Landisinareaw/lowrealestatevalue.
iv. Normallygetsassistance:loanguarantees,localpropertytaxabatements,
contributionsfromcharitableinstitutions,directgovtsubsidies.
f. Important:agreementbtwnownerandlessee/buyerthatbuildingwillbesoldonlyto
communitylandtrust,oranotherlowincomeowner,atpricewellbelowmarketvalue
(NOTonopenmarketforfairmarketvalue).
g. Normallyfixedatamountequaltoownersinitialinvestmentandfutureinvestment,w/
adjustmentforinflation.
h. Groundleasenormallygivescommunitylandtrustrightoffirstrefusaltobuybuilding
forfixedpriceensurepropertyremainslowcostinfuture.
6. Limitedequitycooperativesarelikecommunitylandtrusts,buttheyreorganizedlikeregularco
ops.Thesalepriceofthesharesissetatanartificiallylowlevel,sothesellercantbenefitfrom
anyincreasesinmarketvalue.Buyergetssharesincoopandgetsleasetoacertainunit.
7. Privategovern
mentsandgatedcommun
ities
a. HAsraiseissuesaboutlegitimatescopeofpowersoverindividualownersandabilityto
engageinexclusionaryconduct(privatizingpreviouslypublicareas).
i. Disenfranchisingrentersbcofvotingallocation.
ii. Oppressivemicromanagementofindividualunitsinfringingonlibertyof
ownerstobefreefromcontrolbyneighbors.
b. Creatingprivategovernments.
8. Rule[Appel]
a. Provisionsallowingamendmentofsubdivisionrestrictionsaresubjecttoreasonableness
requirements
9. Policy
a. Topermitindividuallotswithinanareatoberelievedoftheburdenofsuchcovenants,
intheabsenceofaclearexpressionintheinstrumentsoproviding,woulddestroythe
righttorelyontherestrictivecovenantswhichhastraditionallybeenupheldbyourlaw
ofrealproperty.
10. Rule,Developers[Restatement]

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PropertyBlocher67
a. Adevelopermaynotexerciseapowertoamendormodifythedeclarationinawaythat
wouldmateriallychangethecharacterofthedevelopmentortheburdensontheexisting
communitymembersunlessthedeclarationfairlyapprisesthepurchasersthatthepower
couldbeusedforthekindofchangeproposed.
11. Rule,Condominiums/Coops[Condo.AndCoop.ConversionProtectionandAbuseReliefAct]
a. Coops/condosformedafter1980may,byatwothirdsvote,terminatewithoutpenalty
managementcontractsofmorethanthreeyearsenteredintobetweentheassociationand
thedeveloperwhilethedeveloperhadmajoritycontrolofthecondo/coop.
Appelv.PresleyCos(N.M.1991)
1. Synopsis:Provisionsallowingforamendmentofrestrictivecovenantswillbeallowed,aslongas
amendmentsarereasonablesoasnottodestroygeneralplanorschemeofdevelopment.
2. Facts:PresleyCompanies(D)recordedrestrictivecovenantsconcerningsubdivision.Covenants
regulatedlanduse,buildingtype,qualityandsizeoftheresidentialsinglefamilydwellings.
Appels(P)boughthomeinasubdivisionafterrepresentationsweremadeaboutsubdivisionand
purposeofrestrictivecovenants;theyreliedontheserepresentationswhenpurchasedlot.After
purchase,subdivisioncommitteemadeamendmentstocovenants,andtownhousesconstructedon
lots.Restrictivecovenantscontainedaprovisionthatallowedforamendmentofthecovenants.
3. Held:Provisionsallowingamendmentofsubdivisionrestrictionsaresubjecttoarequirementof
reasonableness.
a. Aclauseinarestrictivecovenantthatallowsasubdivisiondevelopertomake
amendmentstotherestrictionsisavalidclauseaslongasitisexercisedinareasonable
mannersoasnottodestroythegeneralschemeorplanofdevelopment.
b. Reasonablenessincludesaregardforthepropertyrightsofthepeoplewhoboughtthe
landinrelianceontherestrictivecovenantswhichappliedatthetimeoftheir
purchase.Clauseintheserestrictivecovenantsallowingforamendmentpermissible.Trial
courtmustdecideifamendmentsreasonable.
c. Evenafterrealpropertyispurchased,restrictivecovenantsmaybechangedbytheseller,
providedthatthosechangesarereasonableandfitintothedevelopmentscheme.
d. Adeterminationofwhethertheexceptionswerereasonablyexercisedorwhetherthey
essentiallydestroyedthecovenantsrequiredresolutionofafactualmatter,soMSJfor
developeronthatissueinappropriate.TrialcourterredingrantingMSJonclaimsof
misrepresentationandunfairtradepractices.
20.RaciallyDiscriminatoryCovenants,p.54051

VII
I

Racially Discriminatory Covenants

C. RestrictiveCovenants[Shelley]
i. Individualsfreetoenterintorestrictivecovenants,butcourts/stateofficerscannotenforce
restrictivecovenantsbcsuchactionwouldbestateactionprohibitedby14A.
D. Themes:

i. Propertyownerslibertyinterestsinevitableconflictw/securityinterests.
ii. Oncepropertyopenedtopublicmarketplace,differentrulesapply(explainsalotinShelley).
iii. Propertyrightsalwayslimitedbyotherspropertyrights.

67

PropertyBlocher68
iv. Oursystemseekstopreventillegitimateconcentrationsofownershipthatwrongfully
precludeaccesstomarketforproperty.
Shelleyv.Kraemer(SCOTUS1948)
1.Courtscannotenforceracialcovenantsonrealestate.
2.Facts:In1945,AfricanAmericanfamily(Shelley)purchasedhouseinSt.Louis,Missouri.At
purchase,theyunawarerestrictivecovenantonpropertysince1911.Covenantbarred"peopleof
theNegroorAsianRace"fromoccupying.
3. PH:Kraemerlived10blocksawaysuedtorestrainShelleysfromtakingpossessionofproperty
theyhadpurchased.SupremeCourtofMissouriheldcovenantenforceableagainstpurchasersbc
covenantwasapurelyprivateagreementbetweenoriginalpartiesand"ranwiththeland"andwas
enforceableagainstsubsequentowners.Sincerestrictionpurportedtoruninfavorofanestate
ratherthanmerelyaperson,itcouldbeenforcedagainstthirdparties.Amateriallysimilar
scenariotookplaceincompanioncaseMcGheev.Sipes.SupremeCourtconsolidatedtwocases.
4. Opinion:(Vinson63):
a. "[T]herestrictiveraciallybasedrestrictivecovenantsarenot,ontheirface,invalidunder
theFourteenthAmendment."
b. BUTprivatepartiesmayvoluntarilyabidebytermsofrestrictivecovenantbutmaynot
seekjudicialenforcementofsuchacovenantbcenforcementbycourtswouldconstitute
stateaction.
c. Suchstateactionwouldbediscriminatory,soenforcementofraciallybasedrestrictive
covenantinastatecourtwouldviolate14AEPC.
d. Courtrejectedargthatsincestatecourtswouldenforcearestrictivecovenantagainst
whitepersons,judicialenforcementofrestrictivecovenantswouldnotbeEPCviolation.
e. 14Aguaranteedindividualrights,equalprotectionofthelawisnotachievedwiththe
impositionofinequalities.
CyPresDoctrine
Allowsacharitabletrusttobedevotedtoadifferentbutrelatedpurposeif:
1. Originalpurposecannolongerbefulfilled;and
2. Settlerwouldhavewantedthetrusttocontinueratherthantofailcompletely.
3. Thispermitsacourttocarrythetrustintoeffectinsuchawayaswillasnearlyas
possibleeffectuatetestatorintention.
1) AlternativetoShelley[Evansv.Abner]
a) Ifthereisnostateaction,thenrestrictivecovenantscanbeenforcedbyprivateparties.
i) Facts:Governordonatedaparkforusebywhiteresidentsonly.Citywasappointedthe
trustee,buteventuallybegantoallowblackresidentstousethepark.Boardofdirectorssued
tohavethecityremovedastrusteeandappointaprivatetrustee
b) InEvans,themainissuewaswhetherornottherewasstateaction:
i) Theinterestwasadefeasiblefeeandwhenthelimitwasreached,thepropertyreverted
ownershiponitsown;nocourtwasnecessary,andthereforenocourtwasnecessaryandno
stateactionwastaken
ii) Ifthatwasthecase,thepartieswouldstillneedtogotocourttoproveitwasadefeasiblefee
c) ThreereasonswhyShelleyandEvanscameoutdifferent
i) Shelleywasfundamentallydifferentbcwrongwassobigcourtfeltobligedtointervene
ii) LowercourtsinShelleywereperpetuatingdiscrimination

68

PropertyBlocher69
iii) Shelleywasaboutcovenants,whereEvanswasaboutdefeasiblefees:therepercussionsof
covenantsismuchgreaterbecauseitappliestothewidespreadareasoflandoveralong
periodoftime,notonepieceofland
2) Policy
a) Propertyrightsareneverabsolute;theyarealwayslimitedbyotherspropertyrights
b) Oursystemofpropertyrightsseekstopreventillegitimateconcentrationsofownershipthat
wrongfullyprecludepeoplefromaccessingthemarketofproperty
Evansv.Abney(U.S.1970)
1. Facts:SenatorBaconwilledparktoMacon,GAbutrestrictedparkforwhites.Baconintentcould
notbefulfilled(Evansv.NewtonU.S.1966heldcityparkmustbew/oracediscrimination),park
couldnotoperateondiscriminatorybasis.SupremeCourtofGAruledgrantorsintention
impossibletofulfill,trustfailed,propertyrevertedtoSenatorsheirs.Blackcitizenssoughtto
haveparkintegratedbyusingdoctrineofcypres.
2. Held:Georgiacitiesandtownsareauthorizedtoacceptdevisesofpropertyforestablishmentof
parksandholdthatpropertyincharitabletrustforclassofpersonsnamedbythetestator.
a. WhenSenatormadetrust,racialrestrictionsallowed,butnowprohibited.
b. Doctrineofcypresallowscourttocarryoutgeneralcharitableintentoftestatorwhere
intentmightotherwisebethwartedbyimpossibilityoftheparticularplanorscheme
providedbytestator.
c. Butoccasionally,doctrinecannotbeappliedbctestatorhadonlyaparticularpurposein
creatingtrust,andifthatpurposefailed,testatorwouldwantwholetrusttofail.Senator
madeclearonlywhitestousepark.Racialseparationwasaninseparablepartofthe
testatorsintent,socyprescannotbeused.
3. Dissent(Douglas):ReturningpropertytoSenatorsheirswillnotnecessarilyachieveracial
segregationSenatordesired.Whenbuildingsareconstructedonthatland,minoritiesmustbe
allowedinside.Thereisnoconstitutionalwaytoassurethispropertywillnotbeusedbyblacks.
4. Dissent(Brennan):UnderEPC,statemaynotclosedownapublicfacilitysolelytoavoiditsduty
todesegregatethatfacility.Closingoftheparksendsmessageofcommunityinvolvementin
racialdiscrimination.
a. Thoughmajorityclaimsthatnostateactionisinvolvedinclosingthepark,thereare
actuallythreetypesofstateactioninvolved:
i. 1)Thereisstateactionwheneverastateentersintoanarrangementthatcreatesa
privaterighttocompelorenforcethereversionofapublicfacility;
ii. 2)stateactionexistswhenacourtenforcesaracialrestrictiontopreventparties
ofdifferentracesfromdealingwithoneanotherand
iii. 3)stateactionexistswhenastatesinglesoutracialdiscriminationforparticular
encouragement,andtherebygivesitaspecialpreferredstatusinthelaw,even
thoughthestatedoesnotitselfimposeorcompelsegregation.

69

PropertyBlocher70

21.RestraintsonAlienation,p.55164
1. TypesofTotalRestraints
a. Disablingrestraints:directlyforbidstheownerfromtransferringaninterestinthe
property.Youcannotsell.AnytransferofBlackacreshallbenullandvoid
b. Promissoryrestraints:granteepromisesnottoalienatehisinterestinland.
i. ConveytoA.Apromisesnottoconveyagain.ApromisethatBlackacreshall
neverbeconveyed
c. Forfeiturerestraints:afutureinterestthatwillvestiftheownerattemptsanytransfer.
i. Ifyousell,youforfeittoB.IfAevertriestoconveyBlackacre,itrevertsto
grantor
2. PartialRestraintsdependsonreasonableness
a. GrantorConsentClause:AcanonlytransferBlackacrewithgrantorsconsent
b. RightofFirstRefusal:IfAeverwishestosellBlackacre,grantorshallhavepriority
overallotherbuyersinpurchasingit.
c. OptionstoPurchase:Atanytime,grantormaypurchaseBlackacrefromAforitsFMV

Disabling
ToA,andA
maynot
transfer
theland.

Feesimple

Void

Feesimple
Limitedintime
Feesimple
Partialasto
numberofpersons
Lifeestate
Leases

Forfeiture
ToA,butifA
attemptstotransfer
theland,
automaticallyreverts
tograntor.
Void

Promissory
ToA,andApromisesnotto
transfertheland.

Voidinmost
states

Voidinmoststates

Voidinmoststates

Voidifnumber
ofpotential
granteesis
small
Void

Voidifnumberof
potential
granteesissmall

Voidifnumberofpotential
granteesissmall

Valid

Valid

Validinmost
states

Validinmoststates

Validinmoststates

Void

A Rule,ModernApproach
v. Restraintsareallowediftheyarereasonable(weighingtheutilityoftherestraintagainst
theinjuriousconsequencesofenforcingtherestraint)[HorsePond]
(1) Factors:
(a) Whetherthereasonforexercisingtheright(e.g.,offirstrefusal)isrationallyrelated
totheprotection,preservationorproperoperationofthepropertyandthepurposesof
theassociationsetforthinitsgoverninginstruments
(b) Whetherthepowerwasexercisedinafairandnondiscriminatorymanner
(2) Unreasonablerestrictions:
(a) Require100%voteofboardmembers
(b) Unlimitedinduration

70

PropertyBlocher71
(c) Requiringtheorganizationtobedissolvedbeforethepropertycanbealienated
(d) Purposewhichiscapriciousandwhoseenforcementwouldaccomplishno
worthwhilepurpose
vi. Exception:restraintsareallowedwhenthepropertyownerisacharity.
E. Rule,TraditionalApproach
i. Covenantsrestrainingagrantorsabilitytosellpropertyareinconsistentwithagrantoffee
simpleandarethusinvalid.[Serio]
ii. Arestrictiverestraintonthesaleoffeesimpletitleisaviolationofpublicpolicy.[Riste]
(1) Limitation:reasonablerestraintsareallowediftheyarejustifiedbylegitimateinterests,
suchasdueonsaleclausesinrealestatemortgages
F. Policy
i. TraditionalRationale
(1) Efficientuseofpropertyifrestrictionsareallowed,propertycannotchangehands
easily,thereforelimitthenumberofpeoplewhocanacquireproperty
(2) Costsinformationandtransactioncostsonbehalfofbuyerswillbogdownthemarket
(3) Interestoffutureownersexcessiverestraintsonalienationgivepriorownerscontrol
overfutureowners
(4) Fairnesswewanttoallowpropertytobedistributedfairlyandequallyandrestrictions
hinderthisgoal
ii. ModernRationale(I)
HorsePondFish&GameClub,Inc.v.Cormier(N.H.1990)
1. Synopsis:Restraintsonalienationvoidonlyiftheyareunreasonable.
2. Facts.HorsePondFish&GameClub(P)obtainedtitletolandbydeed,freeofrestrictions.P
deededpropertytotwomembersconveyeditbacktoPsamedaywithrestrictionsagainst
alienationwrittenindeed.Restrictionsstatedtherewouldnotbealienationoflandunless100%
ofmembersapprovedorclubdissolved.PregisteredwithcharitabletrustdivisionofAG'soffice
ascharitablecorp.Duetoincreasedresidentialnatureofarea,(hunting)Clubsoughttosellpart
ofpropertyandenterintolandswapwithneighboringclub.MemberWilliamCormier(D)voted
againstplan;dealcouldnotgothrough.
3. PH:Psoughtdeclarationthatdeedrestrictionwasvoidasanunreasonablerestraintagainst
alienation.ClubfiledMSJ,whichwasgranted.
4. Held:Restraintsonalienationareallowedwhentheholderofthepropertyinterestisacharity.
Otherwise,therestraintmustbereasonableinordertobevalid.
a. Validityofarestraintagainstalienationdependsuponitsreasonablenessinregardstothe
interestsoftheparties.
b. Arestraintagainstalienationwillonlybevoidifitisunreasonable.
c. Ruleofreasonablerestraintsdoesnotapplyinthecaseofagifttoacharitable
corporation.Anexpressprovisionorconditionagainstalienationcontainedinagiftmade
toacharitablecorporationmaybeavalidrestraint.
d. Asaleoflandownedbyacharitableentitymaybepermittedifanequitycourt
determinesthatduetounforeseencircumstances,thesaleisnecessaryandwouldbein
thebestinterestsofthecharity.
e. Judgmentreversed/remanded.LowercourtmustdetermineifPisacharitybefore
decidingifrestraintisinvalid.
NorthwestRealEstateCo.v.Serio(Md.1929)

71

PropertyBlocher72
1. Synopsis:Whentitletolandisgiveninfeesimple,thegrantorcannotrestrictthegranteefrom
sellingthelandtothirdparties
2. Facts:Northwest(P)granteddeedinfeesimpletoitsgrantees,whichcontainedaprovisionthat
thelandshouldnotbesubsequentlysoldorrented,priortoadesignateddate,withouttheconsent
ofthegrantor.ThegranteecontractedtosellthelandtoCharlesSerio(Defendant),butPlaintiff
refusedtoconsenttothesale.Thissuitwasbroughttocompelspecificperformanceofthesale.
NorthwestDdeededalotinfeesimplewithaprovisionthatthegranteescouldnotsellthe
propertyforacertainperiodoftimewithoutNorthwestsconsent.Subsequently,thegrantees
contractedtosellthelottotheSerios(plaintiffs).WhenNorthwestdidnotconsenttothesale,the
Seriosbroughtsuitforspecificperformanceoftheirsaleagreementonthegroundsthatthe
grantorconsentclauseintheoriginaldeedwasinvalid.
3. Held:Restrictionbythedeedonsalesisrepugnanttothefeesimpletitlewhichthedeed
conveyed.Theobjectoftherestrictionwastodeprivethegranteeoftheunrestrainedpowerof
alienationincidenttotheabsoluteownershipthatafeesimplecreates.Agrantorconsentclausein
adeedforafeesimpleinterestinpropertywillbeinvalidasarestraintonalienation.
4. Dissent:Restraintonalienationmerelygivesthedeveloperthepowertocontrolthecharacterof
thedevelopment.Thisisnotagainstpublicinterest.Thesetypesofrestraintswillopenthearea
andprovidehousesonconvenientterms,whichwillbeapublicbenefitratherthanadetriment.
Ristev.EasternWashingtonBibleCamp,Inc.(Wash.Ct.App.1980)
1. Facts:EWABibleCamp(Camp)(D)ownedsubdivisionsubjecttorestrictionsthatlandwould
notbesoldwithoutCampsconsentortoanyonenotsubscribingtobeliefsofAssemblyofGod
Church.Riste(P)acquiredtitletolotinCampsubdivisionfromhisparents.Ristecontractedto
selllottosomeonewhodidnotsubscribetoCampsfaith.CamprefusedtoallowsaleandRiste
broughtsuitforadeclaratoryjudgmentthattherestrictionwasinvalid.
a. Restriction6:Noresidentsshallconductthemselvesinamannerinconflictwithgeneral
practicesandprinciplesofchurch.
b. Restriction8:PropertyshallnotberesoldwithoutwrittenapprovalbytheSellerorits
agent.
2. PH:TrialcourtheldforP,restrictionsvoid.COAaffirmed.
3. Holding/Rule:
a. Estatesinfeecannotbesubjecttorestrictionsonoccupancyandresale.
b. EWBC(D)claimsthatrestrictionlimitingsaleoflandtomembersofachurchis
reasonableandshouldbeenforcedbycourts.
c. Restriction8isadirectrestrainonalienation.WAruleisthatsuchaclauseisvoidas
repugnanttothenatureofanestateinfee.Exceptionallowsreasonablerestraintsthatare
justifiedbylegitimateinterests.Ex:"DueonSale"clausesinrealestatemortgages.
Doctrineofestoppel(Pknewaboutrestrictions)doesnotapply,becausethisisa
disablingrestraintuponwhichthereisapresumptionofinvalidity.
d. Restriction6isalsoinvalid,becauseLawAgainstDiscriminationforbidsrestrictionson
conveyancetopersonsofacertaincreed.ItisunderstandablethatDswantaquietlake
withnodrinkingorgamblingorSundayworking,buttheoutrightgrantoffeeinthedeed
isfataltotheirhopes.
e. InWA,clauseinadeedprohibitingthegranteefromconveyinglandtoanotherwithout
theapprovalofthegrantorisvoidasrepugnanttothenatureofanestateinfeewhenthe
grantortransferredafeesimpleestatetothegrantee.
f. Therestraintinthedeedisdisablingandrestrainsthealienationofland.

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PropertyBlocher73
g. Therestrictiondealingwithreligionisalsoinvalid.Whenaprovisioninadeedrestricts
theconveyancebasedoncreed,whichisasystemofreligiousbeliefs,thatprovisionwill
bevoid.
h. Anabsoluterestraintonalienationoflandisrepugnanttothenatureofafeesimple
interestandwillbevoided.
i. Publicpolicygroundthatthisdisablingrestraintonafeeisvoidasrepugnanttothe
natureofanestateinfee,courtthrowsoutbothrestrictionsandPcandowhateverhe
wants
j. Exception:reasonablerestraintarejustifiedbylegitimateinterestssuchasDUEON
SALEclausesinrealestatemortgage
k. Cannotsellpropertyuntilpayoffwholemortgage
l. NotequitableestoppelbecausePacquiredpropertywithknowledgethattherewere
restrictions
Wolinskyv.Kadison(Ill.App.Ct.1983)
1. Synopsis:Condominiumassociationsofficersandboardmembersmustexerciseitsrightoffirst
refusalinareasonablemanner.Theyalsooweafiduciarydutytomembersoftheassociation,so
theymustactinamannerreasonablyrelatedtothatduty,andfailuretodosowillresultin
liabilityfortheassociationaswellasindividualmembers.
2. Facts:Wolinsky(P)unmarriedwomanwithchildren,ownedunitincondoandcontractedto
purchaseanotherunit.Boardofdirectorsofcondominium(D)notifiedherthatitwasexercising
itsrightoffirstrefusalwithregardstounit,socontractforsaleterminated.Bylawsstatewhen
exercisingrightoffirstrefusal,boardmustfirstobtain2/3affirmativevoteofownershipof
commonelements.Chicagoscondominiumordinancestatesthatnopersonshallbedeniedthe
righttopurchaseorleaseaunitbecauseofrace,religion,sex,sexualpreference,maritalstatusor
nationalorigin.MunicipalCodeofChicago1978,ch.100.2,par.100.24.Pallegesthatboard
exercisedanunreasonablerestraintonalienationinviolationofthebylawsandbreachof
fiduciarydutyandviolatedtheantidiscriminationsectionoftheChicagocondominium
ordinance.
3. PH:HercomplaintwasdismissedonMTD,soappealing.
4. COA:
a. 1:BreachofFiduciaryDutyspecialdutyowedtosomeone.Doesacondoboardhave
somekindoffiduciarydutytosomeonewholivesthere.
i. Probablyyes.Probablynotrightthatoutrightcondoboardmembershavea
fiduciarydutyallthetimeforeverything.Butprobablyisafiduciarydutyto
followthecondobylaws
ii. Doesthiscomeoutdifferentlyifshewasarandompurchaserandnotapersonin
theprocessofsellinghercondo.Yes.Probablydifferent.
b. 2:
i. Condoresponseisthattheydidnotdenyherrighttopurchaseorleaseaunitbut
justpreventedthesellertosell.
1. Residentclaimedshehadstandingtobringactionforunreasonable
restraintonalienation.Residenthadsubstantial,realinterestinactionbc
sheunabletopurchaseunitforwhichshecontracted
5. Held:
a. Boardmustexerciseitsrightoffirstrefusalreasonablyuponconsiderationofpurchasers
applicationinlightoftheeconomicandsocialreasons,whichjustifytherightofrefusal.
i. Implicationthatthisrightoffirstrefusalmustbeexercisedreasonably.

73

PropertyBlocher74
ii. Thetestforreasonablenesshastwoparts:
1. Whetherexerciseoftherightisrationallyrelatedtotheprotection,
preservationorproperoperationofthepropertyand
2. Whetherpowerwasexercisedinafairandnondiscriminatorymanner.
iii. Exerciseoftherightoffirstrefusalbyacondominiumboardmustbedone
reasonably.Otherwiseitwouldbeanunreasonablerestraintonalienationand
wouldalsobeabreachofthefiduciaryrelationshipbetweentheboardandthe
associationmembers.
b. Condominiumassociationofficersandboardmembersbecomefiduciariestothe
membersoftheassociationwhentheytakeoffice.
i. Afiduciaryisboundtoactingoodfaithwithregardtotheinterestsoftheother
andmustactinamannerreasonablyrelatedtotheexerciseofthatduty.
ii. Failuretodosowillresultinliabilityfortheassociationandtheindividuals.
Thereisadutytostrictlycomplywiththecondominiumdeclarationandbylaws.
iii. Boardbreachedfiduciarydutiesinfailingtofollowcondominiumassociation's
bylaws,whichrequired2/3vote
c. Discriminationbasedonsexormaritalstatusisexplicitlyprohibitedbythecitys
ordinance.Nopersonshallbedeniedtherighttopurchaseorleaseaunitbecauseofrace,
religion,sex,sexualpreference,maritalstatus,ornationalorigin.
i. ResidentstatedCoAundertheChicago,Ill.Ordinancech.198,para.198.7B3,
whichprohibiteddiscriminationwithregardtothepurchaseofcondominium
units.
d. Affirmeddismissalofallegationsagainstindividualboardmembersforwillfuland
wantondisregard.
6. Howisarightoffirstrefusaldifferentfromanoption?
a. Youhavetheoptiontobuywheneveryouwant.Rightoffirstrefusalistriggeriswhen
persondecidestosell.Option,youcanforcethesale.

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PropertyBlocher75

IV.ESTATESANDCOMMONOWNERSHIP
22.TheSystemofEstates

,pp.607625

Propertyinterestcanbedisaggregatedintovariousrights(righttoexclude,use,sell,transfer)
Estatelaw:slicingthoserightsandpropertyinterestsovertime.
Estate:anownershipinterestthatisormaybecomepossessoryandismeasuredbysomeperiod
oftime(evenifindefinitely).
o Ifyouownitnow:ownerofrighttopossessthelandnowownsapossessory/present
interest.
o Ifyouownitinthefuture:ownerofrighttopossess(orpossiblypossess)thelandinthe
futureownsafutureinterest.
o Feesimpledeterminablealwayshassomekindoffutureinterest
o Apersonwhoownsafutureinterestownsthisinterestnow(eveniflanditselfisnotin
ownerspossession)
Hypothetical:OgrantsBlackacretoA,andthentoBifshegraduatesfromlawschool.
o Ahasapresent/possessoryinterest(likelyafeesimple).Bhasfutureinterest.

TheFunctionofEstatesWhydowewantestates?
Estatelawsprovideclearrules,reducetransactioncostsinasocietywherelandisacommodity.
o Numerusclausus:toomanydifferentkindsofpropertyreducecertainty.
o Ruleagainstcreationofnewestates:Theformalizedestatesaretheonlypermissible
categoriesofestates.
Function:Keepsimplegoingforward,Certaintyforowners,Certaintyforbuyers
Autonomy,Intent,Ownership:Allowspresentownertodecidewhowillownproperty,orhowit
willbeused.
o AconveysBlackacretoBsolongasnoliquoriseverservedontheproperty.
o Cantransfersomeownershiprightswithoutlosingcompletecontroloverwhathappensto
yourproperty.
o Someestatesallowdeadhandcontrolaftertheownerdies.
o Family,concentrationofwealth,encouragingwealthcreation
Present Interest

Words Used to Create

Future Interest
In grantor

Fee Simple Absolute

Fee Simple Determinable

Fee Simple Subject to

Condition Subsequent
Fee Simple Subject to
Executory Limitation
Life Estate

to A (and her heirs)

as long as
while
during
until
unless
provided that
on condition
but if
until (/unless), then
to
but if, then to
for life

In third party

Possibility of reverter

Right of entry or power of

termination
Executory interest
Reversion

Remainder
Vested
contingent

75

PropertyBlocher76

76

PropertyBlocher77
OverviewofEstatesAvailable:

PossessoryEstates
o Feesimple
o Lifeestate
o DefeasibleEstates
DeterminableEstate
EstateSubjecttoaConditionSubsequent
EstateSubjecttoanExecutoryLimitation

FutureInterests
o RetainedbyGrantor
Reversion
PossibilityofReverter
RightofEntry
o ConveyedtoaThirdParty
Remainder
ContingentRemainder
VestedRemainder
Absolutelyvestedremainder
Vestedremaindersubjecttodivestment
Vestedremaindersubjecttoopen
ExecutoryInterest
Shifting
Springing

Generally
A. Possessory Estate
i. Fee Simple (O to A [and heirs / in fee simple])
(1) Largest of all estate; owner has right to possess, use, sell, gift, devise, etc.
(2) Conveys all interests, unless conveyance states otherwise
ii. Fee Tail (O to A and the heirs of his body)
(1) At death, property passes in successive life estate to the heirs
iii. Life Estate (O to A for life)
(1) Reverts back to grantor at grantees death
(a) Future interest: reversion
iv. Term of Years (O to A for __ years)
(1) Ends at end of the term
(a) Future interest: reversion
B. Added Limitation
i. Future Interest in Grantor
(1) Determinable Estate (O to A as long as B remains single)
(a) Limitation is placed before the punctuation mark signaling the end of the description
of estate
(b) Future interest: possibility of reverter
(i) Automatic transfer
(c) Language: until, so long as, while and during
(2) Estate Subject to Condition Subsequent (O to A for life, but if A divorces, then to O)

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PropertyBlocher78
(a) Limitation is placed after the punctuation mark signaling the end of the description of
the estate
(b) Future interest: right of entry / power of termination
(i) Grantor decides to use
(c) Language: but if, provided that, on condition that, and however
ii. Future Interest in Grantee / Third Party
(1) Estate Subject to Executory Limitation (O to A, but if A stops farming the land, then
to B)
(a) Limitation transfers ownership to third party on the happening of an event
(b) Future interest: executory interest
C. Future Interest
i. Retained by Grantor
(1) Reversion (O to A for life)
(a) Grantors future interest following an estate that ends naturally
(b) If grantor has both reversion and possibility of reverter, he retains reversion (greater
of the two)
(2) Possibility of reverter (O to A as long as the land is used for a library)
(a) A grantors future interest following a determinable estate
(3) Right of entry (O to A; however, if the land is not used for a library, to O)
(a) Grantors future interest following an estate subject to a condition subsequent
ii. Conveyed to Third Party
(1) Remainder
(a) Contingent Remainder
(i) Not certain to become possessory; contingent if:
1. The remainder is given to an unascertained person (neither born nor
identified), OR
2. Subject to a condition precedent other than the natural termination of the
preceding estate:
i. Is set out within the description of a particular estate, and
ii. Must be satisfied before that estate can become possessory
(ii) Limitations
1. Traditional: destroyed if (1) did not vest before the preceding life estate
ended, or (2) merged
2. Modern: remainders are indestructible
(b) Vested Remainder
(i) Certain to become possessory; any other remainders
(ii) Absolute Vested Remainder (O to A for life, then B)
1. Not subject to change
(iii) Vested Remainder Subject to Divestment (O to A for life, then to B, but if A
sells liquor on the property, then to O)
1. May be destroyed by an event that occurs after the original conveyance, that
can prevent the remainder from becoming possessory
(iv) Vested Remainder Subject to Open (O to A for life, then Bs heirs)
1. Divided among persons who will be born in the future
2. Limitation: rule of convenience stops the limitation after death (if the
remainder is split among Bs children, only includes children born between A
granted title and before As death)
(2) Executory Interest
(a) Any future interest in a third party is created by placing a limitation on an estate that
will transfer ownership to a third party on the happening of a stated event

78

PropertyBlocher79
(b) Shifting Executory Interest (O to A, provided that if A allows the timber to be cut,
then to B)
(i) Follows an estate in a grantee
(c) Springing Executory Interest (O to A for life, then to B 5 years after As death)
(i) There will be a gap in time between when one estate ends and another is created
D. Policy
i. Effectuating grantors intent recognizing that people are more willing to let go of their
property if they can place restrictions on it
ii. Dead hand someone who is long gone will have control over the actions of those who are
present
PossessoryEstates
PossessoryEstate:FeeSimpleAbsolute:
o Thelargestestate!AsbigasPropertyLawwillletyouown!
o Fee:interestinland
o Simple:ownershipofunlimitedduration;noknowneventwillendit
Seizedbygovernment/creditor,adversepossession,naturalchanges
o Absolute:nofutureinterestexiststhatcouldcutshortownership
o Afullbundleofrights.Theownerhastherighttopossessandusetheproperty,tosell
it,togiveitaway,todeviseitbywillortoleaveittoheirs
o Canbeinherited,canbedevised.Alienabilityisgreatforthis.
o Thisisthedefaultconveyance,unlessthelanguagesaysotherwise.
o Hypothetical:OconveysBlackacretoAandherheirs.
Ahasfeesimpleabsolute.Heirshavenothing.Heirsdonotholdafutureinterest.
Exclusionofallotherinterests,soheirshavenointerest.

FeeTailDOESNOTEXISTANYMORE
o Tocreatefeetail:toAandtheheirsofhisbody
o Granteeslinealblooddescendantsnomatterwhat
o Wouldbeaccompaniedbyafutureinterest
o CouldbeaccompaniedbyareversioninOoraremainderinsomethirdparty

PossessoryEstate:DefeasibleEstates
o Apresent/possessoryinterestthatterminatesatthehappeningofaspecifiedeventother
thanthedeathofthecurrentowner.
Personwhogetstheestateonthehappeningofthateventholdsafutureinterest.
o Therearetwodifferentmetricsfortheterminatingevent:
Whetherfutureinterestisinthegrantororinathirdparty.
Whetherfutureinterestbecomespossessoryautomatically,orwhethertheholder
ofthefutureinterestsimplyhasanoption(holderneedstotakeanotherstep)
AutomaticTransfertoGrantor:Whenfutureinterestrevertsautomaticallytothe
grantoratthehappeningofaspecifiedevent:
Thepresentinterestiscalledthefeesimpledeterminable.
Alwaysaccompaniedbythefutureinterestcalledapossibilityofreverter
inthegrantor.
FSDPORFrankSinatraDidntPreferOrvilleRedenbacher
Onlyfutureinterestandonlyonethataccompaniesthefeesimple
determinable.
Keywords:solongas,whileusedas,until,duringthetimethat

79

PropertyBlocher80
GrantormustuseCLEARdurationallanguage
Ifconditionisviolated,forfeitureisautomatic
Hypothetical:AgivesWhiteacretoBsolongasWhiteacreisusedfor
residentialpurposes.
solongas
Bhasfeesimpledeterminable.Ahaspossibilityofreverter
TransferOnlyIfGrantorAssertsPropertyRights:Whengrantormust
affirmativelyasserthisorherfutureinterest,ratherthanittransferringback
automaticallyuponthehappeningofaspecifiedevent:
Presentinterestiscalledafeesimplesubjecttoaconditionsubsequent
(FSSCS).
Thefutureinterestiscalledarightofentryorpoweroftermination.
Keyterms:providedthat,onconditionof,orbutif"PLUSrightof
entry
ToA,butifXhappens,grantorreservestherighttoreenterandretake.
Cleardurationallanguageandcarvesoutrighttoreenter
NOTautomaticallyterminated,butitcanbecutshortatthegrantors
optioniftheconditionoccurs.
Hypothetical:AgivesWhiteacretoBsolongasWhiteacreisusedfor
residentialpurposes;intheeventthatitisnotsoused,Ashallhavea
rightofentry
AhasFSSCS
NoteonAdversePossession:Traditionally,oneofthemajordifferencesbetween
possibilitiesofreverterandrightsofentryhastodowithadversepossession.
Inhypotheticalabove,ifBdoesnotuseforresidentialpurposes,propertygoes
backtoA,butifBlivingonlandstillandthiswereafeesimpledeterminable
situation,thenGrantorwouldpreferrightofentryandnotreverter
Courtsdotreattypesmoresimilarlynow:
Laches:yousleptonthisinterestfortoolong,soyoucantjustcomeinand
assertnow.LikeSOL.Unfairforpersonwhohasrightofentrytositonitandtry
togetlandbackwaylater.
TRADITIONAL APPROACH: DISTINCTION between possibility of
reverter and right of entry: statute of limitations for adverse
possession (SEE P.609)
For FSD/PoR: Statute of limitations starts running
immediately and if holder of PoR does nothing during
statutory period, title shifts back to current possessor
For FSSCS/RoE: Statute of limitations triggered only when
holder of RoE demands possessory right from current
possessor
MODERN APPROACH: treat PoR and RoE the same for purposes
of statute of limitations; under 2 theories:
Apply doctrine of laches to RoE: prevents recovery when
unreasonable delay in asserting legal rights unfairly
prejudices another
Policy: even with RoE, start running statute of limitations
at moment of violation of condition (concern about
perpetual possibility of claim by RoE holder)

80

PropertyBlocher81
TransfertoaThirdParty
Whenathirdparty,ratherthanthegrantor,acquirestheestateuponthehappeningofthe
specifiedevent:
o Thepresentinterestiscalledafeesimplesubjecttoexecutorylimitation.
o Thefutureinterestiscalledanexecutoryinterest.
Thesebehaveexactlylikefeesimpledeterminableestates.
Thirdpartycanstillhavearightofentry
o ToA,butifXeventoccurs,ThentoB.
o Thisestatewillautomaticallybeforfeitediftheconditionoccurs.Harsh.
o WorksinfavorofsomeoneotherthangrantorC
Hypothetical:AgivesWhiteacretoBsolongasWhiteacreisusedforresidentialpurposes;in
theeventthatitisnotsoused,toC.
o Bhasfeesimplesubjecttoexecutorlimitation
o Chasexecutoryinterest
o Note:sinceAhasconveyedboththepossessoryinterestandthefutureinterest,what
interestsdoesAhave?
AhasNOTHING
o WhatdoesChavetodotogetherinterest?Nothing.Itsautomatic.LikeFeeSimple
Determinable
ExecutoryInterestHEDOESNOTCAREABOUTTHIS
o Shiftingexecutoryinterestscutshortsomeinterestinanothertransferee(i.e.,notthe
grantor).
Theyrecalledthatbecausetheyshifttheinterestfromonetransfereeto
another.
o Springingexecutoryinterestsdivestorcutshortsomeinterestinthegrantor.
Theyrecalledthatbecausetheyspringoutofthegrantorsoriginalgrant.
PossessoryEstate:LifeEstates
Possessoryorfutureintereststhataretiedtothelengthofaparticularpersonslife.
Explicitlifetimeterms(ToAforLife)neverintermofyears
Ofcourseinanylifeestatetheremustalsobeafutureinterest,becausenoonelivesforever.
o Ifthefutureinterestisheldbythegrantor,itscalledareversion.
o Ifitsheldbyathirdparty,thefutureinterestiscalledaremainder.
Doctrineofwaste:putssomelimitationsonpersonwhohaslifeinteresttouseandnotabusethe
landorhurtthefutureinterestholders.Personwithlifeinterest,thinkthattheycandiscountthe
land,Donthavelongterminvestmentsbeyondtheirlife.Thismayharmfutureinterest
possessor.
Hypo:OgivesWhiteacretoAforlife.
o UnderstoodthatitsforAslife.PeggedtoA.
o Ahaslifeestate,soafterAdies,revertsbacktoOorOsestate.
o Ohasareversion.
Aisfreetotransferhislifeestatetoathirdparty,B.
o ToBforthelifeofA.
o Bhaswhatisknownasalifeestateperautreviealifeestateforsomeoneelseslife.
o IfBdies,thenitrevertsbacktoA
o IfBdoesnotdie,butAdies,thenitrevertsbacktoO.
o ToMadonnaforthelifeofDavidLetterman.Madonnahasalifeestateperautrevie.Life
estatemeasuredbythelifeofanotherparty.

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PropertyBlocher82

OtoAandherheirs,thentoB
o Bisnotaremaindersincearemaindercannotfollowanestateheldinfeesimpleabsolute
OtoAforlife,thentoB
o Bisavestedremaindersincetheremainderisgiventoanascertainedperson(B)and
therearenoprecedentconditions(suchas"ifBisnotmarried").
OtoAforlife,thentoBifBreaches21,andifBdoesnotreach21thentoCandC'sheirs
o BandCarebothcontingentremainders.WhileBandCareascertainedpersons,the
condition(reaching21)impliesalternativecontingentremaindersforbothparties.
Hypo:OgivesWhiteacretoAforlife,thentoCforever.Adies,andthenCdies.
o Ohasnothing
o Ahaslifeestate
o Chasavestedremainder
o GoestoCsheirs
Hypo:OconveysWhiteacretoAforlife,remainderC.Aisaliveatthetimeofthegrant,butdies
soonthereafter.CsheirisD.Subsequently,Odies.
o Ahaslifeestate
o Chasremainder.GoestoD.
FutureInterestCapableOfCreationinGrantor
o PossibilityofReverteronlyaccompaniesthefeesimpledeterminableFSDPOR(Frank
Sinatra)
o RightofEntry/powerofterminationonlyaccompaniesfeesimplesubjecttocondition
subsequent(BobbyBrown)
o ReversionCatchall.Ariseswhenevergrantorhassomethingleftoverafterconveyinga
presentestate.Ifconveyanythinglessthanfeesimpleabsolute,thenlikelysomething
leftover.
FutureInterestCapableofCreationinTransferees
o Remainderswaitsfortheproceedingestatetoend
REMAINDERSNEVERFOLLOWDEFEASIBLEFEES
ToAforLifethentoB.
Bhasaremainder.
EitherContingentorVested!
Vested:CreatedinaknowntakerANDnotsubjecttocondition
precedent
ToAforlifethentoB.
Contingent:CreatedinyetunknowntakersORsubjectedtoconditions
precedent
ToAforlife,thentoBsfirstchild.
Bhasnochildren.Bhascontingentremainder.
ToAforlifeandthenifBgraduatesfromcollege,toB.
Bisstillinhighschool.Bhasacontingentremainder.
o ExecutoryInterests
ContingentRemainders:
o Therearetwowaysinwhicharemaindercanbecontingent:
o Theremainderwillonlytakeeffectuponthehappeningofaneventthatisnotcertainto
happen(theconditionprecedent).
AgivestoBforlife,thentoCifshereaches21,otherwisetoD.

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PropertyBlocher83
Bhasalifeestate.Chasacontingentremainder,becauseitsathirdparty,its
notA,anditscontingent,becauseCmightdie(mightnotmakeitto21).Dhas
thesame,andalsodependsonwhetherCreaches21.
Creaching21istheconditionprecedent.
Theremainderman(personholdingtheremainder)iscurrentlyunknown(mightnever
exist).
AgivestoBforlife,thentoCschildren.Chasnochildrenatthetimeofthe
conveyance.
Bhaslifeestate.CschildrenownershipiscontingentonCschildrenbeing
born.IfBdiesandnoCchildrenborn,revertstoA.
Hypo:AgivetoBforlife,thentoCandherheirsifCsurvivesB,otherwisetoDandhis
heirs
Bhasalifeestate.Chasacontingentremainder.Dhascontingentremainder
Hypo:AgivestoBforlife,thentoCandherheirsifCattainstheageof21beforeB
dies
Bhaslifeestate.Chasacontingentremainder.
Traditionalrulewasdestructible
Modernlaw:theyarenottreatedasdestructible
Tobeindestructible,meansthatinterestcanberevertedtograntorandbackto
remaindermandowntheroad.
OtoAforlife,thentoBifshehasbeenelectedpresidentoftheUnitedStates.
Ahaslifeestate.Bhascontingentremainder.
BbecomesPresidentbeforeAdies,Akeepsproperty.
TraditionalrulewasthattheremainderwouldbedestroyedwhenAdied.
Modernrule:Preservesremainder.WhenAdies,itgoesbacktoO.Ohas
reversion.Then,10yearsdowntheroad,BiselectedPresident,thenitgoesback
toB.
Bhasfeesimpleabsoluteifeverythingabovehappensinrightorder.
IfAdies,revertstoO.BnotPresident.WhatdoesOhave?DefeasibleFee.
RulesthatlimitContingentRemainders
Nowabolished:RuleofDestructibility:ContingentRemainderwillbe
destroyedifitwasstillcontingentwhentheprecedingestateended.
ToAforLife,ifBreaches21,thenB
AhasdiedleavingbehindBonly19yo,atcommonlaw,Bsfuture
interestwouldbedestroyed.
Nowabolished:RuleinShelleysCase
Historically:ToAforLifethentoAsheirs
Aisalive
PresentandfutureinterestmergegivingAafeesimpleabsolute.
Willpromotealienability
BUTNOW:Ahasalifeestate.Ahasacontingentremainder.
ContingentbecausewedontknowheirsuntilAdied.
STILLSURVIVESTODAY:DoctrineofWorthierTitle
ApplieswhenOwhoisalivetriestocreateafutureinterestinhisheirs.
OtoAforlifethentoOsheirs.
Ifnodoctrineofworthiertitle,thenAhaslifeestateandOsheirshavea
contingentremainder

o
o
o

83

PropertyBlocher84

Ifdoctrineofworthiertitleexists,thencontingentremainderinOsheirs
isVOID.Instead,AhasalifeestateandOhasareversion
ExiststopromotefreetransferoflandAlienability

VestedRemainders(Theyhaveinsomesensebecomelegallyowned.)
NOTCONTINGENT.CREATEDINKNOWNTAKERNOTSUBJECTTOCONDITION
PRECEDENT.
Absolutelyvestedremaindersnotsubjecttochange.Thereisnoquestionthatthedesignated
personwillgetit.Takerisknown.
o AconveystoBforlife,thentoCforlife,thentoDandhisheirs.
o Bhasalifeestate.Cabsolutevestedremainder(tobecomealifeestate).Dabsolute
vestedremainderinfeesimple.
o Dsinterestmightneverbecomepossessory,buttheyhavethatfutureinterestnowfor
sure,sothatswhynotcontingent.
Vestedremainderssubjecttoopenremainderthatmaybedividedamongpersonswhowillbe
borninthefuture.
o Vestedinagrouporclasswhereatleastonememberiseligibletotake.
o AgivestoBforlife,thentoBschildren.Bhasonechild,C,atthetimeofthedevise.
o Bhasalifeestate,Chasavestedremaindersubjecttoopen.
o TheRuleofConvenience:AtthetimeatBdies,theyregoingtoclosetheclasp.Bsnot
goingtohaveanymorekids.
o Classisclosedwhennooneelsecanjoin.Closeswheneveranymembercandemand
possession.(LikewhenBdies).
o Classisopenwhenotherscanstilljoin.
Vestedremainderssubjecttodivestmentgrantcontainsaconditionsubsequentthatcanresultin
divestment.
o Conditionsubsequent:Someeventthatifitoccurswilltakeawayinterest
o AgivestoBforlife,thentoC,butifCmarriesthentoD.
o Bhasalifeestate.Chasvestedremaindersubjecttodivestment
o Dhasacontingentremainder
ContingentRemaindersv.RemaindersSubjecttoDivestment
o Compare:
o AgivestoBforlife,thentoC,butifCoperatesatavern,thentoD.
VReSubjtoDivest
o AgivestoBforlife,thentoCifChasneveroperatedatavern,otherwisetoD.
Contingentremainder
o Vestedremainder:Theyaregoingtogettheinterest,butcanbetakenawayifthatperson
doessomething
o Contingent:mightnevergetit.Somethingthatmightneverhappen.

84

PropertyBlocher85
PresentInterest

WordsUsedtoCreate

FutureInterest
InGrantor

Feesimpleabsolute

toA,toAandher
heirs

Feesimple
determinable

aslongas,while,
during,until,
unless

Possibilityof
reverter

Feesimplesubjecttoa
conditionsubsequent

providedthat,on
condition,butif

Rightofentry(for
conditionbroken)
orpowerof
termination

Feesimplesubjectto
anexecutorylimitation

until(orunless)...
thento...
butif...thento...

Lifeestate

forlife

BUNDLEOF
STICKS
POSSESSION
USE

LifeTenant(LT)

ALTER/DESTRO

,maybeifitsnot
waste

ENJOYFRUITS
TRANSFER

butnowaste

InThirdParty

Executoryinterest

Reversion

Remainder
Vested
Contingent

Remainderman
(Rman)
X
Xbuttheycan
inspect
X
X
*Futureinterest
canbesold

1) TheDoctrineofWorthierTitle:
a) OtoAforlife,remainderintheheirsofObecomesOtoAforlife,remainderinO.
b) Cutsouttheheirs.GoesrighttoOinsteadofOsheirs.
c) Wouldtrytoavoidestatetaxesbygrantingtotheirheirsduringlifeinsteadofleavingitupon
theirdeath.
d) Modernpolicyjustification:Youcanonlydetermineheirsattimeofdeath,soheirsofOsis
nobody.
e) Couldsayreversion:OtoAforlife,reversioninO.
2) ShelleysCase
a) OtoAforlife,remaindertoAsheirsbecomesOtoAforlife,remainderinA
b) WhatdoesAhave?Ahasafeesimple
3) Trusts
a) Thetrusteeholdslegaltitletothepropertyandmanagesitforthebenefitofthebeneficiaries,
whohavelegallyenforceablerightsagainstthem

85

PropertyBlocher86
b) Anytimeanyonehasalegallyenforcementright(likethebeneficiary),thentrusteehasdutyto
beneficiary(likelyfiduciaryduty)
c) Personwhosetsupthetrustisthesettler.
4) InterpretingAmbiguousConveyances:ThePresumptionAgainstForfeiture:Ininterpreting
ambiguousconveyances,courtsrelyontwosomewhatconflictingpolicies:
a) Seektoimplementtheintentofthegrantor
b) Employapresumptionagainstforfeiturethatis,apresumptionagainstfindingfutureinterests.
i) Presumptioninfavorofcovenantsandagainstconditions
ii) Why?Disfavordeadhandcontrol.Intent
c) Futureinterestisaforfeiture,becauseittransfersfromonepersontoanother.
d) Covenant:AconveysBlackacretoBprovidedthatthepropertyisusedforresidentialpurposes
e) Condition:AconveysBlackacretoBsolongasthepropertyisusedforresidentialpurposes
f) Covenantvs.condition
i) Ifcovenant,remedyislikelymoneydamagesorinjunction
ii) Ifcondition,remedyislikelytotransferownership(solongas,feesimpledeterminable
likely)
5) TheDoctrineofWaste:AProblemforLifeEstatesAconveysWhiteacretoBandthentoC
a) Permissivewaste:lifetenantfailstotakeappropriatestepstopreserveorprotecttheproperty
(e.g.,necessaryrepairs).
b) Affirmativewaste:lifetenantintentionallyornegligentlycausespermanentinjurytothe
property.
c) Ameliorativewaste:lifetenantincreasesthevalueoftheproperty.
6)
Woodv.BoardofCountyCommissioners(1988)p.616
a) Facts.Woods(Appellants)conveyedlandtoFremontCountybywarrantydeedforconstruction
ofacountyhospital.Countybuiltahospitalandoperatedit,thensoldthehospitaltoaprivate
company,thatmovedtheoperationandputpremisesupforsale.Appellantsnowcontendthatthe
languageofthedeedcreatedeitherafeesimpledeterminableorafeesimplesubjecttocondition
subsequentwitharightofreversionifthelandceasedtobeusedasahospital.Possibilityof
reverterisautomatic.Rightofentryrequiressomeactionsofeesimplesubsequent
b) Issue.Whenaconveyanceisambiguousandtheintentofthegrantorisunclear,isapresumption
againsttheexistenceofafutureinterestvalid?
c) Held.Yes.Disputedlanguageinadeedisreviewedtodeterminetheintentofthepartiesfromthe
plainlanguageinthedeedconsideredasawhole.
i) Thereispresumptioneveryconveyanceofrealestatepassesalltheestateofthegrantor
unlessintenttopasslessisexpresslystatedorisnecessarilyimpliedinthetermsofthegrant
ii) Theplainlanguageinthedeeddoesnotclearlystatethattheestateconveyedwillexpire
automaticallyifthelandisnotusedforthestatedpurpose.Itdoesnotevidenceanintentof
thegrantorstoconveyafeesimpledeterminable,andsonofeesimpledeterminablewas
createdwhenthelandwasconveyed.
iii) Thereisnolimitinglanguageinthedeedthatwouldevidenceanintentnottoconveyafee
simpledeterminable.
iv) Further,theplainlanguageofthedeeddoesnotclearlysateanintentofthegrantorstoretain
adiscretionarypowertorenterthelandifthelandceasedtobeusedforthestatedpurpose.
So,appellantsdidnotconveyafeesimplesubjecttoaconditionsubsequent.
v) Privilegingrulesagainstforfeitureagainstintentofparties.Intentlessimportant.
d) Discussion.Whentheintentofagrantorisunclear,courtswillattemptfurtherthealienabilityof
propertybypresumingagainsttheexistenceofafutureinterest.

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PropertyBlocher87
7)
Edwardsv.Bradley

(Va.1984)
a) Appellantheirchallengeddecisionthatunderwillatissue,lifeestatewasdevisedtoappellee
beneficiarywithremaindertohersixnamedchildreninfeesimple.
b) Issue:Whetherbycertainprovisionsinherwillatestatrixhaddevisedafeesimpleestateoralife
estateinrealpropertythereindescribed.
c) Decision:Affirmed.Courtfoundthattestatrixintendedbeneficiarytohavetheuseandbenefitof
therealestatefreeoftheclaimsofhercreditors.
i) WhatestatedidMargaretEdwardshave?:FeeSimpleorLifeEstate Iffeesimple,
Bradleyoutofluck,butiflifeestate,thenwillgotoherheirs,includingBradley
ii) CourtdecidesMargarethadalifeestate.GrantorwasVivaParkerLilliston.
iii) Usedfeesimpleinotherpartsofwill,butabsentfromsectionregardingMargaret
iv) Therefore,intentofgrandmothertrumpsalienability
v) Althoughwilldidnotexpresslydesignatebeneficiary'schildrenasremaindermen,
conditionallimitationtothemindicatedthattheywereintendedtotakethefarmwhentheir
mother'sinterestterminated,whetherbyviolationoftheconditionsorotherwise.
vi) Trialcourtproperlyruledthatthebeneficiaryacquiredalifeestateinthepropertywith
remainderatherdeathinfeesimpletohersixchildren
8) TheDoctrineofWaste:AProblemforLifeEstates
a) AconveysWhiteacretoBandthentoC
b) Permissivewaste:lifetenantfailstotakeappropriatestepstopreserveorprotecttheproperty
(e.g.,necessaryrepairs).
c) Affirmativewaste:lifetenantintentionallyornegligentlycausespermanentinjurytothe
property.
d) Ameliorativewaste:lifetenantincreasesthevalueoftheproperty.
9) RuleAgainsttheCreationofNewEstates
a) Stability.Confidencethatinvestmentinnextgenerationwilllast.Encouragesfutureplanning.
b) Simplicity.Systemisalreadycomplicated,soencouragesmoretransfers,reducingambiguities
lowerstransactioncosts
10) Johnsonv.Whiton(Mass.1893)p.627
a) Synopsis:Apersoncannotcreateanewtypeofinheritancebywill.
b) F:Awillgavetoagranddaughterandherheirsonherfatherssideproperty.Sheattemptedto
conveythepropertytoanother,butthepartydidnotthinkshecouldconveyafeesimple
absolute.
c) I:Whenatestatorputswordsoflimitationthatrestrictthedescentoftheproperty,willthose
limitationsbevalid?
d) H:No.Theclauseinthewillconveyslegaltitle.Thewordslimitingtheconveyancetoheirson
herfatherssidearewordsoflimitation;itrestrictstheintestatedescentofproperty.Aperson
cannotcreateanewkindofinheritance,suchasthetestatorattemptstodohere.Thewordsof
limitationwillbestricken,andthegranddaughterwillbedeemedtohaveafeesimpleabsolute.
e) Discussion.Whenapersontriestoconveypropertyinawaythatdoesnotconformtooneofthe
traditionalestates,thelimitationsinthatconveyancewillbeinvalid.Thisistopreventrestraints
onalienation.

23.FutureInterestsandtheRuleAgainstPerpetuities,p.62641
TheCommonLawRuleAgainstPerpetuities

87

PropertyBlocher88
1) Nointerestisgoodunlessitmustvest,ifatall,nolaterthan21yearsafterthedeathofsomelifein
beingatthecreationoftheinterest.
a) Somekindsoffutureinterestsarevoidiftheresachancethattheyvest21yearsafterdeathof
measuringlife.
b) Theintereststhatmightnotvesttoprotectpropertyfromdeadhandcontrolandmakeproperty
moreconveyable.Preventsfutureinterests(traditionallycontingentremaindersandexecutor
interests)fromvestingafteracertainamountoftime.
c) Canbeinterestthroughwillsandtrusts,butcanalsobeoptions.
2) ThreeStepstoanyRuleAgainstPerpetuities(RAP)problem:
a) Identifyinterestssubjecttotherule.
i) Onlysomeinterestsaresubjecttotherule
b) Testtheinteresttoseeifitmayvest,ifever,toofarintothevalidatinglife
(1) MAYvest.JustthepossibilitythattheinterestMIGHTvesttoofarintothefuture
(2) So,easiertolookatthatwhichmightinvalidateinsteadofvalidate
ii) Identifyavalidatinglife.
iii) Applytheperpetuitiesperiod(startingatthetimetheinterestwascreated).
c) Findaremedy
i) Almostalwaysstrikeoffendinglanguageandleavetherest
3) Step1:Identifyinterestssubjecttotherule.
a) OnlycategoriessusceptibletoRAP:
i) Contingentremainder
(1) OtoAforlife,thentoBifBgraduates
ii) ExecutoryInterest
(1) OtoA,solongasusedforhospital,thentoB
iii) Vestedremainderssubjecttoopen
(1) OtoAforlife,thentoAschildren
(2) (Hehasoneson,butunbornchildren,theinterestiscontingentandnotvested)
b) ExemptedfromRAP:
i) FutureInterestsinO
ii) FutureInterestsThatMust/HasVested
(1) VestedRemainderAbsolutelyVested
(2) VestedRemainderSubjecttoDivestment
(a) (Yougettheinterest.Itvests,butyoumightloseit.Whileacontingentremainder:
youmightnevergetitwhichiswhycontingentremainderisnotexempthere)
iii) Futureintereststhattheoriginalgrantormighthold
(1) Reversions
(2) Possibilityofreverter
(3) Rightsofentry
(4) Policyrationales?Englishviewsallthesenonfeesimplegrantascarvedoutofestate.
Theywerestillholdingontotherealthing.Itwasntacloudbutastring.Policyrationale
hardertosee.SomereasonthatstatesaregettingridofRAPistoencouragetrusts.
4) Step2:TestingtheInterest:(a)IdentifyingaValidatingLife.
a) Avalidatinglifeisanypersonwhois:
i) Aliveatthetimetheinterestiscreated,AND
ii) Namedintheconveyanceorwhocanbeimpliedintheconveyance

88

PropertyBlocher89
b) OgrantstoA,butifAceasestousethepropertyforgamblingpurposes,tothegrandchildrenof
B.
c) Iftheyrealiverightnow,thentheyregivenaletter.Ifthereisnoletter,thentheyaretypically
notalive,soOandA
i) IfthechildrenofAandgrandchildrenarealive,thentheyrevalidatinglife.
5) Step2:TestingtheInterest:(b):Applyingtheperpetuitiesperiod.
a) Whendoestheinterestvest?
i) Executoryinterestsvestwhenthecontingencyoccurs.
(1) Consider:OtoAsolongasusedforgamblingpurposesthentoB
(2) Ahasafeesimpledeterminable;Bexecutorinterest
(3) Contingency:notusedforgamblingpurposes
ii) Contingentremaindersvestiswhentheconditionthatmakesitacontingentremainder
disappears.
(1) Consider:OtoAforlife,thentoBprovidedthatBfinisheslawschool.
(2) Ahasalifeestate.Bhasacontingentremainder.Contingencyisfinishinglawschool.
(3) BsinterestcanvestbeforeBcantakepossessionofthelandifBfinisheslawschool
evenifAisalive.SoBsinterestvested.
(4) IfAdiesbeforeBfinisheslawschool,soifcontingentremaindersarenotdestroyed,then
itrevertstoOsubjecttoBsremainder,andthenitspringsbacktoBifBfinisheslaw
school.(ifnot,thenBsinterestdestroyed)
iii) Forvestedremaindersubjecttoopen,itdependsonthenatureoftheclass.
(1) Consider:OtoAforlife,thentoAsgrandchildren
(a) Ahaslifeestate.Grandchildhasvestedremaindersubjecttoopen,because
grandchildhastowaituntilothergrandchildrenborn.Contingentremainderis
contingencyofothergrandchildrensexistence.
(2) IftheclassclosesonAsdeath,noproblemforRAP.
(a) Vestedremaindernotsubjecttoopen.Sotherefore,whatevergrandchildrenwere
alivewhenAdied.
(b) RuleofConvenience:theclassclosesatthetimesomeoneintheclassisabletotake
possession
(3) Iftheclassisopen(i.e.,Ahadanotherchildaftertheconveyance)
(a) Undertheallornothingrule,thewholeclassgifttothegrandchildrenisinvalidated.
(b) Undertheverticalseparabilityapproach,thegiftisupheldforthegrandchildrenwho
arealiveatthecreationoftheinterest.
(4) ApplytheRAP:
(5) OtoAforlife,thentoAsgrandchildren
(a) Identifythevalidatinglives:O,A,Aschildren/grandchildrenthatarealiveatthe
timeofthisconveyance
(b) Ahasanotherkid.Allvalidatinglivesdie.Newchildhaschild21yearsafterdeath.
Doesnotcount
(6) AfterOandAdies,21yearspass,thenAschildbirthschild(Asgrandchild),thenthat
grandchildwillnothaveaninterest.Fertileoctogenarianrule.
(7) Ifsomeoneispregnant,thenaddsonanother9months.
(8) AssumeAismale.Aconceivestheday
b) WaitandSeeApproach
i) Thetraditionalapproach:Atthetimeofcreation,ifthereisthepossibilitythataninterest
mightnotvestwithintheperpetuitiesperiod,theconveyanceisvoid.

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ii) Themodernapproach:Courtswillwaituntiltheendoftheperpetuitiesperiodandsee
whethertheinterestfailstovest
6) Step3:FindingTheRemedy
a) Thebasicrule:strikeouttheoffendinglanguage.
i) OtoAforresidentialpurposes,thentoB.
ii) Becomes
iii) OtoAforresidentialpurposes.
b) CyPres(equitablereformation)
i) OtoAforlife,thentothefirstchildofBtoreach25yearsofage.
ii) Becomes
iii) OtoAforlife,thentothefirstchildofBtoreach21yearsofage.
7) UniformStatutoryRuleAgainstPerpetuities(USRAP)
a) ApplythecommonlawRAP.Ifitssatisfied,thensoisUSRAP.
b) IfinvalidundercommonlawRAP,takethewaitandseeapproachfor90yearsaftertheinterest
wascreated.Ifitvestswithinthat90yearperiod,itisvalid.
c) Ifinvalidevenunderthe90yearwaitandsee,acourtcanreformthedispositioninawaythat
mostcloselyapproximatesthetransferorsmanifestplanofdistribution.
8) Abolitionoftherule
a) Somestateshaveabolishedtheruleentirely,createdextremelylongperpetuitiesperiod,or
permitteddynastytrusts.
b) Iwonderwhy?
c) Lucasv.Hamm56Cal.2d583(1961).
d) Attorneynotliableformalpracticeforviolatingtheruleagainstperpetuitiesinawill,because
reasonablelawyerscouldmakethesamemistake.
e) Few,ifany,areasofthelawhavebeenfraughtwithmoreconfusionorconcealedmoretraps.
f) Butnowyouunderstandit!

ToAforLifethentoAschildren
Aisalivebutnochildrenalive.
Step1:Thisisacontingentremainder,becausewaitingforatakertobeascertained.
Step2:Whathastohappenforfutureinterestholdertotake?Amustdieleavingachild
Step3:Findameasuringlife:Aslifeiscentral
Step4:Willweknowwithin21yearsofAsdeathifthereisatakerornot?Yeswewillknow.
WewillknowtheinstantofAsdeath.
SoOK.DoesnotviolateRAP.

24.ConcurrentOwnership,p.66382
ThreeFormsofConcurrentEstates:
1) JointTenancy2ormoreownwiththerightofsurvivorship
2) TenancybytheEntiretyMaritalinterestbetweenmarriedpartnerswiththerightofsurvivorship
3) TenancyinCommon2ormoreownwithnorightofsurvivorship
1)
TenancyinCommonwhenindoubt,construeinfavoroftenancyincommon

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PropertyBlocher91
a) Whomayown:anyone(canownentiretyoftheparcel)
b) Natureofinterest:undividedbutnotnecessarilyequal
i) Canownseparateproportionofinterest
ii) Buthasrighttopossessthewholenomatterthesizeoftherespectiveshare
iii) Whymatter?Ifyourent,youcansplitrentalincomebyproportion,sameforselling
c) Formalitiesofcreation:none
i) Nothard.Youcanjustconvey(OconveystoAandBastenantsincommon,Awith40%of
interest)
d) Rightsofsurvivorship:none
i) Whenoneownerdies,personsinterestgoestohis/hersurvivors(nottotheothertenant)
e) Transferabilityofinterests:transferablewithoutcoownerconsent
f) Partition:judicialorvoluntarypartition
i) Onefilessuitagainsttheother.Courthastheoptionofpartitioningthepropertyintwoways:
(1) PhysicallypartitionorForceasaletodivideuptheproperty
2)
JointTenancy
a) Whomayown:anyone
b) Natureofinterest:undivided;equalinterests
c) Formalitiesofcreation:
i) FourunitiesTime,Title,Interest,Possession
(1) Time:Taketheirinterestatthesametime
(2) Title:BythesameTitle,inthesameinstrument
(3) Interest:Withidenticalinterests
(4) Possession:Withtherighttopossessthewhole
ii) Inaddition!:Grantormustclearlystatetherightofsurvivorship.
iii) CourtswillnotpermitOtotransfertoOandA.Instead,OwillneedtoselltoBandthen
backtoOandA strawbuyer
d) Rightsofsurvivorship:YES
i) IfAandBarejointtenants,andAdies,thenBgetsentireinterestandAsheirsgetnothing.
ii) IfA,B,Cjointtenants,andCdies,CsinterestsplitsequallybetweenAandB
iii) NOTDIVISABLEORDESCENDABLE
e) Transferabilityofinterests:transferablewithoutcoownerconsent(thisisseverance)
i) Severance:Jointtenantdestroysrightofsurvivorship,soitbecomesatenancyincommon.
ii) Youdonotneedtoaskforpermission,soeitherpersoncandestroyatanytime
iii) AandBjointtenancy,BsellstoC,nowAandCaretenantsincommon
iv) A,B,andCjointtenants,andCsellstoD,thenAandBarestilljointtenants,butDistenant
incommonwithAandB.SoifBdies,thenhisinterestgoesentirelytoA(Ahas2/3of
ownership,andDhas1/3)
v) IfAandBjointtenants,thenBsellstoCandthentransfersitbacktoB,thenjointtenants,
andAwillneverknowandhavenosurvivorship
f) Howdoyouseverajointtenancy?Principallybysale.Jointtenantcansellortransferhershare
duringherlifetime.Sheisevenallowedtodososecretly.Onejointtenantssaleordispossession
ofhershare,seversthejointtenancyastothesellersinterest.SotheBuyerisaTenantin
Common.
i) SupposeOconveysBlackacretoPhoebe,Ross,Monicaasjointtenantswiththerightof
survivorship Jointtenancy.Eachownsonethirdplustherighttoenjoythewhole.Phoebe
sellstoChandler.Whatisthestateofthetitle?Phoebesactseversthejointtenancyasto
Phoebesinterest.RossandMonicahold2/3asjointtenants.Chandlerholds1/3astheir
tenantincommon.

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PropertyBlocher92
(1) Rossnowdies,leavingbehindhisheirRachel.Whatisthestateofthetitlenow?
(2) MonicatakesRosssshare,meaningMonicanowholds2/3withChandlerwhoholds1/3.
(3) MonicaandChandleraretenantsincommon.
(4) Racheltakesnothing.
g) Partition:Meansavailableforcoownerstodissolvetheirrelationship.
i) Judicialorvoluntarypartition
ii) PartitioninkindisaphysicaldivisionbythecourtofBlackacre.Bestforruraloragricultural
iii) Ifinthebestinterestsofallparties,forcesale,proceedingsaredividedupproportionately.
3)
TenantsbyEntirety
a) Whomayown:ONLYMARRIEDPARTIES
b) Natureofinterest:undivided;equalinterests
c) Formalitiesofcreation:FourUnities,plusmarriage
d) Rightsofsurvivorship:Indestructible
i) Incomparisontojointtenants
ii) Neithertenantactingalonecandefeattherightofsurvivorshipbytryingtoselltoanother.
e) Transferabilityofinterests:cannottransferwithoutspousalconsent
f) Partition:onlyupondivorce
g) Cantpartitionorencumberwithoutotherspousesconsent,socreditorswouldbescrewed
h) Ifmarriedcouple,needtoputtenantsbyentiretytogetit.Defaultisjointtenants.
4) Communityproperty:anythingyouveownedduringyourmarriageismaritalcommunityproperty
5)
Olivasv.Olivas(1989)
a) SYNOPSIS:Respondenthusbandchallengedthedistrictcourt'sfinalorderdividingcommunity
propertyinadivorceactionthatwasfiledbypetitionerwife.
b) DISCUSSION
i) Whycanthejustdemandhertopayrent?BecauseTenantsinCommon,sotheybothhave
undividedrighttopossesstheentireproperty(sonorentowed)
ii) Ouster:Whenonecotenantisforcedoutofpropertyunlawfully,thenpersonmayowerent
iii) Rule:Whenaspousedepartsaresidenceheldascommunitypropertyduetomaritalfriction,
aconstructiveousteriseffected.
iv) ConstructiveOuster:Itdoesexist,butinthiscase,helefttolivewithhisgirlfriendinstead
ofhiswife,sonotentitledtocompensation
(1) Substantialevidencethathusband'spurposeinleavingthecommunityresidencewasto
livewithagirlfriendandhisdeparturewasthereasonthatthewifefiledforadivorce.
(2) Longdelay(severalyears)betweenleavingproperty,divorce,andcase
v) Husbandmaintainedthatafterdivorce,heusedhissalarytopaytaxes(wouldvebeenin
favorofconstructiveouster)andcommunityowedhimforsuchpayments,butcourtheldhe
wasnotentitledtocompensationbecausehefailedtomeethisburdenofproofthatheused
hissalarytopaythetaxes.
vi) Asfarasawardingcompensationformissingequipment,thecourtruledthattherewasno
bailmentinthewifeformissingtoolsandthatotherallegedmissingequipmentwasawarded
tothewifeandsosheboretheloss,orthattheevidencewaslackingtoestablishtheclaim.
vii) Further,thecourtfoundthatalthoughthehusbandmayhaveincreasedthevalueofthewife's
propertyandwouldordinarilybeentitledtoacredit,thevalueoftheincreasewasde
minimusandfailedtojustifythedistrictcourt'sreconsideration.
c) CONCLUSION:courtaffirmedthepropertydistributionasorderedbythedistrictcourt.
6) Hypothetical

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PropertyBlocher93
a) Awomanhasalwayslivedwithhersonwhohasmultipledisabilitiesbutisabletogetaroundand
takecareofhimselfwithsomeassistancefromahiredcaretaker.Thewomandiesandleavesthe
housetohersonandherdaughterastenantsincommon.Thedaughterwantstocontinuetolet
herbrothercontinuelivinginthehousebutwantstogetrentfromhim,withoutpartitioning.
b) Assumethatherbrotherhasenoughmoneytopayonehalfofthefairrentalvalue,andthatthe
houseisnotbigenoughtobeoccupiedbythebrotherandsister,sinceshehasapartnerandtwo
children.
c) Shouldthedaughterbeabletodemandrent?
7) Hypothetical
a) Awomanliveswithanabusivehusbandwhohasstruckherseveraltimes.Thewifemovesout
aftersufferingbatteryathishands.Thehusbandaskshertoreturn,butsherefuses.Theyare
separatedfortwoyears,thendivorced.Thewifesuesforonehalfofthefairrentalvalueofthe
houseduringthetwoyearperiod.Isheobligatedtopayonehalfthefairrentalvaluetohiswife?
i) Yes,thisisanactualouster,becausephysicalabusethreatlikephysicallykickingout.
(1) Actualoustermighthavetobeanintentionalact.
ii) Yes,thisisaconstructiveouster,becausephysicalabusethreatenoughtoproveshecannot
gobacktothehouse.Impractical.
iii) No,shewaited2years,andshehadnointenttoreturnsoabandoned
8) Hypothetical
a) Samebasicfactsasproblemone,exceptthatthewifethrowsthehusbandoutofthehouserather
thanfleeing.Canthehusbanddemandrent?
i) Yes,actualouster,becauseshephysicallyforcedhimout.
ii) No,ifshegotarestrainingorder,hehasnolegalrighttobethere?Unclear.Oustedbythe
state.Thenhecantsueforrent.
9)
Carrv.Deking(1988)
a) Summary:Inatenancyincommon,onecotenantmakesaleasewithathirdparty,unknownto
andagainstthewishesofthecotenant.
b) SynopsisofRule:Inatenancyincommon,acotenantmayleasehisinterestinthecommon
propertytoathirdpartywithouttheconsentoftheothertent.
c) Facts:JoelCarr(P)andhisfatherGeorgeCarrownedaparceloflandastenantsincommon.
TheyleasedlandtoRichardDeking(D)onayeartoyearoralagreementoverseveralyears.One
year,PinformedDthathewantedcashrent,butDdidnotagree.DandGeorgeCarrenteredinto
a10yrlease,unknowntoP.Pneverconsentedtotheleaseanddidnotauthorizehisfathertoact
onhisbehalf.PinformedDthathisleasehadexpired,butDclaimedpossessionthroughthelease
withGeorgeCarr.PseekstoejectD;Dseekspartition.
d) Issue:Inatenancyincommon,canonecotenantenterintoaleasewithrespecttohisown
undividedonehalfinterestinthepropertywithouttheconsentoftheothercotenant?
e) Held.Yes.Eachtenantincommonofrealpropertymayuse,benefit,andpossessthewhole
property,subjectonlytotheequalrightsofthecotenants.Acotenantmayleasehisowninterest
inthecommonpropertytoathirdpartywithouttheconsentoftheothertenant,eveniftheco
tenantdoesnotjoininthelease.Nonjoiningcotenantisnotboundbythelease.Thethirdparty
becomesatenantincommonwiththeothercotenantforthedurationofthelease.The
nonjoiningtenantmaynotdemandexclusivepossessionagainstthelessee;hemayonlydemand
copossession.
i) Here,PmaynotejectDfrompropertybecauseleaseisvalid.Partitionistheproperremedy.
ii) WhyisDseekingpartition?BecauseifhelosesunderPstheory,thenhegetsnothing.At
leastifhewinsonthisclaim,heatleasthassomething.

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PropertyBlocher94
f) Discussion.Coownersofrealpropertyhavetherighttoleasethelandwithouttheknowledgeor
consentoftheothercoowners.Whencoownerscannotagreeontheuseoftheproperty,the
courtmayorderapartition,whichisadivisionoftheland
10) Tenhetv.Boswell(1976)
a) F:JohnsonandPownedpropertyasjointtenants.WithoutPsknowledge,JohnsonleasedtoD
withanoptionforpurchase.Johnsondiedshortlyafter.Upondeath,P,believingtohavebeena
jointtenant,thensoughtsoleownershipoftheproperty.PsuedDtohavehisleaseagreement
invalidatedandlostattrial.
b) R:Ajointinterestisoneownedbytwoormorepersonsinequalshares,byatitlecreatedbya
singlewillortransfer,whenexpresslydeclaredinthewillortransfertobeajointtenancy.
c) ISSUE1:Whetherwhenajointtenantleaseshisinterestinthejointtenancypropertytoathird
personforatermofyears,anddiesduringthatterm,theleasedoesnotseverthejointtenancy,
butexpiresuponthedeathofthelessorjointtenant.
(a) Didhecreateaseverance?Heleasedhisinterestinthepropertytosomeoneelse,so
heonlyhadfutureinterest.Ifseverance,thenrightofsurvivorshipcannotkickin,
andleasewillbevalidfortenant.
ii) Yes.
(1) Option1:Leasebyajointtenanttoathirdpersoneffectsacompleteandfinalseverance
ofthejointtenancy
(2) Option2:Temporaryseveranceview:aslongasleaseisineffect,thereisatemporary
severance,butitrevertstotheoriginalowner,andtheygobacktobeingjointtenants
together.So,ifhediesBEFOREleaseends,thenitsstillsevered,anditstayssevered.
(3) Option3:Leasedoesnotseverinterest
(4) Thestatedruledoesnotabrogatethecommonlawrulethatfourunitiesareessentialto
anestateinjointtenancy:unityofinterest,unityoftime,unityoftitle,andunityof
possession.
(5) Presumptionagainstforfeiture
(6) Itisouropinionthataleaseisnotsoinherentlyinconsistentwithjointtenancyasto
createaseverance,eithertemporaryorpermanent.
(7) Johnsonextinguishedthejointtenancythroughhisownactions;andthereforethe
tenancyisnolongerajointone.
(8) Johnsonhadarighttoalienatehisinterestduringhislifetimeundercommonlaw.
(9) Ajointtenancyiscreatedonlywithspecificintent.Severingsuchajointtenancywould
shouldrequiremorethanaunilateralleasebyoneofthejointtenants.
d) ISSUE2:WhetherPmayreceivesoleownershipofthepropertyunencumberedbythelease.
i) Yes.
(1) Bytheverynatureofjointtenancytheinterestofthenonsurvivingjointtenant
extinguishesuponhisdeath.
(2) Leasevalidonlywheretheinterestofthelessorisvalid.Therefore,theleaseexpires
uponJohnsonsdeath.
(3) Therightofsurvivorshipisthechiefcharacteristicthatdistinguishesajointtenancy
fromotherinterestinproperty.
(4) Thecorrectruleisthatajointtenantmaycertainlyleaseduringhislifetime,butthelease
isthereafterterminatedwhenthelessorjointtenantdies.
(5) Notdoingsowouldcontravenetheotherjointtenantsrighttosurvivorshipinexecuting
thejointtenantagreementinthefirstplace.
11) Kreshav.Kresha(1985)

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PropertyBlocher95
a) Synopsis:PmotherbroughtaforcibleentryanddetaineractionagainstDsontoobtain
possessionofcertainland.CountycourtdismissedactionandDistrictCourtaffirmed.
b) F:Courtfoundthatmotherwascoowneroflandinquestionwithherhusband,thefather.Father,
withoutmother'sconsent,leasedlandtosonfor6yr.Whenmotherlearnedoflease,shefiledan
actionforseparatemaintenanceagainstfatherandawardedland.Motherattemptedtoterminate
lease,butsoncontinuedoccupancy.Motherfiledinstantforcibleentryanddetaineraction,which
thelowercourtsdismissed.
c) Opinion:
i) Onappeal,mothercontendedleasewasnotvalidastothefather'sinterestintheland,which
thefatherhadatthetimeofthelease'sexecution.
ii) Courtdisagreed,holdingoneofseveraltenantsincommonwasentitledtoleasehisown
interesttoathirdperson.
iii) Motheralsocontendedthatjudgewhodissolvedmarriageconsideredtheson'sleasehold
interestwhendistributingtheproperty.
iv) Courtheldmothertookpropertysubjecttoleasebecausesheknewatthetimeofacquisition
thatthepropertywasencumberedbythelease
d) Holding:Affirmeddistrictcourt,affirmedcountydismissaloftheforcibleentryanddetainer
action.
e) Kreshav.Tenhet:InKresha,tenantsincommon,sorightofsurvivorship.InTenhet,jointtenants

25.MaritalProperty,p.68893
1) UndertraditionalEnglishcommonlaw
a) Anadultunmarriedwomanwasconsideredtohavethelegalstatusoffemesole
i) femmeseule,'singlewoman'
ii) Hadrighttoownpropertyandmakecontractsinherownname.
b) Amarriedwomanhadthestatusoffemecovert.
i) femmecouverte,'coveredwoman'
ii) Notrecognizedashavinglegalrightsandobligationsdistinctfromthoseofherhusbandin
mostrespects.Instead,throughmarriageawoman'sexistencewasincorporatedintothatof
herhusband,sothatshehadveryfewrecognizedindividualrightsofherown.
iii) Amarriedwomancouldnotownproperty,signlegaldocumentsorenterintoacontract,
obtainaneducationagainstherhusband'swishes,orkeepasalaryforherself.Ifawifewas
permittedtowork,underthelawsofcovertureshewasrequiredtorelinquishherwagesto
herhusband.Incertaincases,awifedidnothaveindividuallegalliabilityforhermisdeeds,
sinceitwaslegallyassumedthatshewasactingundertheordersofherhusband,and
generallyahusbandandawifewerenotallowed
2) MarriedWomensPropertyActs
a)
3) MajorityRule:SeparateProperty/EquitableDistribution
a) DuringMarriage
i) Eachspouseownswhateverheorsheownedpriortothemarriage,plusanyindividual
propertyacquiredduringmarriage(i.e.,wages).
ii) Theymightchoosetoshare,buttheydonthaveto
b) UponDivorce
i) Equitabledistributionkicksin
ii) Ajudgewilldivideallproperty,bothownedindividuallyandshared

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PropertyBlocher96
(1) Courtmayconsidersuchfactorsas"substantialcontributiontotheaccumulationofthe
property,themarketandemotionalvalueoftheassets,taxandothereconomic
consequencesofthedistribution,theparties'needs,andanyotherfactorrelevanttoan
equitableoutcome."
(2) Fairnessistheprevailingguidelinethecourtwilluse.
(3) Alimonypayments,childsupportobligationsandallotherpropertywillbeconsidered.
(4) Evennontangiblecontributionssuchasaspouse'sdomesticcontributionstothe
householdwillbetakenintoaccount,whetherthatspousehasanythingtitledintheir
nameornot.Aspousewhohasmadenontangiblecontributionsmayclaimanequitable
interestinthemaritalpropertyatdivorce.
(5) 20Stateshaveadopted:UniformMarriageandDivorceAct307(UMDA307)also
allows:"thedurationofthemarriage,andpriormarriageofeitherparty,antenuptial
agreementoftheparties[whichisthesameasaprenuptialagreementorpremarital
agreement],theage,health,station,occupation,amountandsourcesofincome,
vocationalskills,employability,estate,liabilities,andneedsofeachoftheparties,
custodialsprovisions..."etc.Maritalmisconductisnotafactorinthedecisionmaking
process.
c) AtDeath
i) Manystateshaveastatutoryforcedshareforthesurvivingspouse.
ii) Ifnowilliswritten,thespousewillalmostalwaysgetsomething,ifnottheentireestate.
4) MinorityRule:CommunityProperty
a) Ninestateshavewhatiscalledacommunitypropertyapproach:California,Arizona,Idaho,
Louisiana,Wisconsin,NewMexico,Texas,Nevada,andWashington.
b) Inthosestates,theearningsofeitherspouseduringthemarriagearesharedequally.
c) Whatcountsascommunityproperty?Everythingexcept
i) Propertybroughttothemarriage,and
ii) Propertyreceivedbygift,devise,bequest,orinheritance
d) UponDivorce
i) Mostcommunitypropertystateshavethesameequitabledistributionruleastheseparate
propertystatesdiscussedabove.Othersgiveeachspousehisorherseparateproperty,plus
halfofthecommunityproperty.
e) AtDeath
i) Theresnoreasonforastatutoryforcedshareinthesestates,becauseeachspousealready
ownshalfofthecommunityproperty
5) HypotheticalOne:InreGraham(Colo.1978)
a) AnneandDennisGrahamgetmarried.Anneworksthroughoutthemarriage,whichallows
Dennistogotoschoolparttimeover3.5yearsofthemarriage.HeearnsaB.S.inEngineering
andanMBA.Annecontributes70%ofthefinancialsupportthroughoutthemarriage,andalso
doesthebulkofthehousework.
b) Bythetimetheydivorce,Dennishasanexecutivepositionwithalargecorporation.Alimonyis
notapossibility.Shouldhisincreasedearningpowercountasamaritalasset?
i) Costofhousework,costofloans,
ii) Marriage,wasntdoingthisformoney,nothing.
iii) Actualholding:degree/educationnotmaritalpropertysubjecttoequaldistribution.
iv) Reasoning:Therearenecessarylimitsuponwhatmaybeconsideredproperty;onedefinition
is"everythingthathasanexchangeablevalueorwhichgoestomakeupwealthorestate."
(1) Indecidingifsomethinginthiscategory,canlooktowhetheritcanbeassigned,sold,
transferred,conveyed,orpledged,orwhetheritterminatedondeathoftheowner.

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PropertyBlocher97
(2) Here,thedegrees/educationsatisfynoneoftherequirementsofproperty.
(3) Aspousewhoprovidesfinancialsupportwhiletheotherspouseacquiresaneducationis
notwithoutaremedy;whenthereismaritalpropertytobedivided,suchcontributionto
theeducationmaybetakenintoaccountbythecourt.
(4) Here,nomaritalpropertyhadbeenaccumulated.
v) Dissent:Themostvaluableassetacquiredbyeitherpartyduringthissixyearmarriagewas
thehusband'sincreasedearningcapacity,whichresultedfromwife'sincome.Sheinvestedin
hiseducation.Equitydemandsthatcourtsseekextraordinaryremediestoprevent
extraordinaryinjustice.Iftheyhadremainedmarriedlongerandaccumulatedmarital
property,therewouldbenoproblem.
6) HypotheticalTwo:Elkusv.Elkus(N.Y.App.Div.1991)
a) FredericaVonStadeandherhusbandPeterElkusaremarriedfor17years,havetwokids.She
goesfrommaking$2,250annuallyasanoperasingerto$621,878.Heactsasvoicecoach,
photographer,primaryparentoftwochildren.
b) Peterarguesthatheisentitledtoequitabledistributionofherfutureearningcapacitybecauseher
career/celebritystatusisproperty.
c) Held.Reversed,totheextentDscontributionsledtoincreaseinvalueofPscareer,this
appreciationwasaproductofthemarriageandsubjecttoequitabledistribution.Thingsofvalue
acquiredduringmarriagearemaritalpropertyeventhoughtheymayfalloutsidethescopeof
traditionalpropertyconcepts.Thestatutedoesnotmandatethatthethinginquestionbe
transferable,assignable,orsalable.
d) TheenhancedskillsofanartistsuchasP,albeitgrowingfromaninnatetalent,maybevaluedas
maritalpropertysubjecttoequitabledistribution.
e) Thenatureandextentofthecontributionbythespouseseekingequitabledistribution,ratherthan
thenatureofthecareer,shoulddeterminewhetheritismaritalproperty.

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PropertyBlocher98

V.TRANSFERRINGPROPERTYINTERESTS
26.Leaseholds:ConflictsaboutRent,p.77082
1. Traditionalnotionofalease:transferofapropertyexchangingpossessionforpayment.
a. Covenantswereindependent
b. Leasescontainnoimpliedduties
2. Modernnotionofalease:acontract
a. Covenantsmaybedependent
b. Mayincludeimpliedtermslikewarrantyofhabitability
3. Trendfromconsideringleasesinpropertylenstocontracts
4. Covenantswereindependent wentawaytosomeextent
5. Leaseshadnorealimplieddutiesonlandlordside,butcontractmodelimpliessomeduty
a. Impliedwarrantyoflivability/habitability
b. Implied
c. Residentialleasescannot
d. Commercialleasescancontractaroundsomeofthesebackgroundrules
e. Why?Commercialactorsaremoresophisticatedparties,soequalbargainingpower
6. Fourtypesoftenancy:
a. TermofYearslease:
i. Lengthofatermofayearsleasecanbeanyamountoftime.
ii. Upwheneveragreedto.
iii. Landlordholdsareversion(meanstheyllgetitback)
iv. TermofYearsLeaseover1yearmustbeinwritingSTATUTEOFFRAUDS
b. Periodiclease:
i. Lengthcanbeanyamountoftime,butdifferencebetweenfirstandsecondleaseis
thatthisoneautomaticallyrenews
ii. Continuesforsuccessiveintervalsuntilpropernoticeisgiven.
iii. Terminatedby:Noticebyeitherparty.Noticemustbegiventoterminateaperiodic
tenancy.Noticemustbegivenatleastequaltothelengthoftheperioditselfunless
thepartiesotherwiseagree(likeinthelease)exceptforyearorgreater(6mon)
iv. ToTformonthormonthORyeartoyearORweektoweek
c. TenancyAtWill
i. Length:Anyspecifiedperiodoftime
ii. Terminatedby:Choiceofeitherparty,withoutnotice
d. TenancyAtSufferance
i. Happenswhenpersonwhoisrightfullyinpossessionstaysonafterleasehas
terminated.
ii. Possessionis9/10thrule,sopresumption
iii. Onlinedefinition:a"holdover"tenancyafteraleasehasexpired,butbeforethe
landlordhasdemandedthatthetenantquit(vacate)thepremises.Duringatenancyat
sufferancethetenantisboundbythetermsofthelease(includingpaymentofrent)
whichexistedbeforeitexpired.Theonlydifferencebetweena"tenancyat
sufferance"anda"tenancyatwill"isthatthelatterwascreatedbyagreement.
7. Nomatterwhichtypeofleaseyouhave,StatuteofFraudsapplies.

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PropertyBlocher99
8. Tenantsduties:
a. Maintainpremisesandmakeordinaryrepairs
b. Tmustnotcommitwaste
9. Problemsforlandlord:
a. Tenantremainsinpropertybutowesbackrent
i. Youwantrentorpossession(torerent)
ii. Traditionalrule:Landlordseekingtoestablishpossessioncouldengageinselfhelp
(changethelocks,physicallyremovebelongingsorperson)
1. Landlordneededlegalrightandshoulddoitpeacefully
iii. Modernrule:Landlordmustrelyonlegalprocess(summaryprocess)
1. LANDLORDCANNOTENGAGEINSELFHELP
2. Summaryprocessnarrowsthekindsofdefensesthatcanberaisedbytenants
3.
Bergv.Wiley

(Minn.1978)
b. SelfHelpagainstTenantinPossession
i. Traditionalapproach:LLscanuseselfhelptoregainpossessionifLLwaslegally
entitledtopossessionandLLsmeansofreentrywerepeaceable
ii. Modernapproach:LLcannotuseselfhelp;mustrelyoncourtproceedings
1. Bergv.Wiley(Minn.1978)
2. n.b.Possibilityofsummaryprocess.
c. Tenantleavesowingrent
i. Backrent/goingforward/damages
ii. Landlordcan:SIR(surrender/ignoreandholdTresponsibleforrent/
1. Acceptsurrender;reletonLLsaccount
a. Mightprefer:Empathy,canletformoremoneyifpricevalueup,get
ridofproblematictenant,costoflitigation
b. Damages:advertisingcosts,utilities,repairs,reducedrentfornew
tenant(FMVrentandagreeduponrent)
2. Refusesurrender(leasestillineffect);reletonTsaccount
a. Mightprefer:youdonttakeontherisk(replacementisnotupto
you,buttenantisobligatedtopay)
3. Refusesurrender(leasestillineffect);waitandsuewhentermisup
a. Mightprefer:Donthavetodoanything.Canchargeaccumulating
costsontenant
b. Negatives:Inefficient(tyingupland),riskthatcourtwillaward
damages,costoflitigation,tenantmightbejudgmentproof
iii. Hypothetical:
1. Landlordletstotenant1foryearlease.Tenant1leavesafter6months.
LandlordfindsTenant2forsamerateasTenant2.Tenantleavesafter4
months.Howdoesthisplayout?
a. Option1:Landlordisoutofluck
b. Option2:Tenant1isonthehook,becauseLandlordneverpermitted
surrender.
c. Option3:Tenant1
10.Sommerv.Kridel
a. Synopsis:Alandlordhasadutytomitigatedamagesbyattemptingtoreletanapartment
vacatedbyatenantatfairmarketvalue.

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PropertyBlocher100
b. F:Kridel(D)signed2yrleaseforapartmentownedbySommer(P).Dpaidsecuritydeposit
andfirstmonth.Priortoevenobtainingkeystoapartment,Dbrokeoffengagement,became
astudentandattemptedtoterminateleasebylettertoP.Pdidnotattempttoreletthe
apartmentuntilmonthslater.Pwasabletoreletlater,buttryingtosueforentire2yrterm
i. PsuedDforfullamountdueunder2yrlease.TrialcourtfoundPhadadutyto
mitigatebyattemptingtoreletpremises.Appcourtreversed,Dappealed.
c. I:Whetherlandlordseekingdamagesfromadefaultingtenanthasadutytomitigatedamages
bymakingreasonableeffortstoreletanapartmentwrongfullyvacatedbyatenant.
d. Held:Reversed,alandlorddoeshaveanobligationtomakeareasonableefforttomitigate
damagesinthissituationforthefollowingreasons:
i. ApplicationofKrulerequiringmitigationofdamagestoaresidentialleaseis
justifiedasamatterofbasicfairness.
1. Puttingcostontenantafteralreadysayingyoudonothavemoneyputs
burdenonpartyalreadyunabletobearit
ii. Tyinguplandiswasteofresources
iii. IfLLhasothervacantapartmentsbesidesonewhichtenantabandoned,hehasaduty
tomakereasonableeffortstoattempttoreletapartment,treatpartofvacantstock.
iv. ToassessifLLmadereasonableeffortstomitigate,courtshouldconsiderwhether
LLoffered/showedthevacantapartment,advertisements,amongotherfactors.
v. LLneednotacceptlessthanfairmarketvaluerentorsubstantiallyalterhis
obligationsasestablishedbythepreexistinglease
e. Discussion:
i. Courtoverruledprecedentbasedontheorythatwhenlandlordsignedleasewitha
tenant,landlordmaynotinterferewithestategrantedtothetenantbylease.
1. Whenlease,ownergivesstickinbundletorightfullypossesstheland,so
landlordcannottakebackthatbundleandrelettomitigatedamages
ii. HeldleaseforresidentialpropertynolongerdistinguishablefromordinaryKand
thussubjecttoKrulerequiringmitigationofdamages.
iii. WhyshouldntLLhavetomitigate?
1. Losingopportunitytorentoutanothervacantapartment.IfIhavemore
stock,thenthatmeansthat
2. Costswillburdenlandlord,raisingrentforeveryone
3. WTPWWisthatbothpartiesagreedtothislease,tobargainforthetenancy
iv. Whyshouldtherebeadifferencebetweensmalllandlordandbiglandlord?
1. Forindividual,itmightbewithinthesamebuilding,soitsnotjustfindinga
tenantthatcanpaybutanacceptabletenant
v. Burdenisonthelandlordtoprovemitigationofdamages(informationisin
landlordshandshowdiligentlytheyadvertised,etc.)
11.RiverviewRealtyCo.v.Perosio
a. Denteredinto2yrleasewithP.LeasepreventedDfromsublettingorassigningapartment
withouttheconsentofLL.Dtookpossessionandoccupiedthepremisesfor1yr.Dvacated
thepremisesafterhavingpaidrentuntilJan1974.Psuedforrentdueonremainingten
months.DansweredcomplaintallegedtherewasavalidsurrenderandPfailedtomitigate
damages.
b. LowercourtsheldforLLbecauseofprecedent.

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PropertyBlocher101
c. SCgrantedcertificationandheldthatdamagesmustbemitigatedbythelandlord,andthat
courtsaretrendinginthisdirection.
i. Distinctionbetweenaleaseforordinaryresidentialpurposesandanordinarycontract
cannolongerbeconsideredviable.
ii. Attentionmustshifttotheintentionsoftheparties,aswithnormalcontracts.
12. Hypo:Shouldthisbeallowed:LLputsinleasethatiftenantleaves,rentisaccelerated,andlandlord
hasnodutytomitigatedamages.
a. Thisisakintoliquidateddamages,sosomecourtssayitsfine(probablydifferentin
commercialv.residentialcontext)
b. Thiswilllikelybeineverysinglecontract,soitllbeadefactorule
c. NYhasnodutytomitigatebuttenantshavearighttosubletsubjecttoalandlordsapproval
whichcannotbeunreasonablywithheld(tenantmitigates)
13. RentControl

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PropertyBlocher102

24.Leaseholds:TenantsRightstoHabitablePremises,p.78298,8027
1) SourcesofTenantsRights:
a) Expressterms
b) Impliedterms
i) TheCovenantofQuietEnjoyment
(1) ActualevictionphysicallybarringTfromproperty
(a) PartialactualevictiontraditionalrulerelievesTofrentobligation;modernrule
abatesrenttoFMV
(b) Inthissituation,tenantdoesnothavetopayrent.Damagesfortrespass,etc.
(c) PartialActualEviction(portionofpropertyblockedbysaleofparceltosomeone
whodoesnotpermitmeaccesstomyschool).
(i) Therefore,abatementofrentforlossofvaluetomeproportionality
(2) Constructiveevictionmakingpropertyunlivable
(a) Traditionalrule:onlycoverssubstantialinterference,LLsnotliablefor3 rdparty
conduct;Tsmustactuallyvacate
(i) Traditionally,tenantwouldhavetoleavepropertyandthenclaimforbackrent
(b) Restatement:requiresthatinterferencebemorethaninsignificant,LLsliablefor
some3rdparties(Blackett);Tsneednotvacate
(c) Traditionalandmodernmajorityrule:Constructiveevictionofcovenantofquiet
enjoyment.Landlordhim/herselfinsuchawaytodestroyquietenjoymentin
property.Landlordsarenotresponsibleforactionsofthirdparties,includingother
tenants,unlesstheleasesaysresponsibleforothertenants(thenexpressterms,not
impliedterm) ExceptBlackett
(i) Pros:Landlordmayhavepowertoevict,andthen,insteadofworkingout
situation,landlordcauseseviction.
(ii) Cons:Mightbeleftwithoutaremedy,deeperpocketsforlandlord.
ii) TheImpliedWarrantyofHabitability
(1) RemediesifImpliedWarrantyofHabitabilityisBreached:
(a) Rescissionorrighttomoveoutbeforeleasetermends
(b) Rentwithholding
(c) Rentabatement
(d) Repairanddeduct
(e) Injunctiverelieforspecificperformance
(f) Administrativeremedies
(g) Criminalpenalties
(h) Compensatorydamages
2)
MinjakCo.v.Randolph

(528N.Y.S.2d554,1988N.Y.App.Div.)
a) Synopsis:Whensuitisbroughtfornonpayment,tenantmayassertasdefensedoctrineof
constructioneviction,evenifheabandonedonlyportionofpremisesduetolandlordsacts,which
madethatportionunsuitableforuse.(desertingportionnotrequired,generallyresidential)
b) Facts:RandolphandKikuchi(Respondents)rentedloftspacefromMinjak(Petitioner).Petitioner
gavethemacommerciallease,thoughRespondentstoldPetitionertheywouldusethespaceas
residenceandatthetimeofthesigning,buildingwasusedpredominantlyforresidential
purposes.Respondentsused2/3spaceasmusicstudio.
i) Anothertenantbeganuseunitashealthspa,fullyfunctioningjacuzzis,bathtubs,saunas.At
least40leaksappearedinRespsapartment,theycomplained,Petitionerdidnotrespond.

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PropertyBlocher103
ii) Petitionerbeganconstructionworkonbuilding,workwashazardous(stairsmissingwithout
warning),causedhealthproblemstoRespondents.Dangerousconstructionprevented
Respondentsfromusingmusicstudioportionofloft.
c) PH:JuryawardedRespondentsrentabatementof80%fromJuly1981Nov1983(for
constructiveevictionfrommusicstudio),40%abatementfromJan1981Nov1983(breachof
warrantyofhabitabilityofresidentialportion),10%abatementonrentattributabletoresidence
forallof1979,forbreachofhabitability.Punitivedamagesof$20k
i) AppellateCtreversedsayingdoctrineofconstructiveevictioncouldnotprovidedefense
becausetenantshadnotabandonedpremises,andreversedawardedof80%forstudio
d) Issue.Maydoctrineofconstructiveevictionbeusedasadefensetothenonpaymentofrent,ifthe
tenantonlyabandonsonlyaportionofthepremises?
e) Held:
i) Yes.Tenantmayassertdefensetononpaymentofrentdoctrineofconstructiveeviction,even
ifheabandonsonlyportionofpremisesduetolandlordsactsmakingunsuitableforuse.
(1) BasedonEastHavenAssoc.v.Gurian(tenantmayassertdefenseevenifhavenot
abandonedonlyaportion,issuesofsocialpolicyandfairness)
ii) Respondentscompelledtoabandonmusicstudioduetolandlord,substantiallyandmaterially
deprivedtenantsofuseandenjoymentofthatpartoftheloft.
iii) Respondentsonlyneedtopayaportionofrentformonthsapartofthepremiseswas
uninhabitable.
iv) Punitivedamagesmaybeawardedinbreachofwarrantyofhabitabilitycaseswhen
landlordsactions/inactionintentional,malicious.Determiningfactoristhemoralculpability
ofDef.Landlordpermittedconstructionworktobedoneinadangerousandoffensive
mannerwithadisregardfortherightsandsafetyofothers.
f) Housingisdifficulttoacquire,sopeopleshouldnotberequiredtomoveoutbecauseonlya
portionuninhabitable.
3)
Blackettv.Olanoff

(Mass.1976)
a) Synopsis:Tenantsimpliedcovenantofquietenjoymentisviolatedwhenlandlordleases
propertytoanothertenant,andleasegiveslandlordrighttocontrollevelofnoise,butlandlord
doesnotpreventtheundesirableconduct.
b) Facts:Landlords(P)leasedpropertyforloungeinanareawhereleasedpremisesforresidential
purposes.Provisioninleasestatedthatentertainmentintheloungehadtobeconductedinaway
socouldnotbeheardoutsidebuilding.Residentialtenants(D)objectedtonoise,whenlandlords
complained,loungebecamequieterfromtimetotime.NoisecausedDstomoveout.
i) Wouldthecasecomeoutdifferentlyiftherewasnoexpressterminthelease?Probablynot?
c) PH:PbroughtsuitfornonpaymentofrentagainstDs,whoraisedthedoctrineofconstructive
eviction.Landlorddoesnotdisputenoise,butarguethatitsnottheirfault,nottheirconduct,third
party.JudgmentforDs.
d) Issue:Whenactsofonetenantpreventtheothertenantsfromenjoyingtheirpremises,willthe
landlordbeliablewhentheleaseprohibitsthetenantfromdisturbingothers?
e) Held:Yes.Judgmentaffirmed.
i) Occasionally,alandlordhasnotintendedtoviolatedatenantsrights,butabreachof
landlordscovenantofquietenjoymentstilloccurswhichflowedasnaturalandprobable
consequenceofthelandlordsactions,inactions,orwhathepermittedtobedone.
ii) Asamatteroflawandoffact,landlordhadpowertocontrolnoise
(1) Phadabilityandrighttocontrolnoise,causedDtovacateaptsbcofprovisioninthe
leasethatregulatednoise.
iii) Landlordsconduct,nothisintentions,iscontrolling.

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PropertyBlocher104
iv) ThoughPsonlyknewtherewouldbepotentialnoiseproblemattimetheygavelease,
experiencedemonstratedthatacceptablemusiclevelatloungeisunacceptableforresidential
v) BcdisturbingconditionwasnaturalandprobableconsequenceofPspermittingloungeto
operateinthatlocation,andsincetheycouldcontrolactionsofthelounge,theyshouldnotbe
abletocollectrentforresidentialpremisesthatwerenotreasonablyhabitable.
vi) Tenantsinthesesituationsshouldbeabletobringaclaimagainstthelandlord.
f) Discussion:Covenantofquietenjoymentimpliedineverylandlordtenantrelationship,holds
landlordpromisesnottodisturbthetenantsquietenjoymentofhispremises.Asseeninthiscase,
thelandlordwillbeliablewhenthedisturbancecomesfromanothertenant.
4)
Javinsv.FirstNationalRealtyCorp.

(D.C.Cir.1970)thiscaseisaBIGdeal!
a) Synopsis:Inregardstoresidentialproperty,thelandlordmakesanimpliedwarrantyof
habitability,andthestandardofhabitabilitywillbesetbytherelevanthousingcodes.
b) Facts:Landlord,FirstNationalRealtyCorp.(Appellee),soughtpossessionbasedondefault.
i) 29Tenantsallagreedtonotpayrentuntilfixhousingviolations.1500HousingViolations.
ii) Oneofrentstrikersagreedtosubmitaffidavitsayinglandlordcoercedhim,only6leftattrial
iii) Bagsofmice,micefeces,broughtintotrial.Pictures,etc.
iv) Appellantsallegednumerousviolationsofstatutoryhousingregulationsasadefense.
c) Issue.Intheleaseofanapartment,isthereanimpliedwarrantyofhabitability?
d) Held.Yes.
i) Holding:Warrantyofhabitability,measuredbythestandardssetoutintheHousing
RegulationsfortheDistrictofColumbia,isimpliedbyoperationoflawintoleasesofurban
dwellingunitscoveredbythoseRegulationsandthatbreachofthiswarrantygivesrisetothe
usualremediesforbreakofcontract.
(1) Substantialviolationsofhousingcodeviolations=breach
ii) ThreeMainConsiderations:
(1) Oldrulebasedonfactualassumptionsthatarenolongertrue
(a) Shiftfromrural,agrarian,feudalpropertylawtomodernurban,citydwellers
(b) Citydwellernotajackofalltradeswhocanfixanything(fixhouses,etc.)
(c) Wedonthavealongtermstakeinproperty
(d) Lowincometenantsdonothavelongterminterestforcollateralofloan
(2) Leasesofurbanapartmentsshouldbetreatedascontracts,andbeinlinewithconsumer
protectionlawwithinthosecontracts
(a) Moderncontractlawhasrecognizedthatthebuyerofgoodsandservicesinan
industrializedsocietygoodsandservicespurchasedareofadequatequality
impliedwarrantiesoffitnessandmerchantability
(b) Inequalityinthebargainingpowerbetweenlandlordandtenant.Tenantscannot
reallydemandbetterhousing.
(c) WhatthePartiesWouldveWanted/ReasonableExpectations:
(i) Sincealeasespecifiesacertainperiodoftimeinwhichthetenantwillusethe
apartment,thetenantmaylegitimatelyexpectthattheapartmentwillbefitfor
habitationforthattime.Thereisnoallegationthattheapartmentswereinpoor
conditionorinviolationofthehousingcodeatthetimetheleasesstarted.Since
thetenantscontinuedtopaythesamerent,theywereentitledtoexpectthatthe
landlordwouldkeepthepremisesasitwereinthebeginningofthelease.
(d) Mustabidebythelaw
(i) theoldnorepairrulecannotcoexistwiththeobligationsimposedonthe
landlordbyatypicalmodernhousingcode,andmustbeabandonedinfavorofan
impliedwarrantyofhabitability.

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PropertyBlocher105
(ii) Brownv.SouthallRealtyCo.(D.C.1968):LLknewattimeofsigningleasethat
buildingviolatedhousingcode,renderingaptunsafeandunsanitaryheldthat
leasewasillegalcontract
1. Cannotrelyonagency,becausenotenforcingobligations
(iii) Holding:Thehousingcoderequiresthatawarrantyofhabitabilitybeimpliedin
theleasesofallhousingthatitcovers.
(iv) Bysigningthelease,thelandlordtakesacontinuingobligationtothetenantto
maintainthepremisesinaccordancewiththelaw.Thecodeimpliesawarrantyof
habitabilitymeasuredbythestandardsoutlinedinthecodeintoallleasesthatit
covers.
(v) AppellantsobligationtopayrentdependsuponAppelleesperformanceofhis
obligations.Appellantsmustbegivenanopportunitytoproveviolationsthat
breachthewarrantyinordertodetermineifrentisowed.
(3) Natureoftodaysurbanhousingmarket(mixedwithconsumerprotection)
(a) Again,inequalityinthebargainingpowerbetweenlandlordandtenant.Tenants
cannotreallydemandbetterhousing.
(b) Abilitytoknowconditionofproperty
iii) Jobofcourtsistoupdatedoctrinewithmodernideals
(1) Courtshaveadutytoreappraiseolddoctrinesinthelightofthefactsandvaluesof
contemporarylifeparticularlyoldcommonlawdoctrineswhichthecourtsthemselves
createdanddeveloped.Thecontinuedvitalityofthecommonlawdependsuponits
abilitytoreflectcontemporarycommunityvaluesandethics.
iv) Obligationsareimposedonlandlordsbymodernhousingcodestokeepthepremisesina
habitablecondition,evidencesmodernshift
e) Discussion:Whenlandlordbreachesimpliedwarrantyofhabitability,thetenanthasalegalright
tostoppayingrent.
f) Isthisagoodrule?
i) Privateenforcement,becausepublicagencies
ii) Contractingperspective:
(1) Freedomofcontract,andrentershavedifferentincentivesandgoals
(2) Noperfectinformationandaccesstoinformation.Socantletthemarketworkitselfout.
g) Isthisabadrule?
i) Defectscameinafterwards
5) Whataboutcommercialspaces?Shouldweimplysuitability?
a) Mostsayno,theycancontractwhattheywant
RemediesforTenantsafterBreachofWarrantyofHabitability
1) Withholdrent
2) Rescindthecontract
3) Rentabatement
4) Repairanddeduct
5) Injunctiverelieforspecificperformance
6) Administrativeremedies
7) Criminalpenalties
8) Compensatorydamages
9) Selfhelp(publicshaming)

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PropertyBlocher106

25.RealEstateTransactions:TheRecordingSystem,p.87286,8923
1) RequirementsforaDeed
a) Identifytheparties
b) Describethepropertybeingconveyed
i) Meatsandboundsdescriptions(describeboundariesofproperty)
c) Statethegrantorsintenttoconveytheinterestinquestion
d) Containthegrantorssignature
i) Deedmustbedeliveredtothegranteeinordertotransferownership.
2) CommonProblems
a) Problemswithdelivery(especiallyforgifts)
i) Doctrineofconstructivedelivery(inasafetydepositboxisokay)
b) Unknownencumbrancesandclaims
c) Disingenuousgrantors(O AthenO Bnimodat)
3) ThreeWaystoIdentifyandProtecttheTitleOwner
a) Covenantsandwarrantiesoftitle(sixforms)
i) WarrantiesofTitle:PresentCovenants
(a) Atthetimeofclosing/conveyance.
(b) Thesecovenantsarebreachedifatallatthetimeoftheconveyance(theclosing).
Thatiswhenthestatuteoflimitationsstartstorun.
(2) Covenantofseisingrantorpromisesthatheownswhathesconveying
(3) Covenantofrighttoconveygrantorpromisesthathehaspowertoconveyit
(a) Lifeestatewithrestraintonalienability
(4) Covenantagainstencumbrancesgrantorpromisesthattherearenomortgages,leases,
liens,etc.
ii) WarrantiesofTitle:FutureCovenants
(a) Ifthesearebeached,theyareaftertheclosing,whenthedisturbancetothegrantees
possessionoccurs.SOLrunswhenpossessionisdisturbed.
(2) Covenantofwarranty
(i) Grantorpromisestocompensatethegranteeforanymonetarylossesoccasioned
bythegrantorsfailuretoconveythetitlepromisedinthedeed.
(ii) Thebelowmustrunwiththeland.(touchandconcern,horizontal/verticalprivity,
written,notice,intent)
(b) Generalwarrantydeed(majority)
(i) Againstalldefectsintitle.
(c) Specialwarrantydeed
(i) Limitsthecovenanttodefectsintitlecausedbygrantorsownactsbutnotbythe
actsofpriorowners
(d) Quitclaimdeed
(i) Nowarrantyoftitlewhatsoever.Youhavesuperiortitletome.
(3) Covenantofquietenjoyment(basicallysameas1)
(4) Covenantforfurtherassurances(rare)
(a) Requiressellertotakefurtherstepstocuredefectsintitlesuchaspayingoffadverse
possessor.
iii) Remedyforbreach:generallymeasuredbypricepaidforpropertythathasbeenlost.Priceis
generallynearthefairmarketvalueofthepropertyatthetimeoftheclosing.
b) TitleInsurance

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PropertyBlocher107
c) RecordingActs
i) Conflictsbetweengrantees:AconveyslandtoB;thenconveyssamelandtoC
ii) Conflictsbetweengrantorandgrantee:Adoesnotownland,butpurportstoconveylandto
B.Alateracquirestheland.
(1) Estoppelbydeedwillvestlateracquiredinterestingrantee.
iii) Whoisprotectedbyrecordingacts?
(1) Ownerswhorecordpropertyinterestspurchaserwithoutnoticeofanyconflictswho
recordswillbeprotectedagainstconflictingclaimantswhoregisterlater
(2) Purchaserswhocheckrecordsbeforepurchasingasubsequentpurchaserwithoutnotice
ofanyconflictwhorecordswilltypicallyprevailoveranypriorunrecordedinterest
iv) Howtouseagrantorgranteeindex
(1) Allinstrumentslistedalphabeticallyandchronologicallybythegrantors/granteesname
(2) Startinthegranteeindextofindwhothegrantorwasandcontinuebackforrequired
period(varieslocally).Youthenhavealistofgrantorswhoarepredecessorsininterest
ofthecurrentowner.
(3) Switchtograntorindexandgoforwardintimeundernameofeachgrantor,startingon
dategrantoracquiredherinterestandgoingforwarduntilaninstrumentconveyingthat
interesttoasubsequentgranteeisrecorded.
(4) Howcouldthisfail?
(a) Thingsnevergetrecorded
(b) Mightbeduringlimboperiod
(c) Wilddeeds:thingsmightgetrecordedtooearlyortoolate
v) Hypo:YouarethinkingofpurchasingapieceofpropertyownedbyDan,whichwas
previouslyownedbyCharlie,BethandAmy.Howwouldyouproceedtosearchtitleinthe
grantorgranteeindex?
(1) LookupDan2000ingranteeindex(thenCharlie1990 Beth1970 Amy1960)
(2) LookupAmyingrantorindexstartingin1960.Andsoon
d) RaceStatutes(NCandLA)
i) Asbetweensuccessivepurchasers,thepersonwhorecordsfirstprevails(notthepersonto
receivetitle).Doesnotmatterifthepersonwhorecordsfirstknowsofanearlierconveyance
tosomeoneelse.
ii) Clarity.Brightlinerule.Encouragespeopletorecord.
e) NoticeStatutes
i) Asubsequentpurchaserprevailsoveranearlierpurchaserifthesubsequentpurchaserdidnot
havenoticeoftheearlierconveyance.Doesnotmatterwhichpurchaserrecordsfirst.Protects
anypurchaserwithoutnotice.
ii) Typesofnotice:
(1) Actual
(2) Constructive
(3) Inquiry
f) RaceNoticeStatutes
i) Asubsequentpurchaserprevailsoverpriorunrecordedinterestsonlyifshe(1)hasnonotice
ofthepriorconveyanceatthetimesheacquiredherinterestand(2)recordsbeforetheprior
instrumentisrecorded.
ii) Unlikeracestatutes,thesedonotrewardunscrupuloussubsequentpurchasers.
g) Hypothetical:Everygrantofanestateinrealpropertyisconclusiveagainstthegrantor,also
againsteveryonesubsequentlygrantingunderhim,exceptapurchaserwhoingoodfaithandfora
valuableconsiderationacquiresatitleorlienbyaninstrumentthatisfirstdulyrecorded.

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PropertyBlocher108
h) Problem1:
i) OtoA(Adoesnotrecord).
ii) OtoB(BhasnoticeoftheearlierconveyancetoA).
iii) Brecords.Arecords.
iv) BsuesAfortitle.
v) Whatresultinaracejurisdiction?Bwins
vi) Notice?AwinsbecauseBhadnotice
vii) Racenotice?AbecauseBhadnotice
i) Problem2:
i) OtoA(Adoesnotrecord).
ii) OtoB(BhasnoactualnoticeoftheearlierconveyancetoA).
iii) Brecords.Arecords.
iv) BsuesAfortitle.
v) Whatresultinaracejurisdiction?Bwins
vi) Notice?Maybe.Saidactualnotice.Didnotsayconstructiveorinquiry.
vii) Racenotice?B
j) Sabov.Horvath(1976)

i)Synopsis:Ifagrantortransferspriortoobtainingtitle,andthegranteerecordspriortotitle
passing,asecondgranteewouldnotdiscoverthisconveyance,andsothesecondgranteeisan
innocentpurchaserandhisinterestwillprevailinadisputeovertitle.
ii) F:
(1) 196568:Loweryinprocessofacquiring.GroverC.Lowery(Lowery)occupiedlandfor
thepurposeofobtainingapatent.
(2) 1/3/1970:LoweryissuedQuitclaimDeedtoHorvaths(Defendants).
(3) Hecouldvealsogivenhimawarrantydeed.
(4) Atthattime,DsknewthatpatentandtitlewerestillinUSGovtspossession,but,they
didnotrerecordtheirinterestafterthepatenthadpassedtoLowery.
(5) 1/5/1970:Horvathsrecorddeed
(6) 8/10/73:Loweryissuedthepatentafterthedeedwasconveyed.
(7) 10/15/73:Afterpatentwasissued,LoweryexecutedanotherquitclaimdeedtoSabos
(8) 12/1973:Sabos(Ps)recordeddocument
iii) Issue:
(1) CanSabosbeinnocentpurchaserswithinmeaningofstatute?Bytheverynatureof
quitclaimdeed,putsthemonnoticethatsomethingmightbeoutthere.Courtconcludes
thatquitclaimdeedmaystillbeinnocentpurchasers.
(2) WhydontSaboshaveconstructivenotice?BecauseSabosonlyhadtolookbackalittle
earlier,becauseLgetspatentin8/10/73.LtoHquitclaimwasin1970.
(3) Alaska=racenoticestate.
(4) Betweentworecordedinterests,secondpurchaserwhodoesnothavenoticeofprevious
recordation,whichwasoutsidechainoftitlehaveprevailinginterestintheproperty.Ds
receivedvalidinterestfromLbcLhadcompliedwiththestatutetoasufficientextentso
astohaveaninterestintheland,whichwascapableofconveyance.
(5) Estoppelbydeeddoesmatterhere.
(a)IfHandLgotintodisputeafterLgotdeed,thenHwillwin(Lisestoppedfrom
claimingownership),soHoutranksL.BUTdoesntchangeoutcome,becauseSwas
innocentpurchaserandwinsoverHandL.SHL.

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PropertyBlocher109
(b) Estoppelbydeed:Ifagrantorpurportstoconveyapropertyinterestshedoesnotown
toagrantee,andthegrantorsubsequentlyomestoownthepropertyinterestby
receivingthedeed,ownershipisautomaticallyvestedinthegrantee.
(6) Agranteewhoreceivesaquitclaimdeedcanbeprotectedbytherecordingsystem,
assumingthegranteepurchasedforvaluableconsiderationanddidnototherwisehave
actualorconstructiveknowledgeasdefinedbytherecordinglaw.Thisgranteecanbe
consideredaninnocentpurchaser.
(7) PclaimDrecordingiswilddeedbecauseitwasoutsidechainoftitle
(8) Purchaserhasnoticeonlyofrecordedinstrumentsthatarewithinhischainoftitle.Ifa
grantortransferspriortoobtainingtitle,andgranteerecordspriortotitlepassing,a
secondgranteewhoexaminesallconveyancesunderthegrantorsnamefromthedate
thatthegrantorsecuredtitlewouldnotdiscoverthepriorconveyance.
(9) Awilddeeddoesgiveconstructivenoticetoasubsequentpurchaserwhodulyrecords.
(a)Thisisawilddeed,becauseitwasrecordedtooearly.
(10)PcannotbechargedwithdiscoveryoftheprepatenttransfertoDwhen
searchingthechainoftitle.
(11)Requiringatitlecheckbeyondthechainoftitlewouldaddalargeburdentoreal
estatepurchases.Theoretically,therecordsforeachgrantorwouldhavetobechecked
backtothelaterofthegrantorsdateofbirthorthedatewhenrecordswerefirstretained.
Thiswoulddefeatthepurposeofarecordingsystem.
Rerecordinganinterestoncetitlepassesislessofaburdenthanrequiringproperty
purchaserstocheckindefinitelybeyondthechainoftitle.
(12)Inordertopromotesimplicityandcertaintyintitletransactions,adeedrecorded
outsidethechainoftitledoesnotgiveconstructivenoticetosubsequentgranteesandthus
isnotdulyrecorded.Firstdulyrecordedinterestwithoutactualorconstructive
knowledgeofthedeedwillprevail.
iv)Discussion.Underthisrule,apartysearchingtitledoesnothavetochecktherecordsundera
grantorsnameuntilthegrantoractuallyreceivestitletotheproperty.Thetitlesearcheris
relievedofalargeburdenbecauseitiseasierforapartytorerecordaninterestthanto
conductanindefinitesearch.leastcostavoider
v) Hsoptions:SueL,buyoffS.
k) Hypothetical:OtoA,AtoB,Brecords,OtoZ.BsuesZ.
i) Zwins,becausehelllookforOsownershipingrantorindex.Andnothingsbeenrecorded.
ii) Ifracejurisdiction:thenBwouldwin.
l) ShelterDoctrine:Granteewhohasreceivedaninterestinpropertyfromabonafidepurchaser
willalsobeprotectedasabonafidepurchaser,evenifthegranteewouldnotlegallyqualifyfor
thisstatus.Thegranteeis"sheltered"fromotherclaimsbythegrantor'sstatusasanactualbona
fidepurchaser.
i) Willrestrictthepurchaserwhohadnoidea.Alienabilityofproperty.

26.TheFairHousingLaw,p.92544,95560,97880
1. Twosetsofcases:
a. Discrim
inatorytreatment(discriminatoryintent,focusisonnatureofDsconduct)
b. Disp
arateimpact(discriminatoryeffectsofDsconduct,focusisoneffectsofDsconduct).
c. NB:employersaregenerallyvicariouslyliableforactsofemployees;butofficersare
generallynotpersonallyliableunlesstheyactedtodirectorapprovediscriminatorypractices.

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PropertyBlocher110
2. Standing:2categoriesofpeoplehavestandingunderstatute
a. Thosedirectlyinjuredbydiscriminatoryacts
b. Thosewhohavesufficientincentivetolitigatethecase
i. Includestestersandfairhousingorganizations.
3. ThreepartburdenofproofofanalysisforprimafaciecaseunderFHA:[Ashbury]
a. Plaintiffmustcomeforwardwithaprimafaciecaseofdiscrimination,whichrequires:
i. Sheisamemberofaracialminority
ii. Sheappliedforandwasqualifiedtorenttheapartment
iii. Shewasdeniedtheopportunitytorentortoinspectornegotiatefortherentalofthe
apartment
iv. Thehousingopportunityremainedavailable
b. Ifplaintiffprovesprimafaciecase,theburdenshiftstodefendantstoproduceevidencethat
therefusaltorentornegotiateforarentalwasmotivatedbylegitimate,nonracial
considerations
c. Oncethedefendantprovesnondiscriminatoryreasons,theburdenshiftsbacktotheplaintiff
toshowthereasonswerepretextual
i. Showingthroughevidenceofatesterorotherwisethatdefendantdidnotfollowthe
policiesitpresentedasjustificationsforfailuretorentorsell
ii. Showingthatthereasonsgivenatthetimeofthediscriminationweredifferentfrom
thereasonsgivenattrial
iii. Negatingthefacts(i.e.,byshowingthatapartmentswereinfactavailablewhen
defendantsaidtheywerenot)
4. FHAmaybeusedtopreventtheuseofrigidracialquotasofindefinitedurationthatmaintaina
fixedlevelofintegrationinpublichousing.[StarrettCity]
a. Threefactorscourtslooktoinevaluatingraceconsciousplans:
i. Projectedduration
ii. Historyofaproblemwiththeparticularentity
iii. Whetheritisanaccessquotavs.ceilingquota
1. WhilequotaspromoteTitleVIIIsintegrationpolicy,theycontraveneits
antidiscriminationpolicy,bringingthedualgoalsoftheActintoconflict
b. Purposeofplansareusuallydesignedtopreventwhiteflight/tipping
i. Ifthelandlordgoesbeyondacertainpercentage/tippingpointofminorities,the
whitefamilieswillleave,whichfrustratesintegration.
ii. DissentbelievesthattheFHAwasnotdesignedtoapplytosuchactions;thepurpose
oftheFHAistomaintainandfurtherintegration,notlimitit.
5. Circumstantialevidenceissufficienttoestablishdiscrimination.[LaBrie]
a. Thepointoftheburdenshiftingregimeisusedbecausethereisusuallynodirectevidenceof
discrimination.
6. BecausetheFHAisaremedialstatute,itisinterpretedbroadlyandexceptionsareinterpreted
narrowly.[LaBrie]
7. Advertising
a. Itisokayforalandlordtoengageinaffirmativeadvertisingeffortstoattractwhitetenantsin
ahistoricallyblackareatopromoteintegration.
8. Reasonableaccommodationsofpersonswithdisabilities
a. Cannotrefusereasonablemodificationsatclaimantsexpenseiftheyarenecessarytoafford
fullenjoymentofpremises
b. Cannotrefusetomakereasonableaccommodationsinrules,policies,etc.ifnecessaryto
affordequalopportunitytouseandenjoypremises

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PropertyBlocher111
9. Discriminationneednotbetheonlyreasonfortherefusalofrenting.
a. Racebeingtheonlyfactorforrefusalwouldsetanextremelyhighbarforproof
b. Thereslikelytobeotherfactorsinthedeterminationtorefuserenting
c. However,theremightbeacorrelationbetweentheimpermissiblefactorandapermissible
reason,whichleadstooverenforcementoftheFHA
10. Punitivedamagesawardedagainstdefendantswhenhisconductisshowntobemotivatedbyevil
motiveorintent,orwhenitinvolvesrecklessorcallousindifferencetothefederallyprotectedrights
ofothers
11. Policy
12. For
a. Freetransferofproperty,promotesalienabilityensureseveryonecanparticipateinan
activemarket
b. Furthersnormsofparticipationandautonomybyallowingindividualstointegrate
c. Increasesutilitybyensuringpeopleuselandthatsavailable
d. Dislikepropertybeingconcentratedinthehandsoffewpeople
e. Combatsdeadhandcontroldislikeoldsocialassumptionsandprejudicescontinuing
becauseoflandownership
13. Against
14. 13.1.1FairhousingAct
i. FHAonlyappliestodwellings;notcommercialproperties
1. 1982appliestoallproperties,butonlyforracialdiscrimination
ii. FHApreventslandlordstodiscriminateonthebasisof:race,color,religion,sex,
handicapordisability,maritalorfamiliarstatus,ornationaloriginal,numberof
children
b. 3601Declarationofpolicy:ItisthepolicyoftheUnitedStatestoprovide,within
constitutionallimitations,forfairhousingthroughouttheUnitedStates.
c. 3602Definitions
i. Dwelling=anybuildingorportionofbuilding;anyvacantlandofferedforsalefor
theconstructionofanybuilding.
ii. Family=includes1person
iii. Handicapdoesnotincludecurrent,illegaluseoforaddictiontoacontrolled
substance.
d. 3603(b)Exemptions
i. Onlysubsectioncof3604appliestosinglefamilyhomessoldorrentedbyowner,
aslongasownerdoesnthavemorethan3singlefamilyhomesatthesametime.
ii. Sale/rentalwillbeexemptedfromthesubchapteronlyifitissold/rented(A)without
useofanyprofessionalrealestateagents,and(B)withoutthepublicationof
anythinginviolationof3604(c).
iii. Alsodoesntapplyifownerisoneofmaximum4unitsinadwelling,intendedfor4
independentfamilies.
e. 3604Discriminationinsaleorrentalofhousingandotherprohibitedpractices.
i. A)Cantrefusetosell/rentbasedonrace,color,religion,sex,familialstatus,or
nationalorigin.
ii. B)Cantdiscriminateinterms/conditions/privilegesofsale/orrentalforthesame
reasons.
iii. C)Cantmakeadvertisementsthatdiscriminateorstatepreferences.
iv. F)Nodiscriminatingagainsthandicappedpeople
1. AfterSept.131988,alldwellingshavetobedesignedsothatpeoplewith

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PropertyBlocher112
wheelchairs/handicapscanusethem.
3613Enforcementbyprivatepersons
i. A)createsrightofactionnolaterthan2yearsafteroccurrenceorterminationof
discriminatorypractice.
ii. B)courtcanappointanattorneyorallowcommencement/continuationofcivilaction
withoutpaymentifthecourtfindsthatthepersoncantaffordit.
iii. C)Courtmayawardactualandpunitivedamages,maygrantreliefintheformof
permanent/temporaryinjunctions,temporaryrestrainingorders,orothers(ex:
enjoiningDfromengaginginsuchpractices,ororderingsuchaffirmativeactionas
maybeappropriate).
iv. AlsocanawardattorneysfeesandcoststoP(reasonable)aslongasPisnttheUS.
g. 3617Interference,coercionorintimidation;enforcementbycivilaction
i. Cantintimidatepeopleiftheyexercisetheirrights/helpothersexercisetheirrights
undertheprevioussections.
h. 3631Violations;penalties
i. Ifyouinjure/intimidate/interferewithanyoneyouwillbefinedunderTitle18or
imprisonedfornomorethanayearorboth.
ii. Ifactsincludeuse,attempteduse,orthreateneduseofadangerousweapon,
explosives,orfirethenyougetfinedunderTitle18orimprisonednotmorethan10
yearsorboth.
iii. Ifactsresultindeathorifactsinclude(attempted)kidnapping,(attempted)
aggravatedsexualabuseoranattempttokill,yougetfinedunderTitle18,or
imprisonedforhoweverlongorforlife,orboth.
15. FairHousingAmendmentsActof1988(FHAA)significantlyexpandedFHA
a. Prohibiteddiscriminationagainstfamiliesw/kids(familialstatus)andagainstpeoplew/
disabilities(handicap)
b. ExtendedSoLfrom6monthsto2yearsandbyeliminating$1000limitonPD
c. GrantedHousingandUrbanDevelopmentpowertoenforcestatute.
d. Aggrievedpeoplecanfilelawsuitinfedctforinjunctiverelief,compandPD.
e. Theycouldalsofilecomplaintw/HUDpowertoinvestigateanadjudicatedispute.
f. IfHUDfindsevidenceofviolation,itmustissueachargeonbehalfoftheperson,explaining
thefactswhichgivetheSecretaryreasonablecausetobelievediscriminatorypracticemaybe
inplace.
16. Discriminationbyhousingproviders
a. Burdenshiftingregimefordiscriminatoryclaims
f.

17.Asburyv.Brougham(10thCir.1989)
a. Synopsis:FairHousingActprohibitsdiscriminationbasedonrace.Pmustpresentaprima
faciecaseofdiscrimination.Then,Dmustproduceevidencethattherefusaltorentor
negotiateforarentalwasmotivatedbynonracialconsiderations.Third,ifDcangivenon
discriminatoryreasons,Pmustshowtheprofferedreasonswerepretextual.
b. Facts:RosalynAsbury(P)blackwomanwenttoaptcomplexandtriedtorentanapartment.
ManagerofBroughhamEstates(D)toldhertherewerenovacanciesandthatshedidnot
keepawaitinglist.Dwouldnotletherfilloutapplicationorviewmodelunits,butsuggested
shelookatacomplexthathousedmostlyblackfamilies.Psincomewassufficienttopayrent
onDsapartment.Whenwhitecustomersinquiredaboutunits,theyweretoldunitswere
available.DrentedunitstowhitesafterPwastoldnothingwasavailable

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PropertyBlocher113
c. PH:PbroughtsuitundertheAct,whichprohibitsdiscriminationonthebasisofrace.Jury
foundinfavorofP,discriminationonraceand/orsex(compensatoryandpunitivedamages)
d. Opinion:Held.Yes.Actprohibitsdiscriminationbasedonrace.Pmustprovea
discriminatoryintent.
i. Aviolationoccurswhenraceisafactorinadecisiontodenyaminorityapplicant
theopportunitytorentornegotiateforarental,butraceneednotbetheonlyfactor
inthedecision.
ii. Actprohibitsgivingfalseinformationaboutavailabilityofhousingbasedonrace
iii. Threepartburdenofproof:
1. Pmustpresentaprimafaciecaseofdiscrimination.
2. Dmustproduceevidencethatrefusaltorentornegotiateforarentalwas
motivatedbynonracialconsiderations.
3. IfDscangivenondiscriminatoryreasons,Pmustshowprofferedreasons
werepretextual
iv. Topresentaprimafaciecase:Phastoprove:
1. (1)sheisamemberofaracialminority;
2. (2)sheappliedforandwasqualifiedtorentanapartmentortownhousein
thecomplex;
3. (3)shewasdeniedtheopportunitytorentorinspectornegotiateforthe
rentalofatownhouseorapartment;and
4. (4)thehousingopportunityremainedavailable.
v. Here,primafaciecasewaspresented.Pisblack,shewenttorentanapartmentthat
shecouldafford,butwasnotevenallowedtoviewone.Shewastoldthatno
vacanciesexistedandwasdeniedtherighttofilloutanapplication.Dthenrentedto
whiteapplicants.
vi. Dsaidthattheydontrentapartmentstopeoplewithchildren,butnoapartments
available.Onlytownhouses.Dhashighpercentageofminorityoccupancyinthe
apartmentsoclaimofintentionaldiscrimination.
1. Pshowedthatownersofthepropertyhadletfamilieswithonechildrent
apartments,sothatanswerisquestionable.
2. Psaidthattownhouseswerenotavailable,buttheyactuallywere.
3. Statisticalevidenceisnotdispositiveofaclaimofintentionaldiscrimination
4. Dhadapolicyofvisuallyinspectingprospectivetenants,andunderthese
circumstances,itcanbeinferredthatthepolicyoperatedtoscreen
prospectivetenantsonthebasisofrace.
5. Dneversaysorryforhisemployee.Didnotseparatehimself.
6. Dhashadmultiplecomplaintsagainsthim(unclearifjustWanda)sohehad
notice,andhedidnttakeanyaffirmativestepstofixproblem.
vii. 1988Amendmentsincludedfamilialstatus,sothiscasein1989mightveoccurred
beforeAct.
viii. Damages:
e. Discussion:FHAisanattempttopreventracialdiscriminationinhousing.Shiftingburdens
ofproofgivebothpartiesachancetoexplainreasoningandmotivesfortheiractions.
18.UnitedStatesv.StarrettCityAssociates(2dCir.1988)
a. Synopsis:FHAmayoperatetopreventrigidracialreservationsystemsfrombeing
maintainedindefinitelytoperpetuateafixedlevelofintegrationinpublichousing,ifsuch
systemsfailtoprovideadequateaccesstopublichousingfortheminority.
b. Facts:
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PropertyBlocher114
i. StarrettCity(D)ownedandoperatedlargestpublichousingcomplexintheU.S.
ii. Hadauniquetenantrentalsystemwhichprovidedforapermanentmixof64%white
tenants,22%blackand8%Hispanic.
iii. Preventmassexodusofwhitetenantsandachieveracialintegration.
iv. Eachdepartingtenantbeingreplacedbyanewoneofsimilarraceornationalorigin.
v. Undisputedthatthispracticepreventedminoritycommunitiesfromhavingincreased
accesstothecomplex.(80%ofpeopleonwaitinglist)
c. Discussion:
i. Quotasetbyracialanimus(worriedabouttipping,sofearsdrivenbywrongparties)
ii. Quotasettoracialpercentageasawhole,sonotdiscriminatory
iii. FHAmaingoals:(1)promoteintegrationor(2)preventdiscriminationbuttheFHA
doesnttelluswhichshouldbethedominantpolicy
iv. CourtsandLegislaturehassaidthatonlyneedtoshowimpact.Nointentrequired.
v. Thisisacapandnotafloor.Floormightbedifferent.
vi. Pointofthestatuteismore.Intent.Cannotjuststopwithlanguageofthestatute.
d. PH:
i. GroupofblackapplicantsbroughtactionagainstStarrettallegingtenantingStarrett
proceduresviolatedfederlandstatelawbydiscriminatingbyrace
1. Theysettled,sayingtheydmakeanadditional35unitsavailableeachyear
fornextfiveyearsforblackandminorityapplicats.
ii. Government(P)subsequentlysuedStarrettongroundofminoritydiscriminationon
thebasisofrace,inviolationoftheFairHousingAct.
iii. Bothpartiesmovedforsummaryjudgmentintheirfavor.
iv. CourtgrantedsummaryjudgmenttotheGovernment,permanentlyenjoiningStarrett
toabandonitsselectionprocesswhichpreventedadequateminorityaccesstothe
complexonaccountoftheirrace.Starrettappealed.
e. Issue.DoestheFairHousingActoperatetopreventrigidracialreservationsystemsfrom
beingmaintainedindefinitelytoperpetuateafixedlevelofintegrationinpublichousing,if
suchsystemsfailtoprovideadequateaccesstopublichousingfortheminority?
f. Held.(Miner,J.)
i. TheFairHousingActmayoperatetopreventrigidracialreservationsystemsfrom
beingmaintainedindefinitelytoperpetuateafixedlevelofintegrationinpublic
housing,ifsuchsystemsfailtoprovideadequateaccesstopublichousingforthe
minority.
ii. AhousingpracticemayfallfouloftheFHAnotonlyforbeingracially
discriminatorybutforaffectingminoritiesoutofproportiontothemajority
community.
iii. Quotasystems,asarule,workagainstthedualaimsoftheFHA,integrationandanti
discrimination.
iv. Anysystemwhichmakesclassificationspurelyonthebasisofraceispresumedtobe
discriminatory.
v. However,anaffirmativeactionwhichtakesaccountofraceneednotbeinconflict
withconstitutionalorstatutorylaw.
vi. However,suchactionsshouldbeintendedtobeforonlyashorttimeandtoendon
attainingaspecificgoal.Suchactionsusuallyresultinincreasingorensuring
minorityparticipationandareupheld.Ontheotherhand,planstomaintainafixed
levelofintegrationusuallyrestrictminorityparticipationandarenotusuallyvalid.

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PropertyBlocher115
vii. Alastpointisthatquotasaremeanttoredresspastminoritydiscriminationor
imbalance.
viii. Inthiscase,Starrettsonlyrationaleforitsquotasystemismaintainingafixedlevel
ofintegration.Ithasbeenmaintainedformorethanfifteenyears.Ithasnoredressal
goalsinview.
ix. Itpreventsanyincreaseintheminorityparticipationinthecomplex.Fearofthe
whitesleavingenmassecannotjustifyrestrictionofminorityaccess.Inthiscasethe
useofaracialquotaisnotinappropriate.Theverdictisaffirmed.
g. Dissent.(Newman,J.)TheFHAwasmeanttopreventsegregationfrombeingapermanent
phenomenon,andnottoprohibitfixedracialquotasmeanttoachieveandmaintainracial
integrationasStarrettwastryingtodo
h. Discussion.AhousingpracticeneednotberaciallydiscriminatorytoviolatetheFHA.Itcan
alsoviolatethislawbyhavingsomeeffectontheminoritieswhichisoutofproportionto
theirnumber.Allracialclassificationsarenotdiscriminatory,eveniftheyadverselyaffect
minorities,unlesstheirmotiveissuchastodepresstheminorityraces.Forinstance,a
justifiableincreaseintherentalmaycauseadropinthepercentageofminoritytenants,but
maynotberaciallymotivatedandsomaynotviolatetheFHA.
19. Racialsteering
a. ManycasesbroughtunderFHAconcernclaimsagainstrealtorswhohavedoneracial
steeringshowingblackshousingincertainareasandwhiteshousinginothers.
i. Violateactbyotherwisemakingunavailablehousingbecauseofrace,andviolating
expressprohibitionagainstdiscrimination
ii. Provingthatarealtorhasengagedinracialsteeringofteninvolvesuseoftesters.f.
Advertising
b. AdsthatlimithousingtowhitesclearlyviolateFHA
i. Raginv.NYTimesConewspaperspracticeofpublishingrealestateadswith
almostalwayswhitemodelsinacityw/significantminoritypopulationmight
violateFHAbyshowingdiscriminatorypreferenceultimateissueforfactfinder
waswhetheranaturalinterpretationbyanordinaryreaderisaracialpreference.
ii. NB:CommunicationsDecencyActof1996:immunizeswebsitesandservice
providersfromliabilityfordiscriminatoryroommateadvertisementspostedonits
website(wouldhavefacedthisliabilityifitwerearegularnewspaper).
20.HumanRightsCommissionv.LaBrie,Inc.
a. BriefFactSummary.Acouplelivedinamobilehomeparkwiththeirbaby.Eviction
proceedingswerecommencedagainstthem.
b. SynopsisofRuleofLaw.Thestatefairhousingactprohibitsdiscriminationinrentingifa
personintendstooccupyadwellingwithminorchildren.
c. Facts:
i. VermontFairHousingandPublicAccommodationsAct(Act)prohibits
discriminationagainstpersonswithminorchildren.LindaandErnestLaBrie
(Defendants)ownedmobilehomepark,whichhadatwopersonoccupancylimit(the
rulewasamendedtothisversionafterpreviousnokidrule,afterFHAmadeitillegal
todiscriminateaccordingtofamilystatus).ScottandLuanneMcCarthypurchaseda
mobilehomeandwerechildlessatthetime.Aftertheyhadababy,theyreceivedan
evictionnoticefromDefendants.McCarthysfiledacomplaintwiththeHuman
RightsCommission(Plaintiff),whocommencedthisaction.Defendantsclaimthe

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PropertyBlocher116
restrictionisneededbecauseofalimitedwaterandsepticcapacityatthepark.
Plaintiffslost
d. Issue.Isarestrictionagainstlivinginamobilehomeparkwithchildrendiscriminatory
e. Held.Yes.TheActprohibitsdiscriminationinrentingifapersonintendstooccupya
dwellingwithminorchildren.
i. TheFHPAisaremedialstatute,soshouldbereadbroadly
ii. AviolationoftheActwillexistifdisparatetreatmentisfound(whenDefendants
intentionallydiscriminateagainstmembersofastatutorilyprotectedcategory
becauseoftheirmembershipinthatgroup)
iii. Evidenceofdirectdiscriminationissufficienttoestablishtheintenttocontinue
discriminationthroughaneutralpolicy.
iv. Here,theleasestatedthattherewasatwopersonmaximumineachmobilehome.
Thisappearsfaciallyneutral,butnominorchildrenhavemovedintotheparksince
Defendantspurchasedit.Thisissufficienttoprovethatthelimitwassetforthe
purposeofeliminatingorlimitingpersonswithminorchildrenfromthepark.
v. BasedonDefendantsactionagainsttheMcCarthysandtheirpatternandpracticeof
excludingminorchildrenfromthePark,therewasanintenttodiscriminateagainst
personsintendingtooccupyadwellingwithoneormoreminorchildren.
vi. ThesepticandwatercapacityconsiderationsbroughtupbyDefendantsisapretext
fordiscriminatingagainstpersonswithminorchildren.Lessrestrictivemeansare
availabletoDefendants.Noevidencewaspresentedthatanincreaseinthenumberof
occupantsperlivingunitwouldadverselyaffectthesepticorwatersystems.
f. Discussion.Whiletheremaybevalidreasonsforalandlordtoexcludesomechildren,a
policythatprohibitsanychildrenwillbefounddiscriminatory.

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PropertyBlocher117

VI.PROPERTY,PUBLICORDERING,ANDTHECONSTITUTION
27.Zoning,p.102755
1. Zoning
a. Usezoningdividesanareaintodistrictsandsayswhatcanbedonewithineachone.
b. Areazoningregulatesthesizeoflots,heightofbuildings,andsoon.Itmaydifferfrom
districttodistrict.
2. MechanicsofZoning:Process
a. Zoningenablingactsdelegatestatepowertomunicipalities.
b. Zoningordinancesarelocalzoninglaws.
c. Municipalitiesmustcreateacomprehensiveplan
i. Thecomprehensiveplandescribesthevariousdivisions(residential,agricultural,
industrial,etc.)andthepoliciesunderlyingtheplan.
d. Generally:
i. Thestatemayenactstatutestoreasonablycontroltheuseoflandfortheprotection
ofthehealth,safety,moralsandwelfareofitscitizens.
ii. Zoningisthedivisionofajurisdictionintodistrictsinwhichcertainusesand
developmentsarepermittedorprohibited
iii. PowerisbasedonstatespolicepowerandislimitedbyDueProcessClauseof14
AmendmentandFifthAmendment:notakingwithoutjustcompensationclause
3. HistoryofZoning
a. Responsetoproblemscreatedbyrapidurbanization
b. LANDMARKCASE:VillageofEuclidv.AmblerRealty,1926
c. EffectsofEuclid
i. Gaverisetospreadofsimilarordinancesacrossthenation. Euclidordinancewas
cumulative:eachsuccessivedistrictpermittedalltheusesallowedintheprevious
districtplussome. Notthecaseanymore(wouldhavehousesinindustrialareas
whichisbad)
ii. Evolution:nowservesanumberofpurposes
iii. Preservingneighborhoodcharacter,protectivepropertyvalues,preventing
environmentaldegradation,encouragingeconomicdevelopment
4. MechanicsofZoning:ZoningVariants
a. Plannedunitdevelopmentapublicprivatepartnershipinwhichthezoningboardset
generaltermsofdensityrequirementsandthenworkdirectlywithadevelopertoestablisha
morespecificplan.
b. Conditional(or
contract

)zoningvs.Euclidean

zoning
c. Euclidean:traditionalzoningseparatingdistrictsandsettingstandardsforeach.
d. Conditional:thezoningboardagreestoaproposedrezoningontheconditionthatthe
developerdosomethingelse,suchasuselimitations,heightrestrictions,giftstothepublicof
abuttingland,etc.
e. Unilateralarrangementsarecommitmentsbytheownertodocertainthingsinexchangefor
rezoning.Butthereisnopromiseofrezoning;itsjustanincentive.
f. Bilateralarrangementsinvolveagreementsonbothsides.Theseareworse,atleastinsome
courtseyes,becausetheycircumventthenormalpublicprocessandbindthezoningboards.

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PropertyBlocher118
g. Spotzoning?
5.
VillageofEuclid,Ohiov.AmblerRealtyCo.,272U.S.365(1926)
a. Facts:AmblerRealtyowned68acres(0.28km2)oflandinthevillageofEuclid,asuburbof
Cleveland.Village,inanattempttopreventindustrialClevelandfromgrowingintoand
subsumingEuclidandpreventthegrowthofindustrywhichmightchangethecharacterofthe
village,developedazoningordinancebasedupon6classesofuse,3classesofheightand4
classesofarea.AmblerRealtyspropertydividedintothreeuseclasses,aswellasvarious
heightandareaclasses,therebyhinderingdevelopinglandforindustry.AmblerRealtysued,
arguingzoningordinancehadsubstantiallyreducedthevalueofthelandbylimitingitsuse,
amountingtoadeprivationofAmbler'slibertyandpropertywithout14Adueprocess
b. Held:
i. Zoningmeasureswouldbestruckdownasunconstitutionalonlyifitwasclearly
arbitraryandunreasonable,havingnosubstantialrelation tothepublichealth,
safety,morals,orgeneralwelfare.
ii. Usezoning scheme,insofarasitreducedtraffic/noiseinresidentialareasand
facilitatedfirepreventionmetthestandard.
iii. Courtdidnotevaluateeachminorprovision,insteadlookedattheoverall
reasonablenessoftheschemewasclear
iv. Courtheldzoningordinancewasnotanunreasonableextensionofpolicepowerand
didnothavethecharacterofarbitraryfiat,andthusnotunconstitutional.
v. Speculationwasnotavalidbasisforaclaimoftakings.
1. AmblerRealtyhadofferednoevidencethatordinancehadinfacthadany
effectonvalueofproperty,butbasedassertionsonspeculationonly.
vi. Challengerinadueprocesscasewouldhavetoshowthatthelawinquestionis
discriminatoryandhasnorationalbasis.
1. Euclid'szoningordinanceinfactdidhavearationalbasis.

6. Priornonconformingusesareusesthatarelegalwhenordinancegoesintoeffect,andwouldnotbe
permittedunderthenewrules.
7.
Durandv.IDCBellingham,LLC
a. BriefFactSummary.IDCwantedtobuildapowerplantinatown,inanareazonedforother
purposes.ThenIDCofferedagiftof$8millioniftheywouldrezonetheareaforindustrial
purposes.
b. SynopsisofRuleofLaw.Zoningbylawswillonlybeoverturnediftheyarearbitraryor
unreasonableorsubstantiallyunrelatedtothepublichealthsafetyandgeneralwelfareofthe
citizens.
c. Facts.TheTownwantedtoincreaseitspropertytaxbase.Aneconomicdevelopmenttask
forcewasappointedbythetownsboardofselectmantostudytheissue.Theyissuedareport
statedthetownneededtoindustrializesomeofthetown.Theypickedanareaoftownzoned
foragriculturalusethatwasnexttoanareazonedforindustrialuseastheplacetheyshould
change.Thefirstvotefellshort.IDCownedapowerplantinthetownandwantedtobuilda
secondplant.TothatendIDCoffered$8milliondollarstothetowniftheyrezonedthatarea.
The$8millionwastobeagifttothetowntouseforanymunicipalpurposeitseemedfit.
Therewasanewvoteandbyamajorityvotetheareawasrezoneforindustrialpurposes.A

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groupfromthetownbroughtsuitstatingthiswasacontractzoningsothevotetorezone
shouldbeconsideredinvalid.
d. Issue.Whetheratownmeetingvotetorezoneanareaofthetownisinvalidiftheprospective
owner(IDC)offeredthetown$8milliondollarsifrezoningwasapprovedandapowerplant
wasbuiltonthesite.
e. Held.Azoningbylawwillnotbeheldinvalidunlessthereisademonstrationby
preponderanceoftheevidencethatthezoningregulationisarbitraryorunreasonable.Zoning
bylawsenactedbytownmeetingsisanexerciseofindependentpolicepowerandalegislative
actwhichcarriesastrongpresumptionofvalidity.Themotivesforgrantingazoningbylaw
doesnotaffecttheanalysisofwhetherazoningbylawisvalidornot.Thereasonforthe
presumptionisthatmunicipalzoningproceduresarehighlygovernedbystatutesandthe
exerciseofpolicepowerisveryimportanttoallmunicipalities.Whensomeoneoffersmoney
inexchangeforthepromisetovoteforrezoningitsconsideredcontractzoningwhichis
invalid.Herenopromisewasmadecontingentuponthemoneywheretheboardpromisedto
voteonewayortheother.Alsothejudgedeterminedthattherezoningwasnotarbitraryor
unreasonable.Azoningbylawwillnotbeheldinvalidforoftheextraneousconsiderationof
giftoffers,onlyiftherewasapromisemadebasedonthatgiftortherewasaconstitutional
violation.
f. Discussion.Ingeneralzoningbylawsareconsideredlegislativeacts.Suchactswillnotbe
heldinvalidforitsmotives.Unlessaclearstandardorruleisviolatedazoningbylawwillbe
upheld.
Variancespermitstheownertodeveloplandinawaythatotherwiseviolatestheordinance.
1. Typesofvariances
a. Usevariances:permitusesotherwiseprohibitedinthedistrict.
b. Dimensionalvariances:permitdeviationsfromareas,bulk,setback,streetfrontage,floor
space,andothernonuserequirements.
2. Waystogetavariance(unduehardship)
a. Noeconomicallyviableuse
b. Practicaldifficulties
c. Unusualcircumstances
3. Specialexceptionspermitstheownertodevelopinwaysthatareonlyconditionallyauthorizedby
thezoningordinance.Togetaspecialexception,theownermustshow:
a. 1)ordinancelistsuseasaspecialexception,
b. 2)usewillmeetallstandardsandconditionssetoutintheordinance
c. 3)thespecialexceptionwillnotdetractfromtheareashealth,safety,andpublicconvenience
beyondthatinherentinthenormalconductoftheactivityitself.
4. Moststatessaythatownershavevestedrightstoexistingzoningregulationsiftheyhaveinvested
substantiallyinrelianceonthoseregulations.
a. Substantialinvestment(majorityrule):mayrequireacquisitionofabuildingpermitaswellas
substantialexpenditures.
b. Sitespecificapproval:Maybeunnecessaryeventogetabuildingpermit.Apreliminary
subdivisionplanmightbeenough
TownofBellevillev.Parrillos
1. Synopsis:Anexistingnonconformingusecanonlycontinueofifitisacontinuanceof
substantiallythesamekindofuseasthatwhichthepremisesweredevotedatthetimeofthe

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2.

3.

4.

5.

passageofthezoningordinance.Nonconformingusesmaynotbeenlargedexceptwherethe
changeissonegligibleorinsubstantialthatitdoesnotwarrantjudicialoradministrative
interference.
Facts:Parillos(Defendant)operatedarestaurantandcateringservice.TheTownofBelleville
(Plaintiff)passedanordinance,whichdidnotallowrestaurants,butsinceDefendantexisted
beforetheordinancewaspassed,theywereallowedtoremaininoperation.Defendantmade
renovationsandturnedtheirpropertyintoanightclub.Theyappliedforalicense,wererejected,
andstilloperatedtheclub.Plaintifffiledcharges.
Issue:Maythenonconforminguseofpropertycontinueifitisnotsubstantiallythesamekindof
useasthattowhichthepremisesweredevotedatthetimeofthepassageoftherelevantzoning
ordinance?
Held:No.Anonconforminguseistheuseofapremisethatlawfullyexistedpriortothe
enactmentofazoningordinanceandwhichismaintainedaftertheeffectivedateoftheordinance,
eventhoughitdoesnotcomplywiththeuserestrictionsapplicabletotheareainwhichitis
situated.
a. Thepropertyhastherighttocontinue,despitetherestrictivezoningprovisions.
b. Tolimitnonconforminguses,themethodusediseithertopreventanyincreaseorchange
inthenonconformity.
c. Anexistingnonconformingusecanonlycontinueofifitisacontinuanceofsubstantially
thesamekindofuseasthatwhichthepremisesweredevotedatthetimeofthepassage
ofthezoningordinance.
d. Nonconformingusesmaynotbechangedexceptwhenthechangeissonegligibleor
insubstantialthatitdoesnotwarrantjudicialoradministrativeinterference.
e. Convertingtherestauranttoanightclubwasasubstantial,andthereforeimpermissible,
change.Theentirecharacterofthebusinesshasbeenaltered.
Discussion.Nonconformingusesofpropertyareinconsistentwiththeobjectiveofuniform
zoning.So,strictlimitationsareplaceduponnonconforminguses.

Cochranv.FairfaxCountyBoardofZoningAppeals
1. Synopsis:Avarianceshouldonlybegrantedifthecurrentzoningordinanceinterfereswithall
reasonablebeneficialusesofthepropertytakenasawhole
2. Facts.
a. Fairfax:AmannamedMichaelR.Brattiappliedforfourvariancesfromlocalzoning.He
wantedtodemolishhishouseandcreateabiggerhousewithasidegarage.Therewasa
zoningordinancerequiringallpropertiestobeback15feet.Heconcededthattheproject
couldbedonewithoutviolatingzoningbutitwouldnotbetheidealhousehewantedand
cutdownonsquarefeetoflivingspace.TheBoardofZoningAppeals(BZA)grantedall
fourvariancesstatinghisrequestweremodestonesandhislandhadunusual
topographicalconsiderations.
i. DefendingBratti:Yourpropertyispersonalandunique.Youhavearightto
changeforaestheticreason.Castle.Moreefficient.Lotwillsuffer.
ii. AgainstBratti:Alluseofthepropertymustbedisturbed.
iii. Helosesintheend
iv. Unduehardshiptestisahighhighburden
b. Pulaski:Mr.andMrs.NunleyownedacornerlotintheTownofPulaski.Therewasa
zoningordinanceforcornerlotsthatrequiredpropertytobeback15feetfromtheroad.
TheNunleysrequestedanordinancetohavenosetbacksothattheycouldcreatea
garageonthesideoftherehouse.Thehousehadpublicstreetsonthreesidesofthe

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house.Theonlywaytheycouldconstructthegarageclosertothehousewouldbeto
constructarampduetocurvingpropertylineanddifficulttopographyoftheland.Also
thereisastoneretainingwallbehindthehousethatwouldbeweakenedordestroyedif
thegaragewasbuiltcloser.Neighborsobjectedbecauseitwouldbeablindareaand
createaneyesore.TheBZAgrantedamodifiedvariancethatrequiredthemtonot
alteringordestroytheaestheticlooksofexistingvegetation.
i. Boardhasalreadycompromised,concession,cantbethatbad
c. VirginiaBeach:Mr.andMrs.Penningtonownedaparceloflandinasubdivisionknow
asAvalonTerraceintheCityofVirginiaBeach.Thereisazoningordinancethat
requiresallaccessorystructurestonotexceed500squarefeetoffloorareaor20percent
ofthefloorareaoftheprinciplestructure,whicheverisgreater.Theyappliedfora
varianceof816feetforastorageshedandalsotomaketheirexistinggaragebein
conformitywithzoning.FirsttheBZAdeniedthevarianceforthestorageshedby
allowedthegaragetobecompliant.TheythenfiledapetitionstatingthatMr.Pennington
wasillandhisdaughterwasmovingbackhometotakecareofhimandtheshedwasto
storeherthings.Thecourtfoundtheynowmetthehardshiprequirementandgrantedthe
variance.
3. Issue.Whetherthegrantingofzoningvariancesshouldbegrantedonacasebycasebasisevenif
thepropertystillhasbeneficialusewithoutsuchvariance.
4. Held.Thereisparticularstandardinallowingzoningvariances.
a. Untilpropertyhaslostitsvalueduetozoningsuchvariancesshouldnotbeallowed.
b. Itseemsreasonablethatconsiderationsofharmtothecommunity,aesthesis,taxbase,
lackofopposition,supportofsuchvariance,andseriouspersonalneedsshouldbe
considered.
c. Howeverzoningboardsdonothavesuchauthoritytodoso.Theonlywayazoning
variancecanbegrantedisifthatzoningbylawmakesallreasonablebeneficialuseloston
thatproperty.
d. Whicheachcasetheprojectoneachpropertycouldstillbecompletedwithoutthe
variance,orthelandcouldbeusedforotherreasonablebeneficialuses.
e. Thisisbecausezoningisavalidexerciseofpolicepower.Itisunderstoodthatzoning
cannotbetailoredtoeachparcelinaparticulartown.
f. Thereforethereisusuallyoneparticularzoningstructure.
g. Ifzoningrendersaparticularpropertyuselessitisunconstitutional.Inordertoprevent
unconstitutionalzoning,zoningboardsareallowedtograntvariancestoprotectour
propertyrights.
5. Discussion.Somestatesallowzoningboardstoallowvariancesincasesofunduehardship.This
courtfindsthatinVirginia,unduehardshipoccurswhenthezoningreasonablyrestrictsthe
utilizationoftheproperty.
Stonev.CityofWilton
1. Synopsis:Thestandardfordeterminingifapropertyownerhasvestedrightsinazoning
classificationisdependentonthetypeoftheproject,thelocation,theultimatecost,and
primarily,theamountofmoniesexpendedwhiletheusewasinconformity.
2. Facts:
a. Inpreparationofbuildingmultifamilyhomes,Phadincurredexpensesforarchitectural
feesandengineeringservicesinthepreparationofplansandplatstobesubmittedtothe
citycouncil.PsalsosecuredaFarmersHomeAdministration(FHA)loancommitment
fortheproject.

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3.

4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

b. Dec1979,Pfiledapreliminaryplatfortheprojectwiththecityclerk.
c. Mar1980,followingapublicmeeting,theplanningandzoningcommission
recommendedtocitycouncilthatlandinnorthernpartofthecityberezonedtosingle
familyresidentialbasedonallegedinadequaciesofsewer,waterandelectricalservices.
d. RezoningrecommendationaffectedPstract.Psapplicationforabuildingpermitwas
deniedinMay,1980,duetothependingzoningrecommendation.
PH:Psfiledapetitionseekingadeclaratoryjudgmentinvalidatingtherezoningoftheirproperty,
temporaryandpermanentinjunctionstoprohibitpassageofanyrezoningordinance,andinthe
eventofrezoning,$570,000.00indamagesformoniesexpended,anticipatedlostprofitsandfor
theallegedreductioninvalueofPlaintiffsland.
a. Thecitycouncil,onrecommendationoftheplanningandzoningcommission,passedthe
ordinancerezoningthePlaintiffslandtosinglefamilyresidentialinJune,1980.
Followingthecitycouncilspassageoftherezoningordinance,thePlaintiffspreliminary
platwasapprovedbytheplanningandzoningcommission.
Issue.DidthePlaintiffshaveavestedrightindevelopingtheirpropertyassubsidized,multi
familyhousing,whichtherezoningordinancetookwithoutjustcompensation?
DiscriminationClaim:Trialcourtdisagreed,andheldaffirmedhere.
a. Psaysrezoningdrivenbydesiretoadviceprivateeconomicinterstsofamemberofthe
commissionandbyracialdiscrimination.
b. Councilfacedwithanumberofcompetingconcerns.
c. Butracialdiscriminationisnotjustanothercompetingconsideration.Whenthereis
proofthatadiscriminatorypurposehasbeenamotivatingfactorinthedecision,this
judicialdeferenceisnolongerjustified Nosuchevidenceheretoprovepurpose.
VestedRightClaims:Held.No.Thedecisionisaffirmed.
a. Psasafactorintheirpurchaseoftheproperty,didbuythetractbecauseitwaszonedto
permitmultifamilyresidences.Psmadeexpendituresinpreparationforobtaining
governmentalapprovalfortheproject.Expenditurestotaledabout$7,900.00,inaddition
totimeandeffortexpendedbyPlaintiffs.
b. Standardfordeterminingifapropertyownerhasvestedrightsinazoningclassification
isdependentonthetypeoftheproject,thelocation,theultimatecost,andprimarily,the
amountofmoniesexpendedwhiletheusewasinconformity.
c. Psonlytookthemostpreliminarystepstowardtheprojectwhiletheusewasin
conformity.Trialcourtfoundthattheplansofthearchitectwerethekindthatcouldbe
foundinamagazineandnottheworkingplansofacontractor.Nocontractingbidswere
sought,nomaterialswereplacedonsite,andnoconstructionwasstarted.
d. CourtagreeswiththetrialcourtthatPlaintiffsexpenditureswerenotsosubstantialasto
createvestedrightsinthecompletionofthehousingprojectonthatparticulartractof
land.
Discussion.Notethefluidboundarybetweenexpenditures,whicharesubstantialenoughunder
thetestandthosewhichfallshort.Theprimaryfactorinthisanalysisistheamountofmoney
expendedwhilethelandwasinconformity.
ProblemPg.1053:
a. Forher:Educationalfacilityeitherunderdaycareandhighschoolstudentswhoaredeaf.
b. Against:Daycarecenterandeducatinghighschoolstudentsentirelydifferent
c. Willshegetavariance?
i. Forher:unduehardship(cost,noteconomicallyviable,practicaldifficulties)
1. Destroythebuildingandbuildanewone(nohouseyoucanbuildon
therethatwillrecoopthecostofhavingtodestroyandbuildanewone

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PropertyBlocher123
ii. Fortown:Theremaybeotheruses.Doesitneedtobeprovidingclassesfordeaf
people.Mightbelearningcenter.Whatdoessheneedtodotolowerinsurance?
Insurancegoingupdoesntmeanexceptional;seemsselfimposed

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28.ExclusionaryZoning,p.101426
1. ExclusionaryZoning=UseZoning
2. MtLaureldoctrineisminorityrule
3. Newremedies
a. Proceduralinnovationsregionaljudgestooverseecasescomingfromdifferentareas.
b. Affirmativeremediescourtshadpowertoorderremedies,includinggovernment
subsidies,incentivezoning(toencourageprivatedevelopers),mandatorysetasides,
etc
c. Buildersremedy:allowsabuildertoproceedwithaprojectthatincludeslowerincome
housingunlessthemunicipalitycanshowthatitisclearlycontrarytosoundlanduse
planning
4. ExclusionaryZoning:Referstolandusecontrolsthattendtoexcludelowincome/minority
a. Euclideanzoningdesignedtoseparatelanduses,butsoonusedtokeepcertaingroups
andusesoutofcommunity
b. Typicalexamplesofdeviceswhichmightbeusedtoexcludepeople:
i. Banonmultipledwelling
ii. Ifapartmentbuildingsareallowed,aminimumfloorareaforeachlivingunit
iii. Prohibitiononpubliclysubsidizedhousing
iv. Ifapartmentsareallowed,setlimitonnumberofbedrooms(preventslarge
familiesfromburdeningschoolsysteme.g.Mt.Laurel)
v. Banonmobilehomes
c. Traditionally,stateswerereluctanttoinvalidateexclusionaryzoningdevices,and
grantedmunicipalitiesagreatdealoflatitudeinfurtheringgeneralwelfare
d. Today,courtshaveexpandednotionofgeneralwelfarefrompresentresidentsofthe
particularcommunity,nowcons
iderwelfareoftheentireregion
e. Zoninginterestfallsunderstatesomustbeininterestofthestate
5.
SouthernBurlingtonCounty,NAACPv.TownshipofMt.Laurel,

N.J.1975
a.
Rule:Zoningasanactionunderthepolicepowermustpromotethegeneralwelfareand
cannotbemotivatedbyotherconsiderationssuchasminimizingthelocalpropertytax
rate.
b. Facts:
c. Facts:PrepresentedBlackandHispanicpersonslivingin/nearMt.Laurelwhoclaimed
thattownszoningpoliciespreventedthemfromfindinglow/moderateincomehousing.
i. Mt.Laurelzoningplancontained2exclusionary features
ii. 1)allareaszonedforresidentialuserequiredsinglefamilydetacheddwellings
withsubstantialminimumlotsizeandfloorarearestrictionsand
1. Attachedtownhouses,mobilehomes,andapartmentsarenotallowed
anywhereinDtownunderzoningordinance.Allfourresidentialzones
providedinthetownszoningordinance,onlypermitonehouseperlot
ofsinglefamily,detacheddwellings.
iii. 2)nearly30%ofthetownslandareawaszonedforindustrialuseseventhough
<1%wasactuallyusedandtherestwasvacant.
iv. PUDshadbeenbuiltbutweredesignedtocontainupperincomeapartments
(mainly1Bsonofamiliesw/schoolagedkidswouldbeallowed).
v. Townar:onlydoingfortaxreasons,tomakesurethatnewhousingwouldin
effectpayitsowngovernmentalwaysowantedasfewchildrenaspossible.
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PropertyBlocher125
d. Findings:
i. Courtdeterminedthatrestrictiontosinglefamilydwellingsrealisticallyonly
provideshousingoptionsforthosewithatleastmiddleincome.
ii. RecordsubstantiatedthatDhadanaffirmativelyandhistoricallydevelopeda
policytocontroldevelopmentdensityandattractselectivegrowth.
iii. Financeshadbeenexpendedsolelyforthebenefitofupperandmiddleincome
people.
iv. NJdoesnotpermitindustrialareastobeusedforresidentialareas
e. Held:Amunicipalitymustbyitslanduseregulationcreateanappropriatevarietyand
choiceofhousing.Actionsunderthepolicepowerareaffirmativelyrequiredtopromote
generalwelfare.
i. Conversely,thezoningenactmentiscontrarytothegeneralwelfareandis
invalid.Amunicipalitymustzoneforthewelfareofthepeopleandnotforthe
benefitofthelocaltaxrate.
ii. Schemeviolatedsubstantivedueprocessandequalprotectionrightsguaranteed
bystateconstitution,failedtoservethegeneralwelfareoftheregionasawhole.
iii. Municipalitymaynotforecloseopportunitiesforlow/moderateincomehousing
andmustofferopportunityforsuchhousingatleasttotheextentofthe
municipalitysfairshareofpresentandprospectiveregionalneed
iv. Fairshareofregionalhousingneeds:confinementtocertaincountyisntrealistic
butrestrictionwithintheboundariesofastateseemedok.
v. Ct.rejectstaxargumentandfiscalconsiderationsasalegitimatedefensefor
exclusionaryzoningb/cmunicipalitiesmustzoneprimarilyforthelivingwelfare
ofpeopleandnotforthebenefitofthelocaltaxrate.
vi. Intentnotimportant:effect.
f. Rule:Azoningregulation,likeanypolicepowerenactment,mustpromotepublichealth,
safety,moralsorthegeneralwelfare.Presumptively,thetowncantpreventopportunity
ofclassofpeoplementionedtogetlow/modincomehousing,regsmustaffirmatively
affordthatopportunity.
g. NB:MINORITYRULE;onlyafewstateshaveinterpretedtheirstateconstitutionsin
thesameway.
h. Holding:Townhastousezoninglawstogivelow/midincomefamiliesappropriate
choiceandvarietyofhousing.Townhas90daystocomply,butPshaveopportunityto
attackamendmentsviasupplementalcomplaint(theydid).
i. Courtfeltthattheregulationsweredesignedtolimitthenumberofschool
childrenandthuslowerthetaxrate.
ii. Remedywasinthehandsofthemunicipalitywhoshouldhavethefirstfull
opportunitytoperformthefunctionofenactingappropriatelanduseregulation
thatwouldprovideforlowandmoderateincomehousingofwithoutjudicial
supervision.
iii. Poorpeoplehavetolivesomewhere,andifoneareadoesthis,thentheyrejust
goingtomovesomewhereelse,butitllcontinuingon.
6.
MountLaurel

II:SouthBurlingtonCountN.A.A.C.P.v.TownshipofMountLaurel

(1983)
a. Eightyearslater.Accompaniedbyfiveothercasesthatwereheardtogetherbcraised
similarissues,decidedinasingleopinion
b. MountLaurelIIputteethintheoriginaldoctrinebycreatingafairshareformulato
measureeachmunicipality'sobligationtoprovideaffordablehousing,andbyfashioning
a"builder'sremedy"toforcemunicipalitiestofulfillthatobligation.
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PropertyBlocher126
c. Trustintownunfounded:8years later Mt.Laurelstillhadexclusionary zoningandno
low/middleincomehousing.Newchallengesbrought,6consolidatedinsingleappeal
d. Extendedobligationtoeverymunicipalityinthestate,notjustdeveloping
communities.
e. Imposedaffirmativeremediesontownstoencourageconstructionoflow/midincome
housing:
i. Densitybonuses:righttobuildextrahousingbeyondnormallyallowedby
zoningordinanceifbuilderpromisestomakesomeunitsbelowincome
ii. Federalsubsidies:Cooperatingw/developertoobtainfederalsubsidiesforlow
incomehousing
iii. EliminatingbansonMobilehomes
iv. Buildersremedy:orderingamunicipalitytoallowadevelopertoconstructa
particularprojectthatincludesasubstantialamountoflowerincomehousing
unlessthemunicipalityestablishesthatbecauseofenvironmentalorother
substantialplanningconcerns,thePsproposedprojectisclearlycontraryto
soundlanduseplanning.
v. Mandatorysetasides:requiringdevelopersincludeaminimumamountof
lowerincomehousingintheirprojectstogetapermittobuild
vi. Appointmentofamastertorevisezoningordinance:inextremecaseof
municipaldisregardofthelaw,appointingamastertorewritethezoning
ordinancetocomplyw/theconstitutionalobligationtoprovideforthe
municipalitysresidentpoororitsfairshareoftheregionallowincomehousing
need
7. Legislation
a. Mt.LaurelIIinvitedNJlegislaturetoacttoimplementconstit.obligationtoprecent
exclusionaryzoning.
b. FairHousingActof1985
i. TransferredauthorityofMtLaurelcasestostateadminagencyCouncilon
AffordableHousing.
ii. AllowedmunicipalitiestobuytheirwayoutofMtLaurelobligationbypaying
neighboringcommunitiestoabsorbuptohalfoffairshareobligation.
iii. NB:TowscanavoidMt.Laurelobligationsbytakingpropertybyeminent
domain,ifthetakingismotivatedbylegitimatepublicpolicy
concerns. couldbeliterallyanything.
8. InclusionaryZoning:Somestateshaveadoptedlegislationtolimitexclusionaryzoningorto
promoteinclusionaryzoning,forexamplethroughlinkageordinancesthatconditionreal estate
developmentonprovidinglowincomehousing
a. Recentevidence:inclusionaryzoningprogramshaveproducedsignificantamtsoflow
incomehousing,butbenefitsmainlyelderlyandwhitepeople(moremeansandmore
likelytotakeplaceinsuburbanareas)
9. Growthcontrol
a. Zuckermanv.TownofHadley
i. MASup.Ct.heldthattownspermanentlimiton#ofannualbuildingpermits
wasdetrimentaltopublicwelfare,thereforenotlegitimatezoningpurpose,
thereforeunconstitutional.
ii. Cantservegeneralwelfareofstatetoallowonetowntodeflectwaveof
newcomersontoneighbors.

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PropertyBlocher127
10. EfficiencyConcerns
a. RobertEllickson
i. Zoning=taxonnewconstructionb/csomeunitsthatwouldotherwisenotbe
profitablemustbeincludedinthedevelopmenttherebyraisingthecostof
providingnewhousing
ii. Whencostisartificiallyraisedbygov'tlesswillbeprovidingthereby
exacerbatinghousingshortageforlow/moderateincome
b. Otherscholars
i. Suchtechniquesarelikelytorestoretheefficientuseoflandbyremoving
inefficientrestrictionsondevelopmentcontainedinexistingexclusionaryzoning
laws
ii. Lawsthatexcludelowincomehousingfromthecommunityarguablydecrease
socialwelfarebyattemptingtocreateprotectedsubdivisionsw/oaccountingfor
theexternalitiesoflimitinglowincomehousing
iii. AlsoartificiallyInc.costoflowincomehousingbyexcludingitfromAresin
whichdeveloperscouldotherwiseprofitablybuild

29.EminentDomain;OriginsofRegulatoryTakingsProblem,p.107191
1. Propertyrightsservetwinrolesasprotectorofindividualrightsagainstothercitizens,andas
safeguardagainstexcessivegovernmentinterference.JeremyPaul
a. Propertyrightsmediatedisputesbydefininglegalrelationsamongpeopleregardingcontrol
ofvaluedresources.Propertyrightsarenotabsolutebecauseownersdonotlivealone;their
rightsarelimitedtoprotectthepropertyandpersonalrightsofothers,thestatemusthavethe
powertodefinethescopeofpropertyrightssoastoestablishthebasicframeworkoflegal
relationshipsinthemarketandtoensurethatpropertyrightsarenotexercisedinwaysthat
infringeonthelegitimateinterestsoftheotherownersorthepublicatlarge.Thus,thestate
musthavethepowertopasslawsregulatingandlimitingtheuseofpropertytoprotectpublic
health,safetyandwelfare.
b. Propertyrightsnotonlyprotectpeopleagainstotherpersonsbutserveasabulwarkagainst
statepower.
c. Decentralizepowerrelationships,individualsratherthanofficialsincentralizedstate
bureaucracy,havecontrolofmanyofsocietysmostvaluedresources.
d. Thisdualroleofpropertylawcreatesanawfuldilemma.
2. RoleofCourts?roleasdefinersanddefendersofpropertyrights
3. Categories
a. EminentDomain
i. Mustmeettwoprongs:PublicUse(ish)andJustCompensation
1. JustCompensation:FairMarketValue
a. Forhomes,generallystraightforward
b. Forbusiness,dontgetcompensationforcustomerloss
b. RegulatoryTakings
i. Reducespeedlimit,sometruckcompaniesgooutofbusiness
ii. BanFourLoko
4. TakingsClause5thAmendment
a. Nopersonnorshallprivatepropertybetakenforpublicuse,withoutjustcompensation.

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PropertyBlocher128
b. Enabling/enumeratedpowerGovernmentcandothis,butsubjecttoconditions
i. Duringwar
ii. Planningforcitiesanddevelopment,canals,roads
iii. Liabilityruleorpurchasedinjunction
iv. Holdouts(certainkindsofsaleswewanttohappen)
c. Limitsofgovernment
i. HistoryofBritishgovernmenttakingpropertywithoutwarning/invasion
ii. Similarto3rdAmendment
5. 5thAsupposedtofilldualroleasappliedtofederalgovernmenttakings
6. 14thAsupposedtofilldualroleasappliedtostategovttakings.
Takings
II

Eminent Domain
G. Generally
i. US Const. 5A: nor shall any private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation
ii. Three requirements: (1) a taking (2) for public use (3) without just compensation
(1) Types of takings
(a) Physical piece of land is physically seized and/or occupied
(b) Regulatory land use is regulated in a way that leads the owner to argue the property
was constructively taken
H. Rule, Public Use Requirement
i. Modern Approach [Kelo]
(1) If the taking serves a public purpose (e.g., a revitalization plan) then it qualifies for as a
public use and therefore, a taking under the 5A.
ii. Development
(1) Berman v. Parker
(a) A department store located in a blighted DC area could be taken even though it
wouldnt be exclusively used for the public
(b) Public use: the plan must be looked at as a whole, not piece by piece, in which case
the Court should defer to the legislature
(2) HawaiI Housing Authority v. Midkiff
(a) The govt was allowe to transfer parcels of land from the lessor to the tenant because
the concentrate of land was owned by private parties
(b) Public use: removing land ownership from a small group of people into a larger
group of people (all private)
(3) Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.
(a) Public use:
iii. Alternative Rules [Kelo]
(1) Kennedy public use met if public benefits and characteristics of the intended use
substantially predominate over the private ones
(2) OConnor public use not met unless nature of property itself justifies the taking (i.e., it
is harmful)
(3) Thomas public use met if requirement means public ownership or use by public
I. Policy

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PropertyBlocher129
i.

Many states have passed legislative reforms since Kelo, narrowing the definition of public
use to exclude increased tax revenue
ii. Most state legislation excludes blighted areas; key is how blight is defined
J. Case
i. Kelo v. City of London
(1) Facts
(a) New London () sought to revitalize the city by undergoing a large construction
project which would draw large company to the area
(b) were landowners whose land would be taken by the project, filed suit to prevent
taking
(2) Holding
(a) The project was allowed under the taking clause even though portions of the land
werent being used for the public; the public was going to benefit by the
revitalization of the city
(3) Arguments
(a) suggested two alternative tests:
(i) Bright line test, which prevents any economic development from qualifying as a
public use (problem: could be boundless)
(ii) Heightened standard of review, which requires a reasonable certainty public
benefits will accrue (problem: could take too long before any benefits accrue)
(4) Dissents/Concurrences
(a) Kenney (C) courts should use rational basis review to strike down any taking that
clearly favors a private party and only ahs pretextual public benefits
(b) OConnor (D) majoritys holding significantly expands meaning of public use to
include incidental benefits to the public
(c) Thomas (D) taking should only be available when land is available for use by
public
7.
8.
Kelov.CityofNewLondon(2005)
a. Facts
b. Bermanv.Parker(1954)upheldredevelopmentlandofblightedareaofDC(5,000
inhabitantsmosthousingwasbeyondrepair),condemnedandpartutilizedforconstruction
i. Challenge:
1. Piecemeal.Whateverswrongwithoverallareaisnotoccurringtomeand
mydepartmentstore.Courtsaysthatcomprehensiveplan,sosomeprofitable
businessesorhomeswillbeincorporated.Doesnothavetobepiecemeal
2. Notapublicuse.Courtsaysthatlegislaturecandecidewhatpublicuseis.
c. HawaiiHousingAuthorityv.Midkiff(1984)100landownersinHawaii,sostatetooktitle
awayfromoriginalownersanddistributedittonewpeople.
i. Upheld.Courtheldthatlegislaturecandefineitsownpublicuseandpurpose.
ii. Alternatives:Hightaxesforthosewithlotsofland.Coup.
d. Ruckelshaus(EPA)v.Monsanto(1984)regulatorytakingcase.
e. Opinion(54,StevenswithKennedy,Souter,Ginsburg,Breyer)
i. Howdowefitthisintothosetwo?
1. GovernmentcannotjusttakepropertyfromAandgivetoB(private)
a. Whywrong?Constitutionpermitspublicuse
2. Governmentcantakeforgovernmenttokeepforpublicuse
a. Constitution

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PropertyBlocher130
ii. HowcanyoufindoutifpublicuseisreallyprivateA B
1. Contributionscampaign,privatedeveloper
2. Whattheywanttodowiththeland,andhowmuchprivatepartieswillpayto
leasethelandafterwards(here,$1foreachyear)
3. Kennedy:Comprehensiveplanv.onetoone
4. Similaritiesanddifferencesbetweenproposedusedandcurrentuse
5. Privatedevelopercreatedplanandpitchedforownprofit
6. Isitaddressinganactualneed
7. Nepotism
8. Kennedy:Proceduralrequirements(hearings,publicmeetings,comments)
iii. Howdodefinepublicuse?
1. NO.Publicusemeansusebythepublicpubliccanusethepropertyas
roads,school,facilities,park,etc.
a. Maystillbetoobroad(publicstillneedstobedefined)
b. Maybetoonarrow(evenifnotdirectlyusedbypublic,stillcanbe
usedbyprivateparties
c. Militaryuse(wouldntbecoveredbythis,andwascontemplatedby
framersofConstitutionandpublicbenefitstillexists)
i. Butfunctionsofgovernmentlikemilitaryandcitybusesetc
bysayingthatmostgovernmentpublicgeneralwelfare
d. Usedbythepublicbutownedandoperatedbyprivatecompany
e. Thomas:Originalism(dictionarieswritten1773)
i. Use=actuallyemploying
ii. Midkiff=useisbeingusedbypublic(notjustsmallgroup
ofpeople)
iii. Berman=wrongcase.discriminatorypurpose(slum
clearance)
1. 97.5%blackinDCblightedarea
2. YES.Publicuseispublicpurpose
a. Courtsaysthatpublicusestricttestistoodifficulttoadminister
(howtodefineandquantify)andtoorestrictingformoderntimes.
b. Broader
c. Evenaesthetic,spiritualgoals,legislature
d. Pros:
e. Cons:Toobroad,nolines,distributivetoobroad
3. Otheroption:HeightenedScrutinyforPublicUse(Standard)
a. Clearandconvincingevidencethattheeconomicbenefitwouldin
factcometopass.
b. Willnotdefertothelegislature
c. Incentivizecitiestogetinbedwithdeveloperrightaway,sofearsof
capturebyprivateactors
d. Institutionalcompetence(isitbettertohavethecitydothisorthe
court?)
e. Wasthereanalternative?
4. Otheroption:BrightLineruleagainsteconomicbenefittakings(Rule)
a. Holdoutproblemwaswholeissue.Here,wholeproblem
b. Thomas:Smallguywillalwayslost.Discriminatorytakings.

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PropertyBlocher131
5. Otheroption:Endinganaffirmativeharmfuluseoftheproperty(OConnor)
withdirectlyachievingapublicbenefit
a. Doesnotfixdiscriminatorytakings
b. Howwillyoueverbuildroads?
c. Caresaboutpowerfulfewhavingabilitytotakewhatevertheywant
iv. WillnotdecidewhetherA Bsolelybecauseofincreasedtaxrevenue
1. Probablyyes,butcomprehensiveplan?Willthisstand
f. Aftermath:Statessetdifferentstandards
i. DidKelosetafloororaceiling?Floor.
ii. Statestookawaytheirownpowerbecauseopinionwassobad?
9. Whoshoulddecidetakings?
a. Courts
i. Etc.
b. Legislature
i. 5Awasenumeratedpower

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30.RegulatoryTakings

,pp.110323
RegulatoryTakings
1. Typesofregulatorytakings
a. Persetakings
i. SupremeCourthasnowclarifiedthatthereareonlytwocategoriesofregulatory
actionthatgenerallywillbedeemedpersetakings.Linglev.Chevron:
1. Permanentphysicalinvasions
2. Regulationsthatcompletelydeprivealleconomicallyviableuse
a. [unless]backgroundprinciplesofnuisanceandpropertylaw
independentlyrestricttheownersintendeduseoftheproperty.
b. AdHoc3FactorTestparticularcircumstancesofeachcase
i. Thecharacterofthegovernmentaction
1. Morepreventingaharm(severeblight)
2. Moreconferringabenefit(lowercarbonemissions)
ii. Theprotectionof/interferencewithdistinct,reasonableinvestmentbacked
expectations
iii. Theeconomicimpactoftheregulationontheparticularowner
1. Inevaluatingthesethreefactors,theCourtsgoalistoapplytheultimate
testoffairnessandjustice.
c. Threecategoriesofcasesthathavesignificantlymorechancetobedeemedunconstitutional
takingsofpropertyunderthistest:
i. Deprivationofcertaincorepropertyrightsorestatesinland
ii. Retroactivedeprivationofvestedrightsbelongingtoownerswhoinvestedin
reasonablerelianceonapriorregulatoryauthorization
iii. Requireddedicationsofpropertyimposedasconditionsonlandusedevelopment
permitswhenthoseexactionsdonotsubstantiallyadvancethesameintereststhat
landuseauthoritiesassertedwouldallowthemtodenythepermitaltogether.
V. Regulatory Takings
A. Rule, Ad Hoc Test
i. Factors to consider in ad hoc inquiry whether a particular restriction will be rendered
invalid by the governments failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it:
[Penn Central]
(1) The economic impact of the regulation
(a) The greater the impact, the more likely it is a taking
(b) No owner is entitled to the full economic use of their land
(2) The extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct, reasonable investmentbacked expectations
(a) Lost opportunity cost is not persuasive; requires action taking to pursue a particular
use before the regulation
(3) The character of the governmental action
(a) A physical invasion by the government is more likely a taking than an interferences
which arises from some public program
ii. Problems

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PropertyBlocher133
(1) Denominator Problem
(a) How should the property being taken being defined?
(i) 10 acres on a 100 acre form either 100% of 10 acre plot hiis being taken, of
10% of the farm is being taken
(2) Average Reciprocity of Advantage
(a) When zoning disadvantages a particular landowner, it is likely to disadvantage
neighbors; but in takings, only one parcel is being disadvantaged by the action
B. Rule, Per Se Takings
i. Two takings generally qualify as per se takings:
(1) Government-mandated permanent physical invasions of property [Miller]
(2) Regulations that completely deprive the landowner of all economically viable use of the
property, unless background principles of nuisance and property law adequately restrict
the owners intended use of the property [Lucas]
(a) Temporary building moratoriums may be a taking under Lucas depending on how
long the moratorium last, other factors. [Tahoe-Sierra Preservation]
C. Case
i. Miller v. Schoene
(1) Facts
(a) Cedar tree carried a virus that infected apple trees within a two mile radius
(b) Agricultural dept. decided to destroy the cedar trees because apples were a valuable
economic resources
(2) Holding
(a) The destruction of one type of property to save another is of greater value to the
public and therefore does not exceed the states constitutional powers
ii. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
(1) Facts
(a) owned Grand Central Terminal and wanted to do construction above it to build a
skyscraper, but GCT was a landmark which did not allow for modifications
(b) denied their permits to build the office building
(2) Holding
(a) No taking has occurred

2.
3. Millerv.Schoene(1928)classicpropertyrightscaseinbalancingrightsofapropertyowneragainst
socialpolicythatisnotunreasonable.
a. Facts:StateentomologistinVirginiaactingundertheCedarRustActofVirginiaorderedthe
plaintiffs'ornamentalredcedartreesgrowingontheplaintiffs'propertytoberemovedto
preventthespreadofrustdiseasetonearbyappleorchards.Theplaintiffsappealedtheorder
tothecircuitcourtofShenandoahcounty,whichaffirmedtheorder,butallowedtheplaintiffs
torecover$100toremovethetrees.TheSupremeCourtofAppealsofVirginiaalso
Affirmedthedecision.
b. I:DidVirginia'sCedarRustActandordertoremoveMiller'scedartreesviolatetheDue
ProcessclauseoftheFourteenthAmendment?
c. Opinion:InanimousdecisionfoundthatthestatuteandtheordertoremoveMiller'scedar
treesdidnotviolatetheDueProcessClause.TheCourtrecognizedtheState'sinterestin
preventingthecedarrustfromdamagingnearbyappleorchardsastheywerethe"principal
agriculturepursuit"inthestate.TheCourtheldthatthedestructionofMiller'streeswouldbe
atakingofhisproperty;however,theState"didnotexceeditsconstitutionalpowersby
decidinguponthedestructionofoneclassofpropertyinordertosaveanotherwhich,inthe
judgmentofthelegislature,isofgreatervaluetothepublic.
4.
PennCentralTransportationCo.NewYorkCity

(1978)
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PropertyBlocher134
a. NYCLandmarkPreservationCommissionrejectedPennproposalsforconstructionofhigh
riseatopGrandCentral,Pennfiledsuit,arguingunderNewYorkHistoricalPreservationLaw
itentitledtoreasonablereturnonvalueofitsproperty,whereasinexistingconditionGrand
Centralcouldnotbreakeven;because(a)PennCentralwasaregulatedrailroad,and(b)it
wasinbankruptcy,itcouldnotceasedeficitcausingoperations,thussufferingtakingofits
property,forwhichitwasentitledtocompensation.Trialcourtagreed.AppellateDivision
reversed,Penndidnotuseproperaccountingmethodstodemonstratethatitwassufferingan
ongoingdeficit.CourtofAppealsaffirmed.AppellateDivisiondifferentlegaltheorythatin
NY,apropertyownerwasentitledtoareturn,notonthevalueofhisentireproperty,butonly
onthatincrementofitsvaluethatwascreatedbyprivateentrepreneurship.
b. SupremeCourtDecision:
i. Purposeofthetakingsclause:barthegovernmentfromforcingsomepeoplealoneto
bearpublicburdenswhichinallfairnessandjusticeshouldbebornebythepublicas
awhole
ii. Unabletodevelopanysetformulaforwhenjusticeandfairnessre:taking
iii. KeystoneaboutpublicinterestbutMahoneisnot.(Holmesopiniontoo)
iv. Butcreatesanewadhoctest:
1. Economicimpactoftheregulationontheclaimant
2. Extenttowhichtheregulationhasinterferedwithdistinctinvestmentbacked
expectations
a. NewYorkCitylawdoesnotinterfereinanywaywiththepresent
usesoftheTerminal.Itsdesignationasalandmarknotonlypermits
butcontemplatesthatappellantsmaycontinuetousetheproperty
preciselyasithasbeenusedforthepast65years:asarailroad
terminalcontainingofficespaceandconcessions.Sothelawdoes
notinterferewithwhatmustberegardedasPennCentral'sprimary
expectationconcerningtheuseoftheparcel.Moreimportantly,on
thisrecord,wemustregardtheNewYorkCitylawaspermitting
PennCentralnotonlytoprofitfromtheTerminalbutalsotoobtaina
"reasonablereturn"onitsinvestment.
3. Characterofthegovernmentalaction
a. Morereadilyfoundwheninterferencewithpropertycanbe
characterizedasaphysicialinvasionbythegovernment(USv.
Causby1946)thanjustinterferencearisesfromsomepublicprogram
adjustingbenefitsandburdensofeconomiclifetopromotepublic
good
4. Also:
a. Millerv.Shoane:Whentheyhavetochoosebetweentwoprivate
uses
b. Coalcases(Keystone):
v. Pennargues:
1. AirRightsTookallmyairrights.Theyhadrighttodevelopuptocertain
heightsaccordingtozoningrules
a. Claimingtotaltakingofairrights,butthisisthedenominator
problem.Howdoyoudescribewhatisbeingtakenaway.Ifits
aboutairrights,thentheyvelostitall.IfitsaboutGrandCentralas
awholeorthecityblock,thenitsonlyapart.

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PropertyBlocher135
b. Indecidingwhetheraparticulargovernmentalactionhaseffecteda
taking,thisCourtfocusesratherbothonthecharacteroftheaction
andonthenatureandextentoftheinterferencewithrightsinthe
parcelasawholehere,thecitytaxblockdesignatedasthe
landmarksite.
2. Losingvalueforotherpeoplesbenefits.Impositiononustomaintainthe
property.
a. Governmentcantbringinmoneyfromeachcitizeninterestedin
keepingGrandCentral,buttouristscantbetaxed.
b. Sophisticatedpartiesthatcanbargain
vi. EconomicimpactonPennCentralwasnotsevereenoughtoconstituteataking
becausePennCentralcouldcontinuewithitspresentusewhosereturn,itconceded,
wasnotunreasonable,sotheregulationdidnotinterferewithitsreasonable
investmentbackedexpectations.
vii. Dissent:NettransferfromPenntopeopleofthecitywhoweremeanttobenefit.
1. EntireburdenofpreservingGrandCentralfallonitsowners(nonconsensual
servitude).Thatcostistheopportunitycostofnotdevelopingtheairspace
overtheterminal.
2. Fullcompliancewithzoning,heightlimitationsandotherhealthandsafety
requirements.Multimilliondollarloss.
3. Sayingitsacomprehensiveplan,butitsnot.Itsreversespotzoningfrom
commercialzoningtonot.
4. Averagereciprocityofadvantage
5. Typicalzoningrestrictionsmay,itistrue,solimittheprospectiveusesofa
pieceofpropertyastodiminishthevalueofthatpropertyintheabstract
becauseitmaynotbeusedfortheforbiddenpurposes.Butanysuchabstract
decreaseinvaluewillmorethanlikelybeatleastpartiallyoffsetbyan
increaseinvaluewhichflowsfromsimilarrestrictionsastouseon
neighboringproperties.Allpropertyownersinadesignatedareaareplaced
underthesamerestrictions,notonlyforthebenefitofthemunicipalityasa
wholebutalsoforthecommonbenefitofoneanother.
Question!
Ascientificresearchcompanybuildsafacilitytotestchemicalweaponsinthemiddleofacity,
pursuanttoagovernmentcontract.Thoughexpertsagreethereisnorealriskofpublichealth
problems,votersapproveareferendumtoamendthezoninglawtoforbidthetesting.Thefacility
cannotbeusedforanyotherscientificpurposewithoutsubstantialrebuilding.
Whatarethebestargumentsforthecompanyandthecityaboutwhetherthisisataking?

31.RegulatoryTakings,cont.,p.114468
1. Whyisgovernmentphysicalinvasionperserule?
a. Exclusionismostfundamentalpropertyright,thenpermanentphysicalinvasionis
againstit
b. Originalism
c. PublicUse=Governmentinvasionphysicalismostobviousform
2. Isthe13thAmendmentataking?

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PropertyBlocher136
a.
3.
Lucasv.SouthCarolinaCoastalCouncil(1992)
a.Establishedthe"totaltakings"testforevaluatingwhetheraparticularregulatoryaction
constitutesaregulatorytakingthatrequirescompensation.
b.Facts:PetitionerLucaspurchasedbeachfrontpropertiesin1986for$975,000.Lucas
ownedtwovacantoceanfrontlotsinBeachwoodEastSubdivisioninSouthCarolina.
BeachfrontManagementActeffectivelydeprivedLucasofhisabilitytoerectanything
onhisproperties
c.PH:SCSupremeCourtsayslawinvolvedexerciseofSCpolicepowerstomitigatethe
harmtothepublicinterestthatpetitionersuseofhislandmightoccasion.
d.Holding(Scalia):SouthCarolinaSupremeCourterredinholdingthatBeachfront
ManagementActwasavalidexerciseofthepolicepoweranddidnotconstituteataking.
i.Thereisnowaytodistinguishregulationthat"preventsaharmfuluse"and
confersbenefitsonnearbyproperty soshouldnotuseharmtestanymore
ii.Aregulationthatdeprivesanownerofalleconomicallybeneficialusesofland
constitutesatakingunlesstheproscribeduseinterestswerenotpartofthetitleto
beginwith.
1.Inotherwords,alawordecreewiththeeffectofcompletelydepriving
alleconomicallybeneficialusemustdonomorethanduplicatetheresult
thatcouldhavebeenachievedinthecourtsunderthelawofnuisance.
2.Ifwhatyouwantedtodowasgoingtobeanuisanceanyways,thenits
notatakingifthegovernmenttakesthatrightfromyou.
3.Nuisance:Youcanstilldoit,butyoucanjustpaysomeoneelseoff
4.Nuisance:Individualsusemaynotbeanuisancebutcollectiveusemay
becomeanuisance.
a.Soisthisnuisanceexceptionallowintheharmanalysisthat
Scaliasayshedoesntwant?Likely
iii.Asaresult,"totaltakings"analysisrequiresaconsiderationof
1.(1)thedegreeofharmtopubliclandsoradjacentpropertyposedbythe
regulatedactivities,
2.(2)thesocialvalueofsuchactivities,and
3.(3)therelativeeasewithwhichtheallegedharmscanbeavoided
throughmeasurestakenbyeithertheclaimantorthegovernment..
iv.Deprivationofalleconomicallybeneficialuseis,fromtheperspectiveofa
propertyowner,deprivationofthepropertyitself.
1.Buthowdowevalueland?Whatisownership?Iseconomicusetheonly
onethatcounts?
2. Regulationsthatrestrictalleconomicallybeneficialusemayoftenbea
guiseofpressingthatlandintopublicservice.
a. Buttheyshouldvejustsaidthis.
v.ContrarytoRespondentSouthCarolina'sassertion,titleisnotheldsubjecttothe
limitationthatthestatemayregulateawayalltheproperty'seconomically
beneficialuse.
e.Kennedy,Concurring:
i.Determinationofnovaluemustbeconsideredwithreferencetotheowner's
reasonable,investmentbackedexpectations.Concernstateregulationcouldgo
nofurtherthanduplicatingcommonlawofnuisancewithoutexposingitselfto
challengeofcategoricaltaking,assomefragilelandsmightpreventsuchpublic

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PropertyBlocher137
concernthatstatecangofurtherinregulatingdevelopmentthanthecommonlaw
ofnuisancemightotherwisepermit.
f.Souter,J.
i.Caseshouldhavebeendismissedasimproperlygranted,asthedecisionofthe
trialcourtthatatotaltakinghadoccurredishighlyquestionableonthebasisof
thefactspresented.
g.Blackmun,dissenting.Launchesamissiletokillamouse.Shouldnothavegranted
certioraritohearthiscaseanditignoresitsjurisdictionallimits
i.ThisCourtrepeatedlyhasrecognizedtheabilityofgovernment,incertain
circumstances,toregulatepropertywithoutcompensationnomatterhowadverse
thefinancialeffectontheownermaybe.Institutionalcompetence.Separationof
powers.
ii.Remakesitstraditionalrulesofreviewandcreatedsimultaneouslyanew
categoricalruleandanexception.
iii.Therecouldneverbeatotallossbecausetheownercanstillenjoyother
attributesofownershipsuchasrighttoexcludeothers,picnic,swim,campina
tentorliveonthepropertyinamovabletrailer
h.Stevens,Dissenting:Categoricalrulecreatedbythecourtisunsoundandanunwise
additiontothelawoftakings.
i.Inthepastcourthadworkedatrejectinganabsoluteformulafordetermininga
takingandhavefrequentlyinthepastheldalawthatrenderspropertyvalueless
maynotconstituteataking.
ii.Newrulecreatedbythecourtisarbitrarybecausealandownerwhosepropertyis
diminishedinvalue95%recoversnothingwhileanownerwhosepropertyis
diminished100%recoversthelandsfullvalue.
iii.Federalismconcerns.Statesaslaboratoriesandevolutionofthecommonlaw
Questions!
Onremand,theSouthCarolinaSupremeCourtheldthatLucassconductwouldnotconstitutea
nuisanceunderthestatescommonlawandthathewasthereforeentitledtocompensation.
Ifthecourthadheldthattheextensivedamagecausedbyconstructiononwetlands
cumulativelywouldconstituteapublicnuisanceunderthestatecommonlawandLucas
againappealedtotheSupremeCourt,wouldtheresultbeanydifferent?
WasMillerv.Schoenecorrectlydecided?
IsitconsistentwithLucas?
Adeveloperwhoowns50acresofpropertysubdividesitandsells45singlefamilyhomeson
singleacrelots.One5acreparcelremainsbutisdesignatedaswetlands;understatelaw,the
ownerisprohibitedfrombuildinganythingonit.Thedevelopersuesthestate,arguingthatthe
wetlandsregulationdeprivesherofanyeconomicallyviableuseforthe5acresofwetlands;the
diminutioninvalueforthisparcelis100percent.Thestateclaimsthattheparcelrepresents10
percentofthetotalareathatthedeveloperhadownedandthatsincethedeveloperhadsold45
homes,shewasnotdeprivedofeconomicallyviableuseforherproperty.
Howshouldthecourtanalyzethisquestion?Isthisa100percenttakingofthe5acresor
a10percenttakingofthe50acres?Shouldtheownerbeentitledtocompensationforher
inabilitytodevelopthe5acreparcel?
Propertyisoftendamagedpursuanttopoliceactivities.Mostcourtsholdthatnocompensationis
requiredwhensuchinjuriesoccur.InEgglestonv.PierceCounty,forexample,thecourtdidnot
findatakingwhenahomewasrendereduninhabitableduetodamagethatoccurredwhenpolice
executedasearchofthehousepursuanttoavalidsearchwarrant.Incontrast,inSteeleCityof

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PropertyBlocher138

Houston,thecourtfoundatakingwhenpoliceburneddownaninnocentpersonshometoeject
suspects.
WhichapproachiscorrectunderLucas?
Aregovernmentsliablefortakingsofpropertywhentheyinadvertentlyornegligentlycause
damagetoproperty?
IfthehomeownersinNewOrleanscouldprovethatthefloodingwhichdestroyedmostof
thepropertyinthecitywouldnothaveoccurredifthefloodcontrolsystemhadbeen
designed,built,andmaintainedbetter,dotheyhaveatakingsclaimagainstthefederal
governmentwhichdesignedthefloodcontrolsysteminthecity?

Palazzolov.RhodeIsland(2001)
1. Claimantdoesnotwaivehisrighttochallengearegulationasanuncompensatedregulatory
takingbypurchasingpropertyaftertheenactmentoftheregulationchallenged.
2. Facts:PPalazzoloandbusinessassociates,asShoreGardens,purchased3undevelopedparcels
onRhodeIslandcoast.Pbecamesoleshareholder,andbeganeffortstodeveloplandby
submittingparcellingplanstothetown.Landrequiredsignificantfilling,Psubmitted
applicationsforpermitsalldenied.Pagainattemptedtodevelopland,submittingseveral
permits,allrejected.
3. PH:PargueddenialofapermitforfillingbyRespondentCouncileffectsatakingwithout
compensationunderthetotaltakingsanalysisofLucasv.SouthCarolinaCoastalCouncilbecause
thedenialdepriveshimof"alleconomicallybeneficialuse"oftheland.
a. RhodeIslandSupremeCourtheld
b. (1)PetitionerPalazzolohadnorighttochallengethepermitdenialasatotaltaking
becauseheacquiredthepropertyaftertheenactmentoftheregulationunderwhichthe
permitwasdenied,andthereforehadsufficientnoticeofsuchregulation(safehaven);
c. (2)theuplandportionsofthelandwereavailablefordevelopment,andtherefore
Palazzolowasnotdeprivedofalleconomicallybeneficialuse;and
d. (3)PalazzolocannotclaimatakingunderthemoregeneralbalancingtestofPennCentral
TransportationCo.v.NewYorkCity.
e. (4)Agencyhadnotissuedafinalruling,sonotripefordecision
4. Rule:Claimantdoesnotwaivehisrighttochallengearegulationasanuncompensatedtakingby
purchasingpropertyaftertheenactmentoftheregulationchallenged.
5. Holding(Kennedy,54):
a. Phasstandingtosuethoughheacquiredpropertyafterenactmentofregulations.
b. RISupremeCourterred,RipeforDecision
c. Argumentthatclaimantwhoacquiresafterenactmentofregulationwaivesrightto
challengeasunconstitutionalregulatorytakingfailsbecause
i. (1)suchaprinciplewouldmaketheconstitutionalityofaregulationamatterof
thepassageoftime,therebycreatinga"[statuteoflimitations]"ona
constitutionalright;
ii. (2)suchaprinciplealsoprejudicesownersatthetimeofregulation,whose
abilitytotransferthelandhasbecomeseriouslyimpaired;and
iii. (3)suchaprinciplewouldcreatedifferentandunequalrightsbetweendifferent
classesofowners(oldownersandnewowners).
1. "[w]erewetoaccepttheState'srule,thepostenactmenttransferoftitle
wouldabsolvetheStateofitsobligationtodefendanyactionrestricting
landuse,nomatterhowextremeorunreasonable.AStatewouldbe
allowed,ineffect,toputanexpirationdateontheTakingsClause.This

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PropertyBlocher139
oughtnottobetherule.Futuregenerations,too,havearighttochallenge
unreasonablelimitationsontheuseandvalueofland."
d. PUNTED:CourtdidnotfullyaddressifRhodeIslandSupremeCourtcorrectlyheldthat
Petitionerdidnotendureatotaltakingbecausesomeoftheparcelremainseconomically
usable.
i. Courtdidnoterrinfindingthat[Palazzolo]failedtoestablishadeprivationofall
economicvalue,foritisundisputedthattheparcelretainssignificantworthfor
constructionofaresidence.
ii. RemandedforconsiderationunderthePennCentralanalysis.Onremandthe
courtwouldneedtomakeadeterminationofwhethertheregulationswenttoofar
soastoconstitutetaking,consideringtheownersinvestmentbacked
expectations.Courtwouldhavetoconsiderwhetherhehassufferedatakingeven
thoughsomeuseoftheparcelremainedviableandalsoconsideringthecharacter
ofthegovernmentsactionandtheeconomicinterferencewithowners
investmentbackedexpectations.
iii. AffirmsandcontinuestheLucasbrightlinerule,butsaysthatthePennCentral
factorsmustbeevaluatedineachcasealsotodetermineiftheregulationwent
toofar.
iv. Leavinganownerwithatokeninterestshouldnotallowthestatetoevadethe
dutytocompensate.ItisunclearhowifitwoulddifferfactuallyfromLucas
becausehereamoresignificantvaluedoesremainfortheupperparcelofland.
v. Beawareofinvestmentbackedexpectationsconsiderationforaclaimanalyzed
underPennCentralv.NewYork,especiallythereasonablenessofthe
expectations.Althoughpriorenactmentofthewetlandsactisnotabartoaclaim,
onemustquestionhowmuchthePetitionercouldhavereasonablyexpectedto
gainfromtheproperty,whichhesucceededto,inlightoftheregulation
e. Courtexpressedsomesympathyfortheargumentthattheupwardparcelcouldbedistinct
andseparatefromtherestoftheparcel.BUTPetitionerdidnotproperlyraisethe
argumentatstatecourtlevelsoSupremeCourtonlyconsideringentireparcelasawhole.
i. However,thequestionofwhatwastheproperdenominator,i.e.whetherthe
wholepropertyorjustafractionoftheproperty,mustbeconsideredwasa
questionleftopenforthefuture.
6. Concurrence(OConnor):Themoredifficultquestioniswhatrolethetemporalrelationship
betweenregulatoryenactmentandtitleacquisitionplaysinaproperPennCentralanalysis.
Todaysholdingdoesnotmeanthatthetimingoftheregulationsenactmentrelativetothe
acquisitionoftitleisimmaterialtothePennCentralanalysis.
a. IfinvestmentbackedexpectationsaregivenexclusivesignificantinthePennCentral
analysisandexistingregulationsdictatethereasonablenessofthoseexpectationsinevery
instance,thentheStatewieldsfartoomuchpowertoredefinepropertyrightsupon
passageoftitle.
TahoeSierraPreservationCouncil,Inc.v.TahoeRegionalPlanningAgency(2002)
1. Facts:TahoeRegionalPlanningAgencyissuedmoratoriumsonvirtuallyallresidential
developmentwithinthebasin(firstfor24months,secondfor8monthsforadopting
comprehensivelanduseplan)tomakesurealgaetocreateclarity.Plsownedindividualhome
sites,claimedmoratoriatakingsunder5A/14A,wantjustcompensation.

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PropertyBlocher140
2. PH:DistrictCourt:(1)Thoughlandretainedsomevalueduringmoratorialandownerswere
completelydeprivedofanyeconomicuseoftheirland,sodidconstitutetaking.CircuitCourt:
sincemoratoriaonlytemporary,notakingoccurredandnocompensationneeded.
3. Opinion(Stevens,63):Heldmereenactmentofregulationsimplementingmoratoriadidnot
constitutepersetakingofproperty.Whethertakingoccurreddependeduponconsiderationsof
landowners'expectations,actualimpact,publicinterest,andreasonsforthemoratoria.
a. DiscardedPsassertionthatenactmentofmoratoriumdeprivedPlaintiffsofalleconomic
useofpropertyandrequiredcompensation.
b. Heldcaselawdoesnotsupportandinfactrejectsideathatatemporarymoratorium
invokesJustCompensationclause.
c. Textofthe5Aitselfcreatesadistinctionbetweenphysicaltakingsandregulatorytakings
specifyingthatonlyphysicaltakingsofprivatepropertyforpublicpurposesrequirejust
compensation.
d. Predictingthatifalltakings,physicalandregulatory,weretorequirejustcompensation
thenthewholenotionofgovernmenttakingswouldbe,aluxuryfewgovernmentscould
afford.DismissedprecedentofLucassayingthatlogicallypropertyatissueinpresent
casecannotbeconsideredtohavelostalleconomicvaluesinceassoonasthe
moratoriumislifteditwillrecoveralleconomicvalue.Fluctuationsinpropertyvalue
cannotbeconsideredconstitutionaltakings.
e. Ifgovernmentsarerequiredtocompensatelandownerseverytimeamoratoriumisput
intoplaceinordertoplanthedevelopmentofanarea,thenofficialswilleitherrush
throughtheplanningprocessorskipitaltogetherfosteringgrowthinthecommunitythat
iseitherillconceivedorinefficient.

31. ExactionsandLinkageRequirements,p.11881205
VI. Exactions and Linkage Requirements
A. Rule, Rough Proportionality [Dolan]
i. Determine whether there is an essential nexus between the legitimate state interest asserted
and the permit conditions exacted [Nolan]
ii. If so, determine whether there is rough proportionality
(1) Is there a legitimate state concern between the problem the state seeks to ameliorate and
the amount of land dedicated to the solution
(2) Is the amount of land dedicated to the solution proportional to the problem that it seeks to
ameliorate?
iii. Improvements [Town of Flower Mound]
(1) No distinction between improvements made to private property for public use or public
property.
iv. Doctrine of unconstitutional condition you cannot condition some benefit on the waiver of a
constitutional right
v. Linkage ordinance an amendment to a zoning ordinance requiring a developer to provide
something for the community
(1) Developers should have to account for the externalities/burdens/higher pries caused by
their development
B. Rule, Direct Proportionality
i. Determine whether the government exaction is directly proportional to the specifically
created need.
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PropertyBlocher141
(1) Difficult to do this accurately.
C. Policy
D. Case
i. Dolan v. City of Tigard
(1) Facts
(2) Holding
(3) Dissents
(a) Stevens new standard does not help local governments with a usable standard to
judge their actions and does not accurately capture the benefit the landowner receives
(b) Souter the standard used by the majority makes exactions more confusing than
necessary; also places the burden of proof on the govt rather than the usual
presumption the govt has acted constitutionally
CoerciveOffers=UnconstitutionalTaking
1. Nollanv.CaliforniaCoastalCommission,483U.S.825(1987)
2. CaliforniaCoastalCommissionrequiredoffertodedicatealateralpubliceasementalongNollans'
beachfrontlotberecordedonthechainoftitletothepropertyasaconditionofapprovalofa
permittodemolishanexistingbungalowandreplaceitwithathreebedroomhouse.
3. CoastalCommissionassertedthatpubliceasementconditionwasimposedtopromotelegitimate
stateinterestofdiminishingthe"blockageoftheviewoftheocean"causedbyconstructionofthe
largerhouse.
4. CCChascompletemonopolyovergivingpermits.
5. Courtheldthatinevaluatingsuchclaims,itmustbedeterminedwhetheran"essentialnexus"
existsbetweenalegitimatestateinterestandthepermitcondition.
6. Facts:Nollansownedbeachfrontproperty,replace504sqftbungalowwhichhadfalleninto
disrepairwith2,500sqfthouse.Asaconditionforpermitstodoso,CaliforniaCoastal
CommissionrequiredNollansdedicatefor20yearsstripoflandalongthebeachinfrontoftheir
housetoallowthepublictherightofpassandrepassalongthebeach.CCCarguednewhouse
increaseblockageofoceanviewandcontributetoawallofresidentialstructureswhichwould
preventthepublicpsychologicallyfromrealizingastretchofcoastlineexistsnearbythatthey
haveeveryrighttovisit".
7. ArticleX,Section4ofCaliforniaConstitutionguaranteedaccesstobeaches,butaprospective
beachgoermighthavedifficultyseeingthebeachorfindingpublicaccesstoit.Wallingoff
effectcreatedpsychologicalimpedimenttopublicaccessensuringthatnomembersofthepublic
wouldbeabletoutilizeapublicresource(guaranteedbyconstitution).Developmentpatterntook
publicresourcesupposedlyavailabletoanyoneandturneditintotheprivateenclaveofthe
wealthypropertyownerswhosehouseslinedthebeach.
8. Nollans'propertydidnotpresentthesameconditionsfoundalongbeachesinMalibu,beingless
than4%developedandhavingsmaller,lessintensivedevelopmentthanthatalongtheMalibu
shoreline.TheconditionforapprovaloftheNollans'CoastalDevelopmentPermitwasthatthe
applicantsrecordanoffertodedicateastripofproperty(generally25feet(7.6m)wideand
locatedlandwardofthemeanhightide)or,moregenerally,fromtheactualedgeofthewateron
anyparticulardayduringanygiventidealongthebeach.
9. Opinion(Scalia,54):RequirementbyCCCwasatakinginviolationof5Aand14A
a. Thelackofnexusbetweentheconditionandtheoriginalpurposeofthebuilding
restrictionconvertsthatpurposetosomethingotherthanwhatitwas...Unlessthepermit
conditionservesthesamegovernmentalpurposeasthedevelopmentban,thebuilding
restrictionisnotavalidregulationoflandusebutanoutandoutplanofextortion.

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PropertyBlocher142
b. Deridedtheconceptofpsychologicalimpedimentstopublicaccess;hewrotethatifa
publicagencywishestoplaceconditionsofapprovalonapermit,thatthoseconditions
mustbearsomerelationtothepublicpolicyconcernspurportedtoberesolvedthrough
theimpositionofconditionsofapproval.
i. Example,projecteliminates120squarefeetofpublicparkland,appropriate
conditionwouldbetorequirereplacementinkindof120squarefeettomaintain
sizeofpublicparkland.
c. Therehadtobeanexusbetweenthepublicpolicyissueandtheconditionofapproval
whichsoughttoaddressit.
d. Publicaccessconditiondidnotmeetthatnexustestbycompensatingfortheslightlossof
publicviewacrosstheNollans'property;iflossofpublicviewsacrosstheNollans'
propertywastrulytheissue,thenanappropriateconditionofapprovalwouldhavebeen
"constructionofapublicviewingplatformontheroofoftheNollans'house.
e. Publichadnorightofpassagewiththeexistingbungalowinplace,soitwouldbe
unaffectedbythelargerstructurereplacingit.
f. Courtspecifiedthataclosenexusmustbeshownbetweentheregulatorycondition
imposedandthedevelopmentimpactsofconcern,andthattheregulatoryactionmust
substantiallyadvancelegitimatestateinterests(AADASDFp53).Althoughthecase
appearstodealprimarilywithtakings,theprinciplesareappliedtotheexactionand
impactfeedebateaswell.TheCourtstruckdownCaliforniaspolicyofanythinggoes
forexactionrequirements,andreaffirmedtherationalnexusstandardforstatesacross
America.[1]
10. HowchangedunderDolanv.Tigard(1994):Evaluatedfurtherdegreeofconnectionrequired.
Dolan:Courtruledcitysrequirementtakingifthecitydidnotshowthattherewasareasonable
relationshipbetweenthecreationofthegreenwayandbikepathandtheimpactofthe
development."Withoutquestion,hadthecitysimplyrequiredpetitionertodedicateastripofland
alongFannoCreekforpublicuse,ratherthanconditioningthegrantofherpermittoredevelop
herpropertyonsuchadedication,atakingwouldhaveoccurred",theCourtheld.Suchpublic
accesswoulddeprivepetitioneroftherighttoexcludeothers,oneofthemostessentialsticksin
thebundleofrightsthatarecommonlycharacterizedasproperty".
Dolanv.CityofTigard(1994)
1. Establishedlimitsonabilityofcitiesandgovernmentagenciestousezoningandlanduse
regulationstocompelpropertyownerstomakeunrelatedpublicimprovements.
2. Facts:PDolan,ownerandoperatorofABoyPlumbing&ElectricalSupplystoreinTigard,
Oregon,appliedforpermittoexpandstoreandpaveparkinglotofherstore.Commission
conditionedapprovalonDolandedicatinglandtopublicgreenwayalongadjacentcreek,
developingpedestrianandbicyclepathwaytorelievetrafficcongestion.AppealedtoStateLand
UseBoardofAppeals,foundreasonablerelationship:largerbuildingandpavedlotwould
increaserunoffintocreek,impactofincreasedtrafficjustifiedrequirementforpathway.
a. Righttoexcludebeingtaken
3. Decision(Rehnquist,54):Overturnedlowercourts
a. Whengovtrequireslandownertoconveypropertytocityasaconditiontoobtaininga
permit,theremustbearoughproportionalitybetweenburdensonpublicthatwouldresult
fromgrantingpermitandbenefittopublicfromconveyanceofland.
b. Onepurposeofthetakingsclauseistobargovernmentfromforcingpeopletobear
publicburdensthatshouldbebornebypublic.

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PropertyBlocher143
c. Helddoctrineofunconstitutionalconditions,agovernmentagencymaynotrequirea
persontosurrenderconstitutionalrightsinexchangefordiscretionarybenefits,wherethe
propertysoughthaslittleornorelationshiptothebenefitconferred.
d. Gardenvarietytakingv.gardenvarietylanduse
i. Taking:Coercion/conditionedonapermit
ii. Landuse:Physicaltaking
iii. Unclear.
e. WhynotaneasyNolancase?NexusrequiredbyNolanismethere(legitimatestate
interestoffloodplainNolanandnotinhibitingeconomicviabilityofland)
i. GreenwayandFloodplain=Nexusispreventingflooding
ii. Path/Bike/Pedestrian=Nexusistrafficcongestion
f. Twoprongtestwasapplied:
i. NATURE:Whetherthereis"essentialnexus"betweenpermitconditionsand
legitimatestateinterest,and
ii. DEGREE:Whetherdegreeofexactionsrequiredbypermitconditionbears
requiredreasonablerelationshiptoprojectedimpactofproposeddevelopment
(roughproportionalitytest)
1. Citymustmakesomesortofindividualizeddeterminationthatthe
requireddedicationisrelatedbothinnatureandextenttotheimpactof
theproposeddevelopment.
2. Noprecisemathematicaldeterminationneeded
3. Buttherewasacomprehensiveplan!!!!!!!!
g. Courtheld:
i. Floodplainisfine,butrequirementforpublicgreenway(asopposedtoaprivate
one,towhichDolanwouldretainotherrightsofpropertyowners,suchasthe
rightofexclusiveaccess)wasexcessive.
1. Petitionerlostabilitytoexclude,oneofmostessentialsticksinbundleof
propertyrights.Difficulttoseewhyrecreationalvisitorswalkingonland
sufficientlyrelatedtocityslegitimateinterestinreducingflooding
problemsalongcreek.
ii. Cityfailedtomeetitsburdenofestablishingthatpathwaywasnecessarytooffset
increasedtrafficthatwouldbecausedbyexpansion.
1. Citydidnotgiveconclusiveevidence.SaiditMIGHT,notthatitwould.
h. Dissent(Stevens):
i. Roughproportionalitytestcreatesnomanageablestandard(notarule)
ii. Roughproportionalitytestrunscontrarytothetraditionaltreatmentofthese
casesandbreaksconsiderableandunpropitiousnewground.
iii. Petitionersacceptanceofthepermit,withitsattachedconditions,wouldprovide
herwithbenefitsthatmaygobeyondanyadvantageshegetsfromexpandingher
business.
iv. Analysisshouldfocusontheimpactofthecitysactionontheentireparcelof
privateproperty.Shouldconcentrateonwhetherrequirednexusispresentand
venturebeyondconsiderationsofaconditionsnatureonlyifdeveloper
establishesthataconcededlygermaneconditionissogrosslydisproportionateto
theproposeddevelopmentsadverseeffectsthatitmanifestsmotivesotherthan
landuseregulationonthepartofthecity.

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PropertyBlocher144
i.

Dissent(Souter):Courtplacestheburdenofproducingevidenceofrelationshiponthe
city,despitetheusualruleincasesinvolvingthepolicepowerthatthegovernmentis
presumedtohaveactedconstitutionally.

Questions:
Inrecentyears,manymunicipalitieshaveenactedamendmentstotheirzoningordinances
requiringcertaindevelopersofcommercialpropertyand/orresidentialhousingeithertodirectly
providelowincomehousingorchildcarefacilitiesortopayafeethatisdevotedtoafundfor
thesepurposes.
AretheselinkageordinancesconstitutionalunderNollanandDolan?
Hypothetical:CoyKoontzwantstobuildonawetland,andseekstheappropriatepermit,offering
tomitigatebygivingaconservationeasementtonearly75%ofhisproperty.Thegovernment
rejectedhisproposalandsaiditwouldonlybeapprovedifhereducedthesizeorhired
contractorstomakeimprovementstowetlandsseveralmilesaway.Hefilessuit.Thegovernment
respondsthatNollanDolananalysisdoesnotapplybecause,unlikeinthosecases,thepermit
herewasrejected,ratherthanacceptedwithconditions.Isthegovernmentright?
Koontz,9justicesagreed,arbitrarydistinction.NollanDolanapplies.
Grantpermit,butneedtopayimpactfeesforexternalities:
Shouldbeaperserule
Impactfeesarelikeatax,soshouldbesubjecttotaxing

InStafford,thetownconditioneditsapprovalofasubdivisiondevelopmentonthedevelopers
payingtorebuildanabuttingroad.Thedeveloperbuiltthesubdivision,rebuilttheroadandthen
suedthetowntorecoverthecostoftheroadconstruction.
TheTexasSupremeCourtfoundthatforpurposesofdeterminingwhetheranexaction
asaconditionofgovernmentalapprovalofdevelopmentisacompensabletaking,wesee
noimportantdistinctionbetweenadedicationofpropertytothepublicandarequirement
thatpropertyalreadyownedbythepublicbeimproved.TheDolanstandardshould
applytoboth.
Wasthecasedecidedcorrectly?
InHomeBuilders,thecourtupheldacitysinclusionaryzoninglawagainsttheclaimthatit
violatedthetakingsclausewhenitrequiredtenpercentofallnewlyconstructedresidentialunity
tobeaffordable.
Whataretheargumentsonbothsidesandwhoshouldhavewonthecase?
WhatdoyouthinkofJusticeBrownsposition?
Issheright?

I have a quick question about easements, specifically the burden running with the land with
regards to easements implied from prior use, easements by estoppel, and easements by
necessity.

As I understand it, you classify the easement as appurtenant or in gross, based upon the
intention of the parties and the nature of the easement, in order to determine whether the

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benefit runs with the land.

For the burden to run with the land, I know express easements require the easement to be in
writing, that the original grantor intended the easement to run with the land, and subsequent
owners of the servient estate had notice at purchase. However, what is the test for determining
whether the burden runs with the land for implied easements? I have in my notes that they
generally run with the land if they were intended to do so, and are reasonably necessary for the
enjoyment of the dominant estate, but I'm not sure if this is referring to the burden or benefit (it
seems like an early identical inquiry to determining appurtenant vs. in gross).

New!

Re: Burdens Running With the Land w/r/t Implied Easements

Joseph Blocher (eb116@duke.edu) (May 1, 2014 3:02 PM)

- Read by: 1

Reply

You'veunderstooditcorrectly,itsoundslike.Easementsappurtenantareeasementsthatrunwiththeland;in
grosseasementsbenefitaparticularperson,andsodonot.That'strueforbothexpressandimpliedeasements.
As a related question, which is preferred in an ambiguous conveyance: Fee Simple
Determinable or Fee Simple Subject to Condition Subsequent? Latter

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B and his heirs, then to C and his heirs.
A has LE
B has vested remainder in FS
C has nothing

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B's heirs, then to C's heirs.

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PropertyBlocher146

A has LE
B's heirs have contingent remainder in FSA
C's heirs have contingent remainder in FSA
O has reversion in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A and her heirs as long as the land is used for educational purposes.
A has FS determinable
O has possibility of reverter in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A for 10 years, then to B, but if B has not yet graduated from law school, then
to C.
A has term of years
B has vested remainder subject to divestment in FS subject to an executory limitation
C has shifting executory interest in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A and her heirs as long as the land is used for educational purposes, but if the
land is not used for educational purposes, then to B and his heirs.
A has FS determinable
B has shifting executory interest in FSA

What is the state of the title?

T to A for 5 years, then to B, but if, after taking possession, B ever fails to place a
red rose on T's grave on T's birthday, then to C.

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PropertyBlocher147

A has term of years

B has vested remainder in FS subject to an executory limitation
C has shifting executory interest in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A and her heirs, but if she stops using the land for educational purposes, then
to O.
A has FS subject to a condition subsequent
O has right of entry in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A if she graduates from law school. (A has not yet graduated from law school.)
O has FS subject to an executory limitation
A has springing executory interest in FSA.

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B if B survives A, but if B does not survive A, to C's children.
(C has no child.)
A has LE
B has [alternative] contingent remainder in FSA
C's children have [alternative] contingent remainder in FSA
O has reversion in FSA [if C has no kids]

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B if B survives A, but if B does not survive A, to C's children.
(C has one child, X.)

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PropertyBlocher148

A has LE
B has contingent remainder in FSA
X has contingent remainder subject to open in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B, but if B ever allows A to be moved into a nursing home,
then to C.
A has LE
B has vested remainder subject to divestment in FSA subject to an executory
limitation
C has shifting executory interest in FSA

What is the state of the title?

1: O to A for life, then to B and her heirs.
2: A to C.
C has life estate pur autre vie, measuring life is A
B has vested remainder in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to the person who is then Dean of O's law school.
A has LE
Dean has contingent remainder in FSA
O retains reversion in FSA, if there is no Dean?

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B if B is then married to C. (B is married to C.)

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PropertyBlocher149

A has LE
B has contingent remainder in FSA
O has reversion in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B, but if B does not serve as the executor of A's estate, then
to C.
A has LE
B has vested remainder in FS subject to an executory limitation
C has shifting executory interest in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B if B adopts A's surviving children.
A has LE
O has reversion in FS subject to an executory limitation
B has springing executory interest in FSA

What is the state of the title?

O to A, but if A mines the property, then to B and her heirs.
A has FS subject to an executory limitation
B has shifting executory interest in FSA

If the future interest following a life estate is in the grantee, what is it called?
Remainder

If the future interest following a term of years is in the grantee, what is it called?

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PropertyBlocher150

Remainder

If the future interest following a fee tail is in the grantee, what is it called?
Remainder

What is the name of the grantee's future interest that "waits patiently" for the prior
estate to "end naturally?"
Remainder

How can you recognize a contingent remainder?

It is (1) given to an unascertained (unborn OR unidentified) person OR (2) it is
subject to a condition precedent

What two characteristics define a vested remainder?

It is (1) given to an ascertained (born AND identified) person AND (2) it is not subject
to a condition precedent

What two characteristics define an ascertained person?

(1) Born and (2) Identified

What is a condition precedent?

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PropertyBlocher151

An event that must occur (or not occur) in order for a contingent remainder to vest

What are "alternative contingent remainders?"

Two remainders that depend on the same condition precedent. I.E. if the condition is
met, one remainder vests, and if the condition is not met, the other vests. They are
mutually exclusive of one another.

Is a reversion deemed vested or contingent?

Vested

Is a right of entry deemed vested or contingent?

Vested, but WHY? It's subject to a condition, no?

Is a possibility of reverter deemed vested or contingent?

Vested

To whom does a reversion belong?

The grantor

To whom does a remainder belong?

A grantee

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PropertyBlocher152

Distinguish between a remainder and a reversion.

A grantor retains a reversion, a remainder is granted to a grantee.

In column 2 on the chart, how do we decide whether to work above the line or
below the line?
Above the line = next estate is in the grantor
Below the line = next estate is in the grantee

In column 3 on the chart, how do we decide whether to work above the line or
below the line?
Above the line = next estate is in the grantor
Below the line = next estate is in the grantee

What words mark the remainder? Is the holder ascertained?

O to A for life, then to B.
then to B
ascertained, assuming B is born

What words mark the remainder? Is the holder ascertained?

O to A for life, then to A's first child (A has one child, B.)
then to A's first child
ascertained

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PropertyBlocher153

What words mark the remainder? Is the holder ascertained?

O to A for life, then to A's heirs. (A is alive and has one child, B.)
then to A's heirs
Unascertained. A may have more heirs than 1.

What words mark the remainder? Is the holder ascertained?

O to A for life, then to B and her heirs. (B has no children.)
then to B and her heirs.
Ascertained. B is the grantee.

What words mark the remainder? Is the holder ascertained?

O to A for life, then to A's widow.
then to A's widow.
Unascertained. A's widow is unknown until A dies.

What words mark the remainder? Is the holder ascertained?

O to A for life, then to A's first child. (A has no children.)
then to A's first child.
Unascertained. A's first child is not born.

What words mark the remainder? Is the holder ascertained?

O to A for life, then to this year's first-year law students at State University Law
School who pass the bar.
then to this year's first-year law students at State University Law School who pass the
bar.
Unascertained. It is not certain which of the first-year law students will pass the bar.

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PropertyBlocher154

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder subject to a condition

precedent?
O to A for life, then to B if B has refrained from drinking alcoholic beverages for the
five years prior to A's death.
then to B if B has refrained from drinking alcoholic beverages for the five years prior
to A's death.
Yes.

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder subject to a condition

precedent?
O to A for life, then to B if B has reached 21. (At the time of the conveyance, B is
22.)
then to B if B has reached 21.
No.

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder subject to a condition

precedent?
O to A for life, then to B; however, if B ever drills for oil on the land, then to C.
then to B
No.

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder subject to a condition

precedent?
O to A for life, then to B, on condition that B has passed the bar.
then to B
No.

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PropertyBlocher155

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B, on condition that B has passed the bar. (B has been
practicing law for 10 years.)
then to B
Vested

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B, but if B uses the land for an insurance agency, then back
to O.
then to B
Vested

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B if B does not then own an insurance agency.
then to B if B does not then own an insurance agency.
Contingent

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B if B is married.
then to B if B is married.
Contingent

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B; however, if B divorces after A dies, then to O.

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PropertyBlocher156

then to B
Vested

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to A's surviving cousins. (A has two cousins.)
then to A's surviving cousins.
Contingent

*What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to A's children (A has one child.)
then to A's children.
Vested

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to the 2001 graduates of O's law school class. (The conveyance
was made in 2002.)
then to the 2001 graduates of O's law school class.
Vested

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to A's widow.
then to A's widow
Contingent

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PropertyBlocher157

What words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?What

words mark the remainder? Is the remainder vested or contingent?
O to A for life, then to B's heirs. (B is alive.)
then to B's heirs.
Contingent

Do A's heirs have any property interest as a result of the following conveyance? If
so, what is it?
O to A for life, then to A's heirs.
Yes, they have a contingent remainder in FS.

Do A's heirs have any property interest as a result of the following conveyance? If
so, what is it?
O to A and her heirs.
No, they will merely inherit A's estate?

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to B.
A has a life estate. B has a vested remainder in FSA.

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, then to O.
A has a life estate. O has a reversion in FSA.

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PropertyBlocher158

What is the state of the title?

O to A and her heirs until B reaches 25 (B is 12.)
A has a fee simple determinable. O has a possibility of reverter in FSA.

What is the state of the title?

O to A and her heirs, but if A divorces, then to O.
A has FS subject to condition subsequent. O has a right of entry in FSA.

What is the state of the title?

O to A and her heirs so long as A never uses illegal drugs.
A has FS determinable. O has possibility of reverter in FSA.

What is the state of the title?

O to A and her heirs, but if B reaches 25, then to O. (B is 15.)
A has FS subject to condition subsequent. O has a right of entry in FSA.

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life, but if an interstate highway is built within one mile of the property,
then to O.
A has life estate subject to a condition subsequent. O has a right of entry and a
reversion in FSA.

What is the state of the title?

O to A for life or until A divorces, then to O.

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PropertyBlocher159

A has life estate determinable. O has possibility of reverter and a reversion in FSA.

Is B's remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B, but if B has not graduated from college, then to C.
Vested

Is B's remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B if B has graduated from college, but if not, then to C.
Contingent

Has O retained an interest?

O to A for life, then to B, on condition that B has passed the bar.
Yes.

Has O retained an interest?

O to A for life, then to B.
No.

Has O retained an interest?

O to A for life, then to B if B does not then own an insurance agency.
Yes.

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PropertyBlocher160

Has O retained an interest?

O to A for life, then to B if B has married. (B is presently married.)
No.

Has O retained an interest?

O to A for life, then to B; however, if B divorces, B's estate ends.
Yes.

Has O retained an interest?

O to A for life, then to A's surviving cousins. (A has two cousins.)
Yes.

Has O retained an interest?

O to A for 10 years, then to B for 10 years.
Yes.

Has O retained an interest?

O to A and the heirs of her body, then to B.
No.

Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B's oldest child who survives B. Then B dies with two
children living.
Vested.
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PropertyBlocher161

Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to A's oldest surviving child who has attained the age of 21.
Then A's oldest child attains the age of 21.
Contingent. The child has reached 21 but must survive A for the remainder to vest.

Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then to B if B marries. Then B gets married. Subsequently, B
divorces.
Vested.

Is the remainder vested or contingent?

O to A for life, then if B has died childless, to whoever is the Dean of State
University Law School at the time of A's death. Then B dies childless.
Contingent until A dies.

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