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Philosophy
and Phenomenological
Research
Descartes'sArguments
for
Mind-BodyDistinctness
STEVEN J. WAGNER
University
of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
I was of threeminds,
Like a tree
In whichthereare threeblackbirds.
Wallace Stevens
In some passages mind is called a ("real") propertyof body (AT III, 667-68, PL,
138-39; AT VII, 441-4z;
HR II, 254-55). This in some ways veryinsightful
move is
simplyinconsistentwiththe officialposition.That Descartesmade it underconsiderable pressuremay be seen fromhis uncharacteristically
outrageousaccount of where
our idea of gravitycomes fromat HR II, z55.
Referencesare to be decoded as follows.HR = Haldane and Ross, The Philosophical
AT =
Works of Descartes, z vols. (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, I977);
PL = A.
AdamandTannery,
Oeuvres de Descartes, I1 vols.(Paris:Cerf,i897-1913);
Kenny,Descartes: PhilosophicalLetters(Oxford: Clarendon,1970); CB = J.Cottingham, Descartes's Conversationwith Burman (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976); W = M.
Wilson,Descartes (London, Henley and Boston: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1978); S
= S. Schiffer,
"Descartes on His Essence," PhilosophicalReview 85, I (January1976).
I will cite AT only in the firstreferenceto a passage.
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
499
physicsof Descartes [Oxford:Clarendon,i965]), Kenny(Descartes [New York: Random House, i968]), and Williams (Descartes, [New York: Penguin,1978]), nor in
Hooker's anthologyof currentCartesianscholarship(Descartes [Baltimoreand London: JohnsHopkins, 1978]). It is mentionedin S only as an "ancillaryargument."
The worksjust citedprovidea good samplingof criticalapproachesto Sep and conof the two main views of Sep to be contain furtherreferences.Clear representatives
sidered below are S and Hooker, "Descartes's Denial of Mind-Body Identity"in
Hooker, op. cit.; some of the other literatureis more confused. I am, however,
indebtedto all of the literature;will not referto it as oftenas it deserves;and will
economize by assumingpoints I take to have been settledthere,even if theyare still
controversial.
500
STEVEN J. WAGNER
I. The SeparabilityArgument
by applyingGod's "validation"
Descartesinfersmind-bodydistinctness
c & d) ideas, establishedin theFourth
of clear and distinct(henceforth
Meditation,to the c & d conceptionof mind attainedin the Second
Meditation.The main question about Sep can be put in termsof a
trade-off:does Descartes relyon a modest conceptionof mind plus a
strongappeal to God, or does an immodestconceptionof mindenable
himto get by withless theology?Our choice heredependson resolving
an ambiguityin Cartesianclaimsto conceivemindapart frombody,to
conceivehimselfonly as a thinkingthing,and the like.
Descartes's conceptionof mind certainlyincludesthe c & d perceptionthatmindsthink.On the modestconstrual,whichI shall call theA
reading,thatis all thereis to it. Descartes's conceptionis simplysilent
thought,not
about whethermindsare extended;whileit onlyattributes
extension,to minds,the possibilityof an extendedmind is in no way
ruledout. But accordingto a second reading(B), Descartes'sconception
of mind in the Second Meditationalreadyincludesa c & d perception
that minds are not extendedor that thoughtis the only propertyof
leave Descartes with very
minds. Of course these two interpretations
amounts of work to do in the followingMeditations.Once
different
bodies are definedas extendedthings,thedistinctionbetweenmindand
body is immediateif mindsare not extended.If thatis what Descartes
perceivesin the Second Meditation,all thatcould remainwould be for
God to assure him of the truthof his c & d perceptions.If, however,
Descartes startswith the more modest conceptionof mind, he must
inferdualismfromthefactthatthisconceptionomitsextension.To this
end he would, it seems,firstneed God's guaranteethatif (undercertain
conditions)I do not see that mindsare extended,each mindis at least
possiblynot a body. Modal principleswould thenlead frompossibleto
actual (or even necessary)non-extension.In this versionof the arguWithout
ment,God does not just validate a perceptionof distinctness.
him,even a perceptionof the objectivepossibilityof unextendedminds
cannot be achieved, and Descartes would have no way to progress
beyonda confessionof ignoranceabout the extensionof minds.
considerableevidencebears on the choice between
Not surprisingly,
as possible
Let us reviewas briefly
thesequite divergentinterpretations.
the argumentsforeach side.
The A readingseems trueto the Meditations.Accordingto the Pref-
ace:
tomyessence,
topertain
I knew
as faras I wasaware,
nothing
clearly
that]
[Ihaveargued
the
I shallshowhow,from
thatI wasa thinking
thing... Butinwhatfollows
except
else
thatnothing
itfollows
to myessence,
factthatI knownothing
elsewhich
pertains
toit (ATVII,8; HR I, 138).
doespertain
really
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
50I
502
STEVEN
J. WAGNER
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
503
Everybodyis extended.
(I .z), (Q).
(G) [Asabove.]
(z.i) Everymindthinks.
extension
but
(z.z) I havea c & d conception
whichattributes
to bodies.
failsto attribute
thought
(2.3)
thenext
throughout
See S andHooker'sarticlein Hooker,op. cit.Thesearerelevant
twoparagraphs.
504
STEVEN J. WAGNER
(NT)
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
505
(dJ)
transcendental
properties;
(d,)
negativeproperties;
(d3)
modes of fI,
(d4)
fn;
This does not hold forthe shapeless,sizelesswhole of res extensa.See W, i66-68. For
op. cit.,pp. 14-z6.
moreon modes,see S, 21-z3, z6, andWilliams,
PrinciplesI, 53 permitstoo easy a proofof dualismfromthe factthatthoughtis not a
mode of extension,or thatextensionis not one of thought.Descartesmusthave seen
that the conjunctionof this Principlewith his theoryof modes begs the question in
favorof dualism.
AT IV, izo;
PL
I5z).
Now thisrestriction
seemsnot to be
Everybodyis extended.
(3.z)
Cartesian
doubtis meant.
notbenegative
ortranscendental.
Also,p must
9 Onemight
lookfora notion
ofcompleteness
intermediate
between
thetwoI have
thusalsoforsomething
I havebeen
somehow
between
theA andBreadings.
described,
a coherent
unable
tofind
third
way.
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
507
unextended
thing.
(3.3) Anymindcan existas a thinking,
of possibly
(NE) Whateveris extendedlacks the property
beingunextended.
(C) No mindis a body.
(4)
(G') [Asabove.]
(4.i)
Everymindthinks.
whichattributes
(4.z) I have a complete,
c & d conception
and failsto attribute
thought
to bodies.
extension
unthinking
thing.
(4.3) Anybody'canexistas an extended,
of possiblybeing
(NT) Whateverthinkslacks theproperty
unthinking.
(C) [As above.]
Of coursethisis onlyone faceofSep (remember
theB version).I find
itprettier
foritsvisionof twofundamental
pointswhichI hopeare at
leastplausible,althoughI cannotsupportthemhere.
itself
whichrules
(i) Thereis simply
nothing
intheconceptofthought
out extension
or eventellsus thatwhatthinksis possiblyunextended.
do not
things
Similarly,
thereis no directwayto concludethatextended
or neednotthink.
is not
(ii) To forma concept,
howeverclear,ofmindonlyas thinking
at all to see thepossibility
mind.One mightevensay
ofan unextended
ofwhatis (objectively)
thatthestepfromthisconception
to knowledge
possibleis so bigthatwe needGod's helpto takeit.
I counttheseamongDescartes'sbestinsights
and wouldjudgetheir
of failureto appreciate
them.ButDescartes's
depthby thepersistence
own appreciation
is tenuous.It disappearsin theB version,whereat
of mindsis inferred
leastthepossiblenonextension
at once,groundlesslyinmyview.How Descartescouldspoilhisownideais thestoryof
SectionIII. First,letus considerSep's neglected
twin.
II. The Divisibility
Argument
I gatherthatDiv is usuallyreadlikethis:
(5)
(5.i)
Everybodyis divisible.
is givenintheFifthMeditation.
ButhowdoesDescartesget(5.z)?
5o8
STEVEN J. WAGNER
He is sometimes
heldto arguefromtheintrospected
simplicity
ofhis
ownsoul.'0Butthatone shouldbe able to introspect
simplicity
is most
implausible,
and Descartes'sdiscussions
ofintrospection
do notsuggest
otherwise.
His usual objectsof introspection
are "ideas" and faculties
is quitesomething
(e.g.,AT VII, 53-54; HR I, I72), and simplicity
else.
Besides,an appealto introspection
is hardto discernat HR I, i96 and
harderelsewhere
(AT VII, I3; HR I, I4i; AT XI, 35i; HR I, 345; AT
is a moreor lessdirectintuiVII, 5zo; HR II, 3I3). Another
possibility
tionof(5.z). This,however,
wouldsaddleDescarteswitha claimto c &
d perception
whichis unlikely
evenbyhis standards.
How couldindivisibility
possiblyseemto followjustfromthedefinition
of mindas a
thinking
thing?One wouldhaveto wonderwhyDescartesbothersto
arguefordualismat all. Thereis also a moresubtletextualproblem
here.If (C) followsfromtwo immediate
itemsof c & d perception
(5.z)), Div wouldbe farmorestraightforward
thanSep (particu((5.I),
larlyas on HR I, i90). Therewouldbe littlechancethenofexplaining
whySep evenappears,letalonewhyitreceives
topbilling.Theobvious
routesto (5.z) are therefore
unacceptable.
(The othersI haveheardin
conversation
aremoreeasilyrefuted
A fresh
thanthosejustconsidered).
look at Div in theSixthMeditation
seemsto be in order.
we maybeginanyreconstruction
witha premiseaboutthe
Certainly
ofbody.We shallseethatdepending
on exactlyhowwe cast
divisibility
theargument,
thenecessary
ofbodiesmaybe usefulevenfor
divisibility
thenon-modal
formof (C), unlikein (5) or in theparallelcasesof (3. I)
and(4.i). Thus:
(6.i)
(Necessarily,)
everybodyis divisible.
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
509
I admitthatDescartes'swordingalone does not dictatethisinterpretation.But thisway he does nothave too easy an intuitionof theindivisibilityof minds,so thereis no dangerthatDiv will be simplerthanSep.
What I am in factproposing,of course,is thatthe argumentsformindin the SixthMeditationare at bottomalike. In argubody distinctness
ment(3) a certainproperty,extension,is attributedto bodies, and we
thennote thatit does not belongto minds- as faras we can tell,anyway. (Analogouslyfor argument(4).) (6.i) attributeddivisibilityto
bodies, and Descartes's next observationis thatthispropertydoes not
visiblybelong to minds. Again the concept of mind involvedmust be
clear,distinct,and complete.Thus,
(6.z)
[as usual,]
indivisiblething.
Anymindcan existas a thinking,
Therefore,
(C)
5IO
No mindis a body.
STEVEN J. WAGNER
(b)
(c)
(d)
If Div does take two forms,is the one with (INC) analogous
to the B formof Sep as (6) is analogous to the A form?
DESCARTES
AND
MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
5 II
(INCP)
So:
With this we reach the heart of the matter.It is clear that (INCP) is
strongerthan (6.z), but if it is even roughlythe sense of (INC), thenas
far as I can see, Descartes still gets nowhere without (G'). Nothing
about how thingsobjectivelyare follows fromhis inabilityto see or
conceiveanything;thisis just the gap that (G') bridges.If thisis right,
thenit is less criticalwhetherDiv beginswith(6.z) as opposed to (INC)
because (G'), the most characteristicfeatureof Descartes's reasoning,
is thereeitherway. But thereis one interesting
difference.
(INCP) and
(G') would give Descartes:
(6.3 a) Anymindcan existas a thinkingthingwhichis not evenpossiblydivisible.
Readers may verifythat (assumingeven the weaker formof (6.i)) (C)
can now be reachedwithsomethingconsiderablysimplerthan (ND) or
(NB)." The use of (INCP) would thereforeminimizethe dangers of
Descartes'simplicitrelianceon modal principles.
We now have thefollowingpicture.Thereare two versionsof Div in
in thatone protheMeditations,alike in theiruse of (G') and different
makes a
ceeds froma somewhatstrongerpremise.But this difference
difference
only at a point (the introductionof (ND) or somethinganal-
If we interpret
the
Descartes'smodaltalkvia standardpossibleworldssemantics,
oftheaccessibility
suffices.
relation
symmetry
5I2
STEVEN J. WAGNER
cal Research.)
'3
What about the possible nonmentalityof bodies expressedby (2.3) and (4.3)? One
mighttake it to be obvious anyway,so that (4.I), (4.3), and (NT) allow Descartesa
proofof dualismwhich avoids (G'). But aside fromthe factthatin thiscontext(NT)
(4.3) is not so easilyhad. Descarteswould rightly
would be virtuallyquestion-begging,
but ifall a methodicaldoubterhas to go on are his c &
regard(4.3) as uncontroversial,
d conceptsof thoughtand extension,theproofof (4.3) would be just as remarkableas
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
5I 3
'4
5I4
STEVEN J. WAGNER
and
(ii)
(iii)
or
and Descartes'streatmentof dualism is largelythe productof running
thesetogether.We alreadyknow that (i) is the startingpoint forthe A
version(in form(3)), while the B versioncan startwith (iii) or with(ii)
(fromwhich (iii) followsby (NE)). The assimilationof (i) to (ii) or (iii)
therefore
givesthetwo versionsseeminglyidenticalfirststeps.Now this
in turninducesthe further
conflationof (G') withthe divineguarantee.
God would be a deceiverif mindswere necessarilyextendedin spiteof
(ii); if (i) is misreadas (ii), then the principlewhich assures Descartes
that minds can be extendedif he has (i) can be identifiedwith what
would guaranteethe same conclusiongiventhe conception(ii). (Similarlyfor(i) and (iii).) This is whyDescartesmistakes(G') foran expression of God's veracity,and hencewhyeach versionof Sep appears as no
moreto himthanan applicationof the divineguaranteeto a c & d perceptionof "mind apart frombody."
To explain the apparentlegitimacyof (G') in the A versionis not to
explain why the B version also invokes God's benevolence.Here I
believewe findDescartesat his mostconfused.When he slipsintotheB
version,thinkinghe has not materiallychangedthe argument,a misapplicationof theguaranteeis the nearestthingto his use of (G') in theA
version.Of coursethismakes no sense; but we can now understandthe
of Descartes's position.He needs to overlookthe difference
instability
between(i) and (ii) to accept (G') in the firstplace, but once the difference is gone (G') is unnecessary- the independenceof mind from
body can be c & d perceivedwithoutGod's help. Yet Descartescannot
just abandon (G') and stickto the B version,withor withouta premise
about divine veracity,because he continuesto sense that (i), which
entailsdependenceon (G'), is all he is entitledto. The vacillationwe
have foundis builtinto the heartof Descartes's reasoning.
Confusionbetween (i) and (ii) or (iii) is promotedby Descartes's
To be sure,
notoriouslyimagisticapproach to mental representation.
his "ideas" are nonphysical,and it is unclearwhetheranyof themare in
any sensementalimages,but various familiarweaknessesof his philosophy can be traced to an imagisticmodel of thought.Notably, Descartes mishandlesthe distinctionbetween concepts and propositions,
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
5I 5
Is See especiallyMeditationsIII and V, passim,which draw on medievalsources.A particularlyfinediscussionof some aspects of Descartes's positionhere is in W, I07-I9.
Kenny,op. cit.,pp. 146-56 is also helpful.
i6 The relationbetweenideas of particularmindsand of mind generally
is actuallyvery
problematicin Descartes,but I thinkI can make mypointwithoutgettinginvolvedin
theseintricacies.
5i6
STEVEN J. WAGNER
'7
and Margaret
Wilson.
I thankWrightNeely,StephenSchiffer,
For theircomments
andilluminating
ofthecomWilsonalsohelpedbywriting
themostsubtle,judicious,
I havecited.
mentaries
DESCARTES
AND MIND-BODY
DISTINCTNESS
5I7