Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
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2655
Complainant: Leonard W. Richards
Respondent: Atty. Patricio A. Asoy
November 11, 1985
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
A.C. No. 5379
May 9, 2003
Complainant: Walter T. Young
Respondents: Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno Llantino, Franklin Q.
Susa
FACTS: On December 29, 2000, complainant filed a complaint for disbarment
against respondents for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court
and violating the lawyers oath. Complainant is the private prosecutor in a
murder case where respondents Llantino and Batuegas were the counsel for
the accused. On December 13, 2000, respondents files a Manifestation with
Motion for Bail alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a
person in authority and is under detention. However, after verification with
the NBI, complainant learned that the accused surrendered only on
December 14, 2000. Moreover, there was lack of notice of hearing to the
complainant. Respondents argued that they fetched the accused on
December 13 but due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI office only at
2:00am the next day. After the case was submitted to the IBP for
investigation, respondents were found guilty of deliberate falsehood and were
recommended for suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of falsehood
HELD: YES. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar the he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court. Respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities
expected from them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for
Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that
accused had voluntarily surrendered and was under detention. Such artifice
was a deliberate use to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice,
violating Rule 10.01 of the CPR. Respondents also failed to show any good
cause to justify the non-observance of the 3-day notice rule. Under Rule
10.03 of the CPR, lawyers are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after
Respondent had finished
his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in
1981), allegedly to
ensure a stable future for them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had
not lived together
as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take
the Bar. In his
application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the
examinations
but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter
No. 78, claiming
that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus,
was unworthy
to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also
alleged that
after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received
on 7 June
1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6).
Therein, he
admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but
that the
marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed
with his law
studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep
stable our
future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his
application to take the
Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as
single since my
marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He
further averred
that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
"Explanation," for
which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case,
this time praying
for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid
marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a
mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already
married in his application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he
submitted to the Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing
of the affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later
on
the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not
sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced
me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he
wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar
Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter
recommended the
indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from
Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar
Examinations that he
was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter
bad faith, for
which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the
Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly
making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with
his application
for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would
have disqualified
him outrightfrom taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack
of good moral
character.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the
various pleadings
CANON 11
On December 11, 2001, the court En Banc issued the following Resolution
justice.
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is
not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
It is respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
[20]
justice
and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and
democracy.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of
court and is hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas accused Justice
Nazario of deciding the case through considerations other than the pure
merits of the case. He averred that we will never understand what moved
the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what forces and influences
caused her to reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as
to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme
Court, as a venerable institution of justice. He then ended by mocking her
when he said sleep well if you still can and that her earthly life will [be]
judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where only the merits of Your
Honors life will be relevant and material and where technicalities can shield
no one from his or her wrongdoings.
As to the Court, supposedly the last vanguard and bulwark of justice, he
likewise accuses it of making itself, wittingly or unwittingly, a party to the
wrongdoing by giving official and judicial sanction and conformity to the
unjust claims of the adverse party. He added: This is an unjust and unfair
decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an impossible
decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate
administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an
administrator of justice, the Supreme Court is ironically a dispenser of
injustice.
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario,
to the other members of the High Court and to the High Court itself as a
revered institution and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he was merely
exercising his right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide
and fair criticism of the Honorable Courts ruling. He explained that his
criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith with no intention
whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of the Court.
Instead of resorting to public criticism through media exposure, he chose to
ventilate his criticism in a very discreet and private manner by writing a
personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds
of decency and propriety.
We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas unsatisfactory. The accusation against
Justice Nazario is clearly without basis. The attack on the person of Justice
Nazario has caused her pain and embarrassment. His letter is full of
contemptuous remarks tending to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode
public confidence that should be accorded it.
To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his
rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these
rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter
contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed
against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of
such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor
and confidence therein.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
In the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have been
made mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By
his unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking
of the Court for allegedly being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of
injustice, he abused his liberty of speech.
The fact that his letters were merely addressed to the Justices of this Court
and were not disseminated to the media is of no moment. Letters addressed
to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial
functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for
the entire court.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Romeo G. Roxas guilty of indirect
contempt of court under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,
CANON 12
[11]
that respondent failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered
the complaint despite several chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was
unfit and unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of
the bar. The CBD recommended a suspension of six months with a stern
warning that repetition of similar acts would merit a more severe
sanction. It also recommended that respondent be ordered to return to
complainant theP18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the
complainants son and the P30,000 attorneys fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent be
ordered to return to complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he
received as attorneys fees.
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges
against him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to
answer and refute the accusations of professional misconduct against him. In
doing so, he failed to observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper.
His propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and
disrespect for the proceedings of the CBD.
He displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to this Court which is the
source of the CBDs authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not
only irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and
[13]
his fellow lawyers.
His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called
upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in
[14]
complying with court directives as an officer of the court.
Respondent
should have known that the orders of the CBD (as the investigating arm of
the Court in administrative cases against lawyers) were not mere requests
but directives which should have been complied with promptly and
completely.
After accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his
attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective
and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent
abandoned the cause of his client.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not
only of dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis
John Bellezas right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article
III of the Constitution, and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules
12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective
immediately.
A.C. No. 7054
CONRADO QUE,
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.
Respondent.
December 4, 2009
[1]
In a complaint for disbarment,
Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of
committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
[5]
n his Answer,
the respondent declared that he is a member of the
Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for
the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the
marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases
formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the
unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the
complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present
clients were the defendants.
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held
liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and
the penalty these transgressions should carry.
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the
Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly
administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action
of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law
profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which
he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the
interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything
else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration
of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated
December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for
professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules
10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01,
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21
and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the
IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the
practice of law.
Atty. Venida was required to comment on the complaint against him. In his
[4]
belated and partial compliance
with the February 17, 1992 resolution, Atty.
Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his supposed infractions.
for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A.
Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year,
effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is furtherSTERNLY
WARNEDthat a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
n March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against
Servier Philippines, Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No.
30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for reinstatement
or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages.
[2]
On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.
It held that
Ebanen voluntarily resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally
dismissed.
Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On
March 31, 2003, the NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter
Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter- complaint
addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that
respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum
shopping and res judicata.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty.
Relamida, filed a second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal
based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier,
[14]
On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.
Both
respondents admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. They
claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void
for want of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was
ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount
to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process.
As a result, they claimed that there was also no violation of the rule on forum
shopping.
On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on
the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping. It further reiterated that
Ebanen voluntarily resigned from employment and was not constructively
dismissed.
Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a
violation of the rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality.
It contended that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the
same act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are being
made to defend themselves in a case that has been settled before the labor
tribunals and courts.
Servier prayed that Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse
of the processes of the courts.
On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP- CBD)
recommended that respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida
was guilty of violating the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. It
concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of recourse to
the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected
by the courts.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
with modification as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it
recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum
shopping.
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping
and violation of the rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained
from filing the second complaint against Servier. He ought to have known
that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. He was aware of all the proceedings which the
first complaint went through as by his own admission, he participated in the
preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen
[21]
occasionally.
He knew that the decision in the subject case had already
attained finality.
he filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless
to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which
obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects
himself to disciplinary
action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of
his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to
maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent
with truth and honor.
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation
of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04
of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP,
which found respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the
Rules on Res Judicata and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective
upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
CANON 13
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on
2
their Statement, which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Courts proper disposition. Considering the
defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the
past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in
administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open
court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents
invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents
are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of
young aspiring attorneys that respondents own non-observance of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of
intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
[6]
and alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him
was because she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G.
Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any
information from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of
harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him
the following invectives before the other employees of the court: Walang
kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob,
pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong; and she insisted that he sign a
prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was
revealed that Judge Paas husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using
his wifes office as his office address in his law practice,
[18]
By Resolution of February 12, 2002,
the Court referred the matter to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges
against Almarvez of exacting money from detainees, violating confidentiality
of official communication, absence without official leave, discourtesy and
insubordination. Given Almarvez unsatisfactory performance ratings for three
[21]
[22]
rating periods covering January to June 2000,
July to December 2000,
[23]
and January to April 2001,
however, the OCA recommended that he be
duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties
with One (1) Month suspension without pay, instead of dismissal
With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for
lack of supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of
maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found,
however, that Judge Paas had used her administrative power of supervision
and control over court personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and
[24]
pettiness
when she issued her September 7, 2000 Memorandum
ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had already filed an
administrative case against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the
purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish
for evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against
him.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of
simple misconduct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
This Courts Findings:
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended
by the OCA, is thus in order.
By Judge Paas own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit,
[31]
she was aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to
receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a Pasay court. As the
OCA puts it, [w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could be
interpreted as a subtle way of sending a
message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and
should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel.
By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before
other courts, Judge Paas indeed allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for
purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and
deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the
court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a
member of the judiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Canon 13a LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPERITY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES
THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case, instead of banking on
his relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives
the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is
unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to
enhance a lawyers prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of
inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;
(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is hereby
REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely;
For consideration of this Court are several motions for reconsideration of our
Decision dated September 9, 2008, sanctioning several justices of the Court
of Appeals (CA) for improprieties or irregularities in connection with CA G.R.SP No. 103692, entitled Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al. (the Meralco-GSIS case).
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
(Presiding Justice Vasquez) prays that the findings against him in our Decision
be reconsidered and set aside and that the penalty of severe reprimand
imposed upon him be removed.
The Panel found that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the
leadership expected of him as head of the CA.
First, the CA en bancs decision referring the propriety of the actions of the
Justices concerned to this Court does not show that the investigation should
exclude Presiding Justice Vasquez. No CA justices were specified, and in order
to get to the bottom of the truth, the investigation had to be full-blown.
Second, during the proceedings, Presiding Justice Vasquez showed his
incapacity to lead the CA. As the Panel found, he was indecisive in dealing
with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He vacillated and temporized
[
in resolving the chairmanship impasse.