Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Facts:
instead requested for a resetting which was granted. The Company was directed anew to submit
its financial statements for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978.
The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to the
withdrawal of the Company's counsel of record, Atty. Rodolfo
dela Cruz. On May 24, 1978, Atty. Fortunato Panganiban
formally entered his appearance as counsel for the Company
only to request for another postponement allegedly for the
purpose of acquainting himself with the case. Meanwhile, the
Company submitted its position paper on May 28, 1979.
When the case was called for hearing on June 4, 1979 as
scheduled, the Company's representative, Mr. Ching, who
was supposed to be examined, failed to appear. Atty.
Panganiban then requested for another postponement
which the labor arbiter denied. He also ruled that the Company
has waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore,
considered the case submitted for resolution.
On July 18, 1979, labor arbiter Andres Fidelino submitted its
report to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 20,
d)
MUEWA did not, however, end with the Order of July 5. 1967,
but more than ever developed into a more pressing problem of
union leadership because 1) Augusto Carreon also claimed to
be the president of the MUEWA by virtue of the affiliation of
his MACATIFU members with MUEWA. Only the UNWU in 2)
The records also reveal that even the ranks of MFWU in
respondent Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc. was
divided between those supporting Ceferino Ramos and
Cornelio Dizon who both claimed the presidency in said
union. 3) Respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation was then
enjoying relative peace as Jose Roque was solely recognized as
the union's president. The events that followed are hereinafter
stated in chronological order for a clearer understanding of the
present situation.
On March 14, 1967, the management of respondent Marcelo
Steel Corporation received a letter requesting the
negotiation of a new CBA together with a draft thereof, from
the PSSLU president, Antonio Diaz, for and in behalf of
UNWU whose CBA was to expire the following day. Similar
letters and proposals were, likewise, sent to the management of
respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation for and in
behalf of MACATIFU, and to respondent Marcelo Rubber and
Latex Products for and in behalf of MFWU, whose respective
CBAs were both to expire on June 5, 1967.
However, on that very same day of March 14, 1967, the
management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation received a letter from the UNWU president, Jose
Roque, disauthorizing the PSSLU from representing his union.
Then, on April 14, 1967, Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA requested
negotiation of a new CBA with respondent Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation, submitting therewith his union's own
proposals.
Again, on May 3, 1967, the management of respondents Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation and Marcelo Rubber and Latex
declared a strike
Marcelo Companies.
LAKAS
10
13. That the above unfair labor practice acts of respondents are
in violation of Section 4, subsections 1, 4 and 6 in relation to
Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875.
12. That the union members listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C"
hereof were not able to secure substantial employment in spite
of diligent efforts exerted by them;
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
On October 24, 1991, the union, through its legal counsel, wrote
private respondent a letter demanding that it should "fulfill its
pledge of sincerity to the union by granting an across-the-board
wage increases (sic) to all employees under the wage orders."
The union reiterated that it had agreed to "retain the old provision
of CBA" on the strength of private respondent's "promise and
assurance" of an across-the-board salary increase should the
government mandate salary increases. 4Several conferences
between the parties notwithstanding, private respondent
adamantly maintained its position on the salary increases it had
granted that were purportedly designed to avoid wage distortion.
Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC
alleging that private respondent's act of "reneging on its
undertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor
practice through bargaining in bad faith." It charged private
respondent with acts of unfair labor practices or violation of
Article 247 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically
"bargaining in bad faith," and prayed that it be awarded actual,
moral and exemplary damages. 5 In its position paper, the union
added that it was charging private respondent with "violation of
Article 100 of the Labor Code." 6
Private respondent, on the other hand, contended that in
implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, it had avoided "the
existence of a wage distortion" that would arise from such
implementation. It emphasized that only "after a reasonable
length of time from the implementation" of the wage orders "that
the union surprisingly raised the question that the company
should have implemented said wage orders on an across-theboard basis." It asserted that there was no agreement to the
effect that future wage increases mandated by the government
should be implemented on an across-the-board basis.
Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated and
expressly stipulated in the CBA. It quoted the provision of the
CBA that reflects the parties' intention to "fully set forth" therein
all their agreements that had been arrived at after negotiations
that gave the parties "unlimited right and opportunity to make
23
24
STRUCTURE
OF
THE
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
A perusal of the allegations and arguments raised by UFEDFA-KMU in the Memorandum (in G.R. Nos. 158930-31) will
readily disclose the need for the presentation of evidence other
than its bare contention of unfair labor practice in order to make
certain the propriety or impropriety of the ULP charge hurled
against Nestl. Under Rule XIII, Sec. 4, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code:
36
This Court is not convinced by the argument raised by UFE-DFAKMU that the DOLE Secretary should not have gone beyond the
disagreement on the ground rules of the CBA negotiations. The
union doggedly asserts that the entire labor dispute between
herein parties concerns only the ground rules.
Had the parties not been at the stage where the substantive
provisions of the proposed CBA had been put in issue, the union
would not have based thereon its initial notice to strike. This
Court maintains its original position in the Decision that, based
on the Notices of Strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU, the Secretary of
the DOLE rightly decided on matters of substance. That the
union later on changed its mind is of no moment because to give
premium to such would make the legally mandated discretionary
power of the Dole Secretary subservient to the whims of the
parties.
37
38
On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules
for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped the
negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new
group of employees had filed a petition for certification election
(Ibid, p. 3).
On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. On July 2, 1996,
public respondent the Secretary of Labor and Employment
assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including
the union president to return to work and for petitioner to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions before the
actual strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except
Ambas. The parties then submitted their pleadings including their
position papers which were filed on July 17, 1996 ( Ibid, pp. 2-3).
On December 2, 1996, public respondent issued an order
declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts
and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with
backwages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in an Order dated May 29, 1997 (Petition, pp. 8-9)." [1]
Having been denied its motion for reconsideration, petitioner
sought a review of the order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment. The dispositive portion of the decision
of the Court of Appeals sets forth:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Petition is
DISMISSED, for being without merit in fact and in law.With cost
to petitioner. SO ORDERED.[2]
Hence, petitioner comes to this Court for redress.
Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of
Appeals:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING
39
40
41
the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall
have been validly executed.[9] Hence, the contract bar rule still
applies.[10] The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of
the workers and the company by preventing frequent
modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good
faith and for the stipulated original period. [11]
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from
1989-1994. The petition for certification election by ACEC,
allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26,
1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom
period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred by the existence of a
valid
and
existing
collective
bargaining
agreement.
Consequently, there is no legitimate representation issue and, as
such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not
constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation. Reliance, therefore,
by petitioner of the ruling in Lakas Ng Manggagawang
Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises[12] is misplaced since that
case involved a legitimate representation issue which is not
present in the case at bar.
Significantly, the same petition for certification election was
dismissed by the Secretary of Labor on October 25, 1996. The
dismissal was upheld by this Court in a Resolution, dated April
21, 1997.[13]
In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is guilty
of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in good faith
with respondent union.
Concerning the issue on the validity of the termination of the
union president, we hold that the dismissal was effected in
violation of the employees' right to self-organization.
To justify the dismissal, petitioner asserts that the union
president was terminated for cause, allegedly for insubordination
for her failure to comply with the new working schedule assigned
to her, and pursuant to its managerial prerogative to discipline
and/or dismiss its employees. While we recognize the right of the
42
43
reminded the Bank, how the Union got what it wanted in 1987,
and stated that if need be, the Union would go through the same
route to get what it wanted.16
Upon the Banks insistence, the parties agreed to tackle the
economic package item by item. Upon the Unions suggestion,
the Bank indicated which provisions it would accept, reject, retain
and agree to discuss.17 The Bank suggested that the Union
prioritize its economic proposals, considering that many of such
economic provisions remained unresolved. The Union, however,
demanded that the Bank make a revised itemized proposal.
In the succeeding meetings, the Union made the following
proposals:
Wage Increase:
1st Year Reduced from 45% to 40%
2nd Year - Retain at 20%
Total = 60%
Group Hospitalization Insurance:
Maximum disability benefit reduced
to P60,000.00 per illness annually
from P75,000.00
Death Assistance:
For the employee Reduced from P50,000.00 to P45,000.00
For Immediate Family Member Reduced from P30,000.00
to P25,000.00
Dental and all others No change from the original demand.
18
44
Union
Wage Increase
1st Year P1,050.00 40%
19.0%23
Diokno stated that, in order for the Bank to make a better offer,
the Union should clearly identify what it wanted to be included in
the total economic package. Umali replied that it was impossible
to do so because the Banks counter-proposal was
unacceptable. He furthered asserted that it would have been
easier to bargain if the atmosphere was the same as before,
where both panels trusted each other. Diokno requested the
Union panel to refrain from involving personalities and to instead
focus on the negotiations.24 He suggested that in order to break
the impasse, the Union should prioritize the items it wanted to
iron out. Divinagracia stated that the Bank should make the first
move and make a list of items it wanted to be included in the
economic package. Except for the provisions on signing bonus
and uniforms, the Union and the Bank failed to agree on the
remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The Union declared
a deadlock25 and filed a Notice of Strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on June 21, 1993,
docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-06-380-93.26
On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor
Practice (ULP) and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila,
docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-06-04191-93 against the Union
on June 28, 1993. The Bank alleged that the Union violated its
duty to bargain, as it did not bargain in good faith. It contended
that the Union demanded "sky high economic demands,"
indicative ofblue-sky bargaining.27 Further, the Union violated its
no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the
NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of strike was an
illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Finally, the
Bank alleged that as a consequence of the illegal act, the Bank
suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced to litigate
and hire the services of the lawyer.28
45
46
47
The issues presented for resolution are the following: (a) whether
or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor
practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged
"interference" with its choice of negotiator; surface bargaining;
making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal to furnish
the Union with copies of the relevant data; (b) whether or not the
public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the
assailed order and resolutions; and, (c) whether or not the
petitioner is estopped from filing the instant action.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
"Interference" under Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code
The petitioner asserts that the private respondent committed
ULP, i.e., interference in the selection of the Unions negotiating
panel, when Cielito Diokno, the Banks Human Resource
Manager, suggested to the Unions President Eddie L.
Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., President of the NUBE, be
excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. In support of its
claim, Divinagracia executed an affidavit, stating that prior to the
commencement of the negotiation, Diokno approached him and
suggested the exclusion of Umali from the Unions negotiating
panel, and that during the first meeting, Diokno stated that the
negotiation be kept a "family affair."
Citing the cases of U.S. Postal Service36 and Harley Davidson
Motor Co., Inc., AMF,37 the Union claims that interference in the
choice of the Unions bargaining panel is tantamount to ULP.
In the aforecited cases, the alleged ULP was based on the
employers violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),38 which pertain to the interference,
restraint or coercion of the employer in the employees exercise
of their rights to self-organization and to bargain collectively
48
Article 2
1. Workers and employers organizations shall enjoy adequate
protection against any acts or interference by each other or
each others agents or members in their establishment,
functioning or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the
establishment of workers organizations under the domination
of employers or employers organizations or to support workers
organizations by financial or other means, with the object of
placing such organizations under the control of employers or
employers organizations within the meaning of this Article.
The aforcited ILO Conventions are incorporated in our Labor
Code, particularly in Article 243 thereof, which provides:
ART. 243. COVERAGE AND EMPLOYEES RIGHT TO SELFORGANIZATION. All persons employed in commercial,
industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious,
charitable, medical or educational institutions whether
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to selforganization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed
people, rural workers and those without any definite employers
may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and
protection.
and Articles 248 and 249 respecting ULP of employers and labor
organizations.
49
50
The Union, did not, as the Labor Code requires, send a written
request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Banks
rank and file employees. Moreover, as alleged by the Union, the
fact that the Bank made use of the aforesaid guestimates,
amounts to a validation of the data it had used in its presentation.
No Grave Abuse of Discretion On the Part of the Public
Respondent
The special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the
proceeding.56 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough.57
While it is true that a showing of prejudice to public interest is not
a requisite for ULP charges to prosper, it cannot be said that the
public respondent acted in capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof.
Neither was it shown that the public respondent exercised its
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility.
Estoppel not Applicable In the Case at Bar
The respondent Bank argues that the petitioner is estopped from
raising the issue of ULP when it signed the new CBA. Article
1431 of the Civil Code provides:
51
52
53
54
55
6. On May 19, 1986, GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLUPSSLU) Federation ... filed a Certification Election petition
(ANNEX J), but as found by Med-Arbiter Candido M. Cumba in
its (sic) Order dated Ju ne 11, 1986 (ANNEX K), without having
complied (sic) the subscription requirement for which it was
merely considered an intervenor until compliance thereof in the
other petition for direct recogbnition as bargaining agent filed
on MAy 28, 1986 by southern Philippines Federation of Labor
(SPFL) as found in the same order (ANNEX K);
7. Int he meantime, the Collective Bargaining Agreement
executed by ALU and GAW Trading Inc. (ANNEX F) was duly
filed May 27, 1986 with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
in Region VII, Cebu city;
8. Nevertheless, Med-Arbiter Candido M. Cumba in his order of
June 11, 1986 (Annex K) ruled for the holding of a ceritfication
election in all branches of GAW Trading Inc. in Cebu City, as to
which ALU filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 19,
1986 (ANNEX L) which was treated as an appeal on that
questioned Order for which reason the entire record of subject
certification case was forwarded for the Director, Bureau of
56
57
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
58
59
60
1. The NLRC, and before it, the Labor Arbiter acted without
jurisdiction in resolving this case, jurisdiction over which is
vested exclusively on another judicial authority. (p. 10, Rollo78524)
2.
Assuming arguendo that
public
respondents
have
jurisdiction, they miserably failed to make a sufficient and valid
findings of facts upon which they could reasonably base their
conclusions. (p. 15,Id.)
3. Assuming arguendo that public respondents made sufficient
and valid findings of facts, such findings are clearly and
manifestly erroneous and absolutely devoid of evidentiary
support. (p. 16,Id.) .
a. Total absence of evidence to support conclusion of unfair
labor practice.
b. The finding of bad faith has no basis; Planters's decision to
amend its retirement plan was prompted by its benevolent
desire to give more benefits to its employees. (p. 18, Id.)
4. Public respondents committed gross errors of law in that
(a) Under its express provision, the Retirement Plan may be
amended unilaterally and the validity and enforceability of the
amendment are not nullified by a mere formal defect. (p.
20, Id.)
(b) Private respondents are estopped from questioning the
validity of the amendment to the Retirement Plan. (p. 24, Id.)
(c) The rule on non-diminution of benefits does not apply to a
modification of a provision in the CBA voluntarily negotiated
and entered into by the parties. (p. 26, Id.)
(d) Continued employment is a condition sine qua non to
entitlement to the liquidation proceeds of the Retirement Fund;
non-employees at the time of liquidation are no longer
participants in the Retirement Plan and are, therefore, not
entitled to liquidation proceeds. (p. 28, Id.)
NOT
THE
THE
THE
61
PPI next contends that this should be a purely civil suit against
the duly designated corporate trustee because it is specifically
against the Retirement Fund which was separately administered
and managed by said trustee.
The first issue to resolve is whether or not the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over the present suit.
62
The incumbents from the start of the RPP until its liquidation,
were: Messrs. M.B. Cortes, M.C. Ortega, H.G. Buhay, N.Q.
Dungca, J.L. Montelibano and Roberto Orig (Exh. "P-1") They
are agents of PPI. Hence, PPI is the proper party-respondent in
this action. (p. 50, Rollo-78524)
Having determined that the public respondents have jurisdiction
over the present case, we now proceed to the other issues.
PPI questions the findings of fact of the public respondents. The
NLRC merely adopted the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter.
It is a well-established doctrine that the findings of fact of
administrative agencies are binding on this Court if supported by
substantial evidence. (Llobecera v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 76271, June 28, 1988; PALEA v. Calleja,
G.R. No. 76673, June 22, 1988; Continental Marble Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-43825, May 9,
1988; Casin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No.
L-46556, May 28, 1988; and Asim B. Castro, G.R. Nos. 7506364, June 30, 1988)
After a close perusal of the records of this petition, we find no
reason to depart from the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter.
The findings were mainly based upon the stipulation of facts
reached by the parties.
Art. XVI, CBA for 1984- 1987). (pp. 7 & 158, Rollo -78524). The
prior CBAs from 1975 upwards granted a termination allowance,
upon the employee's separation, of at least three (3) weeks to
one (1) month's pay for each year of service depending upon the
total years of service. (p. 76, Rollo-78524)
The provisions of the 1978-1984 CBAs (Exhibits "A" to "A-2"),
Art. XVI, Secs. 1 and 2, uniformly read:
ARTICLE XVI. TERMINATION ALLOWANCE
Section 1. A regular employee who is separated from the
service of the COMPANY shall be given a termination pay
which shall depend on the length of his service and shall be
computed as follows:
Employees with: Amount of Allowance
1-5 years service 3 weeks pay for each year of service
6-9 years service 4 months plus 1 month for each year of
service after the fifth year
10 or more years One month pay for each year
service of service
The termination pay shall be based upon the employee's basic
pay at the time of his termination.
Section 2. An employee who is temporarily laid off, discharged
for cause, resigns or retires from the service of the COMPANY
will not be entitled to any termination pay. (p. 54, Rollo-78524)
The crux of the petition is to determine whether or not the 19841987 CBA was validly entered into and to determine: 1) the
terminal benefits due to the employees, and 2) whether or not
there was an unfair labor practice.
If the prior CBA is applied, the complainants/complainantsintervenors who do not fall under the above stated section 2
63
64
65
On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters
decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 6715,[4] which fixed the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, the NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the
CBA draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years
beginning December 1, 1991, the date when the original CBA
ended, to November 30, 1993. The NLRC also ordered GMC to
pay the attorneys fees.[5]
In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the effectivity
of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration of a CBA, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, is five (5) years which, in the
case of GMC-Independent Labor Union was from December 1,
1988 to November 30, 1993. All other provisions of the CBA are
to be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution. Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union remained
as the exclusive bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the
economic provisions of the CBA. Consequently, it was unfair
labor practice for GMC not to enter into negotiation with the
union.
The NLRC likewise held that the individual letters of
withdrawal from the union submitted by 13 of its members from
February to June 1993 confirmed the pressure exerted by GMC
on its employees to resign from the union. Thus, the NLRC also
found GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the
right of its employees to self-organization.
With respect to the unions claim of discrimination, the NLRC
found the claim unsupported by substantial evidence.
On GMCs motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set aside its
decision of January 30, 1998, through a resolution dated October
6, 1998. It found GMCs doubts as to the status of the union
justified and the allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the
unions members to resign unfounded. Hence, the union filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. For failure of
the union to attach the required copies of pleadings and other
documents and material portions of the record to support the
allegations in its petition, the CA dismissed the petition on
66
67
occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter
shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate
status of the union. We agree with the CAs conclusion that the
ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate
that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to selforganization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair
labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to
self-organization.
Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it
imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two
years commencing from the expiration of the original CBA?
The Code provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a
collective bargaining agreement. ....It shall be the duty of
both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date]
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
(Underscoring supplied.)
The provision mandates the parties to keep the status
quo while they are still in the process of working out their
respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule is
that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to
govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is
agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other
things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith.
However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by
purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the
general rule is warranted.
In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,[13] we found that petitioner therein,
Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to submit any counter
proposal to the CBA proposed by its employees certified
bargaining agent. We ruled that the former had thereby lost its
68
December 7, 2011
DEN
GLADYS
ABARIA
et.
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Al.
vs.
69
NATIONAL
70
71
72
73
74
No. 154113, and as prayed for, the Court shall consider them
parties-petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 66540,which case has
already been decided and now subject of appeal in G.R. No.
187778.
MCCHI not guilty of unfair labor practice
Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer [t]o violate the duty to
bargain collectively as prescribed by the Code. The applicable
provision in this case is Art. 253 which provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate
nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either
party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the
agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration
date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo
and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL charged MCCHI with refusal to bargain
collectively when the latter refused to meet and convene for
purposes of collective bargaining, or at least give a counterproposal to the proposed CBA the union had submitted and
which was ratified by a majority of the union
membership. MCCHI, on its part, deferred any negotiations until
the local unions dispute with the national union federation (NFL)
is resolved considering that the latter is the exclusive bargaining
agent which represented the rank-and-file hospital employees in
CBA negotiations since 1987.
We rule for MCCHI.
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
Attorneys fees
The dismissed employees having been compelled to
litigate in order to seek redress and protect their rights, they are
entitled to reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to Art. 2208 (2) of
the Civil Code. In view of the attendant circumstances of this
case, we hold that attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 is
reasonable and justified. However, the respondents in G.R. No.
196156 are not entitled to the same relief since they did not
appeal from the CA decision which did not include the award of
attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R.
No. 187861 is DENIED while the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154113,
187778 and 196156 are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated October 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66540 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that
MCCHI is ordered to pay the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 154113 and
187778, except the petitioners who are union officers, separation
pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, and
reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00. The
Decision
dated November
7,
2008 is
likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that MCCHI is
ordered to pay the private respondents in G.R. No. 196156
separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of
service, and that the award of back wages is DELETED.
Cabuyao
Total
Plant
23
San
Plant
23
46
No
Spoiled
Segregated
41
35
Total Votes
Cast
66
58
0
2
82
[7]
76
124
83
84
85
86
suffering from business losses. They alleged that MMC did not
want to bargain collectively with the Union, so that instead of
submitting their counterproposal to the CBA, MMC decided to
terminate all union officers and active members. Petitioners
questioned the timing of their lay-off, and alleged that first, there
was no showing that cost-cutting measures were taken by MMC;
second, no criteria were employed in choosing which employees
to lay-off; and third, the individuals laid-off were those who
signed the attendance sheet of the union organizational meeting.
Petitioners likewise claimed that they were denied due process
because they were not given a 30-day notice informing them of
the lay-off. Neither was the DOLE informed of this lay-off, as
mandated by law.[9]
Respondents justified the temporary lay-off as bona fide in
character and a valid management prerogative pending the
issuance of the permit to continuously operate TP No. 7.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of MMC and held that the
temporary shutdown of the mining operation, as well as the
temporary lay-off of the employees, is valid.[10]
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) modified the judgment of the labor arbiter and ordered
the payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay for
every year of service. It ratiocinated that the temporary lay-off,
which exceeded more than six (6) months, had the effect of
severance of the employer-employee relationship. The
dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is, as it is
hereby, Vacated and Set Aside and a new one entered
ordering respondent Manila Mining Corporation to pay
the individual complainants their separation pay
computed as follows:
1.
87
P14,300/mo.
P14,300 x 7 yrs. x
P 50,050.00
2.
Myrna Maquio
From March 1992 to
July 27, 2001 = 9 yrs.
P14,000/mo.
P14,000 x 9 yrs. x
P 63,000.00
3.
Doroteo J. Torre
From July 1983 to
July 27,
2001 = 18 yrs.
P10,000/mo.
P10,000 x 18 yrs. x
P 90,000.00
4.
Arsenio Mark M. Perez
From June 1996
to
July 27, 2001 =
5 yrs.
P9,500/mo.
P9,500 x 5 yrs. x
P 23,750.00
5.
Edmundo M. Galvez From June 1997 to
July 27, 2001 = 4 yrs.
P9,500/mo.
P9,500 x 4 yrs. x
P 19,000.00
6.
Jonathan Araneta
From March 1992 to
July 27, 2001 = 9 yrs.
P15,500/mo.
P15,500 x 9 yrs. x
P 69,750.00
7.
Teresita D. Lagman
From August 1980 to
July 27, 2001 = 20
yrs.
P10,900/mo.
P10,900 x 20 yrs. x P109,000.00
8.
Gerardo Opena
From October
1997 to
P 16,500.00
9.
Edwin Tuazon
From August 1994 to
July 27, 2001 = 8 yrs.
P7,000/mo.
P7,000 x 8 yrs. x
P 28,000.00
GRAND
TOTAL
P469,050.00
In addition respondent company is hereby
ordered to pay attorneys fees to complainants
equivalent to 10% of the award. [11]
In an Order[12] dated 31 May 2004, the NLRC affirmed its
Resolution.
Dissatisfied, both parties separately filed their petitions
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 86073 and CA G.R. SP No. 86163.
The two petitions were consolidated upon motion by MMC
in a Resolution dated 3 February 2005.
In its Decision dated 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals
modified the NLRC ruling, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partially
GRANTED and the challenged Resolution dated August 29,
2003 of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 033111-(CA No. 03311102) is MODIFIED insofar as it holds MMC liable to pay the
Union attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the award, which
portion of the questioned decision is now SET ASIDE.
88
89
90
91
CBA
contained
the
following
union
security
92
93
On March 27, 1992, Casio, et al., in the name of IBMLocal 31, filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB-Regional Office
No. VII (NCMB-RO). Casio, et al. alleged as bases for the strike
the illegal dismissal of union officers and members,
discrimination, coercion, and union busting. The NCMB-RO held
conciliation proceedings, but no settlement was reached among
the parties.[12]
Casio, et al. next sought recourse from the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch VII
by filing on August 3, 1992 a Complaint against GMC and
Pino, et al. for unfair labor practice, particularly, the termination of
legitimate union officers, illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and
moral and exemplary damages. Their Complaint was docketed
as NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-08-0639-92.[13]
Finding that NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-08-0639-92 did not
undergo voluntary arbitration, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, but endorsed the same to the NCMBRO. Prior to undergoing voluntary arbitration before the NCMBRO, however, the parties agreed to first submit the case to the
grievance machinery of IBM-Local 31. On September 7, 1994,
Casio, et al. filed their Complaint with Pino, the Acting President
of IBM-Local 31. Pino acknowledged receipt of the Complaint
and assured Casio, et al. that they would be seasonably notified
of whatever decision and/or action the Board may have in the
instant case.[14] When the IBM-Local 31 Board failed to hold
grievance proceedings on the Complaint of Casio, et al., NCMB
Voluntary Arbitrator Canonoy-Morada assumed jurisdiction over
the same. The Complaint was docketed as VA Case No. AC
389-01-01-95.
Based on the Position Papers and other documents
submitted by the parties,[15] Voluntary Arbitrator Canonoy-Morada
rendered on August 16, 1995 a Voluntary Arbitration Award
dismissing the Complaint in VA Case No. AC 389-01-01-95 for
lack of merit, but granting separation pay and attorneys fees to
Casio, et al. The Voluntary Arbitration Award presented the
following findings: (1) the termination by GMC of the employment
=
=
=
=
=
Service
Total
(1/2 mo/yr of service)
April
P47,453.22
May
P29,673.00
Feb.
P37,483.80
Aug.
P41,925.57
Aug.
P34,984.88
24/74
P2,636.29
18
1980
P2,472.75
12
1977
P2,498.92
15
1975
P2,466.21
17
1978
P2,498.92
14
Obregon
May
years
=
P18,185.84
Aninipok
Sept.
years
=
P65,400.25
94
1984
P2,273.23
08
1967
P2,616.01
25
95
well supported by evidence. GMC further insists that before IBPLocal 31 expelled Casio, et al. from the union and requested
GMC to dismiss Casio, et al. from service pursuant to the closed
shop provision in the CBA, IBP-Local 31 already accorded
Casio, et al. due process, only that Casio, et al. refused to avail
themselves of such opportunity. GMC additionally maintains that
Casio, et al. were expelled by IBP-Local 31 for acts inimical to
the interest of the union, and GMC had no authority to inquire
into or rule on which employee-member is or is not loyal to the
union, this being an internal affair of the union. Thus, GMC had
to rely on the presumption that Pino, et al. regularly performed
their duties and functions as IBP-Local 31 officers and board
members, when the latter investigated and ruled on the charges
against Casio, et al.[19] GMC finally asserts that Pino, et al., the
IBP-Local 31 officers and board members who resolved to expel
Casio, et al. from the union, and not GMC, should be held liable
for the reinstatement of and payment of full backwages to
Casio, et al. for the company had acted in good faith and merely
complied with the closed shop provision in the CBA.
At this point, we take note that Pino, et al. did not appeal
from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
96
Labor
Practices
of
xxxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work,
and other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall
stop the parties from requiring membership in a
recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for
97
98
the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and
therefore illegal. Thus, petitioners must not only rely on the
weakness of respondents evidence but must stand on the
merits of their own defense. A party alleging a critical fact
must support his allegation with substantial evidence for
any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot
stand as it will offend due process. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The records of this case are absolutely bereft of any
supporting evidence to substantiate the bare allegation of GMC
that Casio, et al. were accorded due process by IBM-Local
31. There is nothing on record that would indicate that IBMLocal 31 actually notified Casio, et al. of the charges against
them or that they were given the chance to explain their side. All
that was stated in the IBM-Local 31 Resolution dated February
29, 1992, expelling Casio, et al. from the union, was that a copy
of the said letter complaint [dated February 24, 1992] was
dropped or left in front of E. Casio. [30] It was not established that
said letter-complaint charging Casio, et al. with acts inimical to
the interest of the union was properly served upon Casio, that
Casio willfully refused to accept the said letter-notice, or that
Casio had the authority to receive the same letter-notice on
behalf of the other employees similarly accused. Its worthy to
note that Casio, et al. were expelled only five days after the
issuance of the letter-complaint against them. The Court cannot
find proof on record when the three-day period, within which
Casio, et al. was supposed to file their answer or counteraffidavits, started to run and had expired. The Court is likewise
unconvinced that the said three-day period was sufficient for
Casio, et al. to prepare their defenses and evidence to refute the
serious charges against them.
Contrary to the position of GMC, the acts of Pino, et al. as
officers and board members of IBM-Local 31, in expelling
Casio, et al. from the union, do not enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, because the
presumption applies only to public officers from the highest to the
99
100
NATIONAL
LABOR
(NLRC), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
RELATIONS
101
COMMISSION,
102
103
104
105
106
Section 2. Dismissals.
xxx xxx xxx
b) Members of the Union who cease to be such members
and/or who fail to maintain their membership in good standing
therein by reason of their resignation from the Union and/or by
reason of their expulsion from the Union in accordance with the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Union, for non-payment of
union dues and other assessment for organizing, joining or
forming another labor organization shall, upon written notice of
such cessation of membership or failure to maintain
membership in the Union and upon written demand to the
company by the Union, be dismissed from employment by the
Company after complying with the requisite due process
requirement; ... (Emphasis supplied) (Rollo, p. 114)
After the hearings that ensued and the submission of the parties'
respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter held that the union
was guilty of unfair labor practice when it demanded the
separation of Beloncio. The union was then ordered to pay all the
wages and fringe benefits due to Beloncio from the time she was
107
... The Labor Arbiter explained correctly that "(I)f the only
question is the legality of the expulsion of Beloncio from the
Union undoubtedly, the question is one cognizable by the BLR
(Bureau of Labor Relations). But, the question extended to the
dismissal of Beloncio or steps leading thereto. Necessarily,
when the hotel decides the recommended dismissal, its acts
would be subject to scrutiny. Particularly, it will be asked
whether it violates or not the existing CBA. Certainly, violations
of the CBA would be unfair labor practice."
Article 250 of the Labor Code provides the following:
Art. 250. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall
be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers,
agents or representatives: xxx xxx xxx
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee, including discrimination against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on
any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under
which membership or continuation of membership is made
available to other members. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 217 of the Labor Code also provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission
(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide ... the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural;
(1) Unfair labor practice cases; xxx xxx xxx
108
109
Inc. vs. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87; Manalang vs. Artex Development
Company, Inc., 21 SCRA 561).
110
111
considered assets
and
liabilities
of
the
absorbed
corporation. The Voluntary Arbitrator concluded that the former
FEBTC employees could not be compelled to join the Union, as it
was their constitutional right to join or not to join any
organization.
112
113
the workers to join and support the labor union of their own
choice as their representative in the negotiation of their
demands and the protection of their interest vis--vis the
employer. (Emphasis ours.)
In other words, the purpose of a union shop or other union
security arrangement is to guarantee the continued existence of
the union through enforced membership for the benefit of the
workers.
All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union
Shop Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its
terms. However, under law and jurisprudence, the following
kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely,
employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes
effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which
prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious
grounds;[21] employees already in the service and already
members of a union other than the majority at the time the
union shop agreement took effect;[22] confidential employees
who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit;
[23]
andemployees excluded from the union shop by express
terms of the agreement.
When certain employees are obliged to join a particular
union as a requisite for continued employment, as in the case of
Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the
freedom or right not to join any labor organization because it is in
favor of unionism. This Court, on occasion, has even held that a
union security clause in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. [24]
Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement
whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the
contracting union who must continue to remain members in good
standing to keep their jobs. It is the most prized achievement
of unionism. It adds membership and compulsory dues. By
holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the
closed shop, it wields group solidarity.[25]
114
115
116
117
118
119
deemed old employees who are not covered by the Union Shop
Clause. This is not surprising.
By law and jurisprudence, a merger only becomes
effective upon approval by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) of the articles of merger. In Associated Bank
v. Court of Appeals,[33] we held:
The procedure to be followed is prescribed under the
Corporation Code. Section 79 of said Code requires the
approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
of the articles of merger which, in turn, must have been duly
approved by a majority of the respective stockholders of the
constituent corporations. The same provision further states
that the merger shall be effective only upon the issuance by
the SEC of a certificate of merger. The effectivity date of the
merger is crucial for determining when the merged or
absorbed corporation ceases to exist; and when its rights,
privileges, properties as well as liabilities pass on to the
surviving corporation. (Emphasis ours.)
In other words, even though BPI steps into the shoes of
FEBTC as the surviving corporation, BPI does so at a particular
point in time, i.e., the effectivity of the merger upon the SECs
issuance of a certificate of merger. In fact, the articles of merger
themselves provided that both BPI and FEBTC will continue their
respective business operations until the SEC issues the
certificate of merger and in the event SEC does not issue such a
certificate, they agree to hold each other blameless for the nonconsummation of the merger.
Considering the foregoing principle, BPI could have only
become the employer of the FEBTC employees it absorbed after
the approval by the SEC of the merger. If the SEC did not
approve the merger, BPI would not be in the position to absorb
the employees of FEBTC at all. Indeed, there is evidence on
record that BPI made the assignments of its absorbed
employees in BPI effective April 10, 2000, or after the SECs
approval of the merger.[34] In other words, BPI became the
120
121
122
address the issue. With BPI already taking the position that
employees absorbed pursuant to its voluntary mergers with
other banks are exempt from the union shop clause, the chances
of the said bank ever agreeing to the inclusion of such
employees in a future CBA is next to nil more so, if BPIs
narrow interpretation of the union shop clause is sustained by
this Court.
Right of an Employee not to Join a Union is not Absolute
and Must Give Way to the Collective Good of All Members
of the Bargaining Unit
The dissenting opinions place a premium on the fact that
even if the former FEBTC employees are not old employees,
they nonetheless were employed as regular and permanent
employees without a gap in their service. However, an
employees permanent and regular employment status in itself
does not necessarily exempt him from the coverage of a union
shop clause.
In the past this Court has upheld even the more stringent
type of union security clause, i.e., the closed shop provision, and
held that it can be made applicable to old employees who are
already regular and permanent but have chosen not to join a
union. In the early case of Juat v. Court of Industrial Relations,
[38]
the Court held that an old employee who had no union may be
compelled to join the union even if the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) imposing the closed shop provision was only
entered intoseven years after of the hiring of the said
employee. To quote from that decision:
A closed-shop agreement has been considered as one
form of union security whereby only union members can be
hired and workers must remain union members as a condition
of continued employment. The requirement for employees or
workers to become members of a union as a condition for
employment redounds to the benefit and advantage of said
employeesbecause by holding out to loyal members a
promise of employment in the closed-shop the union wields
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
constitutional
right
of
the
employees
to
selforganization. 16Moreover, We cannot countenance the actuation
of the petitioner and the management in this case which is not
conducive to industrial peace.
The renewed CBA cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition
for certification election for the very reason that the same was
not yet in existence when the said petition was filed. 17 The
holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should
not be circumvented. 18
Petitioner posits the view that to grant the petition for certification
election would open the floodgates to unbridled and scrupulous
petitions the objective of which is to prejudice the industrial
peace and stability existing in the company.
This Court believes otherwise. Our established jurisprudence
adheres to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers.
Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining
representative is of paramount importance. The fact that there
already exists a bargaining representative in the unit concerned
is of no moment as long as the petition for certification was filed
within the freedom period. What is imperative is that by such a
petition for certification election the employees are given the
opportunity to make known who shall have the right to represent
them thereafter. Not only some but all of them should have the
right to do so. 19 Petitioner's contention that it has the support of
the majority is immaterial. What is equally important is that
everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit
concerned. Time and again, We have reiterated that the most
effective way of determining which labor organization can truly
represent the working force is by certification election. 20
Finally, petitioner insists that to allow a certification election to be
conducted will promote divisiveness and eventually cause
polarization of the members of the bargaining unit at the expense
of national interest. 21
130
131
132
133
The Board's rule that the existence of a valid written and signed
bargaining agreement between an employer and an
appropriate bargaining representative is a bar to a certification
proceedings for a different representation, if applicable to the
facts in this case, is a procedural rule which the Board in its
discretion may apply or waive as the facts of the given case
may demand in the interest of stability and fairness in collective
bargaining agreements. The Board is not the slave of its rules."
National Labor Relations Boardvs. Grace Co. 184 Fed. 2nd p.
126 (U. S. Circuit Ct. of App., 8th Circuit.)
134
135
On September 15, 1959, while this case was still pending in this
Tribunal, petitioner filed a manifestation to the effect that the
contract between the USUP and the Shipping Line had expired
on June 28, 1959, and that the same had not been renewed. We
asked for the comment of the other party. the respondent United
Seamen's Union in its counter manifestation dated July 6, 1960,
stated that the collective bargaining agreement involved,
executed on July 28, 1957, was automatically renewed for a
period of two years from July 28, 1959 to July 28 1961, pursuant
to the automatic renewal clause, for the reason that neither party
notified the other in writing not less than sixty days prior to the
expiration date, of its desire to terminate the agreement. So, it
would appear that the contract will still be effective up to July 28,
1961, that is to say, about a year from today.
According to the claim or contention of the petitioners the
bargaining agreement of July 28, 1957 was but a renewal of the
same or similar agreement of July 1955, so that the bargaining
agreement has been in existence for about five years, which is
too long a period within which a certification election has not
been held.
The background
summarized below.
facts
are
not
disputed
136
and
are
137
138
The CA noted that the fees at issue in this case fall under
the extraordinary concept the NLRC having ordered the
Company, as losing party, to pay the Union and its members ten
percent (10%) attorneys fees. It found the award without basis
139
140
141
showing that the lawful wages were not paid without justification
is sufficient.
In the present case, we find it undisputed that the union
members are entitled to their AA benefits and that these benefits
were not paid by the Company. That the Company had no funds
is not a defense as this was not an insuperable cause that was
cited and properly invoked. As a consequence, the union
members represented by the Unionwere compelled to litigate
and incur legal expenses. On these bases, we find no difficulty
in upholding the NLRCs award of ten percent (10%) attorneys
fees.
The more significant issue in this case is the effect of the
MOA provision that attorneys fees shall be deducted from the AA
and CBA receivables. In this regard, the CA held that
the additional grant of 10% attorneys fees by the NLRC violates
Article 111 of the Labor Code, considering that the MOA between
the parties already ensured the payment of 10% attorneys fees
deductible from the AA and CBA receivables of the Unions
members. In addition, the Company also argues that the Unions
demand, together with the NLRC award, is unconscionable as it
represents 20% of the amount due or about P21.4 million.
In Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v.
NLRC,[41] we expounded on the concept of attorneys fees in the
context of Article 111 of the Labor Code, as follows:
In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the
extraordinary attorneys fees recoverable as indemnity for
damages sustained by and payable to the prevailing
part[y]. In the second place, the ten percent (10%)
attorneys fees provided for in Article 111 of the Labor Code
and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing
Rules is the maximum of the award that may thus be
granted. Article 111 thus fixes only the limit on the
amount of attorneys fees the victorious party may
recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it
does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower
142