Texas and The Bracero Program

Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942-1947
Author(s): Otey M. Scruggs

Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Aug., 1963), pp. 251-264
Published by: University of California Press
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Texas
and
the
Bracero
Program, 1942-1947
OTEY M. SCRUGGS
This paper, read at the Los Angeles meeting of the
Pacific Coast Branch, is by an assistant professor in
the University of California, Santa Barbara.
OF THE 291,420 BRACEROS(contract farm laborers from Mexico) entering the United States in 1961, 117,368
went to Texas. That was more than to any other state. This proportion, however, has not always existed. For the first five years of the
bracero program-from the signing of the United States-Mexico
executive agreement on farm labor on August 4, 1942, to the end
of 1947, when the wartime farm labor supply program was terminated
-none of the 220,000 Mexican farm workers imported went to Texas.
The efforts of Texas farmers to obtain labor and the Mexican government's ambivalent attitude toward the problem are a neglected chapter in the history of a program that has become an enduring part
of American agriculture and an important link in the chain of United
States-Mexico relations.'
The agreement of August 4, 1942, grew out of the fear of both
southwestern growers and the United States government that there
would be an insufficient supply of labor to harvest the crops during
the war. It placed the administration of the bracero program in the
hands of the Department of Agriculture and guaranteed that the
immigrants would have at least minimum working and living conditions. Many farmers, however, greeted the undertaking with undisguised hostility. They had hoped for a program modeled after the
one developed during World War I. In that program, the United
States, after relaxing its restrictions on the admission of contract
laborers, had left operations largely in the hands of the farmers, and
1 W. Carl
Holley, Office of Farm Labor Service, U.S. Department of Labor, to the
author, Oct. 16, 1962; Wayne D. Rasmussen,A History of the EmergencyFarm Labor
Supply Program,1943-47 (Washington,D.C., 1951), 199, 226.
251

252
PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWV
Mexico, involved in more pressing domestic problems, had played

an even more passive role. Moreover, the growers disliked intensely
the guaranties in the agreement, especially the provision of an hourly
minimum of 30 cents, correctly fearing that the safeguards were part
of an effort to bring all farm labor, domestic as well as foreign, within
the orbit of existing federal labor legislation. For these reasons, only
a handful of growers-none from Texas-participated in the program
in 1942.2
In the spring of 1943, two significant developments led growers

near El Paso, who had long had easy access to large supplies of labor
from Mexico, to attempt to circumvent the agreement. First, on April
26, 1943, the two governments exchanged notes on a new agreement
which replaced the old. Instead of liberalizing the terms of employment, as farmers would have liked, the new accord tightened them
slightly to meet some of the Mexican government's objections to the
program's operation in 1942. Then, three days later, Public Law 45,
in which Congress for the first time gave its approval to the program,
was entered on the statute books. During the bill's progress through
Congress, large farm groups led by the powerful American Farm
Bureau Federation had worked hard to tailor the program to the
farmers' specifications. In conference, Section 5 (g) was added, giving
the commissioner of immigration authority to lift the statutory limitations on the entry of farm labor from Western Hemisphere countries when he deemed it essential to the war effort. The farmers'
desire for an "open border," such as had existed during World War I,
appeared to have been realized. Workers entering under P.L. 45
regulations would not be protected by the wage and working condition provisions of the agreement of April, 1943, nor would supervision be by the War Food Administration, which had superseded
the Department of Agriculture in charge of all farm labor programs.
However, since Section 5 (g) was contrary to the spirit if not the letter
of the bilateral agreement which had just been concluded, any attempt to proceed under this section of the law would lead to a crisis
if the Mexican government adhered to its oft-stated position that
workers would be allowed to emigrate only in accordance with the
agreement.a
2
See the author's "The First Mexican Farm Labor Program," Arizona and the West,
II (Winter, 1960), 319-326; "The Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of
1942," Agricultural History, XXXIV (July, 1960), 140-149; "The Bracero Program
under the Farm Security Administration, 1942-1943," Labor History, III (Spring, 1962),
149-168.
SScruggs, "The Bracero Program under the Farm Security Administration," 160 f.

Texas and the Bracero
253
The crisis was not long in coming. Border farmers, angered at

being denied direct access to labor in Mexico, had been appealing
to the Immigration Service since the initial agreement of August,
1942, to "let down the bars" on the entry of labor from Mexico.
Their appeals had become more insistent as hundreds of workers
poured into Mexican border towns hoping to be contracted under
the agreement. These pressures eventually proved too strong for the
immigration authorities. On May 11, 1943, the commissioner of immigration issued regulations under Section 5 (g) of P.L. 45 authorizing his subordinates to supply laborers at the border with cards
permitting them to enter for one year. Shortly afterward, the Immigration Service's El Paso office informed the head of the local water
users' association of the regulations, and the rush was on. Jubilant
farmers, harried by fears of insufficient labor to meet spring needs,
rushed across the border to recruit the necessary workers. Meanwhile,
Mexicans from Ciudad Juarez, who had permits to cross to the American town opposite to shop and to work on certain nonagricultural
jobs, promptly applied for identification cards under the May 11
regulations. Others without cards crossed at nearby unguarded
points. Before the border was closed at El Paso three days later, 2,040
workers had been distributed to farmers on both sides of the TexasNew Mexico line.'
The Mexican government's reaction to the El Paso episode was
what the State Department had anticipated. Under fire from the start
from powerful groups in Mexico hostile to any form of labor emigration, the government quickly made known its intention of abrogating
the agreement of April 26, 1943, unless all farm labor emigration
from Mexico was placed under its provisions. On May 28, following
a series of conferences in Washington at which some of the participants bluntly advocated disregarding Mexico's wishes, the State
Department announced that Section 5 (g) of P.L. 45 did not apply
to Mexico. However, to avoid the immediate problem of having to
transport the workers back to their homes, the Mexican government
allowed those to whom cards had been issued to remain one year."
Section 5 (g) of P.L. 45 and the subsequent regulations issued under
4 American Consul at Ciudad Judirez to American Embassy (Mexico City), May 12, 18,
1943, Files of the Department of State (hereafter referred to as S.D.); El Paso Times,
Feb. 5, 1944.
5 Memo. of conversation, Division of American Republics, May 12, 1943; memo., Division of American Republics, May 28, 1943; Department of State to American Embassy,
May 28, 1943, S.D.

254
PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW
it were, in fact, parts of a concerted effort by farmers, emboldened

by fears of labor shortage, to undermine the United States-Mexico
farm labor agreement. As Ambassador George S. Messersmith wrote
Secretaryof State Hull from Mexico City in the midst of the uproar:
In other words, in spite of the hue and cry from some of the border
states about their need, they have not requested any certification of
workersfor that area. This is an indication to you that some of the states
are not interestedin getting workersunder the agreementsbut are more
interested in trying to break down the agreementsso as to get workers
under arrangementswhich are quite impossible."
The movement across the border under P.L. 45 temporarily lessened the demand for farm labor in the upper Rio Grande Valley.
But Mexico's unyielding attitude must have convinced most growers
that in order to obtain labor from Mexico they would have either
to accept the bilateral agreement or take their chances with "wetbacks," illegal entrants from Mexico.
Texas farmers did not get around to requesting labor under the
agreement until late in the summer of 1943, a year after the original
notes were signed. By then, however, the Texas farmers' problem of
obtaining labor from Mexico had become complicated by the injection of an issue that was ultimately to prevent the dispatch of workers.
In June, 1943, under prompting from its consuls in Texas, the Mexican government had announced that it would not authorize braceros
for Texas "because of the number of cases of extreme, intolerable
racial discrimination." Though the pronouncement came as something of a surprise, a discerning observer could have detected the
straws in the wind.'
Mexicans on both sides of the border had long been sensitive to
discrimination against Latins in the United States. Texas particularly
aroused their indignation, for there discrimination against Mexicans
was more overt than elsewhere in the country. But the war, in which
Mexican-Americans were required to give their services, led to increased demands among Mexicans in the state for decent treatment.
Moreover, by the spring of 1943, the American government, through
the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA),
had become sufficiently concerned about the effect discrimination
was having on its Good Neighbor policy to underwrite a program
*
George S. Messersmith to Cordell Hull, May 24, 1943, S.D.
SCarey McWilliams, North From Mexico (Philadelphia and New York, 1949), 270.

255
of education on the problems of the Spanish-speaking in the Southwest.!

Aware of the need to take action to improve a situation made more
acute by acts of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in uniform and visiting Mexican dignitaries, Governor Coke Stevenson
had induced the Texas legislature to pass the so-called "Caucasian
Race" resolution, which he had approved on May 6, 1943. The resolution affirmed the right of all Caucasians within the state to equal
treatment in public places of business and amusement and denounced
those who denied such privileges with "violating the good neighbor
policy of our state." Doubtless, this manifesto of good intentions
added to the surprise that greeted the Mexican announcement that
braceros would not be allowed to go to Texas.'
With the cotton harvest fast approaching, many Texas farmers,
now reconciled to obtaining Mexican nationals under the agreement,
became alarmed that the ban would leave them without an adequate
labor supply. It thus became necessary to get the state off the Mexican
"blacklist." To do so the Texas Farm Bureau hired Cullen W. Briggs,
a Texas judge, who brought the matter to the attention of the American consul general in Ciudad Juirez. Accompanied by representatives
of the Ambassador of Mexico and of the OCIAA, the consul called
on Governor Stevenson and explained that steps would have to be
taken to satisfy Mexico's complaints before labor would be made
available. Thereupon, on June 25, 1943, the governor issued a proclamation, which though more specific, in that it pointed to the need
for closer cooperation between Mexico and Texas, was essentially a
reaffirmation of the "Caucasian Race" resolution. He then departed
on a "good will" tour of Mexico, where he gave assurances that upon
his return home he would take steps to assure Mexicans fair treatment."o
Before issuing his proclamation, the governor on June 12 had

drafted a formal letter to Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla.
After pointing to the need for several thousand workers for the
coming cotton harvest and expressing the wish that it might be met
under the agreement, he acknowledged the existence of discrimination and listed the steps already or about to be taken to eliminate it.
8 Ibid., 259-263, 269-270; Nellie Ward Kingrea, History of the First Ten Years of the
Texas Good Neighbor Commission (Fort Worth, 1954), 30-31.
9 Kingrea, op. cit., 27.
0oIbid., 32-34.

256
He promised to order state law enforcement officials to deal severely

with those found discriminating against Mexicans and to consider
the appointment of a commission to handle complaints of illtreatment. In his reply of July 20, 1943, Sefior Padilla expressed the
view that the governor's program of action was unequal to the magnitude of the problem. Effective action, he suggested, would include
"laws, wholesome propaganda, and penalties.""
The contents of the interchange were published in the press of
both countries on July 28, and the next day a copy of the governor's
instructions to the appropriate enforcement agencies was likewise
made public. The governor further notified the Mexican government
that the following week he would announce the appointment of a
commission to study and take action to end acts of prejudice against
Mexicans.12
In the meantime, the United States government was also hopefully

making efforts that would result in the dispatch of braceros to Texas.
On July 22, 1943, following appeals from the Texas congressional
delegation, it approved and prepared to send on to the Mexican government a request for 5,000 Mexican nationals for Nueces and San
Patricio counties in the coastal bend of Texas. The State Department
continued to press for the removal of the ban, which would be necessary before the official request for 5,000 workers could be transmitted.
These efforts appeared to have been successful when, on August 6,
1943, the Foreign Office informed the State Department that in view
of Governor Stevenson's evident desire to help solve the "thorny
problem of discrimination," Mexico would entertain a request for
5,000 workers as soon as the governor announced publicly the creation of his proposed commission to deal with questions involving
discrimination against Mexicans. Mexican leaders, still in doubt
about the wisdom of the move, suggested that braceros going to Texas
either be selected from those already in the United States or be recruited in Mexico City for the "southern" states, but with the understanding that they would go to Texas."
n Coke R. Stevenson-Ezequiel Padilla, "The Good Neighbor Policy and Mexicans in
Texas," Vol. XVII (1943) of Mexico: National and International Problems Series, 7-13,
17-22.
12 Memo. of conversation,
Department of State and American Embassy, July 28,
1943, S.D.
'1 Hull to Messersmith, July 22, 1943; American Embassy to Department of State, Aug.
6, 1943, S.D.; Philip Bruton, Office of Labor to Marvin Jones, Administrator, War Food

257
This unenthusiastic endorsement of the venture was prophetic; no

farm laborers went to Texas under the agreement in 1943. The
governor did not grant the Good Neighbor Commission of Texas
authority to organize until September 4, 1943, when he learned that
federal funds would be forthcoming through the OCIAA to support
it. Whether a formal request for labor was ever made to the Foreign
Office is not known. In all likelihood it was not. In any event, it
would not have affected the outcome, for by this time the Mexican
government had concluded the time inopportune to approve such
a request."
From the start the Mexican government was anxiously concerned
about the repercussions of the contract labor programs on Mexican
politics. President Manuel Avila Camacho had consented to the
undertaking as part of Mexico's contribution to allied victory in the
war. The program was also part of an effort to cement closer ties
with the United States, and thereby strengthen the president's program to hasten Mexico's economic development. But in allowing
workers to emigrate, the government opened itself to the criticism
of powerful and vocal elements within the country. Labor leaders
were disturbed by the president's middle-of-the-road policy for economic growth which courted business as well as labor support.
Agrarians were uneasy over the slowdown in the government's land
distribution programs and over the wartime inflation. Large commercial farmers in the north opposed any program that might add
to their problems of obtaining needed labor. There were nationalists
of all hues, from those like the sinarquistas, who were averse to almost
any form of cooperation with the United States, to those who believed
that Mexican manpower should remain at home to help in the economic development of Mexico. Mindful of the large reservoir of
anti-American feeling throughout the Republic, these groups could
be expected to point to any evidence of difficulty in the operation of
the emigration programs in an effort to embarrass the government.
The exigencies of internal politics were often as compelling as concern for the braceros' welfare in dictating Mexico's course of action
on problems arising out of sending labor to the United States."'
4dministration, July 22, 1943, in General Correspondence Record Group 224, National
4rchives, Washington, D.C.
14 Kingrea, op. cit., 34.
15 Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 261!82; Donald M. Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? (Gainesville, Fla., 1959), 233, 235-236;
stephen S. Goodspeed, "The Role of the Chief Executive In Mexico: Policies, Powers

258
Under these circumstances, nothing exercised the government

more than the reports of discrimination against braceros in the
United States that continued to drift back to Mexico. Indeed, the
Mexican public was apt to regard nearly all of the difficulties as
some form of discrimination. The most serious instances of illtreatment involved workers recruited under the railroad labor agreement of April 29, 1943, an accord similar in most respects to the
earlier farm labor agreements. The protest of a group of braceros
employed on the Santa Fe line near Fullerton, California, early in
July, 1943, against being paid wages lower than those paid American
workers threatened to agitate the political waters in Mexico. Acting
quickly to forestall any cries of discrimination, the government temporarily suspended recruitment under the railroad labor agreement.
After protracted negotiations, a settlement was concluded in favor
of the workers."
A month after the Santa Fe "incident," Mexican nationals working
on railroads in central Texas complained of discrimination in two
towns, and the Mexican government was forced to request their immediate removal to areas where discrimination was not likely to
occur. This and other instances of discrimination against Mexicans
in Texas prompted a member of the Mexican legislature, a former
consular official in that state, to urge adoption of a resolution setting
up a committee to meet with Governor Stevenson and to investigate
conditions. In the face of these developments, the government chose
to say nothing more about sending farm labor to Texas in 1943, and
the State Department, aware of the government's predicament, did
not further press the issue. Texas growers finished the season with
student volunteers, a handful of prisoners of war, the traditional but
much reduced Mexican-American migratory labor force, and an increasing number of wetbacks."
The Mexican government continued to vacillate in 1944. Indeed,
in spite of domestic opposition, President Avila Camacho and Foreign Minister Padilla were anxious to have farm workers go to Texas.
They feared that persistent refusal to send them would not only
and Administration" (unpublished dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1947), 332-350; Messersmith to Hull, Aug. 11, 1943; American Embassy to Department
of State, May 18, 1944, S.D.
16 Messersmith to Hull, Oct. 29, 1943;
Department of State to American Embassy,
April 22, 1944, S.D.
17 American Embassy to Department of State, Sept. 15, 1943, S.D.; McWilliams, North
From Mexico, 271.

259
antagonize the United States, but might undermine the steps already
taken by Governor Stevenson to wipe out discrimination. Thus, the
government announced on December 26, 1943, that braceros would
be allowed to go to Texas in 1944. However, when Ambassador
Messersmith approached the foreign minister several weeks later,
Padilla stated that while he was personally sympathetic to permitting
workers to go to certain counties, he could not defy public opinion
by allowing them to emigrate."
In the meantime, Governor Stevenson was being pressured to have
the ban removed. The workers who entered under Section 5 (g) of
P.L. 45 were due to be repatriated by May 15, 1944, and El Paso
County growers were anxious either to contract them under the
agreement or to import others under its terms to replace them. Together with state officials, they devised a plan that would give El Paso
County preferred treatment. Officials of two El Paso farm groups,
accompanied by a representative of the OCIAA, would journey to
Mexico City to urge that contract labor be allowed to go to Texas
counties with records of favorable treatment of Mexicans, the first
so selected to be El Paso County. The plan was believed to have the
two-fold advantage of demonstrating to Mexico that discrimination
was not inevitable and of stimulating counties with poor records to
reform conditions. The deputation arrived in the Mexican capital
in mid-March and conferred with officials of the American embassy.
Although Ambassador Messersmith did not wish to jeopardize the
two labor emigration programs "by an inopportune insistence on a
point which is politically impossible in Mexico at the present time,"
he again took up the matter with the foreign minister and received
Padilla's promise to authorize labor for El Paso County upon receipt
of a formal request."
The request was made on April 25, 1944, and though the period
of critical need for labor was cited as of May, the month passed
without further word from Mexico. Nor apparently was any promise
made at a three-day conference on border problems in Mexico City
beginning May 29. The meeting was called by Mexico primarily to
I
Messersmith to Hull, July 20, 1943; American Embassy to Department of State,
March 7, 15, 1944, S.D.; El Paso Times, Dec. 27, 1943. Interestingly, Padilla resigned
his post a year later to launch his campaign for the presidency, a campaign which he
lost in part, it is commonly believed, because of his well-known friendship for the U.S.
See Robert F. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, Ill., 1959), 215; also
Austin F. MacDonald, Latin American Politics and Government, 2d. ed. (New York,
1954), 251.
SAmerican Embassy to Department of State, March 15, 1944, S.D.

260
consider ways of coping with the mounting volume of unlawful

emigration, both those who crossed unnoticed and those who used
Form 5-C cards to leave to perform farm work in the United States.
The Mexican delegation also stressed its government's growing concern over the several hundred P.L. 45 workers not yet returned and
its desire that they be repatriated without further delay in accordance with the original understanding. Despite the insistence of the
American delegation that the United States was reluctant to see
Texas stripped of labor, the Mexicans remained noncommittal about
labor for El Paso County. However, the informal agreement of June
2, 1944, pledged the United States to strengthen its border force, to
cease issuing Form 5-C cards to farm workers, and to repatriate all
those in the country contrary to the expressed wishes of Mexico."
United States border authorities acted quickly to meet these commitments, speedily returning the remaining P.L. 45 entrants and
embarking on a campaign to round up and deport wetbacks in south
Texas. This evidence of American willingness to cooperate was probably a major factor in the Mexican government's decision of June 16
to authorize the recruitment of between two and four thousand
braceros for El Paso County, provided Governor Stevenson publicly
reaffirmed his intention to combat discrimination. There followed
a month in which assurances were once again given by the governor
regarding discrimination and by the United States that the contractees' interests would be amply protected. Then followed still another
month of silence from Mexico."
While the Mexican government continued its hedging, instances
of discrimination continued to reach the Mexican public. In August,
1944, the Comite' Mexicano contra el Rdsismo was formed, and its
publication, Fraternidad, ran a column, "Texas, Buen Vecino?"
("Texas, Good Neighbor?"), in which were listed acts, names, and
places of discrimination. The Inter-American Bar Association, meeting in Mexico City the same month, discussed the issue of discrimination as an obstacle to better hemisphere relations. Significantly, the
foreign office notified the American embassy near the end of August
that it had again changed its mind, believing that it could not accede
to the request for labor for El Paso County and still expect the emi-0American Embassy to Department of State, June 6, 1944, S.D.
1 American Embassy to Department of State, June 16, 1944, July 18, 1944; memo. of
conversation, American Embassy and Department of State, June 29, 1944, S.D.

261
gration programs to continue functioning smoothly. "This," said

the embassy, in informing Washington of the decision, "is the long
and the short of it. It is useless to again raise the question .... " The
note of finality was significant, for the attempt to obtain labor for
El Paso County marked the last concerted effort by the United States
during the history of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply program
to induce Mexico to lift the ban on labor to Texas. The United
States had concluded that to persist in the matter would only jeopardize existing labor programs and mar efforts at closer cooperation
between the two countries."
Pressure in Texas to have the ban removed abated after 1944. This
was partly due to previous failures, but it was also due to developments only indirectly related to the ban. In January, 1945, the Texas
State Extension Service, with the cooperation of the Good Neighbor
Commission, inaugurated a program to make greater use of resident
workers by improving on-farm housing and educating local communities in the need for better treatment of Mexican-Americans who
followed the crops. Moreover, when the war ended, greater numbers
of Mexican-Americans returned to the fields."
The most significant accretion, however, came through illegal
entry from Mexico. In May, 1944, Mexican officials had contended
that there were 25,000 wetbacks in American border areas, most of
them in Texas. Early in 1947, they placed the number at 100,000.
At least half of this number was believed to be in the lower Rio
Grande Valley of Texas. Because they were in the country unlawfully, hence subject to immediate deportation in the event of arrest,
these unfortunates were forced to work for painfully low wages and
to accept miserably poor living conditions."
By 1947, the mounting volume of unlawful migration overshadowed all other border problems. As in 1944, officials of the two
governments met in Mexico City to consider ways of solving the
problem, and out of their discussions came two agreements on March
10, 1947. The principal accord permitted wetbacks to be returned
to Mexico and issued contracts enabling them to re-enter the United
22McWilliams, North From Mexico, 263-264; American Embassy to Department of
State, Aug. 29, 1944, S.D.
23 Pauline R. Kibbe, Latin Americans in Texas (Albuquerque, 1946), 182-190.
American Embassy to Department of State, June 6, 1944, S.D.; U.S. Stat., 80 Cong.,
2'
1 sess. (1947), Vol. LXI, Part 4, pp. 4098.

262
PACIFIC
HISTORICAL REVIEW
States legally as farm workers. The other extended the terms of the
accord to workers picked up in Texas."
The official reasons for the separate agreement pertaining to Texas
are set forth in the document. It declared that Mexico remained
"firm in its determination not to permit, under the protection of
existing conventions, persons of Mexican nationality to be contracted to work in States of the United States where there may exist
discrimination
against Mexicans. . . ." Hence, the agreement "was
not to constitute a precedent and was only to be temporary." Mexico,

it said, in effect, was making the concession in appreciation "of the
repeated proofs of friendship and of good will" displayed by the
Texas government in attacking the problem of discrimination.
Finally, the Texas agreement pointed out, with reference to the
wetbacks, that Mexico was "confronted with a factual situation which
was not created by the Government of Mexico, but which it is
desirable to solve in benefit to the Mexican workers.""
The Mexican government's motives were several. It wanted to lend
as much support and encouragement as it could to the Texas authorities in combatting discrimination. It wanted to provide greater protection for the workers. Prompted by a real concern for the workers'
welfare, it was also motivated by political considerations. An American embassy official reported that during the discussions some of the
Mexican delegates admitted as much. In other words, "confronted
with a factual situation," the government was compelled to present
to the Mexican people evidence of its concern to improve the lot of
the workers, the greatest number of whom were in southern Texas.
At the same time, it wished to make clear that it was not abandoning
its position on the discrimination issue, although in fact it was taking
the first concrete step toward doing so. The Texas agreement was
intended to emphasize to interested parties in both countries, but
especially in Mexico, that the Mexican government, with respect
to farm labor emigration, continued to regard Texas in a different
light from the other border states."
These accords supplemented but did not replace the agreement
of April 26, 1943. Thus, the contract subsequently drafted by the
Mexican government was similar but not identical to the bracero
contract. It included guarantees of minimum working and living
2
American
1 sess. (1947),
" US. Stat.,
*American
Embassy to Department of State, Feb. 7, 1947, S.D.; U.S. Stat., 80 Cong.,

Vol. LXI, Part 4, pp. 4097-4100, 4106-4107.
80 Cong., 1 sess. (1947), Vol. LXI, Part 4, pp. 4106-4107.
Embassy to Department of State, Feb. 7, 1947, S.D.

263
conditions. But instead of being enforced by an agency of the United

States, it was to be policed by a commission on labor emigration set
up by Mexico. The parties to the contract were to have recourse to
American courts, and, in the final analysis, the Mexican government
could deny workers to offending employers."
The contract was even less palatable to the growers than the bracero contract had been five years earlier. With the war over, they
were more than ever convinced of the superfluity of worker guarantees. Consequently, the majority, especially in the lower Rio Grande
Valley, chose to ignore the new management, and many of those who
had their workers "legalized" failed to comply with the terms of the
contract. As a result, following a dispute with the El Paso Cotton
Growers Association over wage rates, the Mexican government on
October 15, 1947, abrogated the Texas agreement."
In the years after 1947, due largely to the continuous influx of
wetbacks, Mexico gradually removed its ban on the emigration of
braceros to Texas. As early as 1943, the availability of illegal entrants
had made it unnecessary for the farmers of southern Texas to worry
unduly about the ban on braceros. As long as they could obtain
wetbacks, they could ignore braceros, whose use required the farmers'
acquiescence in conditions of employment which they detested.
However, Mexico's policy of using the braceros as a lever to force
Texas to take steps to end discrimination against Mexicans was not
devoid of results. More than any other factor, it was responsible for
the creation of the Good Neighbor Commission, which in 1947 became a permanent agency of the Texas government. Moreover, the
publicity attending Mexico's stand, and the work of the Good Neighbor Commission, helped bring out into the open a problem long
in need of searching examination.
Mexico's approach to the question of sending labor to Texas in
the years from 1942 to 1947 well illustrates its approach to the larger
question of farm labor emigration over the years. That approach
has been dictated by a host of economic, political, and humanitarian
considerations. The relative importance that Mexican leaders have
attached to each at any given time has determined their course of
action. Indeed, if Mexico's program of economic diversification, bes Otey M. Scruggs,"The United States, Mexico, and the Wetbacks,1942-1947,"Pacific
Historical Review, XXX (May, 1961), 160.
a For a more detailed description of the Texas agreement in operation, see ibid.,
161-162.

264
gun in earnest under President Avila Camacho, were to keep pace

with its rapidly increasing population, which is unlikely for some
time to come, they would probably act quickly to end the bracero
undertaking. American farmers would then have to look elsewhere
for sources of labor.


Texas and The Bracero Program

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Texas and The Bracero Program

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Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942-1947

Author(s): Otey M. Scruggs

This content downloaded from 148.210.226.238 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 19:21:12 PM

This content downloaded from 148.210.226.238 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 19:21:12 PM

PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWV

Mexico, involved in more pressing domestic problems, had played

In the spring of 1943, two significant developments led growers

This content downloaded from 148.210.226.238 on Wed, 13 Nov 2013 19:21:12 PM