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Community Statements of Support for Prison Divestment
Peter Bailinson, Student & Student Body President of the Columbia College Student Council,
I have a stake in prison divestment because I believe that how our University chooses to invest
its money directly reflects the values of our institution, and I also believe Columbia needs to
listen to how its policies affect its student body. After sitting through the divestment panel, I
was unable to hear a single reason as to why Columbia would want to continue investing in an
institution that profits from human captivity, yet I heard account after account highlighting the
personal pain that comes from Columbia's support of the industry. I think that Columbia should
show that it's not willing to neglect its students just to earn an ROI, and I hope that ACSRI
makes the correct decision to divest from private prisons.
Cooper Matthieson, Student, I can't stand how our university continues to act two-faced on
these issues - saying they support and celebrate students of color on campus, but invest in
systems that very clearly target and imprison those same communities of color all across the
country. I think divestment is absolutely necessary and I know I'm not going to donate or give
back to Columbia until we do divest from both the private prison industry and from fossil
fuels.
Julian Brave NoiseCat, Student, Prison divestment is urgent. We incarcerate more than 2
million people in the United States, and private prisons only further contribute to this massive
affront to human dignity. My own father is a convicted felon. My own University stands
against his and millions of other peoples' humanity.
Marcus Hunter, Student, Divestment is both necessary and urgent in order to redress
Columbia's long-standing involvement in state-sanctioned and privatized colonial, racist
practices. My stake in divestment is tied with all of those who value life over profit, who have
experienced racism, colonialism, and institutionalized violence either here or abroad, and who
hold the University responsible for promoting the values inherent in the idea of a free education
free from discrimination and violence for all; those who will not earn their degrees on the backs
of black and brown people globally from whom columbia steals capital and profit to continue
its legacy of white supremacy and capitalist imperialist domination.
Liam Bland, Student, "Private prisons are an unconscionable investment, contributing to many
of the problems within our broken criminal justice system. These corporations lobby for harsh
sentencing laws and the continuation of a war on drugs that has ravaged a generation of young
black and brown men and women. The prison industrial complex should not be fed and
sustained by the investments of higher education institutions, and our community should not
benefit from a racist system of control. In many ways, private prisons are worse than public
prisons, with higher rates of abuse and complaints from offenders. They have an incentive to
imprison people unjustly, and they have taken actions to increase profit margins by
undermining a purported right to equality before the law through lobbying and campaign
financing. There are many reasons to suspect that capitalist societies should not allow
corporations to benefit from imprisoning human beings. We can anticipate the kinds of
incentives such a system would create, and we have seen that those incentives do in fact exist,
that private prisons understand them, and that they act accordingly. It's political economy 101.
My personal stake in this is the benefit I receive from attending an institution that makes a great
deal of money, which is reinvested in my education and my quality of life as a student at
Columbia. This is not the only way I benefit from the prison industrial complex, nor is it the
Community Statements of Support for Prison Divestment
only way I benefit from private prisons specifically. But this is one way that we as a
community can resist those benefits and refuse to support injustice when we see it. "
Omoyeni Clement, Student, For Columbia to be invested in private prisons is antithetical to its
mission and the claims the institution makes about concern for the welfare of its students and
our communities. Divesting from private prisons would mean freeing Columbia from a
hypocrisy.
Student, Because slave labor should have ended a long ass time ago.
Student, "Columbia University's toxic investments in companies that capitalize on the caging
and suffering of people is a clear statement to the students and global community that
Columbia is a hypocritical institution. Columbia carries itself as a premier research university
that values diversity in its students which, among other ways, it expresses through generous
financial aid. But if Columbia spends money on helping unprivileged students get an education,
how can it invest its money in keeping unprivileged people out of work and in cages? Columbia
was one of the last universities to divest apartheid. Now, we ask that Columbia review the
entirety of its investments and send a message to the world that Columbia does not stand for
private prisons and will lead the way in responsible investing.
Tenaya Izu, Alumni, it's deeply shameful and devalues columbia's education.
Rheem Brooks, Other, CCA is currently under federal investigation for human rights abuses,
has been cited in the past for the same, and has been cited for not carrying out the mandates of
the former citation. The private prison industry is morally reprehensible, where profits are more
important than human lives. Any institution in support of such a corporation has a
responsibility to those upon whom it exacts violence. Columbia must divest.
Chioma Ngwudo, Student, Divestment is necessary because support of the private prison
system is a support of the the school to prison pipeline that victimizes millions of people of
color and poor people in America. I do not want to be complicit in an institution that shows its
approval of this heinous industry by investing in it.
Katie Zheng, Student, Columbia's $10 million investment directly affects the lives of APIA
people all over the United States in a myriad of ways, including the incarceration and
mistreatment of women who were victims of sex trafficking, undocumented immigrants, and
low income Southeast/South Asian people whose bodies are criminalized in different ways in
different contexts. Divestment is necessary because private prisons are a crime against
humanity.
Timothy Lundy, Student, Private prisons are morally reprehensible and Columbia's failure to
divest from them would demonstrate that the university is willing to disregard the best interests
of students, faculty, staff, and the broader community.
Student, Columbia's $10 million investment into the private prison industry means my own
inadvertent support of a cycle of mass incarceration and institutional racism. Divestment needs
to stop today because this vicious cycle of poverty, crime and drug abuse, and subsequent
incarceration will continue to perpetuate itself unless we remove the fuel to its flames:
misdirected funds. It is unfathomable to me why an institution that emphasizes the development
of informed and educated citizens to improve upon society (and one that has $9.2 billion
endowment) chooses to profit off a complex that cripples the already under-resourced. Rather,
Community Statements of Support for Prison Divestment
it should invest its resources in something more productive (eg. better school systems) that can
seek to if not improve upon, at least halt this cycle of injustice.
Lillian Belo, Alumni, I received my Master's degree from Columbia. I work with women
serving a life without parole sentence in state prisons. I hear their stories everyday, I visit with
them, I know their families, their children and their loved ones. I am very upset that Columbia
University has ANY investment in the prison industrial complex that is destroying communities
and lives across the country. Please divest and take the shame out of our school.
Layla Tavangar, Student, "A University dedicated to knowledge and progress should not profit
from human suffering on a massive scale"
Cesar San Miguel, Student, In this country, more money is spent on prisons than on schools.
Education appears to be a less worthy cause than imprisoning people... Maybe because the
latter makes money more quickly. Investing in the private prison system means that we are
supporting, and profiting, from the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of people. Added
to that, there is a disproportionate amount of inmates who are people of color, imprisoned for
minor offenses. Why is it more important to imprison the black or brown kid who is carrying a
bit of weed than it is to pay for better education? Invest in education. It's a long term
investment, because the payoffs won't be immediate as it is with private prisons. But it's the
right thing to do. We claim to be an institution of higher learning, and we students were told
that Columbia is a primary mover in the fight against injustice. Imagine our surprise, outrage,
and disappointment when we learned that the coffers of this institution are filled via
investments in private prisons, and fossil fuels. If our goal is to make the most money possible,
here and now and to hell with the consequences for the future, then fine. But if the goal is to
invest in a better world, put your money where your mouth is.
Josue Lopez, Student, "I support prison divestment because I have seen and felt the damaging
effects of violent criminalization and mass incarceration, both in my own life and that of many
my peers. I am appalled to know that Columbia University is fueling, and being fueled by, this
violent system through its investments in G4S and CCA. When I heard about this investment I
lost a great deal of respect and pride for this university. I can no longer marvel at the great
attributes of this school without thinking of miserable human beings locked in cages. The
immaculately manicured landscaping of the campus, the extensive course directory, miles of
full library shelves, lavish lunches, champagne receptions, marble bathroom stalls etc. all bring
a sharp pain of shame now. I realize that Columbia University is an expensive enterprise to run,
but I also know that whatever amount of financial stability is gained from this investment
cannot justify our actively supporting systems violence and the destruction of families and
communities which these systems entail. In my experiences as a student here at Columbia, I
have repeatedly encountered values and aspirations of social justice and respect for the worth of
all persons whether in the classroom, readings, discussions or events. There has also been the
constant mantra that institutions who have the power to affect others in their actions should
always think critically and creatively about how they operate. It is of the utmost importance
that Columbia divest from G4S and CCA, both because a continued compliance is
contradictory to our proclaimed values, and because we have a responsibility to take a stand
against the violence this institution commits. It is especially important that we take this action
Community Statements of Support for Prison Divestment
because the primary victims of this systems are marginalized, literally locked away, and
stripped of their agency and personhood in a multitude of ways."
Mary Joseph, Student, People that look like me are the ones who are most negatively affected
by the private prison industry (i.e. Black people) and I do not want any part of this school's
money to play a role in advancing this racist, classist system.
Kaneisha Payton, Student, Columbia, my community, can't support me while supporting a
system that stands to profit from the targeting of black people.
Student, Columbia cannot ethically claim its position of power as an institution of higher
education and still benefit from corporations who drive the prison industrial complex in order
to increase profit margins. I'm outraged that Columbia continues to reap the benefits of
half-hearted diversity initiatives and brochures while still supporting a prison industrial
complex that is designed to incarcerate black and brown bodies.
Katie Cacouris, Student, As a tuition paying student, Columbia's investments in the private
prison industry makes me complicit in an enterprise that cuts costs at the expense of people's
livelihoods. As a globally respected intellectual institution, Columbia should be a leader in
socially responsible investing and divest from the private prison industry as soon as possible.
Ayah Zaki, Student, I believe that the private prison industry is a racist institution that works
to profit off the backs of black and brown communities/bodies. The fact that Columbia is
invested in an industry that exploits my community makes me disappointed to be a student in
this university. I think divestment is necessarily urgent because we cannot allow ourselves to
perpetuate the systematic racism that this industry stands for especially as an institution that
praises itself as a so called diverse institution. We cannot praise ourselves for diversifying
Columbia's image while simultaneously perpetuating a system that is involved in marginalizing
these same communities from being able to access schooling and decent jobs, to be able to live
without being disproportionately targeted. We have stood on the wrong side of history during
South African apartheid when we were one of the last institutions to divest, I am disgusted that
we still have to learn our lesson.
Student, I am a product of Puerto Rican and Dominican immigrants, I am a United States
citizen, I am a woman of color. While I learn the Western canons of greatness and moral truths
of white history in the classrooms of Columbia University, I also choose to learn my own
history, culture, language and truths. Paradoxically, the institution allowing me to major in
Human Rights and Studies of Race and Ethnicity continues to invest in the private prison
industry that incarcerates, manipulates and preys on my best friends from my hometown, on my
cousins living in Brooklyn, NY. I watch young men, most often black men, running through the
perpetual cycles of prison, probation, fines, community service, and police injustices month
after month, year after year. Columbia must divest, Columbia must not only preach about
learning/changing the uncovered practices infiltrating black and brown narratives but also
practice that recognition and change. It begins with prison divestment; it begins with
Columbia; it begins in New York.
Wang Chun Rosenkranz, Student, Please make the right decision and divest from the
commodification of human beings. I do not want my tuition to contribute to an unjust and racist
system of oppression. Help Columbia be a leader in the field of education and an institution I
can be proud to call home.
Community Statements of Support for Prison Divestment
Student, "I don't want this kind of violence inflicted on millions of people incarcerated in
private prisons and detention centers in my name. Divestment is necessary because if Columbia
really wants to consider itself part of the global community, and part of the local community
here in Harlem, it can't just give lip service to helping communities and marginalized people
and then directly profit off of locking them away. Columbia needs to take a stand and do the
right thing. "
Staff, As a staff person at the University, Columbia's investment in private prisons puts my
values and beliefs at odds with my employer on a daily basis. My values and beliefs in the the
worth of all human life, human dignity and equitable justice does not allow me to support
profiteering off of human suffering, made even more stark and urgent in that our criminal
justice system, private prisons being one extension, disproportionately impacts poor
communities and black communities. There are plenty of other ways to invest the university's
money and the University's continued investment and profiteering off of human suffering is not
only in contrast with my values, but also the values of the University itself.
Chase Morgan, Student, Columbia, as an academic institution, has no business investing in
prisons. Incarceration is the opposite of education. Education is supremely humanizing,
teaching you to identify with and understand your fellow man. Incarceration is dehumanizing.
It teaches people that they aren't worthy of humanity and therefore does nothing more than
breed more criminal activity. I expect better of a great institution such as this one.
A Coughlin, Student, I find the private prison industry to be unethical, as its profit motive is
inextricably linked to the incarceration and indictment of people, and I don't think such
phenomena should be tied to financial gain, both in terms of promoting justice and from a
perspective of the ethical issues that come with imprisoning a human being. It's embarrassing to
me that my institution is invested in this unethical and questionable system, which is further
tied into systems of systematic racism and oppression.
Kelsey Repka, Student, Mass incarceration in the US affects everybody. The odds are that 1
in 9 men will face incarceration in their lifetime, 1 in 3 of African American men, couple this
with the fact that 40 percent of all children live in low income families, and it is obvious how
mass incarceration affects us all, with significant consequences for intergenerational outcomes.
The private prison industrial complex is fully invested in increasing these rates so they can
build more prisons, hire more guards, and increase their profits. It is unimaginable that an
institution of higher learning invests, and makes money from this form of modern slavery.
What if the more than 2 million people currently incarcerated were treated as potential
Columbia students, instead of the number on their uniform? By encouraging this system, and
using money to further propagate the opportunity gap (who even has access to a Columbia
degree?), we as a community are telling a growing portion of this country that they don't
matter, or even worse, that they don't exist in higher ed.
Alvaro Ortiz, Student, Divestment from the private prison and security industry represents the
idea that the school does not recognize these activities as legitimate. I see Columbia's
investment affecting me and those around me negatively through the reinforcing of racist ideas
such as those which see prisons as legitimate. It also brings into question Columbia's
relationship with the NYPD. It is well known that private prison industries are often cohorts
with local sheriff and police departments around the country. For this reason I don't think it is
Community Statements of Support for Prison Divestment
too far off the mark to surmise that Columbia profits from massive arrests in Harlem and
surrounding areas.
Student, Students at Columbia, especially GS students, have lived through the prison
industrial complex, including myself, and become important members of their community NOT
because they were 'rehabilitated' by the prison, but because their experiences gave them tools to
fight injustice. I hope that the school can achieve consistency in the message it sends by
matriculating such students as a part of the school's mission to fight inequity and injustice.
Columbia contradicts itself by investing in private prisons in the US, and abroad especially in
Palestine via the G4S corporation, and the divestment from private prisons works toward
righting this contradiction.
Student, If Columbia truly values the humanity of every person they cannot support a system
that dehumanizes and fatally harms communities of color
Student, I do not feel comfortable with how my tuition dollars are being used by Columbia.
The private prison industry is oppressive and damaging to many populations, who also struggle
to have their voices heard at this university. Students have said time and again we do not
support investment in private prisons: it goes against what we stand for to prop up companies
like CCA, which increases its profit by locking up more bodies. We should stand for education
and equal opportunity for all, instead we're helping ensure that some people lose their
opportunity to live freely.
Ogo Nwodoh, Student, I don't think Columbia should support a system that is focused on
punishment instead of reform. I also believe Columbia should not support a system that targets
certain minority communities. There are other better ways for the University to get money.
Niklas Plaetzer, Student, Knowing what kind of suffering human rights abuses, really
mass incarceration produces for its victims, it fills me with a deep sense of shame and
indignation that Columbia University makes us all complicit in such a systemic inhumanity.
One would think that an institution allegedly committed to humanistic values would find it
repulsive to directly make profits off of the incarceration of human beings but far from that.
The half-serious way in which the administration has responded to the more than legitimate
critique of large parts of the student body just confirms Columbia's disregard for the systemic
marginalization of people of color in the United States: from its ongoing investment in the
prison industry to the disastrous effects that Columbia-induced gentrification has had on
(predominantly Black) working families in surrounding neighborhoods. If Columbia actually
wants to represent a sense of community and value commitment rather than privilege and
marginalization, it must divest immediately and not send its student activists from one useless
meeting to another. The halfhearted response the Divestment Movement has received from
Columbia's various bureaucratic committees just adds insult to injury!
Student, My stake in prison divestment is the consideration that a university's economic
decisions speak loudly about their economic and social priorities. An investment in the private
prison industry regardless of the size is an investment in a system that continues to devalue the
lives of primarily men of color, black men, and members of the LGBTQA community.
Individuals who in some way or another exist on Columbia's campus. The decision by an
academic institution to invest in a system that is fueled and sustained by a flawed justice system
calls into question the goals and views of the university and its role in education. If education is
Community Statements of Support for Prison Divestment
meant to free... meant to equalize... meant to erase borders why is our school doing the exact
opposite by funding an industry and a system that perpetuates those borders and thus a
continuation of social inequality? Divestment is necessary in that it is an educational
institution's duty and purpose to value education as an indication of the value of human life as a
vehicle for change and nuance and impact.
Student, BC MY COMMUNITY IS BEING HEAVILY POLICED BACK HOME AND MY
COMMUNITY MEMBERS ARE BEING LOCKED UP FOR NO REASON. MY SCHOOL
SHOULDN'T MAKE MONEY OFF OF THEIR INCARCERATED BODIES
Cinneah El-Amin, Student, Columbia participates in the mass incarceration and inhumane
holding practices most commonly performed on individuals who LOOK LIKE ME. I'd say
those are pretty high stakes. I unwaveringly support Columbia's private prison divestment.
Other, I have a child that is caught up in a system that does not hold law enforcement
accountable in any way for the legitimacy of the charges that are heaved upon American
citizens on a daily basis. The driving force behind many of these arrests is money. Americans
are being farmed out to these facilities as legal slave labor.
Henry Matarozzi, Other Divestment is necessary to end modern day slavery
Langston Sanchez, Other, As a community member of Harlem there is a direct connection
between the money Columbia has invested in the private prison system and the policing of
Black and Brown people in the neighborhood and surrounding neighborhoods face and the
gentrification or forced removal of the same Black and Brown people in those neighborhoods.
Adrian Febre, Student, I think the prison system unfairly targets people of color, sucking them
into prisons in which they're more or less slaves, and I don't see any reason Columbia can't
reinvest its money without a significant effect on its bottom line
Chinyere Okunji, Alumni, Mass incarceration has been pivotal in increasing the economic and
educational disparity between black and white families and the cycle of poverty and
imprisonment which disrupts black families. The CU prison divest justice movement seeks to
rectify these egregious acts of violence on the black community by asking institutions of
education to be accountable for their role in propagating this system of oppression. As a social
activist and community organizer, it is important to challenge institutions,especially those
which are complicit in upholding power structures which criminalize people of color. It affects
my understanding of justice because I am NOT a proud Columbia alumnus knowing they have
a $10 million investment in the prison industry. I demand their divestment and fully support
this endeavor.
31#January#2015#
#
To#Whom#It#May#Concern:#
I#write#to#express#my#unflagging#skepticism#over#the#value#and#efficacy#of#shareholder#activism#in#the#
case#of#forDprofit#prison#reform.#As#a#nationallyDrecognized#carceral#policy#expert#who#has#been#
examining#the#forDprofit#prison#landscape#for#over#a#decade,#I#strongly#advise#you#to#avoid#negotiating#
with#Corrections#Corporation#of#America#(CCA)#or#G4S#through#the#modality#of#shareholder#activism.#
Time#and#again#this#tactic#has#failed#to#produce#deep#and#meaningful#reform.#
I#pass#along#a#recent#anecdote#of#shareholder#activism#undertaken#by#my#esteemed#colleague,#Mr.#Alex#
Friedmann,#Associate#Editor#of#Prison'Legal'News.#Years#ago#Mr.#Friedmann#decided#to#purchase#shares#
of#CCA#for#the#express#purpose#of#attempting#to#reform#the#company#from#within.#On#at'least#three#
separate#occasions#Mr.#Friedmann#has#encouraged#CCA#visDDvis#resolution#to#improve#prisoner#safety,#
curb#rape#and#sexual#abuse,#and#to#enhance#rehabilitative#services.#CCA#has#rejected#all#of#Mr.#
Friedmanns#proposed#interventions.##
In#lateD2014#Mr.#Friedmann#introduced#a#shareholder#resolution#that#would#require#CCA#to#spend#just#
5%#of#its#net#income#on#programs#and#services#designed#to#reduce#recidivism#rates#for#offenders.#
Weeks#later,#on#9#January#2015,#CCA#filed#a#formal#objection#with#the#Securities#and#Exchange#
Commission#(SEC)#seeking#to#keep#Mr.#Friedmanns#resolution#out#of#the#proxy#materials#it#sends#to#
shareholders#and#various#institutional#investors.#The#company#has#vociferously#objected#Friedmanns#
resolution.#
I#offer#this#brief#story#to#demonstrate#the#fecklessness#of#attempting#to#negotiate#with#CCA#(and#
companies#like#CCA)#from#within.#
I#urge#Columbia#University#to#divest#from#CCA#and#G4S#at#the#earliest#possible#date#and#express#deep#
skepticism#about#the#possibility#of#meaningful#and#durable#shareholder#activism.#
Should#this#letter#generate#questions#of#any#sort,#please#do#not#hesitate#to#contact#me#at#
cpetrella@berkeley.edu.##
Warmly,#
Christopher#Petrella#
Researcher,#U.C.#Berkeley#
#
BANKING ON BONDAGE
Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration
NOVEMBER 2011
BANKING ON BONDAGE
Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration
BANKING ON BONDAGE:
Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration
November 2, 2011
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report has been a project of the ACLU National Prison Project and Center for Justice and was authored
by David Shapiro (Staff Attorney, National Prison Project). First and foremost, the author would like to
thank Mike Tartaglia (Paralegal, National Prison Project) for his many contributions to the report, and David
Fathi (Director, National Prison Project) and Vanita Gupta (ACLU Deputy Legal Director) for their support of
the project. Numerous individuals generously reviewed drafts or otherwise contributed their wisdom and
insight, including Anjali Abraham, Rachel Bloom, Mike Brickner, Inimai Chettiar, Scott Crichton, Shakyra
Diaz, Terence Dougherty, Marjorie Esman, Alex Friedmann, Jennifer Giuttari, Lisa Graybill, Judy Greene,
Rachel Jordan, Bob Libal, Victoria Lopez, Will Matthews, Rachel Myers, Nila Natarajan, Stephen Pevar,
Daniel Pochoda, Judy Rabinovitz, Chris Rickerd, Tom Stenson, Willa Tracosas, Jennifer Wedekind, Margaret
Winter, and Paul Wright.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................5
PART I: THE PRIVATE PRISON EXPLOSION ............................................................9
Early Experiments in For-Profit Imprisonment ..................................................................... 10
The Exponential Growth of Private Prisons............................................................................ 10
Enormous Profits for the Private Prison Industry.................................................................. 13
Private Prisons, Mass Incarceration, and the American
Legislative Exchange Council ................................................................................................. 14
Immigration Detention and Private Prison Expansion ........................................................... 16
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................42
ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................43
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The imprisonment of human beings at record levels is both a moral failure and an economic
oneespecially at a time when more and more Americans are struggling to make ends meet
and when state governments confront enormous fiscal crises. This report finds, however, that
mass incarceration provides a gigantic windfall for one special interest groupthe private
prison industryeven as current incarceration levels harm the country as a whole. While
the nations unprecedented rate of imprisonment deprives individuals of freedom, wrests
loved ones from their families, and drains the resources of governments, communities, and
taxpayers, the private prison industry reaps lucrative rewards. As the public good suffers from
mass incarceration, private prison companies obtain more and more government dollars, and
private prison executives at the leading companies rake in enormous compensation packages,
in some cases totaling millions of dollars.
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Atrocious Conditions
While evidence is mixed, certain empirical studies show a heightened level of violence against
prisoners in private institutions. This may reflect in part the higher rate of staff turnover in private
prisons, which can result in inexperienced guards walking the tiers.27 After an infamous escape
from an Arizona private prison in 2010, for example, the Arizona Department of Corrections
reported that at the prison, [s]taff are fairly green across all shifts, are not proficient with
weapons, and habitually ignore sounding alarms.28 Private facilities have also been linked to
atrocious conditions. In a juvenile facility in Texas, for example, auditors reported, [c]ells were
filthy, smelled of feces and urine.29
Just three weeks before the release of this report, prisoner fights in several locations throughout
a private prison in Oklahoma left 46 prisoners injured and required 16 inmates to be sent to the
hospital, some of them in critical condition.30 The risks to safety confronting inmates in private
prisons are especially relevant at present, as the U.S. Supreme Court considers a case that
could, depending on the outcome, prevent federal prisoners in private institutions from seeking
compensation for constitutional violationsincluding deliberate indifference to prisoners
physical well being.31
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Shrewd Tactics
Certain private prison companies employ shrewd tactics to obtain more and more government
contracts to incarcerate prisoners. In February 2011, for example, a jury convicted former
Luzerene County, Pennsylvania Judge Mark Ciavarella of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy,
and money laundering conspiracy in connection with payments received from a private prison
developer.32 Tactics employed by some private prison companies, or individuals associated with
the private prison industry, to gain influence or acquire more contracts or inmates include: use
of questionable financial incentives; benefitting from the revolving door between public and
private corrections; extensive lobbying; lavish campaign contributions; and efforts to control
information.33
****
Part One of this Report traces the rise of the for-profit prison industry over the past 30 years,
demonstrating that private prisons reaped lucrative spoils as incarceration rates reached historic
levels. Part Two focuses on the supposed benefits associated with private prisons, showing that
the view that private prison companies provide demonstrable economic benefits and humane
facilities is debatable at best. Part Three discusses the tactics private prison companies have
used to obtain control of more and more human beings and taxpayer dollars.
The time to halt the expansion of for-profit incarceration is now. The evidence that private prisons
provide savings compared to publicly operated facilities is highly questionable, and certain studies
point to worse conditions in for-profit facilities. The private prison industry helped to create the
mass incarceration crisis and feeds off of this social ill. Private prisons cannot be part of the
solutioneconomic or ethicalto the problem of mass incarceration.
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PART I:
THE PRIVATE PRISON EXPLOSION
Mass incarceration strains state budgets and deprives individuals of liberty in record numbers.
But the social ill of mass incarceration is a bonanza for the private prison industry, which has
extracted more and more taxpayer dollars from state budgets as governments dispatch prisoners
to private facilities in ever-increasing numbers.
This chapter chronicles the rapid ascent of the private prison industry over the past 30 yearsa
development that went hand-in-hand with explosive growth in incarceration rates. Although
various forms of correctional privatization had existed in earlier centuries, for-profit incarceration
seemed destined for extinctionuntil, beginning in the 1980s, private prisons suddenly reemerged
and proliferated with breathtaking speed.
Today, private companies imprison roughly 130,000 prisoners34 and, according to one group,
16,000 civil immigration detainees in the United States at any given time.35 As states send more
and more people to prison, they funnel ever greater amounts of taxpayer money to private prison
operators. By 2010, annual revenues of the two top private prison companies alone stood at nearly
$3 billion.36
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Three strikes laws: Such laws subject defendants convicted of three crimes to extremely
long sentences. In one case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, a man charged with
stealing golf clubs received a sentence of 25 years to life under a three strikes law.46
Mass incarceration has further weakened depressed communities by depopulating them and
stripping even nonviolent former prisoners of opportunities to find employment and meaningfully
reenter society.47 And while public safety requires the incarceration of certain criminals, current
rates of incarceration are so anomalous that they provide little, if any, public safety benefit.48
Between 1970 and 2005, the number of people incarcerated in the United States grew by 700%.49
Today, the United States incarcerates approximately 2.3 million people.50 According to the
Congressional Research Service, the United States has only 5% of the worlds populatin but a full
25% of its prisoners.51
Source: http://www.aclu.org/combating-mass-incarceration-facts-0
Even compared to this breathtaking rate of overall growth in incarceration, the rate of expansion
of for-profit imprisonment far outpaced the field, accounting for a disproportionate increase in
the number of people locked up. In 1980, private adult prisons did not exist on American soil, but
by 1990 private prison companies had established a firm foothold, boasting 67 for-profit facilities
and an average daily population of roughly 7,000 prisoners.52 During the next twenty years (from
1990 to 2009) the number of people incarcerated in private prisons increased by more than 1600%,
growing from approximately 7,000 to approximately 129,000 inmates.53
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NUMBER OF PRISONERS
7,771
Number of prisoners in
private facilities on December 31, 2009:
129,336
Percentage increase 1990-2009:
YEAR:
1990
2009
1664%
SOURCE for prisoner numbers: United States Department of Justice (Bureau of Justice Statistics)
Increasing incarceration rates fueled this massive expansion of private corrections. CCA
the largest private prison company in the United Statesadmits that current sentencing laws
increase the companys profits by swelling prison populations, whereas policies aimed at reducing
incarceration rates create financial risks for the corporation. Specifically, in a 2010 Annual Report
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), CCA stated, under the heading
Risks Related to Our Business and Industry:
Our ability to secure new contracts to develop and manage correctional and detention
facilities depends on many factors outside our control. Our growth is generally dependent
upon our ability to obtain new contracts to develop and manage new correctional
and detention facilities. This possible growth depends on a number of factors we
cannot control, including crime rates and sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions
and acceptance of privatization. The demand for our facilities and services could be
adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or
parole standards and sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain
activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal laws. For instance, any changes
with respect to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration could affect the
number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing
demand for correctional facilities to house them. Legislation has been proposed in
numerous jurisdictions that could lower minimum sentences for some non-violent
crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release based on good behavior.
Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some offenders on
probation with electronic monitoring who would otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly,
reductions in crime rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime could
lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring incarceration at
correctional facilities.54
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The GEO Group, the second largest private prison operator, identified similar Risks Related to
Our Business and Industry in SEC filings:
Our growth depends on our ability to secure contracts to develop and manage
new correctional, detention and mental health facilities, the demand for which is
outside our control . [A]ny changes with respect to the decriminalization of drugs
and controlled substances could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted,
sentenced and incarcerated, thereby potentially reducing demand for correctional
facilities to house them. Similarly, reductions in crime rates could lead to reductions
in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring incarceration at correctional facilities.
Immigration reform laws which are currently a focus for legislators and politicians at
the federal, state and local level also could materially adversely impact us.55
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$1,269,968,000
81,000
1984 (founded as Wackenhut Corrections
Corporation)
Headquarters:
Boca Raton, Florida
Head:
George Zoley (Chairman, CEO, Founder)
Executive Compensation: $3,484,807 compensation package for Zoley in 2010
(according to Morningstar)
Sources: CCA: 2010 Annual Letter to Shareholders; A Quarter Century of Service to America; About CCA; Morningstar, Corrections Corporation
of America, Key Executive Compensation. GEO Group: 2010 Annual Report; 2010 Letter to Shareholders; Morningstar, The GEO Group, Inc., Key
Executive Compensation.
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changes in public policy. Policies such as mandatory minimum sentencing for violent
criminals represent just a handful of ALECs victories in the states.76
ALEC has not only done work that helped increase the amount of taxpayer money spent on
corrections generally but has also supported policies likely to increase the proportion of
corrections spending funneled to private corporations. In fact, the Private Correctional Facilities
Act, another ALEC model bill, authorized for-profit incarceration contracts between state and
local governments and private prison operators. The model act stated: This Act would allow any
unit of government to contract with the private sector to perform services currently performed by
a corrections agency.77 The model act further provided that a state prisoner may be incarcerated
in a facility constructed or operated by a private entity pursuant to contract under this Act, and
permitted contracts for the private purchase or lease of correctional facilities for periods of up
to 30 years.78 According to a report by an advocacy group, ALECs Criminal Justice Task Force
at one point reported that prison privatization was a major issue on which it was focusing,79
and according to a recent news report, [s]tarting in the 1990s, [an] ALEC task force produced
model bills directly promoting prison privatization. These included bills to let private prisons
house inmates from other states without permission of local governments, require privatization
of prisons and correctional services and encourage contracting for prison labor.80
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Percentage increase in
immigration detention since
1994: 457%
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PART II:
THE FALSE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PRISONS
Although mass incarceration strains state budgets while rewarding for-profit companies, certain
private prison supporters and policymakers have put forth privatization as part of a solution
to budgetary crises confronting states across the nation.92 Similarly, leading private prison
companies promise to provide cost-effective alternatives to governmentally operated prisons.
CCA asserts on its website, [w]ith state and federal budgets stretched and public needs always
competing with limited dollars, legislators are faced with critical choices on where to spend scarce
resources. Creating a partnership with CCA to construct, manage and maintain their prisons
allows governments to care for hardworking taxpayer dollars, while protecting critical priorities
like education and health care.93 Other private prison companies assert that privatization saves
money, or is otherwise cost-effective. GEO, for example, claims to provide 20% to 30% cost
savings in facility development, and 10% to 20% cost savings in facility management.94
This chapter demonstrates that the supposed benefits (economic and otherwise) of private
prisons often fail to withstand scrutiny. The view that private prisons save taxpayer money, fuel
local economies, and adequately protect the safety of prisoners helps to feed mass incarceration
by making privatization appear to be an attractive alternative to reducing prison populations. But
the evidence for such benefits is mixed at best. Not only may privatization fail to save taxpayer
money, but private prison companies, as for-profit institutions, are strongly incentivized to cut
corners and thereby maximize profits, which may come at the expense of public safety and the
well being of prisoners.95
Inflated hopes about the supposed benefits of privatization are especially dangerous now,
as several states, spurred by fiscal necessity, have begun the difficult work of reducing mass
incarceration.96 Such progress threatens the private prison industry. As CCA stated in its 2010
Annual Report, under the heading Risks Related to Our Business and Industry, [l]egislation
has been proposed in numerous jurisdictions that could lower minimum sentences for some nonviolent crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release based on good behavior. Also,
sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some offenders on probation ... who would
otherwise be incarcerated.97
The danger currently posed by the private prison industry is that legislators, operating under
the highly questionable view that private prisons save money, will turn to privatization as a fiscal
solution, rather than cutting corrections spending by reducing the number of people behind
bars. For example, despite a recent statement by the Arizona Auditor General that for-profit
imprisonment in Arizona may cost more than incarceration in publicly-operated facilities,98
Arizona has announced plans to contract out an additional 5,000 prison beds. 99
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Accordingly, an analysis of the key benefits supposedly associated with private prisonsthat forprofit prisons save money, stimulate economic growth, and adequately ensure the well-being of
prisonersis especially relevant in the present moment. Such claims are examined below.
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Furthermore, private prisons can impose costs on local communities by obtaining subsidies,
enjoying property tax exemptions, and receiving municipal services (such as water and sewer
services) that cost taxpayer money.117 In 2001, a report by one advocacy group stated that nearly
three quarters of large private prisons received development subsidies from the government.118
Meanwhile, the benefit to counties where private prisons are built and operated can be quite
scantsome receive less than $2 per prisoner per day from the private prison operator.119 The
private prison companies themselves receive a far greater payoff from the government entity
(such as a state corrections department) whose prisoners the company incarcerates. For example,
private prison operators in Arizona were paid $63.52 per medium security prisoner per day in
2009,120 and as early as 2000, the federal government agreed to pay CCA almost $90 per day for
each detained immigrant at a San Diego facility.121
Furthermore, in some cases, local communities eager to build private prisons have set up
financial arrangements that ultimately damage their fiscal standing.122 The following case study
exemplifies this problem.
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CASE STUDY
In 2004, a group of businessmen had a proposal for the small town of Hardin, Montana: build a
private detention center.123 The theory was that such a facility would lead to economic benefits
for the community.124 In 2004, the citys economic development director predicted that at the
new facility, a job seeker with a GED or high school diploma might be able to get a job with a
significantly higher income.125
To finance the project in Hardin, the economic development authority created by the town issued
$27 million worth of municipal bonds that were both uninsured and unrated.126 But once the
facility had been built, it was unable to obtain a contract to house prisoners, and its 464 beds
remained empty.127 One news report described the facility as follows: Inside its concrete walls,
orange jumpsuits, rubber sandals and stacks of white tube socks weigh down the shelves of the
storeroom. Computers, phones and video monitors line the tables in the control room. In the
cafeteria, stacks of plastic trays and cooking utensils wait to be put to use.128
Because the jail remained empty, the $27 million worth of bonds issued by the economic
development authority created by the town lacked sufficient revenue to back them.129 The
authority defaulted on the bonds.130 Roughly 67 people had been offered jobs and cleared
background checksbut they could not report to work because the facility never opened.131 Just
preventing the empty building from falling apart became a financial burden for the town. Pipes
began to leak in late 2009, more leaks were discovered in 2010, and repairs were slated to total
$8,000.132 In the winter, gas bills ran as high as $10,000 per month.133
Desperate for a solution, the town turned to increasingly outlandish alternatives to fill the facility.
For a time, it appeared that an individual by the name of Michael Hilton, the head of a company
called American Police Force would provide the answer to Hardins prayers.134 Hilton proposed
not only to fill the jail with prisoners but to construct a para-military training center close to
the jail.135 Hilton pledged to provide fees, in addition to such things as computers for schools and
a homeless shelter.136 Hardins economic development authority signed a ten-year contract with
Hiltons company,137 and Hilton arrived in Hardin with SUVs outfitted with a logo for the Hardin
Police Department (an entity that does not exist).138
It soon came to light, however, that Hilton had, according to the Associated Press, gone by
at least 17 aliases and ha[d] a history of fraud and theft He spent three years in prison in
California and ha[d] $1.1 million in outstanding civil judgments against him.139 According to a
news report, American Police Force claimed that its services included sell[ing] assault rifles and
other weapons in Afghanistan on behalf of the U.S. military.140
The towns deal with Hilton and his American Police Force fell through, but the town still sought
a way to fill its empty jail. When President Barack Obama pledged to remove all detainees from
Guantanamo Bay, the Hardin City Council voted unanimously in favor of receiving Guantanamo
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detainees at the local facility, a proposal that of course never materialized.141 Other ideas for what to
do with the empty jail included using it as an enormous indoor greenhouse for medical marijuana,
a fight site for paintball or as low income housing.142 In early 2011, the makers of the show Deadliest
Catch (a program about crabbing boats in Alaska) were exploring whether to use the facility for a
potential reality series on prisons (and how to fill the jail with inmates in order to make such a series
possible).143
According to a news report, one of the groups involved in the plan to construct the facility in 2004
was Corplan Corrections.144 Corplan Corrections currently states on its website:
Many prisons bring 150 to 400 new jobs to a community, not to mention the additional
impact of the income that flows into city and county budgets from prisons. Plus, we have
found that well managed prisons also provide substantial free and donated labor for
civic projects, parks, schools and public needs.
We look forward to working with you. Now, there are many more communities wanting
detention centers than are available. But if your community qualifies, Corplan Corrections
will make it possible for you. We may even be able to show you how your community can
qualify.145
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the females to exit the vehicle, then mislead each of the victims to believe that he was
conducting a legitimate search of their bodies, when in fact, the defendant touched the
victims in a sexual manner and for the purposes of self gratification.156 Dunn earlier
pled guilty to state charges of official oppression and unlawful restraint in connection
with the molestation of five immigration detainees.157 On October 19, 2011, the ACLU of
Texas brought suit against defendants including Dunn, the private prison company, and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on behalf of immigration detainees alleging
sexual abuse.158
In August 2011, according to a Department of Justice press release: former Contract
Security Officer Edwin Rodriguez, 30, pleaded guilty to engaging in sexual abuse of a
female detainee under his supervision and control. The sexual act occurred inside the
Willacy Detention Center while Rodriguez was on duty.159
In 2009, State of Hawaii investigators sent to Otter Creek Correctional Center, a private
prison for women in Kentucky that held Hawaii prisoners, found, according to a news
report, that at least five corrections officials at the prison, including a chaplain, had
been charged with [engaging in sexual intercourse] with inmates in the last three
years, and four were convicted.160
Evidence recently obtained by the ACLU through a Freedom of Information Act request,
submitted in 2011 to the Department of Homeland Security, provides a further window
into assault in private prisons. These documents suggest that the Departments Office
of Inspector General, which investigates sexual abuse of individuals held in immigration
detention facilities, received numerous sexual abuse complaints between 2008 and
2010 regarding the Willacy Detention Center in Raymondville, Texasa private facility
operated by Management & Training Corporation. Excerpts from these documents,
which were heavily redacted by the government, appear below.
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The following case studies further illustrate unacceptable levels of violence and unsafe conditions
in private prisons.
CASE STUDY
Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility, a juvenile prison in Mississippi operated by the GEO
Group, is currently the target of a lawsuit and a Department of Justice investigation regarding
conditions alleged to be so horrific that a former resident reportedly calls the facility the deepest
depths of hell.161 Another former prisoner indicates that violence is so pervasive that it has
become entertainment for guards.162 The facility has averaged as many as three injuries per
day due to violence.163 Oversight at the facility is highly questionable, as the GEO Group provides
reimbursement for the salary of the individual appointed by the state to monitor conditions.164
A lawsuit filed by the ACLU and the Southern Poverty Law Center in 2010 alleges a pattern of
horrendous physical and sexual abuse by security staff, use of prolonged solitary confinement,
abuse and neglect of mentally ill youth, and failure to provide basic mental health care.165 While
juveniles allegedly suffer in atrocious conditions, private companies including the GEO Group
have, according to one report, extracted more than $100 million in revenue from the facilitys
operation.166
CASE STUDY
After spending a month in solitary confinement in a Texas private prison, 32-year-old Jesus
Manuel Galindo, according to the complaint filed in a pending lawsuit, was found dead in his
cell in December 2008.167 According to papers filed in the case, the GEO Group operated the
prison; a second private entity, Physicians Network Association (PNA), provided medical care for
prisoners.168
As court papers and news reports assert, Galindo was an epileptic, and thus in need of regular
medical care and attention, but his body allegedly was found after rigor mortis had set in, indicating
that prison officials did not discover his death for some time.169 According to the complaint filed
in the lawsuit, Galindo died of an epileptic seizure while in solitary confinement, left in a cell with
a broken intercom that prevented him from calling for help.170 According to a neurologist who
reviewed Galindos autopsy, he was set up to die.171
Galindos death is all the more tragic because several years earlier, in 2003, the Civil Rights
Division of the United States Department of Justice had found that another correctional facility,
through PNA, provide[d] inadequate medical services in the following areas: intake, screening,
and referral; acute care; emergent care; chronic and prenatal care; and medication administration
and management. As a result, inmates at the [facility] with serious medical needs [were] at risk
for harm.172 Despite these findings of serious neglect, the federal Bureau of Prisons rewarded the
company by entering into a contract to house federal prisoners at the Texas facility where PNA
provides medical care, and where Galindos death would later occur.
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CASE STUDY
The Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) is owned and operated by CCA. Levels of violence at the
facility have been so extreme that it has been dubbed the Gladiator School.173 A study conducted
by the Idaho Department of Correction in 2008 found that there were four times as many prisoneron-prisoner assaults at ICC than at Idahos other seven prisons combined.174 In a lawsuit filed by
the ACLU on behalf of ICC prisoners, which settled in September 2011, the Complaint alleged that
guards cruelly use prisoner violence as a management tool, that violence is epidemic at ICC,
and that staff fail to adequately investigate assaults, frequently place vulnerable prisoners with
predators, and fail to protect prisoners who request and need protection from assault.175 In
2010, the Associated Press obtained video footage showing a prisoner being mercilessly beaten by
another inmate, while guards reportedly failed to intervene.176
In a letter to the ACLU, one prisoner described the lack of treatment he received after being
attacked:
I was treated horribly. Like it was my fault I was then taken to the hole, stripped to my
underwear and left. I was shaking and cold. I was bleeding and [I kept going] in and out of
consciousness. I had a concussion with loss of balance and headachemany, many hours
later I was given my clothes and a blanket. The ice was all the medical [treatment] I had.
The parties reached a settlement agreement in September 2011 that requires CCA to make major
improvements in facility conditions, including a requirement that the corporation perform an
investigation of all assaults and increase staffing levels.177
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These shortcuts potentially create grave risks, as pay and turnover may contribute to the higher
levels of violence seen in the private sector. 181 More specifically:
Privately operated prisons appear to have systemic problems in maintaining secure
facilities . Advocates of prison privatization have argued that private prisons can
pay workers less, offer fewer benefits, and still deliver a product that is as good or
better than that provided by the public sector. The evidence to date contradicts such an
encompassing assertion.182
The same study continued: [t]he data presented here indicate that less costly workers in private
prisons have not produced an acceptable level of public safety or inmate care to date.183
The following case study shows that an Arizona private prison was staffed with inexperienced
guards, and that better management of the facility might have avoided a horrific escape.
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CASE STUDY
The infamous escape of three prisoners, including convicted murderer Tracy Province, from a
private prison in Kingman, Arizona on July 30, 2010, provides a tragic illustration of the dangers
created in one private prison184and the use of inexperienced correctional officers. The results
of the escape were horrific, and escapees were charged with allegedly murdering, while on the
run, an elderly Oklahoma couple vacationing in New Mexico, and setting fire to their camper.185
One of the prisoners was recaptured only after a chase in which he fired bullets at a police car;
another was caught while hitchhiking with a pistol.186 The Director of the Arizona Department of
Corrections described the prison break as the states worst escape in 30 years.187
The escape is all the more tragic because security lapses may have been a contributing factor.188
Although alarms went off as the prisoners escaped, state officials would later report that private
prison guards ignored the alarms, deeming them false.189 In August 2010, shortly after the
escape, the Arizona Department of Corrections produced a scathing security assessment of the
private prison, finding, among numerous other problems, that the private prisons staff lacked
experience and routinely ignored alarms. Findings in the report included the following:
Alarms regularly and routinely activate throughout the day .... This has become such a
norm that zone activation events are treated at a lower priority than other duties such as
answering the telephone, issuing keys, checking staff in, etc.190
The alarm system in the perimeter zones has not been serviced or maintained by trained
experts .... The sensitivity of the zones is not routinely tested or adjusted. This has led
to constant false alarms (during one five minute period .... [the auditor] noted six alarm
activations) which, over the course of months, has led to staff being desensitized.191
Staff are fairly green across all shifts. Many staff have under one year of service. Finding
staff with 2 or more years of service is rare.192
It was estimated that one third of security employees have less than three months on the
job or in their promoted position.193
Staff are not proficient with weapons.194
Weapons are stored loaded and drills are not being conducted regularly.195
Despite this tragic escape, the same private prison company (Management & Training
Corporation) continues to operate private prisons in Arizona, including the Kingman facility.196
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One day, as a 14-year-old boy was being released after serving his sentence [at a private prison
operated by CCA], the guard offered him some friendly advice.
Stay out of trouble, he said. I dont want to see you back here.
Why not? the kid responded. Thats how you make your money.
Eric Bates, Private Prisons: Over the Next Five Years Analysts Expect the Private Share of the Prison
Market to More than Double, THE NATION, Jan. 5, 1998
****
Although supporters of for-profit prisons contend that such institutions provide an answer to
bloated state corrections budgets, these facilities offer no solutionfinancial or otherwiseto
the mass incarceration crisis confronting state governments. The evidence that private prisons
provide demonstrable financial savings is mixed at best, and prisons do not appear to provide
economic benefits to local communities. Private prisons suffer from flawed incentives and may
face heightened levels of violence.
Given these enormous potential drawbacks, why have private prison companies been so successful
in persuading policymakers to build more and more private prisons? Much of the answer lies in
shrewdand sometimes cynicalefforts used by some members of the private prison industry to
curry political favor. The following chapter explores this topic.
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PART III:
THE PRIVATE PRISON PITCH
In order to increase revenue and maximize profit, private prison companies must obtain more
and more contracts to lock up increasing numbers of people. Some private prison companies, or
individuals associated with these companies, employ a range of aggressive tactics to expand the
reach of for-profit imprisonment. This chapter examines such tactics, which include:
Questionable financial incentives
Benefitting from the revolving door between public and private corrections
Extensive lobbying
Lavish campaign contributions
Control of information
Not every private prison company has been found to engage in each tactic discussed in this chapter,
but the tactics used by some companies may pose an especially grave concern at present, as
state governments struggle to reduce incarceration costs. Such tactics threaten to undermine
real solutions to overincarceration by encouraging cash-strapped state governments to turn to
privatization rather than serious criminal justice reform. The highly questionable view that private
prisons provide advantages (financial or otherwise) over governmental facilities, discussed in the
previous chapter, may become all the more dangerous when coupled with the influence-peddling
strategies discussed in this chapter.
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CASE STUDY
In February 2011, a jury convicted former Luzerene County, Pennsylvania Judge Mark Ciavarella
of racketeering, money laundering, and conspiracy in connection with his acceptance of nearly
one million dollars from the developer of a private juvenile facility.200 Prosecutors reportedly
referred to these activities as a kids for cash scheme.201 Ciavarella was responsible for an
enormous share of imprisoned juveniles. Indeed, in the span of five years, Ciavarellas rulings
accounted for 22% of decisions to detain children in Pennsylvaniaeven though Luzerne
county accounts for less than 3% of Pennsylvanias population.202 Ciavarella has appealed the
convictions.203
According to families with children tried by Ciavarella, the judge would hold trials only minutes
long.204 He allegedly ordered a ten-year-old incarcerated and locked up a high school girl for
three months because she mocked a school official on a website.205 In another reported instance,
a twelve-year-old boy took his mothers car and got into an accident.206 The mother filed a police
report, concerned that insurance otherwise would not cover the damage.207 Ciavarella reportedly
jailed the boy for a full two years.208 In another instance, Ciavarella allegedly based a juveniles
sentence on the number of birds perched outside a courtroom window.209
The payments received by Ciavarella from the private prison developer ultimately led not only to
Ciavarellas criminal conviction but also to the dismissal, by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
of 4,000 juvenile cases handled by Ciavarella.210 The Court stated:
Ciavarella admitted under oath that he had received payments from Robert Powell, a
co-owner of the [two private facilities], and from Robert K. Mericle, the developer who
constructed the juvenile facilities, during the period of time that Ciavarella was presiding
over juvenile matters in Luzerne County .... Ciavarellas admission that he received these
payments, and that he failed to disclose his financial interests arising from the development
of the juvenile facilities, thoroughly undermines the integrity of all juvenile proceedings
before Ciavarella .... [T]his Court cannot have any confidence that Ciavarella decided any
Luzerne County juvenile case fairly and impartially while he labored under the specter of his
self-interested dealings with the facilities.211
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CASE STUDY
The federal probe of political corruption in Alaska that culminated in the trial of Senator Ted
Stevens and the guilty plea of oil executive Bill Allen began as Operation Polar Penan
investigation of corruption connected to a scheme to build a private prison in Alaska.212 The
federal investigation led to charges not only against politicians and oil industry moguls but
also against Bill Weimar, an individual who ultimately pled guilty to criminal counts, including
conspiracy to engage in honest services mail and wire fraud,213 in connection with efforts to win
passage of legislation that could have resulted in construction of a private prison.214 Sections of
the factual basis for his guilty plea, which Weimar signed, are shown on the following page.
Before the scandal, Weimar had made enormous profits in private corrections. In the late
1990s, he had sold, at a price tag of $21 million, five private halfway houses in Alaska to Cornell
Companies.215 Weimar then moved to Montana and acquired a personal compound that reportedly
included a six-bedroom home, two-bedroom caretakers cottage, indoor shooting and archery
ranges, equestrian center, two-lane bowling alley, heated swimming pool, racquetball and tennis
courts and helipad, all on 60 acres.216
But Weimar had an opportunity to make even more money if a private prison were constructed
in Alaska. His company, Allvestalong with Cornell Companies and Veco (the company led by
Allen)were part of a consortium called Corrections Group North that was seeking to acquire
a $1 billion, 25-year contract to build and operate such a prison.217 Weimar retained an interest in
the plan and would have made another $5.5 million if the prison were constructed.218
To push the plan forward, Weimar focused on an individualidentified only as CANDIDATE A
in legal papers filed by federal prosecutorswho was running for a seat in the Alaska State
Legislature.219 According to news reports, the candidate described in legal papers matched the
description of Jerry Ward, who had previously served in the legislature and was seeking reelection
to his former position.220 Ward has been described as one of the [Alaska] Legislatures biggest
advocates of hiring private contractors to provide public services,221 and a representative who
fervently pushed private prison projects. 222
Weimar provided financial support totaling approximately $20,000 to the campaign of
CANDIDATE A, and Weimar, according to his guilty plea, understood and believed that
CANDIDATE A would, as a public official, use his official position to advocate for the passage
and funding of legislation that would establish a privately-operated prison, knowing that if such
legislation passed and a privately-operated prison contract was awarded to Company A, WEIMAR
stood to benefit personally.223
Ultimately, the private prison that Weimar corruptly sought to build was never constructed,
thanks to resistance from local communities, correctional officers unions, and other Alaska
lawmakers.224 Weimar himself served his sentence in a governmentally operated federal prison in
Arizona.225
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CASE STUDY
In 2007, the Texas Youth Commission fired employees responsible for monitoring a West Texas
juvenile prison run by GEO because the employees failed to report horrid conditions at the
prison.232 In fact, the employees not only failed to report substandard conditions but praised the
operation. In the monitors most recent review the prison was awarded an overall compliance
score of 97.7 percent. In that review, monitors also thanked GEO staff for their positive work with
[Texas] youth.233
It later came to light that some of the monitorsimmediately before commencing their
employment as state monitors of GEOs contract performancehad worked for the GEO Group.234
When Texas finally sent independent auditors to the youth facility, the auditors reportedly got so
much fecal matter on their shoes they had to wipe their feet on the grass outside.235 Findings in
the independent report included all of the following:
The GEO Group does not ensure that the youth are provided with a clean and orderly living
environment.
Cells were filthy, smelled of feces and urine, and were in need of paint.
[T]here are serious problems with insects throughout the facility and grounds.
Plumbing chases were not secure at the time of the inspection. Contraband and pests were
found in these areas.
Water leaks are numerous throughout the facility, creating an unsanitary and unsafe
environment for all youth and staff.
There is racial segregation [in] the dorms; Hispanics are not allowed to be cell mates with
African Americans.
Youth sprayed with [Oleoresin Capsicum] pepper spray are not routinely decontaminated.236
The Texas Youth Commission auditors also held focus groups, in which children at the facility
reported:
They have not received church services in over two months.
They are disciplined for speaking Spanish.
They are sometimes not allowed to brush their teeth for days at a time.
They had been forced to urinate or defecate in some container other than a toilet.237
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AK
HI
Campaign Contributions
In addition to lobbying, for-profit prison companies also spend vast sums of money on campaign
contributions. Since 2000, the leading private prison companiesCCA, GEO, and Cornell (which has
since been absorbed by GEO in a merger)have contributed over six million dollars to candidates
for state office and over $800,000 to candidates for federal office, according to the Justice Policy
Institute.245 The organization further reports that in 2010 alone, these companies contributed over
two million dollars to state political campaigns, with a large fraction of the money funneled to
state party committees.246
Data maintained by the National Institute on Money in State Politics also reveal the following
about private prison campaign contributions: Between 2003 and 2011, CCA contributed to over
600 state candidates, and GEO contributed to over 400.247 Both corporations have established
their own Political Action Committees (PACs).248 These companies backed a high proportion of
candidates who ultimately won elections, which may indicate a strategy of focusing contributions
on candidates likely to wield power. GEO, for example, made 506 campaign donations to incumbents
and only 12 donations to challengers between 2003 and 2011.249
| 39
The following case study illustrates the combined effect that campaign contributions and the
revolving door may have had on the expansion of privatized incarceration in Arizona.
CASE STUDY
Faced with fiscal crises, states across the country, including tough on crime jurisdictions
such as Texas and South Carolina, have labored to reduce corrections spending.250 But Arizonas
Department of Corrections is the only large agency in that state not subject to a budget cut in
fiscal year 2012in fact, the Departments budget increased by over ten million dollars.251 Despite
a recent statement by the Arizona Auditor General that for-profit imprisonment in Arizona may
cost more than incarceration in publicly-operated facilities,252 Arizona has announced plans to
contract out an additional 5,000 prison beds. 253
The 5,000 bed private prison expansion was included in Arizona Governor Jan Brewers 2010
executive budget. 254 CCA employees and executives reportedly contributed over $1,000 to
Governor Brewers reelection campaign, and CCAs Political Action Committee and lobbyists
contributed another $60,000 to Brewers top legislative priority, Proposition 100, a sales tax to
help avoid budget cuts to education.255 In late 2010, CBS 5 News in Arizona reported that Chuck
Coughlin, Brewers campaign chairman and policy advisor, worked as a lobbyist for CCA; that
Brewers communications director, Paul Senseman, used to lobby for CCA; and that Sensemans
wife continued to lobby for the corporation.256
Control of Information
For-profit prison companies go to great lengths, and apparently spend significant funds, to put
forth a positive public image. Certain private prison companies offer the public well-manicured
websites with extensive press releases and video footage touting their accomplishments, and the
industry praises itself in publications such as Service, Security and Solutions (published by CCA)
and GEOworld (published by GEO). Puff pieces on private prison websites cover such topics as the
Paws in Prison program (which pairs prisoners with dogs), awards given to the industry, and a
charity golf tournament hosted by CCAs chairman.257
Private prison companies also funnel money (which, of course, initially comes largely from
taxpayers) into communications departments, which churn out positive stories about private
prisons. CCA employs a Vice President for Communications, whose duties include strategic
marketing communications, media management, [and] brand positioning.258 Management &
Training Corporation likewise has a Vice President for Communications.259
Meanwhile, private prison websites rarely report negative information: no one would know from
CCAs website that one of its employees sexually abused multiple female immigration detainees,
| 40
A near-total absence of
committed oversight has
allowed the prison industry
to flourish in the shadows.
Requests for the most
basic information about the
functioning of these prisons
and detention centers
routinely lead nowhere.
****
A range of aggressive and shrewd tactics drive the expansion of private incarceration. The private
prison industry thrives in part by employing effective marketing strategies, rather than offering
effective solutions.
| 41
CONCLUSION
In America, our criminal justice system should keep us safe, operate fairly, and be cost-effective.
Mass incarceration, however, deprives record numbers of individuals of their liberty, has at best a
minimal effect on public safety, and cripples state budgets. Meanwhile, the private prison industry
rakes in profits by obtaining government money in increasing amounts, by depriving Americans of
liberty in ever greater numbers, and potentially by cutting corners at the expense of public safety
and prison security.
For-profit prisons are a major contributor to bloated state budgets and mass incarcerationnot
a part of any viable solution to these urgent problems. In order to reduce corrections spending
and mitigate mass incarceration, governments must focus on the hard work of criminal justice
reform, and not the false promise of for-profit imprisonment.
| 42
ENDNOTES
1
THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5, 35 (2008); Rough Justice in America: Too Many
Laws, Too Many Prisoners, THE ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010; Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other
Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008.
See Rough Justice in America; Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, THE ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010. Currently, the United
States incarcerates over 2.3 million people, approximately one out of every 100 adults. Id.
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6-7 (2010); THE PEW CENTER ON THE
STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 35 (2008); TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 6-7, 9-10 (2007).
See, e.g., Greg Bluestein, Associated Press, State Budget Crises Push Sentencing Reforms, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2011;
JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 1-2 (2010); AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES
5-7 (2011).
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K 19 (2010). The full paragraph stated: Our ability
to secure new contracts to develop and manage correctional and detention facilities depends on many factors outside
our control. Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to develop and manage
new correctional and detention facilities. This possible growth depends on a number of factors we cannot control,
including crime rates and sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions and acceptance of privatization. The demand
for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in
conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain activities that are
currently proscribed by our criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances
or illegal immigration could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially
reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them. Legislation has been proposed in numerous jurisdictions
that could lower minimum sentences for some non-violent crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release
based on good behavior. Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some offenders on probation
with electronic monitoring who would otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly, reductions in crime rates or resources
dedicated to prevent and enforce crime could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring
incarceration at correctional facilities. Id. at 19-20.
From 1990 to 2009, the number of people incarcerated in private prisons grew from approximately 7,000 to
approximately 129,000 inmates. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995 iv (1997); HEATHER C. WEST, ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, 33 App. Table 19 (2010).
HEATHER C. WEST, ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, 34 App. Table
20 (2010) (6.8% of adult state prisoners and 16.4% of adult federal prisoners in private prisons in 2009); DETENTION
WATCH NETWORK, THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION, www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/
privateprisons (49% of immigration detainees in private facilities in 2009) (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 2010 LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS 1 (2010) (($1.7 billion in 2010 CCA revenue); THE GEO
GROUP, INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 20 (2010) ($1.27 billion in 2009 GEO revenue); MORNINGSTAR, CORRECTIONS CORPORATION
OF AMERICA, KEY EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://insiders.morningstar.com (under search insiders by ticker, search for
CXW) (CCA executive compensation); MORNINGSTAR, THE GEO GROUP, INC., KEY EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://insiders.
morningstar.com (under search insiders by ticker, search for GEO) (GEO executive compensation).
For a discussion of the conflicting evidence regarding cost savings, see infra at 19-20 and nn. 100-109.
10
Bob Ortega, Arizona To Expand Private Prisons, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jul. 3, 2011.
11
STATE OF ARIZONA, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 10-08, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS-PRISON POPULATION GROWTH
19, 21 (2010) (citing ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FY 2009 OPERATING PER CAPITA COST REPORT: COST IDENTIFICATION AND
COMPARISON OF STATE AND PRIVATE CONTRACT BEDS (2010)).
12
Bob Ortega, Arizona To Expand Private Prisons, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jul. 3, 2011.
| 43
13
Morgan Loew, Brewer Linked to Private Prisons Housing Illegal Immigrants, KPHO.COM, (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.kpho.
com/story/14791252/brewer-linked-to-private-prisons-housing-illegal-immigrants-9-01-2010.
14
Real Savings Needed for Private Prisons, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, June 22, 2010; see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private
Prisons Found To Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011; Tom Brown, Private Prison Business Eyes Big Florida
Prize, REUTERS, May 12, 2011.
15
Scott Hiaasen, Effort to Privatize Florida Prisons Raises Questions of Cost, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 22, 2011; see also David
Royse, News Service of Florida, Florida State Senator Wants Answers on $25 Million Prison Privatization Costs, FLORIDA
COURIER, Aug. 16, 2011; Teamster Nation, Florida Prison Privatization Already Open for Bids, July 26, 2011, http://
teamsternation.blogspot.com/2011/07/florida-prison-privatization-already.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
16
Seek Savings Beyond Privatizing Prisons, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 2011.
17
Final Declaratory and Injunctive Judgment at 6, Baiardi v. Tucker, No. 2011 CA 1838 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011).
18
Id. at 5. As this report went to press, Governor Rick Scott reportedly had not decided whether to appeal the ruling.
Mary Ellen Klas, Grand Jury Probes Panhandle Private Prison Deal, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 2011.
19
Julie Carr Smyth, Associated Press, Ohio 1st in US To Sell Prison to Private Company, SF GATE, Sept. 1, 2011; Press
Release, ACLU of Ohio, States Decision To Sell Only One Prison Underscores Problems for Taxpayers, Says ACLU,
Sept. 1, 2011 (on file with author).
20
Joe Guillen, Gov-elect John Kasich Picks Private Corrections Consultant and Former Warden To Run Ohios Prisons
System, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 4, 2011; Chillicothes Gary Mohr Named Ohio Prisons Chief, CHILLICOTHE GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 2011.
21
ACLU OF OHIO, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: A LOOK AT PRISON PRIVATIZATION 1, 18-20 (2011); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM
IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 50-51 (2011).
22
Jan Moller, Gov. Jindals Plan To Sell State Prisons Is Killed by House Committee, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 6, 2011; Julie Carr
Smyth, Associated Press, Ohio 1st in US To Sell Prison to Private Company, SF GATE, Sept. 1, 2011.
23
Jan Moller, Gov. Jindals Plan To Sell State Prisons Is Killed by House Committee, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 6, 2011; see also
generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE
PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 54-55 (2011).
24
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT SALARIES AND EXPENSES FISCAL YEAR 2012
CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 57 (2011); Susan Carroll, ICE Upgrades Standards for Detention Facilities, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Sept. 28, 2010.
25
La Opinin, ICE Builds More Immigration Detention Centers, NEW AMERICA MEDIA, June 28, 2011; Jason Buch, New
Detention Center in Karnes County, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 9, 2010; Sam Dolnick, Reversing Course, Officials
in New Jersey Cancel One-Bid Immigrant Jail Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011; Travis Pillow, Corrections Corporation
Partnering with Broward Town To Compete For Immigration Detention Facility, FLORIDA INDEPENDENT, May 27, 2011.
26
Sam Dolnick, Reversing Course, Officials in New Jersey Cancel One-Bid Immigrant Jail Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011.
27
28
Security Assessment, ASP-Kingman August 4-6, 2010, Memorandum from Therese Schroeder, Security Operations
Administrator, to Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections 3, 9 (Aug. 18, 2010) (on file with
author).
29
TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION, COKE COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER AUDIT 7 (2007).
30
Henry K. Lee, California Convicts Brawl in Oklahoma Prison, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 13, 2011.
31
Pollard v. The GEO Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 2449 (May 16, 2011) (No. 10-1104).
32
Mixed Verdict for Disgraced Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011; Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, Former Pennsylvania County President Judge and Juvenile Judge Mark Ciavarella Sentenced to 28
Years in Prison (Aug. 11, 2011) (on file with author). Ciavarella has appealed the convictions. Dave Janoski, Ciavarella
Moved to Federal Prison in Illinois, TIMES-TRIBUNE, Sept. 13, 2011.
33
Of course, not every private prison company has been found to engage in each of these tactics.
| 44
34
HEATHER C. WEST, ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, 34 App. Table 20
(2010). This figure refers to convicted prisoners serving sentences and generally excludes pretrial detainees held in
jails.
35
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION, www.
detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons.
36
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 2010 LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS 1 (2010) ($1.7 billion in 2010 CCA revenue); THE GEO
GROUP, INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 20 (2010) ($1.27 billion in 2009 GEO revenue).
37
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1850, 30 (1978).
38
Id. at 52.
39
JOHN W. ROBERTS, REFORM AND RETRIBUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRISONS 17 (1997).
40
Id.
41
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 31 (2010); see also BRIGETTE SARABI &
EDWIN BENDER, WESTERN PRISON PROJECT AND WESTERN STATES CENTER, THE PRISON PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS AND PRIVATE PRISONS
IN THE INCARCERATION BOOM 1 (2000).
42
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 31 (2010).
43
JOHN W. ROBERTS, REFORM AND RETRIBUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRISONS 82 (1997).
44
ABT ASSOCIATES INC., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 4 (1998).
45
Id. at 5 (stating that the federal government began contracting out immigration detention facilities to private firms
in 1979, which provided the seedbed for the contemporary private imprisonment industry in the United States);
Alex Friedmann, The Societal Impact of the Prison Industrial Complex, or Incarceration for Fun and Profit Mostly Profit
(forthcoming chapter in AND THE CRIMINALS WITH HIM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILL D. CAMPBELL AND ALL THE RECONCILED (ED. RICHARD
C. GOODE)).
46
47
See TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 7 (2007).
48
Id. at 6-7.
49
PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE, PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING AMERICAS PRISON POPULATION 2007-2011, 11 (revised
June 2007).
50
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON POPULATION COUNTS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=131 (last viewed Jul.
24, 2011).
51
SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PRISON GROWTH (2010).
52
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995 iv
(1997). The figures in this paragraph include prisons that hold people who have been convicted. The figures generally
do not include pre-trial detainees held in jails or immigration detainees held in immigration detention facilities.
53
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995 iv
(1997); HEATHER C. WEST, ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, 33 App.
Table 19 (2010).
54
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K 19-20 (2010) (emphasis removed); see also Judith
Greene, Banking on the Prison Boom, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 3 (Tara Herivel &
Paul Wright ed. 2007).
55
THE GEO GROUP, INC., FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JANUARY 2, 2011, 33 (emphasis removed). The
private prison industry has denied claims that it is motivated to take proactive steps in pursuing legislation to keep
their private facilities filled. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND THE USE OF INCARCERATION 4 (January 2002;
updated September 2004).
56
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6-7 (2010); THE PEW CENTER ON THE
STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, 35 (2008); TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION
| 45
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 6-7, 9-10 (2007); Greg Bluestein, Associated Press, State Budget Crises Push
Sentencing Reforms, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2011; JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS:
LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 1-2 (2010); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION
RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES (2011).
57
THE GEO GROUP INC., HISTORIC MILESTONES, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/history.asp (last viewed Oct. 11, 2011); ABT
ASSOCIATES INC, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 5 (1998).
58
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 2010 LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS 1 (2010) (($1.7 billion in 2010 CCA revenue); THE GEO
GROUP, INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 20 (2010) ($1.27 billion in 2009 GEO revenue).
59
Meredith Kolodner, Private Prisons Expect a Boom; Immigration Enforcement to Benefit Detention Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 19, 2006.
60
The vast majority of this taxpayer money no doubt came from taxpayers in the United States. CCA does not operate
prisons outside of the United States; GEO operates a limited number of prisons in South Africa, the United Kingdom,
and Australia, but a far greater number in the United States. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, CCA FACILITY LOCATIONS,
http://www.cca.com/facilities (last visited Oct. 6, 2011); THE GEO GROUP, GLOBAL OPERATIONS, http://www.thegeogroupinc.
com/locations.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
61
62
63
Laura Sullivan, Shaping State Laws With Little Scrutiny, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Oct. 29, 2010 (Videos and photos from
one recent ALEC conference show banquets, open bar parties and baseball games all hosted by corporations. Tax
records show the group spent $138,000 to keep legislators children entertained for the week.). See also AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, ALEC: GHOSTWRITING THE LAW FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 4 (2010).
64
American Legislative Exchange Council, Legislative Membership, (last viewed Jul. 7, 2011), http://www.alec.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Legislative_Membership&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15995.
65
Laura Sullivan, Shaping State Laws With Little Scrutiny, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Oct. 29, 2010.
66
Id. (Heres how it works: ALEC is a membership organization. State legislators pay $50 a year to belong. Private
corporations can join, too [Some] pay tens of thousands of dollars a year. Tax records show that corporations
collectively pay as much as $6 million a year.); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, ALEC: GHOSTWRITING THE LAW FOR CORPORATE
AMERICA 5 (2010); Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the Law: A Little-Known Corporate Lobby is Drafting Business-Friendly Bills
for State Legislators Across the Country, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 2002.
67
Dennis Bartlett, American Legislative Exchange Council, 1997, quoted in DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, CORPORATE AMERICAS TROJAN HORSE IN THE STATES: THE STORY BEHIND THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL 8
(2002).
68
Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the Law: A Little-Known Corporate Lobby is Drafting Business-Friendly Bills for State
Legislators Across the Country, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 2002; Laura Sullivan, Shaping State Laws With Little Scrutiny,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Oct. 29, 2010.
69
Bob Ortega, Political Ties Give Leverage to CCA, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 2011; Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the Law:
A Little-Known Corporate Lobby is Drafting Business-Friendly Bills for State Legislators Across the Country, MOTHER
JONES, Sept.-Oct. 2002; Beau Hodai, Corporate Con Game: How the Private prison Industry Helped Shape Arizonas AntiImmigrant Law, IN THESE TIMES, June 21, 2010; JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF
PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 29 (2011); In the Public Interest, Private Prisons vs.
the Public Interest, (last viewed Oct. 7, 2011); http://org2.democracyinaction.org/o/6488/t/0/blastContent.jsp?email_
blast_KEY=1161818; see also generally Mike Elk & Bob Sloan, The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor, THE NATION,
Aug. 1, 2011.
70
BRIGETTE SARABI & EDWIN BENDER, WESTERN PRISON PROJECT &WESTERN STATES CENTER, THE PRISON PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS AND
PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE INCARCERATION BOOM 4 (2000).
71
Michael Hotra, Getting Tough Works: Old Strategies Are the Weapons in the New War on Crime, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE
EXCHANGE COUNCIL, Oct. 9, 1996, at 8.
| 46
72
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND THE USE OF INCARCERATION 4 (2004).
73
Bob Ortega, Political Ties Give Leverage to CCA, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 2011.
74
Id.; see also Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the Law: A Little-Known Corporate Lobby is Drafting Business-Friendly Bills for
State Legislators Across the Country, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 2002.
75
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND THE USE OF INCARCERATION 5 (2004).
76
77
AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, VOLUME I: SOURCEBOOK OF AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATION 1995, at 144 (1995) (emphasis
added).
78
Id. at 145.
79
BRIGETTE SARABI & EDWIN BENDER, WESTERN PRISON PROJECT &WESTERN STATES CENTER, THE PRISON PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS AND
PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE INCARCERATION BOOM 4 (2000).
80
Bob Ortega, Political Ties Give Leverage to CCA, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 2011.
81
Detention Watch Network, The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, (last visited Oct. 7,
2011), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons).
82
CHAD C. HADDAL & ALISON SISKIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 12
(2010).
83
Id. at 11.
84
Id. at 12.
85
Judy Greene & Sunita Patel, The Immigrant Gold Rush: The Profit Motive Behind Immigration Detention (submitted
to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants). In another account of what appears to be the
same telephone call, the head of the company is reported as instead saying: I think its clear that with the events of
September 11 theres a heightened focus on detention, both on the borders and within the US. So I would say the
events of September 11, um, let me back up. The federal business is the best business for us. Its the most consistent
business for us, and the events of September 11 is increasing that level of business. Prison Privitisation Report
International, No. 44, Nov. 2011, at 5-6 (on file with author).
86
CHAD C. HADDAL & ALISON SISKIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 12
(2010).
87
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHAT HAPPENS IN ARIZONA STAYS IN ARIZONA, http://www.aclu.org/what-happens-arizonastops-arizona (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); see also Daniel Gonzalez, Senate Bill 1070: One Year Later, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr.
23, 2011. A federal court in Arizona later ruled that much of SB 1070 is unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement
of the law, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS UPDATE
ON LEGAL CHALLENGES TO ARIZONAS RACIAL PROFILING LAW (SB 1070), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-racial-justice/
frequently-asked-questions-update-legal-challenges-arizonas-racial-. (last viewed Oct. 3, 2011).
88
Seth Freed Wessler, Bills Modeled After Arizonas SB 1070 Spread Through States, COLORLINES, Mar. 2, 2011.
89
Beau Hodai, Corporate Con Game: How the Private Prison Industry Helped Shape Arizonas Anti-Immigrant Law, IN THESE
TIMES, June 21, 2010; see also Daniel Gonzalez, Senate Bill 1070: One Year Later, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2011.
90
Alia Beard Rau & Casey Newton, Sen. Russell Pearce: SB 1070 Story A Lie, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 29, 2010.
91
Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Oct. 28, 2010; Nate Rau, Ariz.
Immigration Law Pushed for TN, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 5, 2010. But see Alia Beard Rau & Casey Newton, Sen. Russell
Pearce: SB 1070 Story A Lie, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 29, 2010.
92
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found To Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011 (The conviction that
private prisons save money helped drive more than 30 states to turn to them for housing inmates [M]any politicians
have promised to ease budget problems by trimming state agencies. Florida and Ohio are planning major shifts
toward private prisons, and Arizona is expected to sign deals doubling its private-inmate population); D.M. Levine,
Whats Costlier Than A Government Run Prison? A Private One, CNN, Aug. 18, 2010 (In recent years, the trend toward
| 47
privatization, both among state governments and at the federal level has been part of an attempt to address serious
budget troubles and crisis-level prison overcrowding by outsourcing more and more corrections operations to private
companies. The move has translated into big business for industry leaders like Corrections Corporation of America
[and] The Geo Group ); Scott Hiaasen, Effort to Privatize Florida Prisons Raises Questions of Cost, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
24, 2011 (stating that further prison privatization in Florida is needed, backers say, to rein in the prison systems
budget which totaled $2.3 billion last year at a time of mammoth deficits.).
93
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, PARTNERING WITH CCA, http://www.cca.com/partnering-with-cca/ (last viewed Sept. 13,
2011).
94
The GEO Group, GEO Advantages, http://www.geogroup.com/benefitsAdvantages.asp (last viewed Sept. 13, 2011);
see also Emerald Companies, Correctional Management, http://www.emeraldcompanies.com/divisions/corr_mgmt.
htm (last viewed Oct. 13, 2011) (Emerald Correctional Management is dedicated to meeting the collective needs
of governmental public safety and criminal justice agencies (U.S. Marshal, ICE, BOP, state and county) in their
endeavors to deliver competent, cost-effective and secure correctional facilities management and financing.)
(emphasis added); Management & Training Corporation, Corrections Overview, http://www.mtctrains.com/
corrections/corrections-overview (last viewed Oct. 13, 2011) (MTCs proven performance and high integrity provide
delivery of quality services to customers through innovation, adaptability and cost effectiveness.) (emphasis added);
Bob Ortega, Arizona Prison Businesses Are Big Political Contributors, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 2011; JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY
COVENTRY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 15 (2001) (Representatives of privatesector firms assert that they can save taxpayers money by providing correctional services traditionally supplied by
government at less cost.).
95
96
See, e.g., JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 1-2 (2010); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 5-7 (2011).
97
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K 18, 20 (2010). For the full text of this paragraph,
which is excerpted above, see supra n.5.
98
STATE OF ARIZONA, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 10-08, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS-PRISON POPULATION GROWTH
19-20 (2010) (citing ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FY 2009 OPERATING PER CAPITA COST REPORT: COST IDENTIFICATION AND
COMPARISON OF STATE AND PRIVATE CONTRACT BEDS (2010)).
99
Bob Ortega, Arizona To Expand Private Prisons, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jul. 3, 2011.
100
See, e.g., LEONARD C. GILROY ET AL., REASON FOUND. & HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS FOUND., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR
CORRECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN CRISIS AND REFORM (2010); see also Dina Perrone & Travis C. Pratt,
Comparing the Quality of Confinement and Cost-Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Prisons: What We Know, Why We
Do Not Know More, and Where To Go from Here, 83 PRISON J. 301, 315-16 (2003) (reviewing cost studies and stating,
neither side of the correctional privatization debate should, at this time, be able to legitimately claim that the weight
of the empirical evidence is on their side.).
101
STATE OF ARIZONA, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 10-08, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: PRISON POPULATION GROWTH 1920 (2010).
102
STATE OF HAWAII, THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 10-10, MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETYS CONTRACTING
FOR PRISON BEDS AND SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAII 16 (2010).
103
Memorandum from the Legal Review Comm. to the Corr. Facility Evaluation Task Force (Nov. 3, 2010) (emphasis
added) (on file with author).
104
GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-8, COST OF PRISONS: BUREAU OF PRISONS NEEDS BETTER DATA TO ASSESS ALTERNATIVES FOR
ACQUIRING LOW AND MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES 2, 4 (2007).
105
BRAD LUNDAHL ET AL., UTAH CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, PRISON PRIVATIZATION: A META-ANALYSIS OF COST EFFECTIVENESS AND QUALITY OF
CONFINEMENT INDICATORS 20 (2007).
106
Final Declaratory and Injunctive Judgment at 6, Baiardi v. Tucker, No. 2011 CA 1838 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011).
107
Id. at 4-5.
108
Mary Ellen Klas, Grand Jury Probes Panhandle Private Prison Deal, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 2011. For further discussions
of supposed cost savings, see Richard Culp, The Failed Promise of Prison Privatization, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 2011, at
| 48
1, 8 (The big promises of prison privatization less cost, higher quality have simply not materialized . If a quarter
century of experience with prison privatization has not led to better quality and cost outcomes, it is time to take a
more sane approach.); HARLEY G. LAPPIN ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF THE TAFT DEMONSTRATION
PROJECT: PERFORMANCE OF A PRIVATE-SECTOR PRISON AND THE BOP 34 (2005) (The evidence produced by the cost and quality
studies for [a federal prison] suggest that the cost of operating [the prison] was comparable whether [a private prison
company] operated the [the prison] or the BOP operated the prison.); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Private Prisons Found To
Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011.
109
110
Dara Kam, Ethics Board Fines UF Professor $20,000, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Oct. 22, 1999. See also Andrew L. Spivak &
Susan F. Sharp, Inmate Recidivism as a Measure of Private Prison Performance, 54 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 482, 489 (2008);
Judith Greene, Bailing Out Private Jails, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 9, 2001; KEVIN PRANIS, PRIVATE CORR. INST., COST-SAVING OR COSTSHIFTING: THE FISCAL IMPACT OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION IN AMERICA 8 (n.d.); PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA: A CRITICAL LOOK AT ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS 3 (2003); Editorial, Private Prison Problems, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000.
111
In re Charles W. Thomas, No. 99-21, (Fla. Ethics Comm. Oct. 21, 1999) (final order and pub. report).
112
113
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY OUTREACH WITH CCA, http://www.correctionscorp.
com/economic-development (last viewed Sept. 13, 2011).
114
Gregory Hooks et al., Revisiting the Impact of Prison Building on Job Growth: Education, Incarceration, and County-Level
Employment, 1976-2004, 91 SOCIAL SCIENCE Q. 228, 240 (2010).
115
Clayton Mosher, Gregory Hooks & Peter B. Wood, Dont Build it Here: The Hype Versus the Reality of Prisons and Local
Employment in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 90, 91-92 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds.,
2007).
116
RYAN S. KING, MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BIG PRISONS, SMALL TOWNS: PRISON ECONOMICS IN RURAL
AMERICA 2 (2003).
117
PHILIP MATTERA & MAFRUZA KHAN, GOOD JOBS FIRST, JAIL BREAKS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES GIVEN TO PRIVATE PRISONS v
(2001); see also Tom Barry, A Death in Texas: Profits, Poverty, and Immigration Converge, BOSTON REV., Nov.-Dec. 2009.
118
PHILIP MATTERA & MAFRUZA KHAN, GOOD JOBS FIRST, JAIL BREAKS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES GIVEN TO PRIVATE PRISONS, v
(2001).
119
Tom Barry, A Death in Texas: Profits, Poverty, and Immigration Converge, BOSTON REV., Nov.-Dec. 2009; Eric Schlosser,
The Prison-Industrial Complex, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1998.
120
STATE OF ARIZONA, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 10-08, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: PRISON POPULATION GROWTH 20
(2010).
121
Leslie Berestein, Detention Dollars: Tougher Immigration Laws Turn the Ailing Private Prison Sector into a Revenue
Maker, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 4, 2008.
122
John Burnett, Private Prison Promises Leave Texas Towns in Trouble, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 28, 2011 (The packages
look sweet. A town gets a new detention center without costing the taxpayers anything. The private operator finances,
constructs and operates an oversized facility. The contract inmates pay off the debt and generate extra revenue.
The economic model works fine until they cant find inmates.); Kyle Pope, Executives Dropped from Prison Project/
Pair Connected to Scandal in Texas, HOUSTON CHRON. Mar. 6, 1992; Kevin Pranis, Doing Borrowed Time: The High Cost of
Backdoor Prison Finance, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 36, 50-51 (Tara Herivel & Paul
Wright ed., 2007); Matthew Reichbach, Private Prison Developer Behind Montana Fiasco Involved in Construction of NM
Private Prisons, NEW MEXICO INDEP., Oct. 12, 2009; Will Swarts, Jail Bonds Cant Bar Defaults, SMARTMONEY, Sept. 1, 2010.
123
Mike Stark, Detention Facility Would Offer Hardin 150 Jobs, BILLINGS GAZETTE, July 22, 2004; Ruffin Prevost, Bond Default
Could Hinder Future Projects, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 18, 2009.
124
Jennifer McKee, Empty Hardin Jail Puts New Director in Tough Spot, THE MISSOULIAN, Jan. 11, 2010.
125
Mike Stark, Detention Facility Would Offer Hardin 150 Jobs, BILLINGS GAZETTE, July 22, 2004.
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126
Ruffin Prevost, Bond Default Could Hinder Future Projects, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 18, 2009.
127
Jennifer McKee, Empty Hardin Jail Puts New Director in Tough Spot, THE MISSOULIAN, Jan. 11, 2010.
128
Matthew Brown, Montana Town Eager To Put Gitmo Inmates in Its Jail, DESERET NEWS, May 31, 2009.
129
Ruffin Prevost, Bond Default Could Hinder Future Projects, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 18, 2009; Sarah Gravlee, Hardin Jail
Then and Now Financing, KULR-8 NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009.
130
Jennifer McKee, Empty Hardin Jail Puts New Director in Tough Spot, THE MISSOULIAN, Jan. 11, 2010.
131
Becky Shay, Jail Backers Rally Business Community, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 2007.
132
Jennifer McKee & Matthew Brown, Hardin Agency Fixing Pipes in Jail, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 24, 2010.
133
Lorna Thackeray, Producers Eye Empty Hardin Jail for Reality TV Show, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Jan. 13, 2011.
134
Media accounts refer variously to this group as American Police Force and American Private Police Force. This
report refers to the group as American Police Force.
135
Jennifer McKee, Empty Hardin Jail Puts New Director in Tough Spot, THE MISSOULIAN, Jan. 11, 2010.
136
Lorna Thackeray, Producers Eye Empty Hardin Jail for Reality TV Show, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Jan. 13, 2011.
137
Becky Shay, Hardin Agencys Exec Put on Leave, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Sept. 16, 2009.
138
Jennifer McKee, Empty Hardin Jail Puts New Director in Tough Spot, THE MISSOULIAN, Jan. 11, 2010.
139
Matthew Brown, Company Run by Ex-con Drops Montana Jail Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009.
140
Matthew Brown, Security Firms Deal for Filling Empty Montana Jail Is Raising Questions, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 13, 2009.
141
Montana Town Wants Its Empty Jail to be the New Guantanamo Bay, FOX NEWS, Apr. 23, 2009; Editorial, After Guantanamo,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, July 9, 2009.
142
Jennifer McKee, Two Rivers Board Considered Many Options for Hardin Jail, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 9, 2009.
143
Lorna Thackeray, Producers Eye Empty Hardin Jail for Reality TV Show, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Jan. 13, 2011.
144
Mike Stark, Detention Facility Would Offer Hardin 150 Jobs, BILLINGS GAZETTE, July 22, 2004.
145
146
Management & Training Corporation, MTC Keys to Success, http://www.mtctrains.com/corrections/mtc-keys-tosuccess (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
147
148
149
See, e.g., SCOTT D. CAMP & DAWN M. DAGGETT, QUALITY OF OPERATIONS AT PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: USING TRENDS IN INMATE
MISCONDUCT TO COMPARE PRISONS 26 (2005) (The results demonstrated that the private prison did not perform as well as
the three comparison prisons in the public sector, on the whole. For certain measures, the performance of the private
prison was exemplary, as was noted for violent misconduct and security-related misconduct. For the other forms of
misconduct, the results were less favorable for the private prison.); Dina Perrone & Travis C. Pratt, Comparing the
Quality of Confinement and Cost-Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Prisons: What We Know, Why We Do Not Know
More, and Where To Go from Here, 83 PRISON J. 301, 309 (2003) (summarizing prior studies comparing private and
governmental prisons and stating [i]nconclusive results were also found in the domain of safety.).
150
Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector Prisons A Comparison of Select Characteristics, 68 FED.
PROBATION 27, 30 (2004).
151
JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 52 (2001). The study noted that
[t]hese differences may be related to other factors such as reporting standards or the fact that correctional facilities
often experience management difficulties when they are newly opened, but that insufficient training for and lack of
qualified staff in key positions may also be a valid explanation for these differences. Id.
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152
SCOTT D. CAMP AND GERALD G. GAES, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, GROWTH AND QUALITY OF U.S. PRIVATE PRISONS: EVIDENCE FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY 9 (2001).
153
HARLEY G. LAPPIN ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF THE TAFT DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: PERFORMANCE OF A PRIVATE-SECTOR
PRISON AND THE BOP 47, 48 (2005).
154
Id at x.
155
Henry K. Lee, California Convicts Brawl in Oklahoma Prison, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 13, 2011.
156
Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Former T. Don Hutto Correction Center Employee Pleads Guilty to Civil Rights
Charges (Sept. 7, 2011) (on file with author).
157
Shannon Wolfson & Erin Cargile, Former Guard Takes Plea Deal for Abuse, KXAN, Nov. 9, 2010.
158
Complaint at 5, Doe v. Neveleff, No. 1:11-cv-00907 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2011).
159
Press Release, U.S. Dept of Justice, Former Willacy Detention Contract Security Officer Pleads Guilty to Sexual Abuse of
a Female Detainee in Texas (Aug. 4, 2011) (on file with author).
160
Ian Urbina, Hawaii To Remove Inmates Over Abuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009.
161
Patsy R. Brumfield, Walnut Grove Called The Depths of Hell, NEMS360.COM, May 17, 2011.
162
John Burnett, Town Relies on Troubled Youth Prison for Profits, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 25, 2011.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Complaint 2, C.B. v. Walnut Grove Correctional Authority, No. 3:10cv663 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 16, 2010).
166
Tracey Dalzell Walsh, Brutal Youth Jail Called a Private Gold Mine, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 18, 2010.
167
Bob Campbell, Dead Mans Family Seeks Answers in Wake of Prison Riots, MIDLAND REP.-TELEGRAM, June 17, 2009; Tom
Barry, A Death in Texas: Profits, Poverty, and Immigration Converge, BOSTON REV., Nov.-Dec. 2009; First Amended
Complaint 1-2, Galindo v. Reeves County, No. 3:10-cv-00454 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2011).
168
First Amended Complaint 5, Galindo v. Reeves County, No. 3:10-cv-00454 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2011).
169
Tom Barry, A Death in Texas: Profits, Poverty, and Immigration Converge, BOSTON REV., Nov.-Dec. 2009; First Amended
Complaint 1-2, Galindo v. Reeves County, No. 3:10-cv-00454 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2011).
170
First Amended Complaint 1, 136, 141, Galindo v. Reeves County, No. 3:10-cv-00454 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2011).
171
Forest Wilder, The Pecos Insurrection: How a Private Prison Pushed Immigrant Inmates to the Brink, TEX. OBSERVER, Oct. 7,
2009.
172
Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, to Jack Sullivan, County Commission Chairman (Mar. 6,
2003) (on file with author).
173
Editorial, Our View: Another Lesson from Gladiator School, IDAHO STATESMAN Oct. 11, 2011; Rebecca Boone, Idaho
Inmates Settle Lawsuit Over Prison Violence, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Sept. 20, 2011.
174
Letter from Randy Blades, Warden, Idaho Department of Correction, to Phillip Valdez, Warden, Idaho Correctional
Center 1 (Aug. 28, 2008) (on file with author).
175
Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 1-2, Riggs v. Valdez No. 1:09-cv-0010-BLW
(D. Idaho Mar. 11, 2010).
176
Rebecca Boone, Prison Violence: At Gladiator School, Help Never Comes, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 10, 2010. The video is
available at http://blogs.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/2010/11/video_shows_idaho_prison_guard.php.
177
Settlement Agreement 2, 4, Kelly v. CCA, No. 1:11-cv-00185 (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.acluidaho.org/
images/Settlement_Agreement.pdf; Rebecca Boone, Idaho Inmates Settle Lawsuit Over Prison Violence, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Sept. 20, 2011.
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178
DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 187 (1995); see also JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY,
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 17 (2001) (noting that [c]ritics of prison privatization argue
that firms will cut corners, from construction materials to hiring inexperienced personnel, forsaking security and
quality of service in the process of making a profit [O]ne of the central concerns raised by critics of correctional
privatization is that firms motivated by financial gain might make decisions that enhance profits at the expense
of the rights and well-being of inmates. History shows that privately operated prison facilities were plagued by
problems associated with the quest for higher earnings. The profit motive produced such abominable conditions and
exploitation of the inmates that public agencies were forced to assume responsibility.) (citation omitted).
179
SCOTT D. CAMP AND GERALD G. GAES, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, GROWTH AND QUALITY OF U.S. PRIVATE PRISONS: EVIDENCE FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY 3, 9 (2001).
180
Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector Prisons A Comparison of Select Characteristics, 68 FED.
PROBATION 27, 29 (2004).
181
Id. at 30.
182
SCOTT D. CAMP & GERALD G. GAES, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, GROWTH AND QUALITY OF U.S. PRIVATE PRISONS: EVIDENCE FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY 16 (2001).
183
Id. at 18.
184
JJ Hensley et al., Arizona Prisoners Risk Ratings in Question, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 2010; Jim Robbins, Arizona Prison
Escapee is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010.
185
Jim Robbins, Arizona Prison Escapee is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010; JJ Hensley and Ginger Rough, Kingman
Prison Still Under Scrutiny, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 2011; Bob Ortega, Arizona Prison Oversight Lacking for Private
Facilities, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 7, 2011.
186
Jim Robbins, Arizona Prison Escapee is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010.
187
JJ Hensley, Report Rips Private Ariz. Prison After Escape, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 20, 2010.
188
See JJ Hensley & Ginger Rough, Kingman Prison Still Under Scrutiny, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 2011; Bob Ortega, Security
Lapses Found at All of Arizonas Prisons, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jun. 26, 2011.
189
JJ Hensley et al., Arizona Prisoners Risk Ratings in Question, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 2010.
190
Security Assessment, ASP-Kingman August 4-6, 2010, Memorandum from Therese Schroeder, Security Operations
Administrator, to Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections 9 (Aug. 18, 2010) (on file with author).
191
Id. at 8.
192
Id. at 9.
193
Id. at 20.
194
Id. at 3.
195
Id. at 4.
196
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING CORPORATION, AT-A-GLANCE CORRECTIONS FACTS (2011) (on file with author); MANAGEMENT & TRAINING
CORPORATION, CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, http://www.mtctrains.com/locations/correctional-facilities (last visited Oct. 7,
2011); Bob Ortega, Arizona Prison Oversight Lacking for Private Facilities: State Weighs Expansion Even as Costs Run
High, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 7, 2011.
197
DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 153 (1995).
198
Statements compiled by the Private Corrections Working Group Website, www.privateci.org/religion.html (last viewed
July 7, 2011) (source for all quotations from religious groups cited).
199
Andrew L. Spivak & Susan F. Sharp, Inmate Recidivism as a Measure of Private Prison Performance, 54 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 503 (2008). Earlier studies of Florida prisons had found some degree of support for a lower rate of
recidivism among private prison inmates. Id. at 488-89.
200
Lindsey Davis et al., Pennsylvania Judge Convicted in Alleged Kids for Cash Scheme, ABC NEWS, Feb. 21, 2011. The jury
acquitted Ciavarella of other counts, including bribery and extortion. Id.
| 52
201
Id.
202
Trish Wilson, Luzerne County Cash for Kids Defendants Finding Wheels of Justice Spin Slowly, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jun.
27, 2010.
203
Dave Janoski, Ciavarella Moved to Federal Prison in Illinois, TIMES-TRIBUNE, Sept. 13, 2011.
204
Lindsey Davis et al., Pennsylvania Judge Convicted in Alleged Kids for Cash Scheme, ABC News, Feb. 21, 2011.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
210
Lindsey Davis et al., Pennsylvania Judge Convicted in Alleged Kids for Cash Scheme, ABC News, Feb. 21, 2011.
211
In re Expungement of Juvenile Records and Vacatur of Luzerne County Juvenile Court Consent Decrees or Adjudications
from 2003-2008, No. 81 MM 2008, at *5-*6 (Pa. Oct. 29, 2009) (emphasis added).
212
Lisa Demer, Legislators Weigh Cost of Contractor Operating New Prison, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10, 2010; Lisa
Demer, Senator Remembers Corruption Fighter Dee Hubbard, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 15, 2010.
213
Plea Agreement at 3-4, United States v. Weimar, No. 3:08-cr-00089 (D. Alaska Aug. 11, 2008).
214
Factual Basis for Plea at 3, United States v. Weimar, No. 3:08-cr-00089 (D. Alaska Aug. 11, 2008).
215
Lisa Demer & Richard Mauer, Businessman Weimar Paid Candidate To Push Private Prison, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug.
12, 2008.
216
Lisa Demer, Weimar Goes to Prison; Montana Spread for Sale, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 6, 2009.
217
Tom Kizzia, Push for Private Prison Was Downfall, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 12, 2008.
218
Id.
219
Factual Basis for Plea at 2, United States v. Weimar, No. 3:08-cr-00089 (D. Alaska Aug. 11, 2008).
220
Lisa Demer & Richard Mauer, Businessman Weimar Paid Candidate To Push Private Prison, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug.
12, 2008; Lisa Demer, Weimar Goes to Prison: Montana Spread for Sale, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 7, 2009; Richard
Mauer, Judge Calls Hearing for Flip-Flopping Stevens Trial Witness, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 26, 2008.
221
Lisa Demer, Weimar Sentenced to Six Months, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 13, 2008.
222
Lisa Demer & Richard Mauer, Businessman Weimar Paid Candidate To Push Private Prison, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug.
12, 2008.
223
Factual Basis for Plea at 3, United States v. Weimar, No. 3:08-cr-00089 (D. Alaska Aug. 11, 2008).
224
Sean Cockerham, Prison Costs Raise Concern, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 15, 2009.
225
226
STATE OF NEW MEXICO LEGISLATIVE FINANCE COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF PRIVATE PRISON CONTRACTS PENALTY ASSESSMENT (2010); Trip
Jennings, Sen. Smith: Williams Work for GEO Casts Cloud over Decision Not to Fine Firms, NEW MEXICO INDEPENDENT,
Sept. 21, 2010.
227
Terry Frieden, Retiring Head of Federal Bureau of Prisons Apologizes for DUI Arrest, CNN, Mar. 30, 2011.
228
Corrections Corporation of America, CCA Welcomes New CCO, Harley G. Lappin, available at www.insidecca.com/
inside-cca/cca-welcomes-new-cco-harley-g-lappin (last viewed July 6, 2011).
229
230
Letter from John Gage, National President, American Federation of Government Employees, to Honorable Patrick
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 16, 2010) (on file with author).
| 53
231
232
Steve McGonigle, Fired TYC Monitors Had Worked for Facilitys Operator, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 12, 2007.
233
Doug J. Swanson & Steve McGonigle, Seven TYC Workers Fired After Inmates Found Living in Filth, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 3, 2007.
234
Steve McGonigle, Fired TYC Monitors Had Worked for Facilitys Operator, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 12, 2007.
235
Doug J. Swanson, TYC Investigates Staff for Ties to Jail Operator, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 6, 2007.
236
Texas Youth Commission, Coke County Juvenile Justice Center Audit, at 4-7 (2007).
237
Id. at 8-9.
238
CHAD C. HADDAL & ALISON SISKIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
12 (2010) (immigration detainee numbers); HEATHER C. WEST, ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 2 (2010) (prisoner numbers); DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIVATE
PRISON INDUSTRY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (May 2011), available at http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons
(lobbying).
239
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (May 2011), http://www.
detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons.
240
Center for Responsive Politics, Annual Lobbying by Corrections Corporation of America, www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
firmsum.php?id=D000021940&year=2010 (last viewed Sept. 16, 2011).
241
242
Id. at 22.
243
National Institute on Money In State Politics, Client Summary: Corrections Corporation of America, http://www.
followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552&y=0 (last viewed July 6, 2011). Note that the number of
lobbyists listed above may include the same lobbyist working in multiple states. Id.
244
National Institute on Money In State Politics, Client Summary: GEO Group, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/
lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100516&y=0 (last viewed Sept. 16, 2011). Note that the number of lobbyists listed above may
include the same lobbyist working in multiple states. Id.
245
246
Id. at 20-21.
247
National Institute on Money In State Politics, Noteworthy Contributor Summary: Corrections Corp. of America, http://
www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0 (last viewed Sept. 16, 2011); National Institute
on Money In State Politics, Noteworthy Contributor Summary: GEO Group, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/
topcontributor.phtml?u=1096&y=0 (last viewed Sept. 16, 2011).
248
National Institute on Money In State Politics, Noteworthy Contributor Summary: Corrections Corp. of America, http://
www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0 (last viewed Sept. 16, 2011); National Institute
on Money In State Politics, Noteworthy Contributor Summary: GEO Group, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/
topcontributor.phtml?u=1096&y=0 (last viewed Sept. 16, 2011).
249
National Institute on Money In State Politics, Noteworthy Contributor Summary: GEO Group, http://www.
followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=1096&y=0 (last viewed Sept. 16, 2011).
250
Bob Ortega, Arizona To Expand Private Prisons, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jul. 3, 2011.
251
Id.
252
OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA AUDITOR GENERAL, PRISON POPULATION GROWTH 19, 20 (2010) (citing Arizona Department of Corrections
analysis).
253
Bob Ortega, Arizona To Expand Private Prisons, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jul. 3, 2011.
254
Id.
| 54
255
Morgan Loew, Brewer Linked to Private Prisons Housing Illegal Immigrants, KPHO.com, Aug. 31, 2010 (updated Sept. 2,
2010).
256
Id.
257
E.g., Corrections Corporation of America, CCAs 19th Annual Chairmans Charity Golf Classic, Oct. 14, 2010, http://
www.correctionscorp.com/newsroom/news-releases/229/ (last viewed Sept. 21, 2011); Pen Pals: An Innovative Private
Program Teaming Rescued Dogs with Texas Inmates, 13 GEO WORLD No. 4, 2007, at 8 (reprinted from the Fort Worth StarTelegram).
258
259
Management & Training Corporation, Leaders, www.mtctrains.com/about-mtc/leaders (last viewed by author Sept.
21, 2011).
260
Specifically, the authors searches on CCAs website for gladiator, sexual abuse, and sexual assault yielded no
relevant results. For a discussion of the sexual assault incidents and the prison dubbed the Gladiator School, see
supra at 24, 27.
261
The GEO Group, Media Contacts, available at www.thegeogroupinc.com/InfoforMedia.asp (last viewed Sept. 21, 2011).
262
Tom Barry, The Shadow Prison Industry and Its Government Enablers, available at www.cipamericas.org/archives/1995.
263
Specifically, federal entities that incarcerate people, such as the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Department of
Homeland Security, undoubtedly qualify as agenc[ies] under the FOIA; records in the custody of governmentally
operated facilities are therefore subject to FOIA requests, enforceable through litigation in federal court. 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(3)(A) ([E]ach agency, upon any request for records shall make the records promptly available to any
person.); Id. 552(f)(1) (defining agency as any executive department, military department, Government
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency); Berry v. U.S. Dept of
Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that documents in BOPs possession are agency records). By
contrast, private entities, such as for-profit prison companies, do not qualify as agenc[ies] under the FOIA, and
therefore are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the statute. 5 U.S.C. 552(f)(1).
264
Corrections Corporation of America, Schedule 14A, Proxy Statement to Section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, at 29 (2007).
265
Id at 31.
266
Corrections Corporation of America, Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2007, at 40 (2007); see also
Geert De Lombaerde, Persistent Sisters Still at CCAs Heels, NASHVILLE POST, Apr. 7, 2009.
267
Geert De Lombaerde, Persistent Sisters Still at CCAs Heels, NASHVILLE POST, Apr. 7, 2009.
| 55
www.aclu.org
The imprisonment of human beings at record levels is both a moral failure and
an economic oneespecially at a time when more and more Americans are
struggling to make ends meet and when state governments confront enormous
fiscal crises. This report finds, however, that mass incarceration provides a
gigantic windfall for one special interest groupthe private prison industry
even as current incarceration levels harm the country as a whole. While the
nations unprecedented rate of imprisonment deprives individuals of freedom,
wrests loved ones from their families, and drains the resources of governments,
communities, and taxpayers, the private prison industry reaps lucrative rewards.
As the public good suffers from mass incarceration, private prison companies
obtain more and more government dollars, and private prison executives at the
leading companies rake in enormous compensation packages, in some cases
totaling millions of dollars.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 2
THE TRIANGLE OF PRIVATE PRISON POLITICAL
INFLUENCE ...................................................................... 3
THE PLAYERS: TWO COMPANIES ARE AT THE
CENTER OF PRIVATE PRISON POLITICAL INFLUENCE
.......................................................................................... 5
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA ............. 6
GEO GROUP (FORMERLY WACKENHUT
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION).................................... 7
THE STAKES: MORE PRISON MEANS MORE REVENUES
FOR PRIVATE PRISONS ......................................................... 9
MORE PRISON.............................................................. 9
MORE REVENUE .........................................................12
BUT, STATE PRIVATE PRISON POPULATIONS ARE
FALLING. .........................................................................13
THE STRATEGIES: A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO
INFLUENCING POLICY, CREATING MORE
INCARCERATION, AND MAKING MORE MONEY ................15
STRATEGY 1: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ...............15
STRATEGY 2: LOBBYING ..............................................21
STRATEGY 3: RELATIONSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS 25
th
WWW.JUSTICEPOLICY.ORG
PART 1
INTRODUCTION
At a time when many policymakers are looking at criminal and
juvenile justice reforms that would safely shrink the size of our prison
population, the existence of private prison companies creates a
countervailing interest in preserving the current approach to criminal
justice and increasing the use of incarceration. 1
Approximately 129,000 people were held in
While private prison companies may try to
privately managed correctional facilities in the
present themselves as just meeting existing
2
United States as of December 31, 2009; 16.4
demand for prison beds and responding to
percent of federal and 6.8 percent of state
current market conditions, in fact they have
populations were held in private facilities. Since
worked hard over the past decade to create
2000, private prisons have increased their share
markets for their product. As revenues of
of the market substantially: the number of
private prison companies have grown over
people held in private federal facilities increased
the past decade, the companies have had
approximately 120 percent, while the number
more resources with which to build political
held in private state facilities increased
power, and they have used this power to
approximately 33 percent. During this same
promote policies that lead to higher rates of
period, the total number of people in prison
incarceration.
increased less than 16 percent. Meanwhile,
spending on corrections has increased 72
The pro-incarceration policies that private
percent since 1997, to $74 billion in 2007.3 The
prison companies promote do nothing to
two largest
The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the
private
relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and
prison
sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain activities that are
companies,
currently proscribed by our criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect
to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration could affect the number
Corrections
of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing
Corporation
demand for correctional facilities to house them. Legislation has been proposed in
of America
numerous jurisdictions that could lower minimum sentences for some non-violent
(CCA) and
crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release based on good behavior.
GEO Group,
Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some offenders on
combined
probation with electronic monitoring who would otherwise be incarcerated.
had over
Similarly, reductions in crime rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce
$2.9 billion
crime could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring
incarceration at correctional facilities.
in revenue in
4
2010.
~ CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT
PART 2
1,613,740
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
196,429
200,000
0
Sources: Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 - Statistical Tables. Table 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010); Allen J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2001); Allen J. Beck and Darrell K. Gilliard, Prisoners 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1995); Paige M.
Harrison, Prisoners in Custody of State or Federal Correctional Authorities, 1977-98 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000);
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 6.28.2006: Number and rate (per 100,000 resident population in each group) of
sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of State and Federal correctional authorities on December 31.
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282006.pdf
CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF
AMERICA
Founded in 1983, the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA) is the first
and largest private prison company in the
U.S.23 According to the companys website,
CCA specializes in owning, operating, and
managing prisons and other correctional
facilities. In 2010, CCA operated 66
correctional and detention facilities, 45 of
which they owned with contracts in 19 states,
the District of Columbia and with the three
federal detention agencies: Bureau of
Prisons, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the U.S. Marshal Service. 24
In 2010, CCA saw record revenue of $1.67
billion, up $46 million from 2009. 25 The
majority of that revenue (50 percent or $838.5
million) came from state contracts, with 13
Other
7%
U.S.
Marshals
16%
States
50%
Immigration
Customs
Enforcement
12%
Source: Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report
(Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2010).
GEO GROUP
(FORMERLY
WACKENHUT
CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION)
According to their website, the GEO Group is
a private corporation that specializes in
correctional and detention management,
community residential re-entry services and
behavioral and mental health services.31
Currently, GEO operates 118 correctional,
detention, and residential treatment facilities
U.S.
Marshals
19%
States
47%
Immigration
Customs
Enforcement
20%
PART 3
MORE PRISON
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf
1,613,740 120,000
1,078,542
100,000
1,000,000
80,000
800,000
60,000
600,000
400,000
40,000
35,567
20,000
200,000
0
10
Sources: Allen J. Beck, Prisoners 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000)
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p99.pdf; Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 1995. Table 1.96: Private Correctional Facility Management Firms (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996);
Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 - Statistical Tables. Table 1 and Appendix Table 19
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010); Allen J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in 2000 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001); Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in Custody of State or Federal Correctional Authorities, 1977-98
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000); Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 6.28.2006: Number and
rate (per 100,000 resident population in each group) of sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of State and Federal correctional authorities
on December 31. www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282006.pdf
10%
8%
6%
5%
3.7%
4%
2%
0%
Total
Federal
State
11
12
$1,800
$1,541
$1,600
$1,629
$1,675
$1,403
$1,400
$1,126
$1,200
$1,000
$888
$910
$1,193
$1,256
$1,008
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
Source: 2010 Annual Report (Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2010); 2006 Annual Report (Nashville, TN:
Corrections Corporation of America, 2007); 2002 Annual Report (Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2003).
MORE REVENUE
Steady increases in the number of people in
private prisons, especially those coming from
federally contracted beds, translate into
increased revenues for private prison
companies. Since private prison companies
are in the business to make money, policies
that maintain or increase incarceration boost
their revenues; from a business perspective,
the economic and social costs of mass
incarceration are externalities that arent
figured into their corporate bottom line.
13
The GEO Group has seen increasing revenues in corrections the past six
years.
$1,400
$1,270
$1,141
$1,200
$1,043
$976
$1,000
$861
$800
$600
$711
$517
$451
$567
$483
2002
2003
$615
$613
$511
$842
$784
$629
$613
$473
$400
$200
$2004
2005
Total
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
U.S. Corrections
Source: The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report (Boca Raton, FL: The GEO Group, 2011); The GEO Group, 2006 Annual Report
(Boca Raton, FL: The GEO Group, 2007); 2005 Annual Report (Boca Raton, FL: The GEO Group, 2006).
14
15
PART 4
STRATEGY 1:
CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS
As elected policymakers initiate or approve
decisions to enter into private prison
16
17
California
Florida
Georgia
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 27 states
Florida
California
New Mexico
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 23 states
$227,000
$220,150
$1,902,759
$2,400,679
Cornell Companies (2006 to 2009)
Georgia
Texas
$25,000
$24,000
Pennsylvania
$16,050
Three-state TOTAL
$65,050
Total in 6 states
$72,650
Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics, Lobbyist Link Corrections Corp of America, accessed
May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552; National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Lobbyist Link GEO Group, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100516&y=0; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, Lobbyist Link Cornell Companies, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=103304
Notes: For a better picture of contributions given by this client, see the Noteworthy Contributor on the Institute for
Money in State Politics website for Corrections Corporation of America, GEO Group, and Cornell Companies.
18
Contribution Strategies
Private prison companies have
developed a strategic method of
political giving and are less
interested in political party,
values or philosophy than in
access to policymakers.68
According to the Institute on
Money in State Politics, private
prison companies support
incumbents who win elections,
regardless of party.69 Access to
power, clearly, is more important
than supporting particular
political beliefs.
Recent giving, when analyzed by
political party, reinforces the lack
of adherence to a political
ideology. Although on the
whole, most private prison
Winners $1,257,161
(75%)
Not up for
election $162,350
(10%)
19
Democrats
31.8%
Republicans
59.1%
20
Gubernatorial
Candidates
16% ($347,388)
Party Committees
48% ($1,057,594)
Senate/House
Candidates
18% ($401,065
Ballot Measures
16% ($367,500)
Other Statewide
Office Candidates
2% ($46,400)
Court Candidates
>1% ($3,995)
Sources: National Institute on Money in State Politics, Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to
All Candidates and Committees, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Gubernatorial Candidates, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=G&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Senate Candidates, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=S&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to House/Assembly Candidates, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=H&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Other Statewide Candidates, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=O&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to High Court Candidates, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=J&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Appellate Court Candidates, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=K&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=B&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Party Committees, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=P&s=0&b[]=G7000
21
CAP has recently been advocating for the passage of a bill (SB106/HD141), which addresses the 2005
decision by the Department of Public Safety (PSD) to recalculate the sentences of all the people serving
multiple terms of imprisonment. Previously, unless otherwise specified by a judge, sentences were
concurrent. PSD, without approval from the judiciary or legislature, recalculated all concurrent sentences
to be consecutive, thus adding to the length of time that a person serves behind bars. Given that in 2005
around half of the people serving a sentence of a year or more were serving their sentences in a CCA
facility, such an extension of the length of confinement would be in the interest of CCA.
A previous bill had made legislation conform to the practice of giving concurrent sentences unless
otherwise specified, but it was prospective. The current bill would make the practice retroactive, potentially
reducing the number of people in prison, especially in CCA facilities.
For more information about the Community Alliance, please visit:
www.lifeofthelandhawaii.org/Community_Alliance_on_Prisons.html
STRATEGY 2:
LOBBYING
Lobbying efforts by companies, organizations,
and constituencies are a well documented
part of politics in the United States. Similar to
other industries, private prison companies
employ lobbying firms and lobbyists to
advocate for their business interests in
Congress and state legislatures. While giving
22
23
Bill Title
Private Prison
Information Act
of 2009
S. 251
Safe Prisons
Communications
Act of 2009
S. 3607
Department of
Homeland
Security
Appropriations
Act, 2011
S. 3636
Commerce,
Justice, Science,
and Related
Agencies
Appropriations
Act, 2011
Military
Construction
and Veterans
Affairs and
Related
Agencies
Appropriations
Act, 2010
H.R. 3082
Bill Description
To require non-Federal prisons and
correctional facilities holding people in
federal custody under a contract with the
federal government to make the same
information available to the public that
Federal prisons and correctional facilities
are required to make available
Prohibit the provision of federal funds to
state and local governments for payment
of obligations, to prohibit the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System
from financially assisting state and local
governments, and for other purposes
Appropriations for the Department of
Homeland Security for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2011
Outcome of Bill
Died in House subcommittee
All provisions
Sources: Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Corrections Corp of America Bills 2010, February 2011. www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientbills.php?lname=Corrections+Corp+of+America&year=2010;
Govtrack, Federal Legislation, May 2011. www.govtrack.us/congress/legislation.xpd
Note: Blue rows are justice-related pieces of legislation. All bills were introduced in the 111th Congress.
24
$3,500,000
$3,000,000
$2,500,000
$2,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,000,000
$500,000
$-
CCA
GEO
Cornell
Sources: Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Corrections Corp of America Summary 2010, February 2011.
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Corrections+Corp+of+America&year=2010; Center for Responsive Politics,
Lobbying GEO Group Summary 2010, February 2011.
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=GEO+Group&year=2010; Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Cornell
Companies Summary 2010, February 2011. www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Cornell+Companies&year=2010
Florida
Tennessee
Nevada
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 32 states
Florida
State Lobbying
Corrections Corporation of America (2003 to 2010)
State
Number of State Lobbyists
17
12
12
41
179
GEO GROUP (2003 to 2010)
13
Texas
California
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 16 states
8
7
28
63
Cornell Companies (2006 to 2009)
Illinois
Ohio
5
1
Alaska
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 4 states
Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics, Lobbyist Link Corrections Corp of America, accessed
May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552; National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Lobbyist Link GEO Group, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100516&y=0; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, Lobbyist Link Cornell Companies, accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=103304
Notes: Total # of lobbyists may include the same lobbyist working in multiple states. For a better picture of
contributions given by this client, see the Noteworthy Contributor on the Institute for Money in State Politics
website for Corrections Corporation of America, GEO Group, and Cornell Companies.
STRATEGY 3:
RELATIONSHIPS AND
ASSOCIATIONS
Networks and relationships are immensely
important to all businesses. Organizational
theories about relationships and leadership
indicate that individual people influence the
operations and behavior of an organization
26
28
30
PART 5
TAXPAYERS LOSE
Policies that promote incarceration over more
effective public safety strategies cost more in
both the short and long term. The average cost
to incarcerate one person for one day in the
U.S. is $78.88.119 Thus, policies that increase
the length of time that someone is
incarcerated can have a significant fiscal
impact. For example, one study found that 10
years after California enacted its Three Strikes
law, the people added to the prison system
under the law between March 1994 and
September 2003 would cost taxpayers an
additional $10.5 billion in prison and jail
expenditures, including $6.2 billion in added
THE COMMUNITY
LOSES
Communities primarily lose out when it
comes to private, for-profit prisons in two
ways: hidden costs and public safety. There
may appear to be an immediate cost savings
compared to that of facilities run by a
government, but long-term costs negate those
savings. In addition, the safety of
communities is compromised as increasing
incarceration rates are not shown to improve
public safetyand may even make it worse
and adequate and appropriate reentry
services are not available to ensure that
people returning to the community are
prepared to succeed in terms of employment
and reintegration.
32
PRIVATE PRISON
EMPLOYEES
People held in prison are the most vulnerable
to abuse and violence, but people who work
in private prisons are not immune from
injury. Poor training and other cost-saving
measures make the people who staff private
prisons losers in the political battle for private
prisons, too.
34
Worker Safety
As a result of lower pay, less training and
higher staff turnover in private facilities there
is an increased likelihood of conflict between
people in prison and prison staff. Working in
a prison is a stressful job and training is key to
preventing staff from abusing people in the
prison, minimizing injuries to staff and to
prevent violence between people held in
prison.153 When staff lacks adequate training
covering topics such as procedures and
conflict resolution it can often lead to more
incidents occurring between officers and those
incarcerated.154
Although some research shows similar rates
of violent incidents between public and
private facilities,155 other studies comparing
private and public prisons found that assaults
on people in private facilities were nearly
double that of public facilities, while assaults
on correctional officers remained largely the
same.156 Since private prisons have greater
control over who enters their facilities, likely
if they held the same types of people as public
prisons, there would be significant safety
concerns due to under-qualified, poorlytrained staff. Given that private prisons are
generally not subject to state or federal
PEOPLE IN THE
PRISONS
The people who lose the most in the game
that private prison companies play to increase
incarceration are people in prison. Between
the lack of services, violence, abuse, and an
incentive to hold people for as long as
possible, people in private prisons are the
most vulnerable. And as incarceration
disproportionately affects communities of
color, it follows that private prisons also
disproportionately affect communities of
color.
While even public prisons have these
problems, evidence suggests that private
prisons are worse.158 Incentives to keep costs
low drive many of the problems that make
private prisons more detrimental than public
ones.
Services
Private prisons have an incentive to minimize
costs by cutting services and treatment.162
Whether a private prison provides
rehabilitative services (such as job training or
drug treatment) is dependent upon the
private prison companys contract, which is
drafted by legislators and susceptible to
political influence by private prison
companies.163 Although most private prisons
offer similar programming as state-run
facilities as stipulated in their contracts, they
are often not of the same caliber as those
offered within public institutions.164 For
instance, most private prisons have control
over who is placed in their care, often leaving
people with the most expensive needs, like
those who are the highest security risk and
those with serious medical or mental health
issues, in state run facilities.165 Additionally,
most private prison companies provide
limited medical coverage, with advanced and
additional costly care falling on the state.166
For instance, when a person in a privately run
facility requires medical treatment beyond the
established contractual coverage of the
private- prison, the private prison company
36
PART 6
RECOMMENDATIONS
States and the federal government should
look for real solutions to the problem of
growing jail and prison populations. A
number of states are already utilizing
innovative strategies for reducing the number
of people behind bars in their state.ii Reducing
the number of people entering the justice
system, and the amount of time that they
spend there, can lower prison populations,
making private, for-profit prisons
unnecessary, and improving public safety and
the lives of individuals.
Invest in front-end treatment and services in
the community, whether private or public.
Research shows that education, employment,
drug treatment, health care, and the
availability of affordable housing coincide
with better outcomes for all people, whether
involved in the criminal justice system or not.
Jurisdictions that spend more money on these
services are likely to experience lower crime
rates and lower incarceration rates.167 An
increase in spending on education,
employment and other services not only
would improve public safety, but also would
38
Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report (Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2011).
http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDMyMjg1fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
2 Heather C. West, William J. Sabol, and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Washington, DC: 2010). http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf
3 Camille Graham Camp and George M. Camp, The Corrections Yearbook, 1997 (South Salem, NY: The Criminal Justice
Institute, 1997); Tracey Kyckelhahn, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts 2007, Table 1(Washington, DC:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).
4 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011; The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report (Boca Raton, FL:
The GEO Group, 2011). http://www.geogroup.com/AR_2010/images/Geo_Group-AR2010.pdf
5 Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender, The Prison Payoff: The Role of Politics and Private Prisons in the Incarceration Boom
(Portland, OR: Western States Center and the Western Prison Project, 2000).
1
See Justice Policy Institute, Pruning Prisons: How Cutting Corrections Can Save Money and Protect Public Safety (Washington, D.C.:
2010) www.justicepolicy.org/research/1928
6
Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement Indicators,
Research on Social Work Practice 39, no. 4 (2009): 383-394.
8 Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization, 2009.
9 Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, Florida University Law Review 38,
no. 1 (2010): 1-29.
10 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41177.pdf
11 Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 2010.
12 Douglas McDonald and others, Private Prisons in the United States: An Assessment of Current Practice (Cambridge,
MA: Abt Associates Inc., 1998).
13 Amy Cheung, Prison Privatization and the Use of Incarceration (Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project, 2004).
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf
14 U.S. Department of Justice, Correctional Populations in the United States, 1997 (Washington, D.C.; Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2000). http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus97.pdf; Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in
2005 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006); William J. Sabol, Heather Couture and Paige M. Harrison,
Prisoners in 2006 Appendix table 6 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007); William J. Sabol, Heather
C. West and Matthew Cooper, Prisoners in 2008 Appendix table 10 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2009); Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
15 Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman. Prison in 2009 - Statistical Tables. Table 1 (Washington,
D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010); Allen J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners 2000 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001); Allen J. Beck and Darrell K. Gilliard, Prisoners 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 1995); Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in Custody of State or Federal Correctional Authorities, 1977-98
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000); Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 6.28.2006:
Number and rate (per 100,000 resident population in each group) of sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of State and Federal
correctional authorities on December 31. www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282006.pdf
16 Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization, 2009.
17 Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 2010.
18 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
19 Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 2010.
20 Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 2010.
21 Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization, 2009.
22 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
23 Corrections Corporation of America, About CCA, November 2010. www.cca.com/about/
24 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
25 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
26 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
27 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
7
40
42
New York Times, Lehman Hires Kasich, January 11, 2001. www.nytimes.com/2001/01/11/business/lehman-hireskasich.html
93 Public Services International Research Unit, Prison Privatization Report International (London, England: University of
Greenwich, 2001). www.psiru.org/justice/ppri44.asp
94 Mark Niquette, Private-prison Consultant Chosen to Run ODRC, Columbus Dispatch, January 4, 2011.
www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2011/01/04/private-prison-consultant-chosen-to-run-ODRC.html
95 Joe Hallett, Kasich: Ex-advisers Wont Get Lobbying Favors, Columbus Dispatch, February 2, 2011.
www.dispatchpolitics.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2011/02/02/copy/kasich-ex-advisers-wont-get-lobbyingfavors.html?adsec=politics&sid=101
96 Corrections Corporation of America, CCA Nevada Southern Warden named Commissioner of Depart of
Corrections in Maine, accessed May 5, 2011. www.cca.com/newsroom/news-releases/240/
97 A.J. Higgins, Maine Lawmakers Debate Bill to Allow Private Prisons, Maine Public Broadcasting Network, April 29,
2011. www.mpbn.net/Home/tabid/36/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3478/ItemId/16203/Default.aspx
98 Lance Tapley, At a turning point: LePages nominee to head Corrections has the skills to fix Maines broken prison
system. Will the governor and lawmakers give Joe Ponte the tools? The Portland Phoenix, February 9, 2011.
http://portland.thephoenix.com/news/115404-at-a-turning-point/?page=1#TOPCONTENT
99 Trip Jennings, Sen. Smith: Williams work for GEO casts cloud over decision not to fin firms, The New Mexico
Independent, September 21, 2010. http://newmexicoindependent.com/63562/sen-smith-williams-work-for-geo-castscloud-over-decision-not-to-fine-firms
100 Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, Stanford Law Review 60, no. 4
(2008). www.stanfordlawreview.org/content/article/privatization-and-law-and-economics-political-advocacy
101 ALEC, Our Mission, November 2010.
www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11127
102 Laura Sullivan, Shaping State Laws with Little Scrutiny, National Public Radio, October 29, 2010.
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130891396&ps=cprs
103 Laura Sullivan, Shaping State Laws with Little Scrutiny, October 29, 2010.
104 ALEC, History, November 2010.
105 ALEC, History, November 2010.
106 Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender, The Prison Payoff, 2000.
107 ALEC, History, November 2010.
108 ALEC, History, November 2010.
125 ALEC, Public Safety and Elections, December 2010.
www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Public_Safety_and_Elections&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&Content
ID=13312
110 John Biewen, Corrections Inc (American RadioWorks: April 2002).
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/corrections/laws4.html
111 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
112 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
113 Alfred Blumstein and Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, 1999.
114 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
115 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
116 ALEC, The State Factor: A Plan to Reduce Prison Overcrowding and Violent Crime (Washington, D.C.: 2007).
http://www.alec.org/am/pdf/Criminal_Justice_2007_State_Factor.pdf
117 ALEC, ALEC Corrections and Reentry Working Group, accessed June 13, 2011.
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Corrections_and_Reentry_Working_Group
118 Montana Office of Political Practices, https://app.mt.gov/cgibin/camptrack/lobbysearch/lobbySearch.cgi?ACTION=PRINCIPALDETAIL&BACKACTION=PRINCIPALSEARCH
&SEARCH_TYPE=PRINCIPAL&PRINCIPALID=3974&SESSION=2012&ENTITYNAME_SEARCH=Corrections and
LAWS state legislative database, http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2011/billhtml/HB0344.htm
119 American Correctional Association, Correctional Yearbook, 2008 (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional
Association, 2009).
92
Scott Ehlers, Vincent Schiraldi and Jason Ziedenberg, Still Striking Out: Ten Years of Californias Three Strikes
(Washington, D.C.: Justice Policy Institute, 2004) www.justicepolicy.org/research/2028
121 See Ryan S. King, Incarceration and Crime: A Complex Relationship (Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project, 2005)
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_iandc_complex.pdf
122 Lynne Vieraitis and others, The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974
2002, Criminology & Public Policy 6, no. 3 (2007): 589-622. A number of other studies also found serving time in prison
increases the risk of future offending.
123 Patrick A. Langan and David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2002) http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf
124 See Justice Policy Institute, Pruning Prisons and Costs of Confinement, www.justicepolicy.org
125 Nastassia Walsh, Amanda Petteruti, and Ava Page, Education and Public Safety (Washington, DC: Justice Policy
Institute, 2007).
126 National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, Table 30: Amount and percentage distribution
of direct general expenditures of state and local governments, by function: Selected years, 1970-71 through 2007-08, August
2010. http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_030.asp
127 Corrections Corporation of America, Independent Studies on Prison Privatization, April 19, 2011.
www.cca.com/cca-research-institute/research-findings/independent-studies-prison-privatization/
128 For a compilation of studies, see: American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Prisons For Profit: A Look at Prison
Privatization (Cleveland, OH, 2010). www.acluohio.org/issues/CriminalJustice/PrisonsForProfit2011_04.pdf
129 Julianne Nelson, Competition in Corrections: Comparing Public and Private Sector Operations (Alexandria, VA:
CNA Corporation, 2005). www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/cnanelson.pdf
130 Gerry Gaes, Cost, Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization, NIJ Journal/Issue No. 259.
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/221507.pdf.
131 General Accounting Office, Private and Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service
(Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1996). www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf.
132 Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization, 2009.
133 Arizona Department of Corrections: State versus Private Prison FY 2007 Cost Comparison (Scottsdale, AZ: Maximus,
2009). www.azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/ADC_FY2007_cost_comparison.pdf
134 David W. Miller, The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization: An Analysis of State
Correctional Systems, ProQuest Discovery Guides, February 2010. www.csa.com/discoveryguides/prisons/review.pdf
135 Private prisons are not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests; a bill to address this at the federal level has
been re-introduced in the 112th Congress: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.74:
136 Kevin Pranis, Cost-Saving or Cost Shifting: The Fiscal Impact of Prison Privatization in Arizona (Tallahassee, FL:
American Friends Service Committee, 2005). www.afscme.org/docs/AZ.pdf
137 Anonymous Interview, April 18, 2011.
138The State of Texas v. GEO Group Incorporated Formerly Wackenhut Corrections and David Forrest, 2008-CR-0127-A,
November 17, 2008. Found on Private Prison Working Group: www.privateci.org/private_pics/WillacyGEO2.pdf
139 Texas court upholds $42.4M verdict in prison death, Seattle Times, April 8, 2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009009800_apprisoncompanymurder.html.
140 John Burnett, Town Relies On Troubled Youth Prison For Profits, NPR, March 2011.
www.npr.org/2011/03/25/134850972/town-relies-on-troubled-youth-prison-for-profits
141 American Civil Liberties Union, Riggs, et al. v. Valdez, et al. - Second Amended Complaint, March 11, 2010,
www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-3-11-Riggs-SecondAmendedComplaint.pdf.; Brad Iverson-Long, ACLU drops IDOC
from prisoner abuse lawsuit, Idaho Reporter, June 3, 2010, www.idahoreporter.com/2010/aclu-drops-idoc-fromprisoner-abuse-lawsuit/.
142 John Burnett, Private Prison Promises Leave Texas Towns In Trouble, NPR, March 28, 2011.
www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134855801/private-prison-promises-leave-texas-towns-in-trouble
143 Suzanne Smalley, Development Scheme: How a small Montana town nearly handed over control of its prison to a
mysterious security company headed by a former convict known as Captain Michael, Newsweek, October 14, 2009.
www.newsweek.com/2009/10/13/development-scheme.html
144 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
120
44
Cost cutting techniques include: lower paid/less trained staff, higher ratio of correctional officers to people in
prison, limited contractual coverage of health services/costs, control over facility population (i.e. limited people with
mental health and serious medical conditions) and running only medium and minimum security facilities. David W.
Miller, The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization, February 2010.
146 William D. Bales et al., Recidivism of Public and Private State Prison Inmates in Florida, Criminology & Public
Policy 4, no. 1 (2005): 57-82; David W. Miller, The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization,
February 2010. www.csa.com/discoveryguides/prisons/review.pdf
147 William D. Bales et al., Recidivism of Public and Private State Prison Inmates in Florida, 2005.
148 To date all academic research conducted to compare private versus public prison recidivism has been conducted in
Florida.
149 David W. Miller, The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization, February 2010.
150 John Hall and Kelly Walsh, Are Floridas Private Prisons Keeping Their Promise? Lack of Evidence to Show They Cost Less
and Have Better Outcomes than Public Prisons (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy, 2010);
Dina Perrone and Travis C. Pratt, Comparing the Quality of Confinement and Cost-effectiveness of Publics Versus
Private Prisons: What we know, why we do not know more, and where to go from here, The Prison Journal 83, no. 3
(2003): 301-322.
151 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010; Scott D. Camp and Gerald G. Gaes, Growth and
Quality of U.S. Private Prisons: Evidence from a National Survey (Washington, DC: Bureau of Prisons, 2001).
www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
152 David W. Miller, The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization, February 2010.
153 James Austin & Gary Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons, (Washington DC: Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 2001).
154 David W. Miller, The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization, February 2010.
155 James Austin & Gary Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons, 2001.
156 Curtis R. Blakely and Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector PrisonsA Comparison of Selected
Characteristics, Federal Probation 68, no. 1 (June 2004): 27-33.
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2004-06/prisons.html
157 Govtrack, H.R. 74: Private Information Act of 2011, accessed May 5, 2011.
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-74
158 Scott D. Camp and Gerald G. Gaes, Growth and Quality of U.S. Private Prisons, 2001.
www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
159 Private Corrections Working Group, Lawsuits, April 19, 2011. www.privateci.org/lawsuits.html
160 Ian Urbina, Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over Abuse Charges, New York Times, August 25, 2009.
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/26kentucky.html
161 American Civil Liberties Union, C.B., et al. v. Walnut Grove Correctional Authority, et al. Complaint,
November 16, 2010, www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights-racial-justice/cb-et-al-v-walnut-grove-correctional-authority-etal-complaint.; Clarionledger.com, Mississippi lawmakers probe conditions at Walnut Grove youth prison, January
11, 2011, www.clarionledger.com/article/20110111/NEWS010504/110111015/Miss.+lawmakers+probe+youth+prison.
162 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
163 D.M. Levine. Whats costlier than a government run prison? A private one. CNNMoney.com, August 18, 2010.
http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/17/news/economy/private_prisons_economic_impact.fortune/index.htm
164 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010; Dina Perrone and Travis C. Pratt, Comparing the
Quality of Confinement and Cost-effectiveness of Publics Versus Private Prisons, 2003.
165 John Hall and Kelly Walsh, Are Floridas Private Prisons Keeping Their Promise? 2010.
166 Craig Malisow, Prison Pays: Despite a history of abuse and bad conditions, private prison corporation GEO keeps
getting contracts from the state. Houston Press, December 30, 2010.
167 Justice Policy Institute, Public Safety Series (Washington, D.C.: 2007) www.justicepolicy.org
145
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
GAMING THE SYSTEM
This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Open Society
Foundations and the Public Welfare Foundation.
The Justice Policy Institute (JPI) would like to express gratitude to Mike Tartaglia, Bob Libal, Kat
Brady, Mike Brickner, Shakyra Diaz, Ari Wohlfeiler, Paul Wright, Alex Friedmann, and Gail Tyree
for their valuable insight on this report.
JPI would also like to thank Ashley King, Jessie Oxley, Matt Scalf, Keith Towery, Elisabeth
Mulholland, Brad Merrin, Andrew Price, and Adrea Hernandez for their assistance gathering data
and research and Nastassia Walsh for her significant contributions to the report.
JPI staff includes Paul Ashton, Jason Fenster, Zerline Hughes, Amanda Petteruti, Kellie Shaw, Tracy
Velzquez, Keith Wallington and Nastassia Walsh.
Reducing the use of incarceration and the justice system and promoting policies
that improve the well-being of all people and communities.
1012 14th Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: 202-558-7974
Fax: 202-558-7978
www.justicepolicy.org
June 2013
Introduction
Corrections
systems
provides
perverse incentives to
keep
incarceration
rates high.
To mark the companys
milestone anniversary,
Grassroots Leadership and the Public
Safety and Justice Campaign have sought to
highlight why there is nothing to celebrate about
highlights just some of the shameful incidents that
litter CCAs history.
As well as unearthing notable scandals and
violations that have taken place over the companys
last three decades, this report charts several other
key areas in which CCA has left a dubious legacy.
From controversial economic and political ties
to operational cost-cutting and depressing labor
only serve to demonstrate the fundamental reasons
goals of reducing incarceration rates and raising
correctional standards.
This report highlights only 30 incidents in the
companys history, but could have been much more
expansive. We hope it lends a critical eye to the
and immigration policies, and serves as a starting
point for community members and organizations
industry.
3
4
Table of Contents
1. Auspicious Beginnings: Just Like Selling Hamburgers, CCA Opens First Detention Center in Houston,
Texas..............................................................................................................................................................1
2. A Groundbreaking Example of Prison Privatization: Squalor and Violence at Lake Erie Correctional
Institution........................................................................................................................................................2
3.
...................................................................3
4.
........................................................................................................5
5.
..................................................................................7
6.
...........................................................................................................................9
7.
.........................................................10
8.
........................................................................................12
9.
........................................................................................................................14
10.
...................................................................................15
11.
....................................................................................17
12.
...............................................................................19
.................................................................................................21
15.
..................................................................................................................22
16.
.................................................................................................23
17.
........................................................................24
18.
...............................................................................................................26
19.
.........................................................................................................27
20.
...............................................................29
21.
.............................31
22.
..................................................................................................32
23.
...........................................................................33
......................................................................35
26.
..................................................................................................................37
27.
............................................................................................................38
28.
39
29.
...........................................................................................40
30.
...............41
Backed
little
experience
references,
in
2
3
or
1
Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio Becomes First American State to Sell Prison to Private Company,
ohio-prison-sold_n_946862.html>
2
Chris Kirkham, Lake Erie Correctional Institution, Ohio Private Prison, Faces Concerns About Unacceptable Conditions,
Mark Todd, Conneaut police arrest 4 in vicinity of prison, Star Beacon, January 10, 2013. <http://starbeacon.com/local/x1633448322/Conneaut-police-arrest-4-in-vicinity-ofprison/print>
4
Chris Kirkham, Lake Erie Correctional Institution, Ohio Private Prison, Faces Concerns About Unacceptable Conditions,
, February 2, 2013. <http://www.
3
5
Chris Kirkham, Private Prison Corporation Offers Cash in Exchange for State Prisons,
private-prisons-buying-state-prisons_n_1272143.html>
Corrections Corporation of
Americas record of
2
Brett Barrouquere, Private prison supervisors say CCA denied overtime,
, May 15, 2012. <http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/may/14/private-prisonsupervisors-say-cca-02/>
3
Results of a search performed in a database of Overtime and Minimum Wage Compliance Activity (January 1996-October 2002) contained on the Labor Database CD-ROM
produced by the Food and Allied Service Trades, January 2003.
4
Results of a search performed in a database of Service Contract Act violations (January 1996-October 2002) contained on the Labor Database CD-ROM produced by the Food
and Allied Service Trades, January 2003.
5
Executive Salaries,
, 2009. <http://www.privateci.org/salaries.html>
6
Youngstown: Will Justice Be Served,
, January/February 1999. <http://www.afscme.org/news/publications/newsletters/works/
januaryfebruary-1999/youngstown-will-justice-be-served>
7 Failure to Hire Pay Agreed for 96 Women,
, August 29, 2002. <http://newsok.com/failure-to-hire-pay-agreed-for-96-women/article/2805216>
8
Video release prompts FBI prison investigation,
, November 30, 2010. <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40439227/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/video-releaseprompts-fbi-prison-investigation/#.UZG_GJVMaZM>
9
Felisa Cardona, Crowley County prison operator to pay $1.3 million in settling sex-harassment lawsuit,
, October 14, 2009. <http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_13555622>
10
Quick Facts About Prison Privatization,
, 2009. <http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/Private%20prison%20fact%20sheet%202009.pdf>
11
Senate Committee on Criminal Justice, Interim Report to 81st Legislature, December 2008. <http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/commit/c590/c590.InterimReport80.
pdf>
12
Joshua Miller, Worker Rights in Private Prisons, in Andrew Coyle et al., editors,
, Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2003, p. 150.
13
Numerous
Dan DeWitt, Guard Fired Over Inmates Escape; State Review Blames Staff, Jail Construction,
, March 21, 1990, pg. 1.
Dan DeWitt, Inmate Escapes from Hernando Jail,
, December 19, 1990, pg. 1.
3
Jamie Jones, County jail escapee caught a day later,
, November 6, 2002. <http://www.sptimes.com/2002/11/06/Hernando/County_jail_escapee_c.shtml>
4
Jonathan Abel, Hernando: Inmate escapes from jail,
, February 11, 2006. <http://www.sptimes.com/2006/02/11/Hernando/Inmate_escapes_from_j.
shtml>
5
Jamie Malernee, Prison Escapee Capitalized on Opportunities,
, July 6, 2001. <http://www.sptimes.com/News/070601/Hernando/Prison_escapee_capita.
shtml>
6
John Woodrow Cox and Barbara Behrendt. Hernando Countys takeover of jail brings year of sweeping changes,
, August 27, 2011. <http://www.tampabay.
com/news/localgovernment/hernando-countys-takeover-of-jail-brings-year-of-sweeping-changes/1188387>
7
, October 30, 2009. <http://www.hollinslegal.com/wp-content/
1
2
CCA waited before issuing warrant on escape Terrell Watson last seen in the prison on Sunday,
BayCOrelease.pdf>
Susan Hylton, CCA Supervisor Fired Over Mistaken Inmate Releases,
, June 7, 2001.
11
Guard Supervisor at Clifton Prison Fired After Four Inmates Escaped, Associated Press, October 23, 1998.
12
Tennessee recaptures killer who escaped in guard garb, Associated Press, 3 February 1999. <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/673133/Tennessee-recaptures-killer-whoescaped-in-guard-garb.html?pg=all>
13
, April 15, 2006. <http://www.sptimes.com/2006/04/15/Hernando/Guard_helped_plot_jai.
shtml>
10
The
Lockdown Remains in Effect at Private Prison, Associated Press, April 27, 2001.
Colorado Department of Corrections, After Action Report. Inmate Riot: Crowley County Correctional Facility, October 1, 2004. <http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/
Over
1
2
Henri E. Cauvin, D.C. Jail Stay Ends in Death For Quadriplegic Md. Man,
4
5
6
Elizabeth Alexander, Private Prisons and Heath Care: The HMO from Hell, in Andrew Coyle et al., eds.,
Clarity Press, 2003, pg. 67.
, Atlanta:
of-interest
charges
against independent
private prison researcher
Dr. Charles Thomas are
yet another case where the corrupt methods used by
CCA to prove its superior performance have been
publicly exposed. During the 1990s, Thomas (a
professor at the University of Florida and founder
of the Private Corrections Project) was repeatedly
used by CCA as their leading academic supporter,
cited as an authoritative voice on the superiority
of privatized prisons over the public sector. In
1997, Thomas position as an independent analyst
came into question after he was appointed to the
board of CCAs Prison Realty Trust - the real estate
investment trust set up by CCA for tax reasons - and
when it was revealed that he owned stock in private
2
A subsequent investigation by the
Florida Commission on Ethics found that Thomas
had also received $3 million in consulting fees from
the largest civil penalty in the ethics commissions
history, and resigned his academic post as a result.3
Rather tellingly, Thomas later joined the board of
Avalon Correctional Services, a private company
that operates community correctional facilities.4
Nevertheless, his publications continue to be cited
by the private prison industry as evidence of its
superiority over state-run facilities.
In April, 2013 Temple Universitys Center for
Competitive Government released a study that
better performance by private prison companies
compared to their government-run counterparts.5
CCA promoted the report in state media markets
and utilized social media to decry advocate claims
2013 press release issued by Temple University6,
the study was funded by members of the private
corrections industry. However, the report itself
CCA Pays Over $22,000 to American Correctional Association to Claim Stamp of Approval at Five Private Prisons,
releases/PCI_press_release/CCA_ACA_accreditation/prweb4243834.htm>
2
Rick Brooks and Karen L. Tippett, Leading Expert on Private Prisons Criticized for Taking REIT Seat,
1
Avalon Correctional Services, Inc. Appoints Dr. Charles W. Thomas to Its Board of Directors,
Avalon+Correctional+Services,+Inc.+Appoints+Dr.+Charles+W.+Thomas+to...-a074625599>
cpc042913.php>
7
Kennebec Journal
interest_2013-06-03.html>
Private Corrections Institute, May
It
Nathaniel Popper, Restyled as Real Estate Trusts, Varied Businesses Avoid Taxes,
research comparing a public prison with the CCArun Borallon prison in Queensland.3
One of the most notorious incidents in a CCAmanaged prison occurred at Blakenhurst prison
management contract. As a result CCAs joint
venture company, UK Detention Services Ltd,
private prison operator in the UK to cause the
such a death by the use of restraint.4
On December 8, 1995 Alton Manning, a 33 year
old black prisoner on remand for an alleged violent
offence, died as a result of being restrained by
death did not come to light until a subsequent
coroners inquest that led to a jurys unanimous
verdict on March 24, 1998 that Mr. Manning had
been unlawfully killed by UKDS staff.
The coroners inquest found that Manning had
agreed to be strip searched on a routine drug
inspection but had refused to squat for a genital
and anal inspection. This resulted in a violent
head and placed in a neck hold. A call was made
for medical assistance after guards noticed the pool
still restraining Mannings arms and, after asking
the guards to release him, found that he was not
breathing. Manning was pronounced dead shortly
thereafter. A post-mortem examination found that
he had died of asphyxia due to restraint
The inquest also exposed a catalogue of missing
crucial documents and evidence, including the
operational failure of vital surveillance cameras and
the events.
Following the verdict of unlawful killing, seven
For more detailed accounts of CCAs international operations see Corrections Corporation of America: A Crtiical Look At Its First Twenty Years, Mattera,P, Khan, M, and
The Formation of UK Detention Services, Hopkins, R.D.N. paper presented at Private Gevangenissen in Nederland conference, Utrecht, December 1, 1993.
3
4
Metropolitan Borough of Dudley ex parte UK Detention Services Ltd., Royal Courts of Justice CO-402-98, Queens Bench Division, February 18, 1998
A Family Destroyed,
, 8 February 2005. <www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/09/ukcrime.prisonsandprobation>
Corrections
Commissioner, Department of Justice, No. 40, Session 1999-2000, September 13, 2000.
, January 1999.
Sam Howe Verhovek, Politics: Personal Finances; Alexander Still Draws Scrutiny for Making Small Investments
Pay Well,
, February 28, 1996. <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/28/us/politics-personal-
2
Donna Selman and Paul Leighton (2010)
61.
3
Donna Selman and Paul Leighton (2010)
4
5
. <https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/3792_displayArticle.aspx>
as
amongst the most vulnerable populations in the
criminal justice system. One egregious example
comes from the Columbia Training Center, a
now-shuttered juvenile facility in Richland, South
Carolina.
Corrections Corporation of
America shamelessly
depicts itself as a positive business model that is
locally advantageous for communities. However,
the companys performance as a strong corporate
citizen that contributes generously to host
communities jars sharply against the reality.1
Several glaring incidents have brought CCAs
operation as a community partner into question,
t h e
most recent of which was in
Cibola County, New Mexico.
In December 2012, CCA
sought to take back more than
$1.4 million that had already
been distributed throughout
Cibola County, where the
company operated two
a tax dispute settlement against the county,
protesting three years of property tax assessments
at the prisons. The county commission found that
CCAs tax value had been over-assessed, requiring
that Cibola County pay CCA back more than $1.4
million. The amount paid by CCA had already
been distributed to several local groups including
the Cibola General Hospital, the Grants/Cibola
County Schools and NUMSU-Grants. County
Assessor Pablo Savendra, who made the appraisal,
commented, I made a fair market assessment on
both properties of CCA. If the commission so
chooses to support CCA rather than the residents
of Cibola County, so be it. County Manager Scott
Vinson added, Letters are going out next week to
each group it will affect. Thankfully the hospital is
In
Topping
A 2010 Associated
Press report revealed that the facility had
more assaults than all other Idaho state prisons
combined and CCA has settled several lawsuits
concerning severe attacks at the center, including
the video taped incident of prisoner Hanni
Elabed in January 2010.2 The publicly released
surveillance footage shows Elabed being severely
beaten by another prisoner, managing to bang on a
guard station window and plead for help as guards
make no attempts to intervene until Elabed is
knocked unconscious. Following the attack, which
had transferred Elabed from a hospital against his
doctors advice to a cheaper in-prison facility before
3
The
settlement regarding the attack.
This was just one of multiple lawsuits that emerged
from a string of brutal incidences, detailing guards
deliberately allowing and even allegedly exposing
prisoners to assaults as a tool of social management,
Rebecca Boone, ACLU sues over Idaho prison so violent its called gladiator school by inmates,
, March 11, 2010. <http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.
ssf/2010/03/aclu_sues_over_idaho_prison_so.html>
Rebecca Boone, Idaho man sues prison company over alleged beating,
, April 28, 2010. <http://www.correctionsone.com/treatment/articles/2054719Idaho-man-sues-prison-company-over-alleged-beating/>
3
Rebecca Boone, ACLU Suing Correction Corp. of America,
, March 11, 2010. <http://www.correctionsone.com/treatment/articles/2017869-ACLU-suingCorrections-Corp-of-America/>
4
Rebecca Boone, ACLU sues over Idaho prison so violent its called gladiator school by inmates,
, March 11, 2010. <http://www.oregonlive.com/news/
1
index.ssf/2010/03/aclu_sues_over_idaho_prison_so.html>5 ACLU sues over Idaho prison so violent its called gladiator school by inmates,
, March 11, 2010.
5
Philip A. Janquart, Brutality Alleged at Private Prison,
, March 26, 2012. <http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/03/26/44997.htm>
6
Rebecca Boone, ACLU-Idaho Says Corrections Corporation of America May Be Violating Gladiator School Settlement,
, November 14, 2012. <http://www.
For neutral studies see: Private and Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service
, August 16, 1996. <http://www.
gao.gov/products/GGD-96-158> and Arizona State Auditor Study, September 2010. <http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/AZAuditNov2011.pdf>
2
Christopher Petrella, Private Prisons Currently Exempt from Freedom of Information Act,
, September 25, 2012. <http://www.nationofchange.org/privateprisons-currently-exempt-freedom-information-act-1348581256>
1
3
4
Jonathan Meador, CCA Board Votes Down Resolution on Reporting Rape, Sexual Abuse Statistics,
archives/2012/05/10/cca-board-votes-down-resolution-on-reporting-rape-sexual-abuse-statistics>
ALEC,
the
organization
with
members on the Executive
Committee, the Homeland
Security Committee, and
on the Public Safety and
Elections Task Force whose agenda has
included tough-on-crime measures that drove
corporations.
The company was a member of the Public Safety
Task Force, at one time serving as co-chair. This
task force developed model legislation including
mandatory minimum sentencing, three strikes
laws that give repeat offenders 25 years to life,
and truth-in-sentencing laws that require that
prisoners serve most or all of their time without a
chance for parole.3
In 2010, State Senator Russell Pearce of Arizona
championed and successfully passed SB 1070,
legislation that requires state and local law
status of people with whom they come into
of undocumented immigrants into detention (see
#21). The law has been the subject of numerous
legal challenges on the basis that it will be enforced
SB 1070 was developed in 2009 in a Public Safety
and Elections Task Force meeting attended by
both Pearce and representatives of CCA.4 CCA is
center for the growth of the private prison industry.
The private prison industry operates about half of
all immigrant detention facilities, and as such, SB
1070 and other anti-immigration legislation that
ALEC has advanced is money in the pockets of
CCA executives, shareholders, and their industry
counterparts. Although CCA reportedly left ALEC
Corrections
Pearce.
Center
level of
to the
Federal Contractor Misconduct Database POGO, Corrections Corporation of America - Sexual Abuse of Immigrant
Detainees in Texas, October 19, 2011. <http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,222,html?CaseID=1713>
The
Greg Jaffe and Rick Brooks, Violence at Prison Run by Corrections Corp. Irks Youngstown, Ohio,
, August 5, 1998.
Quoted in Cheryl W. Thompason, D.C. Must Stop Sending Inmates to Ohio Prison,
t, February 26, 1998. <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-633681.html>
3
John L. Clark. Report to the Attorney General Inspection and Review of the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, November 25, 1998. <http://www.justice.gov/ag/
youngstown/youngstown.htm>
4
Quoted in Cheryl W. Thompson, Ohio Sours on Prison Managed by Private Firm,
, October 19, 1998. <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-700310.html>
5
David Skolnick, Private prison owner CCA appeals ruling on Youngstown tax,
, October 19, 2012. <http://www.vindy.com/news/2012/oct/19/prison-ownerappeals-ruling-on-city-tax/>
1
2
in%20Colorado.pdf>
Kirk Mitchell, Two of three women in Colorado prisons diagnosed with psychological disorders,
ci_22726190/two-three-women-colorado-prisons-diagnosed-psychological-disorders>
3
Avi Kramer, 8+ years later, case of prison riot comes to trial, Public Justice, February 7, 2013. <http://publicjustice.net/blog/8-years-later-case-prison-riot-comes-trial>
Alan Gathright, $600,000 settlement to be paid to inmates injured in riot at Crowley County Correctional Facility,
, April 24, 2013. <http://www.thedenverchannel.
com/news/local-news/settlement-expected-in-crowley-county-correctional-facility-riot>
5
6
The
Alan Prendergast, McPrison: How a private prison brought jobs - and violence, corruption and scandal to Burlington,
www.westword.com/1999-09-30/news/mcprison/>
Of
Corrections
1
School Allows Private Prison Company To Conduct Drug Sweeps, CBS Las Vegas, December 1, 2012. <http://lasvegas.cbslocal.com/2012/12/01/school-allows-private-prisoncompany-to-conduct-drug-sweeps/>
2
Beau Hodai, Corrections Corporation of America Used in Drug Sweeps of Public School Students,
, November 27, 2012. <http://
www.prwatch.org/news/2012/11/11876/corrections-corporation-america-used-drug-sweeps-public-school-students>
Jim Dooley, Death Penalty Sought In Arizona Prison Murder of Hawaii Inmate,
, February 16, 2012. <http://www.hawaiireporter.com/death-penalty-sought-inarizona-prison-murder/123>
2
Jamie Ross, Disturbing Complaint Against Private Prison,
, February 17, 2012. <http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/02/17/43997.htm>
3
Family of a Second Hawaii Prisoner Murdered in Mainland Prison Files Suit Against State of Hawaii and Corrections Corporation of America, ACLU, May 23, 2012.
<http://www.aclu.org/node/34901>
1
It
The case of
Autumn Miller
was no different.
In 2012, while
serving a oneyear
sentence
at the facility,
Miller gave birth
to a premature infant girl into a toilet
with no medical personnel present.2 Three weeks
prior to giving birth, Miller claims her request for
a pregnancy test and Pap smear were ignored.
1
Ginger Allen, Guards Come Forward In Dawson Jail Investigation,
, October 8, 2012. <http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/10/08/guard-comes-forward-indawson-jail-investigation/>
2
Ginger Allen, Premature Baby Born At Dawson Jail Without Medically Trained Personnel,
, July 10, 2012. <http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/07/10/
premature-baby-born-at-dawson-jail-without-medically-trained-personnel/>
3
Ginger Allen, Guards Come Forward In Dawson Jail Investigation,
, October 8, 2012. <http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/10/08/guard-comes-forward-indawson-jail-investigation/>
4
Robert Wilonsky, Groups sue Dawson State Jail operator, alleging unconscionable and unconstitutional conditions,
, May 1, 2013. <http://
thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2013/05/groups-sue-dawson-state-jail-operator-alleging-unconscionable-and-unconstitutional-conditions.html/>
5
Robert Wilonksy, Texas Department of Criminal Justice says Dawson State Jail on the shores of the Trinity River will close August 31
, June 11, 2013
http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2013/06/texas-department-of-criminal-justice-says-dawson-state-jail-on-the-shores-of-the-trinity-river-will-close-august-31.html/
www.grassrootsleadership.org
..
Criminal
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
Major Findings
65 percent of the private prison contracts ITPI received and analyzed included occupancy
guarantees in the form of quotas or required payments for empty prison cells (a low-crime tax).
These quotas and low-crime taxes put taxpayers on the hook for guaranteeing profits for private
prison corporations.
Occupancy guarantee clauses in private prison contracts range between 80% and 100%, with
90% as the most frequent occupancy guarantee requirement.
Arizona, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Virginia are locked in contracts with the highest
occupancy guarantee requirements, with all quotas requiring between 95% and 100% occupancy.
State-specific Findings:
Colorado: Though crime has dropped by a third in the past decade, an occupancy requirement
covering three for-profit prisons has forced taxpayers to pay an additional $2 million.
Arizona: Three Arizona for-profit prison contracts have a staggering 100% quota, even though a
2012 analysis from Tucson Citizen shows that the companys per-day charge for each prisoner has
increased an average of 13.9% over the life of the contracts.
Ohio: A 20-year deal to privately operate the Lake Erie Correctional Institution includes a 90% quota,
and has contributed to cutting corners on safety, including overcrowding, areas without secure doors
and an increase in crime both inside the prison and the surrounding community.
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
Introduction
n 2012, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the largest for-profit private prison company in the
country, sent a letter to 48 state governors offering to buy their public prisons. CCA offered to buy and operate a states
prison in exchange for a 20-year contract, which would include a 90 percent occupancy rate guarantee for the entire
term.1 Essentially, the state would have to guarantee that its prison would be 90 percent filled for the next 20 years (a
quota), or pay the company for unused prison beds if the number of inmates dipped below 90 percent capacity at any
point during the contract term (a low-crime tax that essentially penalizes taxpayers when prison incarceration rates fall).
Fortunately, no state took CCA up on its outrageous offer. But many private prison companies have been successful at
inserting occupancy guarantee provisions into prison privatization contracts, requiring states to maintain high occupancy
levels in their private prisons.
For example, three privately-run prisons in Arizona are governed by contracts that contain 100 percent inmate quotas.2
The state of Arizona is contractually obligated to keep these prisons filled to 100 percent capacity, or pay the private
company for any unused beds.
These contract clauses incentivize keeping prison beds filled, which runs counter to
many states public policy goals of reducing the prison population and increasing
efforts for inmate rehabilitation. When policymakers received the 2012 CCA letter,
some worried the terms of CCAs offer would encourage criminal justice officials to
seek harsher sentences to maintain the occupancy rates required by a contract.3
Policy decisions should be based on creating and maintaining a just criminal justice
system that protects the public interest, not ensuring corporate profits.
Bed guarantee provisions are also costly for state and local governments. As
examples in the report show, these clauses can force corrections departments
to pay thousands, sometimes millions, for unused beds a low-crime tax that
penalizes taxpayers when they achieve what should be a desired goal of lower
incarceration rates. The private prison industry often claims that prison privatization
TEXAS STATE
SEN. JOHN WHITMIRE
in response to the CCA letter
saves states money. Numerous studies and audits have shown these claims of cost
savings to be illusory4, and bed occupancy requirements are one way that private
prison companies lock in inflated costs after the contract is signed.
Chris Kirkham, Private Prison Corporation Offers Cash in Exchange for State Prisons, Huffington Post, February 14, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/02/14/private-prisons-buying-state-prisons_n_1272143.html
American Friends Service Committee of Arizona, Cell-Out Arizona Exclusive, Part II: Arizona For-Profit Prison Costs Rose 14%; Now Guarantee 100% Occupancy,
August 3, 2012. http://tucsoncitizen.com/cell-out-arizona/2012/08/03/cell-out-arizona-exclusive-part-ii-arizona-for-profit-prison-costs-rose14-now-guarantee-100occupancy/
3 Kevin Johnson, Private purchasing of prisons locks in occupancy rates, March 8, 2012. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-01/buyingprisons-require-high-occupancy/53402894/1
4 A Sept. 2010 report by Arizonas Office of the Auditor General found that privately-operated prisons housing minimum-security state prisoners actually cost $.33
per diem more than state prisons ($46.81 per diem in state prisons vs. $47.14 in private prisons), while private prisons that house medium-security state prisoners
cost $7.76 per diem more than state facilities ($48.13 per diem in state prisons vs. $55.89 in private prisons), after adjusting for comparable costs. See: http://www.
azauditor.gov/Reports/State_Agencies/Agencies/Corrections_Department_of/Performance/10-08/10-08.pdf
1
2
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
This Report
This report will discuss the use of prison bed occupancy guarantee clauses in prison privatization contracts and explore
how bed occupancy guarantees undermine criminal justice policy and democratic, accountable government. Section 1
explains the for-profit private prison industrys reliance on high prison populations, and how these occupancy guarantee
provisions directly benefit its bottom line. Section 2 discusses the prevalence of bed guarantee clauses, drawing on a
set of contracts that ITPI obtained through state open records requests. Section 3 describes how occupancy guarantees
have harmed states, focusing on the experiences of Arizona, Colorado, and Ohio three states that have agreed to these
provisions to detrimental consequences. Lastly, Section 4 will discuss our recommendation that governments can and
should reject prison occupancy guarantees.
SECTION 1:
he private prison industry has promoted policies and practices that increase the number of
people who enter and stay in prison. It is no surprise that the two major private prison companies, CCA
and GEO Group, have had a hand in shaping and pushing for criminal justice policies such as mandatory minimum
sentences that favor increased incarceration. In the past, they have supported laws like Californias three-strikes law, and
policies aimed at continuing the War on Drugs.5 More recently, in an
statement from CCAs 2010 annual report: The demand for our facilities
Dina Rasor, Prison Industries: Dont Let Society Improve or We Lost Business, Truthout, April 26, 2013. https://truth-out.org/news/item/8731-prison-industries-dontlet-society-improve-or-we-lose-business-part-i
6 Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, National Public Radio, October 28, 2010. http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prisoneconomics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law
7 CCAs 2010 Annual Report on Form 10-K
5
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
These companies also spend large amounts of money to lobby federal and state lawmakers to advance policies that
protect their bottom line and keep pro-privatization lawmakers in office. The Center for Responsive Politics reports that
CCA spent $17.4 million in lobbying expenditures from 2002 through 2012,8 while GEO Group spent $2.5 million from 2004
to 2012.9 Similarly, CCA spent $1.9 million in political contributions from 2003 to 2012,10 and Geo Group spent $2.9 million
during the same time period.11
While the for-profit prison industry works
hard to ensure harsh criminal laws and elect
policymakers that support its agenda, bed
guarantee contract provisions are an even
more direct way that private prison companies
ensure that prison beds are filled. These
companies rely on occupancy guarantee
clauses in government contracts to guarantee
profits and reduce their financial risk, since
the ability of private prison companies to
ensure prison beds are filled generates steady
revenues. These contract requirements are an
important tool in private prison corporations
efforts to maximize profits. Private prison
companies have negotiated these clauses
in both older existing contracts and newer
amendments. They have even lobbied
lawmakers to impose bed guarantees on
prison facilities, as the below example from
Colorado shows. Private prison companies
make no secret that high occupancy rates are
critical to the success of their business. During
a 2013 first quarter conference call, GEO Group
boasted that the company continues to have
solid occupancy rates in mid to high 90s.12
By contractually requiring states to guarantee
payment for a large percentage of prison
beds, the prison companies are able to protect themselves against fluctuations in the prison population. These provisions
guarantee prison companies a consistent and regular revenue stream, insulating them from ordinary business risks.
The financial risks are borne by the public, while the private corporations are guaranteed profits from taxpayer dollars.
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
SECTION 2:
private prison companies. ITPI identified 77 county and state-level private facilities nationwide and collected and analyzed
62 contracts from these facilities. These contracts each relate to the operation of an individual facility within the state or
locality. The contracts that we collected were either given to us by state-level organizations that already had the contracts
in their possession, or we utilized the open records request process with state and local governments. ITPI is currently
following up with states to collect additional information.
Of the contracts that we reviewed, 41 (65 percent) contained quotas. These occupancy requirements were between 80
percent and 100 percent, with many around 90 percent. The highest bed guarantee requirements were from Arizona,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Virginia. As mentioned above, Arizona has three contracts that contain 100 percent occupancy
guarantee clauses. Oklahoma has three contracts with
!
!
!
!
!
No clause
95% 100%
90% 94%
Below 90%
Other
enhancing the terms of our existing contracts as one of the approaches it uses to develop its business.13 Additionally,
bed guarantee clauses may be imposed completely outside the contracting process. As discussed in more detail in the
next section, CCA was able to insert a bed guarantee requirement for private facilities into the Colorado fiscal year 2013
state budget, completely circumventing the contract amendment process.14 The percentage of facilities that actually have
bed guarantee requirements may be higher than an analysis of their contracts alone indicate.
13
14
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
SECTION 3:
ed guarantee clauses can have measureable impacts on a states criminal justice policy, the state budget,
the functioning of a specific facility, and the community. This section focuses on the experiences of Colorado, Arizona,
and Ohio and describes the specific impacts that bed guarantee clauses have had on their states. All three states have
prison facilities operated by private prison companies with occupancy guarantees in their contracts, and all three states
have suffered detrimental consequences as a result.
Colorado
Colorado has experienced a sizable reduction in its prison population.
In the past decade, the crime rate has dropped by a third, and since
2009, five prisons have been closed. The state projects that two to ten
additional prisons could close in the near future, depending on the size of
the facilities chosen.15 This decrease in prison population propelled CCA,
which operates three private prisons in the state, to take action. Last year,
CCA negotiated the insertion of a bed guarantee provision in the state
budget for all three of its facilities for the 2013 fiscal year. Even though all
three contracts for these facilities include explicit language specifying that
the state does not guarantee any minimum number of offenders will be
assigned to the contractors facility, the company was able to circumvent the contracting process and mandate occupancy
guarantees long after the contract was negotiated and signed.
In 2012, the state began a utilization study to analyze which facilities made the most sense to close, but did not want
any to shut down any facilities until the formal analysis was complete. In response to these preliminary discussions,
CCA threatened to close one of its private facilities. Behind closed doors and without any public hearings, CCA and the
Governors Office and the Joint Budget Committee negotiated a deal.16 In exchange for keeping the facility open, the state
agreed to a bed guarantee, which required Colorado to keep at least 3,300 prisoners in the three CCA facilities, at an annual
rate of $20,000 per inmate for the 2013 fiscal year.17
Instead of using empty bed space in its state-run facilities, the Colorado Department of Corrections housed inmates in
CCAs facilities to ensure they met the occupancy requirement. Colorado taxpayers must pay for the vacant state prison
beds and for the per diem rate for inmates redirected to the CCA facility to fulfill the bed guarantee.18 The Colorado
Criminal Justice Reform Coalition estimates that the deal cost the state at least $2 million.19 The Colorado Springs Gazette
notes that the figure could be even higher. As of March 2013, the state already had 1,000 empty beds in various state
prisons and that number was projected to increase by almost 100 beds per month.20 Legislators predicted that the inmate
Ann Imse, State pays millions as prison populations sink, Colorado Springs Gazette, March 9, 2013. http://gazette.com/state-pays-millions-as-prison-populations-sink/
article/152065
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition, Prison population update and overview, December 3, 2012.
19 Ann Imse, State pays millions as prison populations sink, Colorado Springs Gazette, March 9, 2013. http://gazette.com/state-pays-millions-as-prison-populations-sink/
article/152065
20 Ann Imse, State pays millions as prison populations sink, Colorado Springs Gazette, March 9, 2013. http://gazette.com/state-pays-millions-as-prison-populations-sink/
article/152065
15
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
population would drop between 160 to 1,256 people by June 2013, but by February 2013, the total had already fallen
by 1,700 inmates.21 The occupancy requirement not only ensured that CCA continued to receive a guaranteed level of
revenue each month despite the decrease in inmates, but also had the effect of diverting inmates away from available
public prison beds. Colorado originally intended its private prisons to be used for overflow purposes, but the bed
guarantee provisions allowed it to become the first priority for placement.
The below chart shows how the inmate population in CCA facilities decreased as state prison population also decreased
until 2012, when the CCA inmate population increased, as a result of the bed guarantee deal.
4,000
3,800
3,600
3,400
3,200
3,000
SEPT
2011
JAN
2012
MAR
2012
JUNE
2012
SEPT
2012
OCT
2012
Source: Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition, CO DOC monthly population reports
Arizona
100% Bed Guarantees at Three Facilities
Private prison companies were successful in inserting the highest
prison bed guarantee into contract amendments for the three oldest
private prison facilities in Arizona: Arizona State Prison Phoenix West
and Arizona State Prison Florence West, both operated by the GEO
group; and the Marana Community Correctional Treatment Facility,
operated by Management and Training Corporation (MTC). All three
contracts require the state to fill or compensate the company for every
available bed. The bed guarantee provisions were the result of an
agreement between the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) and
the private prison companies in 2008. In this deal, the corporations
agreed to lower rates for emergency beds meant to temporarily house
an overflow of prisoners, in exchange for the state accepting a 100 percent occupancy guarantee for all regularly-rated
beds in all three facilities. Even with the addition of the 100 percent bed guarantee clauses, an August 2012 analysis from
Tucson Citizen shows that the per-prisoner, per-day rates for the three facilities have increased by an average of 13.9
percent since the contracts were first awarded. 22
Ann Imse, State pays millions as prison populations sink, Colorado Springs Gazette, March 9, 2013. http://gazette.com/state-pays-millions-as-prison-populationssink/article/152065
22 American Friends Service Committee of Arizona, Cell-Out Arizona Exclusive, Part II: Arizona For-Profit Prison Costs Rose 14%; Now Guarantee 100% Occupancy,
August 3, 2012. http://tucsoncitizen.com/cell-out-arizona/2012/08/03/cell-out-arizona-exclusive-part-ii-arizona-for-profit-prison-costs-rose14-now-guarantee-100occupancy/
21
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
The details of the contract for the Marana facility reveal an even worse deal for Arizona taxpayers. Amendment 14, signed
in June 2011, refers to a dispute between ADC and private prison company, MTC, in which the company claimed that the
5-year contract renewal was not performed in a timely manner. ADC maintained it was. The settlement for this dispute
included ADC paying the company for 500 beds, including 50 which were identified as reduced-rate emergency beds, at
the full per diem rate with the 100 percent guaranteed occupancy requirement. Incredibly, this agreement was applied
retroactively, effectively erasing all but three months of the reduced rate for the emergency beds. The settlement results in
an additional $2,659,390 in revenue to MTC through the remainder of the contract, which expires in October 2013.23
Despite MTCs guaranteed revenue, the Marana facility has been plagued by safety problems. In a security review in August
2010, state inspectors found broken security cameras, swamp coolers out of commission, insecure doors and windows on
housing units, inadequate perimeter lighting, and broken control panels that failed to alert staff when inmates opened
exterior doors. When inspectors returned in March 2011 to perform the annual audit, problems persisted, including broken
security cameras and control panels24
American Friends Service Committee of Arizona, Cell-Out Arizona Exclusive, Part II: Arizona For-Profit Prison Costs Rose 14%; Now Guarantee 100% Occupancy,
August 3, 2012. http://tucsoncitizen.com/cell-out-arizona/2012/08/03/cell-out-arizona-exclusive-part-ii-arizona-for-profit-prison-costs-rose14-now-guarantee-100occupancy/.
24 Bob Ortega, 2010 escape at Kingman an issue for MTCs bid, The Arizona Republic, August 11, 2011. http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/08/11/
20110811MTC-bid-issue-2010-escape-at-kingman.html
25 Bob Ortega, Arizona prisons slow to fix flaws in wake of Kingman escape, The Arizona Republic, June 26, 2011. http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/06/26/
20110626arizona-prison-safety-improvements.html
26 Bob Ortega, Arizona prison oversight lacking for private facilities: state weighs expansion even as costs run high, The Arizona Republic, August 7 ,2011. http://www.
azcentral.com/news/articles/20110807arizona-prison-private-oversight.html
23
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
Ohio
Ohios experiences with prison privatization are plagued with stories
of mismanagement, violence, and unexpected costs. Though crime
rates in the state have been decreasing, the private prison industry
continues to ensure that prisons remain as full as possible. In both the
Lake Erie Correctional Institution and the North Coast Correctional
Treatment Facility, bed guarantees have helped protect the private
prison industrys profits.
Chris Kirkham, Lake Erie Prison Plagued by Violence and Drugs After Corporate Takeover, Huffington Post, March 22, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/03/22/lake-erie-prison-violence_n_2925151.html
28 Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 2012 Full Internal Management Audit Report, September 25, 2012. http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/
default/files/prison-audit-report%20OHIO.pdf
29 The ACLU Ohio continues to monitor the conditions at the Lake Erie Correctional Institution. In May 2013, they released a timeline chronicling problems at the
facility, which can be found at http://www.acluohio.org/crisis-in-conneaut-timeline.
30 Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, LaECI Audit Reinspection, November 15, 2012. http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/ccareinspection.pdf
31 Gregory Geisler, Correctional Institution Inspection Committee Report on the Inspection and Evaluation of the Lake Erin Correctional Institution, January 22-23,
2013. http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/lakeeriereport.pdf
27
10
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
over the fence for inmates to retrieve have been reported.32 The occupancy requirement not only creates perverse
incentives to encourage the facility to keep as many heads in beds, but does so at the expense of the health and safety of
the inmates and the larger Conneaut community.
Chris Kirkham, Lake Erie Prison Plagued by Violence and Drugs After Corporate Takeover, Huffington Post, March 22, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/03/22/lake-erie-prison-violence_n_2925151.html
33 ACLU Ohio, Prisons for Profit: A Look at Prison Privatization. http://www.acluohio.org/assets/issues/CriminalJustice/PrisonsForProfit2011_04.pdf
34 Policy Matters Ohio, Selective Celling: Inmate Population in Ohios Private Prisons May 2001. http://www.policymattersohio.org/selective-celling-inmatepopulation-in-ohios-private-prisons
32
11
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
SECTION 4:
Recommendations
ed guarantee clauses can have broad negative implications for government entities, even beyond
obvious financial concerns. As discussed in the report., these clauses can result in dangerously unsafe conditions,
and tie the hands of lawmakers and correctional agencies. Our analysis leads to one clear conclusion: bed guarantee
clauses should be prohibited in any private prison contract. We offer the following recommendations on ways to avoid
the pitfalls that come with bed guarantees.
12
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
the open market. When entering a contract to operate a prison, a private company should be required to take on some
risk. If the company fails to perform well, a bed guarantee clause should not serve as the companys financial safety net.
In many cases, private prison beds were intended to be a safety valve to address demand that exceeded public capacity.
It was never intended that taxpayers would be the safety valve to ensure private prison companies profits.
Elimination of bed guarantee clauses will allow lawmakers to enact policies that are in the public interest, not in a private
prison corporations financial interest. Corrections agencies should not be forced to direct prisoners to certain private
facilities because of bed guarantee clauses. Criminal justice policy and programs should be guided by our public goals,
such as reducing the number of people in prison. Rejecting bed guarantee clauses allows public officials to make the best
decisions in the publics interest.
For additional information about public interest protections in prison privatization contracts, please see In the Public Interests
October 2012 publication titled Essential Public Interest Protections for Prison Privatization Contracts at:
http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Prison_Privatization_FINAL.pdf.
In the Public Interest also recently released a set of legislative proposals, called the Taxpayer Empowerment Agenda. Among other
important responsible contracting provisions, this agenda encourages lawmakers to ban contract language that guarantees
company profits, including provisions such as occupancy guarantees. You can find the full Taxpayer Empowerment Agenda at:
http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/ITPI-The-Taxpayer-Empowerment-Agenda.pdf.
13
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
Appendix
which contracts ITPI received and which contracts contained occupancy guarantee clauses.
Facility
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
14
Facility
The below chart documents the privatized facilities identified by In the Public Interest, and includes information about
Company
Location
Customer
Have
Contract?
Current
GEO
Hudson, CO
AK
GEO
Florence, AZ
AZ
GEO
Phoenix, AZ
AZ
Expiration
Date
Current
Central Arizona
Correctional Facility
GEO
Florence, AZ
AZ
MTC
Kingman, AZ
AZ
Current
Marana Community
Correctional Treatment Facility
MTC
Marana, AZ
AZ
Current
CCA
Eloy, AZ
CA
Current
Occupancy Guarantee?
(if known)
July 2017
100%
Company
Location
Customer
Have
Contract?
Expiration
Date
June 2013
CCA
Nicholls, GA
GA
Current
CCA
Millen, GA
GA
Current
CCA
Alamo, GA
GA
Current
Current
(if known)
Occupancy Guarantee?
Davidson
County, TN
CCA
Chattanooga, TN
Hamilton
County, TN
CCA
Bartlett, TX
CCA
Bridgeport Pre-Parole
Transfer Facility
CCA
CCA
Kuna, ID
ID
Current
June 2014
CCA
Burlington, CO
ID
Current
July 2014
June 2014
CCA
Indianapolis, IN
IN
GEO
New Castle, IN
IN
Current
January 2015
GEO
Plainfield, IN
IN
Current
March 2015
Current
December 2017
Amendment 4 90%, also fixed monthly payments
for annex
CCA
St. Mary, KY
KY
Tallahatchie County
Correctional Facility
CCA
Tutwiler, MS
CA
Current
June 2013
CCA
Winnfield, LA
LA
Current
June 2020
GEO
McFarland, CA
CA
2012
GEO
Kinder, LA
LA
Current
July 2020
CCA
Woodville, MS
MS
GEO
Adelanto, CA
CA
2012
Wilkinson County
Correctional Facility
GEO
McFarland, CA
CA
Current
McFarland Community
Correctional Facility
GEO
McFarland, CA
CA
2010
CCA
Eloy, AZ
CA/HI
Current CA
portion
January 2024
CCA
Las Animas, CO
CO
Outdated
June 2013
CCA
Washington, DC
DC
CCA
Panama City, FL
FL
Current
CCA
Graceville, FL
FL
Current
CCA
Lake City, FL
FL
2009
Indefinite
CCA
Moore Haven, FL
FL
Current
July 2013
CCA
Lecanto, FL
Citrus County,
FL
Current
September 2015
Blackwater River
Correctional Facility
GEO
Milton , FL
FL
Current
April 2013
GEO
South Bay, FL
FL
2009
July 2014
Article 7 90%
MTC
Gadsden, FL
FL
Current
July 2013
June 2013
June 2013
East Mississippi
Correctional Facility
MTC
Meridian, MS
MS
Marshall County
Correctional Facility
MTC
Holly Springs, MS
MS
MTC
Walnut Grove, MS
MS
CCA
Shelby, MT
MT
CCA
Grants, NM
NM
Current
Guadalupe County
Correctional Facility
GEO
Santa Rosa, NM
NM
Current
GEO
Hobbes, NM
NM
Current
GEO
Clayton, NM
NM
Current
August 2013
CCA
Conneaut, OH
OH
Current
June 2032
North Central
Correctional Complex
MTC
Marion, OH
OH
CCA
Cushing, OK
OK
Current
June 2014
CCA
Holdenville, OK
OK
Current
June 2014
GEO
Lawton, OK
OK
Current
June 2013
August 2013
June 2013
continued
TN
Nashville, TN
HI
June 2013
Clifton, TN
CCA
GA
Eloy, AZ
June 2013
Current
CCA
Metro-Davidson County
Detention Facility
Milledgeville, GA
CCA
Current
CO
GEO
CA
Olney Springs, CO
TN
July 2013
Sayre, OK
CCA
Whiteville, TN
TN
CCA
CCA
Whiteville, TN
ID
Hardeman County
Correctional Center
CCA
Kuna, ID
Customer
MTC
Location
Company
June 2013
June 2016
How Lockup Quotas and Low-Crime Taxes Guarantee Profits Guarantee Profits
15
Facility
December 2016
June 2013
Have
Contract?
Expiration
Date
(if known)
Occupancy Guarantee?
May 2015
2007
June 2016
Current
July 2014
TX
Current
August 2013
Henderson, TX
TX
Current
August 2013
Bridgeport, TX
TX
Current
August 2013
CCA
Dallas, TX
TX
Current
August 2013
CCA
Mineral Wells, TX
TX
Current
August 2013
CCA
Raymondville, TX
TX
Current
August 2013
GEO
Cleveland, TX
TX
Current
January 2014
GEO
Lockhart, TX
TX
2005
January 2013
CCA
Jacksboro, TX
TX
Current
August 2013
MTC
Overton, TX
TX
Current
MTC
Bridgeport, TX
TX
Current
MTC
Diboll, TX
TX
2008
MTC
Henderson, TX
TX
2005
MTC
Kyle, TX
TX
Current
MTC
Venus, TX
TX
2009
MTC
Houston, TX
TX
Current
MTC
Brownfield, TX
TX
Current
GEO
Lawrenceville, VA
VA
Current
CCA
Beattyville, KY
VT
Current
16
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In the Public Interest would like to thank Mike Brickner, Jane Carter, Alex Friedmann, Caroline Issacs, Justin Jones,
Kerry Korpi, Bob Libal, and Kymberlie Quong Charles for their thoughtful and thorough comments and edits.
We would also like to thank Open Society Foundations and The Public Welfare Foundation for their generous
support of this report.
Design and layout by Terry Lutz.
Any errors or omissions in this report are the sole responsibility of In the Public Interest.
www.InThePublicInterest.org
1825 K St. NW, Suite 210
Washington, DC 20006
202-739-1160
facebook.com/InThePublicInterest
@PubInterest
PARTNERSHIP
for
Working Families
[ insurgencies ]
The Color of Corporate Corrections, Part II:
Contractual Exemptions and the
Overrepresentation of People of Color in
Private Prisons
CHRISTOPHER PETRELLA1
My previous study2 published in Radical Criminology, (Issue 2,
Fall 2013) demonstrates that people of color3though historically overrepresented in public prisons relative to their share of
state and national populationsare further overrepresented in
private prisons contracted by departments of correction in Arizona, California, and Texas.
My current research on the relationship between U.S. racial
formation and prison privatization enlarges my previous work
by foregrounding the question of why. That is, why is it that
1
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82 RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
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people of color are overrepresented in private versus public facilities in select states even in the absence of explicit racially
discriminatory correctional placement or classification policies?
In order to explain why people of color tend to be overrepresented in private relative to public facilities around the country
this study draws on data from nine (9) states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. These states were selected on the basis of their
reliably large sample size. Each of the nine states considered
currently houses at least 3,000 prisoners in private minimum
and/or medium security facilities.4 Additionally, this study controls for differences in facility population profile. Therefore,
only public and private facilities/units with a minimum and/or
medium security designation are included in this comparison.
And finally, as in my previous work, in order to avoid artificially inflating the over-incarceration of people of color in for-profit prisons this examination intentionally excludes figures from
federal detention centers controlled by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Marshals Service, and
detention facilities managed at the local level. For similar reasons, it strategically excludes data from transfer centers, work
release centers, community corrections facilities, and reception
centers.
Based on an analysis of data obtained from over sixty separate public record requests5 and reports accessible on state department of corrections websites, this study finds that people of
color are overrepresented in private minimum and/or medium
security private facilities relative to their public counterparts in
each of the nine (9) states examined.
This research further posits that the overrepresentation of
people of color in private versus public prisons across the country is primarily attributable to an unlikely source: finely tailored
4
Over thirty states in total contract with private prison companies but many of
these jurisdictions have sample sizes that are statistically insignificant.
Alaska, for instance, houses less than 1,000 prisoners in minimum and/or
medium security private facilities.
5
All public record requests were made between May, 2012 and September,
2013.
Ibid.
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/elderlyprisonreport_20120613_1.pdf
Corrections Corporation of America, the GEO Group, and MTC are the
three largest private prison companies in the United States. Together they
constitute close to 90 percent of the private corrections market share.
84 RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
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and/or medium security private facilities than in select counterpart public facilities. In fact, the states in which the private versus public racial disparities are most pronounced also happen to
be the states in which the private versus public age disparities
are most salient. Please see data on Oklahoma and Texas.
Secondly, on the rare occasion that a state department of
correction retains control of health services while contracting
10
with a private prison management company 11 elderly populations still remain disproportionately expensive to incarcerate
because those assigned to monitor geriatric and/or chronically
ill prisoners often require special training, benefit from higher
pay grades, and are assigned at lower staff-to-prisoner ratios.
Each of these considerations further erodes profit margins.
In sum, explicit contractual exemptions for health services
and implicit provisions for reducing high cost geriatric or infirmed prisoners helps to explain ongoing racial disparities in
private versus public prisons with similar population profiles.
My modest hope is that this study provides an incontrovertible
example of the ways in which seemingly race neutral or colorblind carceral policies continue to have a differential impact
on communities of color.12
responsible or liable for providing counseling and/or mental health programs.
MTC will not be responsible or liable for providing medical, mental health,
optometry, pharmaceutical, dental, or similar services. MDOC shall provide
security and control of inmates for outpatient needs and /or hospitalization.
Note Arizona: According to a 2011 report issued by the Arizona Department
of Corrections Both private and state-run prison units have differences in the
types of inmates that can be housed based on inmate medical, mental health
and dental needs Generally, state-run prisons house a higher percentage of
inmates with higher medical and mental health needs than private prison
units. Private prison units considered to be corridor facilities have access to
off-site healthcare and can house inmates with more severe medical and
mental health needs. Additionally, two private contracts have a $10,000 cap
per inmate on health care services. When the health care cost of a single
inmate exceeds this cap, the inmate is returned to a state-run prison unit and
the state assumes all further medical treatment costs associated with the
inmate. The consolidation of inmates with higher medical and mental health
needs to certain units is cost-efficient overall, but results in a higher per diem
cost for those units and complexes that house these inmates.
http://www.azcorrections.gov/ARS41_
1609_01_Biennial_Comparison_Report122111_e_v.pdf
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86 RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
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DATA:
ARIZONA: PUBLIC MINIMUM/MEDIUM SECURITY FACILITIES OR
UNITS (PEOPLE OF COLOR / TOTAL POPULATION)
Douglas-Gila: 359/601
Douglas-Mohave: 663/930
Douglas-Eggers: 127/231
Florence-East: 397/690
Florence-North: 604/1085
Florence-Globe: 164/293
Lewis-Stiner: 786/1176
Lewis-Sunrise: 42/99
Safford-Fort Grant: 331/573
Safford-Graham: 349/536
Safford-Tonto: 194/306
Tucson-Cimarron: 246/371
Tucson-Santa Rita: 503/777
Tucson-Winchester: 501/769
Tucson-Catalina: 144/348
Tucson-Whetstone: 685:1171
Winslow-Coronado: 318/498
Winslow-Kaibab: 614/775
Winslow-Apache: 212/358
Yuma-Cheyenne: 734/1188
Yuma-Cocopah: 570/1047
Yuma-Cibola: 152/308
Yuma-La Paz: 661/864
88 RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
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http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2013/06/cdcr-dedicates-newcalifornia- health.html
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2/1/2015
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April 1, 2012
ON Oct. 12, 2010, Jimmy Mubenga was deported from Britain. The 46-year-old Angolan had
come to the country as a refugee 16 years earlier. But after his involvement in a pub brawl and a
subsequent criminal conviction, the government ordered his deportation. Three private
security guards escorted him through Heathrow Airport and onto British Airways Flight 77 to
Luanda, Angola. The exact details of what followed are still unclear and currently subject to
criminal investigation.
Several passengers onboard the plane reported that Mr. Mubenga repeatedly complained that
he could not breathe and that he was being held down with his head between his knees by
security guards. As the airplane taxied to the runway in London, Mr. Mubenga lost
consciousness and later died.
Immigration control has traditionally been viewed as an inalienable sovereign function of the
state. But today migration management has increasingly been taken over by private
contractors. Proponents of privatization have been keen to argue that the use of contractors
does not mean that governments lose control. Yet, privatization introduces a corporate veil that
blurs both public oversight and legal accountability.
Despite efforts to introduce outside supervisors, performance reports and other monitoring
mechanisms, the private nature of these companies breaks the ordinary administrative chain of
command, placing both governments and the public at a disadvantage in terms of ensuring
transparency.
Private companies seldom have an interest in securing public oversight, as any criticism may
entail negative economic consequences. Australasian Correctional Management, which ran
detention centers in Australia from 1998 to 2004, was known to require medical staff members
or teachers entering its facilities to sign confidentiality agreements preventing them from
MORE IN OPIN
disclosing any information regarding detainees or the administration of the centers. Being
foreigners, migrants and refugees have always had a hard time gaining access to outside Political C
complaint mechanisms and advocacy institutions. As an employee in charge of reviewingSurprisin
State Rep
disciplinary cases at a Corrections Corporation of America facility in Houston once told a
Read More
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/opinion/when-it-comes-to-immigration-privatization-can-kill.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print
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2/1/2015
Mubenga case, the three private security guards involved in the deportation were initially
arrested. Following accusations from G4S employees that senior management had repeatedly
ignored internal warnings about poor training and unsafe restraint techniques, charges against
the company are now being considered. Yet none of these lawsuits are likely to address whether
the U.K. Border Agency should face criminal liability for Mr. Mubengas death because of its
decision to outsource deportations in the first place.
Even if governments want to re-establish state control over migration, it isnt so easy. Political
promises to renationalize immigration detention centers in Britain have so far remained
unfulfilled despite repeated reports of abuse and mistreatment. And privatization, once
pursued, is difficult to reverse.
The United States discovered this when, in the aftermath of 9/11, it was faced with the
challenge of hiring 45,000 employees for the newly established Transportation Security
Administration to recoup sovereign control over previously private airport security. And private
contractors work to shape policy as well. When Arizonas notorious SB 1070 immigration bill
was passed, 30 out of 36 co-sponsors had received donations from private prison companies or
their lobbyists.
Today, government outsourcing has given rise to an industry that encompasses nearly every
aspect of migration management in countries across the globe. This shift comes at a price: It
eliminates government accountability and runs roughshod over the rights of those subjected to
private corporations control. And unless governments reassert control over what used to be a
core sovereign function of the state, many more Jimmy Mubengas are likely to die.
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies
and a co-editor of the forthcoming book The Migration Industry.
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