Case Title:

Tua
Case Number:
Date of Decision:
Ponente:

Ralph P. Tua vs Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang and Rossana HonradoG.R. No. 170701
January 22, 2014
Justice Diosdado Peralta

Facts:
Rosanna Honrado-Tua and Ralph P. Tua were legally married with three minor
children. On May 20, 2005, the wife, and in behalf of her children, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite for the issuance of a protection order
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act. The filing of the said protection order was brought because of the
husbands abusive conduct towards his children and spouse; imputing physical
harm and threatening them for the purpose of controlling their actions or decisions;
and the deprivation of the childrens custody as well as the familys financial
support.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
pursuant to the application. By virtue of said issuance, a hearing was set for the
issuance of the Permanent Protection Order. Thereafter, respondent filed a petition
with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO.
In his comment, petitioner denied the allegations and contended that he had
been living separately with his wife and children since November 2004. According to
him, his wife has been involved with a certain Rebendor Zuniga despite their
marriage and that she violated their agreement when she and their children moved
out of their conjugal dwelling to stay with Zuniga. Aside from denying the
allegations, petitioner further claimed that the issuance of the TPO violated his right
of due process under the Constitution.
Without waiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion
to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and hold departure order
on the decision of the RTC.
In order not to render the petition mood and to avoid grave and irreparable
injury, the CA initially issued a temporary restraining order but later denied the
petition for lack of merit. The CA in said ruling opined that the factual matters could
not be passed upon by virtue of the petition for certiorari since there is a pending
petition under RA 9262 before the RTC. Also, the TPO was validly issued and there
was no grave abuse of discretion attendant to it. As regards the claim of
unconstitutionality, the CA ruled that the requisites to question the constitutionality
of the law were not met.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not, the provision for the issuance of the TPO in RA 9262 is
unconstitutional as it is in contravention with the right to due process
afforded by the constitution?
2. Whether or not, there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court
and to barangay officials to issue protection orders?
3. Whether or not, there was grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC
and/or the CA in this case?
Ruling:
The petition was denied. The decision of the CA affirming the RTCs issuance
of the TPO was affirmed. The Supreme Court was order to resolve with dispatch the
petition for a permanent protection order.
Ratio Decidendi:

As to the first issue

The Supreme Court was not impressed by the contention of petitioner on the
question of constitutionality of RA 9262, particularly Sec. 15 of the law. In Garcia v.
Drilon (699 SCRA 352, 401), where the same argument was raised and where the
court struck down the challenge and held: a protection order is an order issued to
prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The court further said that the grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be
challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and
hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
As to the second issue
The Supreme Court was also not persuaded as to the allegation of an invalid
legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
The high court said that the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the
filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the
issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be
present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the courts
discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine
that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO
have been committed.
The violent acts which the court use for its basis are those enumerated in Section
5 of R.A. 9262 (Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children). In this case,
petitioners actions would fall under the enumeration of the said portion of the law and
these are enough for the issuance of a TPO.
As to the third issue
The Supreme Court did not found that the CA committed an erroneous decision
as to its affirmance of the RTCs issuance of the TPO.
It is settled doctrine, according to the court, that there is grave abuse of
discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Case digest by Geline Joy D. Samillano, LLB-2B