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reached after a fair hearing has been given to the individual concerned. And in this
context fair hearing requires two things, namely, AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM and NEMO
DEBET ESSE JUDEX IN PROPRIA SUA CAUSA.
1.2. History of the growth of Natural Justice
Natural justice denotes specific procedural rights in the English legal system and the
systems of other nations based on it. It is similar to the American concepts of fair
procedure and procedural due process, the latter having roots that to some degree
parallel the origins of natural justice. Natural justice is identified with the two
constituents of a fair hearing, which are the rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua, or
"no man a judge in his own cause"), and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem,
or "hear the other side").
The requirements of natural justice or a duty to act fairly depend on the context. In Baker
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), the Supreme Court of
Canada set out a list of non-exhaustive factors that would influence the content of the
duty of fairness, including the nature of the decision being made and the process followed
in making it, the statutory scheme under which the decision-maker operates, the
importance of the decision to the person challenging it, the person's legitimate
expectations, and the choice of procedure made by the decision-maker.
Earlier, in Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19 (1990), the Supreme Court held
that public authorities which make decisions of a legislative and general nature do not
have a duty to act fairly, while those that carry out acts of a more administrative and
specific nature do. Furthermore, preliminary decisions will generally not trigger the duty
to act fairly, but decisions of a more final nature may have such an effect. In addition,
whether a duty to act fairly applies depends on the relationship between the public
authority and the individual. No duty exists where the relationship is one of master and
servant, or where the individual holds office at the pleasure of the authority. On the other
hand, a duty to act fairly exists where the individual cannot be removed from office
Natural Justice: An Effective Mechanism to Diminish Arbitrary Exercise of Discretionary Power
except for cause. Finally, a right to procedural fairness only exists when an authority's
decision is significant and has an important impact on the individual.
The respondent must be given full details of the accusations. That is, the
factual issues and allegations to be examined and discussed should be specified
in sufficient detail to enable adequate preparation of a defence and a reasonable
opportunity of adequate refutation.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Unless there are exceptional circumstances, do not hear one side in the absence
of the other.
VII.
VIII. Give each party the opportunity to correct or contradict any statement
prejudicial to their case.
IX.
X.
It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard. 6 The right to a fair
hearing requires that individuals are not penalized by decisions affecting their rights or
legitimate expectations unless they have been given
I. prior notice of the cases against them,
II. a fair opportunity to answer them, and
III. the opportunity to present their own cases.7
Besides promoting an individual's liberties, the right to a fair hearing has also been used
by courts as a base on which to build up fair administrative procedures. It is now well
established that it is not the character of the public authority that matters but the character
of the power exercised.8 However, in the United Kingdom prior to Ridge v. Baldwin
(1963),9 the scope of the right to a fair hearing was severely restricted by case law
following Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863).10 In R. v. Electricity
Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. (1923),
Lord Atkin observed that the right only applied where decision-makers had "the duty to
act judicially".11 In natural justice cases this dictum was generally understood to mean
that a duty to act judicially was not to be inferred merely from the impact of a decision on
the rights of subjects; such a duty would arise only if there was a "superadded" express
obligation to follow a judicial-type procedure in arriving at the decision.12
13
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 143 E.R. 414
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1993] UKHL 8, [1994] 1 A.C. 531
at 560
14
The British courts have held it is not enough for an affected person to merely be informed
of a hearing. He or she must also be told what is at stake; in other words, the gist of the
case.
Opportunity to be heard
Every person has the right to have a hearing and be allowed to present his or her own
case. Should a person not attend the hearing, even with adequate notice given, the
adjudicator has the discretion to decide if the hearing should proceed. In Ridge v.
Baldwin, a chief constable succeeded in having his dismissal from service declared void
as he had not been given the opportunity to make a defence. In another case, Chief
Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982), a chief constable required a police
probationer to resign on account of allegations about his private life which he was given
no fair opportunity to rebut. The House of Lords found the dismissal to be unlawful.
Likewise in Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya (1962), a
public servant facing disciplinary proceedings was not supplied with a copy of a
prejudicial report by a board of inquiry which the adjudicating officer had access to
before the hearing. The Privy Council held that the proceedings had failed to provide him
a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
However, this requirement does not necessarily mean the decision-maker has to meet the
complainant face to face "Natural justice does not generally demand orality".15 It has
been suggested that an oral hearing will almost be as good as useless if the affected
person has no prior knowledge of the case. In Lloyd v. McMahon (1987), an oral hearing
did not make a difference to the facts on which the case was based. Giving judgment in
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Lord Justice Harry Woolf held that an oral
hearing may not always be the "very pith of the administration of natural justice". 16 It has
15
16
R. (Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd.) v. Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2001] EWCA Civ 329
Lloyd v. McMahon [1987] 1 A.C. 625, C.A. (England & Wales) and H.L. (United Kingdom).
also been suggested that an oral hearing is only required if issues concerning deprivations
of legal rights or legally protected interests arise.
Conduct of the hearing
When deciding how the hearing should be conducted, the adjudicator has to ask whether
the person charged has a proper opportunity to consider, challenge or contradict any
evidence, and whether the person is also fully aware of the nature of the allegations
against him or her so as to have a proper opportunity to present his or her own case. 17 In
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (2009), Lord Phillips of Worth
Matravers said:
The best way of producing a fair trial is to ensure that a party to it has the fullest
information of both the allegations that are made against him and the evidence relied
upon in support of those allegations. Where the evidence is documentary, he should have
access to the documents. Where the evidence consists of oral testimony, then he should be
entitled to cross-examine the witnesses who give that testimony, whose identities should
be disclosed.18
The right to be heard in answer to charges before an unbiased tribunal is illustrated in the
Singapore case Tan Boon Chee David v. Medical Council of Singapore (1980). During a
disciplinary hearing, council members were either not conscientious about their
attendance or did not attend the whole course of proceedings. This meant they did not
hear all the oral evidence and submissions. The High Court held that this had
substantially prejudiced the appellant and constituted a fundamental breach of natural
justice. On the other hand, mere absence from a hearing does not necessarily lead to
undue prejudice. It was held in Re Teo Choo Hong (1995) that the function of a lay
member of a lawyers' disciplinary committee was to observe and not cast a vote or make
a judgment. Thus, the appellant had not suffered undue prejudice.
17
18
Kay Swee Pin v. Singapore Island Country Club [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 802 at 806, para. 7.
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF [2009] UKHL 28
On the basis of reciprocity, if one side is allowed to cross-examine his legal opponent at a
hearing, the other party must also be given the same opportunity. 19 In addition, when a
tribunal decides a case on a basis not raised or contemplated by the parties, or decides it
without regarding the submissions and arguments made by the parties on the issues, this
will amount to a breach of natural justice.20 However, a genuine bona fide mistake by an
adjudicator in omitting to state reasons for not considering a submission is not enough to
be a breach of natural justice.21 This may occur when the submissions were accidentally
omitted, or were so unconvincing that it was not necessary to explicitly state the
adjudicator's findings.
Right to legal representation
There is no inherent common law right to legal representation before a domestic tribunal.
A tribunal has the discretion to admit either a legally qualified or unqualified counsel to
assist the person appearing before it, based on the facts of the case.22 When assessing
whether a party should be offered legal assistance, the adjudicator should first ask
whether the right to be heard applies, and, secondly, whether counsel's assistance is
needed for an effective hearing given the subject matter, bearing in mind the
consequences of such a denial.
In R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Tarrant (1983), Webster J. set
out six factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow representation by
counsel, namely:
1. the seriousness of the charge and the potential penalty;
2. whether any points of law are likely to arise.;
3. whether the prisoner is capable of presenting his own case;
19
Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor [19771978] S.L.R.(R.) 386, H.C. (Singapore).
Front Row Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Daimler South East Asia Pte. Ltd. [2010]
21
SEF Construction Pte. Ltd. v. Skoy Connected Pte. Ltd. [2010] 1 S.L.R. 733
22
Kok Seng Chong v. Bukit Turf Club [1992] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 772, H.C. (Singapore).
20
4. whether they are any procedural difficulties faced by prisoners in conducting their
own defence;
5. whether there is reasonable speed in making the adjudication; and
6. whether there is a need for fairness between prisoners or between prisoners and
prison officers.
It has also been suggested that where a tribunal hearing concerns the individual's
reputation or right to livelihood, there is a greater need for allowing legal representation
as this vindicates the idea of equality before the law.23
When one refuses legal representation, one cannot expect to receive a higher "standard"
of natural justice. This was enunciated in Singapore in Ho Paul v. Singapore Medical
Council (2008). Dr. Ho, who had been charged with professional misconduct, chose to
appear before the Council in person and declined to cross-examine the Council's key
witness. Subsequently, he argued that he should have been warned of the legal
implications of not being legally represented. The High Court rejected this argument and
held he had suffered no prejudice. Dr. Ho had been given a fair opportunity of presenting
his own case and, most importantly, had not been deprived of his right to cross-examine
the witnesses.
It is also not a court's obligation to provide assistance when a party presents his or her
case without legal representation. In Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor (1998),24
the accused had appeared in person before a magistrate and had entered a plea of guilt.
He later petitioned the High Court for criminal revision, arguing that as the magistrate
had not informed him of the defences available to him, his plea had been equivocal. The
Court held:
The onus [of informing the accused of his defence options or what could be
more advantageous to his case] does not shift to the judge (or the Prosecution, for
23
24
10
that matter) simply because the accused is unrepresented. That will be placing too
onerous a burden on the judge. Furthermore, the judge will be performing two
completely incompatible and irreconcilable roles one as the adjudicator, the
other as the de facto defence counsel.
In Singapore, the right to legal representation is contingent on the nature of the inquiry.
However, since Article 12 of the Constitution of Singapore guarantees equal protection
under the law, it has been suggested that greater weightage should be accorded to this
procedural right when balancing it against the competing demand of efficiency.
The decision and reasons for it
Currently, the principles of natural justice in the United Kingdom and certain other
jurisdictions do not include a general rule that reasons should be given for decisions. In
R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw (1951), Denning
L.J. stated:
"I think the record must contain at least the document which initiates the
proceedings; the pleadings, if any; and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor
the reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does
state its reasons, and those reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the
decision."
It has been stated that "no single factor has inhibited the development of English
administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public
authorities to give reasons for their decisions".25
25
Keith Frank Goodfellow (1971), Administration under Law: A Report by JUSTICE, London
11
I.
II.
Foremost rules and procedures to be followed by any person or body charged with the
duty of adjudicating upon disputes:
1. Act fairly:
I.
II.
III.
in good faith
without bias
and in a judicial temper
A person is barred from deciding any case in which he or she may be, or may fairly be
suspected to be, biased. This principle embodies the basic concept of impartiality, 27 and
applies to courts of law, tribunals, arbitrators and all those having the duty to act
judicially.28 A public authority has a duty to act judicially whenever it makes decisions
26
Einfield J in his judgment in Hall & Ors v Shaban & Anor (1988) EOC 92-227 (At pp 77,
142
27
28
12
that affect people's rights or interests, and not only when it applies some judicial-type
procedure in arriving at decisions.
The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to maintain public confidence in the
legal system. The erosion of public confidence undermines the nobility of the legal
system, and leads to ensuing chaos.29 The essence of the need for impartiality was
observed by Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls, in Metropolitan Properties Co.
(F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon (1968):30
"Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when rightminded people go away thinking: 'The judge was biased."31
Public confidence as the basis for the rule against bias is also embodied in the oftenquoted words of Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, that
"[i]t is not merely of some importance, but of fundamental importance that justice
should not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done".32
2.2.3. Forms of bias
29
Tang Kin Hwa v. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board [2005] 4 SLR
Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon [1968] EWCA Civ 5
31
Metrpolitan Properties, p. 599
32
R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at 259, High court (Kings Bench)
30
13
Bias may be actual, imputed or apparent. Actual bias is established where it is actually
established that a decision-maker was prejudiced in favour of or against a party.
However, in practice, the making of such an allegation is rare as it is very hard to prove.33
One form of imputed bias is based on the decision-maker being a party to a suit, or
having a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome of the decision. Once this fact
has been established, the bias is irrebuttable and disqualification is automatic the
decision-maker will be barred from adjudicating the matter without the need for any
investigation into the likelihood or suspicion of bias.34
A classic case is Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852), which involved an
action between Dimes, a local landowner, and the proprietors of the Grand Junction
Canal, in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, had affirmed decrees made to the
proprietors. However, it was discovered by Dimes that Lord Cottenham in fact owned
several pounds worth of shares in the Grand Junction Canal. This eventually led to the
judge being disqualified from deciding the case. There was no inquiry as to whether a
reasonable person would consider Lord Cottenham to be biased, or as to the
circumstances which led Lord Cottenham to hear the case.
In certain limited situations, bias can also be imputed when the decision-maker's interest
in the decision is not pecuniary but personal. This was established in the unprecedented
case of R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 2) (1999).35 In an appeal to the House of Lords, the Crown Prosecution Service
sought to overturn a quashing order made by the Divisional Court regarding extradition
warrants made against the ex-Chilean dictator, Senator Augusto Pinochet. Amnesty
International (AI) was given leave to intervene in the proceedings. However, one of the
judges of the case, Lord Hoffmann, was a director and chairperson of Amnesty
International Charity Ltd. (AICL), a company under the control of AI. He was eventually
33
14
disqualified from the case and the outcome of the proceedings set aside. The House of
Lords held that the close connection between AICL and AI presented Lord Hoffmann with
an interest in the outcome of the litigation.
Even though it was non-pecuniary, the Law Lords took the view that the interest was
sufficient to warrant Lord Hoffmann's automatic disqualification from hearing the case.
In Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. (1999),36 the Court of Appeal warned
against any further extension of the automatic disqualification rule, "unless plainly
required to give effect to the important underlying principles upon which the rule is
based".37
Apparent bias
Apparent bias is present where a judge or other decision-maker is not a party to a matter
and does not have an interest in its outcome, but through his or her conduct or behaviour
gives rise to a suspicion that he or she is not impartial.38
Effect of a finding of bias
In Dimes, the judges advised the House of Lords that Lord Cottenham's pecuniary
interest made his judgment not void, but voidable. This advice is not wrong in the context
of a judicial act under review, where the judgment will be held valid unless reversed on
appeal.39
However, in the cases of administrative acts or decisions under judicial review, the court
can only intervene on the grounds of ultra vires,40 hence making the judgment void. Lord
Esher said in Allison v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894)41
36
Locabail (UK) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. (1999) EWCA Civ 3004
Locabil, p. 465
38
Ex parte Pinochet, pp. 132-133
39
F. Forsyth (2009), Administrative Law (10th ed.), Oxford; New York
40
Wade & Forsyth, p. 401.
41
Allison v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 Q.B. 750
37
15
that the participation of a disqualified person "certainly rendered the decision wholly
void".42
Some cases decided in India shed further light on the issue of bias. It is well settled that
as regards pecuniary interest, the slightest trace will disqualify any person from acting as
a judge. The Supreme Court of India in Secretary to Government Transport Department
vs. Munuswamy, 1988 (Suppl) SCC 651 (AIR 1988 SC 2232), held that a predisposition
to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is
bias.
The Supreme Court of India in International Airport Authority vs. K. D. Bali AIR 1988
Supreme Court 1099 observed, "the purity of administration requires that the party to the
proceedings should not have apprehension that the authority is biased and is likely to
decide against the party. But it is not every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to
the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The apprehension
must be judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere
apprehension of a whimsical person.
The Supreme Court of India in Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. State of Haryana AIR 1987 SC
454 observed, 'It is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man
can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is in
accordance with natural justice and commonsense that the justice likely to be so biased
should be incapacitated from sitting.'
The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or decides partially, but whether
there is a real likelihood of bias.
42
Allison, p. 757.
16
43
44
45
Krishnagopal Dutta v. Regional Transport Authority, Burdawan, AIR 1970 Cal 104
46
Supra, n.1. 8
17
Miscellaneous Situations
Powers of search and seizure- The powers of search and seizure are extraordinary
powers in the hands of the state for the protection of social security47 which is of an
extreme nature and constitutes a serious invasion of the privacy, reputation, business and
freedom of the affected person. Although the power of search may not take into
consideration the natural justice, the power of seizure cannot afford to ignore natural
justice. Similarly, the power of confiscation cannot be exercised without the affected
party being given an opportunity of being heard.48
Discretionary powers- Discretionary powers are subject to control and fair hearing
before the decision-making bodies and they may act as a control mechanism on the
decision-making powers. However, discretionary action may comprise of dominant
element, such as, a major administrative policy, economic or any threat to the community
which may negate the idea of fair hearing.49
Supersession of Statutory bodies and Municipal Corporations- The principle of
natural justice must be observed when the government suspends bodies, such as
panchayats,50 or when it appoints an administrator for a registered society in public
interest.51 The government will also allow natural justice when it decides to supercedes a
municipal corporation.
47
48
Assistant Collector of Customs and Superintendent, Preventive Service Customs, Calcutta v. Charan
50
51
18
Government Contracts- When the government is under contract with a private party and
where the action has statutory basis, the principles of natural justice is applicable.52
Blacklisting- Under a modern administrative technique, a person is blacklisted for the
purpose of disqualifying him for certain purposes and after which he is not eligible to
deal with the concerned authority of the area.53 Blacklisting is an oppressive instrument
which is characterised by both legal and constitutional impropriety. However, before a
person is blacklisted, he eligible of a fair hearing against the proposed action.54
Right to Property- A person whose property rights are adversely affected by any
administrative action is entitled to natural justice. Before passing orders to demolish a
house, the concerned administrative authorities must give the occupant a show cause
against such orders.55
Similarly, in cases of land acquisition by the government for public purposes, the
collector, who is responsible for holding an inquiry and then submitting his report to the
government, must follow the principles of natural justice.56
Withdrawal of benefits- When the government withdraws a benefit conferred by it on a
person, the person is entitled to a fair and just hearing. The government must also follow
natural justice principle when an ex gratia benefit already sanctioned in to be
withdrawn.57
52
56
57
19
Board of High school and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh Allahabad v. Ghanshayam AIR 1962
SC 1110.
59
Jawaharlal Nehru University v. B S Narwal, AIR 1980 SC 1666. 10
60
Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, University of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 353.
61
Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC
840.
62
63
20
Against Pensioners- When a civil servant retires from service, he is entitled to receive
pension. The government cannot reduce or withhold the pension of the person without
giving the pensioner an opportunity to make his defense.64 Similarly, the gratuity payable
to a person upon retirement cannot be reduced without giving the employee a reasonable
opportunity to be heard.65
3.3. Miscellaneous situations
There are certain situations where a fair hearing is given to the person concerned either
by characterising the functions discharged by them as quasi-judicial or without
characterising the functions as quasi-judicial, but holding in each case the principles of
natural justice. They include(a) termination of citizenship of a citizen on the ground that he has acquired the
citizenship of another country66
(b) when a cooperative society applies for winding up process
(c) passing, an order of forfeiture of past service of a government employee for
participation in an illegal strike.67
(d) impositions of damages by a commissioner for failure to deposit provident fund by
the employer68
(e) withdrawing protection granted to a tenant against eviction under a statute
(f) deletion of name from the electoral roll69
64
65
66
67
68
69
21
Natural justice is not only observed in cases where statutory power is being exercised,
but also in cases which involves civil consequences to a person70
71
22
72
75
Bharat Tewari vs. N. Hossain (1958) 10 DLR 481; (1959) 11 PLR 276
23
the petitioner by exercising their power under the said statute in a capricious and
discriminatory manner which is a clear case of "fraud on power".76
6. Without initiating any proceeding or even without issuing any notice the action
impugned against was taken by the respondent No.-1 which is certainly in
violalion of principle of natural justice and also flouts the provision of Article 40
of the Constitution by which right to trade, business and profession of a citizen
have been guaranteed. For that reason as the matter is related with the
interpretation of violation of principle of natural justice and different Articles of
the Constitution in particular Article 40, this writ petition is maintainable even
without exhausting the provision of appeal envisaged under rule 22 of the Customs
Agent Licensing Rules, 1986........... Chapter 17 of the Customs Act deals with the
provision relating to offences and penalties, While dealing with the offences and
penalty in accordance with the different provisions of the said Chapter principle of
natural justice must be observed in the procedure of departmental or judicial, for
trial of Customs offences, This principle is certainly applicable as well upon the
rules framed under Customs Agent Licensing Rules, 1986, These are a clear nexus
between the two which is palpable.77
7. Principle of Natural Justice : High Court Division made adverse remark against
the petitioner without affording her any opportunity to explain her position.
Adverse remarks are required to be expunged for ends of justice.78
8. Adverse Remarks Before making observations and giving directions High Court
Division acted illegally in not giving any notice to the appellants which is a gross
violation of the principle of natural justice and consequently, the remarks should
be expunged.79
76
24
9. If the summons are not duly served on the defendant, that is a good ground for
setting aside an exparte decree under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC. In such a case
question of knowledge is not at all relevant and exparte decree will be set aside
even if the defendant had knowledge of institution of suit.80
80
Md. Abdur Rashid & another vs. Abdul Barik and others, 1984 BLD (AD) 83
BLACKs Law Dictionary
82
Breen p. Amalgamated Engineering Union [19711 1 All E.R. 1148
81
25
83
26
seek to promote purposes alien to the latter or to the spirit of the legislature that
gave it power.., and must not act ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY.84
When it is said that a discretionary power has been exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably
it means that the purported action is
6. Conclusion
The principle of natural justice has developed into a universal jurisprudence for a number
of good reasons. Firstly, the age-old principle has been applied to administrative and
adjudication process to ensure procedural fairness and to free them from arbitrariness.
Secondly, application of this principle helps bolster public confidence in the judiciary by
ensuring that no one having any interest or bias in respect or any matter takes part in the
decision-making relating to that matter. Thirdly, it is often said that it 'is of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly
seen to be done'. By ensuring that the judge is not interested in the outcome of any
adjudication, the parties can 'see' that justice is being done to their cause. In this regard, it
should be noted that whether a judge gave an actually biased judgment by judging his
own cause is not material; the judgment is vitiated if there is a real likelihood of the judge
being biased, which can be easily presumed if the judge himself is the aggrieved party.
The development of this principle helps control arbitrary exercise of discretionary power
of adjudicating authorities almost all over the world.
84
de Smith, op. cit. pp. 252-253. For a fuller discussion on the topic see p. 246 - 31.
Southern Kansas State Lines Co. V. PCS, (1932) 135 KANS, 657
86
[1954] 3 AII E.R. 698;
85
27