Wittgenstein

Philosophy of Psychology Section XI

Seeing and Seeing-as
In Section XI of Wittgensteins Philosophy of Psychology he is concerned with
the nature of perception and perceptual capacities (among other things).
His method for investigating perception follows a grammatical investigation
like his previous Philosophical Investigations. So when we ask things like,
what does it mean to see something, what are the constituent parts of
perception, and how do we explain the difference between what is seen,
Wittgenstein thinks that we need to look at the grammar within our language
games and that doing so will uncover those aspects of perception that
philosophers have tried, and failed, to figure out in the past.
Whats Wrong with Russell?
It seemed to me that part of Wittgensteins intention with this section is to
deflate one prominent view of perception. Im going to attribute this view to
Russell, but others fall in the same or similar camp. Here is Russell on
perception:
Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are
immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds,
smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the
name 'sensation' to the experience of being immediately aware
of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a
sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum,
not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately
aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is plain that if
we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of
the sense-databrown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc.
which we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which
have been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data,
or even that the sense-data are directly properties of the table.
Thus a problem arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the
real table, supposing there is such a thing.
The real table, if it exists, we will call a 'physical object'. Thus we
have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects.
(Copied from Gutenberg online.. Problems of Philosophy)
So where does this idea of sense-data and sensation come from? Sensedata seem to be the stuffs that make up perception or seeing. This idea of
sense-data certainly doesnt come from simply looking at things and talking
with people about them. I dont say to you: Wow, that sense-data and its
accompanying sensation are fantastic. Even if I wanted to say this I couldnt
because sense-data and sensations are private Wittgensteinian sense.
Now, we know that Wittgenstein has an issue with private language and
private objects. This is related to perception and seeing in remark PI 398:

John Dombrowski

PHL860

Wittgenstein
Philosophy of Psychology Section XI
Seeing and Seeing-as
But when I imagine something, or even actually see objects,
surely I have got something which my neighbor has not.
That something is a private object. But what kind of private object? Russell
would say it is a sense-data and the sensation. Wittgenstein calls this a
visual impression (the term sense impression is related to Russells sensedata/sensation). Wittgenstein goes on to say:
In what sense have you got what you are talking about and
saying that only you have got this? Do you possess it? You do
not even see it. Dont you really have to say that no one has got
it? And indeed, its clear: if you logically exclude other peoples
having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it. (PI
398)
The underlying problem with saying that we have something someone else
does not have (a visual impression) or that we see the visual impression, is
that this is simply a mistake of how our visual experience works. Its a
mistake that stems from improperly investigating visual experience.
Concluding that we are perceptually associated with sense-data and
sensations is natural if one start with the premise that one has a special and
unique relationship to the object. All one has to do is break apart the
constituent parts of that impression to find the sense-data. But that crazy,
the sense-data are nowhere to be seen!
Wittgenstein, I believe, would call this a philosophical illusion. Philosophy has
created a way of talking about perception and its constituent parts and other
philosophers simply buy into it. Of course, Wittgenstein doesnt buy into it.
Just like every other investigation so far, we need to set those preconceptions
aside and look at how we use the concepts of visual perception in language,
i.e. look at the grammar in our language-games.
Seeing and Seeing-as
The best place to start is with the two senses of see that Wittgenstein points
out in PP 111:
Two uses of the word see. The one: What do you see there?
I see this (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The
other: I see a likeness in these two faces let the man to
whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.
What is important is the categorical difference between the two
objects of sight.
The first use of the word see is the way that we report to others a simple
visual experience. I see a duck, I see a dog, that there is a cat. The second
use of the word see is different. One is not simply reporting a visual

John Dombrowski

PHL860

Wittgenstein
Philosophy of Psychology Section XI
Seeing and Seeing-as
experience, since one does not see a likeness in the same way the one sees a
duck. Wittgenstein calls the latter type of seeing noticing an aspect
((Quoting PP113):
I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to
another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it
differently. I call this experience noticing a aspect.
When I am noticing an aspect, I am seeing-as instead of simply seeing. To
explain the difference, lets look at Wittgensteins duck-rabbit and how we
talk about what we see when we look at the duck-rabbit. If I have never seen
the duck-rabbit before and dont understand that it is an ambiguous image, I
might see just a rabbit. In that case I would report that I see a rabbit. This
is different than saying I see it as a rabbit. In the former case, I am simply
reporting that the picture I see is a rabbit, indicating that there is only one
way of seeing the object, or what Wittgenstein calls a picture-object.
However, in the latter case, my grammar indicates that I am seeing more
than just a picture object. By saying I see it as a rabbit, I am reporting that
right now I see it as a rabbit, but that is only one aspect of the way that it can
be seen, indicating that I am aware of the other aspects of the duck-rabbit,
but right now Im seeing it as a rabbit. Here Wittgenstein distinguishes
between continuous seeing and an aspect lighting up. In the former case
there is a continuous seeing of the object as a rabbit, meaning that I dont
potentially see it as something else. This is indicated by my grammar I see
a rabbit. In the latter case, an aspect is lighting up for me, or I am seeing an
aspect of the object. Once again this is indicated in my grammar: I see it as a
rabbit. Why is the grammar indicative of the way that I see the object? Take
this false case as an example: I see the object as a picture-rabbit (meaning
that I only see it as a rabbit and nothing else) and I say to you I am now
seeing that as a rabbit. You would reply If youre seeing it now as a rabbit,
what else do you see it as. I reply Nothing, its just a rabbit! You would
think Im loony!
PP 128 expresses the difference between seeing an aspect and seeing:
Im shown a picture-rabbit and asked what it is; I say Its a
rabbit. Not Now its a rabbit. Im reporting my perception.
Im shown the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I may say Its a
duck-rabbit. But I may also react to the question quite
differently. The answer that it is a duck-rabbit is again the
report of a perception; the answer Now its a rabbit is not. Had I
replied its a rabbit, the ambiguity would have escaped me, and
I would have been reporting my perception.
Now we need to unpack this a little more to see what exactly is going on. Its
clear that there is a distinction between seeing and seeing-as. The
former is a simply report of a perception and the latter is a report of the
perception and something else indicating that I am noticing an aspect.

John Dombrowski

PHL860

Wittgenstein
Philosophy of Psychology Section XI
Seeing and Seeing-as
Considering the latter, when I say I see it as a duck, but wait, now I see it as
a rabbit, I indicated that something has changed, but what has changed?
Has the picture changed? At 129 the interloculater says Certainly it has
changed! Wittgenstein asks:
But what is different: my impression? My attitude? Can I say? I
describe the change like a perception; just as if the object had
changed before my eyes.
W at 130:
The expression of a change of aspect is an expression of a new
perception and, at the same time, an expression of an
unchanged perception.
Well, thats rather enigmatic? Lets look at what isnt the case in a changing
aspect. Wittgenstein considers the Russellian sense impression stand point
that it is a change in the organization of the picture. Take for instance an
abstract picture of a face made out of branches (PP 131-4). At first you see
the branches, then notice the face. One might be tempted to say that the
organization of the picture changed, meaning that at one moment it was
organized as branches, then another moment organized as a face. However,
it certainly isnt the picture itself that changed, its the same picture! If you
made a copy of it when you thought it was merely branches and a copy of it
when you though it was a face, it would have been organized exactly the
same! Well then, it must be your inner picture of the picture that changed.
But again, this account rests on the idea that we have an inner picture, a
private object, to explain the difference in visual experience. The problem
with this account is that we are doing philosophy wrong. We are trying to
unpack our visual experience not by looking at the way that we use visual
concepts, but by thinking about the visual experience as if the object caused
something in us (ala sense-dat and sensation). This mistake happens in PP
158 also where the interloculator says: What I really see must surely be
what is produced in me by the object..
So whats reallu going on? Consider these remarks:
137: Seeing as is not part of perception. And therefore it is
like seeing, and again not like seeing.
138: I look at an animal; someone asks me: What do you see?
I answer: A rabbit. I see a landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs
past. I exclaim: A rabbit!
Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are
expressions of perception and of visual experience. But the
exclamation is so in a different sense from the report: it is forced
from us. It stands to the experience somewhat as a cry to
pain.

John Dombrowski

PHL860

Wittgenstein
Philosophy of Psychology Section XI
Seeing and Seeing-as
Noticing an aspect contains multiple parts, just like the perception and the
exclamation of the perception. Here Wittgenstein likens the lighting up of an
aspect with a thought, saying that when an aspect lights up, its half visual
experience, half thought. This points to the multiple parts of noticing an
aspect. Take the duck-rabbit example again: When I say I see it as a
rabbit, there is the visual experience (seeing the rabbit) and the thought
that one is seeing more than just a rabbit. If we jump ahead remarks to 247,
Wittgenstein says that what I perceive in the lighting up of an aspect is not a
property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects.
The latter is the thinking part of Seeing-as. Seeing and Seeing-as are both
part of the way that we talk about visual experience in our language-game,
but they are different parts. The former being the perception and the latter
being something else, maybe thought or response? Liken this with a cry to
pain (as in 138): crying out is a way that we respond to pain; Seeing-as is a
way that we respond to noticing an aspect.
How, then, are we to understand 130 that says the change of noticing an
aspect is both a new perception and an unchanged perception if Seeing-as is
not part of the perception?
The last piece I want to talk about in regards to seeing and seeing-as is the
elasticity of a representation. I take representation here to mean all of the
constituent parts of what is seen, in fact, thats what Wittgenstein calls it in
remark 146. Take remark 147:
The concept of a representation of what is seen, like that of a
copy, is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of
what is seen. The two are intimately connected. (Which is not
to say that they are alike.)
The elasticity of representations means that the constituent parts of what is
seen or a representation can be different in different cases. So when I see a
face and notice a smile, part of my representation is the face with a smile,
but also friendliness or happiness. Take the case of a devious smile, my wife
knows that when I smile to one side, that I have devious thoughts. Her
representation of what is seen contains deviousness. Imagine that she didnt
know this, the visual content would be the same, but the representation
would be different. Maybe it would contain happiness or confusion.
There are some things to say here about interpretation, but Im not qualified
to say those things. Wittgenstein makes these remarks at 164 (But how is it
possible to see an object according to an interpretation?) and 248/249. I
think the point here is that we do interpret things differently, like facial
expressions (see remarks 230/231), but these interpretations affect the way
we see-as and not the visual content itself. In other words, its not that my
smile would look visually different if you didnt know that my smile was
devious.

John Dombrowski

PHL860

Wittgenstein
Philosophy of Psychology Section XI
Seeing and Seeing-as
Aspect Blindness
Finally I want to talk about aspect-blindness. Wittgenstein considers aspectblindness in remarks 257-261. Aspect-blindess is just what it sounds like, the
inability to see thing as different things, i.e. noticing only one aspect. It is like
seeing the duck-rabbit and only being able to report a picture-rabbit, even
when told Hey, it can look like a duck also. An aspect-blind person, as
Wittgensetin puts it: will have an altogether different attitude to pictures
from ours (PP 258). I wonder if a person with aspect blindness would be able
to play our language-game adequately.
The important thing with aspect-blindness is the connection that Wittgenstein
makes with experiencing the meaning of a word (PP 261). If a person is
aspect-blind they would miss out on an integral part of our experience of the
world, just like a person who cant experience a word in a certain way. Think
of double entendres in the case of meaning and words or funny pictures in
the case of pictures and aspects.
Other Things
Concept Formation (also in XII)
Inner-speech 301, 315
As you get closer to the end, the tone of the book changes

John Dombrowski

PHL860