Postmetaphysical Thinking or Refusal of Thought

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Postmetaphysical Thinking or Refusal of Thought? Max Horkheimer's

Materialism as Philosophical Stance
J. C. Berendzen a
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 16(5), 695718
Postmetaphysical Thinking or
Refusal of Thought? Max
Horkheimers Materialism as
Philosophical Stance
J. C. Berendzen
International
10.1080/09672550802493900
RIPH_A_349558.sgm
0967-2559
Original
Taylor
502008
16
jberendz@loyno.edu
J.C.Berendzen
000002008
and
&
Article
Francis
(print)/1466-4542
Francis
Journal
Ltd
of Philosophical
(online) Studies
Downloaded By: [Berendzen, J.C.] At: 23:17 15 November 2008
Abstract
Frankfurt School critical theory has long opposed metaphysical philosophy
because it ignores suffering and injustice. In the face of such criticism, proponents of metaphysics (for example Dieter Henrich) have accused critical
theory of not fully investigating the questions is raises for itself, and falling
into partial metaphysical positions, despite itself. If one focuses on Max
Horkheimers early essays, such an accusation seems quite fitting. There he
vociferously attacks metaphysics, but he also develops a theory that pushes
toward metaphysical questions. His work can thus seem laden with unpacked
metaphysical baggage, and fraught with contradiction. The aim of this paper
is to show that Horkheimers critique of metaphysics makes sense and is not
contradicted by a surreptitious metaphysics. To show this, Horkheimers
views will be compared with Bas van Fraassens in The Empirical Stance.
Ultimately, the paper should show that Horkheimers early philosophy can be
reconstructed in such a way that it employs a materialist stance.
Keywords: Horkheimer; van Fraassen; critical theory; metaphysics;
materialism; stance
Introduction
From Max Horkheimers early aphorisms in Dmmerung onward, Frankfurt
School critical theory has taken up anti-metaphysical or postmetaphysical
positions. While critical theorists have presented various arguments against
metaphysics, they all share in the emancipatory interest that has been central
to critical theory since the beginning of the Frankfurt School. For example,
Jrgen Habermas counts himself among those who, with the early Horkheimer, persevere in the critique of metaphysics because they believe that
the universal concepts of idealism all too slickly and willingly conceal the
concrete suffering that stems from degrading conditions of life.1 Whatever
International Journal of Philosophical Studies

ISSN 09672559 print 14664542 online 2008 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09672550802493900
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
other criticisms one might make of metaphysics, such grand theorizing

supposedly masks injustice.
This anti-metaphysical attitude has not been without its critics. For example, Dieter Henrich, in a larger critique of Habermass work, has famously
characterized critical theorys attempt at postmetaphysical thinking as a
refusal of thought. Following Kant, Henrich argues that many of the kinds
of questions that are traditionally a part of metaphysics spring from a latent
interest of every human being.2 Thinkers who attempt to shirk this human
interest must fall, in Kants terms, into the very metaphysical assertions for
which they displayed such contempt.3 On this view, even anti-metaphysical
theories make metaphysical assumptions, but they are then ignored.
Postmetaphysical critical theory thus has its own secret metaphysics, and
refuses thought precisely by not owning up to this fact.4
One might apply Henrichs criticism to the early Horkheimer, and his
essays from the 1930s that provide the initial framework for critical theory.
There Horkheimer vociferously attacks metaphysics. But he does so on the
basis of a form of materialism that seems laden with unpacked metaphysical
baggage. Any conception of materialism might reasonably be assumed to
make ontological claims. But Horkheimer further depends, in developing
his materialism, on notions of objective reality and natural facts that are
not fully elucidated. He might thus rely on an implicit metaphysics that
covertly supports his materialism.
It would not be unusual to find such a contradiction at the heart of
Horkheimers early work. Even sympathetic commentators often make
such a claim; a good example can be found in Alfred Schmidts contention
that Horkheimers rejection of metaphysics in its own way, is a metaphysically materialistic insight.5 Such interpretations are compounded by the
fact that Horkheimer himself would later find his work to embody
contradiction throughout, at least insofar as he maintained allegiance to
Schopenhauer and Marx simultaneously.6 One might then agree with
Hauke Brunkhorsts influential view that Horkheimer aims to deconstruct
philosophy by driving his philosophical experiments toward overt aporias.7
On this kind of view, then, there is no Horkheimerian philosophy that can
even be guilty of refusing thought.
But one need not interpret Horkheimer as being deconstructive or antiphilosophical in order to explain his seemingly contradictory views on metaphysics and materialism. One can, rather, show that Horkheimers early
work is not contradictory on this score at all. Or so this paper will contend,
by interpreting Horkheimers early materialism in such a way that the
critique of metaphysics does not refuse thought, and is not contradicted by
backhandedly metaphysical pronouncements. To show this, I will enlist a
perhaps unusual ally: Bas van Fraassen, and his work The Empirical Stance.
Van Fraassen presents a view of philosophy that is anti-metaphysical without being overly deflationary, in a sense that is very close to Horkheimers
696
MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE
aims. Also, van Fraassens conception of a philosophical stance provides a

unique framework for reconstructing Horkheimers thought in a way that
runs counter to the above criticisms.
Horkheimers Critique of Metaphysics
As noted above, Horkheimers critique of metaphysics springs from critical

theorys emancipatory aim. We see this early on in Horkheimers work. In
Dmmerung, a collection of aphorisms written during Horkheimers first
three years as the director of the Frankfurt Institut fr Sozialforschung, he
writes curtly that though there is little agreement in the history of metaphysics, all metaphysicians are not terribly impressed by what torments men.8
This belief that metaphysics turns a blind eye toward suffering is developed
more fully in Horkheimers essays published during the same period in the
Zeitschrift fr Sozialforschung, which develop his anti-metaphysical
conception of materialism.
The most basic statement of the kind of philosophical outlook Horkheimer
opposes can be found in Hegel:
Philosophy is not really a means of consolation. It is more than that,
for it transfigures reality with all its apparent injustices and reconciles
it with the rational; it shows that it is based upon the Idea itself, and
that reason is fulfilled in it.9
Horkheimer puts his opposition to such a view bluntly in the 1933 essay
Materialism and Metaphysics, claiming that past injustice will never be
made up; the suffering of past generations receives no compensation.10
Metaphysics that aims at the transfiguration of injustice is bankrupt, and
philosophy must rather aim to uncover, memorialize, and try to eliminate
injustice.
Horkheimer calls (at this stage in his work) this non-transfiguring philosophy materialism.11 What his materialism more specifically entails will be
discussed in the next section of this paper. For the moment, however, we
need only realize that the primary aim of Materialism and Metaphysics is
to compare, and primarily contrast, Horkheimers way of doing philosophy
with metaphysics.
But what, exactly, does Horkheimer mean by metaphysics? One can
begin to answer that question by looking at the influence of Wilhelm
Diltheys doctrine of world views on Horkheimers view. For Dilthey,
when confronted with the enigma of life, human beings pick up on certain
characteristics of their experience and develop them into coherent world
views that have putatively universal validity, and which give an overarching
meaning to life. The development of those world views depends on comprehensive world pictures, and it is on the basis of world pictures that
697
questions of the meaning and significance of the world are decided, and
from this ideals, highest goods, and sovereign principles for the conduct of
life are derived.12 For Dilthey, this development leads to metaphysics:
world views are elevated to an intellectually conceived relationship;
furthermore, scientific reasons are adduced and claims of universal validity
are made in short, metaphysics comes into being.13 So metaphysics, in
this sense, amounts to a kind of intellectualized, theoretically elaborated
attempt at coming up with a synoptic view of nature and human experience.
A large part of Horkheimers critique amounts to rejecting such hypostatization of merely partial experiences. The offending theories are problematic for two related reasons. First, they deal in illusions, because universal,
transfiguring thought is beyond us: knowledge of the infinite must itself be
infinite, and a knowledge which is admittedly imperfect is not a knowledge
of the absolute. The world pictures metaphysics deals in are thus pictures
of a false absolute; they are stand-ins that for the materialist are always
questionable and not very important because far removed from the activity
which generated them. Secondly, they are wrongly foundationalist: the
effort to make his personal life dependent at every point on insight into
the ultimate ground of things marks the metaphysician.14 If insights into the
infinite are false, so is the supposed ultimate ground. Turning away from
false pictures of the infinite toward real human life requires sensitivity to the
changing contours of human history, not a vain search for foundations. In
this regard, Horkheimer argues that rather than pursuing a particularly
human interest, metaphysics obscures the proper understanding of human
life.
Many of Horkheimers early essays aim to show how the works of
various philosophers, past and present, are troubled precisely because
they are falsely universalist and foundationalist. This generally involves
uncovering the philosophical theories historical (often economic) roots;
for example, Horkheimer says regarding (particularly Kantian) moral
philosophy that materialism attempts to delineate with a specific focus
on the distinct periods and social classes involved the actual relationships which are reflected, if only in distorted fashion, in the doctrines
of moral philosophy.15 In all cases, the aim is to show such partial
theories as being just that, and thus undercut their universalist and foundationalist pretensions.
The more-or-less scholarly pursuit of unveiling other philosophers false
universalism does not capture all of Horkheimers critique, however.
Mistaking a partial world view for a universal theory might be misguided
but is not clearly harmful. Furthermore, metaphysicians might easily try to
save metaphysics from foundationalism by simply admitting the partial
nature of their assumptions. Given such an admission, one could at least still
find value in metaphysics as an intellectual exercise. So is metaphysics
actually harmful in the way Horkheimer contends?
698
That contention is dependent on the view that properly construed,

philosophy can actually have great practical import, and can actually work
to alleviate suffering. Though a complete description of this view would
require much more investigation, some of the basic points can be summarized as follows. The assumption of the practical import of philosophy is
dependent on Horkheimers views on our ability to control our social
arrangements rationally. Horkheimers critique of capitalism, for instance,
rests on the notion that capitalist social arrangements are irrational, especially because of the way they create tension between individual and social
interests. Consider the following passage from his 1933 essay Materialism
and Morality:
The social whole lives through unleashing the possessive instincts of
all individuals. The whole is maintained insofar as individuals concern
themselves with profit and the conservation and multiplication of their
own property. Each is left to care for himself as best he can. But
because each individual must produce things that others need in the
process, the needs of the community as a whole end up being
addressed through activities that are apparently independent of one
another and seem only to serve the individuals own welfare.16
Horkheimer regards this as a pathological irrationality inherent in capitalism: there exists no rational connection between the free competition of
individuals as what mediates and the existence of the entire society as what
is mediated this irrationality expresses itself in the suffering of the majority of human beings.17 In his earlier work, at least, Horkheimer is confident
that this irrationality can be made explicit, and more rational arrangements
can be explored.
Because the wretchedness of our own time is connected with the structure of society, a social theory that could make that structures irrationality
explicit could help overcome that wretchedness.18 Furthermore, that irrationality needs to be made explicit to the classes who suffer the most from it,
so they can be formed into a critical force in society. Here Horkheimers
view connects generally to the Marxian view of the proletariat as a critical
force in history, but unlike (on certain interpretations, at least) Marx, he
does not see history as necessarily moving the proletariat to critical
consciousness. Rather, various social and economic forces keep the proletariat from recognizing its potential; for example, there is a split between the
unemployed, who suffer most from capitalism but are disorganized, and the
workers, who more directly experience the problems of capitalism and can
be organized, but who fear losing their jobs.19 The proletariat requires the
help of the theorist.
This point is part of the famed distinction drawn between traditional
theory and critical theory. For Horkheimer, a crucial aspect of critical
699
theory is that the theorist must form a dynamic unity with the oppressed
class, so that his presentation is not merely an expression of the concrete
historical situation, but also a force within it to stimulate change. This is
opposed to traditional theory (which refers most directly to the individual
sciences), which is isolated from its social and historical roots, and thus does
not see the ways in which it can promote emancipatory interests. A truly
critical theory keeps a constant view of social reality, and seeks to find possibilities for that reality to change.20
Note that Horkheimer is not arguing that metaphysics directly causes the
irrationality and suffering noted. But it is linked to it in two ways. First, metaphysics is a kind of symptom of the social arrangements that cause suffering,
as shown by the form of critique that uncovers its social-historical underpinnings. And the (German) idealist metaphysics Horkheimer most often criticizes is taken to be a symptom of the development of capitalism in the modern
period. Secondly, metaphysics hides the fact that social arrangements cause
suffering by turning away from the particular circumstances of life toward
hypostatized intellectual fictions. This further keeps philosophers from
spending their mental energy on overcoming irrationality and considering the
rational arrangement of human conduct. Thus they do not form a dynamic
unity with the oppressed class, and are not a force to stimulate change.
II
Materialism as a Method for Social Research
Now that we have seen why Horkheimers materialist research programme

is to be non-metaphysical, and we have examined its basic aims, we can look
more closely at the methods it employs. This will also help us get a grip on
the sense in which it is materialist, and display the ways in which that materialism might depend on a secret metaphysics. The most obvious starting
point in such a discussion is to examine Horkheimers relationship to Marx.
In Materialism and Metaphysics, Horkheimer tells us that materialism is
not characterized by its form but by its content: the economic theory of
society, and he says that the fundamental historical role of economic relations is characteristic of the materialist position.21 He thus approvingly uses
the position Marx lays out in The German Ideology, on which he had been
lecturing at Frankfurt in the late 1920s.22 In The German Ideology, the first
premise of materialism is described as the existence of living human individuals, who distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to
produce their means of subsistence. Production thus becomes the key
term because what they [humans] are coincides with their production,
both with what they produce and with how they produce.23 So the materialist, in order to open up philosophy to reality, must rigorously investigate
production in all its historical intricacies.
What makes this view a materialism is hotly debated. The traditional
answer is that Marx is thinking of a distinction between materialism and
700
idealism, with idealism being, in brief, the view that ideas (values, concepts,
reasons, etc.) play a primary causal role in arranging human life and human
institutions. Materialism, then, is the insistence that production (or
economic developments) rather than ideas is the primary cause of our social
arrangements.24 A different view (primarily associated with the influential
work of G. A. Cohen) is that the important distinction is between material
and social. On this view social refers to things that entail an ascription to
persons, or are dependent on human actions and interactions. Thus
economic activities, which are part of the material base on the traditional
view, are not material on Cohens view. Rather, material refers to things
that can, in principle at least, be understood apart from human actions, such
as natural resources, and the biological needs of human beings.25 The point
of this view, then, is to claim that the social is determined by the material.26
Setting aside the question of which interpretation is better attributed to
Marx, it is clear that for Horkheimer, materialism is contrasted most
prominently with idealism. Idealism is often used synonymously with
metaphysics in Horkheimers work, and in Materialism and Metaphysics
he contends that too many thinkers miss the opposition between materialism and idealism.27 Also, he (unlike Cohen) speaks of economics as material, given that he calls the economic theory of society the content of
materialism. His anti-metaphysical critiques of other philosophers thus fit
with the traditional interpretation of materialism insofar as they attempt to
show that (primarily) economic developments are at the root of supposedly
ideal/conceptual developments. But Horkheimers main divergence from
the traditional interpretation (especially as it is often found in Engels28)
involves downplaying economic determinism and emphasizing culture and
psychology as important parts of social development that cannot be reduced
simply to superstructural results of movements in the economic base.29
Crucially, though, Horkheimer is most interested in the sense in which
Marxs materialism is methodological. In The German Ideology, aside from
making any ontological claims, Marx exhorts social research to begin with
real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination,
and these premises are derived from the investigation of real individuals,
their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they
find already existing and those produced by their activity.30 Per the traditional interpretation, the point here is to emphasize that general theoretical
concepts (such as man, property, and production), while necessary for
organizing theoretical work, are empty if they are not built on empirical
investigation into actual human activities. Whatever one makes of the
terminological validity of his talk of materialism, what Horkheimer means
to develop is a method for social research that generally follows Marxs
view.
Rather than being a comprehensive ontological doctrine, Horkheimers
materialism involves a critical attitude toward such views, as it did for earlier
701
materialists such as those among the French Enlightenment who treated

universal ontological questions with complete open-mindedness while
observing actual historical praxis with extreme rigor.31 This brand of materialism does not make the metaphysical error of falsely universalizing
partial experiences. Rather, the rigorous observation of historical praxis
leads to a kind of modesty (adverted to above in the discussion of the impossibility of thought about the infinite) that will mark Horkheimers work:
neither pure thought, nor abstraction, nor intuition is capable of

creating a connection between the individual and the permanent
structure of being. The individual within itself is incapable of discovering either the deepest foundations or the highest essence; nor can it
discern supposedly ultimate elements of being.32
The key to Horkheimers early methodology, however, is his belief that
while our being rooted in history deprives us of unassailable universal truth,
it does not deprive us of truth altogether. Materialism is in a broad sense the
name he gives to the method of inquiry that will seek truth (for purposes
relevant to social emancipation) in such a modest form.
Perhaps the best way to begin piecing together Horkheimers materialist
method is to start with the inaugural address he delivered in 1931 upon taking
over the leadership of the Institut fr Sozialforschung. There he lays out most
of the main themes of his view. The address begins by noting that social
philosophys ultimate aim is the philosophical interpretation of the vicissitudes of human fate, found in areas like politics, law, and economics. But
Horkheimers interests go beyond these areas because of the desire to orient
social theory toward the alleviation of human suffering. Thus, social philosophy is confronted with the yearning for a new interpretation of a life trapped
in its individual striving for happiness.33 Along these lines Horkheimer
further notes in Materialism and Metaphysics that the desire for happiness
from beginning to end proves illusory; and in the face of this the alteration
of those conditions which cause unhappiness could become the goal of
materialist thought.34 Social philosophy, in its materialist form, thus has the
primarily emancipatory aim of working against suffering and for happiness.
The methodology of this emancipatory social science requires, for
Horkheimer, a combination of empirical research and more synoptic and
interpretive philosophical thought. In this regard he is not entirely dismissive of metaphysics, and he credits metaphysicians (especially Max Scheler)
for recognizing that the natural sciences had become too specialized and
narrow in outlook.35 This qualified praise for metaphysics also comes out as
a part of Horkheimers critique of positivism. Insofar as logical empiricism
holds only to what is, to the guarantee of facts, it tries to insulate the
individual sciences from broader interpretation. Thus positivism robs
science of its emancipatory possibilities, because brute facts can only grasp
702
the present, and the possibility for changing the status quo in the future is
lost. At least in allowing for the interpretation of facts in relation to values,
situated in historical and social movements, metaphysics exceeds positivist
science.36
In the inaugural address, after briefly critiquing earlier social theory
(primarily for aiming at transfiguration), Horkheimer explains that the
work of the Institut depends on empirical research. In this regard he lauds
the sciences, but he is wary of their insularity. The aim of critical theory is
to combine such scientific research with a broader viewpoint, and thus
overcome the problems with both metaphysics and positivism:
The relation between philosophical and corresponding specialized
scientific disciplines cannot be conceived as though philosophy deals
with the really decisive problems while on the other side empirical
research carries out long, boring, individual studies that split up into a
thousand partial questions the task is to do what all true researchers
have always done: namely, to pursue their larger philosophical questions on the basis of the most precise scientific methods, to revise and
refine their questions in the course of their substantive work, and to
develop new methods without losing sight of the larger context.37
This continuous, dialectical penetration and development of philosophical
theory and specialized scientific practice can be aimed (to use the example
Horkheimer gives) at the elucidation of the links between economic structure, psychology, and culture, in such a way that the work of various social
scientists and theorists can be brought together to forge an empirically
informed picture of society that might replace such previous metaphysical
categories as Universal Reason or Spirit.38
The epistemology which grounds this research project can be termed,
broadly and with some reservation, both empiricist and realist. Horkheimer
speaks often of such research as aiming at facts, and he claims that mans
striving for happiness, which we have seen is a basic component of his
research, is to be recognized as a natural fact.39 This connects to a realist
strain in Horkheimers work that comes out in his 1935 essay On the
Problem of Truth. Materialism, he tells us, insists that objective reality is
not identical with mans thought and can never be merged with it. The truth
about this objective reality has to be discovered empirically, which, for
Horkheimer, means that it is always established by real events and human
activity.40 Crucially, though, the fact that empirical truth is always tied to
such events and activities makes it necessary to see that it is conditioned
and transitory:
Already in the investigation and determination of facts, and even
more in the verification of theories, a role is played by the direction of
703
attention, the refinement of methods, the categorical structure of the

subject matter in short, by human activity corresponding to the given
social period.41
Because all inquiry into truth is so historically and socially mediated, cognition becomes a process, and truth is constantly open to adjustment. And this
means that truth must necessarily be tied to the proper kind of procedure,
which is determined by those who inquire into the truth:
The correction and further definition of the truth is not taken care of
by History, so that all the cognizant subject has to do is passively
observe, conscious that even his particular truth, which contains the
others negated in it, is not the whole. Rather, the truth is advanced
because human beings who possess it stand by it unbendingly, apply it
and carry it through, act according to it, and bring it to power against
the resistance of reactionary, narrow, one-sided points of view.42
The stability of concepts depends on the stability of the reality that
determines the meaning of those concepts, so that the cognitive value of
understanding rests on the fact that reality knows not only constant change
but relatively static structures.43 Presumably, suffering and happiness, at
least as brute facts, are such relatively static structures, but their precise
meaning has to be determined according to current reality. And that means
that they have to be submitted to the proper procedure, which brings truth
to light against reactionary, narrow, one-sided points of view, as mentioned
above.44 This procedure necessarily involves interdisciplinary research,
which brings together various empirically oriented researchers with
theorists who help organize and interpret empirical data.
At this point, we can see precisely how Horkheimer might be refusing
thought in the way Henrich describes. Horkheimers critique of metaphysics
depends on his finding an alternative in materialism. Metaphysical investigations that aim to provide a totalizing meaning for human life are to be
replaced by materialist investigations into historical and social reality. But
this materialism relies on seemingly metaphysical assumptions in two ways.
First, it (along with the critique of metaphysics) gets its initial impetus from
a view of happiness and suffering as natural facts. Secondly, the form of
empirical inquiry Horkheimer advocates is bolstered by an epistemology
that depends on his conception of objective reality. But what is this view of
a world of natural facts, wherein social-scientific investigations can seize
upon objective reality, if it is not a metaphysical view about the ontological
status of the world?
One might, then, develop a potential criticism of Horkheimer in the
following way. He is clearly motivated by and concerned with a human
interest (per Henrichs view) concerning our desire for happiness and its
704
frustration through suffering. This motivation leads him to develop a

research programme that he thinks can illuminate this concern. Per this
programme, he is moved to link theoretical and empirical research, and to
emphasize the historically bounded nature of both. Furthermore, the
particularly empiricist part of this view leads him to emphasize the careful
observation of our objective reality, and to derive historically conditioned
facts of nature from it. And this, for him, is what materialism is. But, he does
little to justify or explain the metaphysical positions that underlie the materialism he has been driven to support. Construed in this manner, Horkheimers early work surely is refusing thought, and it is unlikely that one could
save him by claiming that he means to press contradictions or deconstruct
philosophy. Rather, it just sounds like bad philosophy with woefully undersupported assumptions. But this is a poor interpretation of Horkheimers
work, and Bas van Fraassen can help show us why.
III
On Philosophical Stances
Certainly Horkheimer has put himself in a difficult position, and might want
to have his materialist cake and eat it too. In the face of this problem, it is
important to come up with a clear picture of how one can forgo the kind of
metaphysical theorizing Horkheimer criticizes without undercutting the
possibility of engaging in philosophical thought.
In his recent lectures published as The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen suggests just such a position. While his view of philosophy as stance is
developed in the specific context of a discussion of analytic metaphysics and
empiricism in philosophy of science, it has broader implications for philosophy as a whole. Van Fraassen shows us how to remove the problematic
aspects of metaphysical thinking in a way that opens up further avenues for
philosophical research. In this regard, his work stands out from many antimetaphysical works that are more strictly negative. Also, what is most
pertinent for this paper is that van Fraassens views uniquely match up with
Horkheimers, and provide us with a powerful framework for reinterpreting
Horkheimers early thought.
Before we can see how van Fraassens view fits with Horkheimers work,
however, we need to look at some of the specifics of the view developed in
The Empirical Stance. The terms used in the title are crucial to the point of
the lectures as a whole. Van Fraassen wants to answer the question What is
empiricism and what could it be? He ends up emphasizing the latter part;
his main aim is to reactualize the original critical intent of empiricism and
cast it in a contemporary light. In doing this, he ends up calling his empiricism a stance, contrasting it with metaphysically developed empiricisms.
Van Fraassen begins to explain the notion of philosophy as stance by
describing its opponent, contemporary analytic metaphysics, which he takes
to be a sort of reactionary reintroduction of seventeenth-century-style
705
metaphysics in the face of the critical force of empiricism. In an endnote, he

describes such metaphysics in the following way:
The type of metaphysics to which I refer, and which I take to be the

enterprise engaged in by, for example, Descartes and Leibniz, is
characterized by the attempted construction of a theory of the world,
of the same form as a fundamental science and continuous with (as an
extension or foundation of) the natural sciences.45
Van Fraassen makes his critical case early on in the aptly titled first lecture,
Against Analytic Metaphysics. He begins by invoking the basics of Kants
transcendental dialectic, and claims that traditional metaphysics overshoots
the bounds of reason. Shortly thereafter, he vividly compares metaphysical
theories to baroque four-poster beds, implying that they are fanciful (and
not at all necessary) additions to common ideas, and laments that metaphysicians interpret what we initially understand into something hardly anyone
understands.46 The deeper meaning of this image comes out in the claim that
seventeenth-century-style metaphysics replaces its real subjects of inquiry
with obscure simulacra that it uses to develop theories that purport to
describe or explain those real subjects.47 This use of simulacra is connected
to the metaphysical error that van Fraassen sees empiricism as uncovering:
the demand for explanation and the use of explanation-by-postulate.48 The
metaphysics that seeks to present a complete and true picture of the world
operates in this fashion: it purports to explain phenomena by knitting them
into a theory which rests on postulated entities that present a trumped-up
picture of the world (thus the simulacra) that supposedly then determines
the truth of the matter.
To keep from falling into this kind of obscurantist error, philosophy
should see itself as a stance. What van Fraassen wants from philosophy is
that it be open and honest about the fact that it is not an ultimately grounded,
presuppositionless enterprise. A philosophical position, he tells us,
can consist in something other than a picture of what the world is like
a philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach, a cluster of such possibly including some propositional attitudes such as beliefs as well). Such a stance cannot be
simply equated with having beliefs or making assertions about what
there is.49
While this position can be expressed theoretically, philosophy as attitude or
stance is not the same as the development of a comprehensive picture of
what there is.
But van Fraassens support for the stance view goes beyond his critique
of metaphysical obscurantism. Consider the following central claim of The
Empirical Stance:
706
Philosophy itself is a value-and-attitude driven enterprise; philosophy

is in false consciousness when it sees itself otherwise. To me, philosophy is of overriding importance, to our culture, to our civilization, to
us individually. For it is the enterprise in which we, in every century,
interpret ourselves anew. But unless it so understands itself, it degenerates into an arid play of mere forms.50
Thus, what is truly driving van Fraassens view is not just a particular position on how analytic philosophy of science operates (though that is clearly
at play). It is connected to a broader belief that philosophy has a strong
practical import. He does not seek to recover philosophy from metaphysics
merely because he thinks most metaphysics is internally inconsistent or
outstrips its own aims and abilities. Metaphysics obscures rather than
interprets, and thus separates philosophy from its most important aim.
Now that we have seen why van Fraassen advocates the stance view, we
can examine more closely how philosophical stances are supposed to
operate. Stances have two important aspects. In the first instance, the stance
provides a kind of beginning point for philosophical research.51 But a starting point that stipulates a position based on an attitude or value claim is
crucially unlike a self-evident or necessary axiom. Rather, the aim is quite
the opposite: in the face of our inability to ground all knowledge and inquiry
on axiomatic principles, we need to develop our perspectives on different
grounds, and admit to this. In this regard van Fraassen points out that the
connection to stances common meaning is not arbitrary: it literally means
a persons standing place or vantage point, advantageous or even
indispensable to a certain purpose or a posture, the configuration of the
body again, one advantageous or even indispensable to a certain purpose,
such as to perform a specific athletic feat.52 Such a practical starting point
is not an eternal truth; rather it works in relation to a particular purpose.
The second important aspect of the stance is that once the beginning
point is set, further research is construed according to the value-driven aims
of the stance. So the stance shows up not only in ones starting point, but
also in which approaches are felt as congenial or promising.53 This point
comes out in van Fraassens discussion of voluntarist epistemology.
Voluntarist, in this sense, has minimal connotations; the term is used in
order to highlight the fact that our epistemology follows the aims we decide
to follow given the attitudes and values expressed in our philosophical
stance. Thus a voluntarist epistemology derives its positions from the practical aims we want to achieve, rather than from some purported picture of
what counts as true knowledge about the facts of the world.54 And while we
may be beholden to basic empirical facts and basic rules of rationality, there
is no complete picture of the world that can rationally compel us to adopt
any particular beliefs.55 So we have to choose on the basis of our attitudes
and commitments.
707
For the sake of clarity, and to make it easier to match up van Fraassens
view with Horkheimers, we can more precisely state what a stance is by
dividing the preceding discussion into three basic points. 1. From the point
of view of one who espouses a philosophical stance, philosophy does not
need to be grounded in a comprehensive picture of the world. This comes
out of the critique of seventeenth-century-style metaphysics, which
obscures common ideas by attempting to explain them through postulated
simulacra. When a stance is accepted, such a metaphysical search is given
up. 2. The critique of metaphysics is further tied to a view of philosophy as
crucially practical, and this necessitates that philosophy be self-aware of its
value. So not only is metaphysics given up when the stance is accepted, but
certain practical aims are also embraced. 3. Per the preceding points, stances
are taken to stipulate a value- and attitude-driven starting point for
research. Furthermore, the resulting research is continually determined by
the practical aims tied to that starting point. With these points in mind, we
can begin to develop the sense in which Horkheimer can be interpreted as
employing a materialist stance.56
To start, it can be noted that Horkheimer clearly agrees with van Fraassen
on point 1. The discussion of world pictures that Horkheimer, following
Dilthey, makes a part of his critique of metaphysics is very similar to van
Fraassens discussion of simulacra.57 In both cases, the problem is that
metaphysicians take common (or at least broadly observable) phenomena
and replace them with hypostatized or distorted abstractions, which obscure
what they purport to explain. Along these lines, Horkheimer would also
share van Fraassens distaste for explanations-by-postulate. Given a lack
of understanding in some area (perhaps ethics or science), van Fraassen
says:
It might be one thing to take me by the hand and lead me into the relevant experience. That might allow me to acquire a deeper insight into
those aspects of human experience. It would be quite another thing
to postulate that there are certain entities or realms of being about
which ethics (or science, or religion) tells us a true story.58
Horkheimer does say, in Materialism and Metaphysics, that the materialist tries to replace the justification of an action with an explanation of it
through an historical understanding of the agent.59 Though Horkheimer is
here in favour of explanation, the difference between his view and van
Fraassens is merely verbal. Justification, for Horkheimer, is roughly the
same as explanation-by-postulate, insofar as justification aims to provide
an ultimate, transfiguring ground for the thing in question. Given that
Horkheimer finds such grounds to be illusory, the justification would have
to rest on a postulate, which would purport to explain the ultimate truth.
Furthermore, what Horkheimer means by explanation must generally
708
agree with van Fraassens being taken by the hand through experience,
insofar as Horkheimer wants research to work carefully through empirical
data and historical events. Both agree that truly rigorous theory should
engage in this type of explanation rather than postulate metaphysical
entities.
Point 2, that philosophy is crucially practical and should be self-aware of
this practical import, clearly links the two thinkers. Van Fraassens work is
not in social theory, and is not motivated by the same Marxian aims as
Horkheimers. He does not claim that the philosopher should work for
social change to the same extent as Horkheimer. But in claiming that metaphysics is problematic because it obscures philosophys real value and
import, the two agree. Horkheimer would merely add that philosophys
need to interpret the world anew remains an arid play of forms if that
interpretation has no influence on practical action.
On can also link Horkheimers thought to point 3. The idea of the stance
as starting point fits well; for example, Horkheimer tells us in Materialism
and Metaphysics that materialism does not lack ideals its ideals are
shaped with the needs of society as a starting point and are measured by what
is possible in the foreseeable future with the human forces available.60 Thus,
Horkheimers materialism is also like a stance insofar as it plays a functional
role in organizing research. The decision to regard the needs of society as a
starting point, connected to his views on suffering and injustice, and the
practical abilities of philosophy, motivated his picture of interdisciplinary
social research. Furthermore, the theoretical and interpretive elements of
that research are also always oriented by that initial emancipatory interest.
Given this overview of van Fraassens ideas, and the initial comparison of
those ideas with Horkheimers views, we can now move on to a deeper
consideration of what it would mean to attribute to Horkheimer a materialist stance. This will largely depend on further interpreting Horkheimers
thought in light of point 3 above. In particular, we need to examine how
taking his work as consonant with van Fraassens conception of stances
saves him from the Henrich-style accusation of the refusal of thought, and
from the claim that his work is purposely contradictory or unphilosophical.
IV
Horkheimers Materialist Stance
As if he were anticipating van Fraassens view, Horkheimer wrote in Materialism and Metaphysics that materialism, in fact, does not mean simply a
questionable view of reality as such; it also stands for a whole series of ideas
and practical attitudes.61 The primary practical attitude involved in
Horkheimers materialism is the emphasis on happiness and suffering.
Further construing this materialism as a stance in van Fraassens sense
should allow us to dissolve the problems related to Horkheimers supposed
secret metaphysics, and show that he espouses a coherent theory.
709
We might first consider the potentially problematic metaphysical

element connected to suffering and happiness, because that is most
fundamental to Horkheimers materialism. When Horkheimer refers to a
natural fact requiring no justification, we would do best to interpret such
a claim along the lines of a stance. He is not referring to some kind of
intellectual intuition of a first principle or a natural law (though taken out
of context, it might sound as though he is). Rather, he is bluntly stating
the attitude in which his materialism finds its starting point. All one has to
do is look at the world around them to see and experience suffering and
the desire for happiness, and in the face of that, Horkheimer does not feel
the need to give a philosophical justification for his anti-suffering attitude.
Such a theory would have as much of a necessary connection to his
research plan as a four-poster bed has a necessary connection to the act of
sleeping.
Thus in keeping with van Fraassens view, Horkheimers materialism
can be seen as a cluster of attitudes, commitments, and beliefs; his value
judgments, including his emphasis on suffering, his rejection of metaphysical obscurity, and his early (and qualified) optimism regarding the possibility of a rational society, sit alongside methodological commitments to
interdisciplinary pluralism and beliefs and arguments regarding historicist
epistemology and the nature of capitalism. These views are all woven
together into the stance that generates the research programme for the
Institut fr Sozialforschung.
Perhaps one can save Horkheimers claim regarding natural facts by
interpreting it through the notion of a stance, as just discussed. This would
then connect with the aspect of van Fraassens view that sees stances as
providing starting points. But what about his much more detailed discussions of objective reality and truth, in places like On the Question of Truth,
which are so fundamental to his methodology? It would seem that that is the
real place where he is guilty of refusing thought by introducing unexplained
metaphysical assumptions. Here, we can handle the potential problems by
reconstructing Horkheimers views in comparison with van Fraassens
discussion of voluntarist epistemology.
First, it should be noted that Horkheimer could have done a better job of
explaining his views in this regard. But the fact that his writing sometimes
lacks clarity does not prove that his views are contradictory or are lacking
needed metaphysical grounding. It only shows that they require further
exposition. To motivate such exposition, we can consider one offending
passage from On the Question of Truth:
Truth is decided not by individuals beliefs and opinions, not by the
subject in itself, but by the relation of the propositions to reality, and
when someone imagines himself the messenger of God or the rescuer
of a people, the matter is not decided by him or even by the majority
710
of his fellows, but by the relation of his assertions and acts to the
objective facts of the rescue.62
The correspondence view of truth expressed here is not uncommon, though
most would give it a fuller explanation than does Horkheimer. But his view
can be more fully explained. First, the reference to assertions and acts (and
the broader context) suggests that propositions in this case is an instance
of a more general point. Really, Horkheimer is thinking of human cognitive
or conceptual activity in general, so propositions are one part of the human
activity that conditions our grasp of reality. Horkheimer clearly does not
want to endorse a strong realist position; an isolated and conclusive theory
of reality is completely unthinkable for the reasons discussed in sections I
and II above.63 Unthinkable is meant to be taken more or less literally in
this context; all thinking is marked by practical and theoretical interests that
are partial and subject to historical change, and we cannot step outside of
these interests to get at some complete reality.
But Horkheimer is still not an anti-realist who sees truth as determined
either wholly by our practical interests or by theory-dependent conditions
of verification. When he says that truth is dependent on the relation of
propositions to reality, he means both of those to be given equal weight.
While the weight put on propositions (or better, human conceptual
activity) removes the possibility of a metaphysical theory of reality, it does
not remove reality. In this sense, Horkheimer would broadly agree with
what Hilary Putnam has recently called natural realism. Putnam argues
that what we recognize as the face of meaning is, in a number of fundamentally important cases, also the face of our natural cognitive relations to the
world even though it is also the case that as language extends those
natural cognitive relations to the world, it also transforms them.64
Horkheimer is, in large part, expressing the same view. We have a
number of natural cognitive relations (among which Putnam counts
perceiving, imagining, and remembering) that connect in a common-sense
(or, as Putnam puts it, nave) way with a real world, but it is also the case
that our cognitive activities (which Putnam discusses as linguistic activity)
extend and transform that connection in various ways. Insofar as Horkheimer is focusing on current and historical social conditions, it makes
common, or nave, sense to speak of facts and reality, and to discuss our
historical perspectives on that reality. And he could have said, if pressed,
that such natural realism is all the realism we need for the purposes of the
research programme that is oriented toward combating suffering. Horkheimers realism is not part of a factual theory of cognition, which seeks to
present a complete picture of world and the forms of knowledge we can
have of that world. Such a theory is, he thinks, impossible. But more importantly, attempting to construct a metaphysical theory that would couch his
views in some purported synoptic picture of the world would not contribute
711
to those emancipatory aims. Like van Fraassens voluntarist epistemology,

Horkheimers method is chosen, within the bounds of the natural realist
conception of empirical truth, according to what is warranted by the stance.
We are now in a position to assess whether Henrichs criticism of critical
theory really gains much traction against Horkheimers early works.
Horkheimers thought does not secretly employ metaphysical views that go
unexplored. Those parts of his view that invite this criticism are not secret
or surreptitiously introduced at all. Rather, they can be taken to be a
straightforward part of the materialist stance; given the beginning point
provided by Horkheimers emancipatory aims, a theory is developed that is
meant to pursue those aims. Nothing is hidden, and nothing is added that
the materialist stance does not need to endorse.
Also, if we interpret Horkheimers materialism as stance-driven, it does
not make sense to call his critique of metaphysics a materialistically metaphysical insight. That claim would make sense if what Horkheimer meant to
do was replace certain (idealist?) conceptions of the world with his own
materialist conception of the world. Such a materialist metaphysics might
not aim at a transfiguration of the world that ignores suffering, but it would
still aim at a synoptic understanding of the world. But such a view would not
fit with Horkheimers deeper critique of metaphysics, which denies the
plausibility of any such synoptic viewpoint. Materialism is not metaphysical
in Horkheimers sense of the word, because it is oriented toward emancipatory aims, not an overarching picture of reality.
But in the face of this rejection of metaphysics, Horkheimer still values
philosophy for its interpretive function, and it is important to keep this in
mind when considering the claim that his aims might ultimately be antiphilosophical. This is seen in his criticism of logical positivism, which
stigmatizes as metaphysics all thought which attempts to clarify these relations [between science and the aims of metaphysics] and all theories that
take critical account of the special sciences.65 The point is to save a certain
conception of philosophy from being so stigmatized. Such philosophy seeks
to critique the sciences and elaborate the broader emancipatory concerns of
society so they can be combined with scientific research. While this view
may denude philosophy of some of its traditional pretensions, it is clearly
not an anti-philosophical view; it is crucial that the philosopher proposes
theoretical guidelines for empirical research, and interprets such research
into a coherent perspective on society and its problems.66
But what of Henrichs accusation that in cutting off further metaphysical
inquiry, critical theory is denying a latent interest of every human being?
Horkheimer could just as easily emphasize that the interest in emancipation
is a prominent aspect of human life, and further argue that philosophical
inquiry should not be extended in a way that overlooks that emancipatory
interest. In this case, there is perhaps a difference of opinion over the
relative importance of theoretical and practical activities, and what degree
712
of each is most human. Neither side denies the importance of theory or

practice, but Henrichs emphasis lies with the former while Horkheimers
lies with the latter. It is not clear, however, that either of these is a belief that
is rationally compelled so much as an attitude or expression of value that
would itself be a part of a philosophical stance.
Conclusion
When judged according to the efficacy of the Frankfurt Schools actual early
research programme, Horkheimers work would not fare well. After all,
though the Institut fr Sozialforschung is still in operation (currently under
the directorship of Axel Honneth), the Institut as it was organized under
Horkheimer rather quickly dissolved, large part because of the rise of
National Socialism and Horkheimers subsequent exile.67 These historical
changes further ushered in theoretical changes that shaped Horkheimers
later work.68
But this does not mean that contemporary critical theory would not
benefit from continued study of Horkheimers early work. When construed
in terms of the materialist stance, it can be seen to have certain advantages.
It is important, for instance, that it always keeps its emancipatory aims at the
forefront. While all critical theory is rooted in such aims, there is always a
possibility that such aims will become obscured by further theoretical developments.69 This problem should be forestalled if one keeps the materialist
stance in view. Also, it is noteworthy that the materialist stance as construed
here swings relatively free of the specific theoretical commitments one
makes in pursuing research according to that stance, other than to show that
they must be driven by the appropriate practical concerns. One could thus
take up the position described in this paper but develop it in somewhat new
directions. And importantly the idea of a materialist stance itself does not
stand or fall with the theoretical strategies that are developed out of it.70
This flexibility was important to Horkheimer, and could benefit contemporary critical theory as well.
Furthermore, ideas like Horkheimers are in vogue in areas of philosophy
outside of critical theory, so broader study of his work is merited. For example, those who favour non-ideal theory in political philosophy and those
who advocate experimental philosophy all press for a rejection of a priori
theorizing, and an emphasis on empirical research within philosophy. Viewing Horkheimers work in terms of the stance should help motivate comparisons with such contemporary work, by making sense of the seeming
contradictions in his views. If such an interpretation of Horkheimers essays
is combined with contemporary views on philosophy and empirical
research, a vital new social research programme might result.
And there are other reasons for re-examining Horkheimers work. The
force of the values that form his view has certainly not waned since the
713
1930s: the world is still filled with people suffering and people striving for
happiness. Because of this, what is here being called the materialist stance
continues to have appeal. Of course one can argue with the assumption that
philosophy and social research can have a practical effect in dealing with
such suffering. But as long as there are those who are engaged in social
philosophy with practical intent, Horkheimers early work should be relevant. The present interpretation of Horkheimers materialism should also
help. Social philosophy should be open about its value orientations, and
forgo unnecessary attempts to provide ultimate justifications. Rather, the
work of interpreting, and possibly changing, our current social conditions
can proceed without such foundations, and perhaps a renewed study of
Horkheimers early work can help provide a framework for such research in
the future.
Loyola University, New Orleans, USA
Notes
1 Jrgen Habermas, Metaphysics After Kant, in Postmetaphysical Thinking:
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 15.
2 Dieter Henrich, What is Metaphysics What is Modernity? Twelve Theses
against Jrgen Habermas, trans. Peter Dews, in Habermas: A Critical Reader
(Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1999), quotation on p. 294.
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A, X, quoted in Henrich, What is
Metaphysics?, p. 296. Kant is specifically criticizing Voltaire and similar earlymodern ironists; Henrich means to extend this critique to Habermas.
4 The term secret metaphysics is found in Henrich, What is Metaphysics?, p. 317.
5 Alfred Schmidt, Max Horkheimers Intellectual Physiognomy, in Seyla
Benhabib, Wolfgang Bon, and John McCole (eds) On Max Horkheimer: New
Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 29.
6 Max Horkheimer, Preface, in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, ed. Matthew J.
OConnell (New York: Continuum Press, 1999), p. ix.
7 Hauke Brunkhorst, Dialectical Positivism of Happiness: Max Horkheimers
Materialist Deconstruction of Philosophy, in On Max Horkheimer, quotation on
p. 68. It is noteworthy that Habermas endorses Brunkhorsts view: see, for
example, Habermas, Remarks on the Development of Horkheimers Work, in
On Max Horkheimer, p. 50.
8 Horkheimer, Dmmerung, in Gesammelte Schriften Band 2: Philosophische
Frschriften 19221932 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987),
p. 354. For an English translation of the aphorism see Horkheimer, Dawn and
Decline: Notes 19261931 and 19501969, trans. Michael Shaw (New York:
Seabury Press, 1978), pp. 456. This text includes part of Dmmerung.
9 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans.
H. B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 67; quoted in
Horkheimer, The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an
Institute for Social Research, trans. John Torpey, in Between Philosophy and
Social Science: Selected Early Writings (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 4.
My italics.
714
10 Horkheimer, Materialism and Metaphysics, in Critical Theory, p. 26.

11 Materialism would be later replaced by critical theory as the name for
Horkheimers philosophical position. The shift is most clearly marked with the
1937 publication of Traditional and Critical Theory (in Critical Theory,
pp. 188243). On this shift in terminology, see Brunkhorst, Dialectical
Positivism of Happiness.
12 Horkheimer quotes Wilhelm Dilthey, Die Typen der Weltanschauung und die
Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen, cited in Materialism and
Metaphysics, p. 17. An English translation of this text can be found in Diltheys
Philosophy of Existence, trans. William Kluback and Martin Weinbaum (New
York: Bookman Associates, 1957). The translation of the quotation used here
is my own, based on the text found in Horkheimer, Materialismus und
Metaphysik, in Gesammelte Schriften, Band 3: Schriften 19311936 (Frankfurt
am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), p. 77. World view, as is
common, translates Weltanschauung, and world picture translates Weltbild. A
world picture is, briefly, the intellectual component of a world view; it is a
comprehensive conception of ones world, while a complete world view also
includes ones affective life and behaviours. Horkheimer does not make much
of this distinction.
13 See Diltheys Philosophy of Existence, p. 39.
14 All quotations in this paragraph are from Horkheimer, Materialism and
Metaphysics, pp. 27, 20, and 18, respectively.
15 Horkheimer, Materialism and Morality, in Between Philosophy and Social
Science, p. 21.
16 Ibid., p. 19.
17 Ibid., p. 20.
18 Horkheimer, Materialism and Metaphysics, p. 24.
19 See Die Ohnmacht der deutschen Arbeiterklasse, in Dmmerung, pp. 3738;
cited and discussed in Wolfgang Bon, The Program of Interdisciplinary
Research and the Beginnings of Critical Theory, in On Max Horkheimer,
pp. 10810.
20 See Horkheimer, Traditional and Critical Theory, quotation on p. 215.
21 Horkheimer, Materialism and Metaphysics, quotations on pp. 45 and 25,
respectively.
22 John McCole, Seyla Benhabib, and Wolfgang Bon, Introduction, Max
Horkheimer: Between Philosophy and Social Science, in On Max Horkheimer,
p. 5. See also Horkheimers use of The German Ideology in Materialism and
Metaphysics, p. 25.
23 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Vol. I, Ch. I, trans. W.
Lough, in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. V (New York:
International Publishers, 1976), all quotations on p. 31.
24 This summary of the traditional view is indebted to Charles W. Mills, Is it
Immaterial that theres a Material in Historical Materialism?, Inquiry, 32
(1989) pp. 32342.
25 G. A. Cohen, Karl Marxs Theory of History: A Defense, expanded edition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), quotation on p. 94.
26 Mills, Is it Immaterial?, provides an excellent summary of Cohens view on this
point.
28 See, for example, Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, trans.
Edward Aveling, in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. XXIV
(New York: International Publishers, 1989), pp. 281325.
715
29 On this point see Bon, The Program of Interdisciplinary Research, pp. 11015.
30 Marx, German Ideology, p. 31.
31 Horkheimer, The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy, in
Between Philosophy and Social Science, p. 223.
32 Ibid., p. 223.
33 Horkheimer, The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an
Institute for Social Research, in Between Philosophy and Social Science, quotations on pp. 1 and 7, respectively.
35 See Horkheimer, Notes on Science and the Crisis, in Critical Theory; the point
regarding Scheler is made on p. 6.
36 See Horkheimer, The Latest Attack on Metaphysics, in Critical Theory,
pp. 13287, quotation on pp. 1434.
37 Horkheimer, The Present Situation, pp. 810.
38 Ibid., quotation on p. 9; see also pp. 1114.
40 Horkheimer, On the Problem of Truth, in Between Philosophy and Social
Science, quotations on pp. 189 (my italics) and 190, respectively.
41 Ibid., p. 190.
42 Ibid., p. 193.
43 Ibid., p. 208.
44 Throughout his work Horkheimer refers to this kind of method as dialectical
(though the term means more than what I have described here). I have
suppressed that term because it is contentious enough to require extensive
explanation, and an adequate explanation would be beyond the scope of this
paper. I think that the basic point of this paper survives without the term or its
explanation. I am not avoiding dialectic, though, because of the view (espoused
by many contemporary interpreters of Marx) that it is a remnant of hopeless
Hegelian obscurantism.
45 Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2002), p. 2, n. 1.
46 Ibid., p. 3.
47 Van Fraassen considers Descartess The World, or Treatise on Light, to be paradigmatic of this insofar as Descartes sets aside any observational description of
the real world and instead theoretically constructs the world that God would
have created if he wished to make a world perfectly transparent and intelligible
to the human mind. See The Empirical Stance, pp. 2730.
48 Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, p. 37.
49 Ibid., p. 47.
50 Ibid., p. 17.
51 For a deeper discussion of this aspect of van Fraassens view, see Paul
Teller,Discussion: What is a Stance?, Philosophical Studies, 121 (2004),
pp. 15970.
52 Van Fraassen, Ladyman, Lipton, and Teller on The Empirical Stance,
Philosophical Studies, 121 (2004), pp. 17192.
53 Ibid.
54 Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, pp. 813; see also p. 241, n. 17 on the
minimal connotations of voluntarism.
55 See ibid., p. 92. Van Fraassen speaks in terms of bridled irrationality; reason
does not compel, but only sets broad borders within which choice is necessary.
For a discussion of this point, see Peter Lipton, Discussion Epistemic Options,
Philosophical Studies, 121 (2004), pp. 14758. There he notes that the broad
716
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
principles of reason van Fraassen endorses amount to restrictions on internally

inconsistent beliefs.
It should be noted that van Fraassen discusses materialism, and contrasts the
possibility of a materialist stance with the empirical stance. His use of materialism is clearly different from Horkheimers, however; van Fraassen is focusing
on materialism as it is used in contemporary analytic philosophy. See The
Empirical Stance, pp. 4963.
It is interesting that van Fraassen favourably compares Diltheys discussion of
world views to stances (see Ladyman, Lipton, and Teller on The Empirical
Stance). His brief use of Dilthey is so different from Horkheimers because they
emphasize different parts of Diltheys view; van Fraassen is most interested in
the role that values play in forming a world view, while Horkheimer is drawing
on the role of the world picture (what van Fraassen refers to as cosmology).
Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, p. 37.
Horkheimer, Materialism and Metaphysics, p. 23.
Ibid., pp. 456.
Ibid., p. 17.
Ibid., p. 194.
Horkheimer, On the Problem of Truth, p. 188.
Hilary Putnam, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 69.
Horkheimer, The Latest Attack on Metaphysics, p. 185.
One could, of course, refer to such an interpretive task as metaphysical. See, for
instance, Italo Testa, Hegelian Pragmatism and Social Emancipation: An Interview with Robert Brandom, Constellations 10(4) (2003), pp. 55470. In response
to a question about the relation of his work to Habermass postmetaphysical
view, Brandom endorses the word metaphysics when used in two ways: to refer
to theory that seeks to interpret rather than merely explain, and to refer to
theory that aims at systematicity. He then rejects a third view, wherein
metaphysics is systematic and takes itself as completely describing reality. If we
connect these three forms of metaphysics to Horkheimer, only the first would
fit, as he rejects overarching systematic aims. But the first use of the term could
just as well be termed philosophy (as Brandom notes), and thus the term
metaphysics seems less meaningful.
For a detailed history of the problems the Institut faced during the rise of the
Nazis and their subsequent flight, see Rolf Wiggerschaus, The Frankfurt School
: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), particularly Chs 2 and 3.
For an overview of Horkheimers development that sees a continuity between
the early and later works, see Schmidt, Max Horkheimers Intellectual Physiognomy. For a discussion that emphasizes a break between the early and later
work, see Habermas, Remarks on the Development of Horkheimers Work.
The specific reasons for the dissolution of the early research programme are up
for debate. For example, Habermas, Remarks on the Development of Horkheimers Work, stresses the role of historical events, while Bon, The Program of
Interdisciplinary Research, focuses more on potential problems internal to the
theory.
This accusation has been made against Habermas by Honneth, who argues that
Habermass linguistic theory does not properly link up with the actual moral
experiences of the oppressed. See, for example, Honneth, The Social Dynamics
of Disrespect: Situating Critical Theory Today, in Habermas: A Critical Reader,
pp. 32730. For similar criticisms, see Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of
717
Jrgen Habermas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), p. 379, and David Held,
Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1980), pp. 37475. Interestingly, Honneth has been subject to
the similar criticism that he attempts to describe too many different social
phenomena according to the terms of his theory of recognition, and thus
obscures some of those phenomena. See, for example, Nancy Frasers critique in
Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical
Exchange, trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke (London:
Verso, 2003), pp. 198211, and Christopher F. Zurn, Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneths Critical Social Theory, European
Journal of Philosophy, 13(1) (2005), pp. 89126.
70 This aspect of the stance view could then be contrasted with Habermass critique
of metaphysics, which is very strongly tied to his conception of communicative
interaction, and to the prospect that the role once played by philosophy of
consciousness can be taken over by philosophy of language. In this regard, see
his response to Henrichs criticisms in Habermas, Metaphysics After Kant.
Thus, the validity of Habermass postmetaphysical thinking is strongly tied to his
overall theory of communicative action.
718

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International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Postmetaphysical Thinking or Refusal of Thought? Max Horkheimer's

Philosophical Stance',International Journal of Philosophical Studies,16:5,695 718

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International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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other criticisms one might make of metaphysics, such grand theorizing

MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

aims. Also, van Fraassens conception of a philosophical stance provides a

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Horkheimers Critique of Metaphysics

As noted above, Horkheimers critique of metaphysics springs from critical

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MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

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That contention is dependent on the view that properly construed,

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Materialism as a Method for Social Research

Now that we have seen why Horkheimers materialist research programme

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MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

materialists such as those among the French Enlightenment who treated

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neither pure thought, nor abstraction, nor intuition is capable of

MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

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attention, the refinement of methods, the categorical structure of the

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MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

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frustration through suffering. This motivation leads him to develop a

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metaphysics in the face of the critical force of empiricism. In an endnote, he

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The type of metaphysics to which I refer, and which I take to be the

MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

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Philosophy itself is a value-and-attitude driven enterprise; philosophy

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MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

Horkheimers Materialist Stance

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We might first consider the potentially problematic metaphysical

MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

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to those emancipatory aims. Like van Fraassens voluntarist epistemology,

MAX HORKHEIMERS MATERIALISM AS PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE

of each is most human. Neither side denies the importance of theory or

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