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[G.R. No. 136843.

September 28, 2000]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring,"
RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO RAGONTON Jr., accused;
PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," appellant.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction
extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the
criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed.
The Case and the Facts

Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, [2] in Criminal Case No. V-0447,
in which he was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to
pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
In an Information[3]dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R. Bautista charged
appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with
murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan, Municipality of Villasis,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
long firearms, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.]
y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body x x x injuries [which]
directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
"Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."[4]
With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment on April 30, 1993.[5] After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the
assailed August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the [Appellant]
Pedro Abungan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and such
penalties accessory thereto as may be provided for by law.
The x x x [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs."[6]
Appellant, through counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 14, 1998. On
January 9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa. On
October 26, 1999, he filed the Appellant's Brief [7] before this Court. The Office of the
Solicitor General, on the other hand, submitted the Appellee's Brief [8] on February 4,
2000. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court
received the Manifestation of appellant stating that he would not file a reply brief.
In a letter dated August 7, 2000, [9] however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of
the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan had died on July
19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached to the letter was Abungan's Death Certificate.
Issue

The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the case and
on the appeal.
This Court's Ruling

The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal
extinguished his criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil
liability ex delicto).
Main Issue: Effect of Appellant's Death During Appeal

The consequences of appellant's death are provided for in Article 89 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows:
"Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
x x x x x x x x x"
Applying this provision, the Court in People v. Bayotas[10] made the following
pronouncements:
"1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.'"
"2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
"4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription."
In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition in Bayotas, the
death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during
the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil
liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It
must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation
other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his
estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal
of the criminal case against him. [11] Necessarily, the lower court's Decision -- finding him
guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased -- becomes ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of Villasis, Pangasinan) against
Pedro
Abungan
is
hereby DISMISSED and
the
appealed
Decision SET
ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 154579. October 8, 2003]


MA. LOURDES R. DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 2001 and the subsequent Resolution dated August 1,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 145 in Criminal Case No. 961226,[2] finding herein petitioner, Ma. Lourdes de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Theft.
The Information filed on July 9, 1996 reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of February, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner
thereof, take, steal and carry away several pieces of jewelry valued at P4,600,000.00 belonging
to one Jasmine Gongora, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforementioned
amount of P4,600,000.00.[3]
After due hearing, the trial court rendered its judgment on December 11, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been sufficiently established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby finds the accused MA. LOURDES DE GUZMAN GUILTY
of the present charge of THEFT and committed without aggravating circumstance charged nor
mitigating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences her to
suffer the minimum penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS
of prision correccional, and the maximum penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as well as the penalties accessory thereto.
The Court further finds the accused MA. LOURDES DE GUZMAN civilly liable and orders her
to pay the private offended party, JASMINE GONGORA the sums of FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P4,640,000.00) representing the value as proven of
the stolen jewelries; FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) in moral damages

and TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) as reasonable attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.[4]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but reduced the award of damages, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, We AFFIRM the decision appealed from with the
MODIFICATION that the award for actual damages is reduced to P1,500,00 and moral damages
to P100,000. The award for attorneys fees is DELETED.[5]
Hence, this petition filed on September 24, 2002, raising the same issues in the CA
that the decision of the trial court was tried and decided by a biased judge; and that the
judgment of conviction was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment.
On January 30, 2003, counsel for the petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the
Court that the petitioner passed away on January 13, 2003. [6] The death of the petitioner
resulted from a vehicular accident, as indicated in the Certificate of Death attached
thereto.[7]
At issue now before the Court is the effect of petitioners death on the instant
petition.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code clearly provides that:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally extinguished;
1.
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;

The issue as to whether an action on the civil liability can survive and proceed
against the estate of the deceased has been settled in the case of People v.
Bayotas[8] where it was held that:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liabilityex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.[9]
The pecuniary liabilities adjudged against the petitioner are undeniably ex
delicto. The petitioner was ordered to pay actual damages, which is the value of the
pieces of jewelry allegedly taken from the private complainant in the amount of
P1,500,000, as modified by the Court of Appeals; and moral damages of P100,000 for
the fear and trauma caused to the complainant because of the petitioners intrusion into
her bedroom. These civil liabilities arose from the crime of Theft and are based solely
on said delict.
Although both the trial and the appellate courts found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, she had the right to appeal her case to this Court of last resort and
challenge the findings of the two courts below. The judgment of conviction was pending
review until her untimely demise. It has, therefore, not yet attained finality. Thus,
pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the Court to
dismiss the instant petition for review. The Court is dismissing the case because there is
no longer a need to continue with the review of the appeal. The lower courts decision
has thus become ineffectual.[10]

Needless to state, the civil liability attendant to the crime which includes the
restitution of personal or real property [11] is also extinguished. A substitution of heirs in
petitioners stead is no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. In view of the death of the
petitioner, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. 97472-73. November 20, 2000]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VICENTE PACAA y
SENARLO, BERNARDO PACAA, VIRGILIO PACAA and VICTORIANO
PACAA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For the death and near death of Raul Leyson and Felizardo del Solo, respectively,
accused-appellants were charged with murder and frustrated murder, based on the
following facts:
At around 5:30 p.m. on January 28, 1979, after playing basketball, Edwin Sormillon
passed by a store along V. Rama Avenue, Cebu City. Accused-appellant Vicente
Pacaa was at the store drinking with friends. He invited Edwin for a drink but the latter
begged off as he had to go home to take a bath. When he got home, Edwin was told by
his sister that Vicente maligned her and challenged their father to a fight. Edwin
immediately went out to talk to Vicente. Their confrontation led to a fistfight.
Later, a friend of Edwin, Felizardo del Solo, accompanied by his cousin, Raul
Leyson, tried to talk to Vicente to settle his dispute with Edwin. Vicente brought
Felizardo and Raul upstairs to accused-appellant Victoriano Pacaas house. At the
balcony, Felizardo was met by Victoriano, Virgilio and Bernardo Pacaa. Felizardo
asked Vicente what was the cause of his quarrel with Edwin. Vicente suddenly hit
Felizardo in the face. Felizardo hit him back. While the two were fighting, Bernardo
stabbed Felizardo but he was able to parry it, and was injured on the right wrist.
Bernardo again tried to stab Felizardo, this time hitting him on the chest. Meanwhile,
Raul tried to stop the fight and was struck at the back of the neck with a lead pipe by
Victoriano. This caused Raul to stagger forward. Bernardo, Vicente and Virgilio ganged
up on him and stabbed him. He then fell backwards, and Victoriano also stabbed him at
the back. Suddenly, the lights went off. Felizardo slowly went downstairs and met
Edwin Sormillon at the yard. Together, they boarded a jeepney to the Cebu City
Medical Center. He was later transferred to another hospital where he was treated for
several days and later released.
Raul was rushed to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
On September 10, 1979, accused-appellant Vicente was charged with homicide for
the killing of Raul Leyson. The Information was later amended, wherein the three other
accused-appellants were included and the crime charged was elevated to murder. The
Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. CU-4170, reads:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 1979, at about 6:30 oclock in the afternoon in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused armed with knives, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there suddenly attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one Raul Leyson by stabbing said Raul Leyson hitting him on the different parts of
his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries: x x x and as a consequence
of which said Raul Leyson died a few hours later.
That the crime was committed with the attendance of the aggravating circumstances of
the accused taking advantage of superior strength the deceased unarmed at the time. [1]
Another Information was filed on the same date against the four accused-appellants
for the frustrated murder of Felizardo Del Solo. The Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CU-4908, reads:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1979, at about 6:30 oclock in the afternoon in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused armed with knives, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there suddenly attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one Felizardo del Solo, by stabbing him on different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries: x x x which injuries under ordinary
circumstances would cause the death of the victim, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
which, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
herein accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
Felizardo del Solo, which prevented his death. [2]
Accused-appellant Vicente appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not
guilty. The other accused had not yet been apprehended. Invoking his right to speedy
trial, Vicente moved for a separate trial, which the trial court granted. Later, accusedappellants Bernardo and Virgilio were arrested. They pleaded not guilty at their
arraignment. Victoriano posted bail and was granted provisional liberty.[3] He, too,
pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the accused VICENTE PACAA,
BERNARDO PACAA, VICTORIANO PACAA AND VIRGILIO PACAA are all found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER and FRUSTRATED
MURDER and hereby sentences each to a penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA for the murder and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Raul
Leyson, the sum of P30,000.00. In the case of the Frustrated Murder, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer a
penalty of imprisonment of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum and 17 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, Felizardo del
Solo the sum of P10,000.00 in the form of damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.[4]
All the accused appealed.

During the pendency of their appeal, appellants Vicente, Bernardo and Virgilio, who
are confined at the National Bilibid Prison, filed a motion to withdraw their appeal. In a
Resolution dated August 30, 1999, the Court, after confirming the voluntariness of their
withdrawal of appeal, granted the motion insofar as Vicente and Virgilio were
concerned.[5] Accused-appellant Bernardo, on the other hand, was required to confirm
the voluntariness of his motion to withdraw appeal. However, a return from the Bureau
of Corrections shows that he died on April 5, 1999. [6]
The death of an accused extinguishes his criminal liability even if his death should
occur during the pendency of his appeal. [7] Accused-appellant Bernardos death not only
extinguished his criminal liability concerning the personal penalties but also whatever
pecuniary penalties have been imposed on him, considering that he died before final
judgment, as provided in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. --- Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxx
xxx
x x x.
Both Bernardos civil and criminal liability were extinguished by his death. [8]
Where a person is charged with homicide, for instance, the civil liability for indemnity is
based solely on the finding of guilt. If he is acquitted because of self-defense, the heirs
of the deceased have no right to indemnity. Should the offender die before final
judgment, their right to indemnity is likewise extinguished as there is no basis for the
civil liability. Civil liability exists only when the accused is convicted by final judgment. [9]
Therefore, the appeal of accused-appellant Bernardo Pacaa should be
dismissed. Only the appeal of Victoriano Pacaa is left for adjudication.
At the outset, the Court has noted that this case contains no record of Victoriano
Pacaas commitment in the National Penitentiary. It appears that said accusedappellant is not confined therein. [10] The records reveal that accused-appellant
Victoriano posted bail before the trial court. However, it does not appear that after his
and his co-appellants conviction, his bail was cancelled. The Rules prevailing at the
time of appellants conviction in 1990 provides that, an accused who is charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua shall no longer be
entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his
conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is
strong.[11] In consonance therewith, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 2-92
dated January 20, 1992, which explicitly states:
xxx
xxx
xxx
3) When an accused charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of
the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in
confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending
appeal before this Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following
rules are laid down:

1)
This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10)
days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court
of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this
Court;
2)
The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of
Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3)
If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10)
days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this
Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule
124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail.
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should have ordered the commitment of accused-appellant Victoriano to
the New Bilibid Prisons during the pendency of his appeal.
The appeal is based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY STATING IN THE ASSAILED
DECISION/JUDGMENT THAT TAKING THE ENTIRE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY,
THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION, AND SO HOLDS, THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE FOUR ACCUSED IN THE KILLING OF RAUL LEYSON
AND THE INFLICTING OF THE SERIOUS INJURIES SUFFERED BY FELIZARDO
DEL SOLO, CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS ABUNDANCE OF PROOF ON RECORD
TO THE CONTRARY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ALL THE FOUR (4) ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND
FRUSTRATED MURDER, AND IN IMPOSING ON ALL OF THEM THE PENALTIES
AND INDEMNITIES STATED IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED
JUDGMENT/DECISION OF OCTOBER 26, 1990.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SAYING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ONE
ANTONINA HERASMEO FOR THE DEFENSE (SHE BEING THE SISTER OF
BIENVENIDA, WIFE OF ACCUSED VICTORIANO PACAA), SHOULD BE TAKEN
WITH SOME MISGIVING AS SHE IS AN INTERESTED WITNESS OUT TO PROTECT
HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW VICTORIANO, CONSIDERING THAT FELIZARDO DEL SOLO
IS AN ADMITTED FIRST COUSIN OF RAUL LEYSON AND THAT THE COURT
SHOULD HAVE ALSO TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THAT IT SHOULD HAVE ALSO
TAKEN CAUTION OF HIS TESTIMONY DUE TO DIRECT BLOOD RELATIONSHIP AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM AFFINITY ONLY IN THE CASE OF ANTONINA HERASMEO.
Victoriano Pacaas conviction must stand. The killing of a person with the
attendant qualifying circumstances, such as treachery, constitutes murder in its
consummated stage. In cases where the victim did not die for causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator, the murder is considered frustrated. The gravamen of the two
charges herein murder and frustrated murder were proven against the remaining
appellant Victoriano. He threw the first blow on the deceased Raul by striking the latter
at the back of the neck with a lead pipe, without warning. Raul staggered forward and

was rendered defenseless. In that position, he became vulnerable to the other three
accused-appellants, who proceeded to stab him. As found by the medico-legal officer,
Raul sustained fatal wounds on the right chest and the left part of his back. The other
wounds sustained by Raul though not fatal contributed to the hemorrhage that caused
his death.[12] With respect to Felizardo, the penetrating stab wound on the chest was
fatal and could have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical attention. [13]
The suddenness and severity of the attack on Raul and Felizardo constitute
treachery.[14] Moreover, the congruence of these acts show that appellants acted in
conspiracy. Proof of previous agreement to commit the crime is not essential, it being
sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. [15] Due to
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. [16]
Against the strong evidence of the prosecution, appellants could only offer denial
and alibi. Settled is the rule, however, that such defenses which are inherently weak in
nature cannot be given credence in the light of positive identification, [17] which in this
case was made by no less than one of the surviving victims, Felizardo:
Q When did you first when I come to know that Victoriano had a pipe with him?
A After I was already hit was leaning I saw Victoriano had a pipe because the
distance was very near.
Q And at that very moment that was the time Victoriano hit Raul at his neck?
A Yes.
xxx
xx
x
xxx
Q And Virgilio and Bernardo were directly in front of you?
A Yes.
Q And this is only about 2 meters by 2 meters?
A Yes, it was only small.
Q Is it not a fact that you were most concerned of your safety?
A Yes, I kept on pressing my chest.
Q And since, according to you, it was Bernardo who stabbed you three times, your
attention was more focused on Bernardo that Bernardo might stab you again?
A When Bernardo stabbed me I parried and I was wounded on my wrist and so
Bernardo made another thrust and I was hit on my chest. That was the time
when I was able to move back and faced Raul and that was the time when
Victoriano hit Raul with a pipe.
Q Did you actually see Victoriano or you just saw Raul just leaning forward?
A Yes, I saw Victoriano hit Raul and Raul seemed to fall so I went down. [18] (Italics
supplied).
If the accused was positively identified by the victim himself who harbored no ill
motive against the former, the defense of alibi must fail. [19] No ill motive can be attributed
to the prosecution witnesses. In any event, proof of motive is not indispensable for
conviction when there is positive identification. [20] Motive assumes significance only
when there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime might be. [21] Bare denial is
a negative declaration, which deserves no consideration and cannot prevail over the
affirmative testimony of the victim, which is corroborated by evidence. [22] It cannot
survive positive identification by the victim. Affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative one, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. [23]Denial is

inherently weak, can easily be fabricated and, to warrant acquittal, must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. The trial court has a valuable advantage of observing
the witness deportment and manner of testifying, their furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or
full realization of an oath, all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness honesty and sincerity.[24]
At the time of the commission of these crimes in 1979, murder carried a penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; for frustrated murder, the penalty
one degree lower should be imposed, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium.[25] In such complex penalty comprising of three distinct penalties,
each of these penalties shall form a period in accordance with Article 77 of the Revised
Penal Code. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending,
the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1), which in this
case is reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable when the
penalty actually imposed is reclusion perpetua.[26]
The trial court erred in imposing the penalty for frustrated murder. There being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the medium period of the penalty shall
be imposed, namely,reclusion temporal minimum. The maximum term of seventeen
years fixed by the trial court is within reclusion temporal medium. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty should be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed; and the minimum term
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense. Thus, the indeterminate penalty imposed on accused-appellant for
frustrated murder should be from six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.[27]Hence the reduction of the indeterminate penalty for the
frustrated murder case shall affect not only the remaining appellant but also the others
who withdrew their appeal.
With respect to the civil liability, the trial court held accused-appellants solidarily
liable for civil indemnity of P30,000.00 to the heirs of Raul Leyson, and P10,000.00, to
Felizardo del Solo. The civil indemnity for the deceased victim should be increased to
P50,000.00 in line with latest jurisprudence. [28] As for the civil indemnity in the frustrated
murder case, the same is increased to P30,000.00. Both awards are given without need
of proof other than the commission of the crime and the culprits liability therefor.
Although, the higher indemnities granted herein appears not favorable to those who
withdrew their appeal, they shall all be held solidarily liable for the higher amounts since
they are not in the form of penalty. The medical and hospital expenses in the amount of
P4,000.00 incurred by Felizardo del Solo was duly established by evidence on record.
However, lost earnings cannot be awarded for lack of factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the trial courts decision convicting accused-appellant Victoriano
Pacaa is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS. Accused Victoriano Pacaa,
Vicente Pacaa and Virgilio Pacaa are found guilty of the murder of Raul Leyson in
Criminal Case No. CV-4170, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Likewise, said accused are found guilty of the frustrated murder of Felizardo

del Solo in Criminal Case No. CV-4908, and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve years and one
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They are also ordered, jointly and severally, to
pay the heirs of Raul Leyson, civil indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), and to pay Felizardo del Solo civil indemnity in the amount of thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00), and actual damages in the amount of four thousand
pesos (P4,000.00).
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 2-92, let a Warrant of Arrest be issued
against Victoriano Pacaa. His bail is ordered FORFEITED.
The appeal with respect to the deceased appellant Bernardo Pacaa is
DISMISSED, his liabilities having been extinguished by his death.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE V. PACANA
G.R. No.97472-73 Nov.20, 2000
A case of murder and frustrated murder.
Held:
If the accused was positively identified by the victim himself who harbored
no ill motive against the former, the defense of alibi must fail. In any even
the proof of motive is not indispensable for conviction when there is positive
identification. Motive assumes significance only when there is no showing of
who the perpetrator of the crime might be. An appeal taken by one or more
of several accused shall not effect those who did not appeal, except insofar
as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter. Hence, the reduction of the indeterminate penalty for the frustrated
murder case shall affect not only the appellant but also those who withdrew
their appeal.
[G.R. No. 141931. December 4, 2000]
ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 21347 entitled People of the Philippines versus Aniceto
Recebido, dated September 9, 1999 which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Falsification of Public Document; and its Resolution dated February 15, 2000
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are the following, to wit:
On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of her
cousin, petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her
property, an agricultural land with an area of 3,520 square meters located at San Isidro,
Bacon, Sorsogon, which Caridad Dorol mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April of
1985. Petitioner and Caridad Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but

Caridad Dorol instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973
(Exhibit A) executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol.
In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her property
on his claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Caridad Dorol maintained
and insisted that the transaction between them involving her property was a mortgage.
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there exists on
its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 (Exhibit J), allegedly executed by
Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner and that the property was registered in the latters
name. After comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol in other
documents (Exhibits K to K-10) with that of the signature of Caridad Dorol on the
questioned Deed of Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas, found that the
latter signature was falsified (Exhibits L-1 to L-2).
Thereafter, Caridad Dorol filed her complaint against petitioner Aniceto Recebido with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Legaspi City and its Questioned Documents
Division conducted an examination in the original copy of the Deed of Sale in question
allegedly signed by Caridad, particularly her signature affixed thereon.
Mr. Magbojas report was approved by the Chief of the Questioned Documents Division,
Arcadio Ramos, and the Deputy Director of Technical Services, Manuel Roura, both of
the NBI.[1]
Thus, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information indicting
petitioner for Falsification of Public Document with the Regional Trial Court, 5 th Judicial
Region, Branch 51, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, reading as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1979, in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province
of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to defraud, falsify and/or imitate the signature of one Caridad
Dorol and/or cause it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has signed her name on a Deed
of Absolute Sale of Real Property in favor of the herein accused and Notarized as Doc.
No. 680; page No. 54; Boon No. XIV and Series of 1979 of the Registry of Notary Public
Dominador S. Reyes, when in truth and in fact accused well knew, that Caridad Dorol
did not execute said document, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
As narrated by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contends that the land in
question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of Caridad, on February 25,
1977 and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983 although it was made to
appear that the deed of sale was executed on August 13, 1979. It was also on the said
date that Recebido gave Caridad the amount of P1,000.00 in addition to the P2,600.00
mortgage price given to Juan Dorol which culminated into the execution of the Deed of
Sale signed by Caridad.[3]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision on December 2, 1996,
convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing him as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, accused ANECITO RECEBIDO is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment.

Accused is ordered to pay P5,000.00 damages and to vacate the land in question
owned by the offended party.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the award for damages is DELETED, the
assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The petitioner raises his case before this Court seeking the reversal of the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Based on his petition, the following
issues are before this Court:
1. Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the
information was filed?
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
sustaining the conviction of the petitioner?
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grievous error in affirming the
decision of the trial court for the petitioner to vacate the land in question
owned by the offended party?
We rule in the negative on the three issues.
On the first issue: While the defense of prescription of the crime was raised only
during the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, there was
no waiver of the defense. Under the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert
the ground of extinction of the offense, inter alia, in a motion to quash shall not be
deemed a waiver of such ground.[6] The reason is that by prescription, the State or the
People loses the right to prosecute the crime or to demand the service of the penalty
imposed.[7] Accordingly, prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this
case, be invoked on appeal. [8] Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to
quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to raise
the same anytime thereafter including during appeal.
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The petitioner is
correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already prescribed when
the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable therefor, which in this
case is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than 5,000.00 pesos.[9] Under the Revised Penal Code, [10] said penalty is a correctional
penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the
penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. [11] The issue
that the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive
period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period
necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is inaccurate. Under
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, x x x. In People v. Reyes,[12] this Court has declared that registration in
public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its
contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
charged with knowledge of what it contains.

The prosecution has established that private complainant Dorol did not sell the
subject land to the petitioner-accused at anytime and that sometime in 1983 the private
complainant mortgaged the agricultural land to petitioner Recebido. It was only on
September 9, 1990, when she went to petitioner to redeem the land that she came to
know of the falsification committed by the petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner
contends that the land in question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of
private complainant, and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983. This Court
notes that the private offended party had no actual knowledge of the falsification prior to
September 9, 1990. Meanwhile, assuming arguendo that the version of the petitioner is
believable, the alleged sale could not have been registered before 1983, the year the
alleged deed of sale was executed by the private complainant. Considering the
foregoing, it is logical and in consonance with human experience to infer that the crime
committed was not discovered, nor could have been discovered, by the offended party
before 1983. Neither could constructive notice by registration of the forged deed of
sale, which is favorable to the petitioner since the running of the prescriptive period of
the crime shall have to be reckoned earlier, have been done before 1983 as it is
impossible for the petitioner to have registered the deed of sale prior thereto. Even
granting arguendo that the deed of sale was executed by the private complainant,
delivered to the petitioner-accused in August 13, 1983 and registered on the same day,
the ten-year prescriptive period of the crime had not yet elapsed at the time the
information was filed in 1991. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the crime had
not prescribed at the time of the filing of the information.
On the second issue: We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion when it affirmed petitioners conviction by the trial court. The
petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged document
as found by the trial and appellate court. [13] Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that
notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that there is no proof that the petitioner
authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. This
argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct
proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the
Solicitor General, the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when
the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of the
falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the
questioned sale with the Provincial Assessors Office of Sorsogon. [14] In other words,
the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the
subject land from the private complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the
petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence
of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only
person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession,
it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. [15] As it stands, therefore,
we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals.
On the third issue: Petitioner submits that the trial court is without jurisdiction to
order petitioner to vacate the land in question considering that the crime for which he is
charged is falsification.[16] The petitioner insists that the civil aspect involved in the
criminal case at bar refer to the civil damages recoverable ex delito or arising from the

causative act or omission.[17] In addition, petitioner argues that he is entitled to


possession as mortgagee since the private complainant has not properly redeemed the
property in question.
These are specious arguments. The petitioner based his claim of possession
alternatively by virtue of two alternative titles: one, based on the forged deed of sale
and, two, as mortgagee of the land. As already discussed, the deed of sale was forged
and, hence, could not be a valid basis of possession. Neither could his status as
mortgagee be the basis of possession since it is the mortgagor in a contract of
mortgage who is entitled to the possession of the property. We have taken note of the
practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a collateral, possession usually goes
with it.[18] Besides, even assuming that petitioner had a right to possess the subject land,
his possession became unlawful when the private complainant offered to redeem the
property and petitioner unjustly refused. Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his
crime. The trial court, therefore, did not commit any error in ordering petitioner to vacate
the subject property.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit
any reversible error in its Decision dated September 9, 1999 and its Resolution dated
February 15, 2000.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19, 2004]


ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; tis
Something, nothing;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
- Shakespeare: Othello, III, iii, 155.
Every man has a right to build, keep and be favored with a good name. This right is
protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether
as criminal offenses or tortious conduct.
In these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari, [1] petitioner Roberto Brillante
(Brillante), also known as Bobby Brillante, questions his convictions for libel for writing
and causing to be published in 1988 an open letter addressed to then President of the
Republic of the Philippines Corazon C. Aquino discussing the alleged participation of
Atty. Jejomar Binay (Binay), then the OIC Mayor [2] and a candidate for the position of
Mayor in the Municipality (now City) of Makati, and Dr. Nemesio Prudente (Prudente),

then President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in an assassination plot


against Augusto Syjuco (Syjuco), another candidate for Mayor of Makati at that time.
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in
Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some
50 journalists. In the course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay of plotting
the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and
harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists
copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges
against Binay.[3]
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about
the same. Angel Gonong, a writer for the Peoples Journal, wrote a news article entitled
Binay Accused of Plotting Slays of Rivals. It was cleared for publication by Max Buan,
Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of
the Peoples Journal. Gloria Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled
Binay Slay Plan on Syjuco which was cleared for publication by Augusto Villanueva
(Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel (Manuel), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively,
of the News Today.[4]
The open letter was subsequently published under the title Plea to Cory--Save
Makati in newspapers such as the Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine
Daily Inquirer.[5] The pertinent portions of the open letter read:
4. We have received reports that Atty. Binay and his group are plotting the assassination of Mr.
Augusto Bobby Syjuco, now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race.
These reports are:
1. On December 14, 1987, Atty. Binay and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, president of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP), met at Puerto Azul in Cavite with, among others, a
Commander Luming, a Major Rafael Nieva, and a commander Francis Baloloy. Subject of the
meeting was Winning the Election at all Costs.
xxx xxx xxx
3. On December 17, 1987, Dr. Prudente, Atty. Binay and others including some unidentified
government officials discussed operation Dirty Fingers after the ASEAN Summit Meeting.
The operation involves terrorism, the use of public school teachers, the threat to kill or hurt
political ward and precinct leaders not supporting or opposed to Atty. Binay, and to use these as
samples to show rivals that his group is capable of doing so, the planting of his squads in places
close to potential targets, the mobilization of marshals who will bring firearms and to ferry
hitmen to target points. The marshals will also be used as pointers and to shelter the hitmen
after accomplishing or performing their missions.
xxx xxx
xxx
4. On December 8, 1987, a certain Emilio Anecito, tagged as a hitman in the group of Dr.
Prudente, has been specifically assigned to assassinate Mr. Syjuco, Aniceto has been described as
Iranian mestizo looking, about five (5) feet in height, fair complexioned curly haired, sporting a
mustache, and fairly built bodily. He is said to be a silent person and supposedly has a perfect
score in hit missions assigned to him.
xxx xxx
xxx
5. On December 10, 1987, it was reported that Major Rafael Nieva had been assigned to work
with Mr. Aniceto, Nievas background report is that he:
xxx
xxx
xxx

c. Was hired by Dr. Prudente as security officer and personal bodyguard.


d. Is a notorious killer used by the PUP forces and only his employer can
control or stop him.[6]
As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati fiscals
office four complaints for libel against Brillante, as the author of the letter; Gonong,
Buan and Camino for writing and publishing the news article on Brillantes accusations
against him in the Peoples Journal;[7] Hernandez, Villanueva and Manuel for writing and
publishing a similar news article in theNews Today;[8] and for publishing the open letter,
Buan and Camino of the Peoples Journal;[9] and Arcadio A. Sison (Sison) as President
of A. Sison and Associates, an advertising agency.[10]
Francisco Baloloy (Baloloy), who was identified in the open letter as among the
persons who attended the meeting organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the
assassination of Syjuco, likewise filed a criminal complaint for libel against Brillante,
Domingo Quimlat (Quimlat), Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita, and Sison as
President of A. Sison and Associates.[11]
Subsequently, five Informations for libel against Brillante were filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Similarly, on January 15, 1988, Prudente filed four complaints for libel against
Brillante and the editors and publishers of the newspapers where the open letter was
published. On January 16, 1989, four Informations for libel were filed against Brillante
and several co-accused with the RTC of Manila. Brillantes co-accused in these cases
were: (i) Buan, Editor-in-Chief of the Peoples Journal;[12] (ii) Amado P. Macasaet
(Macasaet), Publisher, and Noel Albano (Albano), Editor, of the Malaya;[13] (iii) Sison,
Public Relations Officer and Federico D. Pascual (Pascual), Publisher and Executive
Editor of the Philippine Daily Inquirer;[14] and (iv) Sison, Public Relations Officer and
Quimlat, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita.[15]
Buan was not included in the trial of the cases in the RTC-Manila because he
eluded arrest and was not arraigned. The charges against Pascual and Quimlat were
dropped upon motion of the Assistant Prosecutor. The charges against Macasaet and
Albano were also eventually dismissed upon motion of the prosecution. Only Brillante
and Sison remained as accused.[16] Both pleaded not guilty to the charges against them.
On January 25, 1993, the RTC-Manila acquitted Sison but found Brillante guilty of
libel on four counts. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision in the
consolidated cases reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused Bobby Brillante, also known as
Roberto Brillante, guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four (4) counts, as author or writer, of
LIBEL defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Article 355 of
the same code, and sentencing him in each count to the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of
ONE (1) DAY for every P8.00 that he is unable to pay, but which subsidiary imprisonment shall
not exceed EIGHT (8) months.
Accused Bobby Brillante is ordered to pay the private offended party, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, the
total sum of P1,000,000.00 in these four (4) cases for moral damages which the latter suffered.
Accused Arcadio Sison is acquitted in the two cases against him, his guilt of the charges against
him not having been established beyond reasonable [doubt].

Two-third (2/3) of the costs is assessed against accused Bobby Brillante while the remaining onethird (1/3) is charged de oficio.[17]
Subsequently, Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Manila to the Court of
Appeals.[18] Brillante contended that when the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 8969614 to 17 were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989, the offense had already
prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since the publication of the open
letter on January 10, 11 and 12, 1988. He also averred that the open letter which he
wrote and caused to be published was not defamatory and was without malice. Brillante
also claimed that the publication is considered privileged communication. Finally, he
argued that he is entitled to equal protection of the laws and should be acquitted of the
offenses charged like his co-accused.[19]
On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R.
No. 14475 affirming the decision of the RTC-Manila. The appellate court held that the
offense of libel had not yet prescribed because the one-year prescription period should
be reckoned from the time that the private complainant Prudente filed his complaint with
the fiscals office on January 15, 1988 and not when the Informations were filed by the
prosecutor on January 16, 1989. The Court of Appeals added that under Section 1,
Rule 110, which took effect during the pendency of the cases against Brillante, the
institution of the complaint before the fiscals office or the courts for preliminary
investigation interrupts the prescriptive period of the offense charged. It held that being
a procedural rule, Section 1, Rule 110, applies to the cases against Brillante. [20]
The Court of Appeals further held that the RTC-Manila did not err in finding that
Brillante had committed libel against Prudente. It explained that the open letter, when
read in its entirety, gives the impression that Prudente is part of a purported criminal
conspiracy to kill Syjuco. According to the appellate court, the open letter is a malicious
defamation which produced in the minds of the readers Brillantes intent and purpose to
injure the reputation of Prudente, thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule.[21] The Court of Appeals rejected Brillantes argument that the open letter may
be considered privileged communication because the evidence does not show that
Brillante wrote and published it out of a legal, moral or social duty.[22]
The appellate court also debunked Brillantes allegation that he was denied the
equal protection of the laws because while the charges against his co-accused were
dropped, those against him were not. According to the appellate court, he and his coaccused are not similarly situated because he was convicted of libel upon a finding that
there existed evidence beyond reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction. In contrast,
the charges against his co-accused were dismissed and their guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
Brillantes contention that his conviction for libel on four counts gave rise to double
jeopardy because under our jurisdiction protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses was also overruled by the
appellate court. It held that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a
separate distinct offense and the charge for one instance of publication shall not bar a
charge for subsequent and separate publications. [24]
Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 19, 1995.[25]

In the meantime, Brillante was likewise convicted for libel on five counts by the
RTC-Makati in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721.
The dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 22, 1993 of the RTC-Makati reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721, finding accused
Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of libel charged in each of these five (5) cases, and sentencing him in each of the cases to
suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2)
YEARS prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay fine, likewise in each of these (5) cases,
of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency pursuant to Article 39, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
2.
As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, Jejomar C. Binay,
the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, in all the four (4) charges
(Crim. Cases Nos. 88-410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721), considering the latters professional
and political standing in society, he being a lawyer and former Governor of the Metro Manila
Commission as well as director of various government agencies.
3.
As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, Francisco Baloloy,
the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, in Criminal Case No. 883060.
4.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410 and 88-1412, ACQUITTING accused Max Buan, Jr.,
Angel Gonong and Louie Camino, of the two charges against them on the ground that their guilt
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
5.
In Criminal Case No. 88-1411 (except for accused Brillante) ordering the same
ARCHIVED on the ground that the other accused herein, Gloria Hernandez, Augusto Villanueva
and Virgilio Manuel, have not been brought to the jurisdiction of this Court; let alias warrant
issue for their arrest.
6.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-3060 and 89-721, likewise ordering the same ARCHIVED
ONLY WITH RESPECT TO accused Arcadio Sison, who has not been brought to the jurisdiction
of this Court; let alias warrant issue for his arrest.
7.
In all these cases, ordering accused Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante, to
pay the proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Makati to the Court of Appeals,[27] raising
essentially the same arguments in his appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475.
On February 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15174 affirming the decision of the RTC-Makati. It held that the filing of the
complaint before the fiscals office interrupts the period of prescription because Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code did not make any distinction whether the complaint is
filed in court for preliminary investigation or for trial on the merits, because the filing of
the complaint for preliminary investigation is the initial step of criminal proceedings. It
added that it would be unfair to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays which are not within his control. [28]
The appellate court also ruled that the open letter cannot be considered privileged
communication because it contains libelous matter and was circulated to the public.
Citing U.S. v. Galeza,[29] it held that while it is the right and duty of a citizen to file a

complaint regarding a misconduct on the part of a public official, such complaint must
be addressed solely to the officials having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges. [30]
Lastly, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts observation that unlike
Brillante, his co-accused editors and publishers could not be held liable for libel because
the news reports regarding the January 7, 1988 press conference which were published
in their respective newspapers sufficiently informed the readers that the reference to
Binays involvement in the assassination plot were allegations made by Brillante during
the press conference and that said allegations were reported for the sole purpose of
informing the public of the news regarding the candidates adverted to in the report. [31]
Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, but the
motion was denied in a Resolution dated August 17, 1995.[32]
Thereafter, Brillante filed the present Petitions for Review on March 13, 1995 in
G.R. No. 118757 and on October 10, 1995 in G.R. No. 121571. In G.R. No. 118757, he
raises the following arguments:
I
THE OFFENSE OF LIBEL CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION (sic) HAD ALREADY
PRESCRIBED WHEN THE SAID INFORMATION (sic) WAS FILED.
II
HE IS NOT GUILTY OF LIBEL HE IS CHARGED WITH, BECAUSE THE LETTER HE
CAUSED TO BE PUBLISHED WAS WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED WITHOUT ANY
MALICE [N]OR MALICIOUS INTENT TO MALIGN THE PERSON, HONOR AND
REPUTATION OF THE COMPLAINANT [PRUDENTE/BINAY] BUT SOLELY FOR THE
JUSTIFIED AND HONEST PURPOSE OF BRINGING TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL
AUTHORITIES CONCERNED THE REPORTS THEREIN MENTIONED FOR
APPROPRIATE ACTION. WHERE THERE IS NO MALICE, THERE IS NO LIBEL.
III
IN TRUTH, PUBLICLY KNOWN PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES OF COMPLAINANT, DR.
NEMESIO PRUDENTE, ALREADY IN OPERATION LONG BEFORE JANUARY 12, 1988,
INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT INCAPABLE OF NOURISHING VIOLENT INTENTIONS
AGAINST THE POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF MAYOR BINAY.
IV
MOREOVER, CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTER REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER
INDUBITABLY RELATES TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THEN GOING ON AS WELL
AS THE PARTICIPATION OF PETITIONER AND COMPLAINANT THEREIN, WHATEVER
IS CONTAINED IN SAID LETTER CAN AT MOST BE NO MORE THAN A POLITICAL
LIBEL, WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE.
WE EARNESTLY URGE THAT THIS PROPOSITION BE ENUNCIATED AS A
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW ON LIBEL.
V
IN THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY PERCEIVE ANY
CRIMINAL LIBEL IN THIS CASE, THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER IS
CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY, AS TO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
AWARDED TO COMPLAINANT.[33]
In G.R. No. 121571, he makes the following assignments of error:
I
THE OFFENSE HAD PRESCRIBED

II
THE PUBLICATION WAS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
III
THE PUBLICATION WAS MADE WITHOUT MALICE
IV
IT MAY, AT MOST, ALSO BE CONSIDERED A POLITICAL LIBEL WHICH IS NOT
PUNISHABLE
V
THE DECISION VIOLATES PETITIONERS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS
VI
THE PENALTY IS CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE[34]
With respect to the issue of prescription, Brillante anchors his claim on the Courts
ruling in People v. Tayco[35] that the prescriptive period of a crime is interrupted only
upon the filing of the complaint in court and not the filing thereof with the fiscals office.
According to Brillante, the ruling in People v. Olarte[36] did not modify the doctrine
in Tayco because in Olarte, the Court referred to a complaint filed in court, not in the
fiscals office. The ruling in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[37] that a complaint filed with
the fiscals office also interrupts the prescriptive period of a criminal offense allegedly
cannot overturn the ruling in Olarte because the latter was decided by the Court En
Banc while Francisco was decided by a mere division of the Court. [38]
It is further asserted by Brillante that the rule in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure that the filing of the criminal complaint with the fiscals office interrupts the
prescriptive period, cannot be applied retroactively to the cases against him because it
impairs his vested right to have the cases against him dismissed on the ground of
prescription.[39] In addition, he claims that Section 6(b), Rule 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which states that [t]he pendency of a petition for suspension of the
criminal action still undergoing preliminary investigation in the fiscals office shall
interrupt the prescriptive period for filing the corresponding complaint of information
supports his position that prior to the amendment of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in
1985, the prevailing rule was that only the filing of the complaint or information in court
tolls the prescriptive period for a criminal offense. [40]
Brillante denies that he is liable for libel for causing to be published his open letter
implicating Binay, Prudente and their associates in a planned assassination of Syjuco
as well as election-related terrorism, and in uttering remarks against Binay and his
associates during the January 7, 1988 press conference. According to Brillante, his
statements and utterances were privileged communication because he made them
public out of a legal, moral and social duty to safeguard the sanctity of the elections to
be held on January 18, 1988, and to avoid the unnecessary loss of life. [41] Since his
statements were privileged communication, malice cannot be presumed from them.
[42]
Brillante adds that at the time he made the statements, he honestly believed that they
were true. Citing an American case, Bays v. Hunt,[43] he contends that where there is an
honest belief in the truth of the charges made, and the publication is in good faith, one is
not responsible even for publishing an untruth. [44]

It is further asserted by Brillante that since Binay, the subject of the allegedly
defamatory statements is a public figure, his (Brillantes) comments affecting Binays
reputation is constitutionally protected speech. [45]
Brillante also urges the Court to reverse his convictions, reasoning that at most,
what he may have committed is political libel which should exempt him form criminal
liability, considering that election campaigns can become very heated and candidates
from rival camps often make charges and countercharges which are offensive to the
name, honor and prestige of their opponents. He contends that statements made by a
candidate against his rivals, although derogatory, are for the purpose of convincing the
electorate to prevent suspicious characters from holding public office. In essence, he
posits the view that political libel should be deemed constitutionally protected speech.
[46]

Brillante likewise argues that the multiple publication rule, i.e., that each publication
constitutes one offense of libel, should not have been applied to him, considering the
factual background of the open letter and the statements uttered by him during the
press conference.[47]
Anent the issue of equal protection, Brillante contends that he should have been
acquitted like his co-accused Angel Gonong who wrote the news article in the Peoples
Journal regarding the January 7, 1988 press conference and Buan and Camino who
were the editors of that publication. [48]
The Solicitor General filed a Comment on each of the petitions.
The Solicitor General insists that the one-year prescriptive period for libel should be
reckoned from the date of filing of the complaints with the office of the prosecutor as
clarified by the Court in Olarte and Francisco and as stated in the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which applies to the complaints filed against
Brillante as of October 1988.[49]
On the issue of libel, the Solicitor General insists that Brillantes statements in the
open letter clearly impute upon Prudente and Binay a criminal conspiracy to
assassinate Syjuco.[50] The Solicitor General also maintains that contrary to Brillantes
claims, the open letter cannot be considered privileged communication because it was
published without justifiable motives and it was circulated for the information of the
general public instead of addressing the letter solely to the authorities who had the
power to curb the dangers alleged by Brillante in the letter.[51]
The Solicitor General disagrees with Brillantes contention that his statements are
constitutionally protected because they are criticisms of official conduct and deal with
public figures. According to the Solicitor General, the record shows that Brillante did not
have enough basis to pass off his accusations as true considering that he admitted to
relying on unnamed intelligence sources.[52]
It is also argued by the Solicitor General that Brillantes statements cannot be
exempt from criminal liability on the ground that such statements were political libel.
Brillantes claim, the Solicitor General asserts, has no basis in law or jurisprudence. [53]
With respect to the issue of equal protection, the Solicitor General avers that
Brillante cannot be acquitted like his co-accused publishers, editors and writers because
their alleged participation in the commission of the libel are different from Brillante who
is the author of the libelous statements. The writers of the news reports were only
narrating what took place during the January 7, 1988 press conference, and wrote the

news articles to inform the public of Brillantes statements. In the case of the editors
and publishers who published the open letter, they indicated in their respective
publications that the open letter was a paid advertisement. The publication of the news
reports in the newspapers was also done to inform the public of what transpired during
the January 7, 1988 press conference.[54]
The Solicitor General further argues that the penalty imposed upon Brillante is not
excessive but is in accordance with law, which considers one publication of a libelous
statement as a distinct offense from another publication of the same statement. [55]
Thus, the Solicitor General prays that Brillantes petitions be denied. [56]
Brillante thereafter filed a Reply to each of the Solicitor Generals Comments. The
replies reiterate Brillantes arguments in his petitions. [57]
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the offense of libel
had already prescribed when the Informations were filed with the RTC-Manila and RTCMakati; (2) whether Brillante is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of libel; (3) whether
Brillante was denied the equal protection of the laws; and (4) whether the penalty
imposed upon him is excessive.
Save for the issue on the amount of moral damages, there is no merit in the
petitions.
With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph of Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel or other similar offenses shall
prescribe in one year. In determining when the one-year prescriptive period should be
reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the
rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of offenses:
Computation of prescription of offenses.The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The aforequoted provision expressly states that prescriptive period shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The meaning of the phrase
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information in Article 91 has been
settled in the landmark case of People v. Olarte,[58] where the Court settled divergent
views as to the effect of filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of
preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period of the offense. The Court therein
held that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts
the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. It explained thus:
the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not
try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in
the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits.
Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account

of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to
initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must
have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if
the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case had been shown.[59]
Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[60] clarified that the filing of the
complaint with the fiscals office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of
a crime:
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation,
a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overruling also
of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or
denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct
the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities,
criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city
fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered
like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of
municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First instance . . ..[61]
There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in Olarte and Francisco as
Brillante erroneously suggests. Olarte laid down the doctrine that a complaint filed for
purposes of preliminary investigation tolls the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense. The criminal complaint for libel in that case was filed, for the purpose of
preliminary investigation, with the Justice of the Peace Court in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan. Hence, in setting the doctrine, the Court referred to the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court. [62] The question of whether the doctrine laid down
in Olarte also applies to criminal complaints filed with the prosecutors office was settled
in Francisco. Specifically, the Court in Francisco amplified the Olarte doctrine when it
categorically ruled that the filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the
running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in ruling that the offense of
libel had not yet prescribed when the informations against Brillante and his co-accused
were filed in the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati.
Neither did the appellate court err in sustaining Brillantes conviction for libel.
Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. [63]

There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in
the cases at bar.
An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it
ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect,
whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which
tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.[64] Brillantes statements during the January 7, 1988 press
conference and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible acts allegedly
committed by Binay, Prudente and their associates, such as the use of goons to
threaten Binays opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjucos assassination.
The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the
defamatory material is communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the
person to whom the defamatory statement refers. [65] In the cases at bar, it was proven
that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press conference attended by
some fifty journalists and caused the open letter to be published in several newspapers,
namely, News Today, Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their
associates as the persons who participated in the planning of the election-related
terrorism and the assassination of Syjuco not only in his open letter but also during the
press conference.
Thus, the determination of Brillantes culpability for libel hinges on the question of
whether his statements were made with malice.
Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal
ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of
the person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. [66] It is
present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity
thereof.[67]
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general rule, that every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive is shown. [68]
As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the
defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication. [69]
Privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged or conditionally
privileged. The Court in Orfanel v. People of the Philippines[70] differentiated absolutely
privileged communication from conditionally privileged communication in this manner:
A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its
author acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the
discharge of their functions as such, official communications made by public officers in the
performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in
their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers
given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings,
provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are
responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other
hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although

containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad
faith.[71] (Emphasis supplied.)
Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those mentioned in,
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
1. A private communication made by a person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.[72]
Brillante claims that he wrote the open letter and uttered the statement complained
of during the January 7, 1988 press conference out of a social duty to disclose to all
concerned the dangers to which he and his fellow candidate Syjuco were exposed in
view of the concerted actions of Binay and Prudente. [73] In effect, he argues that his
defamatory statements and utterances fall under Article 354, No. 1 and are in the nature
of privileged communication; hence, malice cannot be presumed but must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court is not convinced.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer
or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the
power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are
made in good faith and without malice. [74]
With respect to the first requisite, the Court in U.S. v. Caete[75] clarified that the
interest sought to be protected by the person making the communication need not be
his own, but may refer to an interest shared by the other members of society.
It may therefore be argued that Brillantes statements, which according to him were
made in order to protect himself and Syjuco as Binays rivals in the 1988 elections, as
well as to protect the electorate from possible acts of terrorism by Binay, Prudente and
their associates and from casting their votes for undeserving candidates, satisfy the first
requisite.
However, as the Solicitor General noted, Brillantes statements were based merely
on unconfirmed intelligence reports. His belief in such intelligence reports hardly
justifies the publication of such serious imputations against his political rivals. As a
journalist and as a candidate for public office, Brillante should have known that it is
necessary to further verify the truth or at least the reliability of the intelligence reports
before making them public. His hasty publication thereof negates the existence of good
faith and justifiable motives.
The pronouncement of the Court in U.S. v. Galeza[76] is enlightening:
Every communication is privileged which is made in good faith with a view to obtain redress
for some injury received or to prevent or punish some public abuse. The privilege should not be
abused. If such communication be made maliciously and without probable cause, the pretense
under which it is made, instead of furnishing a defense, will aggravate the case of the defendant.

And a party will be taken to have acted maliciously if he eagerly seizes on some slight and
frivolous matter, and without any inquiry into the merits, without even satisfying himself that the
account of the matter that has reached him is correct, hastily concludes that a great public
scandal has been brought to light which calls for the immediate intervention of the people.
(Citations omitted.)[77]
It is, however, the absence of the second element of a privileged communication
that unequivocally negates the characterization of Brillantes statements as privileged
communication. The law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal,
moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the
person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have
the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement.
In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then
President Aquino, the communication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also
published in several newspapers of general circulation and was thus made known to the
general public. Even if the interest sought to be protected belongs not just to Brillante
but to the public in general, certainly, the general public does not have the power to
remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by Brillante in publishing the open
letter or in uttering similar statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference.
Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the information which
essentially destroyed the reputations of the complainants. His lack of selectivity is
indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.
In Daez v. Court of Appeals,[78] Daez was charged with libel for publishing a letter
which accused the Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan of corruption. The letter addressed
to the Mayor was sent not only to him but also to the Municipal Court, Municipal Council
and Chief of Police of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Daez contended therein that he was not
guilty of libel because he was not motivated by malice or ill-will in publishing the letter,
but rather, he did it out of good intentions and a social duty to bring about reforms in the
administration of the municipal government of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The Court
affirmed his conviction for libel and held:
The goodness of the intention is not always sufficient by itself to justify the publication of an
injurious fact; thus the goodness of the end is not a sufficient motive to warrant the employment
of illicit means to obtain it. The existence of justifiable motives is a question which has to be
decided by taking into consideration not only the intention of the author of the publication but all
the other circumstances of each particular case. A communication made bona fide upon any
subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has
a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
However, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public.As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to
make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to
those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and
the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional
requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to
inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or
interest in connection therewith. In the instant case, none of the persons to whom the letter was

sent, was vested with the power of supervision over the mayor or the authority to investigate the
charges made against the latter. (Citations omitted.)[79]
Thus, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the statements
made by Brillante during the press conference and in the open letter do not qualify as
privileged communication.
Indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit
all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity,
to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for. However, to shield such
privilege from abuse, the law itself requires at all times that such petitions or
communications shall be made in good faith or with justifiable motives. If it is
established that the communication was made maliciously or to persons who could not
furnish the protection sought, then the author thereof cannot seek protection under the
law.[80] As was explained by the Court in Caete:
The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost possible
freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and
appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into contact,
and like considerations make it equally proper that members of a religious organization should
enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior of their
spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right must be exercised in good faith, and
may not with impunity be made the occasion for the venting of private spite. It is subject to the
limitation and restriction that such complaints must be made to a functionary having authority to
redress the evils complained of; that they must be made in good faith and that they must not be
actuated by malice.[81]
The Court in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui[82] clarified that the fact that a
communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable; the privileged
character of the communication simply does away with the presumption of malice, and
the plaintiff has to prove the fact of malice in such case.
However, since the open letter and the statements uttered by Brillante during the
January 7, 1988 press conference are defamatory and do not qualify as conditionally
privileged communication, malice is presumed and need not be proven separately from
the existence of the defamatory statement. [83]
Considering that all the elements of libel are present in the cases against Brillante,
the Court finds that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in
affirming his convictions by the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati.
Neither does the Court find any basis in law to uphold Brillantes proposition that his
statements made during the January 7, 1988 press conference and those in his open
letter constitute political libel and should thus be exempt from liability. Unfounded and
malicious statements made by one against another in the course of an election
campaign, or by reason of differences in political views are not per se constitutionally
protected speech. Our laws on defamation [84] provide for sanctions against unjustified
and malicious injury to a persons reputation and honor. Although wider latitude is given
to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their
performance of official duties,[85] or against public figures in relation to matters of public
interest involving them,[86] such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within
the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or

unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties, the same may give rise to
criminal and civil liability.
With respect to the third issue, the Court agrees with the appellate court that
Brillantes right to equal protection of the laws was not violated when he was convicted
of libel while his co-accused were acquitted.
The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather, it permits of reasonable
classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences,
one class may be treated differently from another.[87] It is sufficient that the law operates
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed.[88]
As mentioned earlier, the cases against some of some of Brillantes co-accused
were dismissed during the pendency of the cases before the trial courts. [89] Still, some of
his co-accused remained at large,[90] leaving the trial courts with no option but to archive
the case as against them. Brillantes other co-accused were acquitted since, unlike
Brillante, their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. [91]
The foregoing clearly shows that Brillante was in a situation different from his coaccused. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt his liability for
libel, as the author of the open letter and the source of the defamatory statements
uttered against Binay, et al. during the January 7, 1988 press conference.
As such, his conviction for libel was not violative of the equal protection clause.
The Court likewise finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the
penalties imposed upon him by the trial courts of Manila and Makati.
The penalty for libel by means of writing or similar means is prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. [92] It is likewise
settled that a single defamatory statement, if published several times, gives rise to as
many offenses as there are publications. This is the multiple publication rule which is
followed in our jurisdiction, as explained in Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[93]
We follow the "multiple publication" rule in the Philippines. Thus, in the cases of Montinola D.
Montalvo (34 Phil. 662, [1916]) and United States v. Sotto (36 Phil. 389 [1917]), this Court ruled
that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. Stated more
succinctly for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, every time the same written matter is communicated such communication is
considered a distinct and separate publication of the libel.
We explained this as follows:
"The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was to the
effect that each communication of a written or printed matter was a distinct and separate
publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule
('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be
favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single publication'
rule which originated in New York, under which any single integrated publication, such as one
edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to
only one cause of action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people. . .
(50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 cited in Time, Inc. v. Reyes)" (39 SCRA 301, 313 [1971]).[94]

There is therefore no legal basis for Brillantes claim that the penalties imposed
upon him are excessive.
The Court however agrees with Brillante that the awards of moral damages in the
two cases to private complainants Binay, Prudente and Baloloy are excessive
considering the circumstances surrounding the making and the publication of the
defamatory statements. Accordingly, the award of moral damages in favor of private
complainant Prudente is reduced to a total of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 and 89-69617;
and the award of moral damages to private complainant Binay is reduced to Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 881412 and 89-721. The award of moral damages to private complainant Baloloy in
Criminal Case No. 88-3060 is likewise reduced to Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions are GRANTED in part.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private complainant Dr.
Nemesio Prudente in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 is reduced to
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CR No. 15174 is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award
of moral damages to private complainants Atty. Jejomar Binay and Francisco Baloloy is
reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 881410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in
Criminal Case No. 88-3060, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
ROBERTO BRILLANTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 October 19, 2004 TINGA,
Facts: Roberto Brillante, then a candidate for the position of councillor in
Makati City held a pres conference where he accused Jejomar Binay, a
candidate for mayoralty in Makati, and Nemesio Prudente of plotting an
assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco, another mayoral candidate in
Makati. Several journalists wrote articles regarding the same and an open
letter was published as well. Later, Binay and Prudente both filed libel
charges against Brillante. The trial court found Brillante guilty of four counts
of libel, which decision the CA affirmed.
Issue Whether or not the act of libel charged against petitioner has
prescribed when the Information was filed before the trial court
Ruling No. Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of
libel shall prescribe within one year. In determining when the one year
prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91
of the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of
prescriptive periods of offenses which states that period of prescription shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. In the case, a

proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or


acquittal.
[G.R. No. 139033. December 18, 2002]
JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Camarines Sur, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The instant petition is one for the review, by way of appeal by certiorari, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the Resolution
dated June 14, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn) [2] of the
1978 Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur. The Information alleged:
That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay Ombao,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted himself in
a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting
the room where voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting
center plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the
proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers.[3]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise
known as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which
eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and
executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987.
On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was
submitted by petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the
presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his
bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion
to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty
imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for reconsideration thereof was
likewise denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the orders of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the warrant of
arrest and motion for reconsideration.
On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was filed
before us.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the penalty
imposed upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The Court of
Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision, engaged in judicial legislation when it
added the phrase by escaping during the term of the sentence thereto, so petitioner
claims.
Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals did
not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled:
Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final sentence prescribed as
follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty
of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as follows:
Computation of the prescription of penalties The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it
shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some
foreign country with which his Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment as minimum to three
(3) years of imprisonment as maximum.
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978 Election Code. This
law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This being the case, We have to apply the
provision of the Revised Penal Code which allows the application of said code in suppletory
character when it provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article 25 in relation to
Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such judgment would have
been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did not appear for such proceeding. And he
has never been apprehended.
The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24, 1996.
The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.

2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured,
or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or committed
another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date of the
evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.
(p. 93, Revised Penal Code by L. Reyes 93 ed.)
From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed because the
circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy the second element, to wit That the convict
evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence. As a matter of
fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this
Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,[4] where we declared that, for prescription of
penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during
the term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to
deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties
shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the
felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code,
evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from
the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be
said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner
begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and
tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was
petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to
those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he
refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded
therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and
applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the
pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never
started to run in his favor.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas
y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in
a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction,
Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accusedappellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1 insists
that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the
lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the
affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo
Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of
the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in
part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;


and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law
is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled
upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132
of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia
firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de
las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y
plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts
it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior
thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente,
en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase."
And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before
judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise
exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco
holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed.,
pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the
term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also
brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that
a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period

for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November
9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty,
the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that
criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action
and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous
situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case
where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as
was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme
Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v.Satorre 6 by
dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established,
and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the
pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accusedappellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo
and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him
should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala
v. Marcelino Polinar 7 andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of
one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to

final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in
view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled
therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in
view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep.
Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal
Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action
still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes
the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the
civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but
from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused
who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of
his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for

recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as
plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused
should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can
be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for
civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this
long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with
and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but
only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although
it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8,
1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification
and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23
(should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action
for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People
and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals,
L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina,
24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the

Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his


possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan
arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case
had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is
under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the
civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the
settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil
action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from
a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delictowhen his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that
is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex
delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during
appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to


pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal
action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering
civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In
such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal
inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of
the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such
that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant
pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such
civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared
and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article
30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate
would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made
a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it
upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil
liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon

death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiegoresolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on
appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural
law, this course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom
that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities
had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue
to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of
the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in
criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated
in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the

restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive


enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not
form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1)
treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished
upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending
finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended)
file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but
on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil
action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by
provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate
civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property,
or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the
Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other
than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado,
in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article

1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 115521 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died.
Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to the civil liability of Bayotas arising from his commission of the
offense charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability.
HELD:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of the
convict personal liabilities are extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment.

Thus the court made a ruling as follows:


1.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his


criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon;
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Aricle 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts, Delicts,Quasidelicts;
3.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be
pursued but only by way of separate civil action and may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation aside from delicts;
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil
liability based solely on the act of rape. Hence, his civil liability also
extinguished together with his criminal liability upon his death.
Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111
FACTS: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of
his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required
the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the
Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did
not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego
insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing
his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of
the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore,
civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
ISSUE/HELD: WON death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his civil liability? AFFIRMATIVE
RATIO DICIDENDI:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from
a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which
may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the
quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that
which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence
and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30
to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal
would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto
survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the
criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter.

In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final


determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and
is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil
liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished
from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which
refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life
from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of
this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate
civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a
summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil
action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article
30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiegos appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate
would be liable.
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis
of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiegos conviction
and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently,
although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiegos civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action
already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiegos civil liability.
We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

CIVIL LIABILITY CASES


MELBA
QUINTO, petitioner,
PACHECO, respondents.

vs. DANTE

ANDRES

and

RANDYVER

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a
Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about
eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and
Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. [1] Wilson
assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a
grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system. [2]
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and
Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a
meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. [3] After a while, respondent
Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left [4] without
saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the
boys lifeless body down in the grassy area. [5] Shocked at the sudden turn of events,
Garcia fled from the scene.[6] For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died.
Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her. [7]
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been
conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint
against the respondents for Wilsons death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and
petitioner Quinto.[8]Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage
system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw
Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his
carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of
the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report
containing the following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long sleeves and
dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy particles with
bloody path.

Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody froth.
Brain autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.[9]
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and
Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac,
charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and
maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to
drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified
on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims head and the
abrasion on the latters left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming
from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated
that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the
lumina of the larynx and trachea (Nakahigop ng putik). Dr. Aguda stated that such
injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by force. [11] On
cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp was caused by
a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument.
He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head
could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons
head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of
water, the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused
by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He
also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of
strangulation.[12]
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had
admitted the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof,
[13]
the prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held
that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of
preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.[14]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December
21, 2001. It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the
accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above
rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal
action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the
accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91
Phil. 672)[15]
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.[16]
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head
hitting the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might
have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his
head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to
some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in
ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the respondents to
kill the victim, and in considering that respondent Andres even informed her of Wilsons
death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal
Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the
victim which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that
the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt,
considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring
out Wilsons cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage system only
when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that
either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and
severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution
failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and
caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the latters death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. [17] The civil liability of
such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.[18] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with

the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [19] With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged
into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. [20]
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society,
to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. [21] The sole
purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused. [22] While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the
cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/or
restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there
is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the
civil liability may arise does not exist. [23]
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. [24] Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course
of human life or events, while logical means that there is a rational connection
between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.[25]
There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of
the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The
cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica
del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido);
the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the
concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la
falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act
such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.[26]
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a)
there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed
and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
(b)
the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. [27]
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its
nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the
factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual

act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. [28] A different doctrine
would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard.[29] This Court has emphasized that:
Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. [30]
In People v. Quianzon,[31] the Supreme Court held:
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to the
present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act and in
this case, the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil,
the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the
result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was
the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is
evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.[32]
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo.
In People v. Delim,[33] the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the act.
Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder,
there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately
killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.[34]
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that
presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not
sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants. [35]
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of evidence
is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want

of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.[36]
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil
liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the
respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of
Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr.
Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp.
But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He
presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object
or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard
and his head hit a hard object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is the hematoma, caused on the back
of the head might be due to the victims falling on his back and his head
hitting a pavement?
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is
strong enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete
pavement, then it is possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head
hit the pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?
A It is also possible.
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is
possible that he might have taken in some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would
indicate that the victim was still alive when he was placed under water. [37]
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victims face
could have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be
caused by the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough
surface.
Q Rough surface?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs
that the victim was strangled?
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.[38]
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might
have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:

Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when
the victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a
blunt object and might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?
A - If the fall if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.
[39]

The trial court took into account the following facts:


Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were stones
inside the culvert. (See Exhibit D to D-3). The stones could have caused the victim to slip
and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with
water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his
head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water and drown.[40]
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion
based on the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the parties,
and its conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given
conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the
outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal
of the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia
testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he
refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside. [41] Respondent Andres had no
flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the
abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the
abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or post
mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both
the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently,
any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the
respondents in hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious
crimes for no reason at all.[42] However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased
is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the
person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any illmotive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was
invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres
used to go to their house and play with her son before the latters death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going
from her mother who is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.) [43]

When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent
Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her sons
death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres
followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
A He went with me, Sir.
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres
was with you?
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at
the culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed,
Sir.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante
Andres also came or arrived?
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.[44]
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause
of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECOG.R. No.


155791. March 16, 2005
Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were
fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a
demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the respondents
liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to
prove their liability for Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the order to
the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned.
The CA ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merely based on
reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not
commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule
and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper.
Acquittalin a criminal action bars the civil action arising there from where the
judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal
acts imputed to them.
Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondents criminal liability carries
with it the extinction of their civil liability.

Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
ofcivil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish
the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or
similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or,
in general, to maintain socialorder. The sole purpose of the civil action is the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may
arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any
ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased and as held by
the the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents
rest, i.e., that the petitioner hasa cause of action against the respondents for
damages.

[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]


LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks
to annul and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order
dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due
course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and
allowing execution against the petitioner of the subsidiary indemnity arising from the
offense committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide
and double physical injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of
the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Double Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of


Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person in
charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in
the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to
prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said
dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a
result of which said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and
sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate
no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage in the
amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona with plate no. NAL
-138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the amount of
P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by
Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined
amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven
by Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount
and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto
Aseron thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount; that due to
the strong impact caused by the collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y Julian
and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete were
hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2
passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries
which required medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days
which incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same
period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained physical injuries
which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period
of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991,
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of
Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo
Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and
compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning
capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys
fees, plus the costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment
became final and executory.

Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused
Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner
Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special
Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration" [6]praying that the judgment dated February
4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a
subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for
lack of merit on September 16, 1991.[7]Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[8] on September
25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the
subsidiary civil liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and
dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. [10] The
other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and
satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991. [11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September
16, 1991, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated
February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was concerned, and
(2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of execution against
the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due
process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused
Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992,
disposing as follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE
COURSE and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of
persuasive force and effect."[13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This
was denied in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE
PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED
OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO
FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF
SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
DAY IN COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo
spped

IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE


AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE
EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN
ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner
against the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final
and executory when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration
concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the
criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of
preliminary injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to
prove the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused.
Nor that, alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee
at the time of the incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall give them
due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made.[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues,
there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an
employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.
[19]

In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the
drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding
is that the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case,
he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: Miso
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged
employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris
(supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability
of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained
therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as
still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in
the suit."[20]
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an
accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the

judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,


which is the essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his
truck that was involved in the incident.[22]Further, it was the insurance company, with
which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the
stipulations in their contract.[23] Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings,
despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show
employer-employee relationship.[24] With the convicts application for probation, the trial
courts judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court
did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his
chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the
employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex
old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of
judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion
for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition
thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not
discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the incident. [25] In addition,
counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on December 3, 1991, and
December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for
execution.[26] This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court that the matter
be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel
filed a counter-manifestation[27] that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the
private prosecutor for the execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial
court issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given
the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied
him due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for sustaining
the judgment and orders of the trial court. Mani kx
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143380. April 11, 2005]
OLIMPIO
PANGONOROM
and
METRO
MANILA
TRANSIT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
[1]
This is a petition for review to annul the Decision[2] dated 29 November 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14764, as well as its Resolution [3] dated 5 May
2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
5 February 1993 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 in
Criminal Case No. Q-90-11397.

The Charge
On 21 March 1990, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosario U. Barias filed an Information
charging Olimpio Pangonorom (Olimpio) with reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple slight physical injuries, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the driver and person
in charge of a motor vehicle (MMTC-passenger bus) with plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. 89, did,
then and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same along E. de los
Santos Ave., Quezon Avenue this City, in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner, by then
and there driving the same without due regard to traffic laws and regulations and without taking
the necessary precautions to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such
carelessness, recklessness and imprudence said motor vehicle so driven by him to strike and
collide with an [I]suzu [G]emini car with plate No. NAR-865 L Pil. 89, belonging to Mary
Berba and driven by Carlos Berba y Remulla, thereby causing damages in the total amount
of P42,600.00, Philippine Currency; as a consequence thereof said Carlos Berba sustained
physical injuries for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing
his customary labor for the same period of time and also his passengers namely: Mary Berba y
Matti and Amelia Berba y Mendoza sustained physical injuries for a period of less than nine (9)
days and incapacitated them from performing their customary labor for the same period of time,
thereafter, abandoned said offended parties without aiding them, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended parties in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the
Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on 26 June 1990, Olimpio, with the assistance of counsel, entered
a plea of not guilty.[6]
The Trial
The prosecution presented five witnesses: (1) Carlos R. Berba; (2) Mary M. Berba;
(3) Amelia Berba; (4) Edward Campos; and (5) Enrico B. Estupigan.
On the other hand, the defense presented three witnesses: (1) Olimpio himself; (2)
Milagros Garbo; and (3) Nenita Amado.
The facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows:
The evidence of the prosecution shows that on July 10, 1989 at around 9:00 P.M. Carlos R.
Berba was driving an Isuzu Gemini car bearing Plate No. NAR-865 L Pil. 89 belonging to his
mother Mary Berba. With him inside the car were his mother Mary Berba who was seated in
front beside him and his auntie Amelia Berba who was at the back seat. They were cruising
along EDSA coming from the direction of Makati and headed towards the intersection of EDSA
and Quezon Boulevard but upon nearing 680 Appliances along EDSA, Quezon City, their car
was bumped from behind by MMTC Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. 89
driven by herein accused Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car which was
estimated at P42,600.00 (Exhs. F, F-1). The front and rear portions of their car incurred damages
because by reason of the strong impact at the rear portion of their car, it was pushed forward and
bumped the car in front of it, then it rested near the island. The bus driven by the accused still
travelled a distance of 20 meters from the point of impact. The accused left his bus but they
came to know his name is Olimpio Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its
photographs (Exhs. B and C).

Carlos Berba noticed this bus following them closely at Nepa Q-Mart up to the point of
collision. His car was running along the second lane of EDSA from the island. The MMTC bus
driven by the accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane until it finally occupied the
second lane and bumped his car. Carlos Berba sustained cuts on his shoulder and back because
of broken glasses and was treated at East Avenue Medical Center. He incurred P1,000.00 for
medication (Exhs. G to G-3). Mary Berba sustained contusion, hematoma and abrasion (Exh.
H). Amelia Berba sustained abrasion on his right elbow (Exh. K). Both were also treated at East
Avenue Medical Center.
Edward Campos and Enrico Bantique Estupigan, passengers of MMTC Bus driven by the
accused explained that their bus was running at 70-80 kph when it swerved to the right to avoid
hitting a van stranded at the left side of the island but in the process it hit and bumped an Isuzu
Gemini car in front of it. The rear portion of the Isuzu Gemini car was smashed and the front
part was also damaged as it hit the Lancer car running ahead. The bus driver, herein accused,
fled from the scene.
It was a rainy day, road was slippery, the rain had just stopped but was still drizzling.
The defense on the other hand presented accused Olimpio Pangonorom, Milagros Garbo, Nenita
Amado and documents marked as Exhs. 1 to 15 with sub-markings.
Accused Olimpio Pangonorom testified that he was a driver since 1976, having worked as a
truck driver in Mindanao, then employed as driver of Silangan Transit up to 1981 and from 1981
up to the present is a driver of Metro Manila Transit. He is a holder of professional drivers
license with OR No. 15160307 (Exhs. 1, 1-A). On July 10, 1989 he drove MMTC bus from
Monumento to Baclaran and vice-versa. He was driving MMTC bus between 7:00 8:00 P.M.
along EDSA headed towards Monumento when upon reaching infront of 680 Appliances his bus
was involved in a vehicular accident. It was drizzling, his bus was running at a speed of 70 kph
along the third lane of EDSA going to Monumento and an Isuzu Gemini car ahead of him was on
his left side running along the second lane of EDSA at a distance of 30 meters away. When the
car was at a distance of 20 meters away and before reaching the stalled vehicle, it swerved to the
right without signal light, so he blew his horn, stepped on his brakes, but since the street was
downgrade, it was raining and slippery, his brakes failed to control his bus, thus hit and bumped
the Isuzu Gemini car. He identified the Isuzu Gemini car and damages sustained by the car in
the photograph marked as Exh. C. His bus slided after he applied his brakes because the street
was slippery. He reported at their garage after the accident, left his vehicle and went back at the
scene with a wrecker. The passengers of the Isuzu car were brought to the hospital.
The training officer of MMTC, Milagros Garbo, testified on the procedure of the company in
hiring an applicant driver and the requirements to be submitted by the applicant. An applicant
for a driver of MMTC as what had been done to the accused before he was admitted as company
driver of MMTC must pass an interview, seminars, written examination, actual driving test,
psycho-physical test, road test, line familiarization test, defensive driving seminar, drivers
familiarization seminar, and traffic rules and environment seminar. Documents they required to
be submitted by an applicant driver were NBI Clearance, Residence Certificate, Professional
Drivers License, and Official Receipts of payment of required fees for drivers license (Exhs. 1
to 15).
The internal control relative to the supervision of their drivers was explained by witness Nenita
Amado, a transport supervisor of MMTC. She supervises and gives instructions and
recommendations on bus rules and regulations to their drivers. They have ten (10) comptrollers,
thirty-six (36) dispatchers, seven (7) field supervisors, sixty (60) inspectors and four (4) service

wreckers who helped in the supervision of the drivers and conductors of MMTC. They have
centralized radio that monitor the activities of their drivers during their travel. Her instructions
to the drivers were to avoid accident, obey traffic rules and regulations and to be courteous to
passengers.[7]
On 5 February 1993, the trial court rendered its Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Olimpio Pangonorom guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical
injuries and sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor, to
indemnify the offended parties of the damages incurred by their Isuzu Gemini car in the sum
of P42,600.00 and to reimburse the medical expenses of Carlos R. Berba in the sum of P182.50,
Amelia Berba in the sum of P217.50 and Mary Berba in the sum of P45.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioners appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. [9]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that the finding that Olimpio drove the passenger bus in
a negligent manner, considering the circumstances of weather and road condition, is a
finding of fact of the trial court that is entitled to respect. The Court of Appeals stated
that it is a settled rule that factual findings of trial courts are accorded great respect
unless it can be shown that they overlooked some circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will probably alter the result. The Court of Appeals held that no such
circumstance was overlooked in this case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that even if it were true, as Olimpio claimed, that the car
Carlos Berba (Carlos) was then driving occupied Olimpios lane while the car was 20
meters away, it is a safe distance for a vehicle to switch lanes. The Court of Appeals
held that if only Olimpio did not drive very fast and considered that the street was
downgrade and slippery, he could have easily avoided the accident by applying his
brakes.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the testimonies of Edward Campos (Edward)
and Enrico Bantigue, who were passengers of the MMTC bus, are worthy of credence.
The Court of Appeals stated that they are neutral witnesses who had no motive to testify
against Olimpio. They testified that: (1) the MMTC bus was running at 70-80 kilometers
per hour; (2) the bus swerved to the right to avoid hitting a van stranded at the left side
of the island; and (3) in the process, the bus hit and bumped the Gemini car ahead of it.
Edward further testified that Olimpio earlier overtook another bus. Edward stated that it
was for this reason that the MMTC bus went into the lane where the stalled van was
located. The Court of Appeals held that the MMTC bus was the one switching lanes.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On 28 December 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision. Petitioners asserted that the Court of Appeals
erred in finding Olimpio negligent in driving the subject bus. Petitioners also asserted
that Carlos was the one switching lanes and was therefore the one negligent in driving
his car. Petitioners stated that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the MMTC
was not subsidiarily liable for Olimpios civil liability in the instant case. Petitioners

stated that the testimonies of witnesses Milagros Garbo and Nenita Amado, as well as
Exhibits 1 to 15, proved that the MMTC exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its drivers.[11]
On 5 May 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution [12] denying the motion for
reconsideration. With the assailed decision having amply discussed, considered and
ruled upon the issues that petitioners raised in their motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals held that there was no cogent reason for it to reverse the assailed
decision. The Court of Appeals also held that the MMTC was already estopped in
assailing the trial courts decision considering that the MMTC never appealed the
decision within the reglementary period.
The Issues
Petitioners have presented the following for our consideration:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in sustaining the trial
courts findings of facts instead of considering certain facts and circumstance
raised by petitioners that properly cast an element of reasonable doubt.
2. Whether Estoppel applies to MMTC. [13]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.[14]
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for having sustained the trial courts findings of
fact. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals failed to consider certain
circumstances that would warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the trial court.
Petitioners claim that Carlos negligence in switching lanes to avoid hitting a
stranded van caused the collision. Petitioners assert that Carlos was negligent because
he transferred to the lane where Olimpio was then driving along without first blinking his
signal light and with his car only 20 meters away from the bus. This being so,
petitioners assert that they should not be held responsible for Carlos negligence.
Petitioners assertions have no merit. The issue of whether a person is negligent is
a question of fact.[15] Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when they affirm the
findings of fact of the trial court, are binding on this Court, unless the findings of the trial
and appellate courts are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the
judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. [16] We hold that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the factual findings of the trial court.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or
occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Olimpio is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the MMTC since
1984.[17] As a public utility driver, Olimpio should have as his primary concern the safety
not only of himself or of his passengers, but, also the safety of his fellow motorists.
Considering that it had just rained, it was still drizzling and the road was slippery when

the subject incident took place,[18] Olimpio should have been more cautious and prudent
in driving his passenger bus.
Based on Olimpios testimonial admission, he was driving at 70 kilometers per
hour. He testified he was familiar with the road. [19] Therefore, he ought to have known
the downhill slope coming from the Nepa-Q Mart. [20] As the bus was moving downhill,
Olimpio should have slowed down since a downhill drive would naturally cause his
vehicle to accelerate. However, instead of slowing down, Olimpio admitted he was
running very fast. Thus, Olimpio testified:
Atty. ANTONIO:
Q
It was nighttime Mr. Witness, will you tell us whether you were able to see this
vehicle you were following?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Will you tell us how did you notice this vehicle?
A
Because I saw its tail light, sir.
Q
Before this vehicle you were following reached the place where this stalled
vehicle was, do you know where was this vehicle proceeded?
FISCAL:
I think he is incompetent, Your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
Atty. ANTONIO:
Q
Before your vehicle reached the place where this stalled vehicle was, what did
you notice if any?
A
I noticed that the vehicle I was following Isuzu Gemini before reaching the stalled
vehicle suddenly swerved to the right and I was already approaching, sir.
Q
Before this Isuzu Gemini car you were following suddenly swerved to the right,
how far were you?
A
About twenty (20) meters, sir. It suddenly swerved to the right and I was
running very fast because it was downward.
Q
And when you noticed this Isuzu Gemini suddenly swerved to the right, what if
any did you do?
A
I blew my horn and stepped on my brakes, sir. Considering that it was raining
and slippery I cannot control.
Q
And after your were not able to control your vehicle despite the precaution you
made, what happened?
A
I bumped him, sir.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
The only conclusion that we can draw from the factual circumstances is that Olimpio
was negligent. He was hurrying to his destination and driving faster than he should
have. The fact that after Olimpio stepped on the brake, the bus still traveled a distance
of 20 meters before it finally stopped, and the car, after it was hit, was thrown 10 to 15
meters away,[22] only prove that Olimpios bus was running very fast.
Olimpios claim that Carlos suddenly transferred to his lane to avoid hitting a van
stranded at the left side of the island could hardly carry the day for him. Olimpio says
that the distance between the car and the bus before the car allegedly swerved to the
bus lane was 20 meters. Therefore, at that point, Olimpio still had the opportunity to

avoid the collision by slowing down or by stepping on the brake. However, what Olimpio
did was to continue running very fast.
Another telling proof of Olimpios negligence is the testimony of Edward, a
passenger of the MMTC bus who was seated at the right front seat nearest to the door
of the bus.[23] Edward recounted the incident, thus:
Q
You said that there was a van parked which the Metro Manila Transit tried to
avoid. Where was that van parked?
A
It was stranded above the middle island of the road, sir.
COURT:
Q
When you said of the road you are referring to EDSA?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
FISCAL:
Q
So when it swerved to avoid hitting the parked van, what happened?
A
It was too late, sir, when he noticed that there was a car slowly cruising
EDSA so when he swerved he was very fast so it was too late to avoid the car.
He just braked, the road was slippery so he could not swerve because the bus
might turn over.
x
x
x
Q
Mr. Witness, did you notice this stalled vehicle before you reached the place
where it was stalled?
A
No, sir.
Q
Even when the lights of the Metro Manila Transit were on, you did not notice it?
A
Actually, sir, he was overtaking another bus so thats why he did not notice
this stalled van.
Q
Who was overtaking another bus?
A
MMTC bus, sir, because it stopped at the MMC office near Timog and then it
overtook another moving bus. He went to the left side overtaking that bus.
x
x
x
Atty. ANTONIO:
Q
Are you a driver?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And if circumstances similar to that incident that happened, it would be prudent
for you to swerve also, is it not?
A
At that condition, sir, Id rather brake than swerve, it is slippery.
Q
Mr. Witness, will you tell how far was this MMTC bus when it swerved in
relation to the place where the stalled vehicle was?
A
I guess, sir, it was a few seconds before too late because when it swerved the
bus was already tilting, so it is a matter of seconds.
Atty. ANTONIO:
Q
It was a matter of seconds?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
So if you were in this position stopping would not be sufficient precautionary
measure, was it not?
A
Before that, sir, he overtook that bus so if he did not overtake that bus he
would have seen the parked van. Being a driver myself the way he overtook
was dangerous, it was so close that you could not see the other lane.

x
Q

Will you please explain Mr. Witness, how this MMTC bus hit the car when you
claimed that the car was running ahead of the bus?
A There was this stalled van and there was this bus, now this was the Gemini car,
this slowed down to avoid also the stalled van, it swerved so the bus was here
running very fast and then noticed the van so it swerved also and the Gemini here
was of course slowed down to avoid that van, the bus was still running fast then
after swerving it was too late for him to notice that there was this car running
slowly by the bus, he stepped on the brake.
Q Do you mean to say Mr. Witness, that both the Isuzu vehicle and the MMTC bus
were running on the same course?
A
Yes, sir.[24] (Emphasis supplied).
Edwards declarations that the bus was running very fast and that Olimpio did not
see the stranded van because he earlier overtook another bus are clear and
categorical. There is no evidence of any ill or improper motive on Edwards part that
would discredit his testimony. He was not in any way related to the complainants.
Neither was the defense able to show that some form of consideration induced Edward
to testify for the prosecution. The defense did not even try to rebut Edwards testimony.
When there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives,
his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath
deserve full faith and credit.[25]
Petitioners likewise fault the Court of Appeals for having ruled that the MMTC is
already estopped from assailing the trial courts decision considering that the MMTC
never appealed the same within the reglementary period.
We have carefully gone over the records of this case and found that when
petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 8 March 1993, the MMTC
already appealed the civil aspect of this case. We quote petitioners Notice of Appeal:
The ACCUSED and his employer, Metro Manila Transit Corporation, by their undersigned
counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully give notice that they are appealing, as they
hereby appeal, the Decision dated February 5, 1993, which was received on February 23, 1993,
to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the Decision is contrary to the facts, law and settled
jurisprudence.
Metro Manila Transit Corporation likewise interposes an appeal with respect to the civil aspect
of this case because of its subsidiary liability as employer of the accused under the Revised Penal
Code.[26]
It is therefore not correct for the Court of Appeals to state in its Resolution [27] dated 5
May 2000 that the MMTC failed to appeal seasonably the issue of its alleged nonsubsidiary liability[28] as Olimpios employer.
However, due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a
defense in the present case. The law involved in the present case is Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 100 [29] and 102[30] of the same Code, which
reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged
in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.

Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees
civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he
is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind
of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties;
and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.[31]
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and
103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable.
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.[32]
The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee
in the criminal action.[33] In the present case, there exists an employer-employee
relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry,
[34]
and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties. [35] However, there is no proof here of Olimpios
insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This
being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after
proof of the accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer
be enforced.[36]
In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employers subsidiary
civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary liability cannot in the
first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some
time after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima
facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the
employer will not issue as a matter of course. [37] The procedure for the enforcement of a
judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio
becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is
returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of
execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is
still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee
considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision dated 29 November
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14764 finding petitioner Olimpio
Pangonorom GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple slight physical injuries, as well as its Resolution dated 5 May 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

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