QUINTO vs COMELEC

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5
of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment
they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who
hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal
protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental
act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the
four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are
created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than
a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for
the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger
that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office,
could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would
be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification.
Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective
one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the
same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet
post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of
national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections.
Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this
time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period
and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the
functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling.
The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second
proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the
OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter
moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or

position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the
equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has
four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions
satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers
the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from
the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of
the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates
to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by
their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were
excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for
the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to
the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane
to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the
integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose
wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this
with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the
intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution
declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For
some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local
market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail
Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to
engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said
Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He
said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country

who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally
accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE UNION
FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the Iglesia
ni Cristo, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since
1958. He was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union (Union) which had with
the Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350, the employer
was not precluded from making an agreement with a labor organization to require
as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees. On June 18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was
enacted, introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875, as
follows: xxx but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with
any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union. The
Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee
from the service because he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could
achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the union security clause of the CBA and
assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and contends it discriminatorily favors
those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions.
ISSUE:
Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or not.
RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. Sec 1 (6) of Art
III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the Constitution of 1973,
provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides that employees shall have
the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their

own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the
right to form or join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad notions,
namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power,
whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.
It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join
or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as
to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the
liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at
any time. The right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any
union. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right
to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an
employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to
keep their jobs. By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of RA
3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to
keep his employment he must become a member of the collective bargaining union.
Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, RA No.3350
introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act the following proviso: but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides is that members of said religious sects
cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects
from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their
religious beliefs, the members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor
union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to
sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join.
The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with
the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions. It cannot be
denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union security
clause.
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified.
The prohibition is general. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness, for
it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional prohibition,
the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its
people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or

abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate
of the legal order. The contract clause of the Constitution. must be not only in
harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved
power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has special
application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not
merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good.
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of belief and religion,
and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those
members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions,
confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits
of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life
and the life of their dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two
aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital,
directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into
a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of
collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a
new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with
management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the
individual also needs protection the collective bargaining relationship.
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In
case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.
The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons
be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to
work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of
union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby
they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective
of the state. The Constitution even mandated that the State shall afford protection
to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between
workers and employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor
organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the
collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their
religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the
people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view
that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly
advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption
may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members
from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental
and indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor
unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code.

The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither
does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from
joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor
union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act Republic Act
No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of
closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do
a positive act-to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is
exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.

BIRAOGO VS TRUTH COMMISSION

FACTS:

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.

ISSUES:

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those
of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In

private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those
of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four

requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to

the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
(DISSENTS OF CORONA ANG SERENO ON A SEPARATE FILE)
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office
and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to
the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed
(par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the
BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined
by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of
Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of
BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign
and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office
and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal
protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would
never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be
eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the
exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an

appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled
however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office,
if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although,
as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote
the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other
hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective
local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official
just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from
a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running
for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision.
CENIZA VS COMELEC
Equal Protection Gerrymandering
**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in
power. **
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No.
1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by
their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component
cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of
Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly
urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot
vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of
BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of
voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners
claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas
Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the
Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and

of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the
entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the
province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified
their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities
including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its
electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably
unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions
germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification
amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local
government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners
allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration
of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the
approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or
units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of
the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the
basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The
revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It
would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to
warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated.
Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government
thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial
officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal
protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote
for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing
voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same
privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion
which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage.
NUNEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended
by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his
other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that
PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post
facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings
violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk
and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial
evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to

appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts,
i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection
insofar as appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the
creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving
public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes
mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response
to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought
to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution
came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a
private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set
forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of
the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous
decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably
carefully reached than other trial courts.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
I reiterate my concurring and dissenting opinion in the Nuez case; because the
crime was committed several days before the promulgation on June 11, 1978 of P.D.
No. 1486 and eleven (11) months before the promulgation on December 10, 1978 of
P.D. 1606.
PASEI VS DRILON
Facts:
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged
principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement." It
challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLEs Department Order 1 (series of
1988), in the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. The measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and (3)
for being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative,
and not executive, in character. PASEI also invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of the
Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as
Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in the absence of prior
consultations. It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause, in
addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the
Order be further enforced. On 25 May 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the
Court that on 8 March 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the
states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines,"
the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women.

Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they
are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of
the same class. The classification made the preference for female workers rests
on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is
called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence that, except perhaps for
isolated instances, Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with an identical
predicament. Discrimination in this case is justified.
Further, the impugned guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers, not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then
it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them
are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a
select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a
person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of
persons. Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real
difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the
better rule is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural
minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF ALLIANCE VS QUISUMBING
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the
School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt
from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except
laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires
both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into
two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreignhires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and
local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between
the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB,
the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled
to humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by
which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.
Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor
full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between
labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed
with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer
indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will
of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted
bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination
which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention
to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted
to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreignhires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires
in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of
their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN
PART.
DECS VS SAN DIEGO
Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice
failed the National Medica lAdmission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The
petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that- A student shall be allowed only 3
chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive failures, a student shall not be allowed
to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on
constitutional grounds.
Facts:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS
Zoology. The petitionerclaims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, thepetitioner rejected his application on the
basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela tocompel his
admission to the test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and qualityeducation. By agreement of
the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on
April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed
with leave of court, he squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No.
12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. Theadditional grounds raised
were due process and equal protection.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due
process and equalprotection.
Held:
No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission tomedical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
Ratio:
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. Thisis true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge toone's ambition.
The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that
they are notdissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be
applied in a manner that will best promotethe common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.The Court feels that it is not enough to simply
invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of theConstitution: one must
show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The
privaterespondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainlymisplaced, like a hopeless love. No
depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressedthat a
person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for
any work or occupation.The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the
medical profession, but for another calling that hasnot excited his interest. In the
former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely
tosucceed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is
entitled to quality education forthe full harnessing of his potentials and the
sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliantfuture. We
cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never
have left the farmand engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who
could be better as merchants. It is time indeedthat the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to thecourse
for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise,
we may be "swampedwith mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because
we are lacking in intelligence but because we are anation of misfits.
PHIL JUDGES ASSN VS PRADO
Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show
that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to
P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies
whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759.
Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those
coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The
postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado
implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law
complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the
judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is
discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not
disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives
and their widows among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident
to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The
Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking
privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the
Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of
the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from
all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues
from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies
of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on
all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the
liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons
or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has
been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it
does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not
recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege.
TATAD VS SECRETARY OF ENERGY
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the
government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The
government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One

such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows
that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and
petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the
same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that
the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the
3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do
not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products
from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude
products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19
of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens
oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our
downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign
oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant
players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only
one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of
their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players
that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing
their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument
that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players
to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new
players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.
Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition
in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the
new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the
established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already
being observed by the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CAYAT
Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking
gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of
the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then
charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency.
Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He
averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the
constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark
them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant
challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from
Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group
have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must,
as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with
are;

class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment
permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private
respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to
stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the nonChristian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures
thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a
recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges
now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and
secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of
placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
ORMOC SUGAR CO. INC. VS TREASURER OF ORMOC
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City
Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.
Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax
on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For
production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the
sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest
averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax
in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or
out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such
goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or
otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it
singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is
found in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of
the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which
effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their
turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is
discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same

VILLEGAS VS HIU CHONG

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law
and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be
employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his
will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
ABAKADA GURO VS ERMITA
Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and
6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is
a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has
powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about
the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made
by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase
the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can
never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time
when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its
use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased
rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12%
rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It
leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is
used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory

order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty,
which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12%
VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either
of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to
gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other
pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is
present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.