Vivarium

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1995

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXIII (1995)

E.J.Ashworth

Late ScholasticPhilosophy

Coombs
Jeffrey

Jeronimo
Pardo on theNecessity
of
Scientific
Propositions

GinoRoncaglia

Smigleciuson entiarationis

27

E.J.Ashworth

Surez on theAnalogyofBeing: Some

HistoricalBackground
50

WilliamA. Wallace

and thePaduan Regressus:

Circularity
FromPietrod'Abanoto
Galileo Galilei
76

IgnacioAngelelli

Saccheri'sPostulate

Neil Lewis

WilliamofAuvergne'
s Accountofthe
Enuntiable:itsRelationsto
Nominalism
and theDoctrineofthe
EternalTruths
113

RichardCross

Duns Scotus'sAnti-Reductionistic
AccountofMaterialSubstance
137

ElizabethKarger

WilliamofOckham
, WalterChatton
and AdamWodehamon theObjects
17 1
ofKnowledgeand Belief.

E.P. Bos

A Scotisticdiscussionof "Deus est"

as a propositio
perse nota

TadeuszGrzesik

AndrewWanszyk
O.P. (AndrzejWqzyk)
alias MagisterSerpensand Works
235
Attributed
toHis Authorship

98

197

242

Reviews

20:19:30 PM

Late ScholasticPhilosophy
Introduction

E.J.ASHWORTH

This issue of Vivariumis devoted to late scholastic philosophy, by

which I understand a type of philosophy that coexisted with
humanism, Renaissance philosophy, and early modern philosophy
to the late seventeenthcentury.1I shall
roughlyfromthe late fifteenth
not attemptto characterize early modern philosophy, other than by
pointing out that Descartes' s Meditationsand Locke's Essay concerning
humanunderstanding
may be taken as typicalworks, but a few remarks
about humanism and Renaissance philosophywill help to indicate the
typesof contrastI wish to draw. So far as humanism is concerned, I
followKristellerin seeing it as primarily"a cultural and educational
program which emphasized and developed an importantbut limited
area of studies."2 The studies referredto included grammar, rhetoric,
poetry, history, and moral philosophy, as opposed to the strictly
philosophical disciplines of logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, though there was obviously an overlap in the case of moral
philosophy.3 In pursuing their largely non-philosophical interests,
humanists were very much concerned with classical scholarship,
especially the study of Greek, and with the imitation of classical
models. Despite theirfrequentcriticismsof scholasticjargon and techniques, they were not direct rivals of scholastic philosophers, except
insofaras changes to the universitycurriculumbrought about by the
influenceof humanist ideals diluted or squeezed out scholastic subjects. Under the heading of Renaissance philosophy, I include
1 Forslightly
inthesevenseeJ. Trentman,
Scholasticism
different
characterizations,
A. Kenny,J. Pinborg
teenth
, in: N. Kretzmann,
History
(eds.), TheCambridge
century
soul
Medieval
,
1982,818; andE. Keler,Theintellective
, Cambridge
Philosophy
ofLater
andQ,.Skinner
in:C.B. Schmitt
,
History
ofRenaissance
Philosophy
(eds.),TheCambridge
as CHRP.
1988,507. The latterworkwillbe abbreviated
Cambridge
2
andItsSources
Renaissance
P.O. Kristeller,
, ed. M. Mooney,NewYork1979,
Thought
22.
3 See Kristeller,
Renaissance
, 4.
Thought
1
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 1

20:19:38 PM

philosophers such as Marsilio Ficino with his strong interest in

Platonism, neo-platonismand the occult studiesof the Hermetic tradition, and Tommaso Campanella withhis adoption of a nature philosophy according to which the whole universewas alive and sentient,and
his beliefthat magic was a tool forutilisingnatural processes.4Under
Renaissance philosophyI also include any writerwho was preoccupied
with Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Greek scepticism.
As contrastedwith humanism, Renaissance philosophy, and early
modern philosophy, late scholastic philosophy has four outstanding
characteristicswhich may be taken as defining.First,as the name suggests, it was the philosophyof the schools, the philosophywhich was
taught in institutionsof higher learning, whetherthe secular universities or the institutionsof religious orders such as the Dominican
studium
at Bologna5 or theJesuit Collegio Romano (founded at
generale
Rome in 1553). This means that it was orientedtowardsa curriculum
in philosophy and theologythat was largely based on logic and that,
depending on the place, involved a good deal of natural philosophy
and metaphysics. In sixteenthand seventeenthcenturyOxford, for
instance, natural philosophy and metaphysics were covered rather
modestlyat the M.A. level, but in sixteenthcenturyPadua where the
undergraduate curriculum was directed toward studies in medicine,
there was a great deal of natural philosophy, and logic included the
studyof scientificmethod. To take anotherexample, metaphysicsand
theologywere obviously privileged at the institutionsof the religious
orders, but also more generally in the Spanish universities of the
.
counter-Reformation
The association of late scholastic philosophy with institutionsof
higher learning carried with it a certain method of presentation,one
which is both highly organized and argumentative, with a clear
account of views for and against a given thesis. At the beginning of
the period I have in mind, the standard formof philosophical works
other than introductorylogic textswas thatof commentaryon Aristotle, usually a mixtureof a literalcommentarywhichanalyses and comments on the text, and a question commentary, which takes up
4 For a usefulrecentbookaboutthesematters,
see B.P. Copenhaver
and C.B.
Renaissance
Schmitt,
, Oxfordand NewYork1992.The book,whichwas
Philosophy
written
after
Schmitt's
deathin 1986,paysvirtually
largely
byCopenhaver
untimely
no attention
tolatescholastic
philosophers.
5 Fordiscussion
ofvariousDominicans
whotaught
atBologna,
seeM. Tavuzzi,Some
Renaissance
Thomist
Divisions
in: Angelicum,
70 (1993),93-122.
ofAnalogy,
2

20:19:38 PM

philosophical points in more depth. A good example of this formatis

Pedro da Fonseca' s commentaryon Aristotle'sMetaphysics
, published
of Francisco Surez (pubin 1577. Even the Disputationes
Metaphysicae
lished in 1597), which is perhaps the first lengthy treatment of
metaphysics not in the form of a commentary on Aristotle, is
organized as a series of disputations,each of which is divided into sections. These in turntend to open with an outline of the possible views
on the question being discussed. In the seventeenthcenturythe cursus
coveringthe whole fieldof philosophy,such as the Cursusphilosophicus
of John of St. Thomas, became popular, as did shorter
thomisticus
handbooks of the sort read by Descartes and John Locke.6
The association between late scholasticphilosophy and institutions
of higherlearning also carried with it a focus on Aristotle,for it was
Aristotlewho provided most of the basic textbooksin the sixteenthand
even the seventeenthcenturyuniversity.This is, of course, contrary
to the popular myththat Plato triumphedat the Renaissance, but as
Charles Schmitthas pointed out, fewerthan fivehundred printededitions of Plato before 1600 are balanced by an astounding threeto four
7 Nor was the
thousand printededitionsofAristotelica.
studyof Aristotle
necessarilycarried on in a rigidlytraditionalmanner, for many different Aristotelianisms were developed.8 Moreover, particularly
withintheJesuit order, therewas a stronginclination to include new
developmentsin mathematicsand astronomywithinthe frameworkof
Aristotelian natural philosophy,9 whereas some of the so-called
philosophers of nature, such as Campanella, were hostile to
mathematicsand (so far as I can judge) were more attracted to the
occult than to basic empirical observation.
The fourthand last characteristicof late scholastic philosophy is a
continued, explicit, concern with problems stemmingfrommedieval
philosophy, and with medieval philosophers themselves. There are
fashions here as elsewhere. Nominalism more-or-less disappeared
after a final floweringin early sixteenth-centuryParis and, a little
later, Salamanca. Scotism declined significantly,especially in England
where it had been preeminent in the fifteenthcentury, but showed
6 For discussion
textbook
Theriseofthephilosophical
see C.B. Schmitt,
, in: CHRP,
792-804.
7 C.B. Schmitt,
andtheRenaissance,
Aristotle
Mass.,andLondon1983,14.
Cambridge,
8 See Schmitt,
Aristotle
andtheRenaissance
, passim.
9 Schmitt,
andtheRenaissance
Aristotle
, 104-5.
3

20:19:38 PM

interestingsigns of revival in the seventeenthcentury.10Thomism

underwenta strongrevived,especially when Roman Catholic theology
faculties began to replace Peter Lombard's Sentences
with the Summa
a
as
basic
and
was
more
text,
important
Aquinas
probably
theologiae
in the sixteenthcenturythan at any previous period. Less well-known
figures,such as Peter Aureol and Hervaeus Natalis were also influential.11 Nor should we forgetthe popularity of Averroism, associated
with the great Aristotle-Averroesedition of 1550-1552.12
Obviously late scholastic philosophers were themselvesinfluenced
by Renaissance philosophy and by humanism. In such logic texts as
the Institutionum
dialecticarum
libriodo of Pedro da Fonseca,13 we find
evidence of close attentionto the Greek text of Aristotle,referenceto
recentlypublished Greek commentators,a use of classical vocabulary,
an absence of sophismata, and a replacement of many medieval
Aristotelian material. To
developments by more straightforwardly
take another example, the AristotelianPietro Pomponazzi was influenced by Marsilio Ficino in his discussion of the immortalityof the
soul. Nor are the lines between scholastic and Renaissance
philosophersalways as easy to draw as I have suggested. Nonetheless,
there remain clear points of contrast.
When one compares late scholastic philosophy with early modern
philosophy, however, one is faced with a more difficultproblem. As
a result of developments from the seventeenthcenturyon, contemporary readers tend to look for well-demarcated discussions of such
topics as philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of
science, epistemology, ontology, but these interestsand categories
cannot be neatly mapped onto sixteenth and seventeenth century
scholastic texts. Discussions of analogy provide a good example of
what I have in mind. They involve problems of language in generell,
of religiouslanguage in particular,of metaphysics,and of concept formation and use, all treatedin conjunction,eitherin commentarieson
10SeeJ. Coombs,Scholasticism
II: Seventeenth
, Post-Medieval
, in: H. Burkhardt
Century
andB. Smith,(eds.),Handbook
andOntology
and
, Munich,Philadelphia
ofMetaphysics
Vienna 1991,vol. 2, 806-9;and J. Coombs,ThePossibility
Entities
in
ofCreated
in: The Philosophical
43 (1993),447-59.
Scotismt
Seventeenth-Century
Quarterly,
11ForHervaeusNatalis,see M. Tavuzzi,Hervaeus
Natalis
andthePhilosophical
Logic
theThomism
45 (1992),132-52.
oftheRenaissance
, in: DoctorCommunis,
of
12See C.B. Schmitt,
Renaissance
Averroism
studied
theVenetian
Editions
through
ofAristotlein: Attidei ConvegniLincei,40 (1979),131-40.
Averroes,
13Pedroda Fonseca,Instituies
Dialcticas.
Institutionum
Dialecticarum
LibriOcto>
ed.
and trans.J. Ferreira
Gomes,Coimbra1964.
4

20:19:38 PM

book IV of Aristotle'sMetaphysics
, or in logic texts,especially in commentarieson the opening words of Aristotle'sCategories.
Anothergood
is
the
of
discussions
the
example
concept formation,
justificationof
knowledge claims, and of scientificmethod found conjoined in commentarieson the Posterior
, and in the parts of logic textsdealAnalytics
with
method.
These
difficulties
of mapping contemporaryinterests
ing
onto earlier authors, as well as the points of contrast between
humanism, Renaissance philosophy,and early modern philosophyon
the one hand and late scholastic philosophy on the other, will be
illustratedin the papers which follow.
The firstof the contributorsto this volume, JeffreyCoombs, has
chosen to discuss the workofJernimoPardo, who was part of the last
greatfloweringof nominalismat the Universityof Paris.14This young
Spaniard provides an excellent example of the continued capacity of
medieval logic forinnovation and development,forhe made a serious
attempt to justify a Buridan-style semantics while expanding
Buridan' s ontology to allow not only particulars but modal relations
between particularsto exist independentlyof the human mind. Pardo
did this in the context of an examination of the necessityof scientific
propositions, insofar as this necessity seemed to provide a counterexample to rules of ampliation. If a present-tenseproposition subject
to ampliation (such as "A triangle has three sides") must imply a
second propositionin which the referenceinvolved is fullyspelled out
(as in "A triangle, which is, has three sides"), then, if the only
referencepossible is to currentlyexistingparticulars,it seems to follow
that scientificpropositionswill be contingent.Pardo rejectedboth this
consequence and various attemptsto explain the necessityof scientific
propositionseitherin termsof an enriched ontologyof essences or of
an underlyingconditionalor temporal structure.Instead, he opted for
a parsimonious but nonetheless slightlyenriched ontology, together
with a theoryof underlyingmodal structures.
Jernimo Pardo predated the Reformation and CounterReformation, as well as the triumph of humanist education at the
Universityof Paris; and it seems unlikelythathis work had any influence on the later sixteenthor seventeenthcentury. Gino Roncaglia' s
14As Coombspointsout,thereis someuncertainty
aboutthedateofPardo'sdeath.
I onceaskedJamesK. Fargeaboutthis,andhetoldmethatParis,Bibl.de l'Arsenal,
the
MS 1020,p. 278,givesthedateas 1502,butthattherearereasonsfordoubting
ofthismanuscript.
generalreliability
5

20:19:38 PM

paper on the much later Polish Jesuit, Mrtius Smiglecius, takes us

to an author who belongs firmlyto the Counter-Reformation,who
was influenced by Francisco Surez, who worried about how far
Jesuits could deviate fromthe teachings of Aquinas,15 and who was
particularly influential in seventeenth century Oxford. Yet
Smiglecius, like Pardo, was preoccupied with the ontological foundations of logic, in particular with the status of entiarationis.Two questions were of especial concern to him. First, how are fictitiousand
,
impossible beings related to the three traditionaltypesof entiarationis
as
of
and
relations
reason?
Second, if,
namely negations, privations,
he believed, entiarationis
can be identifiedwithimpossibleentities,how
can the other unreal entities, particularly logical intentions, be
accounted for? Of particular interest in Roncaglia' s discussion of
Smiglecius is his demonstration of how semantic, ontological and
epistemological issues were intertwined in the work of this late
scholastic logician.
Smiglecius died in 1618, only a year afterthe great Spanish Jesuit
Francisco Surez. In my own contributionto this volume,16"Surez
on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background", I set out to
show how Surez' s position on analogy relates to earlier discussions
in two ways, firstwith respectto the classificationof typesof analogy,
and second with respect to the notion of a concept of being which is
both one and analogical. My study sheds lighton the ramificationsof
the revival of Thomism fromthe fifteenth
centuryonwards, but it also
relates closely to the theme of the interrelationshipbetween logical,
epistemological, and metaphysical concerns in late scholasticwriters.
Anothertypeof interrelationship,thatbetween epistemology,logic,
and scientificmethod, is discussed in the fourthcontributionto this
:
volume, William A. Wallace's "Circularity and the Paduan Regressus
From Pietro d'Abano to Galileo Galilei". In thispaper, Wallace takes
up what Nicholas Jardine has dubbed a problem in the epistemology
of the sciences.17This is an apt titleforthe discussion of regressus
, for
the notion combines two problems. On the one hand, there is the
epistemological problem of how human knowledge proceeds from
15See note10 ofRoncaglia'spaper.
16Mypaperwaswritten
tofillthegapscausedbythelast-minute
withdrawal
ofthree
thatofCharlesLohr,wasbrought
contributors.
One withdrawal,
aboutbyserious
illness,and thisvolumeis greatly
impoverished
bytheabsenceofhispaper.
17N. Jardine,
686-93.
, in: CHRP, 685-711,especially
ofthesciences
Epistemology
6

20:19:38 PM

what is betterknown to us, being grasped throughthe senses, to what

is betterknown by nature, in that it involves universais, and how it
is thatwe can then turnback and interpretour experience throughthe
application of universal notions. On the otherhand, thereis the methodological claim that science proceeds by a combination of two types
of demonstration. First, there is 'demonstration of the fact', which
takes us fromeffectto cause; second, there is ' demonstrationof the
reasoned fact', which takes us fromcause to effect;and third, there
is the process known as regression which brings the two types of
demonstration together by showing how knowledge of a newlydiscovered cause can be developed in such a way as to lead us back
to the effectwithoutcircularityand with greatlyincreased certitude.
Wallace's main interest is to settle two recent controversies,by
but that
showingthat Galileo not only knew the details of the regressus
he was able to apply the method successfullyin such mixed sciences
as mechanics and astronomy. However, his paper also performs
another function,in that it lays out the historyof a discussion that
linksdevelopmentswithinscholasticaristotelianismto the new science
of Galileo. Among those featuring in Wallace's account are such
figures as Francesco Securo di Nardo, a Dominican who held the
Thomistic chair of philosophy at the Universityof Padua, the AverroistMarcantonio Zimara, and theJesuit mathematicianChristopher
Clavius (in a walk-on role).
The last paper in this collection, "Saccheri's postulate" by Ignacio
Angelelli, takes us to a much laterJesuit, Girolamo Saccheri, who at
differenttimes taught philosophy,theology,and mathematics. In his
, Saccheri took traditionalAristoteliansyllogistic,
Logica Demonstrativa
the
square of opposition, and combined it with a distinction
including
between pertinentand impertinentterms used by logicians in early
sixteenthcenturyParis, among others.18He then adopted a postulate
asserting the existence of pairs of terms which exemplified the relations of pertinenceand impertinencein order to show thaton the basis
of such a postulate, justificationof various traditional logical claims
could be provided. He did this in what seems to be a completelynew
spirit of formalism devoid of ontological and epistemologica! con-

18Two discussions
thatI knowofare foundin Antonius
Coronel,DuplexTractatus
Terminorum
Dolz, Termini
, Paris,
, Paris,1511,sig.h ii va-sig.h vi rb;andJohannes
ra.
no date,ff.xxxiivb-xxxiii
7

20:19:38 PM

siderations. As Wallace did for Galileo, Angelelli shows us how Saccheri went beyond the late scholasticframeworkin whichhe began his
work.
I shall conclude by remarking that in many respects late
scholasticism is still an untouched field. It is to be hoped that this
special issue of Vivariumwill encourage others to look into it.
Universityof Waterloo
Department
of Philosophy

20:19:38 PM

JeronimoPardo on theNecessityof ScientificPropositions

JEFFREYCOOMBS

JeronimoPardo was a logic professorat the Universityof Paris in

the early sixteenthcentury.1This period saw the last great flowering
of medieval logic when Paris was full of logicians who relied on the
works of such fourteenth-century
nominalists as Jean Buridan and
William Ockham forguidance. JeronimoPardo himselfwas one of the
most consistent defenders of Buridan' s form of nominalism. Most
importantlyPardo follows Buridan in holding that only particulars
existand thatthe necessityofscientificpropositionsmust be explicated
in terms of that claim.
Pardo' s only work was the Medulla Dyalectices(the " Marrow of
Logic") which contains an encyclopedic treatmentof the main topics
of late medieval logic. Much of the discussion belongs to what we
would call "philosophy of logic" since Pardo is interested in the
philosophicaland metaphysicalpresuppositionsof various logical doctrines. Thus his text has a depth often missing from,late medieval
logics, and is hardly suitable for a firstyear logic course, especially
since it presupposes a knowledge of the logical terminologyof the
period and presents many rival views on the topics discussed.2
At the end of the extensivesixthchapter "On Ampliations'' Pardo
discusses the sense in which scientificpropositions are necessary.
Scientificpropositionsare potential counterexamplesto the firstrule
1 In an unpublished
de La Logica"
tothe"III Simposio
de Historia
paperpresented
La DocofNavarrain Pamplona,
at theUniversity
Spain,on May 3, 1993,entitled
Pardo
: Significado
trina
inJeronimo
delDescenso
, PalomaPrez-Ilzarbe
, Inferencia
, Verdad
toVillosada,380,
pointsoutthattwodatesaregivenforPardo's death.According
toElie,206,and
andMuozDelgado(1970),213,thedatewas1502,andaccording
Fraile,322,thedatewas 1505.
2 Good introductions
and concerns
oftheperiodare Ashworth
to figures
(1974),
on theseworksis
Risse,and theworksofMuozDelgado.Completeinformation
I willbe referring
toworksin theBibliography
availableintheBibliography.
bythe
incaseswherethereis morethan
lastnameoftheauthor
plusthedateofpublication
oneworklistedbyone author.
9
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 1

20:19:45 PM

Pardo proposes for determiningthe truthand falsityof propositions

because of ampliation,' ' hence theirdiscussion
"possessing difficulty
formsthe eleventh set of possible counterexamplesto this rule.3
In section I of this paper I give a generiliintroductionto the notion
of ampliation as it was understood by logicians at the turn of the sixteenth century. Section II presents Pardo's discussion of various
attemptsto preserve the necessityof scientificpropositionsas well as
Pardo' s difficultieswith each. Section III presents Pardo' s solution.
Pardo postulates that the necessityof scientificpropositionsis based
on a nontemporal, possible connection between the referentsof the
termsof the propositions. However, we will findthatPardo's solution
raises more questions than it answers.
I
Beforeturningto Pardo's firstrule of ampliation,we, like the unfortunate teenagers in Pardo's logic class at the Universityof Paris, first
need some instructionin a fewbasic notionsfromlate scholasticlogic.
The firstterm requiring a definitionis 'ampliation'. Pardo definesit
in this way:
is theacceptance
ofa termin a proposition
forthatthing(orthose
Ampliation
whichitsignifies
withrespect
toa sign(oritsequivalents)
whichimports
things)
diverse
inrelation
toa termsuppositing
withrespect
typesoftimesdisjunctively
to severaltypesoftimedividedly.4
This definitionis complex because it is the product of at least three
hundred years of philosophical dispute. It can be explained, however,
with some simplificationand a littlehistory.
In the later middle ages some logicians were of the opinion that the
supposition or referenceof terms in a proposition was tied to one of
five "types of times" ( differentiae
temporum
): the present, past, future,
the possible, and the imaginable.5 For example, in 'Claire is sleeping
3 Pardo,f. lxviirb.
4 Pardo, f. lxviiirb.
"Ampliatioest acceptioterminiin propositionem
pro suo
velsuissignifcatis
difdiversas
significato
respectu
signivelequivalentis
importantis
ferentias
inordinead terminm
temporis
disjunctim
supponentem
respectu
plurium
differentiarum
divisim."The definition
is verysimilar
toJohnDorp'sin
temporis
Buridan(1965),sign.I lvb.
5 We findsucha viewin MarsiliusofInghen(1978),102. See also Maier,182.
follows
at f.cxxra.Marsilius
ofInghendoesnot
Marsilius
GeorgeofBrussels
clearly
think
thatthepossible
andtheimaginable
arestrictly
oftimes,
butthat
speaking
types
theymaybe includedin thiscontext.
JohnDorp in Buridan(1965),sign.1 lva,
10

20:19:45 PM

on top of the computermonitor' the subject term 'Claire' was thought

to supposit only for the presentlyexisting cat named Claire because
the verb in this proposition is in the present tense.
If however we wished to assert truly of an individual who is
presentlyalive, that she is engaged in an activitywhich took place in
the past, then the supposition or referenceof this individual's name
had to be ' 4extended" or made "more ample." Otherwise, everytime
we tried to ascribe a past activityto an individual who is no longer
engaged in the activity,we would asserta falsehood. Thus, to say truly
of the cat now sleeping on the computer screen that she was chasing
the ball, we need to "extend" or "ampliate" the subject to include
both the Claire who exists now and the Claire who existed when the
ball chasing took place.
Such examples prompted medieval logicians to claim that a past
tensed verb such as 'was' "ampliated" the subject term 'Claire' to
suppositforthe Claire "who is orwas." It is because of the disjunction
'or' that Pardo insiststhat an ampliated term "imports diverse types
of timesdisjunctively
." Thus, the ampliated sense of the term 'Claire',
whichit must have in the propositionposited in order forthe propositionto be true,would be 'Claire, who is or was, was chasing the ball.'
Not only must the ampliated term be expressible as a disjunction,
but the term must have a referentin at least two "times." Pardo
expressesthis point in his definitionof ampliation by saying that the
."
term must refer "with respect to several types of time dividedly
echoesthesamedoubt,whenhe says"tressuntdifferentiae
scilicet,
temporum,
et futurum,
et suntaliaecopulaedifferentias
diversas
praesens,
praeteritum,
importerscilicet,
esse,respectu
tantes,
potestesseetpotestimaginari
quarumcopularum
miniampliantur."
doesnotextendampliation
and onlyaccepts
Buridanhimself
to theimaginable
to fourtimesin Buridan(1976),28. The imaginable
was controversial
ampliation
becausemanypost-medieval
thattheimaginable
differed
fromthe
logicians
thought
possiblein containing
impossible
objectssuchas thechimera.On thispointsee
tonotethatMarsiliusin hisowndiscussion
Ashworth
(1977),70-1.It is interesting
ofampliation
doesnotincludeimpossibles
Marsilius,110,
amongtheimaginables.
ofthevoid,butacceptsitas a possible
usestheexample
object.Thiswouldnaturally
is betweenthepossibleand the
lead one to wonderwhatexactlythedifference
as thetwopost-medieval
citedinAshworth'
s artiforMarsilius,
logicians
imaginable
thatimaginables
be mental
as opposed
cledo. Marsilius
maybe thinking
maysimply
itis interesting
tonotethatBuridandoesnot
toextramental
objects.In thiscontext,
otherimpossibles,
is opinable(quotedin
think
thattheChimera,and presumably
in theimaginable.
Ebbesen,138),andthusdoesnotwanttoincludetheimpossibles
Thismaybe whyhe seesno needto extendampliation
to theimaginable
sincethe
andthepossibleareforhimcoextensive.
On thispointsee Biard,273.
imaginable
11

20:19:45 PM

Terms which referonly to entitiesin one of the 4'times" are therefore

not ampliateci from one time to another. The term 'Adam' in the
proposition 'Adam was', is not ampliated because it only supposits in
one time, the past. Its supposition is not extended or "ampliated" to
any of the other "times." Similarly, the term 'Antichrist' in 'the
Antichristwill be' is not ampliated because it supposits only for an
individual who will exist in the futureand who does not now exist.6
The notion of ampliation was not without its detractors. Pardo
begins his chapter by arguing against unnamed opponents who
claimed that thereis no such thingas ampliation or ampliated terms.7
Despite the interestof such discussions which deserve a studyof their
own, we now turnto Pardo' s discussion of ampliation in scientificpropositions.
II
Pardo' s firstrule for determiningthe truthand falsityof propositions "possessing difficultybecause of ampliation" is a consequentia
rule, that is, a rule claiming that one typeof propositionis implied by
another:
a proposition
whichrequires
theexpression
ofampliation
ofsometerm...
with
whichis] the expression[of the
regardto time implies[a proposition
ampliation].8
A statementsuch as 'Claire was chasing a ball' requires "expression"
of its ampliation because of the past tensed verb. The expression, as
we learned above, is the proposition which makes the disjunctive
meaning explicit: 'Claire, who is or was, was chasing the ball'.
6 Pardo,f.lxviiiva"b.
See alsoGeorgeofBrussels,
f.cxxviiirb_va.
PardoandGeorge
of BrusselsfollowMarsiliusof Inghenin rejecting
thedefinition
of ampliation
as
extension
ofthesupposition
ofthetermfromthepresent
toothertimes.On thisview
a termis onlyampliated
whenithasa present
referent
anda referent
inanother
time,
as in thecaseofClaire.Pardo,however,
thinks
thattheterm'Adam'in 'Adamis
understood'
is ampliated
sinceit standsfortheAdamwhowasor
(adamintelligitur)
couldbe, but not fortheAdamwho is (f. lxviiiva).
Thus, theterm'Adam' is
eventhough
itonlystandsfora pastAdamanda possible
one.Marsilius
ampliated
ofInghensuggests
thatampliation
canoccurina casewherethetermonlystandsfor
a possibleor imagined
entity
(100).
7 Partsof Pardo's discussion
of thisquestionon f. lxviirb-lxviiirb
are takenfrom
in Buridan(1965),sign.1 lvb.SinceDorpwas activeat the
Dorp's commentary
ofthefifteenth-century,
thearguments
overtheexistence
ofampliation
beginning
in thefourteenth
probably
began
century.
8 Pardo,f. lxviirb.
12

20:19:45 PM

Pardo' s rule states,therefore,thateverypropositionrequiringexpression of the ampliation implies the analyzed version of itselfin which
but it
the ampliation is explicit. This rule may seem straightforward,
was not forPardo, and the bulk of his chapteron ampliation deals with
alleged counterexamplesto the rule.
Scientific propositions form a counterexample to Pardo' s rule
because they would be falsifiable if it were true.9 Although the
of a scientificpropositionmay appear to us, living as we
falsifiability
do in Popper's shadow, as one of its essential features,Pardo follows
the academic custom of his day by adhering to the Aristotelianview
thatscientificpropositionsare necessary. This necessity,according to
"
Pardo, entailsthatthe propositionsare perpetual, eternal,and incorruptible."10
According to the usual rules for interpretinga proposition with a
presenttensed verb, Pardo tells us, the proposition 'a triangle has
threeangles' is expressed as 'a triangle, whichis, has three angles".
Accordingto Pardo' s rule quoted above, the firstmust logically imply
the second. However, the second is, Pardo claims, obviouslycontingent." But if the firstproposition implies the second, and if the
second can be false, then so can the first.But, if the firstcan be false,
thenit is not necessary,which conflictswithAristotle'sstatementthat
scientificpropositionsare necessary.
When Pardo says that 'a triangle, which is, has three angles' is
"obviously" a contingent statement, he seems to mean that the
relativeclause 'which is' commitsone to holding thatthe subject refers
to presentlyexistingtriangles.In anotherexample, Pardo says thatthe
proposition'a human is an animal' is expressed as 'a human, who is,
is an animsil', which Pardo explicitlysays refersto presentlyexisting
humans.11Pardo even goes so faras to say that ifthe propositionGod
is' is interpretedas connotinga time, it would mean thatGod is at the
presentmoment, which would be contingent.12Pardo's assumption is
thatifwe interpretsuch statementsas possessing a temporal connota9 Pardo,f.lxxxiivb-lxxxiiira.
10Posterior
1,4,73a21.Pardo,f.lxxxiivb-lxxxiiira,
putsthepointthisway:
Analytics,
ad scientiampertinentes
"Si regulaessetvera sequeretur
quod propositiones
essent.Consequensest contraphilosophum
falsificabiles
qui
primoposteriorum
vocatproeo quodsunt
etincorruptibiles
eternas
huiusmodi
perpetuas,
propositiones
necessariae."
11Pardo,f.lxxxiiira.
12Pardo,f.lxxxiiivb.
13

20:19:45 PM

tion, then the objects referredto by the statementsmust exist in time,

and all such objects are contingent.Pardo is not, however, equating
temporalitywith contingency,an equation which would entail that
atemporalitywould be coextensive with necessity. Pardo does think
thatall statementswhich are taken to connote time are contingent,but
in addition some statements with no temporal reference are not
necessary because they lack a reason or basis for that necessity.
Here, the term 'contingent' has the sense of "two-sided
possibility." A propositionp is contingentif and only if it is possible
A contingententitye accordingly
thatp and it is possible that not-/?.13
is one such that it is possible that e exist and it is possible that e not
exist. Human beings are contingent entities since for any human
being it is quite possible that theyhad not existed forany number of
reasons. Their parents may not have met, theirparents may not have
liked one another, or God may have decided not to make any human
beings whatsoever. This notion of contingency is contradictoryto
necessity.A necessarybeing is one such thatit is impossiblethatit not
exist, and the primary example given is usually God.
Pardo' s remarks about the proposition 'God exists' are not meant
to suggest that Pardo thinksthat God's existenceis contingent.What
he is saying is that if we were to assert'God is' and then gave 'is' its
usual interpretation,we would be committedto assertingthat God is
at the presentmoment. Since the latterassertsthatGod existsin time,
Pardo believes it commitsus to holdingthatGod is a contingentbeing.
Of course, late medieval philosophers would immediately conclude
that any interpretationwhich entails God's existence is contingent
would have reduced itselfto absurdity. Hence, one of Pardo' s aims is
to determine how one should interpretscientificpropositionsso that
they no longer referto presentlyexisting contingententities.
To save his primaryrule of ampliation, Pardo begins by inquiring
how propositionsare necessary. Pardo presentstwo general attempts
by philosophers to explain how scientificpropositionsare necessary.
The first attempts suggests that scientific propositions have an
underlyingformwhich,when revealed by logical analysis, will explain
theirnecessity.According to the second general attempt,the supposition of termsis used to guarantee theirnecessity.We will explore the
details of the firstattemptfirst.
13Bocheski
todescribe
thedistinction
whichappearsin
(82-3)usesthisterminology
PeriHermeneias
Aristotle's
9, 19a23ff.
14

20:19:45 PM

Accordingto thisfirstgeneral attempt,threesuggestionsare offered

for revealing the underlyinglogical form of scientificpropositions.
Accordingto the first,scientificpropositionsare said to be conditionally
necessaryand have an underlyingconditional structure.A proposition
is conditionallynecessary when one can forma necessary conditional
propositionfromit such that the antecedent consists of a proposition
which assertsthe existenceof the originadsubject term and the consequent is simplya restatementof the originalproposition. For example,
'a human is an animal' becomes the necessary proposition 'if thereis
a human, then a human is an animal'. 'Thunder is a sound made in
clouds' interpretedconditionallybecomes 'If there is thunder, then
thunder is a sound made in the clouds'.
The second suggestion holds that scientificpropositions are temporallynecessary and thus have an underlyingtemporal structure.A
proposition is temporally necessary if and only if the subject term
refersto some existingentity,and at every time the subject refersto
somethingexisting,the predicate refersto the same thingat thattime.
Pardo points out that the temporally necessary propositions are a
proper subset of the conditionallynecessary ones because the statement 'a vacuum is a place not filled with a body' is conditionally
necessarybut not temporallynecessary since the term 'vacuum' can
never have reference.
The third suggestion for expressing the underlying structureof
scientificpropositionsstatesthattheyhave an underlyingmodal structure. Thus, 'a triangle has three angles' is to be interpretedas 'a
triangle possibly has three angles'.14 Pardo prefersthis third interpretationbecause it fitswithPardo' s view of the significationof modal
, which
propositionsdeveloped in chapter one of theMedullaDyalectices
I will presentin section III. Pardo believes that his theoryof modality
will provide the metaphysicalfoundationforthe necessityof scientific
propositionswhichhe thinksis lacking in the conditionaland temporal
interpretations.This perceived lack of a foundation is also the main
weakness of the second main attempt.
The second main attemptto save Pardo' s rule for ampliation is to
find the necessity of scientificpropositions in the supposition or
referenceof their terms. Such an approach has the virtue, Pardo
notes, of statingthat scientificpropositionsare categorical in form,as
Aristotlethought. If the relevant necessity can be ascribed to the
14Pardo,f.lxxxiiira
b.
15

20:19:45 PM

reference of terms, this would preclude claiming that apparently

categorical scientificpropositions have some kind of hidden conditional, temporal, or modal form.
This second attempt relies on the distinctionbetween "natural"
and ' 'accidental" suppositionof the termsin a proposition.According
to Pardo, when the termshave accidental supposition, theyare interpreted as standing forthose entitieswhich exist at the time indicated
by the tense of the verb. When the termsof a propositionhave natural
supposition, they are interpretedas standing for entitiesas they are
"absolved" or detached fromthe time indicated by the tense of the
verb.15
Certain logicians whom Pardo calls "Realists" or Reales, interpret
thisnotion of absolving the verb fromtime as assertingthatthe copula
in scientificpropositionsdoes not signifyany determinatetime. The
copula instead signifiesa disjunction of the four times: the present,
past, future,and the possible. For example, assuming that the copula
'is' is absolved or detached fromtime, the meaning of 'a human is an
animal' is 'a human was, is, will be, or can be an animal'. Alternatively, its meaning can be expressed as 'a human possibly is an
animal' since, Pardo says, "by so saying, 'human' stands forpresent,
past, future, and possible [humans]. And similarly for 'animal'."
Pardo will take advantage of this latteridea to supporthis preference
for the modal interpretation,as we will see in section III. Reales add
that this interpretationis derived fromthe relation of the termswith
extremorum
one another ( habitudinem
adinvicem).In scientificproposithe
term
is
either
the
tions,
essence, the proprium
, or some
predicate
part of these, of the subject.16Although not explicitlystated, Pardo's
main objection to the interpretationof the Realesseems to be thattheir
perspective requires postulating a realm of eternal essences to which
scientificstatementscan referin order to be true when there are no
individuals around to be referents.Since Pardo holds to Buridan' s
idea that only individuals exist, eternal essences can have no part in
his ontology.
15In PeterofSpain'sTractatus
Whenthe
thesamedoctrine.
, 81,we findessentially
term'man'hasnaturalsupposition,
itstandsforall men,past,present,
andfuture.
It hasaccidental
wheninsomecontext,
suchas 'manis', theterm'man'
supposition
standsforpresendy
men.Ofthethreeinterpretations
ofnatural
existing
supposition
availableto post-medieval
PardoacceptswhatAshworth
logicians,
(1974),88, calls
"themostpopularinterpretation"
forthepost-medievals.
16Pardo,f. lxxxiirb-lxxxiiva.
16

20:19:45 PM

The Nominales(Nominalists) interpretthe notion that the copula is

absolved or detached fromtime as implyingthat the copula bears no
temporalmeaning at all. The propositionthus transcendsall temporal
attributions.The argument against the Reales which leads these
Nominales
to this conclusion is one we have seen previouslyand seems
to have exercised a great deal of influenceon Pardo's view. The argument states that if the 'is' in 'God is' connoted a time, that would
entail that God would exist in the present. This would give the statementa contingentsense and make the statementcontingent.This cannot be because God is a necessary being and His existence is
necessary.
One objection to the Nominalesversion of how the verb of a proposition can be absolved fromtime is that Aristotledefined the verb as a
wordwhichpartiallysignifiestime. Pardo reportsthatone can answer
this objection by distinguishingtwo types of verbs. First, there are
ordinary language verbs ( verbumvulgare
) which have a temporal
significationfor the past, present, and future. Sounding more like a
postmodern than a postmedieval, Pardo says we use verbs in the
ordinarylanguage sense when we narrate stories. The second type of
verb is the logical verb ( verbum
logicm
), which has no temporal conas
'a
a
such
In
notation.
trianglehas threeangles' the 'is'
proposition
only denotes the union of the two extreme terms. Pardo claims that
the 'is* as a logical verb is similar in functionto the 'and' in 'Socrates
and Plato' which only unites and conjoins the two terms.
Pardo, although usually sympathetic with nominalist positions,
rejects the view of the Nominalesbecause the absolution from tembasis forthe necessityof scientific
poralitydoes not provide a sufficient
The
held
that
'a human is an animal' is true
Nominales
propositions.
even ifone assumes that no humans exist at the presentmoment, provided that the 'is' does not connote a time. Their argument proceeds
in thisway. Suppose it was true that therewere human beings in the
past before they all ceased to exist in the present moment. Then,
'humans were animals' would be true with 'were' connoting a past
time. But if 'humans were animals' is true in the given case, it is also
trueif'were' only denotes a nontemporalunion of the termsand does
not connote any time. If it does not connote any time, however, then
it is equivalent in meaning to 'humans are animals' and 'humans will
be animals' assuming the 'are' and 'will be' are absolved fromtime
and thus do not connote any time. In each of these cases where the

17

20:19:45 PM

verb is assumed not to connote a time, the verb in each only denotes
the union of the extremes.17
Pardo is willingto concede that ' humans are animals' is true in the
case presented if 'is' does not connote a time. In that case, 'humans
were animals' and ' humans will be animals' would all be equivalent
to 'humans are animals' where all the verbs are assumed to be
absolved from time. However, this interpretationleads to strange
resultswhen one considers the statement'a human runs'. If 'runs' is
absolved from time, then 'a human runs' would be true even if no
human were presently running, and the statement would be
equivalent to a human ran' and 'a human will run'. Most importantly, if absolution from time guaranteed necessity, then 'a man
runs' would be a necessary statement,which seems absurd.18
This latterexample supportsPardo' s main objection to the absolution or detachment from time approach- whether given the inter, which is that it does not propretationof the Reales or the Nominales
vide a sufficientfoundationfor the necessityof the propositions. For
Pardo, the statement'a human is necessarilyan animal' if it is to be
true requires a necessary connection in the world between a human
and an animal. He says:
a necessary
Theterm'necessary'
denotes
unionoftheterms
whichiscosignified
whichare said to bearthisnecessity
are conby theverb'is'. If theentities
thensucha proposition
tingent,
[as theabove]couldnotbe true.Thereis no
unionbetween
termswhichrefer
to contingent
entities.19
necessary
Thus, the problem with absolving the copula fromtime is that it does
not impart any necessityto the entitiesbeing discussed.
Ill
We now turn to Pardo's own solution. Since much of Pardo's view
depends on the modal theorywhich he presentsin chapter one of the
Medulla Dyalectices
, I will begin by summarizing it. Pardo's modal
was
theory
mainly a reaction to thatof the fourteenth-century
philosoAndreas
de Novo Castro who presenteda conceptualisticnotion
pher
of the modalities. For Andreas modalities are to be understood in a
similar fashion as universais. The world outside of our minds only
17Pardo,f.lxxxiiiva.
18Pardo,f.lxxxiiiva"b.
19Pardo,f. lxxxiiivb.
18

20:19:45 PM

contains individuals, and the universal notions we have of them are

constructedby our minds. Thus, universais such as "cat" exist only
in our minds. The world outside of our minds contains individual
creatureswe call "cats" only because of perceived similaritiesamong
those individuals. Following thisline of reasoning, Andreas concluded
that there is nothingnecessary about the contingentworld outside of
our minds except insofar as our minds conceive of it as necessary.
Thus, humans are necessarilyanimals only in our minds.20
Pardo gives three reasons why he rejects Andreas' view. First,
because if, as Andreas claims, necessary and impossible propositions
are only such "according to a figureor way of speaking" (secundum
figuramet modumloquendi),then we can never say that these propositions are necessary or impossible according to truth {secundum
But this does not sufficientlyassign modality to proposiveritatem).
tions. Pardo' s second argumentmaintainsthatthe differenceswe note
among necessary,contingent,and impossible propositionsshould not
be thoughtof as only in our concepts because our "intellect is moved
enimmovetur
a re). Thus, he concludes, if the
by reality" ( intellectus
means
of
one
of these types of propositionsis
conceived
of
by
reality
not differentfrom that conceived of by another type, then it is not
clear why one propositionis possible and another impossible. Finally,
Pardo asks us to consider the proposition 'Socrates possibly is white.'
He asks: independentlyof any operation of the mind ( seclusaomni
intellectus
operatione
), is it necessary or not? If it is not, then we may
wonder where it gets its necessityif it were necessary. If on the other
hand 'Socrates possibly is white' is necessary, then it is so because
there is some necessity in reality (in re) signified by this sentence
because of which the entityapprehended is said to be necessary.21
The main thrust of Pardo's arguments is the idea that truth,
including modal truth,must be based on what exists outside of the
mind. We have seen that he rejected the view that scientificpropositions are absolved from time because absolution from time did not
provide the extramentalfoundation required for their necessity. For
20Andreasde NovoCastro,f.viiivb-ixra.
Restatedin Pardo,f. vva*b.
21Pardo,f. vva.The readermaybe wondering
the
whyPardo is considering
to
It
seem
its
of
white'
instead
is
'Socrates
of
might
possibility.
possibly
necessity
to support
in reality
abouta foundation
makemoresenseforPardotobe worrying
thatPardo
white.I suspect,
ofSocrates
assertion
a truthful
however,
beingpossibly
as I discuss
arenecessary,
inwhich
oftheS5 modalconception
isthinking
possibilities
below.
19

20:19:45 PM

Pardo, there must be a necessary connection in realityto provide a

sufficientbasis for that necessity.
Pardo replaces Andreas' conceptualism with a view I call the
" modal
string" view. To explain this view Pardo distinguishes
absolute from relative modalits. Absolute modalities are modalities
, which denote the type of existence an entity possesses.
simpliciter
Thus, only God is necessary absolutely because He is the only
necessary being. Relative modalities are the modalities possessed by
individuals in comparison with one another. Thus, in one of Pardo's
examples, a donkey and a human have a necessary negative relation
between them which makes the statement 'a donkey is human'
necessarily false.22
In Pardo's opinion, these modal relations are just as much part of
the extramentalworld as individuals:
is setaside,humanand
Forexample,
evenafter
oftheintellect
everyoperation
res
This
is
obvious
foreachofthese.If
entities
donkeyare different
( diversae).
therefore
theyare different
things,theyhave somedivisionbetweenthem
becauseofwhichtheintellect
as 'a humanis nota
can thinkofthatdiversity
thedivision
in reality
is priorto thatin theintellect.23
donkey'.Therefore,
Thus, Pardo concludes:
a
humananddonkey
in reality
havea relative
fromwhichnecessity
necessity
24
is called*necessary.'
proposition
Thus, there exists between a human and a donkey a necessary
negative relation which provides the basis in extramentalrealityfor
the impossibilityof the donkey-human. Modal stringsin fact appear
in as many varieties as there are distinctmodes. There seems to be a
stringfor each of the logical connectives as well, including negation
and disjunction.25Pardo thus concludes that Buridan' s ontology of
particulars had to be extended to include modal and logical connections in order to provide a basis forthe truthof modal statementsas
well as those containing logical operators.
22In thelatefifteenth
PaulSoncinas,
andinthesixteenth
century.
Sylvester
century,
ofFerrara
andDomingoBaeztakeup a viewsimilar
toPardo's"modalstring"
conNorman
Wellsdescribes
theviewcontending
"thatthebondsoftheessential
ception.
withthecreatable
essences
areeternal,
uncreated
andnecessary"
predicates
(Norman
Wellsin Surez,p. 11). Of course,Pardo'smodalrelations
or strings
relateparticulars
whiletheseThomists
seemto thinkthatthe"bonds" relateessenceswith
individuals.
23Pardo,f. vvb.
24Pardo,f. vira.
25See forexample,Pardo,f. vivband Coombs,170.
20

20:19:45 PM

Pardo' s own position on the necessity of scientificpropositions

begins withthe claim thatwhateverdoes not actually existcannot have
a true union signifiedby the verb 'is'.26 In other words, nonexistent
thingscannot be related to anything.This idea that statementsmust
referto some extramentalparticularin order to be true is, as we have
seen, central to Pardo's metaphysics.27However, Pardo thinksthat
contingenttruthscannot have a necessary union between theirterms
which is cosignifiedby the verb 'is'. This claim entails that a proposition can only be necessary if its terms refer to necessary objects
because, Pardo tellsus, "contingent termscannot provide the foundation fora necessaryunion."28 It is this claim which poses the greatest
difficultiesfor Pardo's view because Pardo now seems committed
to the idea that scientifictruthsare not necessary,which is contraryto
the authorityof Aristotle.
Pardo triesto resolve his problem by statingthatthe 'is' in scientific
propositionssignifiesa possibleunion between the entitiessignifiedby
4
its terms. So, we are to interpret'a triangle has three angles' as a
trianglepossiblyhas threeangles.' This possible union is timelessand
connotes no time.29This timeless possibilitycorresponds to the conception of modality which states that possibilities are necessary, an
idea whichmodal logicians of the twentiethcentury,followingthe lead
of C I. Lewis, express with the modal theorem:
Mp - LMp,
where M is 'it is possible that', and L is 'it is necessary that'. The
stated theorem is one which modal logicians believe is characteristic
of the modal logic originallycalled "S5" by Lewis.30
This correspondence between Pardo' s timeless possible union and
Lewis's S5 does not, unfortunately,help to explain why Pardo accepts
such a notion. In fact,Pardo has already given reasons why he should
not accept it. Pardo earlier told us that "contingent termscannot provide the foundationfor a necessary union," and if there cannot be a
necessary relation between two contingentbeings, then the possible

26Pardo,f. lxxxiiiva.
27See Pardo,f. iivaand Ashworth
(1978),100.
28Pardo,f. lxxxiiiva.
29Pardo,f.lxxxiiivb.
30Ockhamis awareofthenecessity
at 513,lines51-7.
in theSumma
ofpossibilities
49.
S5 see Hughesand Cresswell,
Concerning
21

20:19:45 PM

union between them could not be necessary either since the possible
union also unites two contingentthings.
Pardo offersno explicit answer to this problem. But he may have
thoughtthat the necessityin this case is to be ascribed to the possible
union itselfand not to the contingententitiesunited by the union. A
necessary union cannot connect two contingententities,Pardo might
say, but in the case of the possible union, the necessitybelongs to the
possible union and not to the contingententitiesrelatedby the possible
union. For example, assume thatClaire is possibly sittingon the computer. This would mean that there is a possible union between Claire
and (presumably) Claire insofar as she sits on the computer.31The
necessityof this possibilitywill belong to the possible union between
Claire and herself,but not to Claire herself.
But, some furtherquestions arise fromthis solution. First,how can
there be a timeless union between two contingenttemporal entities?
Would not the possible union cease to exist and thus lose its necessity
when the contingententitiescease to exist?AlthoughPardo's textcontains no answers, one response could be thatthe entitiesrelatedby the
possible union are themselvesabsolutely
possible beings and therefore
"
might be eternar' in some way. Perhaps as God is absolutely
necessary because His existence is necessary, creaturescould at least
be absolutely possible in that theirexistence is a possibilityno matter
how unlikelyor dependent on God's will. Perhaps Pardo is assuming
the idea that even though the existence
of creatures is contingenton
God's will, theirpossibleexistence
is guaranteed by logic if not by God.
In addition, absolutelypossible entitiesare consistentwith the theory
of ampliation which extends the denotations of statementsto possible
and imaginary entities.
UnfortunatelyPardo seems to rule out such a solution since he
analyzes propositionssuch as 'the Antichristpossibly exists' in terms
of a relative, not an absolute, possibility. This proposition is true,
Pardo says, because there is a relative possibility between the
Antichrist and existence.32 Unfortunately, this answer may push
31ForNominalists
referred
an affirmative
is trueifandonlyiftheentity
proposition
to bythepredicate.
to bythesubjectis equivalent
to thatreferred
32Pardo,f. virb"va.
est est
"Ad primamdico quod stapropositio
'antichristus
estesse.Significat
enimantichristum
taliter
possibilis
qualiter
possibile
quiasignificat
inordinead existentiam,
etantichristus
affirmative
est.Immoantichristus
possibiliter
ad existentiam,
relativa
relative
et affirmative
refertur
possibiliter
quae possibilitas
estexistens."
cumdicitur
antichristus
importatur
perly "possibiliter'
possibiliter
22

20:19:45 PM

Pardo into an infiniteregress.If 4the Antichristpossiblyexists' is true,

then there is a possible stringbetween the Antichristand existence.
Let us representthis as:
EXISTENCE.
ANTICHRIST-possible
stringAre we here referringto the actual Antichrist,or only a possible one?
It cannot be the actual one, for then the stringwould be lacking a
relatumsince the Antichristdoes not presentlyexist. So, it must be the
possible Antichrist. But, Pardo's analysis suggests that we must
understand this possible Antichristas a relative, not an absolute,
possible. This entails that the (relatively) possible Antichrist is
equivalent to the Antichristlinked to existenceby a possible union. If
we replace 'antichrist' with this analysis we obtain:
EXISTENCE.
stringpossible
stringEXISTENCE]-possible
[ANTICHRISTAgain, we would ask if thisAntichristis actual or possible, and the
cycle begins again with no end in sight.
Anotherquestion this solution raises is: what kind of necessitydoes
thepossible union possess? The only answer is thatit possesses relative
necessitysince only God is absolutely necessary. Relative necessities
are based on relativestrings,however, and then one wonders what is
on the other end of the necessary relation connected to the possible
union. On occasion, as in the example of the Antichristjust men'
tioned, Pardo says that unions can be connected to 'existence."33
Thus, the possible union between the "Claires" might have a
necessary union between it and existence. But this move cannot be
justifiedin Pardo' s metaphysicssince existence seems to be neithera
particularnor a string.Or perhaps Pardo thinksthat all creaturesare
attachedto theAbsolute Existentby possible strings.But thenonly the
Absolute Existent knows how the actual creatures differfrom the
merelypossible ones unless now we add actual stringsto the merely
possible ones. There may be more stringsattached to this theorythan
one can ontologicallyface.
In fact, Pardo' s analysis of the Antichristexample may simply
reveal that his distinctionbetween absolute and relative necessityin
is not well founded. One would
chapter one of the Medulla Dyalectices
thinkthat God's absolute necessitysimply means that His existence
or "being" is necessary. But given Pardo' s treatment of the
Antichrist'spossible existence as a relative possibility,it seems that
33Pardo,f. virb"va.
23

20:19:45 PM

one could just as easily say that God is necessary relative to His
existence. The problem is that absolute modalities seem to be defined
in terms of the modality of the entity's existence. God is absolutely
exists.But then the Antichristshould
necessary because He necessarily
be " absolutelypossible" because hc possiblyexists.Of course, perhaps
Pardo has some othernotion of absolute necessityin mind, but I have
not seen it and I do not see how any othernotion could resolve these
difficulties.
Finally, Pardo's stringtheoryof the modality raises the question,
why not base the necessity of scientificpropositions on a relatively
4
necessary modal string? Thus, a human is an animal' could be
necessary because there is a relative necessitybetween a human and
an animal. Pardo' s reason for rejecting such a solution is his rather
stringentcondition on scientifictruths: that they be restrictedto
necessary objects. Thus, science would be restrictedto statements
about God and possible relationsbetween contingentbeings. But this
is not compatible withPardo' s nominalistictendencies. To make transitory,contingententitiessuch as human beings into eternalnecessary
objects, one mightpostulate the existenceof immaterialideas floating
eternallyin God's mind, but Pardo is adamant in attackingany theory
of semantics which requires anythingbeyond individual entities(and
their strings)to make sense of the meaning and truthof statements.
Although Pardo's view possesses difficulties,I hope its interestis
clear. Pardo's ontology, perhaps more than any of his predecessors,
is a logician's ontology. He may have been a few short steps away
froma severe logical atomism in which there exist (1) only the types
of entitiesreferredto by individual constantsand (2) logical relations
gluing them together.No doubt this is a rather sparse ontology, but
that he was engaged in the project of the logical constructionof the
world to an even greater extent than the logicians of fourteenthcentury makes him a unique figurein the historyof logic.
San Antonio, Texas
Our Lady of theLake University

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26

20:19:45 PM

Smigleciuson entia rationis1

GINO RONCAGLIA

This paper deals with the discussion of impossible entities in the

Logica writtenby the Polish Jesuit Mrtius Smiglecius (1564-1618).
Two preliminarysections give some informationon Smiglecius' life
and works, and on the general structureof his Logica. A thirdsection
offerssome historicalbackground on the logical status of impossible
entities,and theirinclusion in the class of entiarationis.The fourthand
main section presents Smiglecius' ideas on this topic in some detail.
1. The lifeand worksofMrtiusSmiglecius
Born in Lvov (Leopolis) probably in 1564, Smiglecius was the most
importantPolish philosopherworkingbetween the end of the 16thand
the beginningof the 17th century. He began his studies in his native
town, but soon the prominent Polish humanist and politician Jan
Zamojski took him under his wing, paying for Smiglecius' education
first at the Jesuit school of Pultusk, and later in Rome, where
Smiglecius entered the Jesuit order (1581). It was probably on that
occasion that he assumed the name (taken fromthe town of Smigle,
from which his family originated) by which he was to be known:
earlier he used the name of Lwowczyk, or Leopolitanus (from his
native town). Smiglecius studied in Rome until 1586, then he went
back to Poland, where he took his master's degree in philosophyat the
recentlyestablished Academy of Vilnius.2
1 I do notreadPolish,and, sincemuchof theexisting
literature
on
secondary
is inPolish,thispapercouldnothavebeenwritten
without
thekindhelp
Smiglecius
ofAleksandra
Librarian
ofthePolishAcademy
in Rome,and ofEwa
Kralkowska,
I amalsoindebted
toCesareCozzo,who- withhishabitual
kindJoannaKaczynska.
- hasprovided
nessandinsight
mewithmanyusefulcomments
on thefirst
draft
of
thispaper,toStenEbbesenforhisprecious
andtoFelicity
Lutzforthe
observations,
oftheEnglishtext.
revision
2 ThecollegeofVilniusbecamea university
between
1578and 1579;cf.K.
academy
in: StudiaHistoryczne,
Marcin
XXI (1978)25Drzymala,
Smiglecki
TJ(1563-1618),
43, esp. 29.
27
E.J.Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 1

20:19:52 PM

In Vilnius Smiglecius also became a doctor of theology(1594), and

taught both philosophy (for 4 years) and theology (for 10 years).
Smiglecius was actively involved in the administrativeand institutional life of the Academy, as well as in the cultural and educational
policies of the Jesuit order: he was among the members of the local
commission appointed in order to give comments and advice on the
project of the Ratio Studiorumsent from Rome. For Smiglecius, this
was also a period of active participationin religiouscontroversies,and
his fame as a polemicistspread when, in 1594, he had a two-daypublic
disputationwithJan Licyniusz, who was considered to be a supporter
of Arianism. At the end of the disputation, Licyniusz gave in, declaring himselfunable to resistthe argumentsof his opponent. As a result,
twelveof the town's most influentialnoblemen solemnlyabjured their
'mistakes', accepting the Catholic position on the divinityof Christ.
In subsequent years Smiglecius was increasingly involved in an
exchange of polemical writings with Socinians, Lutherans and
Calvinists on subjects such as the divinityof Christ and the duties and
powers of the priests.
The Jesuit order profited from Smiglecius' organizational and
polemical abilities, sending him where the need was feltto raise the
level of studies and to re-organizecolleges. Thus, Smiglecius spentthe
last two decades of his lifeworkingin the colleges of Pultusk, Poznan,
Krakow and Kalisz. He died in Kalisz on July 28, 1618. His tomb was
in the town's monastic church, and in 1650, during restorationwork
on the church,his ashes were placed in a separate urn, withthe whole
alphabet writtenon it as a symbol of his wisdom.3
Twenty-threeworks attributedto Smiglecius are listed in Sommerde la Compagnie
deJsus* A shorterlist
vogel's edition of the Bibliothque
is given in the bibliographyat the end of the recent criticaledition of
the Commentaria
in OrganumAristotelis
, a formerlyunpublished logical
written
a
Vilnius student, Stanislaus Bedensky,
compendium
by
3 The information
on Smiglecius'
lifesummarized
aboveis mainly
drawnfromthe
sources:L. Moreri,Le granddictionnaire
following
, 18thedition,VIII,
historique
Amsterdam
andAloisde Backer,Bibliothque
descrivains
dela
1740,306-7;Augustin
deJsus,ser.VI, Lige1861,342-5,revisedand enlarged
in: Bibliothque
Compagnie
dela Compagnie
deJsus,
nouvelle
dition
parC. Sommervogel,
p. 1 1.VII, BruxellesParis1896,coll. 1320-7;K. Drzymala,
Martin
; I. Dambska,Kilkauwago
Smiglecki
Marcime
ijegoLogice,in:Studia
i Materialy
z Dziejw
NaukiPolskiej
Smigleckim
, seriaE
vol. V (1973),3-27;W. Vois, TheCareer
, in:
ofa Polishneo-Aristotelian:
Smiglecius
Archives
Internationales
d'Histoire
des Sciences,XXIX (1979),23-7.
4 Bibliothque
dela Compagnie
deJsus
, coll. 1320-7.
28

20:19:52 PM

under Smiglecius, supervision.5Smiglecius' major worksare: De fenore

etcontractu
redimibili
locationibus
, censibus,communi
quaestu, conductionibus,
first
in
Polish
etmonopolio
brevis
doctrina
,
published
(Vilnae 1596), which
had more than ten editions, the last three of which were printed in
Vilnius in the 1750s (1752, 1753 and 1758), and is of great interestfor
the historyof economic and social ideas in Poland;6 Nodus Gordiussive
Ministrorum
de Vocatione
, Cracoviae 1609, which had editions
disputatio
in Germany (Ingolstadii 1613 and Coloniae 1622) and which gave rise
to heated polemics between Smiglecius and Protestantauthors(among
those who were involved in the debate, writingrefutationsor discussions of Smiglecius' work, were Johannes Volkel, Valentin Smalcius,
Andreas Reuchlin, Jacobus Zaborowski, Johannes Bissendorft);Nova
monstranoviArianismi
, Nissae 1612, which was the object of a long
between
polemic
Smiglecius and Valentin Smalcius; and finallythe
is dated
in
Logica, published Ingolstadt in 1618 (the epistuladedicatoria
1616), which had three English editions: Oxoniae 1634, 1638 and
1658.7
'
2. Smiglecius
Logica
The Logica is a collection of eighteen disputations, subdivided into
185 questions. The firstedition of the text having been published in
Ingolstadtin 1618 (the year of Smiglecius' death), this book seems to
be the very last published by the author during his lifetime.This is
interesting,since the study of logic was still chronologicallythe first
of the time, and the teaching of logic was
in the universitycurriculum
of
the
first
one
steps in the universitycareer of young prousually
fessors.Smiglecius was no exception to thisrule, since he taughtlogic
at the verybeginningof his career in Vilnius. We have what is probably a good witnessto his teachingat that time in the formof the aforementioned commentary to Aristotle's Organonwritten in 1586 by
Stanislaus Bedensky "sub insigni doctrina, piette et integritte,
5 Mrtius
Aristotelu
inOrganum
Commentario,
, ed. LudwikNowak,Textus
Smiglecius,
vol.XXII fase.1-2,
inPolonia
excultae
actheologiae
historiam
etstudia
spectantia,
philosophiae
Warszawa1987,253-7.
6 Cf. K. Drzymala,Traktat
O Liehwie Y O Wyderkach,
MarcinaSmigleckiego
Krtka
Zarobkach,Najmach,ArendachY Samokupstwie,
Spolnych
Czynszach,
i Materiale
1972,143-72.
Nauka,in: Studia
7 The 1634editionis givenas printed
in Krakowin W. Risse,Bibliographia
,
logica
Hildesheim
1965,131. I couldnotfinda copyof thisedition,but all theother
in Oxford.
I foundgiveit as published
references
29

20:19:52 PM

clarssimo viro Martino Smiglecio".8 It is interestingto compare this

textwith the later Logica. While one can safelyassume that in writing
the Logica Smiglecius used much of the material already presentin his
Vilnius teaching,9 the Logica does not appear to be a simple reelaboration of this material. Thus - even if this can be explained by
the need to follow Aristotle's (and Porphyry's) text more closelyhardly anything corresponding to the firsttwo disputations of the
Logica can be found in the Commentaria.
The Logicashould thereforebe regarded as a maturework,probably
composed over a long period of time10and resultingfromthe author's
lasting interestin the subject he was dealing with. This impressionis
also confirmedby the complex historyof its publication. The Logica
(or at least the firstpart of it) was already completed in 1615, and as
was customary, Smiglecius sent it to Rome for approbation. But the
opinion of the specially appointed censorship commission was not a
positive one:
et censemus
utnuncest,nondebere;
LegimusLogicamP. MartiniSmiglecii:
nonadmodum
veletiamauditasinscholis;
quoniamcontinet
opiniones
receptas,
auctores
atquesatiscommuniter
proillisnoncitt.11
The enclosed censurae
to Smiglecius' book approved by the
generales
commission are the following:
1. Sequituraliquasopiniones
in scholisnostris.
2. Noncitt
parumreceptas
auctores
etcumaliquandocitatauctores
nonnotteorum
prodictisopinionibus;
etiamnonsatisfideliter
eorumdictarefert.
3. Nonvidetur
loca; et interdum
interdum
ut ex particularibus
censuris
ipsesecumcohaerere,
patebit.12
8 Mrtius
Commentaria
, I, 21.
Smiglecius,
9 Cf. I. Dambska,
Kilkauwag
, 4.
10It maybe
to observethatSmiglecius,
as a prominent
member
ofthe
interesting
Polishdelegation
to theJesuitgeneralcongregation
in 1608,askedhowfarthe
ofphilosophy
coulddeviatefrom
wasgivenby
teaching
Aquinas'views.Theanswer
CardinalAquaviva:one shouldnotdeviatefromAquinas'viewswhentheyare
inAquinas'ownwritings
andaregenerally
clearly
expressed
accepted
bythesubsebutoneisallowedtodo so onthemoredubiousmatters,
where
quentcommentators,
theopinions
ofthecommentators
aredivided(cf.K. Drzymala,
Marcin
, 36).
Smiglecki
This questionis not necessarily
connectedwithSmiglecius'own philosophical
butifsomeconnection
work
exists,thenitmaywellbe withthepreparatory
activity,
fortheLogica.
11Quotedin L. Nowak,
Marcina
w opiniiwsplczesnynch
i pznieLogika
Smigleckiego
XXVI/3(1968),219-22,221.Oneofthefourmembers
, in:RuchFilozoficzny,
jszych
ofthecommission
didnotagreewiththisopinion,
andpresented
a separate
report.
thecommission
examined
Apparently,
work," usque
onlythefirst
partofSmiglecius'
'
adpraedicamentum
relationis
exclusive1
.
12Quotedibid.,222.
30

20:19:52 PM

One of the members of the commission, Johannes Lorinus,

observedin a letterthatthe criticismsraised were so fundamentalthat
it was almost impossible for Smiglecius to re-elaborate his work in
such a way as to make it suitable for publication.13
Despite this, Smiglecius did not give in. We do not know how far
he had to modifyhis book to meet the requests of the censorshipcommittee,14but in June 1616 he managed to obtain the approbatioof
Stanislaus Gawronski, delegate of the Jesuit order for Poland. The
book, however, was only published two years later- which may
indicatesome furtherdifficulties.
Afterpublication, the Logica became an influentiallogical textbook
especiallyin England, where it had three editions between 1634 and
1658, and where a circleof 'Smiglecians' was active duringthe second
halfof the century.Curious evidence of the book's fortuneis the fact
thatJonathan Swift had to answer questions on Smiglecius' Logica
duringan (unsuccessful) examination in logic at Dublin universityin
1685.15According to Pierre Bayle- who devoted an articlein his Dicet critiqueto Smiglecius16- the pages of the Logica
tionnaire
historique
ad vim
omniacontinere
intellectus,
videntur,
operationum
quae ad naturam
& si ea exceperis
veritatis
& principia
ad fundamenta
ratiocinandi,
pertinent;
Sectaequam
ab ingenio
necesseeratvelfalsavelabstrusiora
quaeipsiinhaerere
iudiciicumsubtilitate
crtatin eo soliditas
atqueperspicuitate.17
sequebatur,
Let us now take a closer look at the structureof the work. The first
disputation,and the one we shall focus on in the followingsections,
deals withentiarationis'it is also among the longest disputationsof the
Logica(95 pages). If one considers that the role of entiarationisis also
rationis
discussed in the second disputation, and that the relationes
usually included in the class of entiarationis are discussed at lengthin
13Loc.cit.
14A detailedstudyofthecensurae
in orderto
wouldbe ofgreatinterest
particulares
oftheJesuit
arepreserved
intheRomanArchives
documents
this;therelevant
verify
order(vol.654,CensuraeLibrarum,
III, nn. 332 ff.).
15Cf.W. Vois,TheCareer
of
evidence
, 23; I. Dambska,Kilkauwagi5. Forfurther
ofSmiglecius'
theEnglish
fortune
, which
mayhavebeenamongLocke'slogical
Logica
TheScholastic
Sources
IdeasorThings?'
cf.E.J.Ashworth,
'Do Words
sources,
of
Signify
ofPhilosophy,
XIX (1981)299oftheHistory
Locke's
, in:Journal
ofLanguage
Theory
inPost-Medieval
Semantics
in E.J.Ashworth,
Studies
, London
326,esp.304(reprinted
1985).
16Cf. P. Bayle,Dictionnaire
etcritique
, nouvelledition,Paris 1820-1824
historique
Genve1969),XIII, 338-9.
(anastatic
reprint
17P. Bayle,Theses
diverses
, Den Haag 1731(anastatic
, in: Oeuvres
reprint
philosophicae
Hildesheim
1968),IV, 133.
31

20:19:52 PM

the disputation on relations, it will be clear that the entiarationisare

indeed among Smiglecius' main logical concerns. His decision to open
the book with this topic is clearly connected with the idea that an
extensive discussion of entiarationisis required in order to deal properlywith the problem of the nature and the object of logic. Not surprisingly,the second disputation {De logicain commun)is devoted to
thislatterproblem. The thirddisputationdeals withthe firstoperation
of the intellect (the simplexapprehensio)and introduces disputations
and
4-11, discussing the traditional topics of praepraedicamenta
De
seu
de
enunsecunda
intellectus,
praedicamenta.
Disputation 12,
operatione
ciamone,opens the second part of the Logica, and embraces the whole
theoryof the proposition, including the discussion of the meaning of
terms. Disputation 13 can thus directlyproceed to the thirdoperation
of the intellect{De tertiaoperatione
intellectus
quae diciturdiscursus
), and
within it to syllogisms; this leaves the last five disputations free for
such favourite post-medieval topics as the theory of demonstration
(disputations 14-15), the theoryof science (disputations 16-17) and the
theoryof definition(disputation 18).
There are considerable differencesin the relativelengthsof the various disputations,and an interestingfeatureof Smiglecius' work is the
choice of the topics that he feltrequired a more extensivediscussion.
The length of the disputation on entiarationishas already been commented on. Another notable example is his treatmentof the category
of relation (disputation 10), to which he devotes almost two hundred
pages. One cam compare this to the length of the disputationson the
other categories: 63 pages are devoted to the category of substance
(disputation 8), 53 to that of quantity (disputation 9), 44 to the joint
treatmentof quality and of the last six categories (disputation 11).
This means that the space devoted to the categoryof relationis larger
than that devoted to all the other categories put together.18
In the second part of the book, disputation 12, devoted to the theory
of the proposition,deals in 96 pages and 14 questions withthe vox(this
is the only place in which Smiglecius discusses some elements of the
traditionaltheoryof terms),the differencebetween noun and verb, the
nature of the propositionand the role of the copula, the theoryof truth
and the theoryof opposition. No mentionis made of the theoryof supposition, with the exception of the general observation that the voces
18A similar
attention
tothecategory
ofrelation
wasalreadyevident
in theCommentarla
: cf.Mrtius
Commentario,
I, 239-72.
Smiglecius,
32

20:19:52 PM

19None of
while the concepts are signamanifestativa.
are signasuppositiva
the questions within this disputation deals with such standard topics
as the theory of modality and of modal propositions20(but one is
devoted to propositionson futurecontingents).The attentionpaid to
the theoryof demonstration(165 pages) and to the theoryof science
(254 pages) is impressive,but not surprisingin an early seventeenthcenturyauthor.21
and entia rationis
entities
3. On whatthereis not: impossible
The discussion of the ontological status of fictionaland impossible
entitiesand of the logical status of the termsused to referto them is
an old one.22During the late-medieval and post-medievalperiod, this
discussion largely focused- with different accents in different
authors- on the following,often interrelatedproblems:
: a) what kind of supposition
if any, can
problems
1) {mainly)semantical
be attributedto terms 'referring'to fictionaland impossible entities?
This problem is linked to the discussion of the possibilityof ampliating
(<ampliatio
) supposition beyond present, past, future and possible
beings so as to include a fifthclass, imaginable beings. Are impossible
entitiesto be included in the class of imaginable beings?23b) How do
19Mrtius
between
1618,II, 4-5.On thedifference
, Ingolstadii
Logica
Smiglecius,
- and in generalon thissectionof Smiglecius'
and suppositive
manifestive
signs
- cf.E J. Ashworth,
edition
ofthe
'Do Words
, esp.323.The 1658Oxford
Signify
logic
fromtheIngolstadt
has a different
edition.
, usedbyAshworth,
pagination
Logica
20Onceagain,thisalsoseemstobe a feature
oftheCommentaria
, whereonlya single
Mrtius
Commentaria
, II, 69.
Smiglecius,
pageis devotedto modality:
21Fora studyofSmiglecius'
ofscience,cf.L. Nowak,Marcina
Smigleckiego
theory
XIII (1977),109-43andXIV (1978),
teoria
nauki
Christianae,
, in:StudiaPhilosophiae
Marcina
, in: W. Voisand Z. Skubala49-88;id., Gnozeologiczne
Smigleckiego
poglady
Z historii
, Wroclaw1981,113-72.
polskiej
logiki
Tokarskiej,
22Cf.S. Ebbesen,TheChimera's
andJ. Hintikka
Diary,in: S. Knuuttila
(eds.), The
Dordrecht
1986,115-43.
LogicofBeing,
23The simplefactthattheTifth'kindofampliation
goes
entities)
(to imaginable
does notnecessarily
implythatit should
beyondthefourth
(to possibleentities)
in the
onecanwellconceivethe'possibility'
entities:
includeall kindsofimpossible
as somekind
as weaker
thanlogicalpossibility
fourth
kindofampliation
(forinstance,
withthelogically
can be identified
so thattheimaginable
ofphysical
possibility),
Chimeras
andImaginary
cf.E.J.Ashworth,
toimaginable
On ampliatio
entities,
possible.
XV (1977),57in:Vivarium,
inthePost-Medieval
: A Study
Theory
ofSignification,
Objects
dansquelques
in ead.,Studies
; J. Biard,La signification
79,reprinted
d'objets
imaginaires
in: P.O. Lewry(ed.),
tes
textes
duXIVesicle
bury,
Henry
Hey
Hopton),
(Guillaume
anglais
onMedieval
TheRiseofBritish
LogicandSemanEuropean
Symposium
Logic.ActsoftheSixth
'secunetanalyse
tics
, Toronto1985,265-83;H. Hugonnard-Roche,
smantique
Analyse
in
XIV
in:
Caroti
Studies
sicle
au
danslaphysique
dumimaginationem'
, S.
(ed.),
parisienne
33

20:19:52 PM

such terms signify?How do they acquire meaning? What kind of

meaning do they acquire? Are they capable of definition?The common idea was that such terms, although lacking any denotation, are
indeed meaningful, which differentiatesa term like chimerafrom a
non-significativeterm like blityri.Ockham and Buridan' s suggestion
is that they possess only a nominal, and not a real definition.However, the kind of meaning that can be attributedto them is a debated
question. Do they signifyall and only the component parts of their
nominal definition?Or do theyrathersignifyall entities,which would
make any two terms'referring'to impossible entitiessynonymous?c)
What are the truth-conditionsof propositionsin which radically nondenoting terms24appear? Ockham and Buridan took a ratherdrastic
position: all the affirmativepropositions in which something is
predicated of a radicallynon-denotingtermare to be considered false,
and all the negative propositions in which something is denied of a
radically non-denotingtermare to be consideredtrue. In thisway, the
(apparently tautological) proposition chimeraest chimerawould be
regarded as false, and the (contradictory)proposition chimeranonest
chimerawould be regarded as true. This position, clearly inspired by
the need for ontological rigour, was quite popular among late
medieval logicians, but seems to lose support later. Surez, for
instance, is much more liberadtowards chimeras, allowing them not
only to be themselves( chimeraestchimerais considered true), but also
be imaginary animals, similar to one another and dissimilar from
goat-stags, and even susceptible to such complex predications as
privativemodal predications(according to him chimera
potestessececais
also true).25d) A furtherlogical issue raised by the consideration of
Medieval
Natural
Firenze1989,133-53;G. Roncaglia,Utrum
sit
Philosophy,
impossibile
Marsilio
di Inghen
e la chimera
e
Buridano,
, in: L. Bianchi(ed.), Filosofia
significabile:
neltrecento.
inricordo
Studi
diEugenio
Randi
, Louvain-la-Neuve
1994,259-82.For
teologia
a generalintroduction
tothetheory
ofampliation,
cf.A. Maier,Terminologia
logica
dellatarda
scolastica
, Roma 1972,139-93.
24As I havedoneelsewhere
(cf.G. Roncaglia,Utrum
impossibile
), hereI use the
term'to labelthosetermsto whichno reference
expression
'radically
non-denoting
canbe giventhrough
at issue.
anyofthekindsofampliatio
accepted
bytheauthor(s)
25Cf.J.P. Doyle,Suarez
onBeings
andTruth
XXV (1987),
ofReason
(1), in:Vivarium,
onBeings
andTruth
XXVI
47-75,esp.64, andid.,Suarez
ofReason
(2), in: Vivarium,
to add a remark
to Doyle'scon(1988),51-72,esp. 51, 54-5.It maybe interesting
siderations:
in accepting
modalpredications
aboutchimeras,
Surezseems
privative
to be moreliberalthanAquinas:according
to thelatter,a chimera
maybe "non
- notblind."Non vidensenimpotest
dicitamchimera
videns",but- itseems
quam
etiam
homo.
Sed in privatione
estquaedamnaturavelsubstantia
deterlapisquam
minatade qua diciturprivatio:nonenimomnenonvidenspotest
dicicaecum(...)".*
34

20:19:52 PM

impossibleentitiesis clearlythatof the definitionand nature of modal

terms.Do we have different'kinds' of impossible entitiescorresponding to different'kinds' of impossibility (for example, to logical
impossibilityand to physical impossibility)?How do we discriminate
between possible and impossible entities?
: a) What kind of existence, if any,
problems
) ontological
2) ( mainly
for
should be recognized
logically and/or physically impossible
entities? This problem was often addressed within the context of
discussionsof the latitudoentis(what kind of entitiesare to be accepted
in our ontology?Is there some general sense of 'being' which is common to real beings and to such non-beings as privations, negations,
fictitiousand impossible entities?), usually throughthe consideration
of 'diminutive', 'indirect' or 'improper' formsof being. Since these
were often regarded as a product of our intellectual activities,
epistemologica! considerations also played a role here, b) Which
entitiesare to be regarded as impossible? This question is clearlyconnected with the last of the above-mentioned (mainly) semantical
problems; goat-stagsand chimerasare often but, as we shall see, not
class
of
members
of
the
impossibilia.c) Are ficalways prominent
titiousand impossible entitiesto be classified and how- within the
Aristoteliantable of categories? This problem was usually addressed
at the beginning or at the end of the discussion of the ten categories.
logicalproblems',
a) What are the (intellectual and
) epistemo
3) ( mainly
in
conceiving fictitiousand impossible
non-intellectual)powers used
entities?And what are the intentionalattitudeswe can have towards
them?(For instance: can we knowsomethingimpossible? Can we want
or desiresomethingimpossible?) b) What kind of science, if any, can
legitimatelydeal with impossible entities?This problem was debated
notonlywithreferenceto metaphysicsbut also withreferenceto logic,
thusconnectingepistemologicaland logical considerations:are impossible entitiesto be included within the scope of logical discourse?
The subdivision into (mainly) semantical, ontological and
epistemologicalproblems is of course a partiallyartificialone. It is not
to be found- at least not in these terms- in medieval and postmedieval authors, and it may be difficultto apply in concrete situations, since the discussions of the above outlined topics are often
strictlyinterrelatedand interdependent.Nevertheless,it may help us
TheDomain
ThomasAquinas,In IV. Met.,3, 2; cf.R.W. Schmidt,
ofLogicAccording
toSaintThomas
, The Hague 1966,76.
Aquinas
35

20:19:52 PM

to shape the general theoreticallandscape of the problem, beforetaking into account some portionof the vast amount of available and relevant texts, in most cases still to be studied.
From the point of view of the classification proposed above,
Smiglecius' discussion of entiarationisis more directlyconnected with
ontological and epistemological problems, even if it has the ultimate
aim of providingthe background needed in order to answer the question of the object oflogic. This lattertask provides a basis forthe inclusion of a section devoted to entiarationisat the very beginning of a
logical textbook; however, Smiglecius' discussion- as well as most of
the post-medieval discussions of impossible entities within the
- does not directlydeal with such
'chapter' devoted to entia rationis
, the kind of supposition posproblems as ampliation to imaginabilia
sessed by radically non-denoting terms, and the truth-conditionsof
propositions containing them. As a general observation, it may be
noted that Smiglecius' discussion takes up many of the problems that
were debated at his time with referenceto entiarationisnot only in the
field of logic but also in that of metaphysics. In particular, Surez'
Disputationes
Metaphysicae
appear to be one of the most importantof
Smiglecius' sources. On the other hand, it seems that the semantical
and logical problems mentioned above, which were stillquite popular
in the first half of the 16th century,26lost some appeal for later
logicians.27
Why were impossible entities included in- or even identified
with- the class ofentiarationis
? The storybehind thisis a complex, and
stilllargelyunexplored one. The main featureof entiarationis
, and one
on which there was general agreement among medieval and postmedievailauthors, is that theyonly exist in our intellect(where an esse
obiectivum
is usually attributedto them). The fortuneof entiarationisin
late-medieval and post-medieval logic is largely due to the authority
of Thomas Aquinas, and to his view of the object of logic. According
to Aquinas, who elaborated his theoryof entiarationismainly on the
basis of Aristotle's Metaphysicsand of Arabic sources, there are two
fundamentalkinds of being, entiarationisand entianaturae
, and the logi26Cf. E J. Ashworth,
Chimeras.
27Notehowever
thattheampliatio
toimaginabilia
remains
a debatedissueevenlater:
an interesting
discussion
ofit is to be foundin Fonsecain 1564(P.
(and rejection)
dialecticarum
libri
ed.J. Ferreira
Fonseca,Institutionum
octo>
Gomes,Coimbra1964,II,
itis stillmentioned
726-8),andneartheendofthecentury
(andapparently
accepted)
bySurez(F. Surez,Disputationes
, LIV, 2 n. 18).
Metaphysicae
36

20:19:52 PM

cian only deals with the former:it is there that we must seek for the
? If we startwith
proper object of logic.28But what are the entiarationis
the above-mentioneddistinctionbetween entiarationisand entianaturae
,
the termensrationiscovers everythingwhich is not an ensnaturae.This
is a broad meaning, and according to Aquinas it seems thatit includes
at least29the following:
"
negations (such as " nonuidens
");
") and privations(such as caecitas
fictions,such as chimeras; dreams are also included in this class;
'logical' second intentions, such as contrariety, definition,
predicate, proposition and syllogism;
relationsof reason, which are not grounded on intrinsicproperties
of theirfundamenta.
Aquinas, however, elsewhere gives a differentsubdivision of entia
rationisinto two subsets which seem to be considered mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive: negations and relations of reason.30
In speaking of 'negations' here, Aquinas seems to mean both negations and privations, while there are good grounds for including
'logical' intentionsin the class of relationsof reason.31As we shall see,
the inclusion of fictionsin this classificationremains a debated issue.
According to Aquinas, therefore,the termensrationismay cover differentkinds of 'unreal' being. But in various passages he identifies,
among those possible meanings, the 'proper' one:
in
de illisintentionibus
dicitur
Ensautemrationis
quas ratioadinvenit
proprie
sicutintentio
rebusconsideratisi
quae noninvespecieiet similium,
generis,
Et
rationisconsequuntur.
niunturin rerumnatura,sed considerationem
estproprie
subiectum
ensrationis,
scilicet
huiusmodi,
logice.32
The examples given by Aquinas make it clear that here he has in
mind those whichhave been labeled 'logical' intentions,even ifit may
be difficultto give a clear definitionof them.33
28For someof therelevantpassagesand a discussion
cf. R.W.
of thistheory,
TheDomain
ofentia
and post-medieval
theories
Schmidt,
, 49-71.On late-medieval
LevelPredicates,
Mnchen1980;J.P.
rationis
cf.L. Hickman,
Modern
Theories
ofHigher
onBeings
andTruth.
ofReason
Doyle,Suarez
29HereI willnotdiscusstheproblem
- which,
suchas 'humanity'
whether
universais
- are
whilepositively
andimmediately
basedonreality,
do notexistas suchinreality
entiarationis.
Cf. R.W.
also to be includedin theclassof thebroadlyconsidered
TheDomain,
75-93.
Schmidt,
30Cf. ThomasAquinas,De Ventate
, 21, 1, c.
31Cf. R.W. Schmidt.TheDomain
, 89-93.
32ThomasAquinas,In IV Met.,4, 5; on thisand on similarpassages,cf.R.W.
TheDomain
, 53, 90.
Schmidt,
33Traditionally,
wereidentified
withthosesecondintentions
'logical'intentions
are well-founded
an indirect
which,whileexisting
through
onlyin theintellect,
37

20:19:52 PM

Most late-medieval and post-medieval logicians drew from this

traditionthe general idea that the class of entiarationisis subdivided
into negations, privations and relations of reason, and that the most
importantrelationsof reason are those 'logical intentions'which part
of the Thomistic school considered the formalobject of logic. Given
these assumptions, it should come as no surprisethat both the discussion of entiarationisand that of the categoryof relation played a very
importantrole forthe logician. The peculiar attentiondevoted to them
by Smiglecius is thereforefullyunderstandable withinthis tradition.
The location of fictitiousentities within this classificationis not
always clear, but those who emphasize the fact that entitieslike the
chimera result froman impossible composition, and are thereforeto
be considered as logically impossible beings, tend to include themin
the class of negations. This opinion sometimes coexists with the
attributionof an autonomous role to fictions.Thus, the Complutenses
propose a division of entiarationisinto three groups: 1) fictions,made
up by puttingtogetherincompossibleparts, and lacking any real foundation, 2) privations and negations, taken togetheras having nonens
as theirproximate foundation,and 3) relationsof reason, which have
as their foundationsome positive being.34In discussing this opinion,
however, they leave a possibilityfor the inclusion of fictionsin the
class of negations. According to the Complutenses
, if we take the term
in
its broadest sense "pro quocunquenonesse", then iletiam
'negation'
soientin
fictiones,seu chimerae,
quia a partereinullumhabent
fundamentum,
'
hocsensuappellarinegationes*
;35 in a similar way, according to Surez
the division of beings of reason into relationsof reason and negations
"
sub negatione
entiafictaet
may be considered adequate comprendendo
36
also give two possible answers to the
impossibilia". The Conimbricenses
problem of the location of fictitiousand impossible entitieswithinentia
reference
toreality.
Cf.R.W. Schmidt,
TheDomain
ofLogic,85-9;J.P. Doyle,Suarez
onBeings
andTruth
to
ofReason
(1), 67. Thesecriteria,
however,
maynotsuffice
selectexactlythoseintentions
whichwe wishto includein theclassof
precisely
*
For an influential
criticism
oftheThomistic
logical'intentions.
approachon this
inMetaphysicorum
Aristotelis
libros
tomi
pointcf.P. Fonseca,Commentartorum
Stagiritae
Hildesheim
, [Coloniae]1615(anastatic
quatuor
reprint
1964),I, col. 491.
34Cf. Coltegli
inAristotelis
Dialec
Complutensis
(...) Disputationes
ticam,
Lugduni1668
Hildesheim
(anastatic
reprint
1977),73.
35Cf. Collepii
Complutensis
, 74.
36F. Surez,
, LIV, 4, n. 10. Fora schemeoftheresulting
Disputationes
Metaphysicae
classification
ofbeingsofreasonaccording
toSurez,cf.J.P. Doyle,Suarez
onBeings
andTruth
ofReason
(1), 57.
38

20:19:52 PM

rationis.We can eitherthinkthat,althoughproperlybeing entiarationis

,
not
included
in
the
above-mentioned
classification
because
were
they
theylack any foundationin reality,or and thisis considered the best
answer we can assume that they are to be included in the class of
negations.37
The idea thatlogical intentionsare to be considered the most proper
kind of entiarationisis oftennot shared in the post-medieval period.
Being 'well-grounded' in reality even if only mediately logical
beings of reason came ratherto be seen by some authorsas a somehow
'improper' (although very important) subset of the class of entia
rationis.From this point of view, beings of reason in the most proper
sense are those which have no foundationat all in reality.And this is
the position of impossible entities.The position of those authors- and
Smiglecius, as we shall see, is among them who stronglyidentify
entiarationisand impossible entities,is to be seen as the ultimateresult
and impossibleentities,the
of thistendency.In identifyingentiarationis
the
traditional
attributionof the
remained
of
how
to
justify
problem
label of entia rationisto other kinds of unreal beings as well, and
especially to logical intentions.The usual move was to stressthat they
are not to be considered beings of reason because of theirpurely conceptional nature, but ratherbecause theyare thoughtof artificiallysub
modumentis, that is, in a way which attributesto them a formof being
they cannot possibly possess.
3
4. Entia rationis in Smiglecius
Logica
First of all, I wish to stress that I shall not deal with Smiglecius'
opinion on whetherentiarationisare to be considered or not the proper
object of logic- a problem which is addressed in the second disputation of Smiglecius' Logica- but only with his discussion of what entia
rationis
are.38This discussion is the subject of the firstdisputation,that
?
with
the obviously fundamental question quid sit ens rationis
opens
The firstanswer given is the traditionalone: beings of reason are
those which are not (either actually or potentially) real beings, but
37Cf.Commentarli
Aristotelis
e societate
lesuinuniversam
dialecticam
Conimbricensis
,
Collegii
Hildesheim
Coloniae1607(anastatic
reprint
1976),157.
38It maybe appropriate,
the
to Smiglecius
to recallherethataccording
however,
"
directivum
sitobiectum
answerto thequestion" An ensrationis
operationum
logicae
est
ens
rationis
non
esse
obiecthat
directivum
is
2,
probabilius
"longe
question
3)
(disputation
: M. Smiglecius,
tum
sedoperationes
, I, 135.
ipsasutdirigibiles"
Logica
formale
logicae,
39

20:19:52 PM

only exist in the intellect.39They can be considered both with

referenceto theiropposition to real beings and with referenceto their
proper mode of being in the intellect.In the firstcase, we can observe
that the concept of ens rationisdoes not entail the negation of every
featureof the ensreale, since the ensrationisis also a being, though 'in
its own way'.40 We are here at the very heart of the firstof our
(mainly) ontologicalproblems. The idea thatthereis a sense of 'being'
which is common to real beings and to beings of reason (even when
theyare identifiedwith impossible beings) is not new,41and at the end
of the 17th century was to lead another Eastern European Jesuit,
Maximilian Wietrowski, to the quite explicit observation that " sicut
ita etiamdatur
daturconceptus
entisrealiset entisimpossibilis,
quidditativus
entis
a
seu
reali
abstrahentis
et
,
conceptus
possibili
impossibiliqui conceptus
vocatur
enssupertranscendentale"
.42According to Smiglecius, the opposition between the ensrealeand the ensrationisis not grounded on the fact
that the ens rationisis not a formof being, but ratheron the fact that
it is by definitiona being which is not, and cannot possiblybe, an ens
reale.Therefore, a being of reason is, according to Smiglecius, one
whose essence implies the impossibilityof its real existence("quod habet
talemessentiam
in reexistere
, cui repugnet
").43 If we take the term 'impossible' to mean that which cannot have real existence, then the entia
rationisare identifiedwith impossible beings. The impossibilitywhich
is at issue here is thereforelimited to externalreality(beings of reason
can have intellectualreality); nevertheless,it is a logical, ratherthan
a physical, impossibility.Smiglecius is quite clear on this point:
Vocoautemimpossibile
nonid quodpotentiae
creataeestimpossibile,
sedquod
universim
omnipotentiae
tamcreataequamincreatae
seuquod
estimpossibile,
eo quodimplicet
fieripotest,
contradictionem.44
pernullamomninopotentiam
39"Hoc enimnomenentisrationis
quodcumnonsitensreale,insolo
intelligimus,
intellectu
existit.
entisrationis
utnullomodosit
(...) Ad rationem
igitur
requiritur,
: ibid.,2.
reale,necactu,necpotential
40 "Est enimsuo modoens", loc.cit.
41Foritspresence
in Surez,cf.J.P. Doyle,Suarez
onBeings
andTruth
ofReason
(7),
55 n. 51. In themedievalperiod,Aquinas'distinction
ensrationis
and ens
between
naturae
wasalsousedbysomeauthors
todenyanyopposition
between
and
ensrationis
ensreale
as bothensrationis
andensnaturae
wereseenas thesubdivisions
ofens
, insofar
reale
: cf.R. Lambertini,
EntiaRationis.
ontheObject
Matthaeus
deAugubio
Resurgant
of
du Moyen-Age
Grecet Latin,LIX (1989),3-60,esp.
, in: Cahiersde l'Institut
Logic
19.
42Maximillian
Wietrowski,
Philosophia
disputata,
Pragae1697,232,cit.inj. P. Doyle,
Suarez
onBeings
andTruth
Reason
56.
of
(1),
43M. Smiglecius,
Logica
, I, 3.
44ibid.
, 4-5.
40

20:19:52 PM

The examples given are interesting.The traditionalgolden mountain is not, according to Smiglecius, a being of reason, since, although
, it is possible through God's absolute
being impossible naturaliter
power.45 The goat-stag, however, is logically impossible. It would
implythe compositionof the two essences of goat and stag in a single
essence; but those essences, pertainingto two differentspecies, entail
contradictorydifferences,and are thereforeincompatible.46Surez
drew a similar distinctionbetween the possible golden mountain and
the impossible chimera.47The idea that such ficta as goat-stags and
chimerasare logicallyimpossiblebecause of theirinvolvingincompatible essences is not new- Buridan even used this featureto definethe
chimera as thatanimal which is " compositum
exincompossibilibus
componi
"48- and in
ad invicem
adopting it Smiglecius shows his debt to the latemedieval logical discussion of impossible entities. This approach was
not shared by some of Smiglecius' contemporaries: Bartholomaeus
Keckermann, for instance, included both the monsaureus and the
.49
chimera in theclass offictapossibilia, labeling themas bonaephantasiae
It is interestingto observe that Aquinas - who writesbeforeOckham
and Buridan' s sharp attack on the logical possibilityof chimerasdoes not seem to rule out the logical possibilityof both the golden
mountain and the chimera.50 The differentposition adopted by
Smiglecius seems once more to show the influenceof the late-medieval
debate about impossible entities.
An interestingproblem, given the observation that the modal term
'impossible' is used by Smiglecius with referenceto real existence and
not to conceptual existence, is whether there is something that is
impossible in such a way that it cannot exist eitherin realityor in the
45Theflying
inthelistoftradishouldalsobe addedtothegoldenmountain
donkey
God's
as possiblethrough
whichareclassified
entities
tionalfictitious
bySmiglecius
absolute
power:cf.ibid.,10.
46"Nam etsitamHircusquamCervussintsecundum
comse Entiarealia,tarnen
non est realisquin potiusrealiter
positoex Hirco& Cervoin unamessentiam
eandemremesse Hircum& ereo quod contradictionem
implicet,
impossibilis,
vm":ibid.
, 5.
47Cf. F. Surez,Distoutationes
Metahysicae,
LIV, 2, n. 18.
48JohannesBuridanus,
Aristotelis
In Metaphysicen
, Venetiis1518,rpr.
Quaestiones
ofthechimera,
cf.G. Roncaglia,
definition
Frankfurt
a.M. 1964,23vb;onBuridan's
sitsignificabile.
Utrum
impossibile
49Cf.G. Roncaglia,Buone
nellalogica
la riflessione
e cattive
fantasie:
suglientiinesistenti
diBartholomaeus
Keckermann
, in: Metaxn. 13, maggio1992,80-104.
50Ibid.,90-1.
41

20:19:52 PM

intellect. The way in which Smiglecius distinguishes two possible

meanings of the term 'impossible' seems to leave open the way to conceptual impossibilities:
velquod
velquodnonpossitinreexistere,
Impossibile
aliquiddicitur
dupliciter:
nonpossitin rationeexistere.51
However, a few lines later it is made clear that this second class
should be regarded as empty, or, at least, that the intellect (our
intellect?) cannot conceive it except as empty:
esse impossibilia,
Quod si dicas:etiamratioiudicatimpossibilia
respondeo:
iudicatesse impossibilia
ad existendum
in re, non autemad existendum
in
imoiudicatimpossibilia
omniaposseab intellectu
intellectu;
quodest,
cognosci,
in intellectu.52
posseexistere
This position may be difficultto reconcile with Aquinas' view
according to which we can neitherconceive nor imagine in any form
those non-entitieswhose definitionsentail the impossibilityof being
realized:
nonensdupliciter,
unomodo,quianonessecaditindefinitione
Aliquiddicitur
nonens;et talisnonentisnonpotestconcipialiqua
eius,sicutcaecitasdicitur
formanequein intellectu
et huiusmodi
non ens est
nequein imaginatione;
in rerum
malum;aliomodo,quia noninvenitur
natura,quamvisipsaprivatio
entitatis
nonclaudatur
in eiusdefinitione;
et sic nihilprohibet
non
imaginari
entia,et eorumformas
concipere.53
It should be observed, however, that in disputation 3, question 2
"
Smiglecius adopts a positioncloser to Aquinas' own, holdingthat non
'
enssecundum
se a nullointellectu
, sivecreatosiveincreato
, apprehendi
potes .54
This seems to imply that impossible entitiesare not to be considered
non ens simpliciter
, a position which agrees with Smiglecius' aforementioned theoryaccording to which the ensrationis(<estenimsuo modo
ens",55
A last problem dealt within the firstquestion is whetherthe opposition between the ens realeand the ens rationisis such as to admit the
as a
possibilityof a medium.Smiglecius considers the ens in volntate
will
a
role.
The
of
whether
the
candidate
for
such
discussion
possible
can have an ens rationis(or something similar to it) as its object is a
51M. Smiglecius,
, I, 5.
Logica
52Ibid.,
6.
53ThomasAquinas,De Ventate
, 3, 4, ad 6.
54M. Smiglecius,
, I, 208.
Logica
55Cf. supra
40.
yfootnote
42

20:19:52 PM

traditional one.56 The argument described by Smiglecius runs as

follows. If we want somethingimpossible, such as (for a man) to be
an angel, then the object of our will is not real (since it is impossible),
in our will ratherthan in our intellect:therefore,it
and it isformaliter
is neither an ens realenor an ens rationis.The argument is however
"
rejected. The impossible object of our will licetqua volitumrespiciat
9
intellectual.57The same problem is dealt
voluntatem
, tamenqua ensrespicit
with more extensivelyin the sixth question, " utrumsolumab intellectu
an veroetiamab aliis potentiisens rationis
fieripossi' and Smiglecius'
answer is again the traditionalone: only the intellectis capable of producing entiarationis.
The second question is devoted to the problem " an ens rationisconsisttin coniunctione
pluriumrerum",and offersa good example
impossibili
of the modal interestof Smiglecius' discussion of entiarationis.The
debated issue is an intriguingone: are impossible beings (and thereforeentiarationis
) all obtained throughcomposition, or are there also
simple impossible beings? Smiglecius firstgives argumentsforthe latterposition: negations and relationsof reasons are usually included in
the class of entiarationis'however, both of them are simple, and do not
require any composition. Furthermore,our visfingendiis capable of
producingsimple impossible fictions,and this is done throughthe first
operation of the intellect; but if all impossible beings were to be
regarded as composite, then all entiarationiswould depend only upon
the second operation of the intellect. The last consideration is that
impossible beings can also result froman impossible division ( divisio
impossibilis
), separatingin the intellectsomethingthat cannot possibly
be separated in reality, such as God's attributes.
According to Smiglecius, the main argument forthe opposite posinisi vel reale} vel
tion is that our intellect " nihil posse apprehenderey
entisrealis". This implies that the firstoperation of the
similitudinem
intellectcannot handle impossible beings. All the entiarationisshould
thereforebe considered composite. The defendersof this view have a
common strategyforansweringthe argumentsgiven by the supporters
56Scotus'theory
rationis
towhichthewillmayproducea relatio
(Iohannes
according
dist.45 q. unica)wasoftenmeninlibrum
DunsScotus,Lectura
Sententiarum,
primum
Conimbricensis
forthisidea;cf.Commentarii
tioned
as themainauthority
, 152;
Collegii
, 69-70.
Collegii
Complutensis
57M. Smiglecius,
, I, 8.
Logica
58Ibid.,
cf. F. Surez,
51. For a somehowsimilardefenceof thesameposition,
, LIV, 2, 17-18.
Metaphysicae
Disputationes
43

20:19:52 PM

of simple impossibilia
: in all the proposed cases a hidden composition
is involved. Privations and negations are entiarationisonly insofaras
entis, and it is thisway of conceiving
theyare consideredsubsimilitudine
them which entails a form of incompossibility.The impossibilityis
then the result of a composition of somethingwhich only pertains to
real beings with somethingthat is not a being at all. The same is true
of the relations of reason, which are to be regarded as entiarationis
insofar as our intellectconceives them " per modumaliarumrelationum
99
realium
A further,strictlylogical argument is given to support the composite nature of impossible beings: the impossible is what implies a
contradiction; but
essenonpotest,
contradictions
nisiubisuntpluraincompossibilia,
ita
implicatio
utexunosequatur
remesse,exaliononposse.Verbigratia,
inhacpropositione,
Asinus
estrationalis
asinus
, implicatur
contradictio,
quiaduosuntincompossibilia,
& rationale,
& ex unosequitur
ex altero(quia asinus)
quodasinussitrationalis,
Necesseigiturest,ens rationisconstareex incomquod non sit rationalis.
ac proinde
nonessequidsimplex
sedcompositum,
cumresomnino
possibilibus;
nonpossitimplicare
contradictionem.59
simplex
Here the main point is the following.In order to have a contradiction we should have ultimatefundamenta
forboth sides of it. Those fundamentashould be different(otherwisetheywould be unable to ground
a contradiction). Since every impossibilityresults from a contradiction, therecan be impossibilityonly when there is some kind of composition.
In order not to deny that the firstoperation of the intellect can
produce impossible entities,the supportersof the composite nature of
entiarationis
may distinguishbetween two kinds of composition,discursive composition on the one hand, and simple composition "ex parte
obiecti
& nega, quae fit per apprehensionem
(...) absque ulla affirmatione
tione",60on the other. This second composition can also be presentin
the first operation of the intellect, and it suffices to ground an
impossibility.
Concerning those entiarationisresultingfrom division rather than
from composition, it is observed that here the impossibilityresults
fromre-attributingthe products of the division to the original subject
(in the given example, fromre-attributinghis attributesto God once
59M. Smiglecius,
, I, 11-12.
Logica
60Ibid., 13.
44

20:19:52 PM

they have been artificiallyseparated). The impossibility,therefore,

followsagain froma formof composition.
This is the position of the supporters of the composite nature of
every impossible being. Smiglecius, however, seems to be dissatisfied
withit, since he goes on once more to adopt the opposite and communis
, and to give
opinion, marked in the margin as sententiaAuctoris
counter-arguments in favour of simple impossible beings. The main
one is that any relation- including the relations of reason, which are
entiarationisand which are impossible in re- "est quid simplexin sua
essentia
& termino'
' Therefore, relations of
, quam accipita fundamento
reason constitutean example of simple impossible being. As to the
'logical' argumentaccording to which anythingwhich implies a contradictioncannot be simple, since it should offerseparate foundations
for both sides of the contradiction,Smiglecius' answer is that
Nec veronecesseestut id quod implicaicontradictionem
sempercomponatur
exduobusquaefundent
sedsinecompositione
funpartescontradictionis,
potest
daricontradictio.
Namsialiquamrelationem
contradicponia partereiimplicet
ea contradictio
fundari
insuppositione
extrnseca
relationi.
V.G.
tionem,
potest
si supponatur
relatiorationis
existere
earn& esseensrationis
realiter,
sequitur
ob suamessentiam,
&nonesseensrationis
exsuppositione,
quiarealiter
ponitur
existere.
Addopossealiquidconcipitanquamimpossibile,
etsinonconcipiatur
sed solumdefectus
vel si concontradictionis,
implicatio
aliquisessentialis,
absoltam.61
cipiatur,
concipietur
tanquamquidconsequens
impossibilitatem
Smiglecius' answer presupposes that the simple act of positing a
merely intentional object of our reason (for instance, a relation of
reason) as having not only intentionalbut also real being, does not
implya 'composition' between the formwhich is proper to the being
of reason and the formof real being.
The thirdquestion deals with the problem of whetherentiarationis
are to be seen as concepts or as extrinsicdenominations. Extrinsic
denominations are those which are drawn not froma form inherent
in the denominated object, but from a form inherent in something
else- typically,in the knowing or perceivingsubject. In this way, we
say of something,e.g. a wall, that it is 'seen' or 'conceived'. Now, if
theonlykind of being attributedto the entiarationisis thatof being conceived, it seems to follow that they should be considered extrinsic
denominations(that is, as denominated only throughour act of conceiving them). The opposite is true if a 'stronger' form of being is
attributedto them- forinstance some kind of essediminutum
or essefie61Ibid., 16.
45

20:19:52 PM

tum, on the grounds of which they can also possess intrinsicforms.If

this essefictumis seen as a form of conceptual being, then the entia
rationisshould perhaps be regarded as concepts.
The discussion of this problem is quite common among postmedieval authors; Smiglecius'own solution is interestingas it shows
how seriouslyhe takes the implications of giving intentionalbeing to
the entia rationis. In his view, entia rationisare neither extrinsic
denominations nor concepts, but are ratherthe objects of denominations and concepts. It should be stressedthatthe problem at issue here
is one of great importance not only from the ontological and
epistemological points of view, but also from the semantical one.62
Smiglecius' theory,although not explicitlydealing withsuch (mainly)
semantical problems as the kind of supposition to be attributedto
radically non-denotingterms, has clear consequences as regards the
referentialimport of these terms: not only do they have a meaning,
but they also seem to have a denotation, albeit within a domain of
intentionalobjects. According to Smiglecius, the entiarationiscannot
be concepts, because concepts qua concepts should have an adequate
:
object of which they are similitudines
obiectum
esseidemcumconceptu,
Respondeo,
nequeutresnequeutobiectum
estsimilitudo
obiecti.
Obiectum
veroestresipsa&essentia,
cuius
quiaconceptus
estconceptus:
similitudo
numquamautemresestidemquodsua similitudo.63
The factthat entiarationisonly exist when theyare thoughtof, does
not implythattheyare simple concepts, but ratherthattheyonly have
objective being in the intellect:
Ens rationis
nonestconceptus
ab intellectu,
formtus
sedid de quo conceptus
nisiquandode eo formatur
idcirco
formatur,
quodquia nonexistit,
conceptus,
dicitur
habereobiectivum
tantum
essein intellectu.64
A fortiori
beings of reason cannot be purelyextrinsicdenominations:
the essence of an ensrationislike the goat-stagis not given by its being
conceived, but by its being a (fictitious)entityobtained throughthe
(impossible) conjunctionof the essences of goat and stag. The extrinsic
denomination 'conceived' findsin the goat-stagits object, and cannot
be identifiedwith it.
62On theinterrelations
between
andsemantical
levelsin
ontological,
epistemological
thepost-medieval
discussion
ofentiarationis
cf.L. Hickman,
Modern
Theories.
63M. Smiglecius,
, I, 21.
Logica
64Ibid., 22.
46

20:19:52 PM

The fourthquestion furtherinvestigates the way in which entia

can be considered a productof the intellect.65Again, the nature
rationis
of intentionalobject attributedto them by Smiglecius is quite clear
fromhis descriptionof this production':
ab intellectu
estiste.Intellectus
Modusigitur
peractionem
quo fitensrationis
estexpressa
insecognitionem
realem
obiecti,
quaecognitio
intelligendi
producit
obiecti,estquequalitasquaedamin intellectu
producta;
quaedamsimilitudo
facitobiectum
essepraesens
haecporroqualitas,cumsitrepraesentativa
obiecti,
obiectiin intellectu.
oritur
ex iliaenimrepraesentatione
intellectui:
praesentia
a quibusdam
actiointentionalis,
entisrationis
dicitur
(...) Haec actioproductiva
in obiectum
cognitum.66
quia perearntenditintellectus
the objective being proper to a being of reason
What differentiates
fromthatproper to a real being qua known, is that the formeris obiectiuetantum
, and only exists when the intellectconceives it. However,
as already stressed,the ensrationisexists as the object of the act of conceiving: it is produce by this act, but it cannot be identifiedwith
it. Smiglecius rejectsthe idea thatthe act of conceiving should presup, <(nonrpugnt
pose the conceived object: in the case of entiarationis
67The two momentsof the
.
obiectum
productionand of
fieri"
cognoscendo
theknowledgeof the object- although being in rethe same- can however be distinguished by reason.68 The same problem is further
elaborated in the fifthquestion- "Utrum ens rationistuncfiat quando
' - whose main conclusion is that " non
priusfieriens rationis
cognoscitu
sed
nec
cognoscendo
produci & proquamfiat,
quamcognoscatur, priuscognosci
69
.
ducendocognosci"
Of the remainingquestions, special mentionmust be made of question 8, which displays some theological implicationsof the discussion
of entiarationis
, and question 10, which is devoted to their classifica"
tion. The former deals with the problem Utrumdivinusintellectus
". In addressing it, Smiglecius deals with
& faciatEns rationis
cognoscat
a theologicalproblem which seems to have been the subject of much
debate in the post-medievalperiod:70is it possible to attributeto God
65On Smiglecius'
on thistopic,cf.L. Nowak,Gnozeologiczne
, 135-41.
positions
66M. Smiedecius,
Lopica,I, 26.
67Ibid.,31.
68Ibid., 33.
69Ibid.,45.
70Aninfluential
is inF. Surez,Disputationes
discussion
LIV, 2, 19-24;
Metaphysicae,
is nottheonedefended
theposition
bySurez,butonewhich
adoptedbySmiglecius
'
'
it as a variant
andjudges nonimprobabilis
Surezmentions
considering
apparently
ofhisown:cf.ibid.,LIV, 2, 24.
47

20:19:52 PM

a directknowledge of such an 'imperfect'formof being as thatproper

to entiarationis,withoutendangeringhis perfection?In order to understand the importance of this problem, one should not only take into
account that such entiarationisas negations, privationsand impossibilia
are affectedby the ontological imperfectionconnected with theirlack
of being, but that the very concept of malumwas traditionallyconsidered a kind of privation. It is on these grounds, forinstance, that
relevant considerations on the ontological status of non-existent
entities are included in Aquinas' De Veritatewithin the question
"Utrum malumhabeatideamin Deo" .71 Aftera long discussion of the
problem, Smiglecius concludes that God's knowledge of entiarationis
is only mediate, ilin ordinead intellectum
nostrum"
. 12 This means that
God does not directlyknow (and thereforedoes not directlyproduce)
entia rationis
, but rather conceives them as being produced by the
human intellect.
As already mentioned, question 10 deals withthe subdivisionof the
class of entiarationis(" Quotsintgeneraentiumrationis
"), and is therefore
of special interest.According to Smiglecius, the firstand more general
subdivision is between those entiarationiswhich lack and those which
have a foundationin re. The firstgroup is that of mere fictions,while
the second one is characterized by having "fundamentum
aliquodin re,
73The latteris the case of the
Ulam
.
quodquasi exigat
fictionem"
'logical'
beings of reason, and it is interestingto observe that Smiglecius
includes in this class not only, as was usually done, the logically relevant relationsof reason, but also negations and privations.To understand the meaning of this move it may be useful to consider the
examples given in question 11 ("An denominationes
logicaesintvereentia
rationis
"), the very last of this firstdisputation.74Here Smiglecius
informsus that while essepraedicatum
is an example of a relative being
of reason, esseabstractum
is an example- or rather theexample- of a
negative one.
71Cf. ThomasAquinas,De Veritate
, 3, 4.
72M. Smiglecius,
Lorica,I, 63.
73Ibid.,75.
'
74The disputation
closeswitha concluding
deentibus
'Explicatio
aliquot
difficultatum
"
rationis
which
takes
some
oftheissuesdebatedin thepreceding
(86-95),
again
up
thissectiondoes notseemto add anything
questions.Although
reallynew,the
cautiouswayin whichSmiglecius
oftenexpresses
himself
here(forexampleon the
ofthepossibility
ofGod'sdirectly
theentia
problem
conceiving
maysuggest
rationis)
a linkbetweenthesepagesand thecensurae
addressed
to thefirst
ofthe
redaction
couldonlybe confirmed
however,
Logica.Thishypothesis,
bya detailed
studyofthe
censurae
particulares.
48

20:19:52 PM

Since- as we have seen- according to Smiglecius only logically

, in order to include
impossible beings can be considered entiarationis
in this class the 'logical' being of reason he is drawn to add a condition:
& privationem
tuncsolumesseentiarationis,
tamrelationem
quamnegationem
velin seipsiscumconcipiuntur
cumconiunguntur
per
aliquomodoimpossibili,
cui
cumei tribuuntur,
cumnonsintentia,velrespectu
modumentium
subiecti,
necconvenire
nonconveniunt
dsit,tam
possunt,
quaresi modusimpossibilis
negatioquamrelatioeritsuo modorealis.75
The strategyadopted here is the one we have already mentioned in
the third section of this paper. As a consequence of the growing
emphasis on the impossibilityattributedto a being of reason, the need
was feltto characterize ' logical' beings of reason also as impossibilia'
and thiswas done throughreferenceto the factthattheyare conceived
submodumentis.It seems that, in order to have his own object of study
at hand- and even to conceive it- the logician had to make the
'ontological mistake' of takingit as ifit were a real being. Only in this
, and
way do 'logical' intentionscome to be constitutedas entiarationis
are
the
entia
rationis
claim
that
can
proper
Aquinas'
only in this way
object of logic be reaffirmed.
Roma - 1-00161
Via G. Tomassetti7
75M. Smiglecius,
, I, 78.
Logica

49

20:19:52 PM

Suarez on theAnalogy of Being: Some Historical Background

E.J.ASHWORTH

In his DisputationesMetaphysicae
, published in 1597, the great
Scholastic philosopher Francisco Surez offeredan account of the
analogy of being that has long been the focusof attention.1However,
littleattempthas been made to situatehis account historically,despite
the wealth of referencesto earlier authors given by Surez himself.2
Certainly Surez is seen as reactingto his predecessors,but only two
of these, John Duns Scotus and Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan,
are thought to be of any real importance. In relation to Cajetan,
Surez is criticized(or praised) forallowing the analogy of attribution
to embrace both intrinsicand extrinsicdenomination,and forrefusing
to assign the analogy of proportionalityany role outside the area of
metaphor. In relation to Scotus, Surez is accused of followingScotus
so closely in emphasizing the unityof the concept of being that little
if any room is left for genuine analogy. Jean-Luc Marion, for
instance, has claimed that Surez tried to constructa new model of
analogy which would allow an escape from univocity at the verbal
level while admittingits conceptual presuppositions.3
I intendto argue thatSurez is best read as part of a traditionwhich
1 Forthetext,seeFrancisco
in Opera
omnia
Suarez,Disputationes
, vols.25
Metaphysicae
and 26, Paris1866;repr.Hildesheim
1965.I shallrefer
to thesevolumesas DM I
andII. Fordiscussion
ofSurez,seeJohnP. Doyle,Suarez
ontheAnalogy
, in:
ofBeing
The ModernSchoolman,
46 (1969),219-49,323-41;and WalterHoeres,Francis
Suarez
andtheTeaching
DunsScotus
on "Univocatio
DunsScotus
Entis",in:John
,
ofJohn
1265-1965
M. Bonansea,Washington,
D.C.
, ed. JohnK. Ryanand Bernardine
and theHistory
ofPhilosophy,
1965,263-90(Studiesin Philosophy
3).
2 Lyttkens
doesrelateSureztoPetrusFonseca,whois certainly
an important
nearsource:seeHampusLyttkens,
TheAnalogy
between
An
GodandtheWorld:
contemporary
andInterpretation
, Uppsala
Investigation
ofItsBackground
ofIts UsebyThomas
ofAquino
Fonsecais tooclosetoCajetantoservemycurrent
1953,234-6.However,
purposes.
3 Jean-LucMarion,Surla thologie
blanche
deDescartes
, Paris1981,82: "Loin de conclure l'univocit,
Suarezva entreprendre
de construire
unnouveaumodled'ana la foisd'chapper
l'univocit,
verbalement
etd'en admettre
logie,qui permette
les prsupposs
conceptuels".
50
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 1

20:20:01 PM

predates Cajetan with respectto the classificationof typesof analogy,

and whichto some extentpredates Scotus in its insistenceon a concept
of being which is both one and analogical. I add "to some extent"
because the fullestworkingout of the theoryof a single analogical concept is found in later works which make full use of Scotus' s own
arguments.4I shall draw most of my material from three fifteenthcenturyphilosophersand theologians,Johannes Capreolus (d. 1444),
Dominic of Flanders (d. 1479) and Paulus Soncinas (Paolo Barbo da
5
Soncina, d. 1495). I shall also draw on the sixteenth-century
6
Spaniard Domingo de Soto (d. 1560). All of these authors were cited
by Surez, and all had a clear influenceon him.
My paper is divided into two parts. In Part I, I consider how differenttypes of analogy were distinguishedand described. In Part II,
I turn to the discussion of ensitself,and the question of whetherit is
possible for humans to have a single, separate concept of being.
Because my purpose is to place Surez in his historicalcontext,I shall
not consider his actual arguments in any depth; nor shall I consider
the philosophical difficultiesinherentin his theories.7
Part One: TypesofAnalogy
In order to understand the various classificationsof analogy that
were possible, we must begin by noting that analogy was normally
4 OlivierBoulnoishas
the importance
of the absorption
of Scotist
recognized
see BoulnoisinJeanDuns Scot,Surla connaissance
deDieu
arguments
byThomists:
etVunivocit
deVtant
traduction
etcommentaire
, introduction,
parOlivierBoulnois,
Paris1988,36: "Mais l'univocit
de faonplusclatante
encore l'endroit
triomphe
o elleestle plusviolemment
dansl'colethomiste,
car elles'impose
combattue,
- Cajetanestici un cas
commele fondscommun
surlequels'engagela polmique.
lui qui entendait
dfendre
contrel'enseignement
exemplaire,
l'espritthomiste
Forsomediscussion
ofanalogical
see EJ. Ashworth,
scotiste",
concepts,
Analogical
: TheFourteenth-Century
toCajetan
, in:Dialogue,31 (1992),399-413.
Concepts
Background
5
Fordiscussion
of Capreolus,seeJohannes
desSeinsbeiden
Hegyi,Die Bedeutung
klassischen
Kommentatoren
desheiligen
Thomas
vonAquin
: Capreolus-Sylvester
vonFerrarato sayaboutCapreoluson
, Pullachbei Mnchen1959.Hegyihas nothing
Cajetan
Someuseful
material
aboutDominicofFlanders
andSoncinas,
analogy.
biographical
as wellas a compendium
of passagesaboutanalogy,can be foundin Michael
Thomist
Divisions
70 (1993),
Tavuzzi,SomeRenaissance
, in: Angelicum,
ofAnalogy
93-122.
6 Fordiscussion
ofSoto,see E.J.Ashworth,
deSoto(1494-1560)
onAnalogy
Domingo
andEquivocation,
in:IgnacioAngelelli
andMariaCerezo(eds.),Proceedings
oftheThird
ontheHistory
de Gruyter),
forth, NewYork-Berlin
Pamplona
Conference
ofLogic
(Walter
coming.
7 Forthesematters,
thereadercan safely
be referred
to thetwoarticles
mentioned
in note1.
51

20:20:01 PM

regarded as a subdivision of equivocation, and that the main text for

the discussion of equivocation was the opening passage of Aristotle's
.8 Following Boethius's translation,this reads: ' 'Those that
Categories
have only a name in common but a different
substantiae
ratioin accordance with that name are said to be equivocais, e.g. "animal" <in
relationto> man and what is painted."9 These tersewords were considerably expanded on by later Greek commentators,and it is from
them, especially Porphyry, that Boethius took the divisions of
equivocation that were to become fairly standard in the Latin, Boethius begins
speaking West. In his commentaryon the Categories
into
two
main
chance
by dividing equivocais
groups,
equivocais
In the
( aequivocaa casu) and deliberate equivocais ( aequivocaa Consilio).10
firstgroup the occurrences of the equivocal term are totallyunconnected, as when both the son of Priam and Alexander the Great are
called Alexander, or when a barking animal and a constellationare
both called canis.11In the second group, some intentionon the part of
the speakers was involved. In the contextof analogy, this main division was seen as serving two main purposes. First, it allowed the
acceptance of both Porphyry'sclaim that "ens" was an equivocal term
and Aristotle's claim ( Metaphysics
4.1003a33-35) that "ens" was not
" "
equivocal by providingthe explanation that ens was equivocal a Consilio but not a casu.12Second, it allowed authors to claim that Aristotle
8 For moreinformation,
see E.J. Ashworth,
andEquivocation
in ThirteenthAnalogy
inContext
, in: MediaevalStudies,54 (1992),94-135;andE.J.
Century
Logic:Aquinas
andAnalogy
in Fourteenth
and
Ashworth,
Equivocation
, Burley
Century
Logic:Ockham
Buridan
aevi:
medii
, in: Burkhard
MojsischandOlafPluta(eds.),Historia
philosophiae
Studien
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
desMittelalters
, Amsterdam
1991,vol.
-Philadelphia
1, 23-43.
9 Aristotle,
1 1-5.Categoriae
Latinus
velPraedicamenta,
ed.
Categories
(lai -2)in:Aristoteles
L. Minio-Paluello,
1961,5.
Bruges-Paris
10Boethius,
In Categorias
Aristotelis
libriquatuor
in: Patrologiae
Cursus
Series
Completus,
Latina
canbe either
, ed.J.-P. Migne,Paris1891,Vol. 64,col. 166.Equivocais
things
orterms,
butas Toletuspointed
outinthesixteenth
itis easiertotalkabout
century,
terms:Franciscus
Aristotelis
dicuntur
Toletus,In librum
Categoriarum
quaePraedicamenta
commentaria
unacumquaestionibus
in: Opera
omnia
//,Cologne1615/16;
philosophica
repr.
Hildesheim
1985,85b:"... quia facilior
erit,si pervoces,qumsi perresexplicetur,
ipsasvocesdividemus".
11The examplecanis
Elenchi
, takenfromAristotle's
, becamestandardin
Sophisti
medievalcommentaries,
Boethius
had confined
himself
to propernames.
though
12ForPorphyry,
seeAristoteles
1 6-7.Categoriarum
Latinus
Supplemento:
Porphyrii
Isagoge
"LiberSex
Translatio
Boethii
etAnonymi
vocatum
ed. L.
Fragmentm
vulgo
Principiorum",
Minio-Paluello
withBernardG. Dod, Bruges-Paris
1966,12: 4'Vel, si omniaquis
entiavocet,aequivoce(inquit)nuncupabit,
nonunivoce..."Fordiscussion,
see.e.g.,
DominicofFlanders,
XII Libros
Venice1499;repr.
Quaestiones
super
Methaphysicorum,
Frankfurt
1967,sig.h 7 vb, sig.h 8 rb; Suarez,d.32.2.1,DM II, 320a.
52

20:20:01 PM

had countenanced analogy as a type of equivocation on the grounds

that the example of ' 'animal" in relation to a man and his image was
an example of analogy.13
Boethius, again followingthe Greek commentators,went on to provide four subdivisions of deliberate equivocation.14 The firstof these
is similitudo
, or resemblance, and it is here that people used the sole
example provided by Aristotle himself, that of an animal and its
where "proportio"is Boethius's renderimage. The second is proportion
ing of the Greek word "analogia" . The example used was principium
or principle,which designates unityin relation to number or point in
relationto line. The thirdsubdivision is "of one origin" {ab uno), and
the example is the word "medical". The last is "in relation to one
term" {ad unum
), and the example is the word "healthy" {sanum).
1.1 Similitudo
The firstof the four subdivisions, similitudo
, is not very important
forour purposes, despite the role played by the notionsof resemblance
and imitation in all theological discussions of analogy. On the one
hand, it is true that those logicians who only dealt with equivocation
brieflytended to give Aristotle's example of "animal" said of a
man and his image as theironly example of deliberate equivocation,
and to explain that deliberate equivocation and analogy were identical. Two fifteenth-century
examples of this are Johannes Dorp in his
,15 and Johannes Versor in his
commentaryon Buridan' s Summulae
.16On the other
commentarieson Peter of Spain and on the Categories
13Paulus (Barbo) Soncinas,Expositio
Pauli soncinatis
veterem,
superartem
magisti
in
Venetiis
1499,sig.2 vb-sig.3 ra; Thomasde Vio, CardinalCajetan,Commentaria
Romae1939,10;Domingode Soto,Liber
Aristotelis
Praedicamenta
, ed. M.-H. Laurent,
deDemonstratione
Aristotelis
in:In Porphyrii
Praedicamentorum
librosque
Categorias,
Isagogen,
Commentaria
Absolutssima
1967,120a.Cf. Dominicof
, Venice1587;repr.Frankfurt
vocetur
Flanders,In Met.,sig. i 4 ra: "quod autemanalogma phylosopho
thatno onethatI knowofin the
locis". It is noteworthy
patetin multis
equivocum
"zoon" wasa genuine
thatforAristotle
medieval
orpost-medieval
periodremarked
chanceequivocal.
14Boethius,
In Cat. , col. 166.
15Johannes
totius
in:Johannes
,
Buridanus,
Logicae
Compendium
Dorp,commentary
Venice1499;repr.Frankfurt/Main
1965,sig.e 5 va.
16Johannes
Parisiensis
cumVersoru
Versorin: PetrusHispanus,Summulae
Logicales
York 1981, f.70 r;
Clarssima
, Venice 1572; repr. Hildesheim-New
Expositione
Aristotelis
totam
veterem
artem
, Cologne1494;repr.
Versor,Quaestiones
super
Johannes
Frankfurt/Main
1967,f. xxviivb.
53

20:20:01 PM

hand, those logicians who gave a fullerand more detailed analysis of

equivocation but who did not report on Boethius's divisions sometimesomittedsimilitudo
altogether.For instance,Albertthe Great gave
a threefolddivision of analogy (see 1.3) in termsof relationto one subject, one efficientcause, or one end, and did not mentionsimilitude.17
called
Johannes Versor in his commentaryon Aristotle'sMetaphysics
the same threefolddivision a division of analogiarealis, and classed the
Soncinas
case of the painted animal as one of analogia artificialis.18
betrayeduncertaintyon the issue. Afterdiscussing a second threefold
division of analogy (see 1.4), he remarked that beyond the modes of
analogy listed, thereseems to be another based on imitation,as when
' animal' is said of a
painted man. Perhaps this type is reducible to one
of the other modes, he remarked.19
The problem with Boethius's firstdivision in relationto the generad
philosophical and theological interestin resemblance had to do with
the limited, pictorial, type of resemblance involved. Dominic of
Flanders quoted Aquinas' s remarkin De ventate
2.11 ad 8 to the effect
that the word "animal" is strictlyequivocal with respectto an image,
since the word is imposed to signifya nature, not a shape, yetit is only
withrespectto shape thatthe picturecan resembleits original.20In the
sixteenthcentury,Domingo de Soto deliberatelyomittedsimilitudo
as
a separate categoryin the firstedition of his Summulae
on
the
,
grounds
that attributionand proportionwould do all that was necessary.21No
doubt he was bearing in mind that any kind of relationship,causal or
otherwise,was thoughtto involve some kind of resemblance. Probably
throughthe influenceof Cajetan, the categorydid reappear in Soto's
Categoriescommentary as an example of attributionto one form or
exemplar.22 Nonetheless, given the background, it is not surprising
that similitudo
as a separate type of analogy does not seem to feature
in Surez's discussion.

17Albert
InPraedicabilia
theGreat,Liber
omnia
, in: Opera
, vol.1, ed. Auguste
Borgnet,
Paris1890,lib.
18Versor,Quaestiones
, f. vii ra.
19Soncinas,In Praed
. , sig.c 3 va.
20DominicofFlanders,
In Met., sig.h 8 rb.
21Domingode Soto,Summulae
, Burgis1529,f. ix vb.
22Soto,In Praed.
1.9 inBrunoPinchard,
, 119a.ForCajetan,seeDe nominum
analogia
etsmantique.
Autour
de Cajetan.Etude[texte]et traduction
du 4De
Mtaphysique
but
116.
uses
the
"bonum"
Nominum
Paris
here,
1987,
example
Analogia",
Cajetan
cf.De nom.anal.2.19, 119.
54

20:20:01 PM

1.2 " Proporo" and theAnalogyof Proportionality

Boethius's second division,proportio
, raised both the linguisticissue
ofwhat is meant by theword "analogia" and the more substantialissue
of where proportionalityfitsinto the overall scheme of things. This
second issue is closelylinkedwiththe question of metaphor,whichwill
be discussed in section 1.5.
Let us firstconsider the linguistic issue. For the Greeks, analogy
involveda comparison oftwo relations,and according to the definition
Ethics 1131a 31-32, it is an equality of
Aristotlegave in Nicomachean
ratios which involves at least four terms. Latin translations of the
Greek term were varied. Grosseteste's translationof the passage just
cited contains the term ' proportionalitas'
'23 but he does use the word
" in his translationof the
"
Ethics1096b
passage in Nicomachean
analogia
27-28 where Aristotleasks whether goods are one by being derived
from one good, or by being directed towards one good, or by
"
"
analogy.24As we saw above, Boethius used the word proportio for
analogy in the Greek sense, but in William of Moerbeke's translation
of Simplicius the word " analogia" was used in the same list of subdivisions of equivocation.25 Thus the Greek usage of the term was certainly not unknown to medieval logicians. Nonetheless, after 1250,
what we findmost frequentlyis " analogia" used in the new non-Greek
sense of pros henequivocation or focal meaning.26 According to the
logicians, analogical termswere termswhich signifiedtheirobjects in
because of a relaa priorand a posteriorway ( secundum
priusetposterius)
and
the secondary
between
the
principal significate
tionship
'
'
became
ambiguous. This
significate.Thus the word 'analogy' itself
ambiguitywas occasionally remarkedon. In the early fourteenthcenturyThomas Sutton noted a distinctionbetween the common and the

23" Proporcionabas
et in quatuorminimis":
enim equalitasest proporcionis,
Translatio
Roberti
EthicaNicomachea
XXVI 1-3, Fasciculus
Latinus
Aristoteles
Quartus
ed. R.A. Gauthier,
B. Recensio
Ethicorum'.
siue'Liber
Lincolniensis
Grosseteste
Recognita,
Leiden-Brussels
1973,458.
24"Non enimassimulantur
a casuequivocis.Setcerteei quodestab unoesse,vel
Latinus
vel magissecundum
ad unumomniacontendere,
analogiam...":Aristoteles
XXXVI1-3,fase.4, 381.
25Simplicius,
deMoerbeke
deGuillaume
Traduction
d'Aristote.
Commentaire
surlesCatgories
,
ed. AdrienPattin,Louvain,Paris1971,42.
2 volumes,
26The phrase"focalmeaning"wasappliedtoAristotle
byG.E.L. Owen,Logicand
Collected
andDialectic.
Science
in:idem,Logic,
Earlier
Works
inSome
ofAristotle,
Metaphysics
inGreek
, London1986,184.
philosophy
papers
55

20:20:01 PM

strictsenses of "analogia"'?1 and James of Viterbo said that "ens" was

"
improperly called analogical because it was not said secundum
'
'28
but "secundumattributionem*
, id estsecundum
analogiam
proportioned*
In the fifteenthcentury the same point was made by Gerard of
Harderwyck in his commentary on Porphyry.29The atmosphere
and sixteenthcentury,withthe
changed somewhat in the late fifteenth
new attentionpaid to philologyand the historicalsense of Greek texts.
Cajetan himselfwas insistentthatthe word "analogy" should be used
in the Greek sense, as applying only to what he called analogy of
Fonseca gave a fulland accurate account of
proper proportionality.30
Greek usage in his commentaryon the Metaphysics
, and pointed out
that the so-called analogy of attributioncorresponded to Aristotle's
pros hen equivocation.31 Unlike Cajetan, Fonseca seemed to see no
reason why the medieval Latin usage should not be retained.32Surez
himselfuses "analogy" in the medieval way.
Since the Greek word "analogia" was variously translatedas "pro"
"
, and since the word "proportio"itselfhad
portio and proportionalitas"
the more general sense of any kind of relation, analogy in the Greek
sense could be referredto in two ways. Some people spoke of the
analogy of proportionality,and paired it with the analogy of proportion (or attribution). Others spoke of the analogy of proportion,and
paired it with the analogy of attribution.33In what follows,I shall use
the words "proportionality" and "attribution".
Let us now turn to the substantialissue of the place accorded to the
analogy of proportionality.Leaving aside Aquinas' s discussion in De
ventate2.11, theologians certainly made some appeal to proportionality.34For instance, in the fourteenth century, Nicholas of
Straburg distinguishedbetween the analogy of proportionality,the
27[Thomas
ordinariae
, ed. Johannes
Sutton]Thomas von Sutton,Quaestiones
Mnchen1977,918.
Schneider,
28Jacobusde Viterbo,
dequolibet
, ed. EelckoYpma,Wrzburg
Disputado
1968,
prima
29Gerardof
Predicabilia
in: Commentum
artem
Harderwyck,
Porphyrii
superveterem
Arestotelis
secundum
viamAlbertistarum
, [Cologne]1486,sie. DD v rb.
30Cajetan,De nom.
anal.,3.23, 120.
31PetrusFonseca,Commentariorvm
InMetaphysicorvm
Aristotelis
Tomvs
ILibros
Stagiritae
II [onevolume],Cologne1615;repr.Hildesheim
1964,I, cols.665-666,col. 702.
32Pedroda Fonseca,Instituies
Dialcticas.
Institutionum
Dialecticarum
LibriOdo,2
ed. and trans.JoaquimFerreira
volumes,
Gomes,Coimbra1964,I, 62.
33Surezwarnsthereaderaboutthesedifferent
usaees:d.28.3.3,DM II, 13b.
34For discussion,
see FrancoRiva, Tommaso
Claxton
e l'analogia
di proporzionalit:
nellascuolatomistica
traXIV e XV secolo
Indagine
sull'analogia
, Milano1989.
56

20:20:01 PM

analogy of attribution,and the analogy of imitation.35To take a more

prominentexample, the English Dominican Thomas Sutton appealed
to the analogy of proportionalityin the context of divine names,
though he retained the analogy of attributionfor "ens" as said of
substance and accident.36Medieval logicians, however, did not appeal
to the analogy of proportionalityin their logical works. Nor did the
authorsCapreolus, Dominic of Flanders (outside the
fifteenth-century
area of metaphor) and Soncinas. Cajetan is the firstauthor I know of
who not only used the analogy of proportionalitybut who unambiguously insisted on giving it a privileged position.
1.3 "Ad Unum" and "Ab Uno": theAnalogyofAttribution
Boethius's last two subdivisions of equivocation seem to belong
together.They correspondto Aristotle'sproshenequivocation, assum"
ing thatAristotlemade no hard distinctionbetween "ab uno and "ad
unum".37Moreover, as Simplicius remarked, some authorsjoined the
last two modes together,and presentedthem as intermediatebetween
equivocais and univocis, on the grounds that those things called
medicinal or healthydo participate the ratioof health or medicine in
some way, albeit not equally.38It seemed natural to medieval authors
'
to subsume the examples "healthy" and ' 'medical' under attribution, but theyalso feltthe need to accommodate "ens" as an equivocal
term. As a result,the last two subdivisions were expanded into three,
all regarded as typesof attribution.This classificationwas due to Averroes who in his commentary on the Metaphysicssaid that Aristotle
classified ' 'healthy'' as a case of attributionto one < thing> as an
35See textquotedin RuediImbach,Metaphysik,
ZurDiskussion
undPolitik:
Theologie
derAkzidenber
dieAbtrennbarkeit
vonFreiberg
undDietrich
vonStraburg
Nikolaus
zwischen
61 (1986),392,n. 206.
tien
, in: TheologieundPhilosophie,
36Sutton,Quaestiones
and
882, 888, 918 (substance
, 924-925(God and creatures),
inThomas
SutandEquivocation
seeE.J.Ashworth,
Fordiscussion,
Analogy
accidents).
onMedieval
LogicandSemanSymposium
ton,O.P., in:Proceedings
European
oftheEleventh
attention
to the
Claxton
, does notpay sufficient
Riva, Tommaso
tics,forthcoming.
Suttonmakesbetween"ens" and thedivinenamessuchas "bonum"
distinction
,
"
"
seemstomissthedistinction
41,43-4.Przezdziecki
justumandsoon:seeespecially
Thomas
on thesubject:seeJoseph
in hisarticle
ofSutton's
J. Przezdziecki,
altogether
GilsonTribute.
ontheDoctrine
, in: C.J. O'Neil (ed.), AnEtienne
ofUnivocity
Critique
Milwaukee
1959,189-208.
37On thispoint,seeJ. Owens,TheDoctrine
,
Metaphysics
ofBeingintheAristotelian
Toronto1957,117-8;and Owen,LogicandMetaphysics,
182,n. 7.
38Simplicius,
In Cat.,43.
57

20:20:01 PM

end, "medical" as a case of attributionto one < thing> as an agent,

and "ens", as a case of attributionto one subject.39This division is
found in Thomas Aquinas' s own commentaryon the Metaphysics
, and
in Albert the Great's commentary on the same work, though they
speak of an efficientcause or principle ratherthan of an agent.40The
same three divisions, said to be modes of analogy, appear in Albert
the Great's commentaryon the Predicables
, thoughhe does not identify
the mode covering " sanum" in termsof relation to a finalcause as he
does in his Metaphysics
commentary.41A littlelater,John ofJandun in
his commentary on the Metaphysicscites Averroes as saying that
analogy is threefold,and lists the usual three divisions.42In the fifteenthcentury,Capreolus cites Averroes as speaking of attributionto
one end, one agent, or one substance;43and Dominic of Flanders gives
the threefolddivision as a subdivision of a wider division (see .5).44
In the light of Cajetan's later insistence that attributioncan only
occur in relation to extrinsicdenomination, in which the form(e.g.,
health) picked out by the word (i.e., "healthy") can only belong to
one of the analogates (i.e., to the animalibut not to its diet), one can
ask whetherthisissue was raised, eitherin the contextof thisthreefold
division, or in the contextof other divisions of analogy. Soncinas discussed the matter in the context of the second threefolddivision of
"
"
, claiming that sanum
analogy in his commentaryon the Categories
"
involved extrinsic denomination but that ens", which expresses a
single ratio, cannot.45 Discussions under the general heading of
attributionare rare. Two exceptions are found in Thomas Sutton and
Thomas Claxton. Sutton discussed the matterin the contextof com39Averroes,
Aristotelis
Commentariis
OperacumAverrois
(Venetiis1562-1574:repr.
Frankfurt
1962,Vol. VIII, f.65va:"Et intendebat
perhocdeclarare,
quodattributa
eidemfini,aut eidemagenti,aut eidemsubiecto,
sicutnouem
ei, aut attribuuntur
substantiae".
praedicamenta
40Aquinas,InMet.Lib.IV lect.ln.9,n.10,n.11;cf.De
Naturae
6 in: Opera
Principiis
Omnia
LibrosQuinqu
Priores
XLIII, 46-47.AlberttheGreat,Metaphysica
, ed. BernhardtGeyerin: OperaOmnia
XVI Pars/, Mnster/Westfalen
164a.
1960,163b41AlberttheGreat,In Praedicabilia
thethreemodestoJohn
, lib. He attributes
Damascene,without
apparent
justification.
42JohnofJandun,Quaestiones
in duodecim
libros
Venice 1553; repr.
metaphysicae
Frankfurt/Main
1966,f.45va.
43Johannes
diviThomae
Vol./, ed. Ceslai
Capreolus,
Defensiones
Aquinatis.
theologiae
Paban and Thomas Pgues in seven volumes,Turonibus1900-1908;repr.
Frankfurt/Main
1967,141b.
44DominicofFlanders,
In Met., sig.i 3 vb.
45Soncinas,In Praed.
, sig.c 3 rb-va.
58

20:20:01 PM

parison. He said that analogical were susceptible of comparison only

when the analogical formbelonged to both analogates. Thus a field
cannot be said to smile more or less than a man, but substance can
be said to be more ens than an accident, even though an accident is
said to be ensonly by virtueof its relationshipto substance.46Thomas
Claxton said clearlyand explicitlythatthe analogy of attributioncould
be divided into two. In one case, the formin question was found in
both analogates, in the othercase it was not.47In general, it seems to
be the case that people took it for granted that ens involved intrinsic
denomination,and if liens" was a termanalogical by attribution,then
obviously there were differentkinds of attribution. Cajetan's claim
that insofaras "ens" can be regarded as a term analogical by attribution, it must be interpreted as involving extrinsic denomination,
strikes me as unprecedented.48Nor was it accepted by such later
authors as Domingo de Soto.49
1.4 The SecondThreefold
Division
There is a second threefolddivision which has little to do with
Boethius's subdivisions of deliberate equivocation, but which arises
from the long tradition that analogical terms are intermediaries
betweenequivocal and univocal terms. The notion of an intermediary
was already present in late Greek logic (see the passage from
Simplicius cited above), but it is also found in Arab writings. In
4
Algazel's Logic we read: 'Terms related by agreement [convenientia],
come half-waybetween univocis and equivocais, e.g., ens as said of
substance and of accident...".50 and Albert the Great explained that
convenientia
were analogical terms.51Similarly, in his commentaryon
Aristotle'sMetaphysics
, Averroes said thatensis said in a way which is
46Sutton,Quaestiones,
893-4,929-930.
47ThomasClaxton,Thomae
deClaxton
dedistinctione
inter
O.P. (CA. 1400):Quaestiones
ActaPontificiae
entis
realiatquede analogia
esseetessentiam
, ed. MartinGrabmann,
etReligionis
8 (NewSeries)(1943),
Romanae
S. Thomae
Academiae
Catholicae,
Aquinatis
115.
48Cajetan,De nom.anal.,2.11, 116-118.
49Soto,Summulae,
f. ix va: Soto,In Praed.
, 119b-120a.
50" Convenientia
suntmediainterunivocaet aequivoca,ut 'ens', quod diciturde
Introduction
andCritical
substantia
et accidente...":C.H. Lohr, "LogicaAlgazelis":
Text
, in: Traditio,21 (1965),246.
51AlberttheGreat,In Praedicabilia
, 11a.
59

20:20:01 PM

neitherequivocal nor univocal but fallsin between,52and thiswas normally taken to mean that it was said in accordance withanalogy. The
notion of an intermediaryterm, however, is open to more than one
interpretation.The standard view was that analogical terms were
intermediarybetween chance equivocais and univocis, and hence
that they were to be identifiedwith deliberate equivocais, but some
authors went furtherin suggestingthat at least some analogical terms
were intermediarybetween univocis and deliberate equivocais, so
that theywere not equivocal in any of the normal senses at all. They
presentedthis view in the contextof a threefolddivision of analogy.53
For instance, towards the end of the thirteenth century, an
Elenchiproposed the followanonymous commentatoron the Sophistici
classification.
there
are
First,
ing
analogical termswhich are univocal
in a broad sense of "univocal". Here referencewas made to genus
terms such as " animal". Human beings and donkeys participate
equally in the common nature animal, but are not themselvesequal,
since human beings are more perfect than donkeys. This type of
, was routinely
analogy, which Cajetan was to call analogiainaequalitatis
discussed in response to a remark Aristotlehad made in PhysicsVII
(249a22-25) which, in Latin translation,asserted thatmany equivocations are hidden in a genus. Medieval logicians feltobliged to fitthis
claim into the frameworkofequivocation and analogy, even ifthe consensus was that in the end the use of genus terms was univocal.
Second, thereare those analogical termssuch as "ens" which are not
equivocal, because only one ratiois participated, and which are not
univocal either,because thingsparticipatethis one ratiounequally, in
a prior and a posteriorway. It is these terms which are the genuine
intermediaries. Third, there are those equivocal terms which are
deliberate equivocais, because there are two rationeswhich are participated in a prior and a posterior way. The example here was
"healthy"
This threefolddivision underwent some interestingdevelopments.
52Averroes,
, VIII, f. 65rb: "... nomenens diciturmultismodis,& non
Opera
& marino:equeuniuoce,
de latrabili
utanimalde
aequiuoce,sicutcanis,qui dicitur
&asino:sedestde nominibus
de rebusatributis
homine,
eidem,etsunt
quaedicuntur
mediainteruniuoca& aequiuoca".
53Incerti
tiones
ed. S. Ebbesen,Copenhagen
Auctores,
Elenchos,
Quaes
super
Sophisticos
Danicorum
MediiAeviVII). Cf.
1977,129-134,310-317(CorpusPhilosophorum
SimonofFaversham,
libro
ed. S. Ebbesen,T. Izbicki,
Elenchorum,
Quaestiones
super
J.
F. del Punta,E. Sereneand E. Stump,Toronto1984,78, 123-4.
Longeway,
60

20:20:01 PM

On the one hand, it was bitterlycriticisedby Duns Scotus in his early

logical writings.54On the other hand, the firsttwo divisions were
sometimessubsumed under univocation. For instance, Walter Burley
claimed thattherewere threekinds of univocal term.55In the broadest
sense, a univocal term falls under a single concept which applies to
more than one thingeitheron an equal basis or according to some differencebetween prior and posterior. In this sense, both genus terms
and " ens99 could be regarded as univocal. In a strictersense, a
univocal termfallsunder a single concept which applies to more than
one thingon an equal basis. In this sense, genus termswere univocal
but "ens" was not. In the strictestsense, a univocal term falls under
a single concept which is not divisible throughessential differences,
and this excluded both " ens99and genus terms.
In the fifteenthcentury, the threefolddivision described above
became popular among Thomists who realized its closeness to that
given by Thomas Aquinas in his Sentences
commentary.56Johannes
comCapreolus quoted the entire passage from Aquinas's Sentences
mentarybefore later subjecting it to analysis.57Soncinas referredto
Aquinas and gave the threefolddivision in his commentaryon the
.58 He repeated the threefolddivision, this time without
Categories
referenceto Aquinas, in his commentaryon the Metaphysics
.59 Thus
neither Cajetan's use of Aquinas's Sentencescommentary60nor his
threefolddivision of analogy were novel (see 1.6).
1.5 Metaphor
The relationshipbetween equivocation and metaphor, and hence
between analogy and metaphor, had always been a close one, though
54JohnDuns Scotus,In librum
in: Operaomnia1, Paris
Praedicamentorum
quaestiones
in: Opera
omnia
Inlibros
Elenchorum
2, Paris1891,20a-25a.
1891,446a-447a;
quaestiones
55WalterBurley,In Physicam
etQuaestiones
Aristotelis
, Venice1501;repr.
Expositio
Burlei
artem
veterem
York1972,f.13ra,f.220vb;WalterBurley,
Hildesheim-New
super
ofthedifferent
verFora discussion
Venetiis
etAristotelis.
1497,sig.c 5ra-rb.
Porphirii
D.
on thePhysics
and theCategories
s commentaries
sionsofBurley'
, see Alessandro
's LastCommentary
onthe"ArsVetus in: Franciscan
in Walter
Conti,Ontology
Burley
121-2,n. 1 and 151-2.
Studies,50 (1990),121-76,especially
56Aquinas,In I Sent.d. 19 q. 5 a. 2 ad 1.
57See Capreolus,
and 142aforanalysis.
125aforthequotation
, 124bDefensiones
58Soncinas,In Praed.sig.c 3 rb.
59Paulus(Barbo)Soncinas,Quaestiones
Venice1588;repr.
Acutissimae,
Metaphysicales
Frankfurt
1967,9b.
60Forreferences,
see Cajetan,De nom.anal.1.6 (115),2.21 (119),3.30 (122).
61

20:20:01 PM

authors in general seemed uncertain of its implications. The key

passage is SophisticiElenchi166a 15-20, where Aristotledistinguished
three varieties of equivocation, "one when either the phrase or the
9

name primarilysignifiesmore than one thing,e.g. piseis and 'canis';

another when we are accustomed to speak in that way; a thirdwhen
words put together signifymore than one thing, but taken alone
9 99
< signify> simply, e.g. 'seit saeculum .6i The firsttwo modes were
identified with Boethius's divisions into chance and deliberate
equivocation; and, more importantly,Aristotle's description of the
second mode, which suggests metaphorical usage, encouraged an
identificationof metaphor with deliberate equivocation and hence
with analogy in many logic texts. In the thirteenthcenturymost texts
support a close relationshipbetween metaphor and the second mode
of equivocation. Peter of Spain claims that transferredmeaning (transumptio)can be reduced to the second mode of equivocation. When we
say that fieldslaugh, the prior sense of "laugh", which arose through
imposition, is transferredto the fields through habit (<assuetudo
).62
Similarly in William of Sherwood, the second mode of equivocation
is said to involve only improperor transumptivesignification,and he
99are transferredon account
99and " ridet
remarksthatthe terms" currit
of some similitude.63In the treatise De Fallaciis, which has been
attributedto Aquinas himself,64
the second mode is described in terms
of transumptio
and
it
case
of perpriusetperposterius
is
the
,
signification
which is reduced to transumptio
ratherthan the reverse. Moreover, as
was not the case in the two earlier texts,analogy is specificallymentioned: "The multiplicityof analogical names is reduced to this
species <of equivocation > . < Analogical names > are those which
61Aristotle,
in
Elenchi166a 15-20,quotedfromBoethius'stranslation
Sophistici
Latinus
VI1-3:De Sophisticis
Elenchis
Aristoteles
1975,
, ed. B. G. Dod, Leiden-Brussels
9. "Suntautemtresmodisecundum
etamphiboliam:
unusquidem
aequivocationem
quandovel oratiovel nomenprincipaliter
significat
plura,ut piseiset canis;alius
autemquando solitisumussic dicere;tertiusvero quando compositum
plura
ut 'seitsaeculum'."
verosimpliciter,
separatum
significet,
62PeterofSpain,Tractatus
Summule
called
ed. L. M. de Rijk,Assen
afterwards
Logicales,
1972,101.
63Williamof Sherwoodin: CharlesH. Lohr withPeterKunze and Bernhard
39
"Introductions
inLogicam";
Text
Critical
Mussler,William
, in:Traditio,
ofSherwood,
(1983),276-7.
64The editors
on
oftheLeonineeditioncastsomedoubton thisattribution,
partly
thebasisoftheunusually
useoftheword'nam':introduction
toDe Fallaciis
frequent
in ThomasAquinas,OperaOmnia
XLIII. Opuscula
IV, Rome1976,386-7.
62

20:20:01 PM

are said secundum

priusetposterius,as 'healthy' is said of an animal, of
urine and diet".65
Similar views are found in the fourteenthcentury.Ockham, in his
account of the second mode of equivocation in his commentaryon the
SophisticiElenchi, identifiesit with deliberate equivocation, and then
"
"
remarks that the words 11Sanum'' " medicinale
",
", ridere
", currere
and others transferredfrom proper to improper signification,are
found there. This kind of equivocad term can, he says, be called
analogical, and in thisway almost any word can fallunder the second
mode.66In his LiberPropugnatorius
, Thomas Anglicus (who should not
be confusedwithThomas Sutton) remarksthatthe second mode of the
fallacy of equivocation is in accordance with analogy, which is a
medium between pure equivocation and pure univocation. He then
says that there are two types of analogy. The firsttype occurs when
a name signifiesone concept primarily and another ex consequenti
,
because of a resemblance of proportion,and he offersthe example of
" in relation to the act of
" ridere
flowering.67This type causes logical
which
does not cause logicaliproblems,
The
second
type,
problems.
occurs when thingsordered among themselvesare related to one concept, as in the case of ens.
In fifteenth-century
authors we continue to find a close relation
between the second mode of equivocation, metaphor, and analogy. In
his commentary on the Fallacies attributed to Thomas Aquinas,
Dominic of Flanders identifiesthe second mode with metaphor, and
with one type of analogical term, of which his example is "ridere"
"
"
The other type of analogical term cited is ens which, he says, does
"
"
not cause equivocation because ens signifiesmany thingsagreeing
in one ratio secundumprius et posterius.In his commentary on the
Dominic of Flanders appeals to Thomas Anglicus and his
Metaphysics
twofolddivision of analogy, though he departs fromhis source in the
descriptionof the second kind of analogy in thathe allows it to include
65Aquinas,De Fallaciis
, 406.
66WilliamofOckham,Expositio
delPunta,St.
libros
Elenchorum
, ed. Francesco
super
N.Y. 1979,22-4(OperaPhilosophica
Bonaventure,
III).
67ThomasAnglicus,Liberpropugnatorius
contra
sententiarum
Johannem
superprimum
a.M. 1966,f.37 ra. Cf.Aquinas,ST la. 13.6c.
Venice1523;repr.Frankfurt
Scotum,
68DominicofFlanders,
LibrosPosteriorum
Commentaria
In D. Thomae
super
Aquinatis
Perutiles.
Pauli
Fallaciarum
Aristotelis
, necnonetineiusdem
opus.Quaestiones
Analyticorum
etAristotelis
inPorphyrii
etsubtilis
lucida
eiusdem
Soncinatis
ordinis,
Isagogen,
Expositio
quoque
Venetiis
utiliter
in unaquaque
cumsuisquaestionibus
Praedicamenta,
expositione
disputatis,
1600,177b-178a.
63

20:20:01 PM

eithera relationshipof ordered thingsto one concept or a relationship

of ordered concepts to one word. He does this so as to accommodate
the firstthreefolddivision of analogy as a set of subdivisions (see
1.3 ).69
Cajetan explicitlylinked analogy withmetaphorby introducingtwo
kinds of the analogy of proportionality,proper proportionalitywhich
was non-metaphorical, and improper proportionality which was
whollymetaphorical.70In Domingo de Soto, however,we finda reversion to the earlier divisions, in that the main example he gives of the
analogy of proportionalityoutside the contextof theologicaldiscussion
is the metaphorical use of "ridere". 71
1.6 Cajetan, Soto, and Suarez
To conclude Part One of this paper, I shall look brieflyat Cajetan
in relation to Soto and Surez. In his discussion of analogy, Cajetan
adopted the second threefolddivision (see 1.4). He called the firsttype
of analogy, the case of genus terms, the analogy of inequality, and
dismissed it as unimportant.He called the second type the analogy of
attribution, and here he made two changes. First, he gave a new
account of its subdivisions by merging the firstthreefolddivision of
attributionto one efficientcause, one end, and one subject (see 1.3)
with Boethius's division of similitudo(see 1.1), and describing the
resulting four subdivisions in terms of Aristotle's four causes.72
Second, he claimed thatattributioninvolved only extrinsicdenomination. He called the thirdtypeof analogy the analogy of proportionality
and he claimed that the analogy of proper proportionality(as opposed
to metaphor) involved only intrinsicdenomination. Moreover, while
"
99
allowing thattheword ens could be used in accordance withattribution, he claimed that it, and all other metaphysically significant
analogical terms, principallybelonged in this last division.
Domingo de Soto was to adopt somewhat the same overall division,
but as has already been noted, Soto allowed the analogy of attribution
to embrace the case of intrinsicdenomination, and, as we have seen,
he presentedproportionalityas principallyconcerned with metaphor.
69DominicofFlanders,
In Met, sig.i 3 vb.
70Cajetan,De nom.anal.,3.25, 26,
120.
71Soto,Summulae
. , 118b.
, f. ix va; Soto,In Praed
72Cajetan,De nom.anal.,2.9, 116.
64

20:20:01 PM

So faras the case of substance and accident was concerned, "ens" was
taken as an example of the analogy of attribution.It is only when he
discusses the case of God and creatures, a case that Soto thoughtthe
logician ill-equipped to accommodate, that Soto, like his Dominican
predecessor Thomas Sutton, allowed proportionalityto return.73He
remarked that we can understand why Aquinas said differentthings
in differentplaces if we realise that language used of God and
creatures involves both similarityto and differencefrom language
used of substance and accidents. On the one hand, thereis a similarity
to analogy because of the dependence relation between God and
la 13.5, compared
creatures.This is why Aquinas, in Summatheologiae
.
As
urine is a sign of
"ens" said of God and creatures with "sanum"
an animal's health, so the perfectionsof creatures are nothing other
than expressionsof perfectionsin God. On the other hand, there is a
ofboth God and
differencefromanalogy in that "ens" is said simpliciter
and
secundum
of one
creaturesratherthan simpliciter
quid of the other,
and this is why in De veritate
2.11 Aquinas said that there was an
between
God and creatures. As God exists
of
analogy proportionality
in
esse
so
the
formally him, do creaturesexist throughthe esse
through
In his conclusion, and without saying more about
them.
in
formally
proportionality,Soto remarkedthatthe analogy of being between God
and creaturesis called univocation because it is nearer to univocation
than is the analogy of being between substance and accidents.
Surez differsfromSoto in his handling of "ens" , forhe begins by
givingan account of "ens" said of God and creatures,and then argues
that the same account should be given of "ens" said of substance and
accidents.74Leaving that aside, his divisions of analogy clearlybelong
to the earliertradition.Attributionembraces both intrinsicand extrinsic denomination, "ens" and "sanum" are both cases of terms
analogical throughattribution,and the analogy of proportionalityis
concerned chieflywith metaphor.75

73Soto,In Praed
., 132a-133a.
74ForGodandcreatures,
seeespecially
Surez,d. 28.3.1-22,DM II, 13a-21a.For
see especially
andaccidents,
substance
Surez,d. 32.2.1-16,DM II, 319b-324a.It
shouldbe givenofthesecond
isind. 32.2.11(322b)thathesaysthatthesameaccount
kindofanalogyas ofthefirst.
75Surez,d. 28.3.11, DM II, 16b: "...omnis vera analogiaproportionalitatis
dicitur
depratopertranslasicutridere
etimproprietatis,
includit
aliquidmetaphorae
..."
tionem
metaphoricam
65

20:20:01 PM

Part Two: The One AnalogicalRatio

We have already considered one division of analogy whichexplicitly
asserted the existenceof one analogical ratiocorrespondingto the word
"ens" . Now it is time to explore this issue in greaterdetail. To begin
with, we need to look again at the opening words of Aristotle's
:76 " Those that have only a name in common but a different
Categories
substantiae
ratioin accordance withthat name are said to be equivocais,
"animal"
<in relation to> man and what is painted.... Those
e.g.,
that have both a name in common and the same substantiae
ratioin
accordance with that name are said to be univocis, e.g., "animal"
<in relation to> man, ox". It was agreed that the ratiosubstantiae
of
a name included all thatin some way expressedthe essence or quiddity
of a substance or accident; and Aquinas claimed that the ratiowas the
verbum
mentale
or conceptio
which is a mental object but which is distinct
fromthe speciesintelligibilis.77
This inner conceptionwas identifiedwith
the definitionformedwhen the mind understandsa simple object, or
with the proposition formedwhen the mind compounds and divides.
Thus the ratiosignifiedby a name was the intellect'sunderstandingof
the thing signifiedby the name.78
In the fourteenthcentury,there was a general agreement that the
ratiocould be regarded as a conceptus.Thus Ockham explained that
" ratiosubstantiae
" meant
vel intentiones
animae,79and Buridan
conceptus
" ratio" and " intentio
" to mean the same
said thathe took " conceptus
",
in this context.80It was also generally agreed that, given Aristotle's
definitions,pure univocation must involve only one ratio, whereas
pure equivocation must involve at least two. So too do most cases of
deliberate equivocation and hence of analogy. Such terms as
76Aristotle,
Ial-15 in: Aristoteles
Latinus
11-5, 5: "Aequivocadicuntur
Categories
nomenverosubstantiae
ratiodiversa,
est,secundum
quorumnomensolumcommune
utanimalhomoetquodpingitur Univocaverodicuntur
quorumetnomencommuneestetsecundum
nomeneademsubstantiae
ratio,utanimalhomoatquebos..."
77ThomasAquinas,Super
S. Ioannis
Lectura
1.1 n. 25; De veritate
4.2; De
Evangelium
8.1.
potentia
78ThomasAquinas:"Ratioenimquam
estconceptio
de
intellectus
nomen,
significat
re significata
pernomen":ST la. 13.4; cf. 1.5.2.
79Williamof Ockham,Summa
, ed. P. Boehner,G. Gi, S. Brown,St.
Logicae
N.Y. 1974, 45 (Opera Philosophica
Bonaventure,
I); cf. Williamof Ockham,
inlibrum
Praedicamentorum
Aristotelis
N.Y. 1978,
, ed. G. Gi,St.Bonaventure,
Expositio
143(OperaPhilosophica
II).
80JohnBuridan,lohannes
Buridanus.
in Praedicamenta
, ed. J. Schneider,
Quaestiones
Mnchen1983,4.
66

20:20:01 PM

"healthy" ( sanum
) in theirextended secondary use are clearlycapable
of analysis into a concept differentfrom that associated with the
primaryuse of the term. "Ens" , however, seems to be a special case.
On the one hand, "ens" does not seem to be straightforwardly
equivocal, in the sense of being subordinated to more than one concept, since we at least have the illusion of being able to grasp "ens"
as a general term. As Scotus pointed out, in an argumentreproduced
by all who consideredthe issue, we can grasp thatsomethingis a being
while doubtingwhetherit is a substance or an accident, and thissurely
involves having a relativelysimple concept of being at our disposal.81
On the otherhand, despite the belief that a noun signifiesa concept,
and thata concept typicallycaptures a common nature, theredoes not
seem to be any common nature involved, especially as everyone
agreed that Aristotlewas correctin saying that "ens" is not a genus
term.
There are fourpossible responses to the problem. First, "ens" could
be regarded as a chance equivocal, associated with two unrelated concepts.82Second, "ens" could be regarded as a deliberate equivocad,
associated withtwo relatedconcepts.83Third, "ens" could be regarded
as a pure univocal, associated withjust one non-analogical concept.
This, of course, was the view of Duns Scotus. Finally, "ens" could be
regarded as a deliberate equivocal or analogical term of the sort
associated withjust one analogical concept. We have already seen how
this view was put forwardin the contextof the second threefolddivision of analogy. In what follows, I shall consider what Dominic of
Flanders, Capreolus, Soncinas and Soto had to say. I begin with
Dominic of Flanders, since he did not make the division into formed
and objective concepts which was employed by the other three
authors.

81JohnDuns Scotus,In Met. 4 q. 1, in: Quaestiones

subtilissimae
superlibros
Vol. VII, 148b;JohnDuns
Paris1891-1895,
in: Opera
Aristotelis
omnia,
Metaphysicorum
Omnia
I d. 3 pars1 q. 1-2,27-29,in: Opera
, VaticanCity1950-,Vol.
Scotus,Ordinatio
InMet.,sig.h 8
DominicofFlanders,
, 129b-130a;
Ill, 18-19.Capreolus,
Defensiones
va, sig.i 2 rb-vb;Soto,In Praed.129a-b;Soncinas,In Met., 6b-7a.
82Following
See
andwasrejected.
toMaimonides,
Aquinas,thisviewwasattributed
In Met.,sig.i 1 rb.Fonseca,In Met.,col. 689,addedthe
e.g. DominicofFlanders,
butwascriticized
nameofPeterAureolonthebasisofwhathehadreadinCapreolus,
DM
13a.
see
d.
Surez:
II,
28.3.1,
by
83See, e.g., ThomasSutton,as discussed
in 1.2 above.
67

20:20:01 PM

2.1 DominicofFlanders
Firstlet us be precise about how Dominic of Flanders used the word
"ens". He takes it in its nominal sense, as a noun, forthe participial
sense implies actual existence.84He does not take " ens" in its most
general sense, for that embraces everythingwhich is not nothing.85
Instead, it is taken in a more determinatesense, as picking out God
and creatures, substance and accidents.
Next let us consider his definitions.A univocal term is one which
is predicated of many according to one and the same ratiowhich is
equally participated,86whereas an analogical term is predicated of
many either according to rationeswhich are diverse but ordered in
some way, or according to one ratiowhich is diverselyparticipated
secundum
.87The ratiocorrespondingto a univocal term
priusetposterius
has the unity of univocation as opposed to the unity of proportion,88
which is what you get when you take distinct realities, such as
substance and accident, and consider them in accordance with the
dependence of one on the other.89 It also has the community of
abstraction, not the community that comes about through proportion.90As a common ratioor concept, the ratioexpressed by a univocal
term is separate (precisus
) fromthe rationes
propriaeof its inferiors.For
instance, "animal" is a common concept which is separate fromthe
concepts proper to humans and horses, and "human" is a common
concept which is separate fromthe concepts (if any) properto Socrates
and Plato. Whetheror not the concept correspondingto an analogical
term can be separate fromthe proper concepts of its inferiorsis one
of the mattersunder dispute.91
Dominic of Flanders also considers the senses of "concept", saying
that he is using the word ' 'pro re conceptibili
sivepro quidditate
ad quam
terminatur
actusintellectus".
"Concept" in thissense can be taken in two
ways, and here Dominic of Flanders quotes Thomas Anglicus.92One
84DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 4 rb. Cf. Surez,d. 2.4.3,DM I, 88b-89a.
85DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 2 va. Cf. Capreolus,
Defensiones
, 143b-144a.
86DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 1 va.
87DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 4 ra.
88DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 2 va.
89DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 4 rb.
90DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 2 va; cf.sie. i 6 ra.
91DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 5 rb-va.
92DominicofFlanders,
InMet.,sig.i 5 rb.Cf.ThomasAnglicus,
Liber
.
Propugnatorius
f. 37 ra.
68

20:20:01 PM

can regard a concept as it is a thing of some sort, or one can regard

it as representativeof the thingsconceived, throughwhich representarerumconceptarum
tion it is their ratio("ut est representative
per quem
modumestratioearum})). The second sense is the relevant one, and is
nominis.
equivalent to the ratiosubstantie
Given these preliminaries,Dominic of Flanders asks whetherthere
is one concept of ens which is both separate fromthe concepts of all
beings and common throughabstraction.93In his response, he gives
the spectrumof possible answers. First, there are those who hold that
the concept of being is separate.94Those who believe that it is also
"
"
common throughabstractionare the Scotists who take ens to be a
univocal term. However, he claims, unspecified Albertists and
Buridanists opt for a concept which is separate but common through
analogy, and he cites passages fromAlbert the Great himselfto support thisview. Since a concept which is separate must be one concept,
we have here a version of the one ratioview, but Dominic of Flanders
findshimselfunable to support it. He argues that no one who follows
Aquinas can take thereto be a concept of enswhich is separate, forthis
is tantamountto acceptingthe analogy oftwo to a thirdwhichAquinas
rejected in thiscontext.95That is, we would be forcedto see both God
and creatures, both substance and accident in relation to some
independentreality,yet therecan be no such thirdreality.It is impossible forthereto be a quidditativeconcept ofenswhich is separate from
and abstractedfromthe concepts of God and creatures,substance and
accidents.96
The view that the concept of being is not separate is itselfcapable
of subdivision.97View one is that ens signifiesa disjunctive concept
which is one by the unityof proportionor analogy, ( unitate
proportionis
siveanalogie)and this is found in Hervaeus Natalis and his followers.
"
In effect,theyclaim that the term " ens corresponds to the complex
' 'substance or accident". View two is that "ens"
signifiesthe
concept
a conis
made
these
and
from
ten concepts of the categories directly,
cept which is one by the unity of analogy and proportion( unitateana). Here he cites Johannes Versor's commentaryon
logieetproportionis
93DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 4 rb.
94DominicofFlanders,
In Met., sig.i 5 ra.
95DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 5 ra-rb.
96DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 5 va.
97DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sig.i 7 ra-rb.
69

20:20:01 PM

the Metaphysics
.98 Clearly he believes that to be one by the unity of
and
analogy
proportionis not to be genuinelysingular. View threeis
that the concept is partly one, by virtue of attribution,and partly
diverse, by virtue of the differentways ens belongs to substance and
accidents." The word "ens" signifiesboth substance and accidents by
one concept and one imposition, but it does not signifyanything
separate fromsubstance. In fact, it is a proper concept of substance
but with another mode of signifyingand conceiving. It signifies
substance as it is related to and joined with accidents, and thus it is
that accidents are signifiedsecondarily.100The referencesto conceiving suggestthatthe source of the concept's unityis the mind's activity
rather than reality, a view which Surez was later concerned to
reject.101Dominic of Flanders remarkedthatthisthirdview, which he
seems to associate with Thomas Anglicus, appeared to be the truest.
2.2 Capreolus,Soncinas,and theConceptusObjectivus
Thomas Anglicus's distinctionbetween the concept as a thingand
the concept as representativeinvites us to look at one and the same
verbum
fromtwo differentaspects, as an accident of the mind, and as
it representssome object or other. From the veryearly fourteenthcenturyon, other philosophers made a more robust distinctionbetween
the conceptus
, which represents,and the conceptus
formalis
objectivus
(or
objectalisas Capreolus, followingAureol, calls it), which is whateverit
is that is represented.
Capreolus explains that the formal concept is the conception that
the intellectformswhen it conceives something,and thatthe objective
concept is the intelligiblethingwhich serves as object forthe intellect
formingsuch a conception.102Soncinas is fullerin his description.103
98Dominicof Flanders,In Met.,
sig. i 7 rb; JohannesVersor,Quaestiones
super
Aristotelis
, Cologne1494;repr.Frankfurt/Main
metaphysicam
1967,f. xxvvb.
99DominicofFlanders,
In Met.,sie. i 7 rb.
100He writes
secundario
ettalisconceptus
non
(loc.cit.):"...ideosignificat
accidens,
estprecisusa conceptusubstantie,
sed estproprius
substantie
cumalio
conceptus
modo significandi
et concipiendi,
videlicetcum concretione
et habitudine
ad
accidens."
101Surez,d. 32.2.16,DM II, 323b-324a.
"
Theword" negatione
(324aline1) is bet' : seeFrancisco
terreadas ' ' negotiahone1
Surez,Metaphysicarum
, MogunDisputationum
tiae 1600,224b.
102Capreolus,
141a.
103Soncinas,InDefensiones,
Met.,2b.
70

20:20:01 PM

He explains thatthe formalconcept according to some is the act of the

but according to Aquinas it is the verbumformed
understanding,104
about a thingthroughthe act of understanding.The conceptus
objectivus
is the thing itselfwhich is actually or potentially understood, not
insofaras it actually exists, but insofaras it moves the intellect.This
allows him to identifynatures which exist only in a secondary way as
objective concepts.105However, he explicitly disassociates himself
fromthe Scotistview thatthe objective concept is in factseparate from
actual things and enjoys its own type of reality.106
Both Capreolus and Soncinas agree thatthereis one formalconcept
of ens common to God and creatures, substance and accidents, and
Capreolus says that this is proved by Scotus's arguments.107Soncinas
has more to say than Capreolus about the representativenature of this
formalconcept. He contrastsAureol' s view that the concept of being
is simplydenuded of any actual ratioand is one only by the unity of
indiscrimination,including every thing and every ratioimplicitly,108
withthe view thatthe concept of being expresses one ratioactually and
explicitly, and he accepts the latter view.109 When the mind
apprehends things that are in some way similar, it can abstract one
formadconcept, and so, since thingsagree in esse, the mind is capable
of formingthe absolute formalconcept, ensestid cui convenit
esse.110He
also claims that the formalconcept does not include the proper conWhen the intellectformsthejudgment "Lapis
cepts of its inferiors.111
estens it can do so withoutformingthe proper concepts of substance
and accident.
So faras the objective concept is concerned, Capreolus argued that
it was one, not by the unityof univocation, but by the unityof attribu104Herehe presumably
has PeterAureolin mind:see below,note108.
105Soncinas,In Met., 2b.
106Soncinas,In Met.,8b. For discussion
of Scotusand Aureolon thisissue,see
Dominik
AmI Thinking
About?
DunsScotus
andPeter
onIntenAureol
Perler,What
John
tional
32 (1994),72-89.
, in: Vivarium,
Objects
107Capreolus,
141a.
Defensiones,
108For Aureol,see PeterAureoli,Scriptum
Sententiarum
, 2 vols.,ed.
SuperPrimm
St. Bonaventure,
N.Y., Louvain,Paderborn
1956,505. This
EligiusM. Buytaert,
oftheconceptus
isAureol'
s account
thatwiththe
, butsinceAureolcontrasted
objectalis
actusintellectus
realiter
thanwiththeThomistic
intellectui
inhaerens
verbum
,
(483) rather
itmaywellbe thathisdistinction
is morelikeThomasAnglicus's
thantheoneSoncinasis using.
109Soncinas,In Met.,2a, 3a.
110Soncinas,In Met.,3a.
111Soncinas,In Met.,7b.
71

20:20:01 PM

tion, which is a lesser unity.112He also remarkedthat such a concept

is imperfectly
one; and in the case of God and creatures,he linked this
imperfectionwith the imperfectresemblance creatures have to God,
since they are like God only by imitation.113His view, however, is
somewhat ambiguous, forhe does not explicitlysay whetherthe unity
of attributionis the unity of a quasi-nature or whetherit is the unity
of an ordered aggregate.114On balance, he probably adopted the first
alternative. He speaks of "ens" as an analogical termwhich expresses
" unamsolamrationem
', even thoughit is one only by the unity
explicite*
of attribution;115
and he says that the concept of ensis distinctfromthe
proper concepts of its inferiorsin the way that a concept having the
unity of attributionis distinctfrom a trulyunited concept which it
implicitlyincludes.116He also argues thatattributionof one to another
strictlyspeaking pertains to the external object rather than to the
objective concept, for the latter is tantumunus,though it is unequally
participated by the things signified.117
Unlike Capreolus, Soncinas made his own position on the objective
concept or ratioperfectlyclear, forhe canvassed just two views. Either
the objective concept has the unity of analogia et comparatio
, which
occurs when to the formalconcept there corresponds a multitudeof
natures, one of which is called such only in relation to another; or it
has the unityof a disjunction. He opted forthe second alternative.118
2.3 Domingode Soto
In his Categoriescommentary, Soto gave a lengthy account of
Scotus's arguments for the univocityof the word 'ens', and then put
forwardfour theses.119The firstthesis was that there is one formal
112Capreolus,
, 141a-b.
Defensiones
113Capreolus,
, 142b,ad 19andad 25. It shouldbe notedthatCapreolus
Defensiones
also speaksof imitation
He
in thecontext
of thesubstance-accident
relationship.
writes
ad Deum;et
dicuntur
etattributione
entia,ex imitatione
(141b):"creaturae
ulterius
ex imitatione
et attributione
ad illam.,,
accidens,
substantiae,
114Fonsecareported
thatCapreolusseemed
tobe amongthosewhobelievedthatthe
objective
conceptofbeingwas bothone and separate
(Fonseca,In Met.,cols.712toCapreolus
theviewthat
thatpeoplewrongly
attributed
713);andSurezremarked
therewasno one objective
concept(Surez,d. 2.2.4,DM I, 71a).
115Capreolus,
, 142a.
Defensiones
116Capreolus,
142a-b.
Defensiones.
117Capreolus,
Defensiones
, 135b.
118Soncinas,In Met., 6b.
119Soto,In Praed
. , 129a-133a,especially
130a-132a.
72

20:20:01 PM

concept of being, a view which Soto supported both by referenceto

Scotus's argumentsand by extra reasons of his own. One of these had
to do with imposition. Whoever firstimposed the word "ens" to
signifyid quodestcould not have been thinkingspecially of God or of
creatures,of substance or of accidents, any more than do those Latinspeakers who are ignorantof philosophy. So far as the firstthesiswas
concerned, Soto saw no differencebetween Scotus and Aquinas. His
second thesispostulatedjust one objective concept. Even thoughmany
"
Thomists deny this, he said, " ens signifiesone formal ratioin the
object, abstracted by reason from substance and accidents.
"
"
Nonetheless,in his thirdthesishe stated that ens signifiessubstance
and accidents not univocally but analogically, being said perpriusand
and secundum
of substance,perposterius
quidof accidents. This
simpliciter
in its
is because the ratio is not found simply but proportionabiliter
in
the
others.
attribution
in
one
and
through
significates,principally
His fourth thesis, concerning God and creatures, was considered
above in section 1.6.
2.4 Suarez
Now let us turn to Surez. I shall not be looking at the precise
details of his arguments, for my interesthere is simply to show that
the main outlinesof his view fitnicelyinto a long tradition,a tradition
with which he was well acquainted, as his referencesmake clear. In
Disputation 2, he takes up the distinctionbetween the formaland the
objective concept, saying that the formalconcept is the act of mind or
verbum
throughwhich the intellectconceives some thing or common
ratio, whereas the objective concept is that res or ratio which is
immediately cognized or represented by the formal concept.120He
explicitlyadopts a view verylike the one Aureol had held in the early
fourteenthcentury,namely that the objective realitymay or may not
be identical to some external reality. In some cases it is a real thing
as it is presented to the intellect,in other cases it may be a being of
reason; but thereis no special intermediarytype of realityof the sort
postulated by Scotus.121With respect to the formadconcept, Surez
120Surez,d. 2.1.1, DM I, 64b-65a.
121Surez,d. 2.1.1,DM I, 65a: "objectivus
verononsemperestverarespositiva;
entiarationis,
et alia, quae vocantur
eniminterdum
quia
privationes,
concipimus
AmI Thinking
ForAureol,seePerler,What
inintellectu."
esseobjective
solumhabent
81-6.
About?,
73

20:20:01 PM

considers and rejects the view found in Cajetan, Sylvesterof Ferrara,

and Petrus Fonseca, that the formalconcept is itselfnot properlyone
and separate.122Experience shows thatit is one, and thoughit signifies
many things, it does so not insofaras they differbut insofaras they
agree.123On the otherhand, it is undiscriminatingand indistinct(<con
in
or
and
et
its
of
one
fusum indistinctum)
representation
being another,
here Surez uses language very reminiscentof Aureol' s (see above,
section 2. 2). 124He then turnsto the objective concept.125Having canvassed a varietyof views, he concludes that the objective concept too
is both separate and one. As a result, it cannot functionas if it were
equivalent to the proper concepts of substance and accidents by signifyingthem immediately,eitheras a disjunction(as Soncinas had held)
or as a conjunctionor as an aggregate(as Versor had held); nor should
it be said to signifysubstance explicitlyand othercategoriesimplicitly
(as Dominic of Flanders had held). What the concept representsis the
et simlitudo
.126Analogy
agreement between things, their convenientia
enters the picture because the concept does not relate to the things
Infinitebeing existsperse,
picked out with an equal habitudoor ordo.121
finitebeing existsfromanother;128substance existsperse and accidents
exist because of substance.129Hence the one ratiocommunis
exhibits a
determinationwith order and relation to one;130and there is a clear
ordening of prior and posterior.131
Conclusion
There is much more to be said about the detailed argumentswith
which Surez attempts to explain and support his position on the
analogy of being, but it is clear that the broad lines of that position
relate very closely to the positions taken by those Thomists who
preceded Cajetan, as well as to the positions of such sixteenth-century
authors as Domingo de Soto who rejected much of what Cajetan had
122Surez,d. 2.1.2-14,DM I, 65a-70a.
123Surez,d. 2.1.9, DM I, 68a-b.Cf.
Defensiones
Capreolus,
, 135a,142a.
124Surez,d. 2.1.8,DM I, 67b.
125Surez,d. 2.2.1-20,DM I, 70a-77a.
126Surez,d. 2.2.14,DM I, 74b-75a.
127Surez,d. 2.2.36,DM I, 81b.
128Surez,d. 28.3.21,DM II, 20b-21a.
129Surez,d. 32.2.11,DM II, 322b.
130Surez,d. 28.3.21,DM
21a.
131Surez,d. 32.2.11,DM II,
II, 322b.
74

20:20:01 PM

said. In particular, his attitude to the divisions of analogy is more

traditionalthan Cajetan's; and his position on the concept of being
relatesto a long line of thinkerswho held thatit was possible fora concept to be both one and analogical. How close Surez was to Thomas
Aquinas on eitherof these points is a matterof debate. On the question whether "ens" expressed a disjunctive concept, Soncinas
remarked that various views were found among Thomists because
Aquinas himself had not been explicit (" nihil apertedicit circa illudi
and thisstrikesme as a correctjudgment. The least one
quaesitum"),132
can say is that there seems to be no overwhelminglygood reason to
take Cajetan as a correctinterpreterof Aquinas, and ifthatis the case,
then Surez can be seen as belonging in a Thomistic traditionon the
issues discussed in this paper.
Waterloo, Ont.
of Waterloo
University
132Soncinas,In Met.,6b.

75

20:20:01 PM

Circularityand the Paduan Regressus:

From Pietro d'Abano to Galileo Galilei

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

The problem of whetheror not Galileo Galilei was influencedby the

Paduan Aristoteliansin his adoption of a scientificmethodologyhas
been the subject of considerable controversy,beginning with Ernst
Cassirer in the firstvolume of his Das Erkenntnisproblem
inderPhilosophie
der neueren
Zeit (Berlin 1922) and continuing to the
und Wissenschaft
present day. In 1940 John Herman Randall, Jr., made a strongcase
forsuch an influenceon the basis of Galileo's use ofthe demonstrative
,* but recent scholars have tended to overlookhis work. Howregressus
with
the transcriptionand publication in 1988 of Galileo's Tracever,
2 writtenfour hundred
tatiode demonstration,
years earlier, in 1588 or
1589, the situation has begun to change. This Tractatio
, which unforleft
of
the
was
out
National
Edition
of
Galileo's
tunately
works, contains a complete description of the regressus
. There is substantial
evidence that Galileo not only knew the details of the regressus
but
employed it to found the "new sciences" forwhichhe is famous. But
this discoveryis now promptinganotherMethodenstreit
, this one questhe
of
the
on
the
of
its
tioning
validity
regressus
grounds
inadequacy and
thus suggestingthat, even had Galileo used it as a method, it could
not have gottenthe resultshe claimed forit.3 The timeseems ripe to
1 TheDevelopment
Method
intheSchool
oftheHistory
, in:Journal
ofScientific
ofPadua
ofIdeas, 1 (1940),177-206.Thishas beenreprinted
in TheSchool
ofPaduaandthe
Science
hassurveyed
reactions
, Padua1961,16-68.Randallhimself
Emergence
ofModern
to histhesisin hisPaduan
Aristotelianism
Reconsidered
, in: E.P. Mahoney
(ed.), PhilandHumanism
: Renaissance
Kristeller
osophy
Essaysin HonorofPaulOskar
, NewYork
1976,275-82.
2 The fulltitleisGalileoGalilei,Tractatio
depraecognitionibus
etpraecognitis
and Tractatio
dedemonstration,
eds.W.F. Edwards
andW.A. Wallace,Padua,1988.The Latintext
oftheteaching
thiscontains
onthedemonstrative
is reproduced
inmyRandall
regress
Redivivus:Galileo
andthePaduan
Aristotelians
oftheHistory
ofIdeas,48
, in:Journal
133-49.
(1988),
3 The beginnings
ofthecontroversy,
whichalso centers
on elements
ofcontinuity
betweenlate medievaland earlymodernscience,are foundin Nicholas
Jardine,
Galileo's
RoadtoTruth
andtheDemonstrative
inHistory
andPhiloso, in: Studies
Regress
76
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 1

20:20:13 PM

reopen the older controversyand see what it may have to contribute

to the resolution of the new one.
and Galen
Foundationsin Aristotle
is thatthe termitselfis Latin and
A peculiar thingabout the regressus
has no directcounterpartin Greek; thus it is not found in Aristotle's
text.4Yet the doctrine is clearly Aristotelianin origin, though it did
not assume identifiableform as related to a scientificmethodology
until the second century,when it was discussed by Galen in his Ars
medica
, quae et ars parva dicitur(1,4). Then it was taken up by Greek
commentators on Aristotle in the fourth century, following
Themistius, and finallyit received its fullesttreatmentfromAverroes
in a number of his writings.5In view of thisdevelopment,the simplest
way to locate the foundationsof the teaching in Aristotleis to identify
the texts in his corpus that are most frequentlycited by these early
authors and then examined in detail by the Paduan Aristotelians.
These are fairlynumerous, but the main sources are the following:
Physics1,1; Prior Analytics11,5,8,20; PosteriorAnalytics1,2,3,13,22;
Ethics1,2,3; and Metaphysics
V,ll.6
Topics11,2; Nicomachean
Posterior
Analytics1,13 provides the best general idea of what the
is all about when it introducesthe distinctionbetween a demregressus
willbe foundin Ernan
background
phyofScience,7 (1976),277-318.Additional
in Galileo'sWork
, in: R.E. ButtsandJ.C. Pitt
McMullin,TheConception
ofScience
L.
onGalileo
1978,209-57;andWinifred
, Dordrecht-Boston,
(eds.),NewPerspectives
A Reexamination
Method:
, in:ibid.,1-57.See alsoMcMullin's
Wisan,Galileo's
Scientific
ofScience,50 (1983),
toGalileo
ofmyPrelude
review
(note34, below)in: Philosophy
of
Thesis
andtheContinuity
, in: Philosophy
171-3,andmyreplytohimin myGalileo
andthe
inhisNewton's
ZevBechler,
Physics
Science,51 (1984),504-10.Morerecently
Revolution
Structure
1991,has
, Dordrecht-Boston-London
oftheScientific
Conceptual
reasoncircular
as involving
andcomposition
ofresolution
method
Newton's
attacked
to Galileo,105-71.
thesamecritique
ing,and extends
4 Although
termthatcomes
in Greek,thereis another
thereis no termforregressus
makes
Aristotle
circle(huklos
closetoit,namely,
reasoning.
), in thesenseofcircular
ofcontexts.
in a variety
to thattypeofreasoning
reference
frequent
5 Thetexts
Posteriorum
inhisAnalyticorum
arefound
citedbyThemistius
1,2paraphrasis
areinhis
De anima
1,7-9.ThosecitedbyAverroes
3,20-22andhisIn libros
paraphrasis
in
libriduo.Expositio
Resolutoriorum
Posteriorum
, I, text.comm.95-102;Epitome
magna
ineosdem
. . Commentarla
libri
octo.
auditu
Posteriorum
librum
,
magna
, 2-4;DePhysico
primum
libros
media
, 1,2-5.
Physicorum
I, text.comm.2-5;andExpositio
super
6 Hereand in whatfollows
on themoredetailedaccountby
I havedrawnfreely
dellaScuoladi
autori
metodo
come
delregressus
GiovanniPapuli,La teoria
scientifico
negli
Moderna
e Scienza
Veneto
Padova
, 2 vols.,Padua
, in: LuigiOlivieri(ed.), Aristotelismo
citedas Papuli.
1983,Vol. I, 221-77,henceforth
77

20:20:13 PM

onstration"of the fact" (quia) and a demonstration"of the reasoned

fact" {propter
quid). One of the illustrationsof demonstrationquia that
Aristotle provides is the proof that the moon is a sphere from its
having phases; in this case the middle is its having phases and the
major is its being spherical in shape. If the middle and the major are
convertible,Aristotlegoes on, the two termscan be interchangedand
then the proofis convertedinto a demonstrationpropter
quid. Whereas
the firsthad merely established the "fact" of the moon's being a
sphere, the second uses this fact to provide the reason why it exhibits
phases and thus is a demonstration"of the reasoned fact." The line
of reasoning progresses from the effect(having phases) to the cause
(being a sphere), and then goes back again (or regresses) from this
cause to the effectwith which the reasoning started.The effectin this
case is an appearance grasped in sense perception, and yet it is able
to provide universal knowledge of the cause, one on which a propter
quid demonstration can be based. Toward the end of the chapter
Aristotlenotes that these two typesof demonstrationmightpertain to
the same science, but theycan also pertain to differentsciences. The
examples he cites are from the so-called "mixed sciences," such as
optics, which uses geometricalprinciplesto studyphenomena like the
rainbow.7 Here, he observes, it is the business of the physicistto know
the fact and of the mathematician to know the reasoned fact. In this
case the physicistknows the appearances, but the mathematicianhas
an insightinto the universal.
The remaining texts now serve to illuminate this teaching in differentways. Physics1,1, Nicomachean
Ethics1,2-3, and Metaphysics
V, 11
are all concerned with the order of human knowing. They state, in
7 Hereagaintheterm''mixedsciences"hasno
inAristotle's
Greektext.
equivalent
Theexpression
heusesissciences
thatarecontained
"onebeneath
theother"(thateron
In commenting
on thetextZabarellarefers
to theseas "subalternate
hupothateron).
sciences"(scientiae
subaltematae
ofwhichis subalternating
), thesuperior
(subalternam
)
and theinferior
subalternated
(subalternata
). ThomasAquinascalledthem"middle
sciences"(scientiae
becausetheyare intermediate
between
and
mathematics
mediae)
OtherLatincommentators
namedthem"mixedsciences"{scientiae
physics.
mixtae)
becausethereasoning
useselements
ofboth.Thebranch
ofmathematics
theyinvolve
that treatssuch subalternating
sciencesthencame to be knownas "mixed
mathematics"
himselfrefersto the corresponding
{mathematica
mixta).Aristotle
subalternate
sciencesas "the morephysicalof the mathematical
sciences"{ta
tnmathematn).
Fordetails,see RichardD. McKirahan,
Aristotle's
Suborphusiktera
dinate
in: British
fortheHistory
ofScience,11(1978),197-220,
and
Sciences,
Journal
'
, Galileo
JamesG. Lennox,Aristotle
, and MixedSciences
,' in: W.A. Wallace(ed.),
Galileo
D.C. 1986,29-51.
, Washington,
Reinterpreting
78

20:20:13 PM

slightlydifferentways, that we proceed from things that are more

known and clearer to us to those that are clearer and more known by
nature or in themselves.Usually the idea is that particularsor things
of sense are firstgrasped by us, and then we come to the knowledge
of universaisor ideas that are more knowable in themselves.The texts
fromPriorAnalytics11,5,8,20 are concerned with formaddetails of the
conversion of syllogisms by interchanging middles and with the
general problem of circular and reciprocal proof. Those of Posterior
1,2-3,13 then go into material details relatingto circular and
Analytics
Analytics11,22
reciprocal vs. non-reciprocal proof. Finally, Posterior
and Topics 11,2 provide arguments to show that there cannot be an
infinitenumber of middle terms or, alternatively,that the regress of
middles must ultimatelyterminate.
'
It is noteworthythat the term ' 'method,' which comes from a
transliterationof the Greek methodos
, does not appear in the Posterior
, Aristotle'sbasic treatiseon scientificmethodology,thoughit
Analytics
'
is found in his otherwritings.Derived frommeta,meaning 'after" or
' and hodos
"
, meaning "way," the Greek compound
following,'
mean the way or order to be followed in
was
taken
to
originally
rational inquiry. In this meaning it implied the rules or norm according to which inquirywas to be conducted, and in such usage logic was
said to be a method. From the idea of norm the termwas transferred
to a discussion or questioning that proceeded along a logical path, as
in the expression "Socratic method." The word then came to mean
any doctrineattained as the resultof such inquiry, and thus the term
was used to designate various schools or philosophies. This
methodoi
found in the medical writer Galen, from whom it passed
is
usage
ultimatelyinto the Paduan tradition.8
Galen's ideas were basically Aristotelian,but they also drew much
from his medical predecessor Hippocrates and from the works of
Plato, particularlythe Phaedrus.In this dialogue Socrates points out
the similaritiesbetween the work of the physician and that of the
dialectician: the physician must know the nature of the body and the
dialectician the nature of the soul, and to know either requires the
methodos
used by Hippocrates. What this method involved was a composite of differentprocedures: the analytical, the definitive, the
8 DetailsaregiveninJ.A. Weisheipl,
Method
TheEvolution
, in hisNature
ofScientific
D.C. 1985,andin Neil
intheMiddle
andMotion
, ed. W.E. Carroll,Washington,
Ages
Renaissance
W. Gilbert,
, NewYorkand London1960.
ofMethod
Concepts
79

20:20:13 PM

was
divisive, and the demonstrative. Within this setting, methodos
was
to
contribution
art
or
techn.
Aristotle's
associated
with
always
extend the concept to all types of rational inquiry, including the
sciences, and point to analysis and definitionas its primary components.
Galen himself wrote a major work on method. This was lost
sometime afterthe sixth century,and various attemptsto reconstruct
it are based on referencesto methodologyin his otherwritings.From
thesewe can gatherthathe focusedfirston analysis, thenon synthesis;
in association with these he also spoke of definitionand division. In
all ways of teaching( doctrinae
), he stated, thereare threeordersof procedure. One followsthe way of conversion and resolution(dissolutici),
in which the investigatortakes the object of scientificknowledgeas the
end to be aimed at, then seeks what lies nearestto it and withoutwhich
the thing cannot exist, then what precedes that, and so on, until a
principle is arrived at. The second way followsthe way of composition, and is the contraryof the first.This begins withthe principleand
composes these (componeeas), that is, the elements arrived at, in their
inverse order until the object is again reached. Then the third way
follows the way of analyzing the definition. Galen's referencesto
methodos
are usually in the plural, as when he writesof logical methods
and scientificmethods, but sometimes they are in the singular, as
when he mentions the demonstrativemethod (apodeiktik
methodos).9
Paduan Beginnings
A long intervalseparates Galen fromthe firstPaduan to elaborate
on his teachings, Pietro d'Abano (1257-1315). Although methods of
resolutionand compositionwere used earlier in the Middle Ages- by
Robert Grossetesteat Oxford and by Albertus Magnus and Thomas
Aquinas at Paris- interest at both those universities was focused
primarilyon speculative disciplines such as metaphysicsand theology.
The strongmedical orientationat Padua was perhaps instrumentalin
directingattentionthere to medicine, logic, and the natural sciences.
In any event, it was in this settingthatAbano combined the teachings
9 The textonwhichthis
is basedis citedandtranslated
from
theGaleni
analysis
princumcommento
Hali, n.d.,byRandallinSchool
cipismedicorum
Microtegni
, 31-2.
ofPadua
It is alsotranslated
inmyCausality
andScientific
, Vol. 1, AnnArbor1972,
Explanation
120.Thiswillbe citedas Causality
in whatfollows;
and
alongwithPapuli,Causality
School
neededforthisessay.
ofPaduaprovidemostofthedocumentation
80

20:20:13 PM

of Aristotle's Posterior
Analyticswith those of Galen's Ars medica.His
was
to
reconcile
the teachings of the philosophers and the
objective
medical doctors, as in the title of his major work, Conciliator
differentiarumphilosophorum
This was writtenin 1310
, et praecipuemedicorum.
and then published at Venice in 1476; it earned forhim the title"the
'
Conciliator,' by which he is generallyknown.
For Abano science in the proper sense infers conclusions from
causes that are proximate and immediate, and this is what Aristotle
in the Posterior
Analyticscalled demonstratio
propter
quid and Galen, doctrinacompositiva.
There is another sense of science that is also proper,
he goes on. Indeed, this is most proper because it is best adapted to
human modes of knowing, since the natural way forus is to proceed
from what is more knowable and certain for us to what is more
knowable in the order of nature. Aristode describes that way at the
; it is what he identifies elsewhere as
beginning of the Physics
In it we proceed in the
resolutiva.
demonstratio
quia, and Galen, doctrina
opposite order fromeffectto cause throughproximate and logically
immediatemiddle terms.Anothertypeof demonstratio
quia is had when
we conclude an effectfrom more general causes, omitting specific
causes that are in between.10
The method here outlined by Abano is somewhat similar to that
contained in the writingsof Averroes already mentioned in note 5.
Perhaps on thisaccount Abano is said to have introducedLatin AverroismifromParis, where he had studied, to the Universityof Padua.
However thatmightbe, an Averroistcommentaryon the Physicswritten in 1334 and published at Venice in 1492 pointed to the threetypes
of demonstrationidentifiedby Averroes. In this context it notes that
causes such as are found in natural science, though prior and more
known in the order of nature, are oftenposterior and less known to
us. Such causes we investigatethrougheffectsthat are prior for us,
and this is the method of resolution. Then, afterwe have discovered
the causes, we demonstratethe effectsthroughthem, and this is the
method of composition.11
10Conciliator
, 119.
, ed. Venice1496,Diff.3, prop.1; School
ofPadua,28-9,Causality
inLatin
Abanocitesthetextfrom
Galen'sMicrotegni
LateronintheConciliator
(known
referred
to in theprevious
note.See also
as theArsmedica
, quaeetarsparvadicitur)
Papuli,225-9,274.
11ThetextisthatofUrbanus
summus.
..commentorum
omnium
Averoys
Averoysta
philosophus
auditu
librum
Aristotelis
dephysico
, Venice1492,comm.text.2, citedand
expositor
super
translated
in School
, 121.
, 39-40;see Causality
ofPadua
81

20:20:13 PM

The most importantthinkerat Padua in the centurythat followed

was the Augustinin friar Paul of Venice (1369P-1428), who had
studied at Oxford and Paris beforeteachingat Padua. In his commentary on the PhysicsPaul cites Averroes as recognizing a double procedure in natural science, one from effectto cause, the other from
cause to effect. He explains that in physics one begins both from
causes and fromwhat is caused, though in differentways. One way
is fromcauses understood inclusively( inclusive
), by knowingthem,the
other from effectsunderstood exclusively {exclusive),by knowing by
means of them. Thus there is a twofoldknowledge of the cause, one
obtained by a procedure quia, the otherby a procedurepropter
quid; the
second kind depends on the first,and the firstis the cause of the
second. Then, in his commentaryon the Posterior
, Paul uses
Analytics
the notion of necessary connection to explain how a demonstration
quia can sometimesbe convertedto a demonstrationpropter
quid. This
can only be done if there is a ' 'mutual necessary relationship"
between cause and effectsuch that, if the cause is placed the effectis
placed also, and vice versa. The example he cites is an eclipse and the
interposal of the earth between the sun and the moon. In his Summa
naturalisphilosophiae
, finally,Paul takes up the objection that the use
of this double procedure involves one in circularreasoning. His reply
is that knowledge of an effectthroughpropter
quid reasoning is not the
same as knowledge of an effectthroughreasoning quia; in the second
case the effectis known in itself,in the firstthroughwhat causes it.
There would be circularityif the knowledge were of the same kind,
whereas in thiscase the knowledgesare different.But in Paul's expositions, although the ordomentalisalways precedes the ordonaturalis
, his
emphasis is on the connectednessbetween the two, a point thatAverroist commentaries tended to overlook. They focused on Averroes's
threetypesof demonstration,demonstratio
causae, and
signi, demonstratio
demonstratio
the
three as unrelated pro, generally seeing
simpliciter
cedures.12
A similar line of thought is found in Paul's contemporary,Ugo
Benzi of Siena (d. 1439), who insiststhat any doctrina
must involve a
of
forth
what
is
a
demonstrabilis.
As
demonstrable, manifestatio
setting
practiced in physics and medicine, he states, this involves a double
process, the firstof which begins with the effectsand seeks theircause
and the second explains those effects through the cause newly
12School
, 121-7;cf.Papuli,229-30,274.
ofPadua,30-1;Causality
82

20:20:13 PM

is resolutive, whereas
discovered. The process of discovery {inventici)
that of settingforththe consequences ( notificatio
) is compositive. But
to
the
second
process, findingthis only
Ugo denies scientificfertility
in the resolutivemethod that discovers the middle term.13
A similarobservation,expressed more forcefullyand with a certain
advanced by
intransigence,is found in the teachings on the regressus
to as
referred
Nardo
di
Securo
Francesco
(fi. 1480), usually
Neritonensis. A Dominican philosopher and professor in the
Thomistic chair at the Universityof Padua, he taught Tommaso de
Vio Gaetano, Gaspar Contarini, and Pietro Pomponazzi. He left
nothingin writing,but his views, which show him even more removed
fromthe Averroists,are reportedby Pomponazzi and Girolamo Baiduino. Basically Neritonensisdenies all probativevalue to the putative
quid, regarding it
by demonstrationpropter
part played in the regressus
more as a dialectical syllogism,a logical construct,since it is in evident
conflictwith our human mode of knowing, which should always proceed fromthe more known. The being of the effectis what produces
our knowledgeof the being of the cause. It is true that nature acts by
causing, but thata determinatecause will produce a determinateeffect
is only a conjecture, a suppositio.If the effectis there the cause must
be also, but if the cause is there there is no necessity that the effect
follow. As Neritonensis sees it, the quia reasoning that precedes the
propter
quid arrives at the existence of the cause, but it tells nothing
about the essence of the cause or how the causing of the effecttakes
quid is not truly
place. Thus the reasoning that is regarded as propter
demonstrative.14
Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) reacted against this teaching of his
mentor. He concedes to Neritonensisthat scientificknowledge begins
in the senses, but in the studyof nature one cannot remain only with
. The human mind grasps the sensible firstthrough the
the sensatum
cogitative power, and then the universal through the power of
intellect,actually seeing it in what is sensed. Thus reasoning propter
quid is not topical but demonstrative; it seeks to know not merely
13Causality
, 126-7;School
ofPadua,37-8;Papuli,230-1,274.HerePapuli'sinterpretafromRandall's.PapuliholdsthatUgo didnotattach
differs
tionofUgo's teaching
the
demonstration
to
value
scientific
, whereasRandallseeshimas
quid
propter
any
scientific
ina strictly
moments
boththequiaandthepropter
quidas essential
regarding
procedure.
14Neritonensis'
aliBalduini
in Hieronymi
arestatedandrefuted
s arguments
Quaesita
etlogica
etnatur
1563,fols.217v-218v;
Papuli,231-3.
alia,Venice:Joan.Gryphius,
quot
83

20:20:13 PM

existence, or definition,but whythe effecttakes place. Yet its type of

, and, as a
reasoning has to be joined to quia reasoning in the regressus
if
the
has
quia reasoning
already provided knowledge of
consequence,
a cause thatis perseand essential, its productionof the effectis likewise
essential and not merely accidental. In this way of thinking, the
strengthof the demonstrationquia is that it serves as a via resolutiva
when science is in the investigativemode of discovery;the strengthof
when
the demonstrationpropter
quid is that it serves as a via compositiva
science is in the mode of systematizingknowledge already acquired.
itselfis seen as a demonstratio
And when the regressus
potissimauniting
both the quia and the propter
quid, then the ordomentalisand the ordo
naturaliscomplement each other in the knowing process.15
The DevelopingTraditionat Padua
With this the ground was well prepared for the refinementof
, which by the sixteenthcenturyhad come to
teaching on the regressus
be the common term forthe double process being discussed by these
authors, and which served to distinguishit fromcirculatio.
Perhaps the
fullestaccount is that found in the writingsof Agostino Nifo (14701538), who had carefullyanalyzed the commentaries of Themistius
and Averroes, among others. In showing that the regressus
is not circular he explained thatfourtypesof knowledgewere thenbeing distinguished at Padua: that of an effectthroughsense experience; that of
a cause discovered throughthe effect;that of the same cause through
the work ( negotiatio
) of the intellect,which fitsit to serve as the middle
term of a demonstration; and that of the same effect,known now
through a propter
quid demonstrationbased on that cause. Since the
of
the
effectin the last type is quite differentfromthat in
knowledge
the firsttype, there is no circular argumentbut rathera true regress.
As Nifo explains the term negotiatio
, this involves composition and
division. When the cause has been discovered, the intellectcomposes
and divides until it knows the cause not only as a cause but also as a
middle term and a definition.The negotiatio
is a graspingof the cause
as a middle termand definition.But since a definitionis reached only
by composition and division, it is throughthem that the cause is seen
15PietroPomponazzi,
deregressu
, in: Corsiinediti
,2
Quaestio
dell'insegnamento
padovano
vols.,ed. Antonino
Poppi,Padua 1970,Vol. 1, 153-76;Papuli,233-5,274.
84

20:20:13 PM

under the formality{ratio)of a middle term, fromwhich one can proceed to a strictdemonstrationof the effect.16
Other major logicians of the sixteenthcenturyreacted variously to
Nifo's teachings. Marcantonio Zimara (1475-1537?), the preeminent
Averroistof the time, adjusted his understanding of the regressus
to
of
the
three
demonstration
types
incorporate
recognized by Averroes,
For him, the demonstration
namely, quia, propter
quid, and simpliciter.
plays only an auxiliary role, since only the via
quia of the via resolutiva
is
compositiva strictlyspeaking demonstrative. Yet he identifiesthe
itselfwith demonstrationsimpliciter
, since effectivelyit comregressus
the
of
functions demonstrationsboth quia
bines in a unitaryprocess
and propter
quid. Zimara was also much interestedin methodological
He
sharpened the distinctionbetween mathematics,which
questions.
demonstratesa priori, and physics, which he sees as demonstratinga
even when reasoning propter
quid from causes to effects.He
posteriori
which is concerned with the
also differentiated
between order (orrfo),
of
a
and method ( methodus
and
matter,
exposition
subject
),
teaching
whichis concernedwiththe discoveryof principlesand the demonstration of properties.In the order of teaching the passage is fromthe less
difficultto the more difficult,which correspondsto thatfromthe more
known to the less known; both are instances of going from what is
).
prior with respect to us {prius nobis) to what is posterior {posterius
Then the contrapositionof the priusnobisto the priusnaturae
, moving
fromwhat is prior with respect to us to what is prior in nature, is
preciselythatreflectedin the processes of resolutionand composition.
of Galen, proIn such a contextZimara offersa novel reinterpretation
as well as the
sciences
in
the
resolutiva
that
the
via
speculative
posing
practical disciplines involves him in a twofoldanalysis, one a posteriori
.17
ad prius, the other a prioriad posterius
16Theseteachings
in Nifo'sExpositio
dephysico
auditu
odolibros
are contained
,
super
Venice:OctavianusScotus,1508. The textsare citedin SchoolofPadua, 42-3;
histeaching
Niforevised
, 140-1;cf.Papuli,235-6,275. In a laterrecognitio
Causality
ofthenegotiatio
hisexplanation
on thefourtypesofknowledge,
, and
withdrawing
He further
heldthatthesecondprothattheotherthreetypesaresufficient.
holding
butonlyin
demonstration
in an absolute
cessdoesnotresult
(<demonstratio
simpliciter)
of thecause is not obviousto us
coniecturalis
a demonstratio
, sincethediscovery
wonover
Thusitappearsthathe waseventually
butonlyconjecturally.
absolutely,
Fordetails,see Causality
, 141-3.
byNeritonensis.
MS D 109inf.,
Biblioteca
17Marcantonio
Ambrosiana,
Posteriorumi
Zimara,Inprimum
limitationes
seumemorabilium
fols.17-29(c. 1521),and Theoremata,
, ed.
propositionum
byPapuli,236-8,275.
Naples1523,props.14,61, bothreferenced
85

20:20:13 PM

AnotherAverroist,Tiberio Bacilieri (1461 ?-1511?), devoted himself

to an intensive logical investigationof the concepts involved in the
He had studied under Alessandro Achilliniat Bologna, where
regressus.
Achillini was insistingthat the order of teaching or exposition should
follow the order of nature. Bacilieri noted that the ordo doctrinae
,
according to Galen, involved a threefoldprocedure: resolutive,comas opposed to this,
positive, and definitive. In the ordo inuentionis,
Bacilieri identifieda threefoldprocess, the firstof which is obscurus
,
where the startingpoint is a simple unknown ( ignotumincomplexum)
, where the
grasped in sense experience, the second is difinitivus
unknown is defined, and the thirdscientificus
, where the unknown is
grasped scientifically.The second and thirdsteps combine elementsof
the via resolutivaand the via compositiva.From this type of analysis
Bacilieri goes on to deny any scientificvalidityto the firststep of the
In his view, only the part offeringa demonstrationpropter
regressus.
quid
gives knowledge of the real world; the rest is merely a logical construction.18
Tommaso de Vio Gaetano (1468-1534), like Neritonensis a
Dominican and a Thomist, came to conclusions not very different
fromthose of Bacilieri. He attacked the Averroistposition that there
are three differentspecies of demonstration, quia, propterquid, and
simpliciter,the last of which was also called "most powerful"
(potissima
). Averroes regarded demonstratio
simpliciteras a separate
from
species of demonstration;Gaetano defined this type differently
Averroes and saw it merelyas a subspecies of demonstratio
propter
quid.
The latter,forGaetano, carries the whole burden of the regressus
, not
as
demonstratio
it
had
for
Neritonensis.
The
main problem that
quia,
engaged Gaetano was the convertibilityof the middle termin the two
demonstrationsand precisely how this could be effected.19
The high point of this developing tradition at the University of
Padua was reached in the worksof Girolamo Balduino (fl. 1550), who
began teaching at Padua in 1528 and many of whose teachings
anticipated those of Jacopo Zabarella, to be treated in the following
section. In his various Quaesitaon problemsin logic and natural philosophy, published at Venice in 1563, Balduino summed up the
18TiberioBacilieri,
Lectura
inuniversam
Aristotelis
etAverrois
, ed.
Dyalecticam
facultatem
Pavia 1512;referenced
byPapuli,238-40,275.
19Tommasode Vio Gaetano,In libros
Posteriorum
Aristotelis
additamenta
,
Analyticorum
Ed. Venice1505,fols.7r-24r;referenced
in Papuli,240-1,275.
86

20:20:13 PM

teachings of the Greek commentators,Averroes, and his immediate

predecessorsand contemporaries,analyzing them in great detail and,
on the basis of that analysis, advancing his own positions. His query
An deturregressus
demonstratvus
is obviously of most interestfor our
study. In the editionjust cited the firstpart of this is concerned with
the various species of demonstration,but in a later edition, Venice
Also
1569, that becomes a special query, De speciebusdemonstrations.
relevantto our studyis his query on the relativeimportanceof definition and demonstrationas instrumentsof scientificknowing, Utrumest
.20
nobiliusinstrumentum
an demonstratio
sciendi,definitio
In treating the species of demonstration Balduino rejects the
teachingof Gaetano and defendsinstead the position of Averroes and
Zimara, namely, that there are three species: quia, which proves a
cause fromits effect;propter
quid, which proves only the cause of the
effectbut not the effect'sexistence; and potissima
, which proves both
the cause and the existenceof the effect.Then, in treatingthe relative
superiorityof definitionvis--vis demonstration,Balduino rejects the
teachings of Simplicius, Philoponus, and most of the Latin commentatorsthatdemonstrationis the most important.Instead he again supports the position of Averroes, holding that definitionis superior.
These are indications that Balduino should be situated generally
among the Paduan Averroists.When he comes, therefore,to taking
a position on the regressus
, afterhaving discussed in detail all previous
ancient Greeks (against whom Aristotle
those
of
the
positions
the
later
Greeks
(Philoponus, Alexander Aphrodisias, and
argued),
Themistius), Avicenna, Ugo Benzi, Neritonensis, and various
unnamed contemporaries( moderni
) it is not surprisingthat what he
takes as the true position is identifiedwith that "of Aristotle and
Averroes."21
With regard to the regressus
itself, Balduino defines this s "an
artificialprocess that is scientific,a mutual showing (monstratio
) of the
effectthroughthe cause by the conversionof the middle termwiththe
20We haveusedtheVenice1563editionof Balduino'sQuaesita
,
logicaetnaturalia
Of thenine
ninequerieson logicand twoon naturalphilosophy.
whichcontains
tothisstudyareAndetur
regressus
pertinent
queriesonlogicthethreethataredirectly
and
De medio
fols.216r-225v;
demonstrationis
, fols.226r-235r;
demonstratvus,
potissimae
andemonstratio
Utrum
instrumentum
estnobilius
, fols.235v-237v.
sciendi,
definitio
21Quaesita
is treated
in
ofvariouspositions
, fol.223v.His previous
exposition
aliquot
fols.
and Averroes,
theteachings
ofAristotle
thesecondexplaining
twochapters,
fols.216v-221v.
ofall theothercommentators,
andthefirst
theteachings
221v-223v,
87

20:20:13 PM

major, not in the manner of demonstrationand not seekingthe same

goal."22 By "artificial process" here Balduino means that it uses the
art of logic, not an otiose reasoning of the type "A is because A is"
(equivalent to the modern "if p, then p"); rather it makes use of
demonstrations,both quia and propter
quid. Since both of these are productive of science, and theirend is science, the process is also "scientific." The point of the expression, "a mutual showing of the cause
throughthe effect,and vice versa," is to show how the end of science
is achieved. For, since we principallyintend to know the "why" (i.e,
the propter
quid) of the effect,and this cannot be had except fromits
and
the cause is unknown, it is necessary firstto demonstrate
cause,
the existenceof the cause fromthe existenceof the effect.This requires
the "mutual showing" of the cause firstthroughthe effect,and then
of the effectthrough the cause by the "proper conversion" of the
necessary middle term. In the firstdemonstrationthe middle term
does not "show" in the same way and to the same end as it does in
the second. This Balduino explains as follows: if the effect"shows"
the cause in the firstprocessus
, in the second the cause does not show
the effectto exist, nor are cause and effectsought under the same
aspect, namely, that of existence, forin the second it is the "why" of
the effect'sexistence that is sought. From this, he goes on, it can be
seen that the regressus
is not a circle, for a circle would returnto the
from
which it started.Rather, it moves in the formof a triangle:
point
from the effect's existence to the cause's existence; then from the
cause's existence to the "why" of the effect'sexistence. If the second
step were back to the effect'sexistence, ratherthan to the "why" of
that existence, the argumentwould be circular. In the regressus
clearly
it is not.
The principal end or goal of the regressus,
as Balduino sees it, is to
have perfectand certain science of an effectthroughits proper cause.
This is the procedure Aristotlefollowedin the firstbook of the Physics
in findingthe firstprinciples of natural things and also, as Averroes
points out, in the eighthbook of the Physics
, in showing the existence
of the firstunmoved mover. In both cases the two viae, quia and propter
quid, must be joined togetherto produce the type of perfectknowing
23
that is characteristicof a scientia.
22The Latinreads:' 'Regressus
estprocessus
ad
monstratio
artificialis,
scientificus,
invicemeffectus
cum causa, conversomediocum maiore,non eodemmodo
necad eandemremquaesiti,',Quaesita
demonstrationis,
, fols.223v-224r.
aliquot
23Ibid.,fol.223v-224r;
see also Papuli,242-54,275. For a fullerexposition,
see
88

20:20:13 PM

Zabarellaand theRegressus
AfterBalduino, the next great expositor of scientificmethodology
is Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589), who broughtteachingon the regressus
to its highestpoint of development. Before coming to him, however,
it is desirable to treatbrieflyof threeotherthinkerswho ease the transitionbetween the two. The firstof these is Girolamo Capivacci, who
doctrinarum
at Padua in 1562. In it he made
published his De differentiis
the point that Galen's ideas of ways (viae) that are resolutive, compositive,and definitiveare concerned only with the systematizationof
knowledge already acquired, whereas the principal means for the
acquisition of new scientificknowledge should be divided into the
demonstrative, definitive, divisive, and resolutive. The definitive,
according to Aristotelianteaching, searches forthe genus and specific
differenceso as to approximate as far as possible the essence of the
individual being studied. The divisive then reconstructsthe properties
of the various species to locate where those of the particularindividual
belong. The demonstrativeis then divided into the threetypesof dem, but Capivacci denies that
onstration,quia, propter
quid, and simpliciter
with the resolutive
be
one
of
these
can
identified
any particular
method. Rather the latter includes the entire functioning of the
and is constitutedof two moments: the firstis an ' 'ascending' '
regressus
moment fromthe phenomena to the essential definition,the second a
"descending" moment toward the specificphenomena that are being
demonstratedin the individual.24
The othertwo thinkersare Bernardino Tomitano (151 7?-1576) and
Ludovico Boccaferri (1482-1545), both of whom took up and
is a concatenation of
advanced Balduino' s teaching that the regressus
the
first
with
demonstrationsquia and propter
having an analytic
quid,
functionand the second a synthetic.Tomitano, who held the chair of
: Ricerche
sullalogicadellaScuoladi Padovanel
Balduino
GiovanniPapuli,Girolamo
Rinascimento
, Mandura1967,243-74.ForBalduino,thetwoviaeareno longertwo
oftheconThe manifestation
inconcatenation.
distinct
stagesbutgobackandforth
thatis proper
ofthediscourse
andthearticulation
between
causeandeffect,
nection
Thisbecomesclear
occurinthesamemental
tothehumanwayofknowing,
process.
causeis theworkoftrial
oftheproximate
wherethefinding
inscientific
investigation,
connected
anderror.Yetthequiaandthepropter
elements,
by
quidaretwodistinctive
becomesmoreandmore
theprocess
ofthemiddletermwhichduring
thereciprocity
is no longera simplefactof
In theendtheeffect
defined.
adjustedandmorestrictly
naturalis
mentalis
andtheordo
ofthecause:theordo
buta necessary
nature,
consequence
havethusintertwined.
24Papuli,254-5,275; see alsohisGirolamo
Balduino
, 44-8.
89

20:20:13 PM

logic at Padua foryears and was Zabarella' s teacher,was much preoccupied with the problem of method. For him natural science must use
the regressivemethod of discoveryand demonstrationbased on signs,
that is, fromparticulareffects.He is the firstto identifythe firststage
of the regressus
, demonstrationquia, as an inductive process, the way
of inquiry ( inquisitio
), to be opposed to the second stage, which is
deductive. Without a method of induction,forhim, therewould be no
possibilityof having a natural science.25Boccaferro,who taughtat the
the demonstrative
Universityof Bologna, was at pains to differentiate
from that used in dialectics or
induction employed in the regressus
rhetoric,both of which workon the plane of the contingentand do not
arrive at necessary and universal knowledge. He also worked on the
problem of circularityto explore various ways ofjustifyingthe conversion fromeffectto cause and fromcause to effectin the two types of
demonstration.26
It is withinthis general settingthat Zabarella set about formulating
what was to become the standard version of a logic of discovery and
proof identifiedwith the Paduan Aristotelians.A professorat Padua
from 1564 to 1589, he wrote numerous works on logic, including an
extensivecommentaryon the Posterior
and various treatiseson
Analytics
natural philosophy. His definitionof the regressus
is classical and may
be statedas follows:"It is a kind of reciprocaldemonstrationin which,
afterwe have demonstrated the unknown cause throughthe known
effect,we convert the major proposition and demonstratethe same
effectthrough the same cause, so that we know why the effect
exists."27
For Zabarella logic is practically identified with method, and
science itselfis nothingmore than logical method put to use. For him,
the definitionof method does not differfrom that of the syllogism.
Moreover, all scientificprogress from the known to the unknown is
25In hisAnimadversiones
inprimum
librum
Posteriorum
Resolutoriorum
, Venice1574;
aliquot
see School
Padua
, 48-9;Papuli,254-5,276.
of
26The maintextsarefoundinhisDe
auditu
liber
, Basel1571,
physico
primus
explicatus
fols.13v-14v,
andIn duoslibros
Aristotelis
degeneratione
etcorruptione
commentar
ia, Basel
see Papuli,255-6,276.
1571,fols.93r-113r;
27The Latinreadsas follows:
"... estenimreciprocata
qua
quaedamdemonstratio,
causamignotam
exeffectu
notodemonstravimus,
maiorem
postquam
propositionem
et eundemeffectum
ut sciamus
convertimus,
pereandemcausamdemonstramus,
, 3d ed., Cologne:Sumptibus
quidsit...," De regressuy
Zetzneri,
cap. 1, Opera
logica
whichhasthesamepagination
1608
as theFrankfurt
1597,col. 48IC. Thisedition,
is citedthroughout.
edition,
90

20:20:13 PM

eitherfromcause to effector fromeffectto cause; the formerhe calls

the demonstrativemethod, the latter the resolutive. If we progress
fromone thingto another, neitherof which is the cause of the other,
there cannot be an essential and necessary connection (<connexus
essen
tialis ac necessarius)between them and thus no certain knowledge
results. Although the demonstrativemethod, that of composition, is
most appropriatein mathematics,where causes are more known than
their effects,the resolutive method is characteristicof the natural
sciences, where one must start from effects because causes are
generallyunknown. And since we cannot set out fromthe unknown,
in physics we must employ a kind of secondary procedure, the
resolutivemethod that leads to the discoveryof principles. Hence for
Zabarella the resolutivemethod is subordinate and the servant of the
demonstrative.The end of demonstrativemethod is perfectscience,
knowledge of things through their causes; the end of the resolutive
method is discovery( inventio
) ratherthan science, since by resolution
we seek causes from their effectsthat we may afterwardsknow the
effectsthroughtheir causes, not that we may rest in a knowledge of
the causes themselves.28
Having thus set the stage for his discussion of resolutive method,
Zabarella, pursuing a line of thoughtthat was only implicitin Nifo,
points out that thereare actually two methods of resolution. The one
is demonstrationfromeffects,which is efficaciousforthe discoveryof
thingsthat are obscure and hidden. The other is induction, which is
a much weaker form of resolution and is used for the discovery of
something that is not completely unknown yet needs to be made
clearer. Induction, forZabarella, is most helpfulfor the discovery of
and do not require proof through
principlesthat are known naturaliter
somethingelse. Induction does not prove a thing throughsomething
else; ratherit reveals thatthingthroughitself.For the universal is not
distinguishedfrom the particular in the thing, but only by reason.
And since the thingis betterknown as a particularthan as a universal,
inductionis thus a process fromand to the thingitself.That is, it proceeds fromknowing the thing in the way it is more obvious to us to
knowingit in the way it is more obscure and hidden. On this account,
not only are the principlesof thingsknown by induction, but also the
28Zabarella,
De meihodis
, cols.
, Lib. 1,cap. 2; Lib. 3, capp.3, 17-18,in: Opera
logica
, 144-5,SchoolofPadua, 50-2;
134-138,226-229,264-268;textscitedin Causality
Papuli,256-66.
91

20:20:13 PM

principles of science and of knowing itself, which are said to be

indemonstrable.29
Zabarella' s analysis here outlines an analytic method of discovery
whereby ordinaryexperience is brought to the level of the scientific.
He explains this process more fullyin his De regressu
, where he first
makes the distinctionbetween two types of knowing, one confused
and which he says
(icognitio
confusa
), the otherdistinct( cognitio
distincta),
applies to both knowledge of the effectand knowledge of the cause. A
confusedknowledgeof somethingis an awareness of its existence(esse)
without knowing what it is (quid sit), whereas a distinctknowledge
grasps not only the existence but also the nature of the thing. With
regard to particulars, Zabarella furthermakes the point that it is not
necessary that every fact or particular be recorded, since a general
principle can be gotten inductively by a careful examination of
selected instances or illustrations. This procedure, what he calls
demonstrative induction (inductiodemonstrativa)
is only effectivein a
matter
wherein
have
essential connections
necessary subject
things
with each other. Aftera certainnumber of these have been examined,
the mind straightaway notices the essential connection, and then,
disregardingthe remainingparticulars,it proceeds at once to bringall
the particulars togetherin the universal.30
In connection with this inductive process one might wonder
whetherZabarella knew of Nifo's discussion of the work or negotiatio
of the intellectit requires. In facthe did. Afterthe effect-to-cause
stage
of the regressus
has been completed, he writes, before returningfrom
the cause to the effecttheremust intervenea thirdintermediatework
(labor) by which the mind passes fromknowing the cause confusedly
- Nifo is here
Some thinkers
(confuse)to graspingit distinctly(distincte).
of the intellect. Zabarella himself
implied call this stage a negotiatio
thinksof it as a mental examination (examenmentale)or a mental consideration(mentalis
of the cause itself:afterhittingupon the
consideratio)
cause, this considerationleads one to understandwhat it is (quidsit).31
From thisZabarella goes on to explain the nature of thisexamenmentale. He indicates that there are two things that help one to know a
cause distinctly. One is the knowledge that it is (quod est), which
29De methodisy
Lib. 3, cap. 19, Operalogica
, cols. 268-271;School
, 53-4;
ofPadua
Causality
, 145-6.
30De regressu
, cap. 4, Opera
ofPadua,56.
, cols.484-485;Causality
, 146-7;School
logica
31De regressu
, cap. 5, Opera
, cols.486-487;Causality
, 147;School
, 57-8.
logica
ofPadua
92

20:20:13 PM

obviously prepares forthe discoveryof what it is (quid sit). The other

help, which is a necessaryadjunct to the first,is the comparisonof the
cause discovered with the effectthroughwhich it was discovered. At
the outset this is not with fullknowledge that one is the cause and the
other the effect,but simply a comparison of the one with the other.
From this examination it comes about that the investigatorgradually
) of each; moreover,
gains a knowledge of the conditions ( conditiones
when the firstof the conditions has been discovered this helps to the
discoveryof another,until finallythe cause comes to be recognized as
providing the unique explanation of the particular effect.32
, Zabarella provides no
Despite this detailed analysis of the regressus
strikingexamples of how it has been, or can be, used in scientific
discovery.He does give two illustrationsof the ways Aristotleused the
method in his Physics
, essentiallythe same as proposed by Balduino,
though worked out in more detail. The firstis how Aristotle used
substantial change to come to the existence of a protomatter( materia
prima),and then regressesback fromthis to explain how mutationsor
occur in the order of nature. The otheris how he anatransformations
lyzed series of movers and moveds to come to the existenceof an eterand then regressesback fromthis
nal firstmover (primusmotor
aeternus),
to explain all motion in the universe.33UnfortunatelyZabarella does
not examine examples drawn from the mixed sciences, though he
offersan excellentanalysis of the lunar eclipse in his De mediodemonstrationistLib. 1, capp. 10-13. Also, in his commentaryon the firstbook
of the Posterior
, cap. 12, he explicidyidentifiesthe way AristoAnalytics
when explaining phases of the moon and the
tle uses the regressus
twinklingof planets. We shall returnto this example when explaining
in his astronomical discoveries.
Galileo's use of the regressus
Galileoand His New Science
One might thinkthat Galileo became acquainted with Zabarella' s
when he himselfbegan teachingat the Univerteachingon the regressus
has been the general supposition of those
This
in
1592.
Padua
of
sity
Galileo's mentions of resolution and
connected
have
who
previously
As a matterof factGalileo
Aristotelians.
compositionwiththe Paduan
32De regres
, 58.
, 147-8;School
ofPadua
, col. 487; Causality
su,cap. 5, Operalogica
33The protomatter
in De regressu
, capp.4-0,theprimemover
exampleis explained
, cols.484-492.
, cap. 6: Opera
logica
examplein De regressu
93

20:20:13 PM

at Pisa and actually used it there in his

already knew of the regressus
of
he learned of the method has been fully
studies
motion.
How
early
in
the
recent literatureand need not be repeated here in
discussed
detail.34Galileo probably came upon it quite accidentally in 1587 or
1588 through a contact with Christopher Glavius, the foremost
mathematician at the Jesuit university in Rome, the Collegio
Romano. Clavius had read one of Galileo's first compositions,
on theCenterof Gravity
Theorems
ofSolids, and called Galileo's attention
to what he perceived as a petitioprincipiiin its main proof. To brush
up on his logic, throughClavius's good graces Galileo obtained a copy
of the lectures then being given at the Collegio on Aristotle's Organon
by Paolo Delia Vaille. From these he appropriated, in his own hand,
two treatises on the PosteriorAnalytics
, one on the foreknowledge
for
demonstration
the
and
other
on demonstrationitself.The
required
last question of the latter treatisecontains Galileo's exposition of the
demonstrativeregress.
Della Valle' s explanation of the regress follows closely that of
Zabarella in his De regressu
, though there are a few changes of expression in it that are reflectedin Galileo's version. The main difference
is that where Zabarella distinguishesbetween knowing a thing first
confusedly {confuse)and then distinctly(<distincte
), Galileo speaks of
it
first
materialiter
and
then
knowing
materially(
formally(formaliter).
)
The alternateterminologiescan be explained simplyenough in terms
of an intermediateappropriation of Zabarella' s teaching by another
Jesuit, Giovanni Lorini, who taught the logic course at the Collegio
beforeDella Valle. By tracingsuccessive changes fromLorini to Delia
34The beginnings
of thisresearch
are reported
in myPrelude
toGalileo
: Essayson
Medieval
andSixteenth-Century
Sources
1981.The
, Dordrecht-Boston
ofGalileo's
Thought
basiclinesofa solution
aresketched
in myGalileo
andHis Sources:
TheHeritage
ofthe
Romano
inGalileo's
Science
1984.Additional
in
detailsareprovided
, Princeton
Collegio
Sources:
orPrinted
in:G.B. TysonandS. Wagonheim
Works?,
myGalileo's
Manuscripts
in theRenaissance:
in Europe
,
(eds), PrintandCulture
Essayson theAdvent
ofPrinting
Del. 1986,45-54,andmyGalileo,
the
Medieval
in:ColNewark,
, andthe
Aristotle,
Jesuits
lectedStudiesSeriesCS 346, Hampshire
(UK) 1991.The LatintextofGalileo's
then
was published
in 1988(note2 above);myEnglishtranslation
logicaltreatise
A Translation
's LogicalTreatises:
andCommentary
Notes
, with
, ofHis
appearedas Galileo
LatinQuestions
onAristotle's
Posterior
Dordrecht-Boston-London
Appropriated
Analytics,
and Proof:The
1992. This was accompanied
by my Galileo'sLogicof Discovery
and Use of His Appropriated
Treatises
on Aristotle's
Posterior
Content,
Background,
howGalileomadeuseof
Dordrecht-Boston-London
1992,whichexplains
Analytics,
thedemonstrative
in hisscientific
willbe found
work.Additional
reflections
regressus
in myDialectics,
andMathematics
in Galileo
in a volumeon
, forthcoming
Experiments,
Controversies
, eds. MarcelloPeraand PeterMachamer.
Scientific
94

20:20:13 PM

Valle to Galileo one can ascertain the intendedequivalence of the two

sets of terms.35
As Galileo presentsthe teaching it involvestwo demonstrations,one
quid. He refersto these demonstrationsas
quia and the otherpropter
) and notes that they are separated by an
progressions (progressions
intermediatestage. The firstprogressionargues fromeffectto cause
and the second reversesthe direction,regressingfromcause to effect.
For the process to work, the demonstrationquia must come first,and
the effectmust be better known than the cause, which initiallyis
'
4
grasped only materially,' though later the effectand the cause are
seen to be convertible.Then, ' 'having made the firstprogression,"
Galileo continues, "we do not begin the second progression
) the
immediately,but wait until we come to know formally{formaliter
cause we firstknew only materially ( materialiter
)."36 Following this
called
the
intermediate
what
we
have
or
stage, the
waiting period
'
second progressionstarts:in it the cause, having been grasped 'for'
mally' or preciselyas it is the cause, and indeed the unique cause in
view of the convertibilitycondition, is shown to be necessarily connected with the effect.Only at this stage is knowledge that is strictly
scientificattained, forthenone knows thepropter
quid,the proper cause
of the effectthat is being investigated.
This is the logicadocensfound in Galileo's appropriated treatise on
demonstration.The waitingperiod he insertsas an intermediatestage
between the two progressions seemingly corresponds to Nifo's
and to Zabarella's examenmentale.But in the logica
intellectus
negotiatio
to work in his scienutensGalileo developed when he put the regressus
tific investigations, this intermediate stage expands far beyond
anythingpreviouslyexplained by Nifo or Zabarella.37 It involves not
only time but also work, fortestingwhere experimentationis needed
and forcomputationwhen mathematicsis involved. Predictably,most
were in the "mixed sciences," either
of Galileo's uses of the regressus
in mechanics or in astronomy.In the firstexperimentationwas dominant, in the second, computation. On both counts, then, those of
experiment and mathematics, the Paduan regress turned out to be
35A detailedanalysis
is givenin myRandallRedivivus
(note1), 142-5.
36Galileo's
, 183; Latinedition,112.
LogicalTreatises
37ForGalileo'sunderstanding
utens
andlogica
docens
between
ofthedifference
,
logica
the
on thisis essentially
andProof,
seemyGalileo's
21-6;histeaching
LogicofDiscovery
viewson thesubjectare
sameas Zabarella's,as notedthereon p. 24. Balduinus's
Balduno
, 89-101.
similar;see Papuli,Girolamo
95

20:20:13 PM

open to innovation on precisely the points Galileo could exploit. In

many cases he signalled its use by a reference,sometimesimplicit,to
resolution and composition.38Only once does Galileo mention the
"demonstrativeprogression," and thisin his 1612 analysis of floating
bodies.39 But he gives a very good descriptionof it in his firstattempt
to formulatea proof forthe earth's motion fromthe tides in 1616. In
concludinghis proposed proofGalileo explains to Cardinal Orsini how
well he has been able to harmonize the earth's motion and the tides,
"taking the formeras the cause of the latter,and the latteras a sign
of and an argument for the former,"40which is preciselywhat one
does in the regressus.
Full details of how Galileo actually used the demonstrativeregress,
sometimes unsuccessfully,aire given in Galileo'sLogic ofDiscovery
and
41
of
his
most
are
that
dramatic
those
Proof. By way illustration,
proofs
followedthe simple patternproposed by Aristotlein Posterior
Analytics
1,13 and mentioned at the outset of this study. These are his
arguments for the existence of mountains on the moon, for the
presence of four satellitesorbitingJupiter,and forVenus's phases as
proof of its motion around the sun. All start from some new
phenomenon detected throughthe use of a small telescope. From this
all regressto a hithertounknown cause. In the intermediatestage, all
use principlesof projective geometryto show the convertibilityof this
cause with the phenomenon recognized as an effect.Finally, all conclude apodictically for anyone who can verifythe data and comprehend the mathematics involved.42
38Papulirefers
to mostofthesein hisLa teoria
delregressus,
268-72.
39GalileoGalilei,Le
di GalileoGalilei,ed. AntonioFavaro,20 vols,in 21,
opere
Florence:G. BarbraEditore,1890-1909,
rpt.1968,Vol. 4, p. 67. Henceforth
reference
as GG, as in GG4:67.
40GG5:293.The regress
involved
is analyzedin detailin Galileo's
LogicofDiscovery
andProof
, 212-6.
41The mainastronomical
arethoseforthemoon'sphasesandaspects,
arguments
p.
on themoon,p. 199;thesatellites
ofJupiter,
195;themountains
p. 202;thephases
ofVenus,p. 205;thetidalargument
of1616,p. 214;andthetidalargument
of1632,
arethosefordetermining
p. 229. The mainmechanical
arguments
speedsoffallin
variousmedia,p. 242;thedependence
ofspeedoffallon specific
weight,
p. 248;the
variation
ofspeedsindifferent
oninclined
media,p. 250;theratiosofmotions
planes,
ofspeedin falling
p. 253;theincrease
motion,
p. 256;thetruecauseofflotation,
p.
accelerated
motion
in freefall,p. 271;thetruecauseofcohesion,
271;uniformly
p.
ofa beam,p. 283;andthesemi-parabolic
motion
ofpro281; thebreaking
strength
jectiles,p. 292.
42Withregard
totheuseofmathematical
intheregressus
, inan essaypublished
proofs
in 1983EnricoBertiseemedtoregard
their
useas leadingonlytoa dialectical
conclu96

20:20:13 PM

The illustrationsof the demonstrativeregressprovided in Galileo's

writingsare undoubtedlysuperiorto those adduced by Balduinus and
Zabarella. It is not easy in the present day to give assent to materia
primaor to the primusmotoraeternus.By the same token it is very difficultnow to deny thattherearemountains on the moon, thatsatellites
do orbit Jupiter, and that Venus is in orbit around the sun. Our
knowledge of these hithertounknown facts shows in a strikingway
that the regressus
works, and Galileo deserves great creditforteaching
us how it can.
College Park, Maryland
The University
ofMaryland
*deimatematici
a la 'resolutio
risolutivo
aristotelici
trail metodo
sion.See hisDifferenza
,
degli
in hisLa teoria
moderna
veneto
e scienza
in:Aristotelismo
, Vol. 1, 453-7.Morerecently,
andC.
di Galileo
omonima
nella'tractatio'
delladimostrazione
aristotelica
, in: M. Ciliberto
Garin
e cultura,
Vasoli(eds),Filosofia
, Rome1991,327-50,Bertihasrevised
perEugenio
dedemonstration
workonGalileo'sTractatio
thisopinion.Havingreviewed
myrecent
toGalileo's
withregard
areindeedapodictic.
thattheseproofs
heconcedes
Moreover,
oflogic,hehasbeena peripatetic
Licetiin 1640that,inmatters
toFortnio
statement
thatthiswas
all his life,Bertiremarks
that,likemanyothers,he once thought
thetruth.
to believethatGalileowas telling
butnowhe is inclined
dissimulation,

97

20:20:13 PM

Saccheria Postulate

IGNACIO ANGELELLI

0. Introduction1
Three jewels have been contributedto logical theoryby Saccheri in
the LogicaDemonstrativa:2
his postulate stipulatingthe existenceof various typesof predicates, his proposed "nobler" method forachieving,
withoutthe postulate, the same results as obtained withthe postulate,
mirabilisin at least
and, as a bonus, a brilliantuse of the consequentia
some of the applications of the nobler method.
It took almost two centuriesforthe scholarlyworld to discover the
thirdof these gems,3and thereis by now a certainliteratureon it. The
other themes have been neglected, perhaps overshadowed by the
"admirable consequence", although they alone would suffice to
secure forour author an outstandingplace in logic. The presentpaper
is intended to correct this situation by focussingon the postulate.
The postulate as statedby Saccheri is examined in section 1. The
postulate as usedby Saccheri is examined in section 2 . In section 3 I
describe the significanceof the postulate not only relativeto Saccheri' s
Aristotelianlogic but also relative to our modern logic. In section 4 I
propose a definitionof Saccheri's "nobler way" (i.e. postulate-free
logic) in termsof a restrictionto "internal" interpretationsin the use
1 The research
in thispaperwaspartly
involved
doneundera FRA grantfrom
the
ResearchInstitute
ofThe University
ofTexasat Austin,1990-1991.
University
2 As scholars
seemtounanimously
Girolamo
Saccheri(orHieronymus
Sacreport,
wasbornin San Remo,Italy,1667anddiedin Milano,1733.He entered
cherius)
theSociety
ofJesusin Milano,1685;afterordination
in 1694,hetaught
philosophy
and theology
in Turin,and mathematics
in Pavia. One littleembarassing
textual
issueis thatthe1697edition
theonlyonereally
(reprinted
byOlms,andconsequently
availabletoday)doesnotshowSaccheri'
s nameanywhere.
3 It is veryrevealing
thata rather
extensive
in Turin
published
logicalbibliography
Saccheri'
s death,i.e. veryclosetohimbothchrono(cf.Pavesio),a fewdecadesafter
and geographically,
doesnotevenhintat theLogicaDemonstrativa
or at its
logically
author.
98
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 1

20:20:23 PM

of the ' 'method of interpretations". Finally, in section 5 I introduce

that
thephrase via nobilissima
(not in our author) to referto a via nobilior
is even more "admirable."
1. The LiteralPostulate
is an expresThe followingterminologyis standard. Term(terminus)
sion that can be subject or predicate of a sentence (in the traditional,
pre-Fregeansense of "subject" and "predicate"). Examples: i) Petrus
esthomo(Peter is (a) man), where termsare "Petrus", "homo" ("est"
is not a term); ii) homoestanimal (man is a living being), where the
terms are "homo" and "animal" (here we notice the difference
between pre-Fregean and Fregean predication: for Frege homois not
subject of the predicate animal but is a predicate "subordinated" to
animal). Terms are singular(singularis:"Peter") or common{communis:
"homo", "animal").
Less known today is the following distinction of four relations
between two terms: 1) irrelevance,2) relevance by repugnance, 3) relevance by mutual consequence, 4) relevance by non-mutual conseif neither
quence. Two common terms are irrelevant {impertinentes)
term infersor excludes the other (white, warm); relevant {pertinentes
)
) ifone excludes the other(white, black); by
by repugnance ( repugnantia
mutual consequence {sequela mutua) if both terms imply each other
(animal, sensitive); by non-mutual implication {sequelanon mutua)if
one implies the other but not viceversa (animal, man). In the nonmutual implication, the implying term is called inferior
(man), the
is
called
term
superior(animad).
implied
Saccheri stateshis postulate as follows: "It is postulated that not all
termsare relevantby mutual consequence, or by repugnance, but that
some are superior terms and some inferior,and some irrelevant"
mutuasequela,aut repugnantia
essepertinentes
nonomnesterminos
,
{Postulatur
et
sedquosdamesseterminos
,
yquosdametiamimpertinentes
, inferiores
superiores
Logica, I, ch. 4).
Strictly,the postulate is neither true nor false ("let there be such
and such terms..."); its propositional content ("there are such and
such terms...") is true or false. In talking about the postulate this
distinctionshould be kept in mind, although forbrevityit can be often
ignored.
The postulate makes fourclaims: 1) not all couples of terms are in
the relationof relevance by mutual consequence, 2) not all couples of
99

20:20:23 PM

termsare in the relation of relevance by repugnance, 3) some couples

of termsare in the relation of relevance by non-mutual consequence,
4) some couples of terms are in the relation of irrelevance.
It seems reasonable to read claims (1) and (2) as saying that, of
course thereare termsthat are mutuallyrepugnantand termsthatare
relevantby mutual consequence, but also thatthereare termsthat are
not mutuallyrepugnant and that thereare termsthat are not relevant
by mutual consequence.
Thus, the postulate says that there is at least one couple instantiating each of the four relations.
For the satisfactionof the postulate at least fourdifferent
predicates
are needed (for instance, Tj relevant by repugnance to T2, Tj
inferiorof T3, T3 irrelevant to T2, Tj relevant by mutual consequence to T4), or three if we contentourselves with the relevance by
mutual consequence of any term to itself.
After stating the postulate, Saccheri makes the following very
importantremark: "That thisis true is clear; however, since it cannot
be proved, at least in logic, it must be postulated in order thatwe may
constat
; quia tarnen
proceed scientifically." ( Hoc verumessemanifeste
probari nonpotest
.
, saltema logica, debetpostulan ut scienti/ice
procedamos)
Saccheri affirms that the non-emptiness of the four relations
between termscannot be established by logic, and this is forhim the
reason why it must be postulated.
2. The Postulateas Used
In this section I will examine Saccheria use of the postulate in the
proofsof several propositionsthat occur between the statementof the
postulate and chapter 11 (of the firstpart of the Logica).
1) Chapter 4, Proposition 3: "Two contrarypropositionscannot be
at the same time true, but can be at the same time false" . For the
proofof the second part of thispropositionSaccheri uses the postulate.
He writes:
LetA andE be twocontrary
oneofwhich,sayA, is thenegation
propositions,
ofC, whereas
theother,
"C&F'' Theywillbecontraries,
becauseone
E, affirms
ofthemnamelyE, saysmorethanis neededto falsify
theother,A. [...]. Ifit
A andE willbe false.
happensthatC is trueandF is false,thetwopropositions
F beingat thesametime
[...] IfitcannothappenthatC be [quodC /]without
simul
sitF'> theterms
C andF willbe relevant
buttheterms
[quin
byimplication;
C and F represent
terms;henceall termswillbe relevant
any arbitrary
by
whichis absurd,and againstthepostulate.
Henceit can happen
implication,
thatC be [quodsitC], whileat thesametimeF be not[etsimulnonsitF'.
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The lettersA and E obviously referto the classical universal affirmative and the universal negative categorical sentences respectively.
The modern reader may be confusedby the use of the variables C and
F: theyseem to range both over sentences and terms. Sententially,C
may be thoughtof as the particularnegative O, and F as the negation
of I. In fact, E implies not only O but also the negation of I, i.e. F,
while A implies the negation of O, that is C.
In order to show thatA and E can be both false it is enough to suppose that C is true while F is false, or according to our reading, that
both0 and I are true.
If it was not possible to have both C true and F false, i.e. notboth
0 and I true
, then O would imply not-I, that is O would imply E. E
however is convertible,and the converse of E implies (by subalternation) the converse of our initial O. Thus, if A and E cannot be both
But the convertibilityof O entails the converfalse, 0 is convertible.
which
makes
all termspertinentes
of
sequela, relevantby consetibility A,
quence, and indeed by mutualconsequence. Saccheri does not add this
last point perhaps because he realized it was redundant; in fact,iffor
every t and , t and are relevant by consequence, then for every
t and , t and are relevant by mutual consequence.
2) Chapter 7, Proposition3: "The universal affirmativeis convertible in part (per accidens), not simply." Here the postulate is used by
Saccheri forthe second part: "all B are A" does not imply "all A are
B" since there
are terms tj and t2 such that the interpretationof B as
ti, of A as t2 verifies"all B are A" and falsifies"all A are B".
3) Chapter 9, Proposition3: "No termcan be posited in the conclu'
sion which was not posited in the premisses.'
The point of this propositionis not to show that implication claims
such as: {SpM, MaP} imp StX, where p, a, and t are any of the
a, e, i, o relations of the four categorical sentences, are not valid
syllogisms(they are not even syllogismsfrom a syntacticalpoint of
Saccheri proves
view) but simplyto show thattheyare notimplications.
his propositionas follows:
Forifan affirmative
conclusion
is sought,
thenewlyassumedtermmaybe relewithrespect
vantbyrepugnance
totheothertermoftheconclusion.
If,on the
thenewlyassumedtermmaybe
conclusion
is sought,
otherhand,a negative
relevant
withrespect
totheothertermoftheconclusion
byconsequence,
(sienim
denovo
velis
conclusionem
terminus
esse
poterit
ajfirmativam,
assumptus
pertinens
repugnanterminm
velis
tiarelate
adreliquum
conclusionis.
Si autem
conclusionem
negativam,
poterit
relate
essepertinens
ad aliumterminm
terminus
denovo
assumptus
sequela
conclusionis).
This shows that what Saccheri has in mind goes beyondthe strict,
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20:20:23 PM

literal formulationof the postulate in chapter 4. Here Saccheri is

termt thereis a such thatt and are relevant
assuming thatforevery
by repugnance, and there is a term t" such that t and t" are relevant
by consequence.
4) Chapter 9, Proposition 4: "From premissesincludingfourterms
no conclusion follows."
Here, as in the preceding proposition, Saccheri' s purpose is certainly not to show that sets like {SpP, XaM} are not conclusive
syllogisticpremisses (they are not even syllogisticpremisses) but to
show that fromthem no conclusion of the formYxZ can be derived.
Saccheri restrictshimselfto the case where the two termsof the conclusion are in the premisses, and, moreover, each term occurs in a differentpremiss:
with
Ifhowever,
be compared
intheconclusion,
onetermoftheminorpremiss
Ifan affirofthemajorpremiss,
weproceedas follows.
either
oneoftheterms
mativeconclusion
is sought,
either
termoftheminorpremiss
maybe relevant
ifa negative
conwithrespect
toeither
termofthemajorpremiss;
byrepugnance
thenconversely
termoftheminorpremiss
clusionis sought,
either
maybe relewithrespect
toeithertermofthemajorpremiss
vantbyconsequence
(si autem
exterminis
maioris
inconclusione
unus
minoris
cumalterutro
terminus
praemissae
comparetur
terminus
itaproceditur.
Si enim
velis
conclusionem
praemissae,
ajjirmativam,
potent
uterque
si velis
minoris
essepertinens
relate
adutrunque
maioris
praemissae
praemissae;
repugnantia
relate
econverso
terminus
minoris
esse
sequela
poterit
uterque
praemissae
pertinens
negativam,
ad utrunque
maioris
praemissae.)
If t is a or i: interpretS into a term relevant by repugnance with
respect to the terms assigned by our interpretationto X and to M;
interpretP into a term relevant by repugnance with respect to the
termsassigned by our interpretationto X and M; thus SeX, PeX and
PeM are all true, and our candidate for conclusion is false.
If t is e or o : same interpretationwith "by consequence" instead
of "by repugnance".
Here we see the application of an evenstronger
of the
understanding
:
each
term
t
there
are
for
two
terms

t"
such
t is
and
that
postulate
relevant by repugnance with respect to each of them, and there are
also two terms and t" such that t is relevant by consequence with
respect to each of them.
3. The SpiritofSaccheri3
s Postulate
The discoverythat the letter
of the postulate, the literalpostulate, is
not definitivenaturally leads one to wonder what is the spirit
, or
of
the
significance,
postulate not only relative to Saccheri' s
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20:20:23 PM

Aristotelianlogic but also to the more complex modern logical theory.

It has been always customary among logicians to refute certain
logical properties(such as logical implication, and logical truth)or to
establish others (such as logical consistency) by means of suitable
or models, of the variables involved. I will referto this
interpretations,
as
the
method
of interpretations.
procedure
Aristotle,forinstance, shows that the particular negative "A does
the implication
not belong to some B" is not convertible,i.e. refutes
from"A does not belong to some B" to "B does not belong to some
A", by interpretingthe variable A into "man" and B into "living
being" {Prior Analytics/, 2). It is well known that the non-valid
syllogisticimplicationsare rejected by the fatherof logic in the same

way.
In modern logic the method of interpretationsis more diversified.
On the one hand, there are not only variables for general terms or
predicates, as in the Aristotelian syllogistic,but also for singular
terms,forsentences,etc. On the otherhand, while in Aristotleinterpretationsare mainly used to disprove logical implication, in modern
logic theyare equally employed to disprove logical truthas well as to
prove logical consistency.
The use of the method of interpretationspresupposes, of course, the
availability of the chosen expressions (and their corresponding
denoted entities)in each case, or at any rate the possibilitythat such
expressionsoccur in language. This possibility ifnotsecured
bylogicshould be postulated: such is, in my view, the general significance,the
spirit,of Saccheri's postulate, applicable to modern as well as to traditional logic. Modern Fregean logic was motivated by the need of
making explicit the logical rules and laws taken for granted by
Euclid- Saccheri's postulate tells us to move one step furtherin the
same direction.
One point remains undecided: are thereinterpretationswhose
availability is secured by logic, and that thereforedo not have to be
postulated?
The reader of theLogica, beforereachingchapter 11 of the firstpart,
is likelyto favora negative answer. But in chapter 11 (cf. our next section), Saccheri shows, withoutsayingit, that the answer is affirmative.
Beforetakingup this issue, a few furtherremarkson the postulate are
in order.
A) First, with the understanding of the postulate as concerning
every interpretationpossibly used by the method of interpretations
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20:20:23 PM

but not guaranteed by pure logic- and not just those listed by the
literal postulate, Saccheri' s project becomes transparent.We do not
have to worry any more about whether the postulate posits the
existence, for each given term t, of one, or ratherof two or perhaps
of even a greater number of terms with which t stands in one, two,
three or all of the four relations in question. All these complications
are unnecessary, and miss the point.
Now the search foruses of the postulate in the Logica Demonstrativa
becomes a trivialmatter:the postulate is used any time the method of
interpretationsis used, and Saccheri need not state explicitlyin each
case an ad hocpostulate.
Without aiming at completeness, we may add the followingto the
four applications of the postulate mentioned in section 2:
5) Chapter 9, Proposition 5: "In the firstfigurethe major cannot
be particular; the minor cannot be negative; nor can a particular
negative become a premiss".
6) Chapter 9, Proposition 6: "In the second figure the major
[premiss] cannot be particular, nor can both premisses agree in
quality."
7) Chapter 9, Proposition 7: "In the thirdfigurethe minor cannot
be negative" .
8) Chapter 9, Proposition 8: "In the fourth figure a particular
negative cannot be a premiss."
9) Chapter 9, Proposition 9: "From purely negative premisses
nothing follows."
10) Chapter 9, Proposition 10: "From purely particularpremisses
nothing follows."
The ten examples of the postulate's application in the Logica concern proofs of non-implication,except the first(ch. 4, prop. 3: "two
contrary propositions can be at the same time false") where the
satisfiabilityof {O, I}, or the falsifiabilityof {A, E} are established.
Once we have seen the connection between the postulate and the
method of interpretationsit is not surprisingto findthe postulate used
not only to refuteimplications but also to prove satisfiability(or
falsifiability):whereverone interpretationis enough to establish or to
refutea logical propertythe method of interpretationscan be correctly
employed, and, ifthe existenceof the interpretationcannot be secured
by logic alone, the postulate is activated. I have not found in Saccheri
applications of the method of interpretationsto refutelogical truths.
B) As a second remark, once we consider the spiritof the postulate
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20:20:23 PM

instead of its narrow literal formulation, the pseudo-problem of

whetherthe postulate applies to negative rather than to affirmative
propositions apparently suggested by Saccheria text vanishes. In
11
we
read:
chapter
fromthesixthchapter
The negative
up to thispoint)
propositions
(beginning
havenotbeenestablished
without
thehelpofa postulate;
fore.g. thatinthefirst
has
theminor
orthatitcannotbe negative,
shouldbe affirmative,
premiss
figure
ofthesubject,
beendemonstrated
byus fromthefactthat,fromthenegation
The fact
tothepredicate.
thereis no inference
evenofa universal
proposition,
thereis no
evenofa universal
thenegation
ofthesubject,
thatfrom
proposition
to thepredicate
has beenestablished
inference
by thisfact:that,otherwise,
andhencethere
totheantecedent;
inference
wouldbe validfrom
theconsequent
terms
wouldbemutually
andsuperior
butallrelevant
wouldbenoinferior
term,
to the
whichis contrary
or relevantby mutualconsequence,
convertible,
in short,thewholeargument
is basedon theaforesaid
Wherefore,
postulate.
ofallnegative
similar
occursinthedemonstration
proposipostulate.
Something
tions.But,intruth,
affirmative
e.g.,all themoodshavinga major
propositions
neededno
inthefirst
anda minoraffirmative
conclude
universal
figure,
rightly
four
in chapter
demonstrated
postulate.
[...] I noteonlythatthepropositions
thispostulate
wereaffirmative,
whichrequire
mayboth
e.g. thattwocontraries
arenegative.
thesepropositions
be false.In theotherchapters,
however,
The firstpart (till
suggests that only negative propositions
may require help fromthe postulate. This is correctedby the second
part. Still, Saccheri fails to explain the nature of the linkage between
negative or affirmativepropositionsand the postulate, and why some
propositionsdepending on the postulate are negative while others are
affirmative.
All thisbecomes perfectlyclear once the proposed understandingof
the postulate is adopted, namely that to use the postulate is the same
as to explicitlyrecognize the possibilityof the method of interpretations. In fact, statementsof falsifiabilityor satisfiability(such as the
thirdpropositionof chapter 4) are, or, at any rate tend to be, of affirmative form,whereas statementsof non-implicationwill normallybe
of negative form.
Saccheri refers
In the second part of the quoted text(after
in the plural to affirmativepropositionsin chapter fourthathave been
proved by the postulate. In our list of Saccheri' s uses thereis only one
example fromchapterfour,namely item (1), i.e. proposition3; to this
the second part of the proposition4 of the same chapter("two subcontraries can be true at the same time") should be added, since it is
proved on the basis of proposition 3, and thus depends on the
postulate.
105

20:20:23 PM

ofSaccheria postulate all

C) Thirdly,with regard to the originality
I can say is the following. As mentioned in my (1975), a similar
postulate occurs in Leibniz, and may have occurred in other
mathematicallyoriented postmedieval authorswho were related to
Euclid. Aside from this, however, the postulateseems original with
scholastictradirespectto what may be roughlycalled theAristoteliantion, and it may turn out to be original even withrespect to logical
theoryafterSaccheri, throughto today.
D) Finally, Saccheri's view is not to be confusedwithsuch critiques
as Ross's complaintthatAristotle'srefutation
ofinvalidforms,involving empirical elements("horse", "stone"...), in the end is not really
satisfactory:
Butin histreatment
doesnotpointoutthe
oftheinvalidmoodshe [Aristotle]
from
formalerrorinvolvedin drawinga conclusion,
e.g. thatof reasoning
aboutpartofa classtoa conclusion
aboutthewhole.He reliesinstead
knowledge
on empirical
to showthat,majorand
knowledge
(or supposedknowledge)
middletermbeingrelatedin a certain
andminortermbeing
way,andmiddle
relatedin a certain
themajoris infacttrueoftheminorand
way,sometimes
sometimes
itis not.He thusshowsthatcertain
cannotwarrant
ofpremiss
forms
a conclusion,
buthe doesnotshowwhytheycannot
do so (1949,p. 33).
More interestingand intriguingis the comparisonof Saccheri with
Lukasiewicz. The latter writes in a way verysimilar to Saccheri:
Aristotle
as 'man', 'animal',
terms,
rejectssomeforms
by meansofconcrete
'stone'.Thisprocedure
andproposiintologicterms
is correct,
butitintroduces
tionsnotgermane
andthepropotoit.'Man' and'animal'arenotlogicalterms,
sition'Allmenareanimals'is nota logicalthesis.
Logiccannotdependonconcretetermsand statements
(1957p. 72).
The sentence: "This procedure is correct,but it introduces into
logic terms and propositions not germane to it" is particularly
reminiscentof Saccheri's remark followingthe postulate (cf. above,
section 1). There are two differencesthough; the firstwill be stated
here, the second will be presented at the end of section 4.
It is notjust the empirical flavorof horses,swans, humans or stones
that disturbsSaccheri; the issue is forhim a deeper one. For instance,
to take Aristotle'srefutationof the convertibility
of O, Saccheri is not
troubled by the concrete predicates 'man', 'animal' as such but
aretwopredicates
primarilyby the general, abstractassumptionthatthere
" and
relatedto eachotheras " inferior
"superior".
"
4. The NoblerWay: Restriction
to " Internal
Interpretations
It is obvious that Saccheri does not like the use of interpretations
extraneous to logic, even afterthese interpretations
have been blessed
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20:20:23 PM

by the officialstatementof the postulate. In fact,he is very happy to

announce, at the beginningof chapter 11 of the firstpart of the Logica,
the discovery of a way of doing logic withouthavingto state the
the nobler way. Let us examine
postulate. This he calls the via nobilior,
one of the examples of such a nobler procedure.
In the second propositionof chapter 11 Saccheri proves, withoutthe
postulate, the proposition 6 proved in chapter 9 with the postulate.
The propositionsays: "In the second figurethe premissescannot have
the same quality." The proof goes as follows.
First, we have the obvious observation that if a syllogism with
premisses agreeing in quality were conclusive in the second figure,
thenthe premissesAA or EE would be conclusive in the second figure
AA is conclusive, if EO is
(for instance, if AI is conclusive, a fortiori
EE is conclusive, since A implies I and E implies
conclusive, a fortiori
O in Aristotelianlogic).
The case EE is regarded as already dismissed by a previous
postulate-freeresult, so that only the possible conclusions of II-AA
("H" referringto second figure)are to be considered. Let us state the
two premisses of II-AA as follows: "All B are A, all C are A".
Let us recall that in the Aristotelianapproach the question is not
whetherthereis anyconclusion fromthe premisses II-AA but whether
there is a conclusion of one the four categorical formsA, E, I or O,
linking, moreover, the two terms that occur only once in the
premisses. Thus, Saccheri's task is to show that II-AA does not yield
any of the followingfourrelations: A, E, I, O, between the termsrepresented by B and C.
For the rejectionof A and I, Saccheri uses the followinginterpretation. The predicate variable B is interpretedinto "being a syllogism
thathas a universal major and has premissesdifferentin quality", the
predicate variable A into "being conclusive in the second figure", the
predicate variable C into "being a syllogismwith premisses AA".
Under this interpretation, the two premisses become: "Every
syllogismhaving a universal major, and having premissesdifferingin
quality, concludes in the second figure" and "Every syllogism AA
concludes in the second figure".
Suppose the conclusion is A. Then the two stated premisses should
yield the conclusion: "every syllogismAA has premissesnot agreeing
in quality". Thus, however, the allegedly good implication "II-AA
implies A", with premisses that are true independently of the
postulate, yields an absurdity.
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20:20:23 PM

Suppose the conclusion is I. Then the two stated premisses should

4
yield the conclusion: 'some syllogismAA has premissesnot agreeing
in quality". Thus, however, the allegedly good implication "II-AA
implies I", with premisses that are true independently of the
postulate, yields an absurdity again.
For the rejectionof the E and O candidates Saccheri constructsthe
'
following interpretation:A = 'having one of the premisses affir'
mative", B = 'being conclusive in the second figure", C = "being
a syllogismAA". Thus, the two premissesbecome: "Every syllogism
that concludes in the second figure has one of its premisses affirmative", "Every syllogismA A has one of its premissesaffirmative".
Suppose the conclusion is E. Then the two premisses should yield:
every syllogism AA does not conclude in the second figure. The
premissesare true independentlyof the postulate. The conclusion says
that the form II- AA is not good.
Suppose the conclusion is O. Then the two premisses should yield:
some syllogism AA does not conclude in the second figure. The
premissesare true independentlyof the postulate. The conclusion says
that the formII- AA is not good, because if an instance of A A is not
conclusive, then no AA is conclusive (this is an application of Saccheria interestinglemma
, chapter 11 of part I of the Logica). Q.e.d.
After considering this example of the via nobilior
, one may object
that, given that the allegedly postulate-freeproofs still depend on
interpretationsof the variables, the availability of the latter ought to
be postulated, if, as Saccheri says, one is to "proceed scientifically."
The interpretationsemployed in the via nobiliorare, however, very
speciali,and differentfromthe Aristotelianand usual ones: they are
as partofthelogicaltheory
linguisticexpressions, termsalreadyintroduced
These
which
we
call
internal
, do nothave to
itself.
interpretations,
may
be postulated "in order to proceed scientifically": their existence is
secured by logic.
I propose to define the via nobilioras the restrictionof the method
of interpretationsto internalinterpretations.
A comparison between Saccheri and Lukasiewicz is unavoidable as
soon as we consider the immediate continuation of the Lukasiewicz'
text quoted above in section 3:
Ifwe wantto avoidthisdifficulty,
I
we mustrejectsomeforms
axiomatically.
have foundthatif we rejectthe twofollowing
formsof thesecondfigure
axiomatically:
toall B andA belongstoall C, thenB belongs
tosomeC, and
(7) IfA belongs
(8) IfA belongsto no B andA belongsto no C, thenB belongsto someC,
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20:20:23 PM

all theotherforms
,
maybe rejected
bytherules(c) and(d) (Aristotle's
syllogistic
p. 72)
where Lukasiewicz' rules (c) and (d) are respectivelythe following:if
an implication is asserted, but its consequent is rejected, then its
antecedentmustbe rejectedtoo; ifa substitutioninstance of a formula
is rejected, then the formula must be rejected too.
The question arises: is Lukasiewicz' rejection method similar to
? My tentativeanswer is no. Let us ask on which
Saccheria via nobilior
groundsdoes Lukasiewicz selecthis two rejectionaxioms. Presumably
- but here is
because they can be falsifiedunder some interpretation
where the crucial issue for Saccheri begins. Saccheri would demand,
forthe via nobilior
, that the falsifyinginterpretationsbe internal, and
there is no hint of this in Lukasiewicz.
5. The NoblestWay. AdmirableUpdate
Saccheri does not even hint at a definitionof his via nobiliorin terms
of a restrictionto internalinterpretations.His account- at the beginning of Logica, I, ch. 11 is quite different:
and as I thinka
Now in factwe mayconceiveanotherwayof proceeding,
of
without
theassistance
thesametruths
beautiful
way,bywhichI demonstrate
ofthepropoI shallproceed
thus:I shallassumethecontradictory
thepostulate.
and fromit I shallelicitostensively
sitionto be demonstrated
[ostensive
] and
to be proved.This methodof proofwas
the proposition
directly
[directe]
employed
byEuclid,prop.12,book9.
Thus, all Saccheri sees in his postulate-free,nobler project is the
mirabilis(not his phrase). As opposed to the
beauty of the consequentia
indirect
argumentor via negativa(this expression is found in
ordinary
of chapter 11), in the reasoning envisaged by Saccheri the
the scholium
to the
supposition of the negation of the desired result leads directly
desired result, without the intermediatestep of bumping into some
absurdity(that negates the negation of the desired result and consequently affirmsthe latter).
We can appreciate this peculiar argument in two cases of the
postulate-freeproof presented in the preceding section: when the
assumed conclusion is O and E. But then anyone perceives that in the
other two cases (when the assumed conclusion is A and I) the via
negativaseems to prevail. This happens several times in the postulatefreeproofsof chapter 11. Saccheri anticipates the reader's objections,
and defends himselffromthem in the scholiumof that chapter. Even
if his defense is correct,as I have suggested in (1975) and Hoorman
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20:20:23 PM

in (1976), the conceptual

distinctionbetween postulate-freereconstrucreconstructionoflogic ought
tion oflogic and postulate-free-admirable
to be respected, unless a deeper connectionbetween the two becomes
apparent. This is why I would suggestthatSaccheri's own phrase "via
nobilior" ("nobler method") be reserved forthe sheer postulate-free
procedure, while the new designation "via nobilissima" ("noblest
method", not in Saccheri) be applied to those cases that are both
postulate-freeand admirable.
As a final remark,I would like to point out that the admirable consequence continues to attractthe interestof scholars and logicians. In
the bibliography I mention two important recent contributions,by
Nuchelmans and Thiel, and I list a fewSaccherian titlesthatappeared
after my (1975) or not mentioned therein. From earlier admirers of
the admirable reasoning I will quote here an impressiveletterfromthe
mathematician Halsted, the translator into English of Saccheri's
EuclidesVindicatus.
The letter,addressed to the topologistR.L. Moore,
refersto the same paradigmatic passage in Euclid mentioned by Saccheri in the above quoted text.4
Dear Professor Moore,

June 21, 1919

Your letterofJune 17 gives the ordinaryviews and thereforeis not

you.
Now let your genius wake, and give me just the opposite side of the
debate. Show that Eu. [did] IX, 12 is in sharpest opposition to the
Reductio ad absurdum.
The R.a.a. proves by reaching a contradictionof a known theorem.
Thus the firstReductio, Eu. [?] 5, proves the part equal to the whole,
then accepted as an absurd proposition. Eu. IX. 12 proves no absurd
theorem. On the contrary,it gives a directdemonstrationof the very
theorem we wish to prove.
It is a wholly new method of proof, which never occurs before (or
after) in Eu. It is this new method that Saccheri is trying,expecting
it to give a directdemonstrationof the parallel-postulate.
4 I amgrateful
toAlbert
C. Lewisfordrawing
tothisletter,
myattention
keptinthe
R.L. Moorearchives,
The University
ofTexasat Austin,and published
herewith
thekindpermission
fromtheBarkerCenter,The University
ofTexasat Austin.
110

20:20:23 PM

The world had always supposed he was engaged in givingor trying

to give a Reductio ad absurdum. Far otherwise.
And he maintains that he has justifiedEuclid in making Euclid ['s]
parallel assumption by showing that the parallel postulate is
indemonstrable(as we all now know since Bolyai).
Sleep on it, and give me a spark fromyour genius. Yours always.
George Bruce Halsted
Bibliography
useofthe"consequentia
Akten
desII. Intern.
mirabilis",
Angelelli,
Ignacio,OnSaccheria
Leibniz1972, Wiesbaden1975,vol. 4, 19-26
Hannover
Kongresses,
"ViaNobilior",
zu Saccheris
in: LeibnizWerk
und
Dufour,Carlos,NeueUntersuchungen
IV. Internationaler
Leibniz14-19.November
1983.VorHannover,
Wirkung.
Kongress.
vonderG.W.Leibniz
, Hannover1983,135-42
herausgegeben
Gesellschaft
trge,
Hardoctoral
Emch,ArnoldF., TheLogicaDemonstrativa
dissertation,
ofG. Saccheria
thefirst
vard1934?,670 pp. [Contents:
hundred
pagesincludeEmch'sstudy
anddiscussion
ofSaccheri's
the
logic;morethanfivehundred
pagesreproduce
Latintextand offer
an EnglishversionoftheLogica
; Gambarana's
biography
ofSaccheriand a bibliographical
appendixconcludethedissertation.]
di Gerolamo
Demonstrativa
Saccheri
, in:AttidelConGiacobbe,GiulioCesare,La Logica
Internazionale
diStoria
dellaLogica.
1982, Bologna1983,265-70
SanGimignano
vegno
andtheself-application
C.L., Saccherian
Hamblin,
, Australasian
oflogic
arguments
Journal
ofPhilosophy,
53 (1975),157-60
"
examination
useof the consequentia
Hoormann,CyrilF.A., A further
of Saccheri's
mirabilisNotreDame Journal
ofFormalLoeic, 17 (1976),239-47
thestandpoint
, 2nded.,
Lukasiewicz,
Jan,Aristotle's
from
ofmodern
logic
syllogistic
formal
Oxford1957
"
e implicaciones
mirabilis desarrollo
histrico
Miralbell,Ignacio,La consequentia
de Sevilla,4 (1987),79-95
Univ.
, Thmata,
filosficas
a history
Towards
Nuchelmans,
Gabriel,Dilemmatic
,
arguments.
oftheir
logicandrhetoric
1991
Amsterdam
adsubalpinos
ofTexas
Pavesio,Elementa
, Taurini1793[copyat theUniversity
logices
at Austinlibrary.
Pavesio'snamedoesnotoccurin thetitlepageas authorof
thebook.Still,thatPavesiowas theauthoroftheseElementa
is apparent
from
thepreface].
toAristotle's
Prior
andPosterior
Oxford1949
Ross,W.D., Introduction
Analytics,
Euclides
editedbyB. Halsted,second
Saccheri,
Gerolamo,
vindicatus,
Latin-English,
ed., Chelsea,N.Y. 1986,firsted. Halsted,G.B., Chicago1920. Full title:
abomni
ofall blemish).
Euclides
naevo
vindicatus
(Euclidfreed
[The1986"second
edition"ofHalsted'svolumehas a preface
mysteriously
signed"A.G."]
Miteiner
vonW. Risse,Olms
Saccherius,
Hieronymus,
LogicaDemonstrativa.
Einleitung
York1980
Verlag,Hildesheim-New
Clavius
unddieConsequentia
In: Leibniz.Werk
undWirkung.
Mirabilis.
Thiel,Christian,
14-19.November
IV. Internationaler
LeibnizHannover
1983.Vortrge,
herausKongress.
vonderG.W. Leibniz
, Hannover1983,765-74
gegeben
Gesellschaft
Austin, Texas
University
of Texas
111

20:20:23 PM

William of Auvergne'sAccountof theEnuntiable:

its Relations to Nominalism and theDoctrineof theEternal Truths
NEIL LEWIS

1
Introduction
One of the most notable trends in the development of twelfthcenturythoughtwas the increasing interconnectionbetween dialectic
and theology.In a classic paper M.-D. Chenu broughtto lighta particularaspect of thisinterconnectionin the developmentoflogical doctrinesof the stateable( enuntiabile
) and theologicaldoctrinesconcerning
divine knowledgeand the articlesof the faith.His researchesrevealed
two schools of thought regarding these issues. The nominalists
believingthat stateableswere the objects of the immutable
{nominales),
divine knowledgeand were the unchangingarticlesof faith,concluded
that they could not change in their truthvalue; they were untensed
and ' 4once true, always true". Their opponents, the realists (reales),
held that stateables did vary in theirtruthvalue, and at least some of
in
the divine knowledge.2
for
them appear to have allowed
change
The close connectionbetween accounts of the stateable in logic and
writersthemselvesas
theological concerns also strucktwelfth-century
in the late twelfthwritten
rerum
De
naturis
In
his
mention.
of
,
worthy
the
that
remarks
question whetherthe
century,Alexander Nequam
stateable is somethingthat is not just a logical question, but also a
theological one. An anonymous student studyingat Paris late in the
twelfthcenturymakes a similar claim.3 But these authors evidently
1 I wouldliketothank
veronan earlier
comments
Prof.RegaWoodforherhelpful
sionofthispaper.
2 See M.-D. Chenu,Grammaire
d'histoire
auxxiieetxiiiesicles
etthologie
, in: Archives
du moyenge, 10-11(1935-36),5-28. Vivarium
et littraire
doctrinale
, 30 (1992)is
andpapers
a fullbibliography
andcontains
totwelfth-century
devoted
nominalism,
see G.
on thestateable,
For background
stateofresearch.
thecurrent
presenting
1973.
Theories
, Amsterdam
Nuchelmans,
oftheProposition
3 De naturis
utrumenuntiabile
290: Oaeterum
London18J,
rerum
, ed. T. Wright,
estquaestio";D. Germain
sitaliquidquodsit,nontantum
logicasedet theologica
lafinduxiiesicle
deParisvers
del'universit
enthologie
indite
d'untudiant
Morin,Lettre
6 (1934),412-6,at 415: 4'Estet
et mdivale,
ancienne
de thologie
in: Recherches
113
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:16:29 PM

have in mind questions about the ontological status and nature of

stateables, issues not touched on in the material Chenu considered,
and the theologicaldoctrinewith repercussionsforthesequestions was
the doctrine of the eternal truths,with its suggestion that stateables
might be eternal entities.
It mightbe thoughtthat these concerns over the ontological status
of stateables were unrelated to the disagreementsbetween nominalists
and realists that Chenu revealed. But I hope to give some reason to
thinkthat thiswas not so, and that therewere distinctivenominalistic
and realisticpositions on the nature of stateables, according to which
nominalistsnot only held stateablesto have invariabletruth-valuesbut
also took them to be temporal items, whereas realists held them to
have variable truthvalues and to be eternal items of some kind.
The evidence forthisclaim is to be found in William of Auvergne's
discussion of stateablesin his De universo.
William was born c. 1190 and
from1228 untilhis death in 1249 served as bishop of Paris. De universo
,
writtenc. 1231-36, is part of his Magisterium
divinale
, a vast and important work William wrote between 1223 and 1240. 4 By the 1230s the
debates between nominalists and realists appear to have become
largely a thing of the past, but some of their characteristicpositions
appear to have stillhad supportersin the firstfewdecades of the thirteenthcentury,when William was studyingthe arts and theology,and
theirpositions continue to be mentioned even in workswrittenin the
mid-thirteenthcentury.
William and his contemporariesaccepted the doctrine that certain
stateables have been true frometernity.But like many of his contemporaries, William rejected any suggestion that stateables themselves
were eternal entities.5His rejectionof such a suggestionis distinctive,
adhucalia quaestio,quae emergit
ex diversis
opinionibus
magistrorum;
quae et in
habetlocum,et in dialctica.
Ouaeritur
enimutrumenuntiabilia
theologia
sint".
4 Thereis no modern
edition.I haveusedthetextofthe1674Orlans-Paris
Opera
omnia
a. M. 1963;De universo
is in vol. 1), collatedwiththe
(rpt.2 vols.,Frankfurt
edition
from
before1497.I haveindicated
variants
inthislatNuremberg
important
tereditionin thefootnotes
to theformer
editionbythe
bythesigilN, andreferred
the1674edition's
inquotations
butreplaced
its
sigilO. I haveretained
orthography
For thedatingof De universo
see J. Kramp,Des Wilhelm
von
heavypunctuation.
divinale
1 (1920),538-84,and 2 (1921),
", in: Gregorianum,
Auvergne's
"Magisterium
42-78,174-87(Latinversion1 [1920],585-616,and 2 [1921],79-103,187-95).For
William's
lifeandworks,
seeR.J.Teske;William
in:Dictionary
ofAuvergne,
ofLiterary
344-53.
, vol. 115,ed. J. Hackett,Detroit-London
Biography
1991,
5 Forcriticisms
ofthenotionofeternal
seeRobertGrosseteste,
De veritate
stateables,
andDe libero
arbitrio
Werke
desRobert
Grosseteste
vonLin, in:Diephilosophischen
, Bischofs
114

20:16:29 PM

however, in that he formulatesit in the contextof an endorsementof

nominalisticprinciplesconcerningtruthand tense, and holds that the
doctrine of eternal stateables lies at the root of the position on the
mutabilityof the divine knowledge ascribed to the realists. In addition, William gives a richercharacterizationof the doctrineof eternal
stateables than we find in other works of his day, leading us to hope
that we may pinpoint its proponents in other texts.
My aims in this paper are to outline the nominalistic elements in
William's account of the stateable, explain in some detail his conception of the stateable and his attacks on the idea of eternal stateables,
and make some suggestionsregardingthe source of the doctrine he is
attacking.
themes
in De Universo
Nominalistic
The stateable is best viewed as the contentasserted in the utterance
of an assertoricalsentence; that is, it is what one states in making a
statement. By a statement I mean the assertorie utterance of an
eIt is plausible to take such contentsas
indicativesentence(enuntiatio)
also being the objects of propositionalattitudessuch as knowledgeand
belief, and many medieval thinkersaccordinglytook stateables to be
the objects of both human and divine knowledge. But when coupled
withthe plausible thesisthatstateableschange in truth-valueover time
in line with changes in the things they are about, this seems to lead
to the conclusion that God's knowledge changes, and hence that God
is not immutable.
thinkers.Peter of Poitiers
This problem exercised twelfth-century
remarksin his Sententiae
(writtenbefore 1176) thathe does not see how
thosewho say that stateablesvary in truth-valuecan avoid saying that
i. W. 1912,130-43,150-241;Alexander
of
coin
, ed. L. Baur,(BGPM 9), Mnster
Petri
S.
libros
sententiarum
Lombardi
, 1, d. 39, ed. Collegium
Hales,Glossainquatuor
ascribed
toAlexvol. 1, Quaracchi1951,393-9;theSumma
Bonaventurae,
theologica
S. Bonaventurae,
vol.
anderofHales,pars1, inq. 1, tr.3, q. 2, c. 2, ed. Collegium
ofAuxerre,
aurea
Summa
, 1.9.3,ed.J. Ribaillier,
1,Quaracchi1924,148-9;William
AlexBonaventurianum
1980-,16: 195.63-196.80;
16-20),Paris-Rome
(Spicilegium
II. xli-xliii,
ed. R.M. Thomson,
Oxford1988,
anderNequam,Speculum
Speculationum,
180-7.
6 I amnotusingtheterm" statement"
hereandinwhatfollows
torefer
tothecontent
. Myuseof
an indicative
suchis thestateable
statedinuttering
sentence;
{enuntiabile)
I usethis
ofthesentence
tostatea stateable.
totheactualuttering
refers
"statement"
and enuntiatio.
theparallelbetween
enuntiabile
in orderto preserve
terminology
115

20:16:29 PM

God begins to know certain truthsin a sense that implies variation in

his knowledge. He concludes that stateables do not vary in
value. 7
truthThe problem continued to be discussed in the early thirteenthcentury. Peter of Capua notes in his Summa(writtenc. 1201-2) that some
hold that stateables can vary in their truth-valueand that God can
begin to know them. He ascribes these views to the so-called realists.
values
The opposing views, that stateables have unchangeable truthand that God cannot begin or cease to know them, he ascribes to the
nominalists, among whom he appears to number himself.8
A littlelater, William of Auxerre in his Summaaurea(writtenc. 121529) also ascribes to the realists the view that God begins to know
stateables, and notes that the nominalists, "who say that what once
is true, always will be true'', reject it.9
It is in referenceto this by then long-runningdebate that William
of Auvergne introducesthe section of De universo
in whichhe discusses
stateables and the eternal truths. He admonishes the reader:
Ne obliviscaris
autemopinionem
eorumqui dicuntomniaveraessehujusmodi
utnoncadantistaeduplicitates
circaea velsuperea, videlicet
alteratio
a veritate
in falsitatem
vel e converso;
similiter
essendiverumet desitioconincoeptio
traria.Horrendum
enimreputant,
et nonimmerito,
creatorem
nuncprimm
scirealiquid,quicquidilludsit,et incipereaut desinerescireillud.Multum
et contumeliam
nec ista
quippesonarevideturinjuriam
creatoris;
sapientiae
veraetfalsaquaedamsicalterari
etmutari
effugere
possunt
quiponunt
(1.3.18;
ed. cit.,782bH).
William adds that those who hold that God begins or ceases to know
stateables must also grant that he learns or forgetsthem.10
In thispassage William endorses the nominalists' view thatin order
to maintain the immutabilityof the divine knowledge we must deny
7 Sententiae
PetriPictaviensis
, 1.12, ed. P.S. Mooreand M. Dulong,vol. 1, Notre
Dame, Indiana1943,116.208-223.
8 See text#44ain Y. Iwakumaand S. Ebbesen,
Schools
the
Logico-Theological
from
Second
A ListofSources
Peter's
, in: Vivarium
Halfofthe12thCentury:
, 30(1992),173-210.
viewsarediscussed
in W. Courtenay,
Peter
, ibid.,157-72.
ofCapuaas a Nominalist
9 Summa
aurea,1.9.2; ed. cit.,16: 181.30-36.
10"Cum enimnonpossitsciria creatore
aliquid,nisicumestverumetquandiuest
cumincipit
esseverum,et
verum,necesseestut tuncincipiatipsumscirecreator,
tuncdesinetilludscire,cumipsumdesinitesseverum,et tuncsciat
consequenter
enimconsequens
primoaliquid,cumilludprimoestverum.Videtur
esse,utsi incipit
aliquidscire,vel desinitscireillud,discatilludvel obliviscatur"
(1.3.18; ed. cit.,
thattherealistsdenythis
782bH-783aA).Williamof Auxerreclaims,however,
ofGod'sbeginning
orceasingtoknow(Summa
aurea
allegedconsequence
, 1.9.2;ed.
cit.,16: 181.30-33).
116

20:16:29 PM

that stateables, that is, veraetfalsa, vary in truthvalue over time. He

then proceeds to add an unexpected and important detail to this
debate, which links it to the problem of the eternal truths.He tells us
that:
et creatori
Causamveroveloccasionem
dedithuicerrorialia stultissima
conhocestomniaveraet falsa
tumeliosissima
enunciabilia,
opinio,qua posuerunt
omniaab aeternofuisseet haberesuummodumexistendi
per se seorsuma
sed
et ab omnibus
Dei operibus;
necessefactaautcreataa creatore,
creaturis
nihildeberecreatori,
velquantum
esseaeterna
etab aeterno
fuisse,
quapropter
ad essevelquantumad suumbeneesse(1.3.18; ed. cit.,783aA-B).
We shall returnlater to this conception of eternal stateables. At present, however,we may note thatWilliam bases the realists' doctrineof
the mutabilityof the divine knowledge, and presumably,of the truthvalue of stateables, on their adoption of a conception of eternal
stateables, clearly implying that positions on the changeability of
truth-value and the divine knowledge standardly ascribed to the
realistswere intimatelybound up with theiradoption of a conception
of eternal stateables.
In addition to the nominalists' view that stateables do not change
in their truthvalues,11 William also accepts other closely related
nominalistic theses concerning signification and tense. The
nominalistsdenied that statements( enuntiationes
) of the same sentenceThis was due
same
stateable.
times
the
at
different
made
signified
type
to theiracceptance of the view that statementsof the same sentencevalue. Since a
type made at differenttimes may well differin truthvalue derives fromthat of the stateable it signifies,
statement'struththe claim thatsuch statementshave the same significationwould entail
rejectionof the nominalists' view that stateables do not vary in truthvalue. The nominalists thereforeheld that statements of the same
sentence-typemade at differenttimes signifydifferentstateables. In
addition, they held that statements of differentlytensed sentences
made at appropriatelyrelated times signifythe same stateable. Thus
4'Christ is
being born" utteredat his birthsignifiedthe same stateable
'
as 'Christ was being born then" does when uttered now.
This conceptionof the stateable requires denyingthat a statement's
tense identifiesa componentof the stateable it signifies.Stateables are
not themselvestensed. Tense instead pertains to the manner in which
11In addition
tothepassagequotedabove,seealsoDe univ.1.3.15;ed. cit.,779bC;
1.3.17;ed. cit.,781aD.
117

20:16:29 PM

a statementsignifiesan untensed stateable, that is, it serves to locate

the stateable in time in relationto the timeof the utteranceof the statement in question.
William adopts this nominalistic account of tense. A statement's
tense, as well as the tense of verbs, is a matterof how it signifiesits
significate,and differencesof tense do not necessarilycorrespond to
differencesof significates:
non
etde futuro
Orationes
de < praesenti
etde> praeterito
peristatriatempora
diversantur
autsignificatis,
sicutnequeipsaverba.'Est' enim
significationibus
et 'disputt'
et 'fuit'et 'erit'remunamsignificant,
videlicet
essevelentitatem;
licetmodis
nisidisputationem,
et 'disputaviet 'disputabinon significant
etcum
cumestpraesens
etcumestfutura
variis,quemadmodum
ipsadisputatio
eritpraeterita,
nonaliudestaut alia res(1.3.18;ed. cit.,783bA).
William also adopts the nominalists' view that statementsof the same
sentence-type made at differenttimes signifydifferentstateables,just
as utterancesof temporaladverbs signifydifferent
times. Thus a statement of ' 'Socrates is now", made now, "never beforenow signified
that Socrates is now, just as the adverb 'now' neitherdemonstrated
this now before nor will do so later".12
William's conception
of thestateable
These nominalistic elements in William's account of the stateable
suggest that his own conception of the stateable's nature may represent the kind of view adopted by the nominalists. We have surprisinglylittleinformationabout the nominalists' views on the nature of
the stateable; neither the descriptions of nominalism found in the
twelfthor thirteenth-century
literature,nor textsthatcan be plausibly
ascribed to the nominalistshave anythingto say about theirconception of the natureof stateables.13AdmittedlyWilliam's account pro12
esseinactusiveintempore
nonseitipsecreator
nisi
"Quod si dixerit
quia rerum
cumipsaein actuet in tempore
sunt...debesreminisci
eorumquae praedixi
tibiin
tractatu...
ubidixitibiquia Socratem
essenuncscivitcreator
ab aeterno,
praecedenti
sedreveraoratioista'Socrates
estnunc'nunquam
antehocnuncsignifcavit
Socratem
essenunc
'nunc'demonstravit
hocnuncantea,
, quemadmodum
nequehocadverbium
necdemonstrabit
in posterm.
Non enimdemonstrat
nisinuncsolumquodest,et
solummodo
cumest.Similiter
se habetetde hocverbo'est',quoniamnonsignificai
essenisiquodestin ipsonuncquo dicitur
velprofertur,
velad quod,tanquamad
refertur"
ed. cit.,887bA-B).
praesens,
(2.2.46;
13In general
thepapersin Vivarium
ofstateables
, 30(1992)do notfocusonthenature
as such,though
thisissueis touched
on inj. Marenbon,Vocalism,
Nominalism
andthe
Commentaries
ontheCategories
theEarlier
, 51-61;andC .J.Martin,
from
Twelfth
Century
TheLogicoftheNominales,
or,TheRiseandFallofImpossible
Positio,110-26.
118

20:16:29 PM

vides at best rather circumstantial evidence concerning the

nominalists'conceptionof the stateable's nature, but we shall see that
it has some support in the writingsof Alexander Nequam, and at the
veryleast suggeststo us anotherarea in which we may be able to identifydistinctivenominalisticviews.
William's account of the stateable must be understood in the light
of the idea, already found in Aristotle's De interpretatione
1, that the
bearers of truthand falsitymust in some sense be composite items.14
In the twelfthand early thirteenthcenturies this idea was naturally
understoodto apply to stateables,which were generallytaken to be the
value. But there was disagreementover the
primarybearers of truthnature of stateables. Among those who held them to be compositions
or divisionsof some kind or other, some took them to be compositions
or divisions of terms
, be theymental, spoken, or written.Others, however, took themto be compositionsand divisions of the ressignifiedby
such terms.15
William belongs to the latter group. He sharply distinguishes
betweenwhat he calls natural compositionsand divisions and rational
or intellectualones, a distinctioncorrespondingto the levels of things
signifiedand their signifiersrespectively.Rational compositions and
divisions simply are compositions and divisions of subject and
predicate terms, that is, they are affirmationsand denials, be they
spoken, written,or mental in nature. Natural compositionsand divisions, however, are compositions and divisions of the extra-linguistic
items {res) signifiedby such terms. According to William, stateables
are natural compositions and divisions; the formerare signifiedby
affirmations,the latter by negations.16
14Cf.Arsmeliduna
in: Logicamodernorum
, vol. 2, ed. L.M. de Rijk,Assen
, extracts
abbreviatum
1967,2.1: 358; PetertheChanter,Verbum
(PL 205: 31OD); Alexander
II. xli; ed. cit,180.
speculationum,
Nequam,Speculum
15Cf.Arsmeliduna
took
in Log.mod.2.1: 358. It mustbe notedthatnotall authors
a comthinkers
ordivisions.
tobecompositions
stateables
developed
Twelfth-century
to Alexander
ranging,according
plex set of viewson the natureof stateables,
to theviewsthat
anddivisions,
ofthemas compositions
conceptions
Nequam,from
orintelligible
, II. xlicomplexes
speculationum
{Speculum
thought,
theyaresubstances,
xlii;ed. cit.,180-2).
16Thedistinction
isclear
anddivisions
natural
andintellectual
between
compositions
nonaffirmantur
et negationibus
in thefollowing
neque
passage:"Affirmationibus
nisi res [read 'res' for'tres' withN, fol. 133vb]quae per praedicata
negantur
et niside rebusquae persubjecta<significantur>
, et nisiex his,id
significantur,
et praedicatis,
est,ex rebussubjectis
potestaliquidunumcomponicompositione
incujus
<non> rationis
suntetintellectus,
immohujusmodi
naturali;
compositiones
seurationabiliter
estetcomponere
quae permodumnaturae
intelligibiliter
potestate
119

20:16:29 PM

William has littleto say about the nature of such natural compositions and divisions, but his criticism of a conception of eternal
stateables does at least indicate that he took them to be temporal in
nature, at least for the most part. He notes that those who thinkof
stateables as eternal cannot treatthem as compositions,forhow could
eternal stateables 4'be composed of subjects and predicates,which are
4
certainlytemporaland generallyhave begun in time?"17By 'subjects
and predicates" in this contexthe means the thingssignifiedby subject and predicate terms,presumably substances and forms.Since the
elements of compositions are generally temporal items, and a compositioncan only existwhen its componentsexist and are compounded
together,it is clear that forWilliam stateables, like theircomponents,
generally have temporal location and come into and go out of
existence. For this reason theymay quite properlybe characterizedas
past, present, or future. In line with this, William remarks that the
compositions signified by future-tensed statements, in which case
there are neitherthe (extra-linguistic)subjects nor predicates, do not
yet exist.18
non sunt,et divideresimiliter
componibilia
per modumsuumquae per modum
naturaedividiimpossibile
est.Et compositiones
istaeatquedivisiones
intellectuales
seu rationales
nonsuntnisiaffrmationes
et negationes,
de quarumutrisque
inveniuntur
veraeetfalsae,possibiles
etimpossibiles,
necessariae
etcontingentes.
Etpromusicum
withN, fol.133vb]
esse
pterhoc,grammaticurri
musicam",
[for'grammaticam
,
de quo audivistiapudlogicamAristotelis
estnecaeternum,
[Topics
1,11] necfactum
necnegatiofacitaffrmatum
velnegatum,
quoniamnecaffirmatio
quoniamnondat
ei esse. equecompositio
resnisiapud intellectum,
intelligibilis
conjungit
neque
propterearnminussuntin sua divisionevel sua contrarietate
apud semetipsas.
Similiter
minussuntin sua conjunctione.
Si enimdicas
nequepropter
negationem
aute converso,
nonminuslongeestpropter
hancconjuncquodoriensestoccidens,
tionemoriensab occidente,
et si dicasde eo quodestin oriente,
quodipsumestin
aute converso,
nonpropter
hocrecessit
hocab oriente
occidenti,
autappropinquavit
etiamoccidente.
Similiter
nequee converso"(1.3.18; ed. cit.,783aB-D).Truthis
as a matter
ofthe"concordantiam
interipsumenunciabile
et suamoraexplained
'
tionem
velnegationem"
etfalsitas
secundum
(1.3.26;ed. cit.,795aC),i.e., 'veritas
intentiones
istas velutrespectussunt aut comparationes
compositionum
atque
divisionum
ad affirmationes
et negationes
a afflrmasuas,et Veritas
atquefalsitas
tionum
etnegationum
suntsiverelationes
autrespectus
ad composicomparationes
tioneset divisiones
rerumquas significant"
(1.3.26; ed. cit., 795aC). (The last
sentence
indicates
thatWilliamtakesaffirmations
tosignify
anddenials
compositions
to signify
divisions.)
1
sunthujusmodi
exsubjectis
etpraedicatis,
"Qualiterautemcomposita
quaeutique
suntetextempore
temporalia
coeperunt
pro
majore
parte?"
(1.3.18;ed. cit.,783aB).
18Thushewrites:
"Enunciabilia
de futuro,
ubinecsubjecta
sunt
necpraedicata,
praesentialiter
verasunthujusmodi
hocest,convenientia
siveconcordia
siveadaeveritate,
theviewthat
quationesiveaequalitate"(1.3.26; ed. cit.,795bB);and,criticizing
truths
aretruebythefirst
he writes:"Tarnen[for'tunc'withN, fol.141rb]
truth,
120

20:16:29 PM

It mightbe thoughtthata compositionas so described must be some

tertium
quid over and above its components. This would make for
metaphysicalmystery;besides Socrates and his whiteness,for example, we would have to identifysome thirdthing, Socrates-combinedwhateverthatmay be. We need not take thispath,
with-his-whiteness,
far
fromclear that William would have. An alterand
it
is
however,
been
nativehad
suggestedby Peter Abelard. At one point in his Dialcticahe describes statementsnot as designatingthings( res), but as proposing the ways in which thingsare disposed.19Such an account does
not suggest that the significatesof statementsforma shadowy realm
of entitieshoveringabove ordinaryres.It instead suggeststhat talk of
stateables ultimately is to be taken as a way of talking of things
inasmuch as theyhave qualities or stand in relations to one another.
Talk of the compositionof Socrates and his whiteness,on such a view,
mightbe taken to be a way of speaking of Socrates inasmuch as he is
white. Views along these lines had early thirteenth-century
proview
notes
the
William
of
Auxerre
aurea
in
his
Summa
Thus
ponents.
that stateables are things insofar as they are in composition; unfortunatelyhe does not identifyits proponents.20
William says very little about divisions. His only remark about
them is that the stateable thatthereis nota chimerais true but does not
exist.21The idea of a true but non-existentstateable is ratherhard to
grasp, but some sense can be made of it ifwe treatdivisions as privations or lacks of the corresponding compositions. These privations
estde qualibet
verum
earum,quoniamhaecreserit,quacunqueearumdemonstrata.
enuncianihilest[seil,verumprimm],
Autforte
hujusmodi
quoniamsubjectum
est[for
essequodnondum
'Fore'enimpraedicat
tionsnonest,nequepraedicatum.
Sedneque
essevelquodnon'withN, fol.141rb].
compostilo
'nequeenimforepraedicat
etsecunreali
sunt
modo
enim
ilianullo
Nonentia
etpraedicati.
estsubjecti
conjunctione
conjuncta
est.
dumveritatem'
immo,reveradivisa,quoniamreverahaecresnonestvelnondum
intenest.Estautemverumhancremforesecundum
hancrem
foredenon-entibus
Quare
ineo dequo
veritatem
nominis
tionem
'verum',qua dicitprimam
hujusmodi
positam
eritinhocnonenteetinomnisimilivero,etproQuareprimaessentia
praedicatur.
innonente.Quis autemintelligat
hoc,quodenssitin nonente?"
pterhocsimiliter
(1.3.25;ed. cit.,793aB-C).
19Dialctica
, ed. L.M. de Rijk,2d ed., Assen1970,160.29-32.
'
20Summa
aurea
, 3.12.7; ed. cit., 18: 222.100-104: Sed tidesest de lilisenunnon
sed istaenuntiabilia
Christum
esse
Christum
resurrexisse;
tiabilibus;
passum,
secundum
nonsuntnisiresillesignifcate,
quodsuntin
sunt,quia iliaenuntiabilia
nonsunt."
in compositione
et ressignificate
compositione,
21"Sicutigitur
non[add non
aliquidestverumquodtamennonest,ut Chimaeram
necsubjectum
withN, fol.142vb]
est,sicnonestmirum
esse,cujusnecpraedicatum
si aliquidestverumveritate
quae nonest" (1.3.26; ed. cit.,796aE).
121

20:16:29 PM

may be due eitherto an existingsubstance's lacking a propertyor to

the non-existenceof both the subject and property. That thereis nota
is of the latterkind. Now according to medieval thinkersthere
chimera
is a sense in which privationsexist, as well as a sense in which they
do not. Aquinas, for example, makes this distinctionin the opening
remarks of De enteet essentia.A privation does not exist inasmuch as
it is not a recipientof being; it is not a created or creatable thing,but
the lack of such. Even so, privationsexist inasmuch as it is correctto
say that there are lacks. Granted this distinction,we may say that a
true division exists in the latter,weaker sense, but not in the former
sense. I suggest that we understand William's view in this way.
William's account of compositions and divisions is clearly a mere
sketch. In his Speculumspeculationum
, writtenc. 1205-13, Alexander of
had
some
noted
obvious, ifperhaps not insurmountabledifNequam
ficultiesconfrontinga theoryof stateables as compositions. What, he
asks, are we to say about the stateable signifiedby "God exists", or
those signifiedby negative or compound statements,or by futuretensed statements?Furtherdifficultieshad also been raised in the Ars
22
meliduna.
Besides raisingproblemsforthiskind of theory,Alexander also provides us with some independent evidence for associating the conception of the stateable as an extra-linguisticcomposition with the doctrinesof the nominalists. His Speculumspeculationum
is a ramblingwork
crammed with informationabout the theological and logical disputes
of the late twelfthcentury.At one point in it he notes that those who
say that stateables are compositions of formand subject(terms that
surely referto extra-linguisticitems), held the view that "that which
is thatPeteris is that which is thatPeterwas and is the same as thatPeter
will be". He seems to have in mind here the view of the nominalists.
Later he seems to associate closely the conception of the stateable as
a compositionof subject and predicate withthe nominalists' view that
the "same stateable is signifiedby these three: 'Socrates is', 'Socrates
was', and 'Socrates will be' ", a view, he expresslynotes, thatimplies
the nominalists' thesis that "whatever is once true, always will be
22Alexander
, II. xli;ed. cit.,180;forthedatingsee,
Nequam,Speculum
speculationum
R.W. Hunt,TheSchools
andtheCloister
: TheLifeandWritings
ofAlexander
Nequam
(1157William
wouldholdthatnegations
1217),Oxford1984.In response
divisions,
signify
not compositions
as Alexander
hereassumes,and thatfuture-tensed
statements
non-existent
stateables.
He doesnotconsider
theotherproblems
signify
presently
Alexander
raises.FortheArsmeliduna
see Log.mod.,II.l, p. 358.
122

20:16:29 PM

true".23We mightnote thatAlexander does not quite understandthe

nominalists' point that the same stateable is only signified by
utterances of the above three sentences made at differentbut
appropriatelyrelated times, or that it is not true to say now that that
Peteris is thatPeterwas; instead we should say that thatPeteris now is
the stateable that will be signifiedby " Peter was then".
Truth
The suggestionthatthe stateable is a compositionor division having
temporal location may seem to fit ill with the claim that stateables
values. It might be thought that if a
never change in their truthstateable is always true it must in some sense always exist, and this,
it mightbe thought,accords betterwith treatingstateables as eternal.
It is importantthen to see that a conception of the stateable as having
value.
temporallocation does not rule out its having immutable truthIn fact William's account of truthand his nominalisticassumptions
allow him to maintain the immutable truth-valueof stateables.
Avicenna held thatthe truthof a statementis its adequation to a res.
William, one of the firstLatin thinkersto make use of Avicenna's
writings,reworksthis theoryto hold that the truthof a statementis
a matterof its adequation to the stateable it signifies,which he identifieswith Avicenna's res, and that the truthof a stateable in turn is
a matterof its adequation to a statementthat signifiesit or thatwould
do so, were it to be uttered.24Adequation (i.e., truth)is a symmetric
23"Secundum
et
forme
essecompositionem
etiamdicentium
enunciabile
doctrinam
Vt enimaiunt,id quod
ad propositum.
subiecti,
qualequalesimileintroduci
poterit
esseestid quodestPetrumfuisseet idemestPetrumfore.Nontarnen
estPetrum
velPetrum
fore"(I.xv;ed.cit.,52); "Placuitergononfuisse
Petrm
esseestPetrum
nichilsit nisi compositio
nullisassererequod enunciabile
predicatiad subiechanc[sic],'Sorteseri?Dant
itemaliquidenunciabile
significatur
tum...Numquid
ististribus:'Sortesest','Sortesfuit',
idemenunciabile
virimaturi
significan
pectoris
eritverum.
'Sorteseri.Quodsiest,dabitur
semper
quodquicquidsemelestverum,
istorum
Sedaliaeritconsideratio
consignificapropter
quameorumquiad idasserunt
seemsto be corrupt.]
determinati.
tionem
Numquidergo
[Thissentence
presents
Sortemesse est Sortemfore?NonneSortemesse estverum,etsiSortemforesit
falsum?"
(Il.xli; ed. cit.,180).
24"Sextaverointentio
etveraeenunenunciata
verietveritatis,
qua veradicuntur
et rerum,
estadaequatioorationis
ethaec[hocNO], aitAvicenna,
idest,
ciationes;
et negationis
<et rerum>" (1.3.26; ed. cit.,795aA-B)."Sive dicas
affirmationis
interipsumenunciabile
et suamorationem
siveconcordantiam
convenientiam
(vel
'hoc
suam,inquam,sicutexposuitibiprius),haec['hoc' N fol.142r,:>;
negationem
estutriusetenunciationis
Veritas
velconcordia
enunciabilis
est'O] ipsaconvenientia
123

20:16:29 PM

relation, an idea of which there is no sign in Avicenna but which

makes some sense once Avicenna' s resis understood as being itselfa
truth-bearer.In a strictsense, then, to say that a statementis true
tacitlyimplies a referenceto a stateable signifiedby it; and to describe
a stateable as true tacitly implies a reference to a statement that
signifiesit or that would do so, were it to be uttered.
Of course this account raises the question of the conditions under
which a statementand stateable are adequated. William's only remark
in this regard is that if the relation of adequation holds the stateable
neitherhas nor contains anythingother, more or less, or in any way
otherwise,than the statementasserts or denies.25He does not explain
this comment, but I think it can be understood as follows.
A stateable is, in the case of an affirmation,a composition of the
significatesof its subject and predicate terms. But it is in preciselythe
conditionsin which these significatesare combined thatan affirmative
statementin the present tense is true. Thus it is preciselywhen the
stateable, i.e., the composition, existsthat the present-tensedaffirmative statementis true. I suggestthen thatby talk of having and containing William has in mind the idea that the stateable has or contains
the existence that the statementasserts it to have. We are to thinkof
statementsas asserting the existence of stateables, and as true provided the stateables exist.26
This is but a firstapproximation, however. Statementshaving past
and futuretenses complicate matters.Now William clearlythinksthat
siveprivatio
illiusestfalsitas
Verumigitur
que, et contrarium
estenunutriusque.
ciabilequoda sua affirmatione
velnegatione
nondisconvenit
veldiscordt"
(1.3.26;
ed. cit.,795aC)."Debesetiamscirequodcumdicuntur
enunciabilia
veraesse,idest,
convenientia
siveadaequataaffirmationibus
aut negationibus
suis,nonintelligitur
hoc quod dicitur['de' add.NO] 'affirmationibus
et negationibus
suis' secundum
Et hocestdicerequia nonintendo<de> affirmaactum,sedsecundum
potentiam.
tionibus
velnegationibus
suisquas praesentialiter
habeant(hocest,quibuspraesentialiter
aut actualiter
sed potiusquibuspossibilia
suntaffirmari
vel
significentur),
oftruth,
seeStevenMarrone,
negari"(1.3.26;ed. cit.,795bD).On William's
theory
William
andRobert
Grosseteste:
NewIdeasofTruth
intheEarlyThirteenth
ofAuvergne
,
Century
Princeton
1983.
25"Debesetiamscirehoc,
veraalicujusenunciabilis
quianonestenunciatio
quaevel
modorum
aliud,autplus,autminus,autaliterquolibet
asserit
velnegatquamhabeat
velcontineat
Et haecestsimilitudo
velaequalitasveladaequatio
ipsumenunciabile.
Avicenna"(1.3.26; ed. cit.,795aC).
quamintendit
26Othersalso seemto haveheldthis
Porview;cf.Peter
ofSpain(Petrus
Hispanus
Tractatus
calledafterwards
Summule
tugalensis)
, ed. L.M. de Rijk,Assen1972,
logicales
207.15-17:"Quedamenuntiabilia
suntexistentia,
ut 'Deumesse'e
tomniavera,etalia
' et omniafalsa".
suntnonexistentia,
ut 'hominem
esseasinum
124

20:16:29 PM

thesestatementssignifystateables thatdo not exist at the time of their

utterance.We have already noted his view that a future-tensedstatement signifiesa presentlynon-existentstateable. This does not mean
it is not true, however. For the truthof a future-tensestatementis a
matterof thefutureexistence of its stateable. For it to be true, the
stateable must exist at the temporal location the statement'stense or
temporaladverbs specify,viz., in the future.27Past and future-tensed
statementsassert stateables to exist at past and futuretimes, and they
are true provided that their stateables existed or will exist at those
times. These remarksmay be extended to negations and the divisions
theysignify,provided we bear in mind the weaker sense in which divisions may be said to exist, and treatthe logical functionof denying as
equivalent to the assertion of the existence of a division.
It is a consequence of William's account of truthand signification
thatthese relationsdo not require the coexistence of theirrelata. This
is crucialto William's rejectionofeternalstateables. He firstmade this
in a discussion concerned
pointabout these relationsin his De Trinitate
'
to show that the relational term " father' asserts nothing in the
Father,28arguing thatthereis a broad class of relations,to which truth
and significationbelong, that do not require the coexistence of their
relata. His argument is based on the point that the truthof certain
ostensiblyrelationallocutions, say, "A loves B", does not require the
existenceof theirdirectobjects. William wants to assimilate semantic
relationsto these cases.
27"Verumigitur
utdixi,suaeaffirmahancintentionem
estsecundum
adaequatum,
immo
unumtempus
estnonsecundum
etistaadaequatio
tionivelnegationi,
tantum,
Oratioigiturveraest qua
etiamin aeternitatem.
secundum
omne,et extenditur
essequodest,autnonessequodnonest,velfuissequodfuit,velnonfuisse
dicitur
se habetde futuro"(1.3.26; ed. cit.,795aB).
quodnonfuit,et similiter
28SeeDe Trinitate
Toronto1976,173.Thispassageis referred
, 30,ed. B. Switalski,
esttibipermequia
: "Alibiautemdeclaratum
De universo
textfrom
tointhefollowing
necponunt
rebusinsemetipsis,
necadduntnecminuunt
etrelationes
comparationes
aut
aut relatum
perhoc,quodestcomparatum
aliquidin illis;nequecomparatum
dictumvel
habetaliquidin se, sed habetaliquidad se vel sibi.Similiter
relatum,
amatum,per hoc quod significatum,
cogitatum,
apprehensum,
significatum,
nonhabetaliquidinse. Necistaedisposiautamatum,
autapprehensum,
cogitatum,
esseilludinquo suntvelde quo sunt.Significatur
tionsseucomparationes
requirunt
estaliquidin eo"
id quodnonest,necsignificatio
enimplurimum
qua significatur
inthe
kinds
ofrelations
of
two
this
We
also
find
ed.
cit.,
conception
795aD).
(1.3.26;
II. 2, p. 337.13-21).De Rijk
monacensis
deunivocatione
{Log.mod..,
logictextTractatus
(II. 1, p. 407) had supposedthisto be Parisiantextfromthethirdquarterofthe
methathewouldnowdatethis
ofthisjournalinforms
buttheeditor
twelfth
century,
workin thefirst
century.
quarterofthethirteenth
125

20:16:29 PM

Granted these doctrines and William's nominalistic views on the

interplaybetween tense and signification,the fact that a stateable is
always true does not require that it always exist or be eternal in any
sense. To say a stateable is true at a given time, as William
understandstruth,essentially
involves a referenceto an actual or possible statementof it as existing at that time. It means that any such
statementis or would be adequated to the stateable. To say that a
stateable is always true is, presumably, to say that every actual or
possible statementof it made at any time is or would be adequated to
it, that is, that the stateable exists at the temporal location that is or
would be specified by any such statement. In other words, cosignifyingstatements,whatevertime theymay be made, will all share
the same truthvalue. It is not hard to see whyWilliam would embrace
this view. According to the nominalists, statementsmade at different
timescan only signifythe same stateable iftheyare what we mightcall
counterpartstatementsin which certain changes in tense or temporal
adverbs have been made. Thus the nominalists would deny that
" Socrates is white" when
utteredat differenttimes signifiesthe same
stateable. Rather, if Socrates is white'' is uttered at t, in order to
signifybeforet the stateable this utterancesignifiesat t, we must state
a sentence such as Socrates will be white at
the same applies,
mutatismutandis
in
the
case
of
statements
made
after
/. But it is evident
,
that if the statement made at t is true, so are those co-signifying
statementsmade before or aftert. For in each case that statementin
effectasserts a stateable, the composition of Socrates and whiteness,
to exist at t; and if one trulydoes so, they all do. Thus if a stateable
is true at some time, it is true at every time, since any actual or possible statementmade at any time that manages to signifyit will indeed
be adequated to it. Thus true stateables are always true, even though
they have a determinatetemporal location.
There is then no immediate inferencefromthe factthat stateables
have temporallocation to the conclusion thattheyvary in truthvalue.
Likewise, the factthat stateables are eternal does not imply that they
do not vary in truthvalue. Indeed, such a conception of stateables
allows for a natural understandingof the claim that stateables change
in truth-value,and this, I suggest, is what William has in mind when
he says that the doctrine of eternal stateables underlies the denial of
the immutabilityof God's knowledge. For if stateables are eternally
existententities,it is natural to thinkthattheycontinue in some sense
to existwhile changingin theirtruth-valuesin line withchanges in the
126

20:16:29 PM

thingstheyare about, even if this change is not a real change in the

stateable but only in these things.29
The doctrine
ofeternalstateables
Many authors in William's day mention the idea of eternal
stateables, but none to my knowledge do so with the degree of
specificitywe find in William. He tells us that:
Posuerunt
enunciabilia,
hocest,omniaveraetfalsa,omniaab aeternofuisseet
haberesuummodumexistendi
a creaturis
et ab omnibusDei
perse seorsum
necessefactaaut creataa creatore,
sed esseaeternaet ab aeterno
operibus;
nihildeberecreatori,
velquantumad essevelquantumad
fuisse,
quapropter
suumbeneesse(1.3.18;ed. cit.,783aA-B).
It will be of some value to unpack carefullythe elementspresentin
thisdescription,but beforedoing so we should considerthe key notion
of eternityat issue here. It is quite clear in William's discussion and
those of other authors of his day, that by "eternity" in this context
theymeant not everlastingtime, but the non-temporal mode of being
thatproperlycharacterizesGod alone. At one point William notes, in
criticismof the doctrineof eternal stateables, thatGod alone is eternal
Both he and his contemporaryRobert Grosseteste
and frometernity.30
were greatlyconcernedto marka sharp distinctionbetween the eternal
and the temporal.31Their concern, however, suggeststhat some were
confusedon thisdistinction,and it would not be surprisingifwe found
such confusionin earlier accounts positing eternal stateables.
With this clarificationof "eternar' in mind, we may turn to the
doctrinelaid out in the above passage. In the firstplace, William
describesit as extending to all stateables, be they true or false. This
part of his account perhaps involves exaggeration or distortion,forit
29Theideathatsuchchanges
ineternal
aremerely
stateables
probapseudo-changes
somerealists
hadin positing
thelackofconcern
changeofknowledge
blyunderlay
ofthe
ofthepseudo-changes
thischangeinGod,a consequence
inGod.Presumably
was
theknowledge
he knew,wasalso realonlyon thesideofthethings
stateables
couldbe
notall thinkers
about.However,
agreedthatchangesin God's knowledge
viewsquite
whoin manyrespects
reckoned
Grosseteste,
proposes
pseudo-changes.
arbitrio
heldin hisDe libero
toWilliam,
similar
(ed. cit.,184-85)that"knows"was
"knows"toGod
ofthepredicate
likethis,andthatanychangeintheapplicability
not
wouldrequiregenuinechangein God.
30"Ipse soluset aeternus
estet ab aeterno"(1.3.18;ed. cit.,783bC).
31See R.C. Dales,Medieval
Discussions
, Leiden-NewYork
oftheEternity
oftheWorld
1990.
127

20:16:29 PM

does not accord withthe motivationhe himselfprovidesforthe theory,

namely, the need to find a subject for eternal truth.
Second, the above passage employs but does not explain a distincand being eternal.These expressions
tion between being frometernity
thinkers.Peter of Poitiers notes
for
medieval
distinct
had
meanings
that to say that somethingis frometernityis to say that it "never has
begun", whereas to say that it is eternal is to say that "it is in such
a way that nothingis past or futureto it".32 "From eternity"tells us
somethingabout a thing's lack of beginning; "eternal" tellsus something about its mode of being. Of course, there is likelyto be a close
relation between these ideas; in particular, given the Christian belief
that everythingin the created temporal order has a beginning, it
would seem thatwhat lacks a beginningcould not be temporal. Robert
of Melun tells us that some authors used the same argumentto argue
for both of these views. Alexander of Nequam, however, notes and
appears to endorse the position that although stateables were from
eternity,theyare nonethelessnot eternal, suggestingto us that some
found especially troublingthe idea that stateables are eternal.33
Third, there is the idea that stateables have their own mode of
existingperse. It is natural to thinkthat in this context"per se" means
"by themselves", as is clearly confirmed by the followingphrase
"apart from creatures". So construed, the doctrine of eternal
stateables holds them to exist in some manner apart fromcreatures.
This of course suggests that they are not themselvescreated items,
and William goes on to point out that proponentsof the view in question held that stateables are neither made {facta)nor created {creata),
thatis, theyare neitherworkedup frompreexistingmatternor created
ex nihilo.Accordinglytheyowe nothingto a creator in regard to their
being. This does not necessarilymean, however, that stateables owe
nothing to God. The proponents of the view in question perhaps
simply meant that stateables owed nothing to God in sofar as he is a
creator
, which allows for the possibility that they are nonetheless in
some manner dependent on God.
Strikingas the denial that stateables are created items is, it is not
hard to understand the pressures that might lead someone to it.
32Sententiae
, 1.34; ed. cit.,292.91-95.
33RobertofMelun,Sententiae
deRobert
deMelun,
vol.3.2.,ed. R., 1.5.45,in: Oeuvres
M. Martinand R.M. Gallet,Louvain1952,257.1-5;Alexander
Nequam,Speculum
, Il.xliii;ed. cit.,182.
speculationum
128

20:16:29 PM

Robert Grosseteste, a contemporaryof William's, mentions a brief

argument to the effectthat prior to God's creation eternally true
stateableswere true, and hence must have existed prior to creation as
were they
subjects for truth,yet they were not God, nor ex hypothesi
creatures.34Robert of Melun outlines a similar argument formulated
in termsof stateables like thatGod is, thattheSon is, and so on. They
are not God, the argument goes, but nor are they created in any
way.35
William rejects the above conception of the stateable. We have
already seen that he thinksthat it underlies an erroneous conception
of God's knowledge as changeable. It has two other defects. First, it
is incompatiblewith treatingthe stateable as a composition. Afterall,
an eternal stateable would have to be prior to the subjects and
predicates of which it is composed, i.e., things that in most cases
belong to the temporal world, and since it is uncreated it could not
have been compounded by anyone, includingGod.36 William does not
consider these points to be a refutationof the doctrine, however,

34Robert
arbitrio
8 (ed. cit.,190.18-25):4'Itemquodverumest
De libero
Grosseteste,
verumest,etveritate
veritate
quae est,et quae aliquid['aliud'Baur]est,sedquod
veritate,
Igitursi informatur
quae est,nonpotestinforman.
purenihilestveritate,
esse.
omnemverumfuitnullamcreaturam
nonestpurenihil.Sed antecreaturam
non
veritate
informabatur
cum
.
.esse'
om.
esse
creaturam
nullam
Baur]
['Ergo.
Ergo
necfuitDeus. Nonenim
fuitcreatura,
fuit
quianondum
purenihil,necfuitcreatura,
utvidetur,
esse'.Fuitigitur,
haecvera'Deus estnullamcreaturam
fuit
quodnecfuit
the
Baur'stext,collating
andcorrected
neccreatura".(I haverepunctuated
creator
Bibl.LaurenLibr.F. 152andFlorence,
Cathedral
MSS heemployedWorcester,
to containthiswork:
discovered
ziana,Plut.18, dext.7- withMSS subsequently
C. 163,andLonBibl.Marucelliana
Cathedral
Libr.,A.iii.12; Florence,
Durham,
in
truths
eternal
of
the
discussion
Grosseteste's
Otho
Cotton
British
Libr.,
D.x)
don,
inhis
toWilliam'sviews.In addition,
similarities
numerous
contains
arbitrio
Delibero
tooappearsto propose
in hisDe veritate
truths
oftheeternal
discussion
, Grosseteste
tothestatement
ofitsconformity
isa matter
truth
signifying
theideathata stateable's
that
ofthedictum
thatthetruth
something
(i.e., stateable)
it;hetellsus, forexample,
to itsstatement
is itsconformity
wasfuture
) in theeternalWord(ed. cit.,
(dictionem
140).
35Sent.1.5.45and58;ed. cit.,256-58;279-81.Anallusion
tothislineofthought
may
in PeterofPoitiers'Sententiae,
1.32;ed. cit.,292.84-91.
alsobe found,I suggest,
36"Qualiterautemcomposita
etpraedicatis,
exsubjectis
sunthujusmodi
quaeutique
temporaliasunt et ex temporecoeperuntpro majore parte? Et quomodo
cumcomsedaeternitate?
Praeterea,
partessuasnonsolumtempore
praecesserunt
aut
fuerunt
a
eorum,
a
creatore
non
et
compositores
qui
eque seipsis,
positasint,
destrucPertranseo
nullocomponente?
vel quomodocomposita
quis compositor,
somniavit"
imbecillitas
intellectus
erroris
tionem
(1.3.18;
istius,quemincogitabilis
ed. cit.,783aB).
129

20:16:29 PM

presumably because its proponents did not conceive of stateables as

compositions or divisions.37
The other defect is mentioned by a number of thirteenth-century
thinkers.This conception of the stateable implies the existence of a
pluralityof eternal beings, although only one being, God, is eternal
in the non-temporal sense they take to be at issue. In fact, as I have
noted, William also expresslyholds that God alone is frometernity.
The motivationforthis conception of the stateable was the need to
finda subject foreternal truth.If stateables have been true frometernity, then surely they must have existed frometernityas subjects of
that truth,and, it mightbe argued, must thereforebe eternal.38This
does not, however, explain why one should treatall stateables as eternal or frometernity,forit failsto accommodate stateablesthatare not
eternaltruths;thoughit mightbe argued thatin theircase therewould
be a need to find eternal subjects for their eternalfalsity.
That certain stateables have been true frometernityis not at issue
in these debates. What is at issue is whetherthis entails the eternality
of these stateables themselves.That it does is a natural conclusion for
anyone who thinksof truthas a propertyof a true stateable, but we
have seen that William does not take this view. Truth is a relation of
adequation between a statement and a stateable. To say that a
stateable has been truefrometernityis to say thatan actual or possible
statementof it in eternitywould be adequated to it, but, as we have
seen, adequation does not require coexistence. "Antichristwill exist"
would state an eternal truth,if stated in eternity,as would any true
future-tensedproposition, but according to William's account this
does not require the existence in eternity
of the stateable whose
37In his Speculum
; ed. cit., 180-82),Alexander
speculationum
(II. xlii-xliii
Nequam
discusses
ofstateables
as compositions
from
that
conceptions
separately
conceptions
takethemto haveexistedfrometernity,
thatthesewerequitedistinct
suggesting
approaches.
38"Jamveroerror
et enunciabilibus
occasionem
quempraedixitibide dicibilibus
habuissevidetur
ex hocquia enunciabilia
<vera?> fuerunt
ab aeterno,
et hocper
viasquas ostendam
tibi.Autenimverafuerunt
ventatequae erateteratin eis,aut
non.Si sic,eratigitur
ventaseorum,eteratineis. Erantigitur
etipsa,cuminnonentibusnecveritas
necaliudessepossit.Si verononeratVeritas
eorumneceratin
veraerantea ventatequae neceratneceratin eis?Hoc enim
eis,quomodoigitur
itadicividetur
ac si diceretur
quodaliquideratalbumalbedine
quaeneceratnecerit
ineo" (1.3.25;ed.cit.,792bG-H).See alsothestudent
letter
editedbyMorininLettre
indite
ab aeterno,
sicprobatur.
Hoc verum,
, 415: "Quod aliquafuerint
Deumesse,
verumfuitab aeterno.Illud ['Item'Morin]fuitverumab aeterno:ergofuitab
aeterno;quia si aliquidestverum,ipsumest".
130

20:16:29 PM

existence would verify the statement.39 Instead, it requires the

existenceof the combination of Antichristand being at a time posterior to eternity,as is indicated by the statement's future-tense.
tensed statements
One mightobject, however, that negative presentabout creatures "The world does not exist", forinstance- are true
frometernity,and hence, given the above account of truth,that their
stateables must exist in eternity.Now William would not, I think,
deny that such statementsare true frometernity;otherscertainlydid
not.40But the stateables they state are, I have suggested, privations,
and the sense in which a privation would exist in eternityis the
minimalone in which therewould be a lack of something,but not that
in which anythingpositive would exist. There is no reason to think
thatWilliam would find this problematic.41
Sourcesof thedoctrine
of eternalstateables
References in writers such as Alexander Nequam, Robert of
Melun, and the anonymous studentleave no doubt thatthinkerswere
proposingdoctrines of eternal stateables in the late twelfthcentury.
Although it is probable that some thinkersin the early thirteenthcentury,too, were proposing such doctrines,42I know of no examples
of them. I shall thereforeturn my attentionto two twelfth-century
textsthat propose doctrines along the lines mentioned by William.
39Itshould
as coextentruths
werenottreated
benotedthatinthisperiodtheeternal
truths.
sivewithwhatwe might
calllogically
Theyweretakento be any
necessary
truefrom
thepointofviewofeternity.
Henceall
stateables
thatcouldbe considered
as akinto a time
truths
are eternaltruths,
future-tensed
eternity
beingconsidered
ofHaleswefind
toAlexander
ascribed
toalltimes.ThusintheSumma
theologica
prior
willexist
ofeternaltruths
suchas thattheworld
a discussion
(ed. cit.,149-50).
40Cf.Grosseteste,
omnium
De veritate
negationum
(ed. cit.,139.32-36):"Veritates
sineinitioantererumcreavidentur
habuisseveritatem
existentia
de creaturarum
'mundum
nonesse'verumfuitetsineinitioverumantemundicreationem,
utpote
tionem".
41It is worth
is conoftheeternaltruths
Grosseteste
notingthatin hisdiscussion
orexistentiae
thatindicate
essentiae
arenoteternal
cerned
toshowthatstateables
, terms
thathasbeing.
something
42Thisis suggested
in theperiod
of thedoctrines
criticisms
bothby thefrequent
ofthe
and also by thefactthatin 1241Williamand Odo, Chancellor
c.1215-35,
thecloselyrelatedviewthatmanytruths
ofParis,condemned
(veritates
)
University
Parisiensis
Universitatis
haveexisted
from
, vol. 1, ed. H. Denifle
eternity
(Chartularium
thatthecondemnation
was
Paris1889,170-72.Itseditors
andA. Chatelain,
suggest
oneofthefirst
Dominican
masters
ofVenice[Stephanus
directed
atStephen
Varnesia],
therein 1248).
inParis;he wasstillteaching
131

20:16:29 PM

43This work,written
The firsttextis John of Salisbury's Metalogicon.
in the 1150s, contains a wealth of informationabout the teaching of
John's contemporaries,but also in a number of places John's own
views. In his discussion of truthJohn proposes the view thatthe truths
significata)have existed from
signified by statements ( enuntiationum
does
are
not
say they
eternity(he
eternal) and fall outside the division
of all things into God and creature. It is worth noting that John
appears to identifyhimselfas a realist.44He writes:
Dei dixerit
Si ergo
etnonab initioomniacontemplatam?
otiosam,
Quismentem
affirmaverit
veraquasiquaedamcogitata
Dei sunt,quisillanisipraesumptuosus
autquisea nonsemper
fuisse
inmenteeiusqui ab aeterno
universa
evanescere,
etscivit,
audeatprofiteri?
disposuit
Nunquidetillenovascogitationes
concipit,
et novamorenostroinitConsilia?
Et licethaec ab aeternofuerint
vera,non
tarnen
dicitur
eius
estad parilitatem
coaeternum,
aliquidcreatori
quiautdictum
nihilomninoconsurgere
potest.Siquidemipsiusestuthaecipsaverasintaut
certa.Quod autemomnisresautcreator
dicitur
autcreatura,
ad substantias
et
ad ea quae substantiis
insunt
univermodo,ex auctoritate
Patrum,
quocumque
sitatiscomplexiorevocatur.
Nam enuntiationum
non contingit,
significata
ad
urgentealiqua rationesermonis.
Qui enimsic partitisunt,respexerunt
Nonnihilergosuntveraquaeinmente
Dei conincomplexorum
significationes.
sed neccreaturae
sistunt,
sunt,eo quod ab aeternoextiterunt.
(4.37; ed. cit.,
176.11-27).
John is sensitiveto the charge that this view undercutsthe distinction of all things into Creator and creature. As the above passage
indicates, he takes this distinctionto apply only to the significatesof
incomplexexpressions, and believes that it does not and never was
intended to apply to the significatesof complex ones.
Furthermore,the items signifiedby statementshave an unusual
mode of being. John tells us that:
Hoc esteisessequodad primitivam
rationis
scientiam
et itaessequasi
referri,
stabili
iudicio.Esseergoistorum,
innotescere
est(ed.
pronuntiari
intemptatoque
cit.,177.32-35).
As John presentsit, his theoryaims to account forthe factthateternally true stateables have been thought by God from eternity.He
seems to reason that being thought of itselfrequires that we admit
some kind of being forthe items thought.John is ratherunclear about
what this being amounts to, but he is adamant that such truths,like
43Ioannis
Saresberiensis
1991.
, ed. J.B. Hall (CCCM 98), Turnhout
Metalogicon
44In a letterquotedin W.J.Courtenay,
intheTwelfth
"Nominales"
andNominalism
PaulVignaux
Paris1991,11-48,
varietates,
Century
(in:Lectionum
hommage
(1904-1987),
at 16),John,writing
to MasterBaldwin,Archdeacon
ofExeter(1167/8),
expresses
hisdesireto focuson things
notmerewords,"meorum
more
realium".
132

20:16:29 PM

other ontologically problematic items, must not be said to be

nothing.45
Nicholas of Amiens in his Chronicles
, writtenc.1200, also indicates
that proponentsof the view that stateableshave existed frometernity
held themto have an unusual mode of being. He informsus that "the
logicians say that genera and species and stateables have been from
eternity",and notes that theyhave in mind not an "actual and true"
mode of being but a "theoretical [doctrinale
] mode of being".46 His
referenceto the "logicians", however, is probably not directed at
, which is neither a work of logic as such nor
John's Metalogicon
advances the view that genera and species have existed frometernity.
He is more likelyto be referringto logical writingsof the late twelfth
century,and they,I think,are more likelyto be William's source, too.
The position William describes, we may recall, holds that all
stateables are from eternityand eternal, have per se existence, are
uncreated, and owe nothing to a creator. Since William holds that
theseviews underlie the doctrinethat God's knowledgeis changeable,
presumably because they imply the variable truth-value of the
stateables known, we should expect to find associated with them the
value. Another interesting
idea that stateables change in their truthbe
added
here.
After
criticizingthese doctrines,William
point may
goes on to add that the proponents of eternal stateables also adopted
the peculiar view that vocesor utteranceswere frometernityand eternal.47The presence of this doctrinealong with the above views would
45"Habentitaqueresnaturae
servelnaturalium
scilicet
cogitationes,
opera,habent
ut
modum,
mones,etverbaetrationes,
singulainquamhaechabentsuumexistendi
enuntiantur
accipiendasitinterpretatio.
proqualitateillius,eorumquae fideliter
autnonesse,
esseveradicantur,
Vndeinspecta
verborum,
diligenter
significatione
Thislatnihilsint"(ed. cit.,177.42-48).
veranonomnino
dumtarnen
noncontendo,
are
stateables
whether
withAlexander
intersects
terpointclearly
Nequam'squestion
something
(aliquid).
46"Paristudiogeneraetspeciesetenuntiabilia
setne
fuisse
ab eterno
Logicidicunt,
sedde
modoessendinonloquimur,
in mododicendi,de iliodoctrinali
quisfallatur
indits
AlaindeLille,Texts
actualietvero";quotedin: M.-T. d'Alverny,
, Paris1965,
doesnotdatetheChronicles
321.D'Alverny
, butweknowthatNicholaswasbornin
and probably
ofthethirteenth
at thebeginning
in theology
century,
1147,reigned
catholicae
De arteseuarticulis
diednotmuchlater.He wrotea workentitled
fidei(PL
deParisau
enthologie
desmatres
c.1187-91{Rpertoire
datedbyGlorieux
210:595-613),
overtheascription
ofthecontroversy
vol.1,Paris1933,263).Fora survey
xiiie
sicle,
thanto AlanofLille,seeG.R. Evans,AlanofLille,
ofthisworkto Nicholasrather
1983,172-87.
Cambridge
47"Et ab hujusmodi
et tria
nonlongeestille,qui posuittriapraedicamenta
errore
Etde rationalibus
moraliavelcivilia,etrationalia.
naturalia,
videlicet,
rerum,
genera
erroris
velpericulosi
nihilpericuli
vocaverunt
rationalia,
quidem,si solossermones
133

20:16:29 PM

be very strong evidence that we have located a source of William's

discussion.
As it happens, the Ars meliduna
, an extremelyimportantParisian
48
written
11
text
c.
70-80,
logic
proposes a great many of these claims,
most
the
idea
that at least some voces
and,
, as well as
strikingly,
have
indeed
existed
from
stateables,
eternity.
In factthe Arsmelidunabegins with the question of when vocesbegan
to exist.49 Its author starts by discussing the view that they never
began to exist, and proposes arguments to the effect that their
elements, i.e., simple voces
, have existed without beginning.50 In
response to thishe raises, among others,the objections thatthiswould
imply that several things,and not just God alone, have existed from
eternity,and that some things(aliqua) have existed frometernity.The
author stands by the formerview, however, and notes that certain
stateables have existed frometernity,too. He remarksthat:
Vocesquidemsimplices,
idestelementa,
sicutetartes,quoniam
fuerunt
semper
habentessea natura,nona positione
etiamfuerunt
ab eterno,
sicut
hominum;
et quedamenuntiabilia
vera(fol.211ra).
To the claim thatGod alone has existed frometernity,he replies by
'
'
'
distinguishingdifferentsenses in which 'being' or 'being frometernity" are said of God and other things:
Et tarnen
solusdeusab eterno
aliterdicitur
de
fuit,quia essesiveesseab eterno
et aliterde substanciis.
Et fordeo,aliterde vocibus,aliterde enuntiabilibus,
tassisideononestdandumaliquaessesi aliquevocessunt,necaliquidessesi
voxest(fol.211ra).
The author has littleto say about these differentsenses of ' 'being",
but his remarksbring to mind bothJohn of Salisbury's and Nicholas
habuitopinioeorum,nisiforte
inillamdeclinaverint
utidem
delirarent
devocibus
insaniam,
erronei
deveris
etfalsis,ethujusmodi
errores
videlicet
dicebantur
voces
quodpraedicti
,
,
quod
fuisse
"
ab aeterno
etaeternas
(783aD-bA).
48Forthedatingsee,R.W. Hunt,Absoluta:
TheSumma
onPriscianus
ofPetrus
Hispanus
Minor
2 (1975),1-22,at 18,note8.
, in: Historiographia
Linguistica,
49De Rijk
extracts
from
thiswork,butomitssomemate{Log.mod.,II. 1) publishes
rialofcrucialimportance
forus inthepresent
context.
I citetheMS, Oxford,
Digby
174formaterial
notprinted
editionis beingprepared
byde Rijk.A complete
byY.
Iwakuma.
50He argues,forexample,
thatthevoxcteo"("I go") alwaysexisted,
sinceeachpart
ofitdid,andthisis becausetheelements
do nothavebeingfrom
humanimposition,
butfromnature,sincetheyarenaturalutterances
thatwe havefound.
(prolationes)
Our finding
themis simply
a matter
ofourdistinguishing
themfrom
otherelements
and assigning
thema propername.
134

20:16:29 PM

of Amiens' point that the doctrine of eternal stateables takes them to

have an unusual kind of being.
Althoughthe last part of the Ars melidunacontains a long discussion
of stateables,it does not returnto the issue of theireternality,at least
not in the extanttext.51Its author appears not to have been concerned
to discuss this issue in detail, perhaps because it raised theological
issues not strictlypertinentto a logical text. Even so, in passing he
proposes a number of the other points we have seen William or
Nicholas of Amiens associate with the doctrine of eternal stateables.
First, in line with William's descriptionof the doctrine of eternal
stateables,he takes the stateable to have a special mode of being per
se. In thisregard, he tellsus, stateables are akin to universais. In both
cases theirperse being is a matterof their being apart fromsensible
thingsand perceptible only by the intellect.52This brings to mind
William's account of per se being as a kind of being ' 'apart from
creatures", and the commentthat in thisrespectstateables are similar
to universaisrecalls Nicholas of Amiens' point that the proponentsof
eternal stateables also held genera and species to have existed from
eternity,although it should be noted that the Ars melidunadoes not
expresslystate that universais have existed frometernity.53
Since William associates the doctrine of eternal stateables
withrealisticpositionson the issues of tense and truthvalue, we might
also expect the Ars melidunato adopt such positions. This turns out
to be so. It treats stateables as tensed and varying in their truthvalues over time.54In addition, it holds that false stateables are some51Muchofthismaterial
hisextracts
wasnotpublished
byde Rijk,although
givean
in
to investigate
oftherangeoftopicstheauthoris concerned
accurate
impression
ofthestateable.
hisdiscussion
52"Nonsuntergouniversalia
necproprietates,
sedhabentsuumesseper
substantie
etvoces,etinania['fama'de Rijk].Quaresuntextra
se,sicutenuntiabilia,
tempora,
extra
velhocindividuum
Socrates
uthecspecieshomo
etextraintelliguntur,
sensibilia
circaipsumintelligitur"
sedtarnen
Socratem,
{Log.mod.,II.l, p. 308). "Nec subsed habentsuumesseperse ... Et comprehenduntur
suntnecproprietates,
stantie
ad ea sensumdonari,utnecvisumnec
Necenimcontingit
etintellectu.
solaratione
auditum"(ibid.,358).
53TheArsburana
toexistper
takesstateables
, II. 2, p. 208.24-27)similarly
{Log.mod.
Alainde Liberahas
ofexistence.
tohavethesamemanner
seandholdspredicables
and
topredicables
ofa persemodeofexisting
thatitsascription
however,
suggested,
See
ofAbelardandnota platonizing
stateables
tendency.
maydisplaytheinfluence
La Philosophie
dela logique
Le "Dialogue"
etledictisme
Abelard
, Actesdu Col, in:Ablard:
Genve-Lausanne-Neuchtel
1981,59-92,at 75.
loquede Neuchtel,
54
esse
veldesinere
utrum
"Deindequeritur
possitincipere
aliquodverumvelfalsum
ut 'id quodcurrit
enuntiabile.
moveri',
Quod videturpropterdictaimplicitarum,
135

20:16:29 PM

thing.55I have argued that William tookfalsa not to exist and hence,
presumably, not to have been anything,but the view that they are
somethingaccords well witha conception of them as eternallyexisting
entitiesthat may be ascribed differenttruth-valuesat differenttimes.
These remarks indicate that William of Auvergne's discussion of
the stateable in De universo
has historicallinks to the Ars meliduna.The
nature of the link remains obscure, however. The most likelypicture
is that William became acquainted with the doctrines of the Ars
melidunaand disputes between nominalists and realists during his
trainingin theologyand the arts in Paris in the firsttwo decades of
the thirteenth-century.
The Ars meliduna
, we may surmise, was still
exertingan influenceon some thinkersin this period. These thinkers
are probably identical to those whom William and othermajor figures
in the 1220s and 1230s frequentlycriticizeforproposing doctrinesof
eternal stateables. Their identitieswould be well worth knowing.
Washington D.C.
Georgetown
University
'
'Socratem
essealbumquodipseest'.Similiter"Socratem
suum'aut esse
diligere
filium
albiorem
Platone
*.Namquemadmodum
locutioque congruaest,fitex reimutatione
itaetipsaenuntiabilia
fieri
videntur
ut 'Socratem
essealbum
incongrua,
nugatoria,
quod
'
desinet
esse
albus
aut
haberefilium...
Ponensuum'
ipseest' vel diligere
filium
quando
dumitaquetaliaenuntiabilia
fieri
nugatoria
posse.Ex quoacciditaliquodenuntiabile
pluriesincipereet desinereesse verumvel falsumiuxtareivariationem..."
(Log.
mod.,II. 1, p. 362-3).
Log.mod.,II. 1, p. 384: Hns rationibus
persuasidicimusquodsicutbonumest
aliquid,itaet malum,sicutverum,ita et falsum"

136

20:16:29 PM

Accountof Material Substance

Duns ScotusJsAnti-Reductionistic
RICHARD CROSS

Duns Scotus' s ontologyis fairlydensely populated with individual

things or entities.1 For example, within any individual material
substance,we will on Scotus's analysis typicallyfindindividual prime
matter, individual substantial form, individual quantity, individual
quality, and a set of individual relations cementing these various
entitiesinto a unifiedwhole.2 Each of these individual entitiesis really
distinctfromany of the others.3Of these entities,Scotus holds thatthe
1 I usethefollowing
ofScotus:Ord.(Ordinatici),
Forworks
inthisarticle.
abbreviations
Led. (Lectura),
Questions
), In Met. (questionson Aristotle's
Quod.(Quodlibetal
to
I also refer
Met.(Metaphysics),
Phys.(Physics).
Metaphysics
); forworksofAristotle:
as In Sent.The following
ofWilliamofWare,abbreviated
theSentence
commentary
MS 137[Scotus,Ord.]);
A (Assisi,Biblioteca
tomanuscripts:
Communale,
siglarefer
MS
MS 206[Scotus,Led]);B2(BalliolCollege,Oxford,
Bi (BalliolCollege,Oxford,
MS Lat. Plut.33 Dext.
Biblioteca
InMet.]);F (Florence,
Laurenziana,
234[Scotus,
MS 103 [Williamof
ofWare,In Sent.]); M (MertonCollege,Oxford,
1 [William
in
I encloserespectively
In theLatintextsandEnglish
translations,
Ware,In Sent.]).
inserted
material
brackets
in
and
by
myself.
square
pointed
draft
ofthispaper,
an earlier
forreading
I shouldliketothankRichardSwinburne
andforhelpwithsomeoftheissuesraisedin it.
2 For primematterand substantial
form,see Lect.2.12, nn. 49, 58, 68, Opera
Omnia,editedbyC. Balieand others(VaticanCity1950-),XIX, 88, 91, 95; for
seeQuod.3, n. 3, OperaOmnia,
andquantity,
ofquality
andtheaccidents
substance
editedbyLukeWadding,12vols(Lyons:Durand,1639),XII, 67; EnglishtranslaThe
GodandCreatures.
tion(basedon a criticaltextpreparedby FelixAlluntis),
andLonandAllanB. Wolter
(Princeton
, editedbyFelixAlluntis
Questions
Quodlibetal
see Ord.2.1.5,n. 200 (Vaticanedition,
VII,
don),p. 62 (par.3.12). On relations,
101-2).
3 According
forreal
condition
and sufficient
is a necessary
to Scotus,separability
see forexampleOrd.2.1.5, nn. 200-4(Vaticanedition,VII, 101-3).
distinction:
substantial
forprimematter,
form,
quality
Scotusisclearthatitis(logically)
possible
see:Led. 2.12, nn. 47-48
all to existseparately
and quantity
(forprimematter,
seeInMet.7.15,n. 8 [Wadding
form,
XIX, 87-88]; forsubstantial
edition,
[Vatican
see Ord.4.12.1,n. 5
ofqualityand quantity,
IV, 719a];fortheaccidents
edition,
and nonsubstance
that
is
clear
Scotus
edition,VIII, 711]). Equally,
[Wadding
fromany
accidents(i.e., qualityand quantity)can existseparately
relational
tothem(Ord.2.1.5,nn.200,205 [Vatican
whichmight
relations
pertain
categorical
and this
possibleforthisprimematter
VII, 101-104]).Sinceit is logically
edition,
thatthis
wecanconclude
thissubstance,
toexistwithout
form
substantial
constituting
137
E.J.Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:16:38 PM

essential constituentsof a material substance are prime matter and

substantial form. I want to look at the followingquestion: In what
sense do prime matterand substantial form,when united, constitute
material substance? This question can be construed in two different
but importantlyrelated senses. (1) In what sense do individual prime
matter and individual substantial form constitute an individual
substance? (2) In what sense do prime matteras such (i.e., the essence
or quiddity of prime matter)4and substantial formas such (i.e., the
essence or quiddity of substantial form) constitutecomposite essence
as such (i.e., the essence or quiddity of composite substance)?5 (In
each of these uses, the terms Substantial form', Composite
substance', and 'composite essence' are to be understoodas glossed by
'of such-and-such a kind'.)
In what follows,we shall see Scotus' s answers to both these questions. But he does not always distinguishbetween them. There is a
good reason for this. Scotus holds that individual substance is really
identical with the essence which it instantiates. Since the essence
instantiated by a substance- which of course determines everything
about the kind of thing the substance is6- is really identical with the
substance, there is an exact correlation between the mereology of
essence as such (in terms of its really distinct
components) and the
mereology of an individual substance (in terms of its really distinct
components).7Thus, ifessence as such is a compositeof reallydistinct
substance
is reallydistinct
fromthisprimematter
and thissubstantial
form.This
distinction
willbe thetopicofthispaper.Forotherbriefaccounts
oftheprincipal
issueaddressed
in thispaper,seeTamarM. Rudavsky,
TheDoctrine
ofIndividuation
inDunsScotus
, in: Franziskanische
Studien,59 (1977),320-77and62 (1980),62-83
andSemantics
(p. 349-52);Costantino
intheOntology
Marmo,Ontology
, in:
ofDunsScotus
UmbertoEco and CostantinoMarmo (eds.), On theMedievalTheory
of Signs,
1989,143-93(p. 156-7);Prospero
Amsterdam-Philadelphia
diG.
Stella,L'ilemorfismo
DunsScoto,
Turin1955,p. 147-63(Pubblicazioni
delPontificio
AteneoSalesiano.II.
Testie studisulpensiero
medioevale.
2).
Scotusclaimsunequivocally
thatprimematter
hasan essenceorquiddity:
seefor
exampleOrd.2.3.1.5-6,nn. 138,187(Vaticanedition,
VII, 462,483); Ord.3.22,n.
7 (Waddingedition,
VII, 443); Met.7.15,nn. 3, 5-6(Wadding
IV, 717b,
5 edition,
718a-b).
'
In thetexts
whichI discussinthisarticle,
Scotususestheterms
, 'essentia*
quidditas*
,
'
natura
, and'quodquidest
In whatfollows,
(communis)
I translate
all
interchangeably.
ofthesetermsas 'essence'.
6 See Ord.2.3.1.5-6,nn.
181-82,197(Vaticanedition,
VII. 480-1.488-9
7 By
'reallydistinct
here,I meantopickoutmatter,
components'
and
form,
relation,
non-relational
accidents.
I do notmean,forexample,individual
material
or
parts,
extended
continuum.
partsofa spatially
The unityofa complex
is in
organic
body
factsomething
whichScotuswillhavesometrouble
with:seebelow,note16.On the
138

20:16:38 PM

parts,thenan individual substance instantiatingthatessence is a composite of the same really distinctparts.

Despite holding that an individual substance is reallyidentical with
itsessence, Scotus does not hold thatan individual substance is in every
way identical with its essence. He argues that any individual entity
(including a composite substance) can be analysed into two really
identical'components': essence and individuatingfeature.These two
components,unlike the entitativecomponents of a substance, are not
reallydistinctfromeach other; theyare ratherwhat Scotus labels 'formallydistinct': really identical, but susceptible of definitionindependentlyof each other.8
is comcontinuum
extended
other
hand,in no casedoesScotusholdthata spatially
XVII, 252). According
posed
ofitsparts:seeLect.1.17.2.4,n. 221(Vaticanedition,
ofactandpoteninterms
toScotus,fora unity
ofparts,weneedan analysis
composed
suchthatone partis actual,and theotherpotential.
(By 'act' and 'potentiality,
one ofwhich[viz.,act]is aptto be
Scotusmeansto pickouttwoentities,
tiality',
On thewholeissue,see
received
by,or to inherein,theother[viz.,potentiality]).
(SI) in sectionfourbelow.
8 ForScotus'sformal
seeOrd.1.8.1.4,n. 193(Vaticanedition,
IV, 261distinction,
Distinction
TheFormal
seeMauriceJ. Grajewski,
discussion,
ofDuns
2). Fora thorough
of
A Study
inMetaphysics
D.C. 1944(The CatholicUniversity
Scotus.
, Washington
seetheaccount
America
Series,90). Fora morerigorous
presentation,
Philosophical
in theEarlyFourteenth
, in: Norman
Century
byMarilynMcCordAdams,Universals
andEleonore
Kretzmann,
Stump(eds.),TheCambridge
Anthony
Kenny,
J. Pinborg,
Medieval
1982,411-29(p. 412-17);alsoAllanB.
, Cambridge
Philosophy
ofLater
History
M. Bonansea(eds.)
Distinction
TheFormal
, in:JohnK. RyanandBernardine
Wolter,
D.C. 1965,45-60,(Studiesin Philosophy
1265-1965
DunsScotus,
, Washington
John
in AllanB. Wolter,ThePhilosophical
ofPhilosophy,
andtheHistory
3), reprinted
McCordAdams(Ithaca-London
DunsScotus
, editedbyMarilyn
1990),
Theology
ofJohn
ofindividuation,
tohisaccount
distinction
ofScotus'sformal
. Fortherelevance
27-41
seeOrd.2.3.1.1,n. 32 (Vaticanedition,
VII, 403); Ord.2.3.1.5-6,nn. 179-80,192
ingeneral,
see
ofindividuation
edition,
VII, 479,486).On Scotus'saccount
(Vatican
Ord.2.3.1 passim(Vaticanedition,VII, 391-516);also MarilynMcCordAdams,
TheDoctrine
intheEarlyFourteenth
Universals
, p. 412-7;TamarM. Rudavsky,
Century
Individuation
B.
Scotus's
Allan
in
Duns
Scotus
Individuation
, in: The
Wolter,
;
Theory
of
in:
DunsScotus,
DunsScotus
, 68-97;AllanB. Wolter,
John
ofJohn
Theology
Philosophical
TheLaterMiddleAgesandthe
in Scholasticism.
J.E. Gracia(ed.), Individuation
Jorge
1150-1650
Counter, Albany1994,271-98;WoosukPark,TheProblem
of
Reformation
ora Principle
A Principle
Individuation
?, in: FranofDistinction
ofIndivisibility
forScotus:
makesit
ciscanStudies,48 (1988),105-23.Scotus'sbasicaccountofindividuation
intowhathelabels
ofa concrete
clearthatwhatis at issueis theindivisibility
entity
VII, 412-13];Ord.2.3.1.4,
'subjective
parts'{Ord.2.3.1.2,n. 48 [Vaticanedition,
at is that,unlikean essence,
n. 76 [Vatican
VII, 426-7]).Whatheis getting
edition,
item:and it is thisnon-repeatability
is a non-repeatable
an individual
which,for
between
Scotus'saccountoftherealdistinction
prime
Scotus,requires
explaining.
accidents
formand non-relational
substantial
matter,
(i.e., qualityand quantity)
ofanyofthe
wouldseemto entailthateachoftheseis individuated
independently
anditsaccidents
substance
thecaseforcomposite
Thisisclearly
others.
{Ord.2.3.1.4,
139

20:16:38 PM

Since my task is exegetical, it will not always be possible to keep the

two questions raised above separate, and I sometimes deliberately
chose ways of speaking which draw attentionto the factthat Scotus is
in at least some passages providingan answer to both of the questions.
In this way, I shall try to remain reasonably faithfulto my Scotist
sources. On the other hand, whereverpossible I shall tryto keep the
two questions separate. I shall talk of issues raised under the firstquestion in terms of individual matter, individual form,and (when relevant) relational entity constitutingan individual substance; and of
issues raised under the second question in terms of matter as such,
form as such, and (when relevant) relational propertyconstituting
essence as such. When I wish to referindifferently
to both the quesI
shall
in
terms
of
tions,
matter,form,relation(when relevant),
speak
and substance. Likewise forthe terms 'nature' and 'quiddity'. When
I speak of 'matter', 'form', 'substance', and 'essence', I understand
therebyprimematter, substantialform, composite
(material) substance,
and composite(material) essence, unless I specify some different
meaning.
I shall sometimes (for convenience) talk of a position's being
'Aristotelian'. By this, I mean to draw attentionto one or more of
n. 89 [Vaticanedition,
forprimematter
andsubstantial
form.
VII, 433-4]).Likewise
- sivepartialissivetotalis
- alicuiusgeneris,est de se
"Omnis entitasquiditativa
ut entitasquiditativa,
ad hancentitatem
et illam,ita quod,ut entitas
indifferens,
estnaturaliter
uthaecest,et ut priorestnaturaliter,
quiditativa,
prioristaentitate
sicutnon convenitsibi esse hanc, ita non rpugntsibi ex rationesua suum
etsicutcompositum
nonincludit
suamentitatem
esthoc)
oppositum;
(qua formaliter
- in quantumnatura
- includit
in quantumnatura,itanecmateria
suamentitatem
- in quantumnatura
- includitsuam". Ord.
(qua est haec materia),nec forma
2.3.1.5-6,n. 187(Vaticanedition,
VII, 483); see alsoOrd.2.3.1.4,n. 114(Vatican
edition,VII, 447); Ord.2.3.1.5-6,nn. 138-40,211 (Vaticanedition,
VII, 462-63,
thatthe
494); see alsoGrajewksi,
p. 152.The passagejustquotedseemsto suggest
substance
constituted
and individual
formis
composite
byindividual
primematter
individuated
oftheindividuation
ofitstwonecessary
independently
parts:and this
seemstobe a supposition
madethroughout
Scotus'
s discussion
oftheindividuation
ofcomposite
substance.
The reasonis thattheessenceofa composite
substance
is a
and 'everyquiddity
is communicable,
quiddity,
(Ord.2.3.1.7,nn. 227-28[Vatican
substance
is individuated
edition,
VII, 500]).IfScotusreallymeansthata composite
ofitstwonecessary
independently
parts,thenhewouldseemtohavemadea mistake.
It is surely
forsomething
whichis composed
ofnon-repeatable
impossible
partstobe
a repeatable
essence.Thus,I wouldarguethattheindividuation
ofthepartsisa sufficientcondition
fortheindividuation
ofthewhole.PerhapsScotus'spointisjustthat
a wholecomposite
essenceis a quiddity,
and thatas suchit requires
somekindof
wherethisindividuation
couldbe completely
accounted
forby the
individuation,
individuation
oftheparts.
140

20:16:38 PM

threepossible claims, each of which looks to be Aristotelian: (1) a

meaningfuldistinctioncan be made between an essentialpropertyand
an accidental property; (2) a meaningful distinction can be made
betweensubstantial unity and accidental unity; (3) matter and form
can reasonably be labelled material and formal causes. It does not
especiallymatterwhetherthese claims can actually be foundin Aristotle.9They look to me, however, to be assumptions with which the
schoolmenwould be happy, and which the schoolmen would be happy
to see as Aristotelian.
and unity
: substance
1. Introduction
Scotus's account of the union of matterand formto constitutecomposite substance (having matter and form as parts) is stronglyantireductionistic:it is not true, on his account, that substance is identical
withits parts, or that substance is merely the aggregate of its parts.
I shall label Scotus's account R' Scotus opposes his account to four
reductionistaccounts: Rl: composite substance is just the
different
aggregateof all its non-relationalparts (viz., matter and form); R2:
compositesubstance is just the aggregate of all its non-relationaland
relationalparts (viz., matter,formand the relation existingbetween
them);R3: substance is just form;R4: substance is just matter.In this
article,I shall be interestedprimarilyin Rl and R2. Scotus rejectsR3,
accordingto which matteris at best accidental to substance,10since he
holds (1) that it violates all of the Aristotelian claims listed above
(claimswhichScotus believes to be true),11and (2) that it entails denying that there could be natural generation and corruption.12Scotus
9 Itlookstomeas though
in
claimcanbe foundin Aristotle's
thefirst
explorations
Met.7.4,thesecondclaimin Met.5.6, and thethirdin Phys.2.3.
10ForScotus'
s accountofR3, see Ord.3.22, n. 3 (Waddingedition,VII, 441-2).
is to be
thisposition
in theWaddingedition,
annotation
tothemarginal
According
a passage:
do not,however,
toAlberttheGreat.The annotators
attributed
suggest
on theSentences
andinhiscommentary
, 3.22.1ad 1, Albertclearlyrejectsan idenwithessence(OperaOmnia,editedbyS.C.A. Borgnet,
form
ofsubstantial
tification
Forsomeoftheambiguities
38 vols[Paris:Vivs,1890-99],
XXVIII, 385b-386a).
useoftheterms'form'and'essence',seeGeorgWieland,
inAlbert's
anddifficulties
des Groen
Alberts
imMetaphysikkommentar
zumSeinsbegriff
, Mnster
Untersuchungen
undTheologie
derPhilosophie
zurGeschichte
1971,pp. 18-40(Beitrge
[Westfalen]
desMittelalters,
N.F., 7).
11See Ord.3.22,nn. 5-8(Waddingedition,
VII, 443-44).
12SeeOrd.3.22,n. 9 (Wadding
VII, 445);alsoLect.2.12,nn.11-16 (Vatican
edition,
XIX, 72-74).
edition,
141

20:16:38 PM

rejects R4, according to which formis merelysomethinglike matter's

mode of organization,13since he holds that it entails that formis the
same species ofthingas matter,and consequently- since matteris just
of one species- that all formsare of just one species: a claim which
Scotus holds to be false.14
I will not consider R3 and R4 any further,since Scotus construes
both theoriesto deny that substances have really distinctparts of the
relevanttype(viz., matterand form). On R1 and R2, a substance will
have such reallydistinctparts, such that the parts constitute
the whole.
As we shall see, Scotus holds thatboth R1 and R2 amount to the claim
that a composite substance is the aggregate of its parts. But R2 is disbetween the
tinguishedfromRI just because R2 allows thatthe relation
non-relationalparts (matter and form) is itselfa part of the whole.
Clearly, a termsuch as 'whole' is fairlyambiguous: we are usually
prepared to use it in all sortsof ways, some of which entail far closer
unitiesthan others. I am moderatelyhappy, forexample, to talkabout
a whole bundle of sticks,a whole deck of cards, a whole black sheep,
a whole cat, a whole angel, the whole divine nature. These more or
less natural usages correspond to differentusages of 'unity' which
Scotus is prepared to allow:
(1) The unity of aggregation
(2) The unity of order
(3) Accidental unity
(4) Substantial unity (viz., the unityof a substance composed of
really distinctparts)
(5) The unity of simplicity(viz., the unity of a substance composed of merely formallydistinctparts)
(6) Formal unity (viz., unity which has no parts at all, either
really distinctor formallydistinct).15
I shall label these differenttypes of unity respectively 'unityi', to
'unitye'. The relevant unity for our purposes is unityi As Scotus
discusses unity4in relationto composite substance, it is clear thatthere
are two distinctionsat stake. The firstis ratherdifficultto spell out.
Roughly, at issue is how to distinguishbetween (1) the whole which
13
totheeditors
oftheVaticanedition,
R4 canbe attributed
toRichardof
According
Middleton,
Quaestiones
Disputatae
, 17: see Vaticanedition.XIX. 77-78.
14Led. 2.12,n. 56
edition,
XIX, 90).
15Ord.1.2.2.1-4,n.(Vatican
403 (Vaticanedition,II, 356-7).
142

20:16:38 PM

of matterand form(and, on R2, relaconsistsmerelyof the aggregate

of matterand form:where
which
is a composite
tions),and (2) the whole
the conditionsfor(2) cannot consist merelyin adding some
satisfying
furtheritem to the aggregate of matterand form(and relation), and
wheresatisfyingthe conditionsfor(2) will include satisfyingthe conditionthatthe whole is some entityreallydistinctboth fromits parts and
fromthe aggregate of them. Thus, on (2) a whole is more than just
its parts. I shall label this distinction 'substance-distinctiom'. How
Scotus understands this distinctionwill emerge fullyin the final sectionof thispaper. The second distinctionis thatbetween and accidental collection of items and a substance. I shall label this distinction
'substance-distinctiom'.Thus, at issue in substance-distinctiomis
how to provide a principleddistinctionbetween unityi and unity4.At
issue in substance-distinctiomis how to provide a principled distinctionbetweenunity3and unity4.Scotus is clearlycommittedto both of
these distinctions: though it looks to me as though substancedistinctiomhas more metaphysical import. In what follows, I shall
indicate if an argument is relevant to substance-distinctiom;otherwise, I shall assume that what is under discussion is substancedistinctiom.Scotus attemptsto show that adopting either R1 or R2
will fail to provide the tools for an account of substance-distinctiom.
Finally,it is worthnotinga littleabout the contextof the argument.
The discussions mostlyoccur in the contextof a consideration of the
unity of a human composite. A human composite, according to
Scotus, consists of prime matter, bodily form, and intellectivesoul.
Primemattertogetherwithbodily formconstitutethe body.16Scotus's
professedaim is to show how body and soul constituteone substance.
But, as a perusal of the texts quoted in the notes below will show,
16On theplurality
ina humanbeing,seeOrd.4.11.3,nn.25-57(Wadding
offorms
thebodily
hastwoforms:
thatan animate
thing
edition,
VIII, 629-54).Scotusaccepts
it as 'probable'thatthereare someotherforms
andthesoul.Buthe regards
form
from
different
as well.He reasonsthattheorgansofa complex
bodyarespecifically
. 4.11.3,n. 46 (Wadding
see Ord
forms:
substantial
eachotherin virtueofdifferent
then,Scotusholds,theywillbe ordered
VIII, 649).Iftherearesuchforms,
edition,
withregard
andpotential
tomatter,
form:
tothebodily
theyareallactualwithregard
VIII, 646]). On theother
tothebodilyform{Ord.4.11.3,n. 4 [Wadding
edition,
toeachother
ofthedifferent
toseehowtheforms
organsareordered
hand,itisdifficult
material
of
the
forms
are
and
of
in
terms
partsof
different
potentiality act):they
(say,
forthe
condition
thenScotuswillgrantthata necessary
thecomposite.
Presumably,
with
actual
all
are
forms
various
that
the
is
an
animate
of
organic
composite
unity
In the
tothesamebodilyform.
withregard
andpotential
tothesamematter,
regard
himinso doing.
andI shallfollow
thisdifficulty,
Scotusignores
I shalldiscuss,
texts
143

20:16:38 PM

Scotus holds thatexactlythe same problem holds forthe unityof matter and form.17Since the unity of matter and form is the standard
case - obtaining in the case of every material substance- I will concentrateon this issue. But we should also bear in mind that the same
kinds of arguments hold for the non-standard case of the unity of
human body with intellectivesoul.
2. Rl: composite
substanceis thecollection
ofall its non-relational
parts
Eventhough
thewholeis otherthantheparts,or from
eachpartseparately,
it
is nothowever
otherthanall thepartsat once.18
The wholeis [not]another
beingthanall thepartsconjunctively.19
Scotus attributesthis opinion to Averroes.20The parts at issue are
non-relationalparts: specifically,matterand form.Thus, Scotus consistentlydiscusses Rl as though it entails that the conjunction of the
non-relational parts does not add any furtherentityto these parts.
There is, of course, a number of ways in which Rl might be
developed: depending upon what exactly the relationbetween matter
and formshould be understood to be. This question will itselfdepend
on a general account of what it is to be a relation. Scotus, forexample,
understands a relation between two entities- say, their union or
conjunction- to be itselfa thing or entitywhich would count as part
of a whole. A relation is what Scotus would label a 'relational' entity:
the kind of entitywhich is necessarily dependent on the existence of
the termsof the relation.21Granted that necessarilya relation(say, of
union or conjunction) is a thingwhich would count as part of a whole,
17Furthermore,
willmakeitquiteclearthatScotusisconperusalofthequotedtexts
cernedwithprime
matter.
The forms
ofairand firearecommon
offorms
examples
and theforms
ofsuchelements
employed
wereheldto
byScotusin hisdiscussions:
inheredirectly
in primematter.
18"Licet totumsit
aliuda partibus
sivea qualibetparteseorsum,
nontarnen
ab
omnibuspartibus
simul".Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144rb;Waddineedition,
VII, 75 in.
6]).
19"Totum<non>sitensaliudab omnibus
coniunctim".
Ord.3.2.2(A, fol.
partibus
144va;Waddingedition,
VII, 76 [n. 7]).
In hislargecommentary
on Aristotle's
to
, Averroes
claims,withreference
Physics
thematerial
"Totumenimnihilaliudestquamcongregatio
partsofa substance:
partium"(seeAristotelis
cumAverrois
Commentaria
Opera
, 11 vols[Venice:Iuntae,15501
IV, fol.7va[n. 17]).
21See MarkG.
Relations.
Medieval
Theories
1250-1325
Henninger,
, Oxford1989,ch.
5.
144

20:16:38 PM

RI should be rejected, since it entails the denial of this claim. But R1

could make perfectsense on a differentaccount of relations. R1 could
easily be held by someone who believed a relation to be a mode, or
an intention,or indeed anythingwhich could not be meaningfully
called a partof some whole, or an item contained withinsome whole.
And there were plenty of possible takers amongst the Schoolmen for
claims such as these.22 Scotus, however, does not capitalize on his
account of relationsto criticizeRl. His argumentsare all intended to
show merelythat union must in somesenseinvolve more than just the
two (non-relational)parts: while remainingneutral on just what needs
to be added to the two non-relationalparts to allow them to constitute
a whole. (I shall follow Scotus in labelling non-relational parts and
properties'absolute' parts and 'absolute' properties.)
As understood by Scotus, Rl amounts to the followingclaim:
(A) An individual substance is merely the aggregate of all its
individual absolute parts.
Scotus's basic argument against Rl is that it cannot allow a clear
account of substance-distinctioni:
(Rl '1) (PI) An individual substance exhibitsa unityat least as great
as unity3.
(P2) Something exhibitingunity3is more than the aggregate
of all its individual absolute parts.
(CI) An individual substance is more than the aggregate of
all its individual absolute parts ([PI] and [P2]).
(P3) If Rl, then an individual substance is merely the
aggregate of all its individual absolute parts.
(C2) Not Rl ([CI] and [P3]).
(PI) and (P2) are Aristotelian,23as Scotus makes clear. (P3) relies on
Scotus's assessment of what Rl amounts to. But someone who held
a non-entitativeaccount of relations might regard (P3) as fairly
misleading. On such an account, the only partsthat a substance has
might be its matter and form; but this would not entail that a
substance was merely the aggregate of its parts: viz., it would not

22See Henninger,
medieval
of a numberof different
Relations
, fora discussion
theories.
23For(PI), seeMet.8.6 (1045a8-10);for(P2) seeMet.7.12 (1037bl5-17).
145

20:16:38 PM

entail (A). In any case, someone accepting (A) mightregardboth (PI)

and (P2) as false.24
(Rl'2)

ad quernof generation is either

(PI) If (A), then the terminus
individual matter or individual form.
ad quemof generation is neitherindividual
(P2) The terminus
matternor individual form.
(C) Not (A).

(PI) is justified on the grounds that the end term of generationmust

be some really existing entity.(P2) is justifiedby the claim that it is
at least possible thata substance be generatedfrompre-existentmatter
and pre-existentform. Scotus appeals to the resurrectionof the body,
where on medieval accounts a composite is produced from two
individual pre-existentparts: its body and its soul.25 This argument
and the followingwould seem to present any adherent of (A) with
some difficulties:and any adherent of Rl, where R1 is understoodto
entail (A).26
(Rl '3) (PI) If (A), then it is not possible thatan individual substance
be destroyedwhile both its parts still exist.

24"Ostendoquod totumsitensaliudab omnibus

coniunctim
et divisim.
partibus
Proboquia aliasnonessetdistinctio
totiusvelunius:8 metaphysicae
va,ubidicitur
quod totumvel unumaliudquod est per se unum,aliudtotumquod est unum
utcumulus
velacervus,et istudtotumsecundum
estsuaepartestanaggregatione
tum.Consequensinconveniens
videtur:tumex 8 metaphysicae,
tumquia etiam
unumperaccidensestmagisunumquamilludaggregatione
unum,etminusunum
unumperse,ettarnen
totum
unumperaccidens
nonestsuaepartestanquamtotum
7 metaphysicae
c. de unitate
inhoc
tum,quia (secundum
philosophum
definitionis)
esthomoalbusunumaliquid,quia albedoinesthomini;nonigitur
essettaletotum
unumsi noninformaret".
Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144va;Waddingedition,
VII, 76 [n.
71).
25As shownabove,Scotusholdsthatit wouldbe
logically
possiblefora nonsubsistent
formtobe keptin existence
fromanymatter:
andpresumably
separately
thatitcouldbe unitedwithsomeexisting
matter.
Scotuscouldappealeasilytothis
claimin ordertojustify
(P2) moreeffectively.
26 "Per se terminus
ad quemgenerationis
estaliquidhabensentitatem
propriam,
estad esseproprii
termini.
Sed totumestprimusterminus
ad quem
quia generatio
nonalterapars.Immosi utraqueparspraeexistat
etde novounirentur
generationis,
nihilominus
essetgeneratio
vel productio
sicutin resurrectione.
ipsiuscompositi,
Dato quodtamanimaquamcorpuspraeexisterent
secundum
suasentitates,
adhuc
- nonautemad essecorporis
fieret
resuscitatio
totiuscompositi
et animae,necad
amboista.Igiturad aliquodtertium
aliudab istis".Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144va;WadVII, 76 [n. 7]).
dingedition,
146

20:16:38 PM

(P2) It is possible that an individual substance be destroyed

while both its parts still exist.
(C) Not (A).
(PI) seems true. (P2) is justified by generalizing the Aristotelian
argument27that the two letters 'a' and 'b' of the syllable 'ab' can
remain even if the syllable itselfno longer exists. The relevant parts
here are, of course, matter and form.28
(RV.4) (PI) This individual matter cannot be the material cause of
itselfor of this individual form; this individual formcannot
be the formalcause of itselfor of this individual matter.
(P2) This individual matter is the material cause of some
individual entity;this individual formis the formalcause of
some individual entity.
(CI) This individual matterand this individual formare the
material and formal causes of some individual composite
entity([PI] and [P2]).
(P3) If (A), there is no such individual composite entity.
(C2) Not (A) ([CI] and [P3]).
(PI) is a basic metaphysical principle: neither matter nor form has
eithera material or a formalcause. If (P3) is true, then the truthof
(A) would entail that (P2) is false: where the precise claim would be:
This matteris not the material cause of some entity,and this formis
not the material cause of some entity.(I have put [RV.4], as will be
obvious, in a rather abbreviated way.) And the falsityof (P2), thus
construed,does not look very plausible. But is (P3) true? We could
answer affirmativelyonly if we stipulated that an entityexhibiting
unityi couldnot count as an individual composite entity:which looks
question-begging.Thus, an adherent of (A) could perhaps claim that
some entityexhibitingmerelyunityiwould satisfythe requirementsof
(CI): meaning that (P3) is false. But (R1 '4) would at least show that
27Met.7.17( 1041b11-17).
28"Potestarguia simili,vel assumi,de corruptione,
secundumargumentum
in fine,quia manet'a' et 'b' etnonmanet'ab': etidem
7 Metaphysicae
Philosophi
ab 'a' et 'b'
nonpotestmanereetnonmanere.Igitur'ab' estaliudrealiter
realiter
nonrepugnet
cumitasitin omnibus
compositis
perse quodrationipartium
Igitur
et totumnonmaneat,aliquaeritentitaspropriaipsiustotiusalia
utillaemaneant,
Ord.3.2.2(A, fol.144va;Waddingedition,
ab entitate
VII, 76 [n. 7]). As
partium":
of
and formcan existindependently
shownabove,Scotusarguesthatbothmatter
eachother.
147

20:16:38 PM

the adherent of (A) would be forced to give a non-standardaccount

of what it is to be a material or formal cause.29
( Rl'5 ) (PI) If (A), then proper passion, operation and accident
would inhere either in individual matter alone, or in
individual form alone, or in some aggregate of these two
parts.
(P2) Proper passion, operation and accident do not inhere in
individual matter alone, or in individual form alone, or in
some aggregate of these two parts.
(C) Not (A).
(PI) is clearly true. (P2) is a metaphysical principle which is central
to any non-reductionistaccount of substance. I will defera discussion
of it to the finalsection. Like (R1 '2) and (R1 '3), the argumentturns
fromany
on at least some of the propertiesof the whole being different
of the propertiesof the parts.30Of course, an adherent of (A) could
claim that the propertiesof the whole are differentfromthose of the
parts: in the last section of this article I will suggest a clear
metaphysical principle, which Scotus seems to accept, which will
perhaps allow a clear account of substance-distinctiom.
isjust thecollection
substance
3. R2 : composite
and relaofall itsnon-relational
tionalparts
R2 is held by William of Ware.31 William reasons that, if R1 were
true, then it would be impossible to give an account of the union of
the parts of a composite substance. He argues as follows.
29"... Aliasnihilessetperse causatum
a causisintrinsecis,
scilicet
materia
etforma.
hoccompositum
Quod enimistaecausaecausent
patet,quia istaecausaesuntpartes
causati:sedistaenonsuntpartesnequealterius
earumnequeambarum,
quianeutra
estcausata,nequeambae,quia suntprimaecausaeet primaprincipia
rei. Igitur
etc.". Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144;Waddingedition,
VII, 76 [n. 7]).
..quodnullumensessetcui perse inessetpropria
Sequeretur.
passioet propria
accidensproprium,
operatio,vel quodcumque
quia istainsuntspeciei,nec insunt
materiae
necformae
eiusnecutriquesimulnisiutsuntunuminaliquototoperse".
Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144;Waddingedition,
VII, 76 [n. 71).
31On WilliamofWare,See A. Daniels,Zuden
zwischen
Wilhelm
vonWare
Beziehungen
undJohannes
DunsScotus
, in: Franziskanische
Studien,4 (1917), 221-38;Joseph
Die mehrfachen
desSentenzkommentars
desWilhelm
vonWare,
O.F.M. ,
Lechner,
Fassungen
in:Franziskanische
31(1949),99-127;GedeonGi,Gulielmide
O.F.M.
Studien,
Ware,
Doctrina
, in: Franciscan
Studies,14 (1954),
Philosophica
perSumma
Capitula
Proposita
zumscholastischen
desSchpfersichen
155-80,265-92;LudwigHdl,Untersuchungen
Begriff
inderTheologie
desWilhelm
vonWare
andOlafPluta(eds.),
OM,in:Burkhard
Mojsisch
Historia
MediiAevi.Studien
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
desMittelalters
, 2 vols.
Philosophiae
Amsterdam
1992,387-408.
148

20:16:38 PM

(RV.6) (PI) If two individual absolute entitiesare necessarilyunited

to each other, then they are parts of some whole such that it
is not possible for them to be separated fromeach other.
(P2) It is possible fortwo individual absolute parts [viz., matter and form]to be separated fromeach other.
(C) It is not the case that two individual absolute entitiesare
necessarilyunited to each other.
(PI) looks reasonable, and (P2) would be accepted by all the
schoolmen as a standard account of corruption.32As we shall see,
William reasons fromthe conclusion to the claim that,fortwo absolute
entitiesto be united, thereis necessarilyrequired some furtherentity
over and above the two absolute entities. This claim, of course, is
inconsistentwith (A), which according to both William and Scotus is
entailed by Rl. William reasons, however, that the required further
component cannot itself be an absolute entity. He gives two
ad absurdum.
argumentsfor this, both reductiones
(R2. 1) (PI) If thereis some absolute form(Fi) required to explain the
unityof matterand substantialform(F), then Fi is the highest
formin the composite.
(P2) There is such a form.
(CI) Fi is the highestformin the composite ([PI] and [P2]).
(P3) Higher formsare more perfectthan lower forms.
(C2) Fi is more perfectthan F ([Cl] and [P3]).
According to William, (C2) is false, since the substantial formis the
mostperfectformin the composite. Since (PI) and (P3) are true, (P2)
must be false.33
(R2.2)

(PI) If it is the case that an absolute formcan make a perse

32"Quod partesnondicantactualemunionemnec separationem

praecise,patet:
sidicerent
nonpossent
unionem
actualem
actualiter;
separari
praecise
quiasidicerent
InSent.
departibus":
nonpossent
actualem
uniri,etideoistarepugnant
separationem
I
William'sSentence
3.2.2[qu. 164](F, fol.165v).Whenquotingfrom
commentary,
to notethevariant
noted.I makeno attempt
follow
thetextin F unlessotherwise
tothenowstandard
refer
in squarebrackets
in M. The questionnumbers
readings
und
vonWare
Wilhelm
zwischen
numeration
Johannes
giveninDaniels,ZudenBeziehungen
DunsScotus,
p. 230-8.
33"Omnisforma
alias
in unitate
continet
ulterior
estperfectior,
ulterior
quia forma
esset
Si igitur
etsensitivm.
inse vegetativam
continet
sicutintellectiva
praecedentes
In Sent.
essetperfectior
ultraintellectivam,
aliaforma
quamintellectiva".
compositi
3.2.2[qu. 164](F, fol.165v).
149

20:16:38 PM

unity with some other entityonly in virtue of some further

absolute form, then there is an infiniteregress of forms.
(P2) An infiniteregress of formsis impossible.
(C) An absolute formcannot make a per se unity with some
other entityin virtue of some furtherabsolute form.
(PI) is justifiedby the claim that, ifforany absolute formwhatsoever,
some furtherabsolute form(let us label it a 'unifyingabsolute form')
is required in order to explain the unityof the absolute formwithsome
other entity,then a fortiorisuch an absolute formwill be required to
explain the unity of the unifyingabsolute formwith that to which it
is united: and so on ad infinitum
.34In both ( R2.1 ) and (R2.2), William
is supposing that the added absolute entityis some formwhich somehow perfectsor informsthe matterand substantialform,and thereby
causes theirunity. This unifyingabsolute formis still a part of some
whole: the otherpart is the matterand substantialformwhich the unifyingabsolute form informs.
Since the composite is not just identical with its matter and form
(from [Rl'.]), and since a composite is not identical with matter,
substantial form and some furtherunifying absolute form (from
[R2.1] and [ R2.2] ), William reasons that a whole material substance
must consist of matter and substantial form togetherwith a relation
between these two absolute components. William argues that, when
some substance is generated, the only new entityinvolved is a new
relation between matterand form. Likewise, he reasons, when some
substance is corrupted,the only entitywhich ceases to exist is the relation existing between the two absolute parts:
The parts[ofa composite]
arepriortotheirbeingcombined:
the
nevertheless,
wholecomposite
is saidto be generated.
Butthewholediffers
reallyfromthe
whichresults
fromtheunionoftheparts.
partsonlyin virtueoftherelation
results
theseparation
ofthenatural
union[ofthe
Likewise,
corruption
onlyfrom
- whichis a relation.And thus,a relationis theterminus
of thecorparts]
ruption.35
34"Si totum
addataliquidrealesuperpartes,accipioillamformam
compositi
quam
tu das et materiam
suam.Illa formaet istamateriasuntpartesalicuiuscompositi.
diffrt
realiter
ab istispartibus
et
Igituroportet
perte quodformaistiuscompositi
iterum
et materiam
suam.Cumsintpartes(habent
accipioillamformam
compositi
unumcompositum),
ab istispartibus,
diffrt
etsie
oportet
quodillaforma
compositi
in infinitum".
In Sent.3.2.2 [qu. 164](F, fol.165v).
35 Priussuntpartesantequamcomponantur,
et tarnen
et
totumdicitur
generari
totum
nondiffert
realiter
a partibus
nisisecundum
relationem
quaeacciditexunione
Et similiter
acciditex solaseparatione
naturalis
unionisquae est
partium.
corruptio
relatio:etitarelatio
estterminus
'. InSent.3.5.5 [qu. 172](F. fol.172r:
corruptions'
150

20:16:38 PM

Since on this account the composite is no entityother than matter,

form,and relation,I take it thatWilliam is committedto the following
variant of (A):
(A*) An individual substance is merely the aggregate of all its
individual absolute and relational parts.
William suggests the followingargument against his theory:
( R2'l ) (PI) If a substantialchange is a change merelyin the category
of relation, then there is a change that is a change merelyin
the category of relation.
(P2) There is no change that is a change merely in the
category of relation.
(Cl) A substantial change is not a change merely in the
category of relation ([PI] and [P2]).
(P3) If a substantial change is not a change merely in the
category of relation, then substantial change necessarily
involves the generationor corruptionof some absolute entity.
(C2) Substantial change necessarily involves the generation
or corruptionof some absolute entity([CI] and [P3]).
Accepting (C2) is unacceptable for William. He reasons that the
absolute parts- i.e., matterand substantial form- are not generated
or corruptedin a substantial change; therefore,if (C2) is true, some
otherabsolute must be generatedor corrupted:and the only candidate
is the composite of matterand substantialform.Thus, accepting (C2)
would entail accepting that in the composite there is some absolute
entityover and above its absolute parts of matter and substantial
form:a position which William rejects in ( R2.1 ) and (R2.2). (PI) is
analytic;and (P3) looks fairlysecure.36William thereforereasons that
the Aristotelian (P2)37 should be rejected.38 Scotus agrees with
seealsoIn Sent.3.2.2 [qu. 164][F, fol.165v], quotedin note38 below;thesame
fromthe[absolute]
partsexceptin virtueofa
point-thatthewholedoesnotdiffer
- is madein In Sent.3.6.2 [qu. 175][F, fol.174r]).
relation
36"Nulla unitioperse estad relationem,
quia 'in ad aliquidnonestmotusnec
etincorruptione
ingeneratione
mutatio'.
aliquid
producitur
aliquidabsolutum
Igitur
in
secundum
non
autem
destruitur.
absolutum
philosophum
generantur
partes
Ipsae
sedcompositum.
incorruptione,
7,sedcompositum,
ipsaepartesnoncorrumpuntur
est aliud
tam generatio
ad quod terminatur
quam corruptio
Igiturcompositum
a partibus".In Sent.3.2.2 [qu. 164](F. fol.165r).
differens
realiter
absolutum
37See Phys.5.2 (225bl1-13).
38"Cumdicitur
ad aliquidabsolutum,
terminatur
quodestgeneratio,
quodmutatio,
sed ad realemrelaad aliquidabsolutum
quod terminetur
nego,quia nonoportet
151

20:16:38 PM

William that (P2) should be rejected, and hence Scotus cannot use
(R2'l) against William, or in support of his own theory.39
Crucial to a correct understanding of William's theory is some
notion of William's account of relations. Elsewhere, William discusses
at some lengthjust how a relation should correctlybe described. He
rejects the theorythat a relation does not involve any furtherentity
over and above the foundationof the relation (i.e., that in virtue of
which the two related terms are related). He argues as follows:
(S)

(PI) If a relation does not add any entityover and above the
foundation,then relation belongs to more than one category.
(P2) Nothing can belong to more than one category.
(C) A relation adds some entity over and above the foundation.

(PI) is presumably to be justified by arguing that, if a relation does

not add any entityover and above the foundation,then relation will
belong to the same categoryas that to which the foundationbelongs.
(P2) follows fromconsiderations of the Aristoteliancategories as an
exhaustive taxonomy. Granted (C), William reasons that a relationis
a thing which belongs to the category of relation- irrespective,

presumably, of the category to which the foundation belongs.40

According to William, therefore,a relationis a thing.It has an essence
over and above the essence of its foundation.41In the case of the
(substantial) unityof matterand form,William argues that the foundation of the relation is just the matter and form.42
Granted William's claim that the relationbetween matterand form

tionem".In Sent.3.2.2 [qu. 164](F, fol.165v:see alsoIn Sent.3.5.5 [qu. 172](F,

fol.172r],quotedin note35 above).
39See
Ord.3.1.1, nn. 14-15(Waddingedition,VII, 23).
40 Contraistamopinionem
arguitur
primocontrahoc quod dicitquod una res
sicutexemplificai
de actioneetpassione".In
potestessein diversis
praedicamentis,
Sent.1.33.3[qu. 99] (F, fol.83r).
41"Dico igiturad quaestionem
dicitaliamessentiam
ab
quod relatioin creaturis
essentia
itaquodopposito
modoestinDeo etincreaturis.
Namibi[M,
fundamenti,
fol.91ra;om.F] ratiofundamenti
etratiorelationis
suntdiversae
rationes
reaies,non
tamenrelatio
estalia resa fundamento.
In creaturis
autemnonsolumsuntdiversae
rationes
realesratiofundamenti
etratiorelationis,
immoipsarelatio
estalia resa re
' refers
fundamenti".
In Sent.1.33.3[qu. 99] (F, fol.83v).1Ratiorealis
to somekind
offormal
or intentional
distinction:
see Gi, Gulielmi
de Ware,
176.
p.
42"Fundamentum
autemhuiusrelationis
ad quod terminatur
estcorpus
generatio
et anima".In Sent.3.2.2 [qu. 165](F, fol.165v).Williamhereis referring
to body
and soul;buthisremarks
mutandis
and formalso.
hold,mutatis
, ofmatter
152

20:16:38 PM

is itselfa thing, it would be possible to formulatean objection to his

position along the lines of (R2.2):
( R2.2 *) (PI) If it is the case that a formcan make a perse unity with
some other entityonly in virtue of some furtherform, then
there is an infiniteregress of forms.
(P2) An infiniteregress of formsis impossible.
(C) A formcannot make a perse unitywith some other entity
in virtue of some furtherform.
The point of the objection is that, if it is necessary to posit a further
(relational) form (call it 'Ri') to explain the unity of matter and
substantialform,thenit will be necessaryto posit a further(relational)
formto explain the unity of Ri with the matter and form which it
unifies: and so on ad infinitum
,43
William does not raise the objection: but his discussion of relations
would neverthelessprovide him withthe tools to answer it. He reasons
thatthe addition of a relationalentityto an absolute one does not itself
produce a composite whole. Rather, thereis just what William labels
'apposition' between the two entities.And, presumably,whateverthis
apposition is, it is not the kind of state of affairswhich requires any
furtherontological explanation.44( R2.2 *) is not an objection which
Scotus could invoke against William's position, since Scotus too
believes that it is possible to block the proposed infiniteregress.45
Scotus rejectsR2 on the grounds that it does not allow a principled
.
account of substance-distinctiom
( R2'2 ) (PI) If unity4consists merely in two absolute parts and the
relation between them, then unity4is the same as unity1.
(P2) Unity4 is not the same as unityi
(C) Unity4does not consist merelyin two absolute parts and
the relation between them.
43Thisobjection
fromAvicenna
has a longhistory
ofrelations
againstthereifying
onwards:
see Henninger,
Relations,
p. 89.
44"Nec tamenex hocquodestalia relatioa fundamento
estibiproprie
compositio
albumsimile[M, fol.91ra;similem
F] quamsitalbum),
(utputanonestcompositius
nisiappellando
materialem,
quamante.
quiaibisuntpluresessentiae
compositionem
etessentia
etpriusfuitibisolumessenabsoluta
Estenimibinuncessentia
respectiva,
sed appositio
tiaabsoluta.Undenonestibi proprie
magis,quia plures
compositio
essentiae".
In Sent.1.33.3[qu. 99] (F, fol.83v).
45Scotusachieves
from
is notreallydistinct
thisbyclaiming
thata relational
entity
see Henninger,
Relations
itsrelation
ofinherence:
, p. 90-1.
153

20:16:38 PM

(PI) is entailed by Scotus's understandingof unityi and by (A*). (P2)

looks here as though it is pre-theoretical.As we shall see, Scotus does
have some arguments for it.46 Scotus' s next argument seems less
significant:
(R2'3)

(PI) If the entitydistinguishingthe whole fromits parts is a

relation, then the essence of the whole is formallyrelational.
(P2) The essence of the whole is not formallyrelational.
(C) The entitydistinguishingthe whole fromits parts cannot
be a relation.

(PI) is presumably warranted by the claim that the distinguishing

entity(' entitaspropria') is what determinesthe species to which some
substance belongs. An adherent of R2 could, however, simply deny
(P2). Nevertheless, denying it would entail denying the received
wisdom about the elementsof a definition:Scotus, forexample, points
out that (P2) is entailed by the claim that the essences of substances
belong to genera the members of which clearly are absolute, and not
relational, entities.(Think of the genus 'animal', forexample.) But a
determined adherent of R2 could deny even this.47
Scotus also claims that versions of arguments(Rl'2), ( Rl'3 ), and
(R1 '5) are effectiveagainst R2. The followingfourargumentsare the
strongestthatScotus proposes against R2, since theyprovide him with
good metaphysical reasons for his claim that it is possible to give a
clear account of substance-distinctioni.I shall reserve discussion of
these arguments until section five.

46"Dico quod <totum>etiamest aliudens, et alia entitate

absoluta,quia solus
nonsufficeret
ad hocquodtotumdiceretur
respectus
perse unum,quia in totouno
estperse respectus
etessentialis
utpatetde dependenperaccidens
partisad partem,
tiaaccidentis
ad subiectum".
Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144va;Wadding
edition,
VII, 79 [n.
makesitlookas though
theissueisgiving
anaccount
ofsubstance8]). Thisargument
it wouldbe possibleto makea substance-distinctioni
distinction.
Since,however,
- andonewhich
without
a substance-distinction,
I takethistobe a mistake
making
Scotushimself
rectifies
ina laterdiscussion,
with
R2
thefailure
to
clearly
identifying
"Non dicithumanitas
solum
givean accountofsubstance-distinctioni:
respectum
unionis
ultrapartes
- Si enimhomonihilessetnisipartes
unitaesibi,homononesset
homonisiaggregatione".
Ord.3.22 (A, fol.164va;Waddingedition,
VII, 451 [n.
On this,see also,on analogywithRl, (Rl'.l).
181).
47 "Quidditatesomniumabsolutorum,
ut includentes
materiam
et ut definibiles
nonsunttantum
formaliter
entiarespectiva,
(quiautsicsuntspeciesgeneris
absolti)
si entitaspropriatotiusessetrespectus".
Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.
quod tarnen
oporteret
144vay
VII, 79 [n. 8]).
Waddingedition,
154

20:16:38 PM

(R2'4)

ad quemof generation is a
(PI) If (A*), then the terminus
relational entity.
ad quernof generation is not a relational
(P2) The terminus
entity.
(C) Not (A*).

(R2'5)

a quoof corruptionis a relational

(PI) If (A*), thenthe terminus
entity.
a quo of corruptionis not a relational entity.
(P2) The terminus
Not
(A*).
(C)

(R2'6)

(PI) If (A*), then absolute causes are the causes merely of a

relational entity.
(P2) Absolute causes are not the causes merelyof a relational
entity.
(C) Not (A*).

(R2'7)

(PI) If (A*), then proper passion, action, and absolute

accidents would inhere in a formallyrelational entity.
(P2) Proper passion, action, and absolute accidents do not
inhere in a formallyrelational entity.
(C) Not (A*).48

Scotus offersone furtherargument against R2:

(R2'8)

(PI) If some essence as such has a specific difference,then

that specificdifferencewill itselfbe specificallydifferentfrom
any other specificdifference.
(P2) A relation is not specificallydifferentfrom any other
relation.
(C) A relation is not the specificdifferenceof any essence as
such.

Althoughhe does not spell this out, Scotus must be relyingon a claim
thatR2 entails that a relationis the entitywhich distinguishesa whole
substance from its absolute parts: and that as such it must be the
specificdifferenceof the essence of a substance. Hence, R2 violates
48'Hoc etiamconcludunt
rationesfactaead primumarticulum,
quia neque
ad quern;necetiamcorruputad terminm
aliquaestperse ad respectum
generatio
suntsoliusrespectus
a quo; nequecausaeabsolutae
uta termino
tioesta solorespectu
totumpraeciseinquantum
velrespectivi
causae,nequepropriapassioconsequitur
Ord.3.2.2(A,
velaliquidaccidensabsolutum".
nequepropria
operatio
respectivum,
fol.144va;Waddingedition,
VII, 79 [n. 8]).
155

20:16:38 PM

(C) here, and is thereforefalse. (PI) looks reasonable. (P2), on the

other hand, would look as though it requires some justification:
though Scotus clearly wants to remain fairly non-committal('non
videtur
possibile tantam ponere differentiam[viz., specificam]respectuum': my italics). (PI) does not entail an infiniteregress, since a
specificdifferenceneed not itselfbe a complete essence, and hence be
definable in termsof genus and specificdifference.But the inference
fromR2 to the claim that a relation (on [R2]) is the specificdifference
of the essence of some substance looks false. A specific difference
distinguishes the differentspecies in some genus: it does not standardly distinguisha whole fromits parts.49
4. R

Scotus's anti-reductionistic
accountof materialsubstance

Scotus claims that a whole composite substance is some absolute

entity really distinct from all of its parts. He construes this claim
carefullyto preclude the view that this absolute entityis itselfa part
of some (further)whole. Thus, Scotus cites with approval William's
arguments ( R2.1 ) and (R2.2).50 He also agrees with William that, if
matter and substantial formare to be actually united, it is necessary
that thereexist a relation between them.51Like William, Scotus holds
52Granted that a relation counts
that a relation itselfcounts as a thing.
as a thing, Scotus will be committedto the claim that the relation of
the two absolute parts adds some furtherentityover and above the
49 "Nec tandemvidetur
differentiam
omnium
possibileposseassignare
specificam
tantam
inter
quidditatum:
quianonvidetur
possibile
poneredifferentiam
respectuum
79 fn.81).
partesunitas".Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144va;Waddingedition,
VII,
50"Si
in totopraeterformam
estin homineanima
intelligatur
partis(cuiusmodi
essealiamformam
illiquaesitetiamaliquidipsius
intellectiva)
quasisupervenientem
dicaturformatotius(distinguendo
earncontraformam
totius,et tarnen
partis)quia
constituit
totum
isteintellectus
estfalsus,
completius
quamillaalia forma,
quia tunc
essetinhomine
constituens
hominem
animaintellectiva,
aliquaforma
perfectior
quod
- puta
estinconveniens.
Similiter
si innitatur
rationiacceptaeex perfectione
totius
unumnisiperaliamformam
quia ex materiaet formaquae est parsnon fieret
- istaratioconcluderei
unientem
illaspartes,
ininfinitum,
quae sittotius,
processum
et formapartis.Si ex
quia etiamde ipsaquaeroquomodofacitunumcummateria
se, igitursic potestconcedide formapartis,quod ex se sitnatafacereunumcum
in infinitum".
Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144va;Wadmateria;si peraliud,eritprocessus
dingedition,VII, 79 [n. 81).
51 "Esse quidemtotiusnecessario
concomitatur
uniopartiumet econverso.
Nec
tarnen
illaunioestilludesse,quia unioestrespectus,
et esseilludestabsolutum":
Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144vb;Waddingedition,VII, 80 n. 111).
52See above,
note21.
156

20:16:38 PM

absolute parts. But, as we have seen, Scotus holds that (A*), entailed
by William's theoryR2, is not a sufficientdescriptionof a material
substance.(A*), according to Scotus, is an accurate descriptionnot of
unity4,but merely of unityi. Thus, (A*) does not allow for a clear
account of substance-distinctiom
.
Scotus puts the claim that essence as such is a composite of formas
such and matter as such as follows:
Iftheform
ofthewholeis understood
nottobe something
a whole,
constituting
butrather
tobe thewholenatureitself
takenas quiddity,
thenitcanbe rightly
conceded
thattheform
ofthewholeis different
from
thepartialform,
andthat
nature
orquiddity
canbe called'form'.Thisis clearfrom
Aristotle,
Metaphysics
I reply
5.2.53... Withrespect
towhatis it[viz.theformofthewhole]a form?
withrespect
tothewholecomposite,
notan informthatit[isa form]
bysaying
formaddedto thewholecomposite],
buttheformin
ingform[i.e., a further
ofwhichthecomposite
is a beingin a quidditative
virtue
way.Andin thisway
a form,just as whiteis said to be whiteby
thewholebeingis formally
- notthattheform
ofthewholeis so tospeaka causeofitself,
whiteness
causing
a kindofa wholetogether
withmatter
andthepartialform.
Rather,it[viz.,the
form
thewhole]is thewholeitself
considered
justin thewaywhichAvicenna
5: 'horseness
is justhorseness'.54
speaksofin Metaphysics
In thispassage, 'partial form'( 'forma
partis3)refersto substantialform.
The point of the passage is that essence as such is more than just its
reallydistinctcomponents: essence as such is really distinctfromits
really distinctcomponents. Thus, the components constitute some
essenceover and above the essence of the components. Assuming (A*)
to entail that a whole is just identical with the aggregate of its parts,
R' entails that (A*) is false. Since essence, as understood by Scotus,
is not some new part of some furtherentity,Scotus' s claim that the
essence is a new absolute does not fall victim to William's
arguments ( R2.1 ) and (R2.2) against essence as some further
absolutepart. Of course, essence understood as a whole, ratherthan
as a part,does not have any parts that are not eithermatter,form,or
531013b21-23.
54"Si tamenintelligatur
sednaturatota
totiusnonaliquidconstituens
forma
totum,
totius
sitaliuda forma
hocmodobeneconcedipotest
utquidditas,
partis,
quodforma
5 Metaphysicae
etquodnaturavelquidditas
possitdiciforma:patetex Philosopho
cuiusestforma?
Respondeoet dicoquod respectu
cap.de causa Sed respectu
estens
sed formaqua compositum
nonquidemformainformans
totius
compositi,
album
sicutalbumdicitur
estforma,
ensformaliter
Ethocmodototum
quidditative.
etforma
totiussitquasicausaipsius,cummateria
nonquidemquodforma
albedine,
secundum
sedestipsumtotumpraeciseconsideratum
causansquasitotum,
partiali
iliummodumquo loquiturAvicenna5. Metaphysicae,
'Equinitasest tantum
". Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144va;Waddingedition,VII, 80 [n. 9]).
equinitas'
157

20:16:38 PM

relation: but on Scotus' s non-reductionisticaccount, it is

matter-form
neverthelessstill not identical with its parts.
The same is true of individual composite substance. As I have
noted, Scotus tends to slip fairlyreadily between these two different
points, and he oftentalks of 'composite' ambiguously, not making it
clear whetherhe is talkingabout composite essence or this individual
composite. But the contextmakes it quite clear that what he is saying
about the unityof a composite applies to this individual composite as
much as to composite essence. The discussion of RI, R2, and R',
takes place within a consideration of the union of Christ's human
nature to the second person of the Trinityin thehypostaticunion. The
question is: Was this human nature assumed by the second person of
the Trinity by means of the assumption of its parts, or not? And
Scotus is elsewhere quite clear that Christ's human nature is itselfan
individual substance, individuatedwithoutreferenceto its union with
the second person of the Trinity.55In our text, Scotus makes the
following remarks about this individual substance (viz., Christ's
human nature):
The wholenatureoutofparts... is a certain
third
from
eachof
being,different
itsparts,and frombothtogether
or separately.56
It is also worth noting that a whole substance on R' will be really
distinctfromits parts. Some of Scotus' s argumentsagainst R1 and R2
make this clear: see particularlythe text cited at ( Rl'3 ): (AB [viz., a
whole] is really differentfromA and B [viz., its parts]'. Equally, the
parts of the whole are reallyseparable fromthe whole: since, as Scotus
supposes, the absolute parts can continue in existence even if the
whole does not exist. (Separability is a sufficientcondition for real
distinction.)57Thus, the whole is really distinctfromits absolute and
relational parts.58We can thus formulatethe basic claim of the theory
as follows:
is someabsolute
from
matter,
form,
relation,
(B) Substance
entity
reallydistinct
and anyaggregate
oftwoor moreoftheseparts.
55See forexampleOrd.3.1.1,nn. 6, 17 (Waddine:
edition,
VII, 12, 25).
56"Naturatotaex
tertium
aliuda partibus
partibus...est
quoddamensabsolutum
et ambabusconiunctim
et divisim".Ord.3.2.2 (A, fol.144vb;Wadding
utrisque,
edition,
VII, 80 fn.111).
57On theseparability
criterion
forrealdistinction,
see above,note3.
58A puzzling
noteplacednextto(RV.l) seemstosuggest
otherwise:
'Nota
margin
veldivisim
quodtotumnonestaliudrealiter
quampartesvelconiunctim
acceptae'
claimsinthemaintext,I assume
(A, fol.144va).In thelightofScotus'sunequivocal
thisto be a mistake.
158

20:16:38 PM

(B) should be understood to exclude the claim that therecould be any

partsotherthan matter,formand relation. (B) should also be understood to entail that substance exhibitsunity4.I will discuss this claim
furtherin the last section.
Scotus addresses threeproblems raised by R' (SI) Can R' provide
for the fact that matter and substantial form can be
an explanation
united in such a way as to constitutea whole which exhibits unity4?
for the fact that accidental forms
(S2) Can R' provide an explanation
cannot be united with some other entityso as to constitutea whole
whichexhibitsunity4?59(S3) Can, as R' supposes, an absolute entity
(viz., the whole composite substance) depend on, or at least presuppose, a relational entity?60
(SI) The most importantdiscussion gives what looks like a standard
Aristotelianreply to the question:
and formis one,because'thisoneis act,and thatone
A composite
ofmatter
forjustas thereis no mediumbetween
as Aristotle
saysthere:61
potentiality',
anditsbeing
form
anditsbeinga causein itsgenus,andnonebetween
matter
a perse unity.62
constitute
a cause,thesetwotherefore
According to this passage, matter and substantial form are united
immediately to each other as potentiality and act: matter is
immediatelypotentialto form,and formis immediatelyactual to matter. For this reason, a composite of matter and formis one in itself.
Thus, the explanation of the fact that matter and substantial form
uniteto make an entitywhich exhibits unity4is just that matterand
substantialformare the types of thing that they are.
By labelling matter'potential', Scotus does not mean that matteris
pure potentiality,or that it somehow fails to be an entityor thing in
itsown right.Scotus consistentlyclaims thatmatteris potentialmerely
in thesense of being a subject capable of receiving(substantial) forms,
or in which formscan inhere. Scotus labels this type of potentiality
'subjective potentiality'.63Subjective potentialityis not a property
59For(SI) and(S2), see Ord.3.2.2, n. 10 (Waddingedition,
VII, 80).
60Ord.3.2.2,n. 11 (Waddingedition,
VII, 81).
61Met.7.6 (1045b7-21).
62"Compositum
,
ex materiaet formaestunumquia hocactuset llludpotentia
et ipsamesse
sicutibidiciPhilosophus;
quia enimnonestmediumintermateriam
etipsamessecausamingenere
ingenere
suo,ideoper
causam
suo,necinterformam
unum".Led. 2.12,n. 50 (Vaticanedition,
sefaciunt
XIX, 89). See alsoOrd.3.2.2,
XIX, 95).
n. 10(Wadding
VII, 80); Led. 2.12,n. 67 (Vaticanedition,
edition,
63Led.2.12,nn.30, 37 (Vaticanedition,XIX, 80, 82).
159

20:16:38 PM

instantiable only by prime matter. Scotus believes, as noted above,

thatsome composite substances contain two (or more) essentialforms.
A necessary(though not sufficient)condition forthe substantialunity
of such composites is that the various forms are arranged hierarchically: the composite composed of mattertogetherwitha lower form
is itselfsubjectivelypotential to a higher form.64Since the significant
claim here is that matterand lower formsare subjectivelypotentialto
, be used to give an account of
higher forms,R' can, mutatismutandis
the substantial unity of any composite exhibitingunity4,irrespective
of the number of hierarchicallyarranged formswhich, with matter,
compose it.
(52) Scotus claims that it is not possible to provide an explanation
forthe fact that accidents cannot be united with some other entityso
as to constitutea whole which exhibits unity4i
Thereis noreasonwhythisentity
isperseactwithrespect
tothatentity,
whereas
another
is onlyperaccidens
tosomefurther
[act]withrespect
entity,
exceptthat
this[kindof]entity
is this[kindof]entity.65
(S2) in fact concerns the possibility of giving a clear account of
substance-distinctiom:or more precisely, the grounds upon which
such a distinctionis to be made. Scotus, as the passage makes clear,
is fairlyagnostic about the grounds on which the distinctioncan be
drawn. On the other hand, his account of (SI) makes it clear that he
does not have such difficultywith substance-distinctioni.
(53) Scotus argues that there is no difficultyinvolved in affirming
thatsome absolute entitycan depend on, or presuppose in some sense,
a relational entity. He argues that, generally, any natural causal
activityentails spatial proximity:a fortiori
, then,natural causal activity
in
the
of
a
substance
or absolute accident entails
resulting
production
spatial proximity.But spatial proximity,in Scotus's fairlyAristotelian
account of place, is itselfmerelya relation. Hence, the natural production of some substance or absolute accident depends on a relation.
in the case of a whole dependAnalogously, then, thereis no difficulty
the
relation between its parts.66
ing upon
64On this,seenote16above,and
Ord.4.43.1,n. 7 (Wadding
conveniently
edition,
X, 6).
65"Quareautemistaentitas
estperse actusrespectu
tanistius,etaliaperaccidens
tumrespectu
nonestratio,nisiquiahaecentitas
esthaecentitas".Ord.3.2.2
alterius,
(A, fol. 144va*b;
Waddingedition,VII, 80 [n. 10]). See also Led. 2.12, n. 50
(Vaticanedition,
XIX, 89).
66"Nec estinconveniens
velpraeexigere,
velsaltem
aliquidabsolutum
dependere,
Universaliter
enimomneabsolutum
coexigerealiquo modoaliquemrespectum.
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20:16:38 PM

5. Assessment
Is Scotus right to hold that a whole is more than merely the
aggregateof its parts (where the relevant parts are matter,formand
relation)?I do not know the answer to this ratherambitious question.
But I will tryto spell out more clearlywhat his position mightamount
to. First, I will exclude those arguments which fail to suggest why
drawinga substance-distinctiomis desirable. One argument,( Rl'4 ),
relies on the stipulation of the per se unity of a composite as a pretheoreticalgiven. Much the same trait is revealed by (R2'3), which
tradeson the stipulationthatthe quiddity of a whole is not in any way
a merelyrelational property.These two arguments thereforecannot
his position. Other argumentsfail forother
be used by Scotus to defend
reasons to be relevantto a fullyarticulateddefence of R' (R2.1) and
(R2.2) amount to the rejection of an unsuccessful non-reductionist
account of substance. Equally, rejection of ( R2'l ) is consistentboth
withR2 and with R' Rejecting (R2'.l) requires the rejection of the
Aristotelianclaim that there can be a change in a relational property
only as the result of a change in some non-relationalproperty:i.e.,
in the categoryof
thatit is not possible forthereto be a change merely
relation. ( R2'8 ) trades on the related stipulation that an absolute
cause cannot be the efficientcause of a merelyrelational entity.This
stipulationlooks inconsistentwith a rejectionof the Aristotelianclaim
in ( R2'l ). Since Scotus does reject this Aristotelianclaim, it seems
difficultto see how we can allow him the stipulation required for
(R2'8). Finally, (Rl'.l) and (R2'2) show that R1 and R2 will have
. They are
providinga clear account of substance-distinctiom
difficulty
if
R1
and
the
adherents
to
the
adherents
of
R2
thusof relevance
just
of these theorieswould be reluctantto make this reductionistmove.
But the two argumentsdo not provide any reasons for thinkingthat
the reductionistaccount is not in fact desirable.
This leaves the following group of arguments: ( Rl'2 ), (Rl'.3),
(Rl'5), (R2.4), ( R2'5 ), ( R2'6 ), (R2'7). Roughly, these arguments
fall into three groups, (i) (Rl'2), (R2'4)' (ii) (Rl'3), ( R2'5 ); (iii)
unionemet approximationem
causatuma pluribuscausisnecessariopraeexigit
causarumin causando.Et ita potesthic esse quod totaentitastotiussit
illarum
absolutarum".
vel coexigatunionempartium
licetnecessario
absoluta,
praeexigat
Ord.3.2.2(A, fol.144vb;
VII, 80 [n. 10]). Forlocationas a relaWaddingedition,
ediXII, 499);Quod.11,n. 3 (Wadding
edition,
tion,seeOrd.4.10.1,n. 7 (Wadding
and Wolter,
tion,XII, 263; Alluntis
p. 258 [par.11.4]).
161

20:16:38 PM

(Rl'5)y ( R2'7)' adding (R2'6) to the firsttwo groups. Let us grant,

with Scotus, the followingclaims: (1) that (A) and (A*) are false; (2)
that (R2.1) and (R2.2) are true; and (3) that (R2'.4)-(R2' 7) presuppose the rejectionof R1 (and hence [A]) foundin (R1 '2), (R1 '3) and
(Rl'5). Let us furtherinferfrom(1) and (2), with Scotus, that (B) is
true. On this basis, we can perhaps formulate three composite
argumentswhich will express what Scotus is drawing our attentionto.
ad quernof generationis
( T1) (PI) If it is not the case that the terminus
eitherindividual matteralone, or individual formalone, or relational entityalone, or some aggregate of two or more of these
parts, then (B).
ad quernof generation is
(P2) It is not the case that the terminus
eitherindividual matteralone, or individual formalone, or relational entityalone, or some aggregate of two or more of these
parts.
(C) (B).
a quo of corruptionis
(T2) (PI) If it is not the case that the terminus
eitherindividual matteralone, or individual formalone, or relational entityalone, or some aggregate of two or more of these
parts, then (B).
a quo of corruptionis either
(P2) It is not the case thatthe terminus
individuadmatteralone, or individual formalone, or relational
entityadone, or some aggregate of two or more of these parts.
(C) (B).
(T3) (PI) If it is not the case that proper passion, operation, and
absolute accident inhere eitherin individual matteralone, or in
individual formalone, or in relational entityalone, or in some
aggregate of two or more of these parts, then (B).
(P2) It is not the case that proper passion, operation, and
absolute accident inhere eitherin individual matteralone, or in
individual formalone, or in relational entityalone, or in some
aggregate of two or more of these parts.
(C) (B).
Putting the premisses like this makes it clear that what is at issue is
an account of substance-distinctioni
. There are two good reasons for
that
the
I
have
these
thinking
way
put
premisses- particularlythe
'some
recurring
aggregate of two or more of these parts'- is warranted by Scotus's discussion of R' First, I phrase the premisseslike
162

20:16:38 PM

thisto capture Scotus's claim that a whole is not simplyidentical with

all its parts (where the relevantparts are matter,form,and relation).
Secondly, as Scotus phrases (Rl'5) (from which, with [ R2'7 '], I
derive [T3J), it entails the denial of the claim that proper passion,
operation,and absolute accident inhere in individual matteralone, or
individual formalone, or in both simultaneouslyfutriquesimuV): the
only plausible reading of which would be 'in some aggregate of these
two parts'. In putting( R2'7 '), Scotus expresslyclaims that argument
(Rl'5) is sufficientto refute R2: though he does add the further
stipulationthatproperpassion, operation, and absolute accidents cannot inherein relationalentityeither.And puttingall this together,we
can formulatethe whole of the antecedent of (PI): 'It is not the case
thatproper passion, operation, and absolute accident inhere eitherin
individual matteralone, or in individual formalone, or in relational
entityalone, or in some aggregate of two or more of these parts'. The
way Scotus expresses(R1 '2) and (R1 '3) is a bit less clear: but I would
defendmy formulations(Tl) and (T2) by analogy with (T3).
Are there any good reasons for accepting these arguments? Let us
look firstat (Tl) and (T2). 'Generation' and 'corruption' are terms
standardlyused to referto the production and destructionof a completecompositesubstance in virtueof the conjunctionor separation of
its parts. Hence, the two terms refer to changes which can be
in kind from the
undergone by a substance, and which are different
formalone, or
or
matter
alone,
changeswhichcould be undergone by
relationalentityalone. The fourthclaim made by (P2) of (Tl) and
(T2) is that the terminiof generationand corruptioncannot be some
aggregateof two or more of matter,form,and relational entity.One
conditionunder which (P2), thus expressed, could be true would be
if the followingwere true:
(T) Some of the properties of some whole are differentin kind
fromthe propertieswhich inhere in individual matteralone, or in
individual form alone, or in relational entityalone, or in some
aggregate of two or more of these parts.67
(T) is a non-reductionisticclaim, entailing(P2) of (Tl) and (T2). But
67By'properties'
suchas 'is a partofx', or 'is comhere,I do notmeanproperties
falseofanywholewhichis not
ofwhichwouldbe (trivially)
posedofparts',thefirst
falseofany
wouldbe (trivially)
a partofsomefurther
object,andthesecondofwhich
to meannonwholewhichdoesnothavepartsofitsown.I am using'properties'
tosmile'.
onx', or'hasthecapacity
suchas: 'hasa causalinfluence
trivial
properties,
163

20:16:38 PM

accepting (T) is not a necessary condition for accepting (P2) of (Tl)

and (T2). This premiss is also entailed by the weaker claim:
(U) Some of the properties of some whole are numericallydifferent from the properties which inhere in individual matter
alone, or in individual form alone, or in relational entityalone,
or in some aggregate of two or more of these parts.
But plausibly (U) could be satisfiedonly in one of two ways. (1) We
stipulatein advancethatthe whole is notjust the set of all the parts, and
thus guarantee that some propertyof the whole is not just a property
of all the parts together.But if we do this, our accepting (U) will be
at best no more than a petitioprincipii.(2) We understand (U) as
entailed by (though not entailing)(T). In thiscase, it is Scotus's assent
to (T) - not his assent to (U) - which is of importance. Thus, if (P2)
of (Tl ) and (T2) is to be accepted, it must be construedas entailing
(T):
(T*) jf some 0f the properties of some whole do not inhere in
individual matter alone, or in individual formalone, or in relational entityalone, or in some aggregate of two or more of these
parts, then these propertiesare differentin kind fromthe properties which inhere in individual matteralone, or in individual form
alone, or in relational entityalone, or in some aggregate of two
or more of these parts.
(T*) would give us a principled- though perhaps not very
sophisticated- way of spelling out substance-distinctioni.(T*) is thus
just the kind of principle which Scotus needs if his account is to be
reasonably complete. There is no unequivocal evidence that Scotus
would assent to (T*): though I shall tryto show that (T*) is the most
plausible reason forScotus's accepting (Tl), (T2) and (T3). The best
evidence for Scotus's assent to (T*) is to be found in ( T3). In his
discussion in (R1 '5) - on the basis of which I have formulated( T3) Scotus reasons:
andanyproper
accident
do notbelongtomatProperpassion,proper
operation
teror form
orbothofthesetogether
as theyareonein some
(exceptinasmuch
persewhole),though
theydo belongto thespecies[ofthewhole].68
Although this does not provide unequivocal evidence of Scotus' s support for (T*), nevertheless, Scotus's use of 'species' here perhaps
alerts us to the relevance of differencesin kind- not merelynumerical
68Forthetext,see above,note30.
164

20:16:38 PM

- between the propertiesof the whole and the propertiesof

differences
the parts. And it thus might signal his support of (T*). In any case,
adherence to (T*) provides the most plausible reason for Scotus's
claim thatthe propertiesof the whole do not inherein any of the parts,
or in any aggregate of the parts. Thus, proper passions, like proper
accidents, are Aristotelian properties {propria
): necessary but nonclaim
that
The
proper passions and accidents do
definingproperties.69
not inhere in a part or in any aggregate of two or more of the parts
makes good sense on the supposition that such propertieswould be of
the appropriatekind to inhere in a composite substance, but notof the
appropriatekind to inhere in individual matter,individual form,relational entity,or in any aggregate of two or more of these parts. Much
the same point can be made with regard to operations. A material
substance is capable of all sorts of causal activitywhich are different
in kind fromthe causal activityof any of its parts. Typically, matter
and form(even as parts of a composite) do not exercise any efficient
causalityat all: whereas in medieval accounts the composite substance
whichtheyconstituteclearlydoes exercise efficientcausality.70But the
claim that operations do not inhere in an aggregate of two or more of
individual matter, individual form, and relational entity,could best
make sense on the supposition that such propertieswould be of the
appropriate kind to inhere in a composite substance, but notof the
appropriatekind to inhere in individual matter,individual form,relational entity,or in any aggregate of two or more of these parts. With
regardto (Tl) and ( T2), the propertiesof being generable and corruptible,which can be instantiated(uniquely) by a material substance, do
notlook to be the same in kind as the propertiesof the parts of a material substance (i.e., matter, form, and relational entity). I conclude
thatScotus accepts (T*), and that it is forthe reason outlined in (T*)
thathe adopts a non-reductionisticaccount of material substance.
(T) and (T*) are principles which concern individual substances.
But the argumentsin section fourof this article make it clear that an
essence as such is differentfromits various parts in a way analogous
to that in which an individual substance is differentfromits various
69See Ord.1.3.1.3,n. 134(Vaticanedition,III, 83).
70Inthecaseofa humancomposite,
twooftheparts(viz.,bodyandsoul)doexercise
whichtheyexerthetypeofefficient
own:
of
their
efficient
causality
though
causality
It is
in kindfromthatwhichtheyexercise
is stilldifferent
cisetogether
separately.
causasome'downwards'
exercises
thecasethatthewholehumancomposite
perhaps
wouldbe a case in point.
ofvitalactivity
theexercising
tionon itsparts,possibly
165

20:16:38 PM

parts. Perhaps we could formulateanother principle, along the lines

of (T), to cover this:
(V) If some whole has an essence which is differentin kind from
the essence of any of matter alone, or form alone, or relational
entityalone, or some aggregateof two or more of theseparts, then
the essence of the whole is really distinctfromthe essence of matter alone, or form alone, or relational entity alone, or some
aggregate of two or more of these parts.
We can argue forthe antecedentof (V) from(T) since, ifan individual
has at least some essential propertieswhich are differentin kind from
the propertiesof its parts, then the essence which it instantiateswill
be differentin kind fromthe essence of its parts. The antecedent of
(V) entails the consequent since an essence which is differentin kind
from some other essence is a fortiorinumericallydifferentfromthat
essence.
(V) enables us to clarifyprecisely Scotus's account of substancedistinctiom.An individual exhibitingunity4will satisfythe description
in the antecedent, and will hence have an essence which fails to be
identicalwiththe essence of its parts: whereas an individual exhibiting
merely unityi will not satisfythe description in the antecedent. On
(V), essence as such exhibitsunity4just because it is not reducible to
its parts. But adding furtherproperties does not yield some further
non-reducibleessence. The resultingabstract object would in factbe
reducible to essence and the added non-essential properties. The
whole will constitutea unityi- or at best unity3.
Which of R2 and R' is to be preferred?William of Ware would
presumablyhold that some of the propertiesof the whole are different
in kind fromthe propertiesof any of the parts. But, since he does not
hold that a whole substance is anythingbeyond its parts, he would
reject (T*). Thus, Scotus's opinion will be preferredto William's if
(T*) is true. Assessing the truthof (T*) would take me well beyond
my merely historicalaims in this paper. But I hope at least to have
identifiedthe lines upon which an assessment of these two theories
might take.
Appendix
Scotus'saccountin theQuestionson theMetaphysics, 8.4
In the Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics
, 8.4, Scotus presentsa
(rather confusing) discussion of some of these issues which in places
166

20:16:38 PM

lookslikea versionof R2. But the account does not seem to be wholly
and large parts of it look like a defence of R' I shall first
consistent,
the
present textualevidence (in two parts), and then make some sugas to the most plausible reading of the texts.71
gestions
ques(1) The main expositionof Scotus's opinion in theMetaphysics
tionsrunsas follows:
thosecausesnevercause
areessentially
there
When
manycausesofoneeffect,
unlesstheyconcurin theircausing.To concur,andtofailtoconcur,
theeffect
is thatconcurrence
abouttheabsolutenatureofa cause;neither
alter
nothing
and finalcauses].
efficient
cause[viz.,otherthanmaterial,
formal,
anyfifth
invirfailtocausemerely
causeandsometimes
Therefore
thecausessometimes
ofthecausestoeachother,
which[are]nothowever
tueofthevariousrelations
- [either]
forthem[viz.,thecauses]orforany
forthecausation
thebasis[ratio]
tothetwocauses(viz.,matter
oneofthem.Thus,here,withregardespecially
- i.e., concurrent
incausing(and
andform)
theycausebecausetheyareunited
is brought
aboutbytheactionofan agent);and whenthey
their
concurrence
inthecomthereis something
arenotconcurrent,
theydo notcause.Therefore
and form].72
them[viz.,matter
posite
beyond
Somecommentsare in order here. First, as the final sentence makes
71Itisdifficult
It is
thedateofthe(incomplete)
todetermine
questions.
Metaphysics
felt
thattheyareearly:seeVaticanedition,
XIX, 41*-46*.Scotuscertainly
generally
refers
to themin Ordinatio
4.11.3, n. 41 (Waddingedition,VIII, 645). But in
to the
7.13,n. 26 (Waddingedition,IV, 708,;))thereis a reference
Metaphysics
are
eitherthatat leastbooks7 to9 oftheMetaphysics
Ordinatio
: indicating
questions
Scotuscontinued
oftheVaticanedition
orthat
tinkering
late,
suggest)
(as theeditors
seealsoVaticanedition,
hislife(on thewholequestion,
with
thework
I,
throughout
in: American
ontheLifeandWorks
ofScotus,
155*;alsoAllanB. Wolter,Reflections
ofthe
67 (1993), 1-36[p. 35-6]).The discussion
Catholic
Quarterly
Philosophical
farlesspolishedin the
to me in thisarticleis certainly
areofinterest
which
issues
In Scotus'sLectura
thanitis intheOrdinatio.
, wefindan account
questions
Metaphysics
islesswell
account
the
Lectura
account
totheOrdinatio
similar
which
isfairly
(although
is followed
3.22 (Bi, fols65v-69v)
Lectura
verycloselyby theOrdinatio
developed).
makestheimportant
3.2.2 (Bi, fols14v-15r)
andLectura
pointthatquiddity
account;
torefer
to
aretobe understood
totius
with
istobeidentified
, wherebothterms
forma
veranother
a whole
: nottothekindofpartwhichcan inform
part.It alsoprovides
sions
ofarguments
(R1'.1), (Rl'.2), (Rl'.3), (Rl',4), (R2.1),(R2.2). Butbookthree
oftheLectura
XIX, 33*),andhence
(1303-04)is notan earlywork(Vaticanedition,
- anyshift
- or indeeddenying
Scotus's
ofopinionbetween
ofnohelpindetecting
andlaterwritings.
earlier
72"Quandoalicuius
causant
illaenumquam
causatisuntmultaecausaeessentialiter,
nihil
autemet nonconcurrere
Concurrere
nisi<in)causandoconcurrant.
causatum
alicuiuscausae,necestisteconcursus
naturam
circaabsoltam
variant
quintacausa.
ad invicem,
aliaetaliacausarum
solarelatione
quae tamennoneis <sunt>nec
Itaque
alicui
ratiocausandi,causaequandoquecausant,quandoquenon.Ita hicde
earum
- hocestconcurrentia
etmateria,
forma
videlicet
duabus
causisspecialiter,
quiaunita
- causant(qui concursus
nonconcurfiteorumperactionem
adcausandum
agentis);
estaliquidpraeter
rentia
noncausant.
ipsa". InMet.8.4 (B2,fol.
Igiturincomposito
155ra; Wadding
edition,
IV, 757l)[n. 6]).
167

20:16:38 PM

clear, in orderformatterand formto constitutea substance, some furtherentityneeds to be added to them. Secondly, thisadded entitydoes
not itself have any causal role in the constitutionof a substance.
Thirdly, matterand form,as absolute entities,remain in themselves
unchanged when they constitutea substance. Fourthly,matter and
formare united in virtueof theirconcurringin the (material and formal) causation of some substance.
Since the substantiveclaim here is the firstone, the passage seems
in factconsistentwithboth R2 and R'. But a replywhich Scotus gives
consistentonly
to an objection to his position looks straightforwardly
with R2:
Ifthereis understood
inthecomposite
tobe somerelation
theabsolute
(beyond
nature
ofeach[viz.,matter
andform]),
notas an intrinsic
cause,noras thebasis
ofa cause- and(becauseofthis)notas an essential
[ratio]
partofthecomposite,
butrather
suchthatthepartandthecauseareconcomitant
[upontherelation],
without
which[relation]
thecausewouldnotcause,theconsequence
cannotbe
is
is theconsequent
awkward.
denied,and neither
If, however,
'something'
understood
tomean'someabsolute
inthecomposite
as
essence'or'[something]
itsessential
ofthesefollows.73
part':neither
This passage makes it quite clear that the entityin virtue of which
matterand formconstitutea substance is just a relation. Furthermore,
it claims that a relationis a necessary(though not sufficient)condition
both forthe status of matterand formas real parts of some real composite, and (consequently) fortheirstatus as causes. But it appears to
go on to claim that, apart frommatter and form,there is no further
absolute entityin the composite at all. This claim is consistentwith
R2, but not with R'
Scotus goes on to offera reply to (Rl'3) - an argument which, as
we have seen, is a pivotal part of his defence of R' in the Ordinatio.
4
According to the reply,the Aristotelianexample of the syllable ab' is
to be construed not as about matterand form(since standardlyform
does not survive the destructionof the composite), but as about the
differentmaterial constituentsof a substance.74
73"Si intelligatur
naturamutriusque
in comaliquisrespectus
praeterabsoltam
necratiocausae(ac perhoc,nonutparsessentialis
posito,nonutcausaintrinseca,
sedutconcomitans
etcausam,sinequo causanoncausaret),
non
compositi,
partem
necconsequens
estinconveniens.
Si autemintelligatur
potestnegariconsequentia,
ut parsessentialis
eius'
'aliqui idest,'aliquaessentiaabsoluta',vel 'in composito
neutrum
In Met.8.4, (B2,fol.115ra_rb;
IV, 757b[n.
sequeretur".
Waddingedition,
7]).
74
In Met.8.4, n. 7 (Waddingedition,IV, 757b-758a).
168

20:16:38 PM

(2) On the otherhand, some passages in the questions on Metaphysics

defence of R' Scotus objects to his
8.4 look to be a straightforward
account by invoking William of Ware's argument ( R2'l ). Here,
Scotus accepts the controversialAristotelianpremiss (P2): viz., that
therecannot be a change merelyin the categoryof relation(a premiss
which,as we have seen, Scotus elsewhere rejects). Scotus argues that,
in the case of the relationbetween matterand formin the constitution
of a material substance, the relation can be corruptedonly if there is
a change in some absolute entity.The relevant change cannot be in
matterand formsince, as both R2 and R' accept, matter and form
remain essentially unchanged in the constitution of a composite
substance. The relevant change must thereforeoccur in some other
absolute entity.To spell out what this other entitymight be, Scotus
distinguishestwo ways in which matterand formcould be related: (i)
directlyto each other; (ii) indirectly,in virtue of their both being
(directly)relatedto some thirdentitydistinctfromeitherof them. The
second of theseis relevantto the case at hand: matterand form,Scotus
argues, are related indirectlyin virtue of their both being related to
the whole composite- which composite is an absolute entity- of
which they are parts:
Whentwothings
aremutually
related
tosomethird
suchthatitis imposthing,
sibleforthem
thustobe related
unlessoneorbothofthemisthusrelated
tosome
thentheirmutualrelation
canindeedbe corrupted,
without
third
thecorthing,
inoneofthem,butmerely
invirtue
ofthecorrupofanyabsolute
ruption
thing
tionofsomeabsolute,
corruption
[which
is] positedin thethirdthingtowhich
formatter
and formto be united
eachofthemis related.It is thusimpossible
in a composite
therelation
of
unlesseachis partofa composite.
Therefore,
is corrupted
whensomeabsolutething(whichwas the
totality
[relatio
totalitatis]
oftotality
in it) is corrupted:
andconsequently
the
fortherelation
foundation
in these[viz.,matter
and
of[being]a part[is corrupted]
and form],
relation
ineachofthese[viz.,matter
whichcannot
andform],
themutual
relation
thirdly
ofbeinga part].75
without
this[viz.,therelation
survive
On this account, (P2) of (R2'l) is not violated, since the destruction
ofthevarious relationsbetween matter,formand the composite whole
75"Quandoaliquamutuoreferuntur
ad aliquodtertium
etincompossibile
estiliasic
referri
sicreferatur
nisialterum
illorum
ad aliquodtertium
velambo,benepotest
coreorumrelatio
inaliquoillorum,
alicuiusabsolti
sola
mutua,sinecorruptione
rumpi
absoltipositain ilio tertioad quod alterumillorum
dicitur.Sic hoc
corruptione
etformam
esseunita,nisiutrumque
sitparscompositi.
est,materiam
incompossibile
relationis
corrupto
aliquo absolutoquod eratfundamentum
Igiturin composito,
totalitatis
in ipso,corrumpitur
relatiototalitatis,
et ex consequenti
relatiopartisin
relatiomutuain utroqueistorum:
istis,ettertio
quae nonpoteststaresineilia". In
Met.8.4 (B2fol.115va;Waddingedition,
IV, 758a"b
[n. 9]); seealsoIn Met.8.4, n.
8 (Wadding
edition,
IV, 758a).
169

20:16:38 PM

which they constitutecan be explained in virtue of the corruptionof

the composite. But this argument entails, of course, that the whole
composite is some thirdabsolute entityover and above its matterand
form.It thus entails both that Scotus reject R2 and thathe defendhis
standard account R'
Thus, if Scotus is to avoid being inconsistentin this Metaphysics
question, he will have to defend R' throughout.Can we provide a
reading of the texts discussed under (1) in this section which will
renderthem consistentwithR'? I explained above thatthe firstof the
two passages quoted denies merelythat, in order formatterand form
to compose a substance, some furtherabsolute (in virtueofwhichmatter and form would compose a substance) needs to be added to
them- the denial of which is consistent with R' What about the
second passage? What Scotus is concerned to deny in this passage is
that thereis some absolute entityin the composite beyond matterand
form. Perhaps we could read the difficultphrase in the last sentence:
' "Some absolute essence" or
"[something] in the composite as its
essential part" ' to deny (respectively)merelysome furtheraccidental
absolute essence or some furtheressential absolute part. The reading
is a littleforced: but unless we adopt some such strategy,we will be
constrainedto conclude that Scotus contradictshimselfwiththe space
of a couple of pages; a conclusion which, grantedScotus5s usual care,
is clearly unlikely.
Finally, the discussion of Aristotle'sexample of the syllable 'ab' can
be explained by the context. If we look at the discussion of thisexample not as it occurs elsewhere in Scotus' s writings,but as it occursin
Aristotle,we find that it is indeed about the material constituentsof
a thing, and not about matterand format all. Hence, the difference
between Scotus' s discussions in the Ordinatioand the Metaphysics
questions can be explained by the greater importance which mightbe
ascribed to the Aristoteliantext in the latter discussion.76
Oxford
OrielCollege
76MauriceO'Fihely
de Portu),inhisannotations
totheMetaphysics
(Mauritius
questions,printedin the Waddingedition,claimsthatScotus'saccountof in the
is different
from
thatintheOrdinatio
: andthedifference
hesugMetaphysics
questions
R2 (or Rl) and R' (see Waddingedition,
gestsisjustthatbetween
IV, 757a).But
I havegivenreasons
forholding
thatthetwoaccounts
I thusdisagree
arenotdiverse.
withO'Fihely.
170

20:16:38 PM

William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on the

1
Objectsof Knowledge and Belief
ELIZABETHKARGER

Though they practicallyall took the existence of mental discourse

forgranted,it was far frombeing the case that all 14th centuryphilosophers and theologians identifiedthe objects of knowledge and
belief with mental sentences. When we examine the theories held
withinsome circles,we will find that this was a thesis which seemed
plausible when a certainconception of mental discourse was assumed,
butwhichbecame quite indefensiblein the eyes of some when another
conceptionofmentaldiscoursehad become thepreferredone.
Thus consider the views on the objects of knowledge and belief and
on mental discourseheld by William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and
Adam Wodeham, all three Oxford philosophers and theologians,all
threeFranciscans.2Ockham had, at the verybeginningof his academic career,admittedthatthe objects of all knowledgeand beliefare mental sentences,conceiving at the time of mental discourse as formedof
objects of thought.He later abandoned however that conception of
mentaldiscourse,conceivingof it instead as formedof acts of thinking,
and, when he did so, he also abandoned, at least partially,his initial
views on the objects of knowledge and belief.3 As for Chatton and
1This
over
ofthecontroversy
toour"understanding
paperwill,itis hoped,contribute
atOxford"
initsdevelopment
velcredendi
sciendi
theobjectum
(Moody1964,p. 65).Ithas
fromthe
and students
to a groupof faculty
beenread,in a prelimary
version,
who
Calvin
at
State
Ohio
of
Normore,
gave
May
University.
DepartmentPhilosophy
for
ofthegroupbe thanked
ofdoingso,andtheothermembers
metheopportunity
with.
dealt
the
of
discussion
topics
helpful
2Chatton,
ofOckhamwhohadopposedhis
wasa juniorcolleague
itwillbe recalled,
ofbothmenandwasa friend
hadbeena student
andWodeham
onmanyissues,
senior
withwhom
ofChatton,
an
but
his
to
ofOckham,
views,
opponent
mostly
sympathetic
thesethree
between
on someissues.On therelationship
concurred
henevertheless
there
on
andlectured
forsometimeatOxford
eachofwhomhadresided
Franciscans,
Sentences
Peter
Lombard's
1978,ch.2,Tachau1988
, seeGi 1974(p.53*-6*),
Courtenay
(ch.7,p. 180-1andch.10,p. 275-7)andWood1990(p. 12*-9*).
3The
whichled to the
research
ofearlier
basedon theresult
paperis partly
present
171
EJ.Brill,
Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII,2

20:16:47 PM

Wodeham, they both dismissed the way of conceiving mental discourse originally admitted by Ockham, embracing without hesitation the other. They also both opposed the view that the objects of
all knowledge and belief are mental sentences, arguing that these
objects should be identifiedwith other entities. Clearly, for these
three Franciscans,whetherthey were disposed or not to identifythe
objects of all knowledge and belief with mental sentences depended
in part on which of two rival conceptions of mental discourse
theysubscribedto.41 propose to explain whythisshould have been the
case.
To thatend, I shall firstbrieflydescribe both conceptionsof mental
discourse,which I shall referto as the "object of thought"conception
and the "mental act" conception respectively.This will be followedby
an account, also quite succinct,of Ockham's originaltheoryof knowledge and belief.5On thatbasis, the thesisthatthe objects of all knowledge and belief are mental sentences,a thesis essential to Ockham's
original theory,will be shown to depend for its plausibilityon the
"object of thought"conception of mental discourse.It will thenbe particularlyinterestingto see how Chatton, the older Ockham (by a few
years at most) and Wodeham, who all dismissedthe "object of thought"
conception of mental discourse and subscribed instead to the "mental
act" conception,each proposed to deal withthe issue, which now had
to be confrontedanew, of identifyingthe objects of knowledge and
belief.

ofa sharpdistinction
between
twotheories,
notonlyofuniversais
andconcepts,
drawing
butalsoofcognition
andofmental
heldbyOckham.
SeeKarger
discourse,
successively
1994.Whenresearching
thesetopics,
I havegreatly
benefited
from
ClaudePanaccio's
forceful
ofthelaterofOckham's
twotheories
ofcognition
andofmental
presentation
(seePanaccio1991,chapter
language
2).
4Thisis a factwhichofcoursewillbe missed
ifoneisnotawareofthesetworivalconofmental
discourse.
I havethusfound
itmentioned
neither
ceptions
byK. Tachau,who
dealswiththedebatebetween
thesethree
Franciscans
ontheobjects
ofknowledge
and
belief
inTachau1988,ch.12,p. 303-8,norbyG. Nuchelmans,
whodealswiththesame
1980.
topicinNuchelmans
5
Boththisaccount
andthatdescription
arebasedonKarger1994,where
theyarehoweverdeveloped
in muchgreater
detailthanhere.I haveincluded
hereonlywhatis
forthepurpose
athand.
strictly
required
172

20:16:47 PM

1. Two conceptions
of mentaldiscourse
1.1. The "objectof thought"
conception
Accordingto Wodeham, Ockham had not been the firstto conceive
of mentaldiscourse as formedof objects of thought,ratherthan of acts
of thinking.Not only various "doctors and philosophers", amongst
them Scotus, but even Aristotlehad done so.6 It is however only
Ockham's variantof this conception of mental discourse which need
concern us here. By "the object of thoughtconception of mental discourse",let us thenagree to referexclusivelyto Ockham's variantofit.7
It is the conception of mental discourse which Ockham subscribed to
on theSentences
in his veryfirstwork,namelyin the Commentary
,8exceptdraw
on that
I
shall
work
its
later
insertions.9
this
from
Accordingly,
ing
textto explain brieflywhat this conception of mental discourse consistedin and what the considerationswere which had led its authorto
subscribeto it.10
6
callterms
notes:"they
Wodeham
toOckham
(inspiteoftheuseofa plural),
Referring
ofparticular
as alsoAristotle
ofa sentence,
[... ipsivocant
had,theobjects
cognitions"
sicutetAristoteles,
terminos
[Lectura
particularium]
objectacognitionum
propositions,
Sententiarum
secunda
in librum
d.3,q.4,R. Woodassisted
by G. Gi eds.,St.
primm
mentions
Scotusas
andheelsewhere
N.Y. 1990,vol.II, p. 178lin.29-30),
Bonaventure,
thethings
conofsentences
who"calledterms
andphilosophers"
oneofthose"doctors
and
not
the
or
of
be
whether
ceivedoforapprehended,
cognithey things signs things,
in totooperesuoet ... (alii)tamdoctores
tionsthemselves"
quam
[... DoctorSubtilis
velcognita,
terminos
vocaverunt
... concorditer
ipsaconcepta
propositionis
philosophi
etnonipsascognitiones]
illafuerint,
siveresipsaesivealiquasignarerum,
quaecumque
... prol.q.6,ed.cit.vol.I, p. 149lin.15-7).
secunda
(.Lectura
7Another
canbe
a realist
one,andthusofcourseonewhichOckhamrejected,
variant,
ed.S. Brown(seeBrown
inlibrum
inWalter
found
Perihermeneias,
Quaestiones
Burleigh's
conofthought"
variant
ofthe"object
Asidefrom
1974,
beingofa non-realist
p.248-50).
inbeingmuch
from
differs
account
Ockham's
ofmental
discourse,
Burleigh's
ception
moreelaborate.
8The
for
hadbeenrevised
bookoftheSentences
onthefirst
bytheauthor
commentary
threebooksnever
on theremaining
The commentary
as an "Ordinatio
publication
of
edition
I shallbe usingthecritical
andexistonlyas a "Reportatio".
wereso revised
the
Ordinatio
which
in
Franciscan
to
the
due
works
Ockham's
Institute,
non-political
the
seriesandtheReportatio
ofthe"OperaTheologica"
fourvolumes
thefirst
occupies
each
R.
and
Green
Wood
R.
F.
G.
S.
three.
G.
Etzkorn,
Brown,
Gi,
Kelley,
following
atSt.Bonaventure
collaborated
tooneormoreofthesevolumes,
N.Y.,over
published
I shallreferto theseriesby theabbreviation
"OTh.",to the
theyears1967-1984.
Ordinatio
"Ord.",totheReportatio
bytheabbreviation
by"Rep".
9Seefootnote
11.
10I shallbe
oftheintelontheissueoftheactivity
alsoona "quaestio"
bearing
drawing
cauintellectionis
activesehabetrespectu
velhumnus
lect("utrum
intellectus
angelicus
173

20:16:47 PM

;
When, on the thresholdofhis career,he commentedon the Sentences
Ockham thoughtthattherewas such a thingas an act of thinkingnot
of an individual man, but of man in general.11Since he had however
already dismissed the notion that there might be general thingsin
the outside world which we could subsequentlyapprehend, he considered that the only alternativeconsisted in positinggeneral objects
of thought,12themselves entities whose whole reality reduces to
their being thought of.13Such pure objects of thought,he called
ataboutthesametimeas theReportatio
ofthe
, whichtheeditors
sandae"),
composed
Franciscan
ina collection
itis
Institute
edition
haveincluded
ofwhich
of"quaestiones",
'
"
a collection
thefifth,
varia
entitled
theeighth
(hereafter
Quaestiones
forming
"Quest."),
volumeofthe"Operatheologica"
series(G.Etzkorn,
andJ.Wey
eds.,1984).
F.Kelley
11Thisis theviewon
intheReportatio
contained
andinthequaestio
"utrum
generality
..." (seepreceding
intellectus
Ockhamstillheldthatviewwhenhestarted
to
footnote).
reviseforpublication
thetextofhiscommentary
onthefirst
bookoftheSentences
, leavinata latertime.Whenheeventually
didso,hehadhowingsomeblankstobe filled
everstarted
tohavesomedoubtsonthewisdom
ofpositing
ofthought
general
objects
andon thecorrectness
oftheattendant
ofmental
a factwhich
discourse,
conception
he thenaddedtohisearlier
whichareallclearly
text,
explains
manyoftheinsertions
marked
inthecritical
edition
be thanked
forhaving
doneso,andPh.
(maytheeditors
forthefirst-rate
detective
in Boehner1942,
Boehner,
work,recorded
posthumously,
whichledtorecognizing
theselaterinsertions
as such).
12
toOrd.prol.q.l, OTh.I, p. 30 lin.12-5,theobjectofan actofcognition
According
inonesenseoftheterm,
is "abstractive",
is a "something
universal
abstractible
which,
from
abstractiva
unomodoquiaestrespectu
many"[... notitia
potest
accipidupliciter:
alicuius
abstracti
a multis
etsiccognitio
abstractiva
nonestaliudquamcogsingularibus
nitioalicuius
universalis
abstractibilis
a multis].
In Quest,q.5,OTh.VIII,p. 175lin.402thattheactoractsbywhichthemindapprehends
oneorseveral
19,Ockhamexplains
causesitto"produce",
as itwere,bya further
actofcognition,
a universingular
things
salas theobjectofthat"abstractive"
act.Forexample,
anintellect
oneor
apprehending
several
whitenesses
isdetermined
toform
anactofcognition
it"produces"
as
bywhich
itsobjecta "whiteness
ingeneral"
inparticulari
...
[... primo
cognosco
aliquasingularia
ethabitanotitia,
statm
ad eiuspraesentiam
-sinonsitimpedimentumnatusequitur
raliter
aliusactus,distinctus
a primo,
terminatus
ad aliquodtaleesseobjectivum
quale
Etilleactussecundus
iliauniversalia
... etnon
priusvidiin essesubjectivo.
producit
eas. Exemplum:
vel duasalbedines,
intuitive,
praesupponit
aliquisvidensalbedinem
abstrahit
ab eisalbedinem
incommuni
utestspecies.
Quodnonestaliudnisiquodillae
duaenotitiae
terminatae
ad albedinem
insingulari
... causant
naturaliter
incomplexae
... unamtertiam
notitiam
distinctam
ab illisquae producit
talemalbedinem
in esse
fuit
visainessesubjectivo].
objectivo
qualis
prius
13"... a universal
isnotsomething
realhaving
inthesoulorouteither
subjective
being,
sidethesoul,butithasonlyobjective
in
beinginthesoul,andisa certain
fictum
having
hasinsubjective
objective
beinga beingofthesamesortas theexternal
thing
being"
nonestaliquidrealehabensessesubjectivum,
necinanimanecextra
ani[... universale
habetesseobjectivum
in animaetestquoddamfictum
habensesse
mam,sedtantum
taleinesseobjectivo
(Ord.d.2 q.8,OTh.II, p.
qualehabetresextrainessesubjectivo]
271lin.l4-p.
272lin.2).Analternative
ofthesegeneral
conception
objectsofthought,
dismissed
butregarded
consists
inthinkbyOckham
byhimas notwholly
improbable,
174

20:16:47 PM

"
fict.u Fictabeing posited,concretethingscould thenbe regardedas
capable of being apprehended in two ways: either directly,in which
case theyare always individuallyapprehended,15or by the mediation
Now fictaand concretethingsare, Ockham assumed, both
of a fictum.16
of
enteringmental discourse,fictaas general termsand concapable
crete things,provided they are the objects of an act of direct apprehension, as singular terms.17No discourse however consists only of
general and singularterms,since the simplestsentence requires additionallyat least the presence of a copula. But Ockham thoughtthat
mental copulas, and more generally mental syncategorematics,were
also available, probably in the formoffictaused by the mind withthe
same import as that of the syncategorematicwords of external discourse.18The mind, thus having at its disposal a sufficient
varietyof
mental
sentences.
of
be
will
forming
terms,
effectively capable
tomenbeing"inthemind,subsequent
having
"subjective
ingofthemas.realentities,
acts[Aliapossetesseopinioquodestaliquaverares,
mental
talacts,butnotthemselves
hocessetuniversalis
actum
rei,etpropter
quia
intellectus,
quaeessetsimilitudo
sequens
omniarespiceret]
(Ord.d.2q.8,OTh.II, p. 269lin.18-20).
aequaliter
14Seethepreceding
isthen
ofit,a fictum
s conception
toOckham
footnote.
According
is apprewhenno singular
an actofintellection
terminates
"thatwhichimmediately
actum
termint
... estquodimmediate
hended"
intelligendi
quandonul[... illudfictum
neither
while
274
lin.
OT
lumsingulare
II,
15-6),
d.2,
having
(Ord.
p.
q.8,
intelligitur]
inthemind.
existence
butonly
normental
extra-mental
"objective"
reality,
15Suchactsofdirect
somebeingintuitive
areoftwokinds,
ofsingulars
, the
cognition
from
becauseitabstracts
a cognition
others
"abstractive",
beingnowcalled"abstractive"
of a "universal
and not becauseit is the cognition
and non-existence
existence
ofsingulars,
from
abstractive
cognition
many"(seen.12).On thesetwokindsofdirect
seeOrd.prol.q.l, OTh.I, p. 30-3.
16In
267lin.l,Ockham
OTh.V,p. 266lin.25-p.
opposesthecognition
Rep.II, q.12-14,
a concept
"ina common
toitscognition
"initself'
[...
ofa thing
beinga fictum
concept",
sibiet
communi
in
vidiconceptu
-quodnunquam
aliquodsingulare
quandointelligo
in
licetnonin se,tarnen
abstractivam,
aliis,tunchabeode iliosingulari
cognitionem
communi].
conceptu
aliquo
17"The
ora concept
be ita thing
canpredicate
(i.e.a
intellect
anyobjectofcognition,
consive
sit
res
sive
omne
intellectus
of
of
cognitum,
[...
fictum)anyobject cognition"
de omnicognito]
(Ord.prol.q.2,OTh.I p. 110lin.6-7).On
praedicare
potest
ceptus,
of
totheconception
missed
often
thefact,
(seen.35),that,
according
bycommentators
extrafavored
themselves",
discourse
mental
including
"things
byOckham,
originally
as sindiscourse
mental
canenter
mental
ones,provided
apprehended,
theyaredirectly
toKarger1994,p. 441-3.
is referred
thereader
terms,
gular
18In Ord.d.2q.8,OTh.II, p. 286,lin.5-14,
tftat
on thepossibility
Ockhamspeculates
from
abstracted
certain
themindshould"institute"
(i.e.ficta)
syncategorematconcepts
andinthesame
as thosewords
thesamethings
"tosignify
discourse
ofexternal
icwords
"in
a
certain
of
the
notion
is
is
relevant
what
here
where
way",since
signifying
way",
haveno othersemantic
often
[... ab istisvocibussicsignifimport
syncategorematics
istos
de eis,etimponit
communes
intellectus
abstrahit
cantibus
praedicabiles
conceptus
ilia eademquae significant
ad significandum
ipsaevocesextraet eodem
conceptus
modo].
175

20:16:47 PM

The act of formingsuch a sentence should not however be thought

of as thatof assemblingthe entitiesit is composed of,fictaor concrete
particulars,obtaining thereby a new entitywhich might in turn be
apprehended. Rather it is the act of apprehending these entitiesall
the sentence
or negatively,19
togetherin a certain way, affirmatively
will
which
insofar
those
as
itself "existing" only
entities,
ipsofacto
become itsterms,are apprehended in thatway. Withinthisconception
of mental discourse, there is then no distinctionwhatsoever to be
drawn between the act of forminga mentalsentenceand thatof apprehending it.20Moreover, in practicallyall cases, such an act, described
preferablyas thatof apprehendinga mental sentence,will be a "nonreflexive"act. Let me explain.
Let us call "reflexive"any act of directapprehensionby the mind of
one of its own acts,21and "non-reflexive"any act of directapprehension of otherentities,real thingsor ficta,the mind itselfbeing however
a thing the human mind is probably not capable of directlyapprehending at all.22It is clear thatmental sentences,as just now character19In
281lin.10,Ockhamexplains
OTh.V, p. 280lin.21-p.
thatifone
Rep.II, q.12-13,
a givenwhiteness
anda givenblackness
apprehends
directly
byoneactwhich"terminates"inthatwhiteness
andthatblackness,
onerequires
acttoform
the
justonefurther
i.e.themental
to"thiswhiteness
is notthisblacksentence,
"complex",
corresponding
an act"which
terminates
in thecopulaandtheextremes
whiteness",namely
(i.e.the
nessandtheblackness)
distincta
[... si intelligitur
negatively"
aliquaextrema
specie...
unoacto-puta
sisimulvideamalbedinem
tunc
etnigredinem
unicoactuintelligendi-et
hoccomplexum
formem
'albumnonestnigrm'
illacognitione
mediante
..., hictantumhabeoduplicem
unum... terminatum
ad albedinem
etnigredinem
etalium
actum,
albedoa nigredine,
ad copulam
etextrema
complexum
quonegatur
quiterminatur
negThesamewouldholdiftheextremes
wereficta
thanconcrete
rather
ative].
particulars.
20
Itisnotsurprising
thentofindOckham
that"what
iscalleda compositio"
is
claiming
the"actbywhicha complex(i.e.a mental
is apprehended"
sentence)
[... actumquo
apprehenditur
complexum,
qui dicitur
compositio]
(Quest,q.5, OTh. VIII, p. 169
ortofindhimrefer
totheact"bywhichI form
a complex"
as an"apprehenlin.268-9)
sivecognition"
[... cognitionis
apprehensivae,
perquamformo
complexum]
(Rep.II,
ortofindhimspeaking
offorming
and
q.12-13,OTh.V,p. 258lin.6-7)
interchangeably
ofapprehending
a mental
as hedoesinQuest,q.5,OTh.VIII,p. 170lin.287sentence,
8 andinRep.Ill, q.2,OTh.VI,p. 85lin.15-6,wherehespeaksofthe"apprehension
or
formation
ofa complex"
siveformationem
[apprehensionem
complexil.
21Thenotion
ofa reflexive
mental
actmustbe distinguished
from
thatofa self-reflexiveone.To sayofanintellective
actthatitis self-reflexive
wouldbe tosaythatitis an
actofdirect
ofitself.
Thepossibility
ofa self-reflexive
mental
actisapparapprehension
ruledoutbyOckham,
tohim,"noactis itsownobject"[... nulsince,according
ently
lusactusestobjectum
suiipsius](Rep.II, q.17,OTh.V, p. 386lin.10).
22Whereas
Ockhamadmits
thatangelsarecapableofapprehending
intuthemselves
andthusdirectly
thathuman
(cf.Ord.prol.q.l, OTh.I, p. 65 lin.18),hedoubts
itively,
intellects
havethesamecapacity
"inthislife"orrather,
as Marilyn
heseems,
Adamshas
176

20:16:47 PM

ized, will containmentalacts onlyveryexceptionally,namelywhen the

mind, directlyapprehendingone of its own acts, formsa mental sentence of which thatact is a term.In thatcase, true enough, the apprehension by the mind of the sentence requires an act which is partly
reflexive.For the vast majorityof mental sentences however, composed as theyare of otherentitiesthan mental acts,theirapprehension
by the mind is entirelynon-reflexive.We shall see laterthe importance
of this.
"
"
1.2. The mentalact conception
of mentaldiscourse
According to Wodeham, most "Moderns", including Chatton and
himself,preferredto the foregoingconception of mental discourse
another,accordingto which mental discourse consistsnot of objects of
intellection,but of the very acts of intellectionthemselves.23Ockham
himselfultimatelypreferredthis alternativeconception of mental discourse. Having provided the main reason forhis change of mind,I will
consequentlydraw again on Ockham, thistimeon latertheologicaland
on
and the Questions
philosophicalworks,amongstwhich the Quodlibets
of
mental
this
what
of
account
a
brief
for
Aristotle's
conception
Physics?*
discourseconsistedin.
Ockham's thoughtevolved. Apparentlyat firstswayed and finally
won over by the argumentsof some of his opponents, in particular
"
those of Chatton,he became convinced that fict were suspect enti-

out,nottohavemadeuphismindonthatissue(cf.Adams1987,p. 510,where
pointed
toOrd.d.3 q.2,OTh.II,p. 412lin.19-22andtoOrd.d.3q.8,OTh.II,
refers
theauthor
thatpoint).
indecisiveness
ofOckham's
forevidence
regarding
p.541lin.4-9
23ThusWodeham
actsofcognition
to"thewayofspeaking"
refers
whereby
particular
as theonewhichis sharedby
ofsentences"
arecalled"terms
thantheir
rather
objects
atleastnotinthetexthe
notbyOckham,
and"theModerns",
himself
Chatton,
though
sicutet Aristoteles,
to [... ipsi(Ockham)vocantterminos
is referring
propositionis,
sunt
scilicet
apud
propositionis)
(partes
quae
particularium,
objectacognitionum
istolicetad modum
etmeietmodernorum,
illius(Chatton)
modum
loquendi
loquendi
sint
illae
non
contra
rum(Ockham)
subjectum
cognitiones
partes-sive
(ille)
arguit
quos
secunda
sedpotius
...,
etpraedicatum-propositionis
pertalesactus][Lectura
ipsacognita
ed.cit.vol.II, p. 178lin.30-1).
24Forbothtexts,
wheretheQuodlibeta
Institute
totheFranciscan
I shallrefer
edition,
volumeIX ofthe"Opera
hereas "Quod.")editedbyJ.Wey,form
(abbreviated
Septem
in Libros
hereas "OTh. IX") and the Quaestiones
series(abbreviated
Theologica"
form
editedbyS. Brown,
hereas "Quest.Phys."),
partofvol(abbreviated
Physicorum
hereas "OPh.VI").
series(abbreviated
umeVI ofthe"OperaPhilosophica"
177

20:16:47 PM

ties betteravoided.25He thus came to adopt the view that,afterall, it

never does happen that we apprehend, for instance,man in general.
We merely thinkwe do, but what is in facthappening is thatwe are
confusedly,but neverthelessdirectly,apprehendingall men.26Such an
act of intellectionmay then be called general, by contrastwith one
where we apprehend distincdyone given man, which may be called
singular.Having renounced the hypothesisthatthereareficta,Ockham
had of course to abandon also a conceptionofmentaldiscourseaccording to which its components include ficta.But then the obvious alternative was to identifythe termsof mental discourse withacts of intellection,some of which have been just now recognized as general,and
othersas singular.He thus came to subscribeto the "mentalact" conception of mental discourse.
According to this alternativeconception of mental discourse,27general termsare, as one would expect, identifiedwithacts of intellection
wherebya multitudeof particularsare confusedlyapprehended whereas singulartermsare identifiedwithacts of intellection,chieflyacts of
intuition,wherebyjust one particularis distinctly
apprehended.28Other
intellectiveacts are assumed to exist, correspondingto syncategorematics.29As withinthe previous theory,the intellectthushas at its disposal sufficiently
many types of termsto formsentences. The act of
forminga mentalsentencewill however now be regardedas an act dis25
hisformer
Quod.IV, q. 35,OTh.IX, p. 473,Ockhamadducesagainst
opinion
tothosebywhichChatton
in hisReportatio
hadopposedit,a
arguments
verysimilar
factfirst
noticed
himtoedittherelevant
from
byG. Giandwhichprompted
quaestio
theReportatio
influence
onOckham
ofChatton's
(inGal 1967).On thelikely
of
critique
thefictum
besidesGi 1967,Kelley1981,p. 223.
see,
theory,
26ThisisWodeham's
ofourbelief
inuniversais.
See Lectura
veryilluminating
diagnosis
secunda
... d.8q.l, ed.cit.vol.III p. 31lin.8-1
hewrites
that"afictum
wouldnot
1,where
havebeenposited
unlessitweretoconfirm
ourexperience
... thata something
unique
terminates
anactofgeneral
intellection"
nonservirei
necponeretur
nisi
[... illudfictum
ad satisfaciendum
videtur
nolimus
experientiae
supratactae,
nobis,
quiascilicet
velimus,
actumintellectionis
Notethatwhat
quodunicumquidsistatet terminet
communis].
Wodeham
herecallsan "experience"
canbe illusory,
as is forinstance
thatof"seeing"
a stick
as broken
which
ispartly
inwater.
Ockham
a general
immerged
explains
cognitionas beinga confused
ofmanyparticulars
inQuest.Phys.q.6,OPh.VI,p.
cognition
408.
27Theaccount
I willbegiving
hereofthisconception
ofmental
sufficient
for
discourse,
is mostsuccinct.
See footnotes
5 and3.
mypresent
purpose,
Ockhamassigns
confused
therleofgeneral
terms
ofmental
discourse
in
cognitions
ofa giventhing
therleof
Quest.Phys.q.7,OPh.VI, p. 408andintuitive
cognitions
inthesametextp. 411.
terms
singular
29
Ockhammentions
"mental
in Quod.IV q.35,OTh.IX, p. 471
syncategorematics"
lin.48.
178

20:16:47 PM

act-which may occur or not-of apprehendingthe

tinctfromthefurther
sentenceonce formed.30
which will prove to be particularlyrelevantto our
Two differences,
main topic,followbetween mental sentencesas now conceived and as
they previouslywere. One differenceis that,of mental sentences as
now conceived, it no longer holds that they are formed and apprehended by one and the same act.31The second differencepertainsto
thenatureof the act, ifit does occur,by which a given mentalsentence
is distinctly32
apprehended. Whereas formerlysuch an act was practia non-reflexiveact, since mental sentences, as they
cases
in
all
cally
were then conceived, practicallynever included mental acts, now, on
since mental
the contrary,such an act will necessarilybe reflexive,33
sentences,as now conceived, are all composed of mental acts.
30In
theterm"apprehension"
beingtakenin
Quod.III q.8,OTh.IX, p. 233lin.21-3,
I havebeenusingituptonowand
senseofcognition
itscustomary
(thesenseinwhich
can be
thata "complex"
Ockhamacknowledges
to use it hereafter),
shallcontinue
Elsewhere
ofit[sineomniapprehensione].
"without
formed
(Quod.
anyapprehension"
to saythattherearetwokindsofapprehe prefers
V q.6,OTh.IX, p. 501lin.20-4),
theother
ofthesentence,
onewhichis the"formation"
ofa mental
hension
sentence,
formed"
ofthatcomplexalready
which
is "thecognition
[... duplexestapprehensio:
aliaquaeestcognitio
siveformatio,
etdivisio
unaquaeestcognitio
ipsius
propositionis
sentence
is calledan actof
ofa mental
The actofformation
iamformati].
complexi
ofthesenno awareness
ofthatsentence
however,
onlybycourtesy
"apprehension"
tencebeingimplied.
31If,
inQuod.V q.6,OTh.IX,p. 501(seepreceding
ofOckham
theexample
following
an actof"appresentence
ofa mental
we wereto calltheactofformation
footnote),
menevenas nowconceived,
wewouldhavetoconcedethat,
ofthatsentence,
hension"
andapprehended
areformed
talsentences
byoneandthesameact(a facttowhichC.
theterm"apprebe taking
We wouldnothowever
hasdrawn
Panaccio
myattention).
wouldhaveto
so thatthepointI ammaking
senseofcognition
initsstandard
hension"
as
sentence
a
of
mental
instance
for
other
beexpressed
that,
words,
by
saying
using
by
anactof
holdsthatitisformed
itnolonger
nowconceived,
facto
byanactwhichis ipso
ofthatsentence.
cognition
32
anactof"directapprehension
ofthepreceding
Whatwas,intheframework
theory,
ofa
ofthatthing
withan actofapprehension
ofa thing
bythemediation
(bycontrast
of
anactofdistinct
ofthepresent
theframework
apprehension
is,within
theory,
fictum)
ofthatthing
withan actofconfused
thatthing
alongwith
apprehension
(bycontrast
others).
many
33Anactofintellection
ifitis an actbywhichthe
as "reflexive
willnowbe defined
an act
ifitis either
"non-reflexive"
and
acts
its
own
of
one
minddistinctly
apprehends
or an actofconfused
ofsomeexternal
ofdistinct
apprehension.
thing
apprehension
froma self-reflexive
mentalactshouldbe distinguished
one,now
Againa reflexive
ruledoutthe
Pierre
ofitself.
as anactofdistinct
defined
explicitly
d'Ailly
apprehension
andO. Pluta
ofsuchan actofcognition
276-7,L. Kaczmarek
(.Insolubilia
possibility
andpresumably
communicated
byL. Kaczmarek)
eds.,forthcoming,
kindly
transcript
wouldhavedoneso as well(seefootnote
Ockham
21).
179

20:16:47 PM

s originaltheory
2. Ockham'
and belief
of knowledge
Let us now turn to Ockham's original theory of knowledge and
belief,in which the "object of thought"conceptionof mentaldiscourse
is presupposed, a theorycontained in his Commentary
on theSentences.
We have here a very elaborate theory,many of the basic assumptions
of which will be incorporatednot only into the author'slatertheorybut
also by Chatton and by Wodeham into theirown theories,as we shall
see.
According to this theorythen, knowing and believing are mental
acts, specificallyacts of assent. These acts possess two main features:
they"terminate"in an object34and theyare real entities,albeit mental
ones, the existenceofwhich,as thatof any real entity,has been brought
about by causes. The object in which an act of assent terminatesis the
object assented to and consequentlythe object ofthe agent'sknowledge
or belief.That object is in all cases a mentalsentence.The way in which
such an act has been broughtabout, togetherwiththe truthvalue ofthe
mental sentence assented to, determinesthe kind of act of assent it is,
in particularwhetherit is an act of evident cognition,35
i.e. of knowlin
a
wide
or
rather
an
act
of
sense,
edge
opinion, conjectureor faith,36
i.e. an act of belief.
34Thus,inOrd.
Ockhamspeaksofthe
prol.q. 9, OTh.I, p. 266lin.19-20forexample,
ofscience"
as thatwhich"terminates"
an actofknowing
scientiae
"object
[... objectum
estilludquodscitur
ettermint
actumsciendil.
35Thereare,itseems,fourmainkindsofevident
ofa
(orassent):
cognition
cognition
mental
sentence
mental
caused
"perse nota",whichis alwaysofa necessary
sentence,
inpartbythecognition
ofitsterms,
evident
ofa contingent
(orapprehension)
cognition
mentalsentence
causedin partbytheintuitive
ofitsterms,
demonstrative
cognition
whichis ofa mental
conclusion
inferred
from
caused
knowledge,
necessary
premisses,
inpartbyactsofassent
tothesepremisses,
andknowledge
is also
which
byexperience
inferred
causedinpartbyactsofassenttoothermental
oneof
knowledge
sentences,
which
is contingent.
Themostcomplete
account
ofassent
ofthevarand,inparticular,
iouskindsofevident
itincludes
is to be foundin Quest,q.5,OTh. VIII,
cognition
ofthataccount,
itis ofutmost
to
p. 170-4.To gaina proper
understanding
importance
bearinmindthattheconception
ofmental
itpresupposes
discourse
isoneaccording
to
whichtheterms
ofmental
sentences
areeither
fictaorelseconcrete
particulars
direcdy
orabstractively)
(beitintuitively
that
(seefootnote
17).Ifoneoverlooks
apprehended
it
is
to
make
sense
in
of
thatassent
fact, impossible
tosomecontinparticularthenotion
sentences
canbe causedinpartbytheintuitive
oftheir
terms
gentmental
(cf.
cognition
"... illeassensus
causatur
exnotitia
Quest,q.5,OTh.VIII,p. 171lin.310-1:
incomplexa
intuitiva
terminorum
et ex apprehensione
illiuscomplexi
One scholar
sufficienter").
whohasstruggled
tounderstand
butwhofailed
todo so,having
failed
torecognize
this,
thattheterms
inquestion
aretheconcrete
which
arebeingintuthemselves,
particulars
is T.Boler
inBoler1973,p. 97 andinBoler1976,p. 96-8.
itively
apprehended,
36
toOrd.prol.q.2,OTh.I, p. 88lin.3-4,
actsofassent
which
arenotevident
According
include
actsofopinion,
andfaith.
Foranaccount
ofthoseactsofassent
which
conjecture
areactsoffaith,
seeQuest,q.5,OTh.VIII,p. 184-91.
180

20:16:47 PM

The object of an act of assent being, withinthistheory,identifiedin

all cases with a mental sentence, it is however required that the sentence be apprehended by the agent.37But we have seen that,where
mental sentences are conceived, as they are here, according to the
"object of thought"conception of mental discourse, the act of apprehendingsuch a sentencejust is the act of formingit. It followsthat,by
requiringthatthe mentalsentence,object of assent,be apprehended by
theagent,Ockham is not requiringany furtheract on his partthanthat
of formingthe sentence.
Now thisact of apprehension (or formation)of the mental sentence,
object of assent,need not in principlebe distinctfromthe very act of
assent itself,since no contradictionis involved in supposing that it is
not.38However, Ockham insists,proving his point by an argument
based on experience,39withinthe normal course of nature,there are
necessarilytwo acts involved, the act of assent requiringthatthe sentence which is assented to has, by a distinctact, been apprehended (or
formed). Indeed, the somewhat strongerproposition must also be
admittedthat,within the normal course of nature, an act of assent
requiresas one of its "partial" causes an act of mere apprehension (or
formation)of the mental sentence which is its object.40
37"... thereis an evident
to a senthatsomeoneassents
contradiction
(insupposing)
tenceanddoesnotapprehend
it"[... evidenscontradictio
estquodaliquisassentiat
ettarnen
nonapprehendat
alicuipropositioni
earn](Ord.prol.q.l, OTh.I, p. 59lin.101).
38Anactofassent
andthusanapprehension
ofthemenanawareness
includes
always
talsentence
forms
itsobject(Ord.prolq.l, OTh.I,p. 16lin.13-4andp. 59lin.18).
which
insupposing
thata menthere
wouldhavebeena contradiction
though
Consequently,
insupat
is
none
talsentence
there
hasbeenassented
towithout
all,
beingapprehended
itbyan appreanddoesnotapprehend
"thatan intellect
assents
toa sentence
posing
hension
distinct
from
thatassent"[Potest
diciquodnonestcontradictio
quodaliquis
earnunaapprehenintellectus
assentiat
alicuipropositioni
ettarnen
nonapprehendat
ab ilioassensu]
sionedistincta
realiter
(Ord.prolq.l, OTh.I, p. 59 lin.14-6).Notethat
ofthe
an actofassent,
an apprehension
(andhencetheformation)
though
including
as anact
isitsobject,
is notan actofthesamekindor"species"
mental
sentence
which
ofapprehension.
39This
toprovethat"anactof
tooinvolved
tobe recounted
here,purports
argument,
anactofappretoa complex
orofdissent)
relative
(i.e.ofassent
presupposes
judgment
alicuius
hension
relative
tothesamecomplex"
[... actusjudicativus
complexi
respectu
actumapprehensivum
eiusdem]
(Ord.prol.q.l., OTh.I, p. 17
respectu
praesupponit
18lin.12).
lin.l5-p.
40InOrd.
anobjection
thearguraisedagainst
answering
prol.q.l, OTh.I,p. 20lin.3-8,
thattheactofapprement
tointhepreceding
Ockham
referred
footnote,
acknowledges
cause
a sufficient
notingeneral
hension
ofa mental
sentence,
cause,isa partial
though
ofanyactofassent
tothatsentence
[sufficit
quodsitcausapartialis].
181

20:16:47 PM

3. Whereit is shownthat Ockham'soriginaltheory

and
of knowledge
conception
beliefrequiresthe "objectof thought"
of mentaldiscourse
Suppose that,while subscribingto the "mental act" conception of
mental discourse,one should wish to retainOckham's originaltheory
of knowledge and belief, continuingto identifythe objects of knowledge and belief with objects of assent and the latter,in all cases, with
mental sentences.Can thisbe plausiblydone? The answer,forreasons
Ockham himselfprovided in a laterwork,41is negative.Here is why.
If a mentalsentenceis identifiedwithacts of intellection,as itis within the "mental act" conception of mental discourse,it may well, as we
earliernoted,be formedby the mind withoutbeing itselfapprehended.
Yet, according to Ockham, a mental sentence can be the object of an
act of assentonly ifit is apprehended by the agent of thatact and, within the normal course of nature,only ifit is apprehended by an act distinctfromthe act of assent itself.It followsthatone could, while presupposing the "mental act" conception of mentaldiscourse,stillidentify the object of an act of assent with a mental sentence only if one
admittedthatthe agent has, by one mentalact,firstly
formedthatmental sentence and, by a furtheract, normally distinctfrom the act of
assent,apprehended it. Now such an act of apprehensionwould, as we
observed, have to be "reflexive".But if a reflexiveact were always
requiredforthereto be assent,and hence knowledgeor belief,it would
then follow thatall knowledge and beliefwould involve an introspective awareness of one's own mentalacts. But thisis surelyan unacceptable consequence, since thereare undoubtedlycases of knowledgeand
beliefwhere the agent remains whollyunaware of the workingsof his
own mind.42
One could not substitutethenthe "mentalact" conception of mental
discourseforthe "object of thought"conceptionwithinOckham's original theory of knowledge and belief and obtain a plausible theory.
Which shows this to be a theorydepending forits plausibilityon the
41
intheQuodlibets.
See thefollowing
footnote.
Namely
42As
acknowledged
byOckhamwho,In Quod.Ill q. 8, OTh.IX, p. 233-4lin.14-29,
outthata person
whoisnotofthereflective
butclearpoints
type(thetexthas"laicus"
"rusticus"
wouldhavebeenmoreappropriate)
andwhoisnotawareofwhatgoeson
ly
inhismindwhenheknows(orbelieves)
thata
something,
maywellknowforinstance
stoneis notan ass,though
hehasno knowledge
ofa mental
sentence
[... laicussciens
nihilcogitt
de propositione
etperconsequens
nonassentiat
quodlapisnonestasinus,
Licetassentiat
etsciatquodsicestinrevelnonest,mediante
propositions
propositione
formata
inintellectu,
tamenhocnonpercipit].
182

20:16:47 PM

assumptionthatmental discourse is composed not of mental acts, but

of objects of thought.
4. Threetheories
and beliefin whichthe "mentalact"
of knowledge
conception
of mentaldiscourseis assumed
We know that Chatton, Ockham in later works,and Wodeham all
subscribedto the "mental act" conception of mental discourse. Given
that they could not simply substitutethat conception of mental discourseforthe "object of thought"conceptionwithinOckham's original
the objects
theory,how did theythen solve the problem of identifying
ofknowledge and belief?This is the issue I propose we look into now.
4.1. Chatton'
s theory
In accordance withchronologicalorder,let us turnto Chattonfirst.43
Chattonhad stronglyobjected to Ockham's theoryof knowledge and
His arguments
on theSentences.
belief,as contained in his Commentary
were however misleadinglypresented as though his colleague had at
the time subscribed to the "mental act" conception of mental discourse44which, as Chatton knew fullwell since he had criticizedhim
on thatpoint,45he had not. This unfairnessto Ockham need not detain
us however.46Ratherwhat is of interestis the theoryof knowledge and
"
43Thetextis thatofart.1 1 ofthe
andtohisLectura
tohisReportatio
super
Prologue
q.
'
ed.J.Wey,Toronto,
Sentential
1989,p. 18-45.
(hereafter
"Prol."),
44InProl. a.l, 21 lin.106-7,
can
takesforgranted
thata mental
sentence
Chatton
q.l
p.
cirbe intheintellect
without
("... omniapprehensione
complexi
beingapprehended
tothe
inintellects
..."). But,as weknow,according
positoipsocomplexo
cumscripta,
inthetheofmental
discourse
whichOckhamassumes
ofthought"
conception
"object
sincetheact
is opposing,
thisis nota possibility,
andbeliefChatton
oryofknowledge
itareoneandthesameact.Itis
a mental
andthatofapprehending
offorming
sentence
within
the"mental
ofmental
discourse.
a possibility
act"conception
however
45Chatton
thatthereare"ficta"
as general
tothehypothesis
objects
primarily
objected
couldcontain
to thenotionthatmentaldiscourse
ofthought
andconsequently
ficta.
"... norisa syllogism
ora sentence
Thusinq. 2,d.3,bookI oftheReportatio
, hewrites:
exficvelpropositio
officta
butofintellections"
[necsyllogismus
componitur
composed
inGi 1967).
tissedexipsisintellectionibus]
206ofG. Gl'sedition
ofthatquestion
(p.
46Thisunfairness
"... ifaccording
to this
wasdenounced
byWodehamwhowrites:
him(Ockham),
he prohe (Chatton)
(ofa mental
sentence),
understanding
disproves
cedesequivocally
andinvain,as hedoesfrequently"
[... siad iliumintellectum
impro...
secunda
bateum,in aequivocoet frustra
sicutet frequenter
facit][Lectura
procedit
in criticizing
Prol.q.6,ed. cit.vol.I, p. 150lin.25-6).The sameunfairness,
consisting
discourse
whichhedidnothold(atthe
Ockham
ofmental
onthebasisofa conception
in thesameworkat d.3 q.4,ed. cit.vol.II
is againdenounced
time),
byWodeham
183

20:16:47 PM

of beliefby which Chattonproposed to improve on Ockham's original

theory.
The theoryChatton propounded has some veryfundamentalpoints
in common with that of Ockham. As Ockham did, Chatton too
analysed knowledge and belief as naturally caused acts of assent,
requiringobjects which "terminate"them,objects which,accordingto
him too, must be apprehended by the agent of that act. Mental sentences are not however, according to Chatton's theory,or at least are
not in most cases, the objects of these acts of assent. Rather it is they
which are the causes, or which are at least partial causes, of acts of
assent.For example, he who formsthe mental sentence corresponding
to "God is one and triune",withoutapprehending it, may be determined,in partby thatverysentencewhich,let us not forget,consistsof
acts of apprehension, to an act of assent.47But what will he then be
assenting to? Surely not to the sentence itself,since it has not been
apprehended, but ratherto what is apprehended or signifiedby that
sentence,48which in turnreduces to what is apprehended or signified
by the intellectiveacts of which thatsentence consists,in particularby
those which formits subject and predicate. The correctthingto say
then about the agent who formsthe mental sentence correspondingto
"God is one and triune"withoutapprehending it and who is determined, in part by that very sentence, to an act of assent, is that the
object of his act of assent is God, since it is God who is signifiedboth
by the subject and by the predicate of thatsentence. Chatton's theory
then,ifI have read him correctly,amountsto this:the objects of an act
of assent,and hence of an act of knowledge or of belief,are the things
apprehended or signifiedby the termsof the mental sentence which
has caused, or contributedin causing thatact.49
We mustobserve thatsuch a theorydoes not rule out the possibility
23.
p. 177-8lin.28-36,a textpartofwhichis quotedinfootnote
47
Prol.q.l a.l, p. 21 lin.120-4.The mentalcounterpart
ofthatsentence,
notoriously
inevidence,
isincapable
ofcausing
anactofassent
which
intheintellect
lacking
byitself
hasformed
istum
format
it,butitcando soifthewillconcurs
[... positoquodintellectus
articulum
'Deusesttrinus
etunus'concurrente
... causabitur
actus
voluntatis,
imperio
credendil.
48"... theassent
causedbya sentence
anextra-mental
hasthatthing
as
thing
signifying
immediate
causatus
[... assensus
objectandnotthatcomplex"
sigperpropositionem
nificantem
remextrahabetillamremproobjectoimmediato
etnonilludcomplexum]
(ibid.p. 27 lin.282-3).
49G. Nuchelmans
Chatton
as proposing
toidentify
ofa mental
thesignificate
interprets
sentence
withthatofitssubject
term
1980,p. 181.
only.See Nuchelmans
184

20:16:47 PM

thata sentence,even a mental one, should be an object of assent,and

hence of knowledgeor ofbelief.Suppose thatan agent should formthe
metalinguisticmental sentence correspondingto "The article of faith
"God is one and triune"is true",and thatthissentence should play its
partin producingin the agent an act of assent.The object he is assenting to will then be the articleof faithsignifiedby the subject,also signified,thoughconfusedly,by the predicate,namely the very sentence
"God is one and triune"or the correspondingmentalsentence.But this
is only a special case.50
in the Quodlibets
4.2. Ockham'stheory
Let us turnnow, once again, to Ockham. By the timehe was writing
he had definitelyrejected the "object of thought"conthe Quodlibets,
mental
discourse in favorof the "mental act" conception of
of
ception
it.51He consequentlyrealized that,for the reasons given earlier,52he
could no longer identifythe objects of all knowledge and belief with
mentalsentenceswhile retainingthe other components of his original
theory.He knew of Chatton's alternativetheory,but he foundhe could
not accept it either.His reasons were simple: individual things,including even God, are the kind of thingswhich can be apprehended, but
notthe kind of thingsthatcan be assented to, and consequentlynot the
kind of thingswhich can be known or believed. In effect,Ockham is
what is assented to withparobjectingto Chatton that,by identifying
ticulars,he is committinga categorymistake.53
Ockham favors,would have us
The theorywhich,in the Quodlibets,
believe thatacts of assent are of two kinds.54
An act of assent of the firstkind is, within the normal course of
50"...
in otherwordsa (mental)
ofan external
thing,
apprehension
justas a complex
to
assentrelative
a corresponding
thatthing,
causesintheintellect
sentence
signifying
is a
and(which)
sentence
another
sentence
anexternal
so a (mental)
signifying
thing,
assent
causesa corresponding
ofthatsentence
(tothatsentence)"
complex
apprehension
earnin intellectu
reiextraseupropositio
signifcans
[... sicutapprehensio
complexa
itaunapropositio
reiextra,
sibicorrespondentem
causat
assensum
signifcans
respectu
causat
et (quae)estapprehensio
aliampropositionem
complexailliuspropositionis,
sibicorrespondens]
assensum
(Prol.q.l a.l, p. 41 lin.700-3).
51Cf.Quod.IV q. 35,OTh.IX,p. 472-4.
52Inpart3.
53"... noassent
becausetosaythatI assenttoa stoneortoan ox
toa thing,
is relative
estrespectu
istosaynothing"
rei,quianihilestdictuquodassentio
[... nullusassensus
lapidivelbovi](Quod.IV q. 17,OTh.IX,p. 380lin.86-7).
54This
inthree
is contained
places:Quod.Ill q. 8,IV q.l6 andV q. 6.
theory
185

20:16:47 PM

nature,partiallycaused by a mental sentence which however is not

itself apprehended.55This is the case when an agent, formingfor
instance the mental sentence correspondingto "a stone is not an ass"
withouthowever apprehendingthat sentence itself,assents to it being
the case thata stone is not an ass.56For acts of assent produced under
those conditions,the correctthingto say, Ockham claims,is thatnothing has been assented to and that consequentlynothingis known or
believed.57Yet one should, he thinks,also recognize that there are
thingsin which such an act of assent terminatesand which are therefore,in some sense, its objects, namely those thingswhich are apprehended by the termsof the mental sentencewhich has partiallycaused
thatassent,such as stones and asses ifthatsentencehappens to be one
correspondingto "a stone is not an ass".58 Ockham then implicitly
admits that one may, forthis kind of assent,distinguishthe notion of
what is assented to fromthatof the thingor thingswhich terminatethe
act of assent. He is thus in effectrenouncingone of the main assumptions of his original theory, an assumption on the basis of which
Chatton had concluded thata real thing,ifit is the object which terminates an act of assent,is ipsofactothatwhich is being assented to.
By contrast,an act of assent of the second kind is one where thereis
somethingwhich is assented to, and consequentlyknown or believed,
namely a mental sentence.59That sentencemustbe apprehended however, and it must even be assumed, according to Ockham, that,within
the normal course ofnature,itis necessarilyapprehended by an act dis55Anactofassentofthiskindis
ofa proposition
formed
produced
"bythemediation
intheintellect"
thesentence
byan agentwhois notawareofforming
(Quod.Ill q.8,
textquotedinfootnote
OTh.IX, 233-4lin.24-7,
42).
56Sinceinp.
thiscasetheactofassentis an actofknowledge,
onemayalsosaythat"by
thatactitisknown
thata stoneis notan ass"[... istoactuscitur
quodlapisnonestasinus](Quod.Ill q.8,OTh.IX,p. 234lin.32).
57Iftheactofassentis an actof
then"properly
itshouldnotbe
knowledge,
speaking,
admitted
thatsomething
isknown
nondebetdiciquod
bythatact"[... proprie
loquendo
istoactu](Quod.Ill q. 8,OTh.IX,p. 234lin.31-2).
iftheactof
aliquidscitur
Similarly,
assentis an act offaith,
then"properly
it shouldbe saidthatnothing
is
speaking,
believedbythatact"[... de virtute
debetdiciquodnihilcreditur
sermonis
istoactu]
(ibid.p. 235lin.69).
58"... thatacthasexternal
as objects,
a stoneandan ass"[... isteactus
things
namely
habetresextraproobjectis,
etasinum]
(ibid.p. 234,lin.27-8).
puta
lapidem
59"Ofanother
kindistheact(ofknowing)
isknown,
sothattheact
bywhich
something
itaquodactussciofknowing
relates
tosomething"
[... aliusestactusquoaliquidscitur,
endirefertur
ad aliquid](Quod.Ill q. 8,OTh.IX,p. 233lin.16-7).Similarly,
"ofanotherkindis theact(offaith)
tosomething"
relates
[... alius
bywhichtheactofbelieving
itaquodactuscredendi
refertur
ad aliquid](Quod.Ill q. 8, OTh.
quoaliquidcreditur,
IX,p. 235lin.65-6).
186

20:16:47 PM

an act of pure apprehensionwhich,

tinctfromthe act of assent itself,60
withinthe normal course of nature,is required as a partialcause of the
act of assent.61Suppose forexample thatan agent not only formsthe
mentalsentencecorrespondingto "a stone is not an ass", but also, by a
furtheract, apprehends thatsentence. He may then be quite naturally
determinedto assent to that sentence,which will have become at the
same time the object he apprehends and thatwhich he assentsto.
Acts of assent of the firstkind may be called "non-introspective"
insofaras theydo not in general require thatthe agent apprehend any
mentalsentence,nor thathe be aware of any ofhis mentalacts. By contrast,acts of assent of the second kind may be called "introspective"
insofaras theyall require thatthe agent apprehend a mental sentence
and thathe thereforebe aware of some of his mental acts.
thesetwo kindsof assent,Ockham manages to parBy distinguishing
his
originaltheory,since thereexist acts of assent of one
tiallysalvage
which
the
old theorystillholds, namely acts which all have a
kind for
mentalsentence as theirobject and which,given the normal course of
nature,are all partiallycaused by an act of apprehension of that sentence. It is not surprisingthen that he considers acts of assent of this
kind as involvingmore perfectionthan the othersand as being those
whichthe philosophershave in mind when theyclaim thatonly truths
can be known.62These acts of assent being however all of the "intro60"... thesecondkindofassent,
ofthecasewhereitis naturally
produced,
speaking
ofa complex... Thereasonis thatthiskind
theapprehension
presupposes
necessarily
toa thing
assentordissent
butwe do notnaturally
hasas objecta complex,
ofassent
toa complex
thatI assentnaturally
itis therefore
itis apprehended;
unless
impossible
necessario
naturaliter
it"[... secundus
without
assensus,
praeloquendo,
apprehending
habetcomplexum
... Etratioestquiaisteassensus
complexi
apprehensionem
supponit
et
nisicognito
assentimus
nec dissentimus
proobjecto;nuncautemnullinaturaliter
nisi
naturaliter
alicui
assentiam
est
complexo
igiturimpossibile quod
apprehenso;
illud](Quod.IV q.16,OTh.IX,p. 377lin.37-43).
apprehendam
61
senthemental
andoftheactofapprehending
ofthesecondkindofassent
Speaking
act(the
actcausesthejudicative
notesthat"theapprehensive
tence
assented
to,Ockham
causatactum
actofassent)"
(Quod.V q.6,OTh.
judicativum]
[... actusapprehensivus
IX,p. 502lin.59).
62".'. itis ofthatkindofact(theactofassentwhichhas a complexas object)that
whatistrueand
isknown
except
generally
speak... Theysaythatnothing
philosophers
communiter
thattheyarespeaking"
itis ofa truecomplex
[... de istoactuloquuntur
deverocomplexo]
etloquuntur
nisiverum
etiamquodnihilscitur
... Dicunt
philosophi
onemight
say,itis ofsuchacts
Similarly,
(Quod.III q. 8, OTh.IX,p. 234-5lin.44-8).
ofbelief
faith
areobjects
of
that
articles
when
thattheologians
ofassent
theysay
speak
proobjecputaarticulum,
(cf.ibid.p. 236lin.74-6:"... (actusfideihabet)complexum,
nisicomplexum").
etnihilestverum
sicnisiverum,
to,quianihilcreditur
187

20:16:47 PM

spective" kind, they require that the agent be aware of some of his
mental acts, a requirementwhich was altogetherabsent fromhis original theory.
4.3. Wodeham'stheory
Let us turnfinallyto Wodeham who, as Chatton had, subscribedto
the "mental act" conception of mental discourse.63Consequently,
though acknowledgingits merit,he too dismissed Ockham's original
theoryof knowledge and belief.64But, while agreeing with large portions of it, he also dismissed Chatton's theoryforreasons which shall
be seen shortly. Ockham's second theory, as propounded in the
, he did not discuss however,indeed he seemed to have been
Quodlibets
unaware of it.65
Though he had to rejectOckham's originaltheoryof knowledgeand
belief and found he could not accept Chatton's theory either,
Wodeham proposed a theorywhich sharesthe same basic assumptions.
He too identifiesknowledge and belief withmental acts, more specifically withacts of assent,the existence of which mustbe broughtabout
by causes, and which musthave an object in which theyterminate,an
object apprehended by the agentin an act distinctfromie act of assent
itself.66
On thisbasis, Wodeham concurs with Chatton on the rle he
to
assigns mentalsentenceswithrespectto acts of assent.He too admits
thateveryact of assentrequiresas itscause, or as one ofitspartialcauses, a mental sentencewhich has been formedby the agent. He further
concurs with Chatton in thinkingthat the mental sentence which has
caused, or has contributedin causing a given act of assentcan never be
63ForWodeham's
ofknowledge
andbelief,
themaintextis distinction
1,questheory
tion1,article
1 ofhisLectura
secunda
... (hereafter
ed.cit.vol.I, p. 180-98.
This
"Lect."),
twoarticles,
wasfirst
edited
question,
comprising
byG. Gi,inGi 1977(seebelowfootnote81).
64He dismissed,
thatis,theviewthattheobjects
ofknowledge
aremental
(orofbelief)
sentences.
"... itdoesnotseemtomethata complex
isthetotalobjectofanactofknowmihiquodcomplexum
sitobjectum
totaleactussciendi]
ing"[... nonvidetur
(Lect.d.l
Wodeham
as Chatton
hadnot(see
however,
q.l, vol.I, p. 185lin.3-4).
acknowledged
footnote
ifitwereadmitted,
as ithadbeenby
46),thatthisviewcouldbe defended
thata mentalsentence
is formed
notofactsofthinking,
butofobjectsof
Ockham,
orthings
thought,
ficta
(cf.Lect.d.l q. 1,vol.I, p. 186lin.19-25andlin.29).
65Asnoted Katherine
Tachauinachau1988,p. 304-5,footnote
99.
by
66"...
is theobjectofan actofassent... whichis notfirst
known
nothing
byan actof
which
is onlyanactofapprehension
andnotofassent"
cognition
[... nihilestobjectum
actusassentiendi
... quinpraecognoscatur
distincta
cognitione
quaesittantum
apprehensioetnonassensus]
(Lect.d.l q. 1,vol.I, p. 190lin.15-7).
188

20:16:47 PM

itselfthe object of thatact of assent,67and in thinkingthatthatobject

mustbe identifiedinstead withwhat is signifiedby that sentence. But
he rejectsChatton's conclusion thatthe object of an act of assent must
thereforecoincide entirelywiththe significatesof the subjectand of the
predicateofthementalsentencewhich caused (or partiallycaused) that
assent.
If thiswere the case, Wodeham argues,the act of assentcaused in the
mind of an agent by a given mental sentence-corresponding for
instanceto "God is God"-, and the act of dissentcaused in the mind of
the same agent by its contradictory-corresponding
to "God is not
would
have
the
the
mind
is surelyas
same
But
God-",
exactly
object.68
capable of acts of dissentas it is of acts of assent,Wodeham believes.
To avoid such an undesirable consequence, one must,he concludes,
draw a double distinction,which Chatton failed to draw, between on
the one hand partial and total objects of assent, and, on the other,
betweenpartialand totalsignificatesof sentences.
Consider the latterdistinctionfirst.Chatton had identifiedthe significateof a sentence with the significatesof its subject and of its predicate. But that cannot be correct,Wodeham argues, since a sentence
containsadditionallyto its subject and predicate always at least a copOne
ula, which mustitselfbe making some semanticalcontribution.69
that
therefore
concede
the
the
of
and
of
the
significates
may
subject
a
of
sentence
are
its
not
that
form
but
predicate
partialsignificates,
they
itstotalsignificate.What then is the total significateof a sentence? For
example what is the total significateof "a man is white"? It is,
Wodeham answers,thata man is white,70and thisis not a thingbut it
is a "being so in reality"if the sentence is true and a "not being so in
reality"ifit is false.71Now whereas a thing,i.e. a substance or a quali67"... the
iscaused.Thatiscontheassent
isnotthecomplex
bywhich
objectofassent
causatur.
assensus
nonestcomplexum
mediante
ceded"[... objectum
quotalisassensus
Ethocconcessum
est](ibid.p. 197,lin.2-4).
68"... itfollows
atthesametimeto
anddissents
Chatton's
views)thatoneassents
(from
et
dissentit
simul
et
semel
assentii
thesamething"
eidem]
(ibid.p. 184
[... sequitur
quod
lin.19-20).
69"... a sentence
whicharenotsignified
something
orsomethings
bythesubsignifies
[... propositio
per
significai
aliquidvelaliquaquodnonsignificata
jectorthepredicate"
velpraedicatum]
(ibid.p. 185lin.48-9).
subjectum
70"... huius'homo
essealbum"(ibid.p. 193
esthominem
estalbus'... significatali
lin.20-21).
71"...
denoestsicessevelsicnonessesicutperpropositionem
(totale)
significatimi
alsosays(ibid.p. 195lin.23)thatthetotalsignifitata"(ibid.p. 193lin.18).Wodeham
buta "beingwhat"("... nonestquidsed estesse
cateofa sentence
is nota "what"
quid").
189

20:16:47 PM

ty,can be signified"incomplexlyor complexly",i.e. both by termsand

a being so in realityor a not being so in realitycan only
by sentences,72
be signified"by a complex", i.e. by a sentence.73Clearly then,the total
all
significateof a sentenceis whollydistinctfromitspartialsignificates,
of which are things,i.e. substancesor qualities.
Another indispensable distinctionis between the partial object and
the total object of an act of assent. It is, Wodeham thinks,because
Chattonfailedto draw thatdistinctionas well as the precedingone that
he failedto realize thathe was dealing only withthe partialobject ofan
act of assent when he identifiedthatobject with the significatesof the
subjectand of the predicateof the mentalsentencecausingthe assent.74
Yet it is not the partial object, but the total object of an act of assent
whichis most characteristicofthatact. But whatis the totalobject of an
act of assent? Wodeham's answer is, as one mightexpect, thatit is the
total significateof the sentence which caused thatact,75or which contributedin causing it.76Suppose, forexample, thatan agent formsthe
72"...
however
or incomcan,itseems,be signified
everything,
simple,
complexly
videtur
res,quantumcumque
plexly"[... quaelibet
simplex,
possesignificali
complexe
etincomplexe]
a proposition
inthecontext
stated
ofanobjection,
(ibid.p. 193lin.12-3),
butacknowledged
as trueonp. 196lin.42.
73"... thata manis an animal
... is a certain
signifiable
bya complex,
namely
bythis:
'a manis an animal'"[... hominem
esseanimal...estquoddamsignificabile
percomanda fewlinesabove:"... a beingsoinextraplexum,
putaperillud'homoestanimal']
mental
ora notbeingso doesnotdependonanyactofthemindoronanysign;
reality
andanything
ofthatsortis signifiable
butnotbya mental
inother
words
incomplex,
notbya simpleintellection,
itis (signifiable)
therefore
ordivided
bya composed
sign,
inother
wordsbyan affirmative
ora negative
sentence"
[... sicessea partereivelsic
nonessenondependet
ab actuanimaevelab aliquosigno.Etomnehuiusmodi
estsigetnonperincomplexum
idestnonpersimplicem
nificabile,
mentale,
intelligentiam,
igiturpersignum
veldivisum,
idestperpropositionem
affirmativam
velnegcompositum
ativam
andlin.29-33).
(ibid.p. 194lin.51-5
74"... whatever
is apprehended
bythecomplexwhichdetermines
(theagent)to an
assentis a partialobjectofthatassent"[... quidquidapprehenditur
percomplexum
necessitans
ad assensum
estpartale
illiusassensus]
aliquem,
(ibid.p. 192lin.6objectum
7).
75"...
ofassent
whichis simply
theimmediate
evident,
speaking
(total)
objectofanact
ofassent
is thetotalobjectofthecomplex
whichdetermines
toassent."
(theagent)
[ ...
immediate
actusassentiendi
estobjectum
totalecomplexi
necessitans
(totale)
objectum
ad assensum,
loquendode assensu
simpliciter
evidenti.]
(ibid.p. 192lin.19-21).
76"...
itsimmediate
totalobjectisthetotalobjectortotal
(ofassent),
speaking
generally
ofthesentence
... whichcontributes
in causing
significate
it,andwhichitnecessarily
eiusobjectum
immediatum
totale
[... generaliter
presupposes"
loquendo(de assensu),
estobjectum
totaleseusignificatum
totalepropositions
... concausantis
iliumetnecessariosibipraesuppositae]
An actofnon-evident
which
(Ibid.p. 192lin.21-3).
assent,
ina widesensebutwhich
falls
maystillbe oneofknowledge
mayalsobe oneofbelief,
within
this"general
causedbya mental
sinceit
case",beingonlypartially
sentence,
190

20:16:47 PM

mental sentence correspondingto "God is God". He may then be

determined,in part by thatvery sentence,to an act of assent,the partial object of which is indeed God, the total and adequate object of
which however is not God,77but thatGod is God.
Of course it may happen thatone should forma metalinguisticmental sentence and thatthat sentence should cause or at least contribute
in causing an act of assent. Such a sentence mightbe forexample the
one correspondingto "the sentence "a man is an animal" is true". In
thatcase, a partialobject of thatact of assent is a sentence,namely the
sentence"a man is an animal" or the correspondingmental sentence.78
Itstotalobject howeveris thatthe sentence"a man is an animal" is true,
and thisis not a sentence.Indeed itis impossible,Wodeham insists,that
a sentence should ever be the total object of an act of assent,and the
reason is simple: the total object of an act of assent is always the total
significateof the mental sentence which caused it (or contributedin
causingit) and a sentenceis never the totalsignificateof any sentence.79
This is a veryimpressivetheory.The main issue it raises however is,
as Wodeham himselfrealized, that of the ontology it presupposes.
Should it be admittedthata "signifiableby a complex"80or, to use an
such as
expressionenjoyingsome currency,a "complexlysignifiable",81
thata man is an animal,is something?Wodeham thinksthatthe answer
thepowerofthewillas
inpartonthewilltoassent(" ... suchan actis within
depends
ibid,
sicutactuscredendi],
isanactofbelief'[... actustalis... subest
(voluntatis)
imperio
p.207lin.53).
to
thefactthat,
themainissue,I havedisregarded
So as nottoobscure
according
inwhichcasetheobject
assent
demonstration,
Wodeham,
maybe causedbyan entire
whichcomposethe
of eachof thesentences
thetotalsignificate
ofassentincludes
is alluding
to thison p. 192lin.23-4,a thesisto whichthe
demonstration
(Wodeham
wholeofLect.d.l q.l a.2 is devoted).
77"... the
noranysimple
isnotGodhimself
[... objecthing"
adequate
objectofassent
nonestDeusipse,necaliquaressimplex]
assensus
tumadaequatum
(ibid.p. 189-90
lin.6-7).
78"... a
of
assent... as forexample
is a partial
objectofsomeactofreflexive
complex
est
in
true"
bene
that
that
assented
which
it
is
theassent
[...
complexum
complex
by
illiusassensus
... verbigratia
reflexi
assensus
alicuius
quo assentito
partiale
objectum
esseverum]
illudcomplexum
(ibid.p. 192lin.3-5).
79"... nulla
totalecuiuscumque
estobjectum
(ibid.p. 192
propositionis"
propositio
lin.13-4).
80
73.
See thetextquotedinfootnote
percomplexum".
81"significabile
of Rimini
Thisis theexpression
which,fromGregory
significabile".
"complexe
from
one fora notionRiminiborrowed
was to becomethe standard
onwards,
hidas hasbeenshownbyG. GiinGi 1977a factwhichhadremained
Wodeham,
workonthecomplexe
dentoH. Elieinhispioneering
(seeElie1936).
significabile
191

20:16:47 PM

mustbe negative,thoughit does not followthata complexlysignifiable

is nothing.Indeed it should be denied both thatit is somethingand that
it is nothing,82
as one would deny thata crowd or a people is a man (i.e.
a human being) as well as thatit is a non-man,sayingratherthatit is
men.83
Wodeham's answer seems to me somewhat puzzling however. If a
complexly signifiableis to be the possible object of acts of assent,and
thereforealso a possible object of apprehension,ifit is furthermore
to
be a possible object ofreference,84
thenitmustbe, in some sense, something.Moreover, if one says of an x that it is neithersomethingnor
nothing,then eitherone is assertinga contradiction,or one is using the
indefiniteterms "something"and "nothing" as restrictedquantifiers,
presupposing a wider universe of discourse than the class of entities
theyrange over. By denyingthata complexly signifiableis something,
is not thenWodeham merelytakingthe word "something"in a narrow
sense, makingit applicable to some entities,but not to all? It seems that
such is precisely how a later Parisian theologian,Gregoryof Rimini,
felt about the issue. While fully subscribing to the main tenet of
Wodeham's theoryof knowledge and belief,according to which what
is known or believed is the total significateof some sentence, and is
thusnot a thing,substance or quality,but a complexly signifiable,85
he
introduceda wide sense of "something",enabling one to say not only
of a thing,substance or quality,but also of a complexly signifiablethat
it is something.86
In so doing,I suggest,Riminiwas not makingany real
addition to Wodeham's theory,ratherhe was makingexplicitits ontologica! commitment.87
82"Dices:hominem
esseanimalestaliquidautestnihil... Dicoquodneutrum
estdandum"(ibid.p. 195lin.15-6).
"... itaquaeram
a te:populus
autesthomoautestnonhomo?Neutrum
estdandum,
sedquodnonesthomosedhomines"
195lin.16-8).
(ibid.
p.
84As it is
to Wodeham.
Cf.Lect.d.l q. 1, vol.I, p. 194lin.50-5,
where
according
Wodehamclaimsthata phrasesuchas "thata manis an animal",
calleda "dictum
can"supposit
forthatwhichis signified
forthata manis
propositionis",
byit",namely
an animal,
andthatis a complexly
esseanimal'potest
("... hominem
signifiable
supetsumiproistodictopropositionis
... velproeo quodperhuiusmodi
dictum
ponere
significatur.
Etsic(hominem
esseanimal)nonestcomplexum
necincomplexum,
sedest
quoddamsignificabile
percomplexum").
85
See footnote
81.
86
Primm
etSecundum
Sententiarum
ofthe1522edition,
I, d. 1,q. 1 a.l, reprint
Super
Franciscan
N.Y.,1955,fol.lQ-2A.
Institute,
87Thiswouldbe
1980,p. 184-6)
(seeNuchelmans
hodycontested
byG. Nuchelmans
as byH. Weidemann
Bothauthors
haveclaimed
1991,p. 140-4).
(seeWeidemann
that,
a widesenseof"something",
bothtoconcrete
and
individuals
byintroducing
applicable
to complexly
Riminididadd to Wodeham's
Thisaddition
howsignifiables,
theory.
192

20:16:47 PM

It is preciselyfromthe point of view of theirrespectiveontological

commitment,thatit is most interestingto compare Wodeham's theory
of assentwithone of the theoriesOckham propounds in the Quodlibets,
kind of assent.These theoriesbear
namelythatofthenon-introspective
some strikingsimilaritiesto each other.88As Wodeham for assent in
general,Ockham would have admittedforassent of the non-introspectivekind thatthe agent assentsto itsbeing as is signifiedor denoted by
the mental sentence which has caused his act of assent.89But whereas
Wodeham took this to be equivalent to the claim that the object of
assentis the significateor denotatumof the sentencewhich has caused
the assent,Ockham rejected as illegitimateany purportedreferenceto
thatwhich is assented to,90and would have similarlyrejected as illegitinsemanthedifference
sinceitobscured
wasnoimprovement
tothem,
ever,
according
whichcanbe named,
as Weidemann
ticalcategory
between,
objects",
putsit,"genuine
a difference
towhich,
whichcanbe expressed
ofaffairs"
and"states
they
bysentences,
alive.Yettheverysameaccubefore
hadbeen,asAbelard
Wodeham
him,fully
believe,
sationthusleveledagainstRiminicould be leveledagainstWodehamhimself!
referhadallowedfora widesenseofwhatmight
Wodeham
todaybe called"normal
conofbothtypes,
towhichentities
ence",i.e.of"significative
according
supposition",
for"by
arecapableofbeing"supposited
andcomplexly
creteindividuals
signifiables,
this
them(seethetextquotedin footnote
whichsignify
84).Nowsurely
expressions
entities
as
between
these
in
semantical
be
there
difference
obscures
category
might
any
theooffact,
Asa matter
all"something".
much
as itdoestocallthem
givensupposition
individuals
canbe suppoas wellas concrete
signifiables
ry,theclaimthatcomplexly
theclaimthat,in a widesenseof
thementails
whichsignify
sitedforbyexpressions
hasmerethenthatRimini
Itappears
aresomething.
ofbothtypes
entities
"something",
doctrine.
a consequence
drawn
byWodeham's
implied
ly
88Asnoted G. Nuchelmans
90.
footnote
inNuchelmans
1980,p. 185.See however
by
89Ockham
thefactthat,
from
butitfollows
doesnotexplicitly
this,
according
recognize
is partothata stoneis notan ass (forexample)
tohim,an actbywhichitis assented
ordenoting
whichis ofcoursea sentence
sentence
causedbya mental
signifying
tially
thata stoneis notanass(seethetextquotedinfootnote
42).
90
Ockham
which
isanactofknowledge,
assent
toanactofnon-introspective
Referring
isknown
itshouldnotbe saidthatsomething
writes:
bythisactbut
speaking
"properly
nondebet
thata stoneis notan ass"[ ... proprie
that
loquendo,
bythisactitis known
istoactused quodistoactuscitur
diciquodaliquidscitur
quodlapisnonestasinus]
ofan actofnon-introspectalking
Similarly,
(Quod.Ill q.8,OTh.IX,p. 234lin.31-2).
isbelieved
hewrites:
is anactoffaith,
which
tiveassent
nothing
by
speaking
"properly
sermonis
thatGodis three
thatact... butbythatactitis believed
[devirtute
persons"
ilioactu... sedilioactucreditur
debetdiciquodnihilcreditur
quodDeusesttresperas hasbeensugisnotclaiming,
Ockham
Inthesetexts,
sonae](ibid.p. 235-6lin.69-71).
there
1980p. 185),that,
speaking,
(cf.Nuchelmans
properly
byG. Nuchelmans
gested
to"isnota thing"
tobecausethatwhichisbeingassented
oneis assenting
isnothing
(a
toOrd.d.2q.8,OTh.II, p. 273lin.1-2,
andyet,according
"nota thing"
issurely
fictum
rather
Ockhamis claiming
inthesoul").In thesetexts,
itis "something
that,
although
to sinceone can
is assented
onecould,in someloosesense,concedethatsomething
"itis known..." or"it
to ..." (orthephrases
thephrase"ithasbeenassented
complete
to
thereis no objectassented
nevertheless
isbelieved
...") andobtaina truesentence,
193

20:16:47 PM

imate any purportedreferenceto that which a sentence signifiesor

denotes. Consequently,he avoided positingany of the "complexlysignifiables"to which Wodeham's theoryis committed.
Conclusion
Ockham, Chatton and Wodeham all assumed that nothingcan be
the object of an act of knowledge or of beliefunless it is apprehended
by the agent of thatact. Taking forgrantedthe existenceof mentaldiscourse, theyalso assumed, withthe exception of Ockham in his early
career,thatmentalsentencesconsistof acts of intellection.Given these
in all cases the objects of acts of
assumptions,the option of identifying
or
of
belief
with
mental
was rejected, since it
sentences
knowledge
would have entailedthateverysuch act be introspective,
requiringas it
would thatthe agent be aware of some of his mental acts.
That very same option had been quite an attractiveone however as
long as mentalsentenceshad been conceived of as consistingof entities
which can be apprehended withoutinvolvingany reflexionofthe mind
on itself.In particularit appeared to be such to Ockham as long as he
chose to identifymentaltermswitheitherfictaor directlyapprehended
concreteparticulars.When he ceased to do so, identifying
insteadmental termsand mental sentenceswithacts of intellection,he resortedto
another theory,which admittedof acts of knowledge and of belief of
two kinds, some indeed of an introspectivekind, having mental sentences as theirobjects,the othersof a non-introspective
kind by which
however nothingis properlyspeakingknown or believed. In the meanwhile, Chatton,who unreservedlysubscribed to the view thatmental
termsand mental sentences are acts of intellection,had proposed to
identifythe objects of acts of knowledge or beliefnot withmental sentences,but withtheirsignificates.Wodeham was laterto choose a similar option, associated however with a totallydifferent
and novel conwhat
a
of
sentence
ception
signifies.
For those who foundall of these latteroptionsunappealing,but who

Andhe wouldhavedeniedthatthe
(andhencenonewhichis knownor believed).
"dicta"
usedtocomplete
thesephrases,
a stoneisnotanass"or"that
suchas "that
God
is three
areusedas referring
sincetheyarebeingusedsignificapersons",
expressions,
withWodeham
whoadmits
thattheythen"supposit"
forwhat
and,bycontrast
tively
admits
thata dictum
(seefootnote
84),Ockham
theysignify
apparently
"supposits"
only
whenitisusednon-significatively
torefer
toitself
ortothecorresponding
sentence.
194

20:16:47 PM

mental termsand mental sentenceswithacts of

insistedon identifying
other
intellection,
optionsremained open, which all involved givingup
one or otherof the basic assumptionscontained in Ockham's original
theoryof knowledge and belief or in the underlyingtheoryof cognition,assumptionswhich Chatton and Wodeham had incorporatedin
theirown theories.One such option mighthave consistedin admitting
and that consequentlya mental
thatall mental acts are self-reflexive
sentencecannot be formedwithoutbeing apprehended.91Every act of
knowledgeand beliefcould thenhave as its object the mentalsentence
which has contributedin causing it, since that sentence would be ipso
factoapprehended. Another,quite radical option,mighthave consisted
in giving up the assumption that there is a distinctionto be drawn
between mental acts and theirobjects. Such seems to have been the
option chosen by Robert Holcot.92 Yet another, less radical, option
mighthave consisted in giving up the assumptionthat nothingis the
object of an act of knowledge or of belief unless it is apprehended by
theagent of thatact. Later authors,such as Pierred'Ailly,or laterones
still,such as John Dorp, who belonged to the followingof Buridan,
seemed to have chosen the latteroption. But that would have to be
investigated.
otherthanmainprimarysources
References
1987
NotreDame,Indiana,
Adams1987- M. McCordAdams:William
Ockham,
Ordinatio
Thetexttradition
Boehner
1942- Ph. Boehner,
, in: The New
ofOckham's
in Collected
Articles
on Ockham,
16 (1942),303-41,reprinted
St.
Scholasticism
N.Y. 1958,110-27
Bonaventure,
on intuitive
in:Journalof theHistory
of
Boler1973- J. Boler,Ockham
cognition,
11(1973),95-106
Philosophy,
in:Franciscan
36 (1976),85onevident
Boler1976- J.Boler,Ockham
Studies,
cognition,
98
inLibrum
in:
Brown
1974- St.F. Brown,
Walter
Perihermeneias,
Quaestiones
Burley's
Franciscan
Studies
34,(1974),200-95
91Chatton
is an apprehension
ofitself
thateverymental
sentence
refers
totheopinion
inProl.q.l al, an
is a cognition
ofitself
thateveryactofcognition
andmoregenerally
ifitdid
atlength
which
heargues
(ibid.,ed.cit.pp.22-7).Thisopinion,
opinion
against
whocitesanddismisses
each
with
notoriginate
him,wasdefended
byjohnofRodington
ofhisCommentary
itinthefirst
oftheprologue
ofChatton's
arguments
against
question
onthe
Sentences
(edited
byM. TweedaleinTweedale1965,p. 298lin.8-p. 301lin.7).
92Seehis
edited
"Utrum
Deuspossit
scirepluraquamseit"(first
by
question
Quodlibetal
on thebasisof additional
E.A.Moodyin Moody1964and reedited,
manuscripts
inCourtenay
unknown
toMoody,
1971),p. 5 lin.38-41,
p. 17lin.308byW.Courtenay
edition.
11,p. 19lin.332-5andp. 20 lin.363-71ofCourtenay's
195

20:16:47 PM

1978- W. Courtenay,
tohislifeandwritings,
AdamWodeham
, an introduction
Courtenay
Leiden1978
1971- W. Courtenay,
A Revised
TextofRobert
Holcot's
on
Quodlibetal
Dispute
Courtenay
Godis AbletoKnowMoreThanHe Knows
der
Whether
, in: ArchivfrGeschichte
53 (1971),1-21
Philosophie,
Elie 1936- H. Elie,Le Complexe
significabile
, Paris1936
deNatura
Gi 1967- G. Gi, Gualteri
et Guillelmi
de Ockham
Controversia
de Chatton
Universalis
27 (1967),191-212
, Franciscan
Studies,
Conceptus
Gi 1974- G. Gal,Introduction
to Guillelmus
Summa
de Ockham,
, eds.Ph.
Logicae
G. GaletS. F. Brown,
N.Y.1974,8*Boehner,
I, St.Bonaventure,
OperaPhilosohica
73*
Gi 1977- G. Gal,AdamofWodeham's
onthe"Complexe
as the
Question
Significabile"
Immediate
37 (1977),66-102
in:Franciscan
Studies,
Object
ofScientific
Knowledge,
Thories
delapense,
desesobjets
etdesondiscours
Guillaume
selon
Karger1994- . Karger,
in:Dialogue,
d'Occam
33 (1994),437-56
Chatton
vs.Aureoli
andOckham
theUniversal
regarding
Kelley1981- F.E.Kelley,Walter
in:Franciscan
41 (1981),222-49
Studies,
Concept,
O.P.ontheProblem
Holkot,
Question
Moody1964- E.A.Moody,A Quodlibetal
ofRobert
of
theObjects
in:Speculum,
andBelief,
39 (1964), 53-74
ofKnowledge
Nuchelmans
1980- G. Nuchelmans,
AdamWodeham
on theMeaning
ofDeclarative
in:Historiographia
VII 1/2,1980,177-87
Sentences,
Linguistica,
Panaccio1991- C. Panaccio,
Lesmots
etleschoses,
Montral-Paris
1991
, lesconcepts
Tachau1988- K. Tachau,Vision
andCertitude
intheAgeofOckham,
Leiden,1988
Tweedale1965- M. Tweedale,
onKnowledge,
Science
andTheology,
PhD
John
ofRodynton
AnnArbor
dissertation,
UCLA,1965,University
Microfilms,
Weidemann
1991- H. Weidemann,
ZurDiskussion
ber
das
SatzundSachverhalt:
Sache,
imSptmittelalter,
desWissens
in:Vivarium,
29 (1991),129-46
Object
Wood1990- R. Wood,Introduction
toAdamde Wodeham,
Lectura
inLibrum
Secunda
Primm
eds.R. Woodassisted
Sententiarum,
N.Y.,1990,
byG. Gi,St.Bonaventure,
3 volumes,
vol.I, 5*-49*
Paris
CNRS

196

20:16:47 PM

"
A Scotisticdiscussionof Deus est" as a propositio per se nota
Editionwithan Introduction

E.P. BOS1

1. Introduction
In philosophy, the "a priori" proposition (such as "the whole is
greater than any of its constituentparts") plays an importantrole.
The truthof this proposition is clear, "evident in virtue of the terms
used", or "self-evident": there is no need to appeal to external data,
such as those of experience, to establish its truth.
Medieval philosophers,too, were interestedin the a prioriproposition. They called it "propositio per se nota", i.e. propositionknown
in virtueof itself,or self-evidentproposition. This kind of proposition
was discussed not only in medieval handbooks of logic, but also, and
in
on theSentences
in factin most detail, in the theological Commentaries
connection with the problem whether the proposition "Deus est"
("God exists") was per se nota. Traditionally, this problem was discussed as one of the firstquestions of distinoII of the firstbook.2
Medieval philosophers firmlybelieved in the existence of God.
Many defined God as "Ipsum esse", i.e. Being itself, and, quite
understandably,feltthat they had to solve the problem whetherthe
proposition"God exists" ("Deus est") was self-evidentand whether
this propositionhad the nature of a proposition naturally known in
virtueof the termsused, like "the whole is greaterthan any of its constituentparts". The general conviction was that "God exists" was
indeed self-evident,but that self-evidentknowledge of it was impossible forthe human wayfarer,because of his deficientunderstanding.
So the proposition "God exists" gave rise to a discussion about the
per se nota.
precise nature of the propositio
1 I wishtothankmycolleagueDr. J. W. McAllister
ofLeiden)forthe
(University
corrections
ofmyEnglish.
2 Asusual,themedieval
the
followed
Sentences
on PeterLombardus'
commentators
order
laiddownbyhim(in thiscase:Sententiae
oftheproblems
I, dist.ii, c. 1-5,ed.
Bonaventurianum
1971(Specilegium
Grottaferrata
IV), 61-7).
197
E.J.Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:16:54 PM

One of the most importantphilosophersof the Middle Ages, John

Duns Scotus (1265-1308/9), also discussed the problem in his Commentaryon theSentences.
Nearly twentyyears ago ProfessorL.M. De Rijk
of the Universityof Leiden made a provisionaltranscriptionof a Tractatusde propositione
per se nota, writtenby an anonymous disciple of
Duns Scotus. ProfessorDe Rijk was kind enough to allow me to use
his transcriptionas the basis for an edition. I shall here brieflyintroduce the tract, which I shall analyse elsewhere in more detail.3
Although the anonymous author professesto be, and indeed is, a
follower of Duns Scotus, he says that his master is very obscure
("obscurissime") on a specific point, viz. the problem whether a
mathematician, who does not know the nature of a line as precisely
as a metaphysician(forthe latterhas insightinto the nature of things),
yet has propositiones
perse noteas parts of his science.4 Further,the
author explains that the definitionof propositio
perse notaapplies both
to definitionswith categorial and to definitionswith transcendental
terms, so it can be applied also to God (who cannot be defined with
categorial terms). On this subject he goes well beyond Duns Scotus'
text. Quite interestingly,
he informsus of a varietyof mid-fourteenthdiscussions
about
self-evidentpropositions.
century
2. The text
The tract is handed down to us in MS Pisa, Bibliotecadel Seminario
Arcivescovile
SantaCatheriana159, ff.121r-128r(I referto it by thesiglum
"P"). The author's name cannot be ascertained, I think.In his cata"
logue of 1900, C. Vitelli5calls the tract <eiusdem tractatusde propositione per se nota>", referringby "eiusdem" to archiepiscopus
Armacanus
, by which, no doubt, Richard Fitzralph, the archbishop of
Armagh (ca. 1300-1360) is intended. By using brackets,Vitelli seems
to suggest that he is not completelycertain about this ascription. In
3 See Vestigia,
Semiotics
andLogicinMedieval
Texts
, Verba.
Imagines
Theological
(XII -XIV
Actsofthe11thEuropeanSymposium
on MedievalLogicand Semantics,
Century),
ed. byR. Lambertini
and C. Marmo(forthcoming).
4 Cf. P. Vier,Evidence
andItsFunction
toJohnDunsScot
, St. Bonaventure
According
alsonotesthatDunsScotusis notunam1951,78. Vier,whodidnotknowthetract,
on thisscore.
biguous
5 C. Vitelli,Codices
PisaniLatini
, in: Studiitalianidi filologia
classica,Vili (1900),
321-413,esp. 398-400.
198

20:16:54 PM

the recentcatalogue (1980) edited by T. de Robertis et al.,6 a detailed

description of the manuscript can be found introduced by the title
" Riccardo
, De continentia
singularis,De
Fitz-Ralph, De distinctionibus
De propositione
perse nota,De productione
praxi,De triplici
genereactionum,
Verbi"- (then followworks ascribed to John of Ripa and Albert the
Great). This ascription is probably based on notes by XVIth and
XVIIIth-centuryhands thatmentionFitz-Ralph as the author. Above
the text of the first,second, third and sixth tracts "Tractatus (...)
ArchiepiscopiArmacani" again is mentioned,but by a hand probably
later than the one that wrote the tracts.7
perse notaon
Though the author discusses the problem of propositio
on theSentences
occasion of Duns Scotus' Commentary
I, dist. 2, pars I,
8 it seems to be an
2,
independent compendium, writtenat the
qu.
Its
his
of
independence seems clear fromthe opening9
request
pupils.
In
the opening lines, our author says, that,
lines.
and concluding10
because of the difficulty
involved, he shall discuss the problem in comtract
he says thathe will not comment Scotus'
end
of
the
.
At
the
pendio
textfurther.According to the list, made up by G. Leff, of questions
on the Sentences
of his Commentary
, Fitzralph does not discuss the
problem of the self-evidenceof God's existence.11Moreover, from
Leff's study we learn that Fitzralph was on important points
undisturbedby the problems raised by Duns Scotus and Ockham and
he is in importantrespects quite critical of the subtle Doctor. The
4
author of our tract, however, explicitly calls Duns Scotus 'his
master".12
Our tract must have been composed after 13-50,because all the
philosophers to whom it refers, wrote their commentaries on the
in the firsthalf of the fourteenthcentury. I cannot establish
Sentences
antequem.According to the catalogues, the
an exact date or a terminus
the fifteenthcentury.
from
dates
manuscriptitself
6 Catalogo
italiane
nellebiblioteche
di manoscritti
, vol. 1, Firenze,Pisa, Poppi,
filosofici
L.
D. Frioli,M.R. PagnoniSturlese,
Rimini,Trieste,a curadi T. de Robertis,
Firenze(Olschki)
di ClaudioLeonardi),
E. Staraz,L. Sturlese
Pinelli,
(presentazione
1980,64-6.
7 In lines450-1oftheedition,"PetrmvelThomam"are givenas examples.
Do
Thome
to Peter
theyrefer
(ca. 1280- after1337)as author?
8 Ed. Vaticana,1950(Opera
omnia
II), 126-48.
9 See 1. 8 (P, f. 121r).
10See 11.954-957(P, f. 128r).
11G. Leff,
A Study
inTheological
Commentator
Richard
,
Orthodoxy
oftheSentences.
Fitzralph,
I and II).
Manchester
1963,176-97(appendices
12See 1. 9-10(P, f. 121r).
199

20:16:54 PM

3. Surveyof thecontents
In some sense the main conclusion of the tractis thatforthe human
4
wayfarerthe proposition 'God exists" is not self-evident.But the
author is especially interestedin the question whethersomeone can
know self-evidentpropositionswhile nothaving distinctknowledge of
the termsused; in otherwords, whetherevidence and distinctnesscan
be distinguished.Take forexample a mathematicianin contrastto a
metaphysician.A mathematicianknows self-evidentpropositions,our
author concludes, even though he has only opaque knowledge of the
terms(in contradistinctionto the metaphysicianwho knows the same
termsdistinctly).As we shall see below, this possibilityis accepted by
Scotus: in thisway mathematicsand othersciences have theirownpropositiones
perse note.In thisway a mathematicianknows the proposition
"a line is length without width" while he has only opaque or nondistinctknowledge of the terms,but a metaphysicianknows the terms
distinctly,i.e. knows the nature of a line.
Our author gives Scotus' definitionand explains it in detail: propositi perse notaestilla que ex terminis
propriis,utsui sunt, habetevidentem
veritatem
sue complexionis
("a propositio
perse notais that which on basis
of its own terms,as far as theybelong to the proposition,has evident
truthof its composition").13 According to him14Scotus' definitionis
strict, and in agreement with Augustine. Many theologians (our
anonymous author included) refer to Augustine, De vera religione
,
where it is said that the evidence of propositionsis knowledge of the
eternal rules, i.e. the ideas in God's mind.15A propositio
perse notadoes
not have a causa comparticeps
, i.e. an external
cause; it is known in virtue
of the terms. He explains Scotus' qualificationutsui suntby sayingthat
some terms, such as diffinitum
initioand passio refermateriallyto
, diff
the same thing,but one is logicallyprior to another. So in a syllogism,
the premise omneanimal rationaleest risibileis logically prior to omnis
homoest risibilis.
This bringsour anonymous author to a discussion (which goes well
beyond Scotus' text) of two types of definition: one has a more
4
realistic,almost Platonic flavour,and is called 'broader" (viz. a defi13See 1. 207-209(P, f. 122v).
14Itisclear,ourauthor
toDunsScotustheexpressions
exterminis
says,thataccording
andexterminis
suison theonehand,andquisunt
eiusandutsunttermini
propriis
aliquid
eiuson theother,are synonymous.
15Augustine,
De verareligione
ch. XXX, 56.
, forinstance
200

20:16:54 PM

nitionby the quiddity), while the other, the strictkind, explicitlydescribed as Aristotelian,and called "in use by the masters of arts'', is
16This
a definitionby genusand differentia.
part of the tract leads the
author to the conclusion that for a proposition to be per se notait is
required thatits self-evidenceshould resultfromthe knowledge of the
terms,be these termsknown distinctlyor confusedly,be these terms
categorial or transcendental,be they within a genusor outside, and
and difare involved. For if diffinitio
or diffinita
whetherdiffinitiones
a
result
there
would
the
were
same,
petitioprincipiiin a
finitum
1)
the
be
and
effect
would
cause
same, 3) a syllogisticproof
syllogism,2)
and
of
would have two termsinstead three,
4) the same concept would
be both logically prior and logically posterior.17The existence of the
fourthabsurdity is his own thesis, the author says. This passage is
important,because according to thisdistinctionthe proposition"God
exists" is not perse nota, forGod does not fall under a genus and is,
therefore,not to an Aristoteliandefinable in categorial terms.
There followsa discussion whethera propositionhaving termsthat
are only opaquely known can be self-evident,or, in other words,
whetherthere is evidence when an essence to which the terms refer,
is notknown distinctly.Here we come across a remarkable but quite
understandablestatement.Our author says that Duns Scotus is very
obscure (obscurissime).18
First, the subtle Doctor concludes that a prois
if
its evidence is clear because the diffinitum
is
then
se
nota
per
positi
the
has
been
as
made explicitby the diffinitio.
Thus,
proppointed out,
ositionhomoestrisibilisis not perse nota, whereas "a rational animal is
able to laugh" {animal rationaleest risibile)which is a premise of its
truth,is.19Accordingto thisline of thoughta conclusion cannot be per
se nota, but the firstprinciplesof the conclusion can. This agrees with
and the diffinitio.
the distinctionbetween the diffinitum
With this in mind, it followsthat in mathematicsthere are propositions per se note
, such as "line is length without width", though a
mathematicianknows the termsof this propositionnot distinctly,but
only opaquely. For a mathematician does not know the essence of a
line, knowledge that belongs to the province of metaphysics. For the
same reason mathematicalobjects such as lines can be studied under
different
lights.Our anonymous author explains the differencerather
16L. 363-366(P, f. 123v-124r).
17L. 471-491(P, f. 124v).
18L. 518-608(P, f. 125r-v).
19See above,p. 200.
201

20:16:54 PM

, I would say, without making its self-evidencein any

psychologically
way dependent on actual knowledgeof the intellect.20Only truthsthat
are known withabstractiveknowledgecan be self-evident,a claim that
seems to be in agreement with Duns' other semantic views21.
Then the author advances some criticismof contemporaryconceptions of self-evidentpropositions.
A propositio
per se nota cannot in any way be deduced from other
propositions.22This is made clear in a passage in which he discusses
the criticism of Peter Aureoli (ca. 1280-1322) by Francis of
Mayronnes (d. 1325 or 1328). Our author opines that, if Aureoli
meant (as, according to his friends,is not the case) that a propositio
per
se notacould occur in a subordinate science, he was wrong.
Some other philosophersthink,the author says, that a propositio
per
se notacan be proved, by levidialctica(i.e., he explains, in a logical
inferencein which the premises are very close to the conclusion, so
that they are practically equally evident).23He refersto an "Adam
Toutum", who perhaps can be identified with Adam Wodeham,
though up to now I have not found the expression "levi dialctica"
in Wodeham' s works that are available to me. Wodeham says that
assent by a geometer to a conclusion such as "a triangle has three
angles of which the sum is equal to the sum of two rightangles" is not
an "direct act" ("actus rectus'3),but an "reflexive act" ( "actus
reflexus
"), which includes the evident knowledge of the premises,
leading to the conclusion.24Our author replies that this thesis cannot
be defended asserting the autonomy of sciences. This implies that a
science has self-evidentpropositions of its own, although a scientist
may know the terms only opaquely. The same principle cannot be
both irreducibleand reducible. There is a difference,our author says,
in the knowledge of the terms (i.e. distinctversus opaque).
Our author discusses some other views of a propositio
perse nota.He
excludes the possibilitythat its truthoriginates in somethingoutside
20See Duns Scotus'criticism,
below,p. 204.
' TwoCommen21E.P. Bos, TheTheory
toJohnDunsScotus
According
oftheProposition
in: LogosandPragma.
taries
onAristotle's
Perihermencias,
Essayson thePhilosophy
editedbyL.M. de Rijk
GabrielNuchelmans,
ofLanguagein HonourofProfessor
1987(Artistarium,
andH.A.G. Braakhuis,
esp.
Supplementa
III), 121-39,
Nijmegen
129-30.
22L. 610-644(P, f. 125v-126r).
23L. 697-726(P, f. 126v).
24See p. 100 (n. 106) in G. Gi, Adamof Wodeham's
on the"Complexe
Question
in: Franciscan
as theImmediate
Studies,vol.
significabile"
Object
ofScientific
Knowledge,
37, XV (1977),66-102.
202

20:16:54 PM

the proposition. Any evidence originating from outside ("evidentia

originalis aliunde") should be excluded. Duns Scotus had already
criticizedotherphilosopherson this score but the presenttextarouses
interestbecause it presents a discussion from the early fourteenth
century.
It is wrong to say that a propositio
per se nota is known when it is
perse
actuallyknown.25One should not distinguishbetween a propositio
nota in itselfand a propositioper se nota when actuallyknown. This
criticism is directed against Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217-1293) and
Harvey Nedellec (Hervaeus Natalis) (1250/60-1323). The Scotistposition is, as has been shown, that only the termsplay a role in a proposition's being self-evident.
perse notain
Further,one should not distinguishbetween a propositio
intellect.26
our
or
to
to
with
se
nota
itselfand a propositio
respect us,
per
This interpretationcan be found in Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274).
The conceptionof a propositio
perse notaquoadnosimplies thatthe terms
of "Deus est" are known properlyby a human intellect,which cannot
be the case. Our author criticisesthisview by saying that, ifa propositionwere selfevident in one intellect,it would be so in any otherthat
conceives the terms under the proper aspect (i.e. opaquely or
distinctly).
Is there a differencebetween a propositio
perse notaas far as known
by the wise and as faras known by fools?27Here Henry of Ghent and
Thomas Aquinas, again, and others are attacked. In a text, which,
by Duns
cancellatus)
according to the modern edition, is deleted ( textus
The
be
drawn.
not
should
a
distinction
that
such
it
is
said
Scotus,
author
Boethius.
Our
refer
to
authors who uphold this view,
replies,
followingthe lead of Duns Scotus, that Boethius drew a distinction
of termsand a propositio
communis
between the conceptio
perse nota.The
firstis presupposed in the knowledge of the latter. The firstkind is
. He refersto Scotus' own view
imperceptibih
proved, althoughsyllogismo
as an adequate explanation of Boethius.
Accordingto our author Duns Scotus rejectsthe idea of a hierarchy
among propositions28.Duns criticisesthe view of his master William
of Ware (second half of the thirteenthcentury), he says, who
distinguishesbetween more or less contingent,more or less impos25L.
26L.
27L.
28L.

769-782(P, f. 127r).
783-804(P, f. 127r).
805-829(P, f. 127r).
830-855(P, f. 127v).
203

20:16:54 PM

sible, necessary,and perse propositions. Examples of more or less con'

propositionsare "a man is running' {homocurrit
tingent
) which is more
contingent,and "a man is white" ( homoestalbus), which is less so.
"
Examples of more and less impossiblepropositions are substance is
' substantia
estquantitas)which is more impossible than "man
quantity' (
is an ass" ( homoestasinus), because in them latter case the terms at
least belong to the same genus. Among necessary
propositions, "God
is being" {Deus estens) is more necessary than "man is being" {homo
estens). The same holds forthe propositio
perse nota.A propositio
perse
notaof the firstorder applies to terms that are known by experience
(e.g. the part/wholeprinciple), while a propositioper se nota of the
second order has termswhichdo not derive fromexperience,e.g. Deus
est. As another example "man is a rational animal" {homoestanimal
rationale)is morepersethan "man is an animal" {homoestanimal).Duns
Scotus rejects such a distinction.
Some philosophersthinkthat a mathematicalpropositio
perse notais
of the firstorder, and a metaphysicalpropositio
se
nota
of
the second.
per
This distinctionis subject to the same criticism.This view is in line
with Averroes (1126-1198), our author says.
Our author adduces examples from Nicolaus Bonetus (d. 1343),
withwhose explanation he agrees. It is possible thatan intellectshould
know the proposition"a trianglehas threeangles etc." firstaccording
to opinion(which is like the night) and later according to science(which
is like the day). Notitiaopinativais about termsin general, notitiascientificais about terms specifically.The proposition does not have the
same ratio in the case of differentways of knowing it.
The author commentsupon the last solution thatDuns Scotus gives
to the main problem: is Deus esta propositio
perse nota?29Duns says that
as faras the termDeus refersto an intrinsicmode of God, the proposition is self-evidentfor God and the angels, but not formen in their
present condition, forman cannot grasp the termsdistinctly.Deus est
as far as known fromthe Bible and as far as known by proof are differentpropositions,though their terms are the same. So Deus estis a
propositio
perse notaforone intellect,and not for another. Our author
refersto Aristotle, who intends to say that, although metaphysics,
mathematics, and physics use the same terms, they form different
propositions, just because of the intellectual light which considers
them.30
29L. 856-862 f. 128v).
30L. 863-952(P,
(P, f. 128r).
204

20:16:54 PM

Anonymi Tractatus De propositione

per se nota
Biblioteca
del
Seminario
Arcivescovile
Santa
Catheriana159,
(MS Pisa,
f. 121r-128r)
5

10

15

20

25

30

Propter1obscuritatem,prolixitatem2et opinionum varietatem

de materia propositionisper se note, quam etiam difficulter
tangit doctor subtilis magisterJohannes Scotus, distinctione 2a,
questione 2a,3 dicam in compendio quid mihi rectiusde ipsa sit
sentiendum,simulque cum hoc elucidando textmmagistimei
Scoti, motus meorum caritate rogatuque scolarium.
<De sex generibus propositionis>
In primis igiturnotenturhee quinqu propositiones,quas alias
vidi in tractatuquodam, scilicetpropositio in se, propositio de
se, propositiosecundum se, propositio per se, propositio per se
nota; et addo ego sextam, que est propositio immediata.4
Propositio in se est illa que formam et naturam habet in se
propositionis ac diffinitionem,et sive sit vera sive falsa, non
refert.
Propositio de se est ilia que ultra formampropositionisaddit
veritatem,ita quod omnis propositio vera diciturpropositio de
se, scilicet quia nata est de se habere veritatem et in mente
causare.
Propositio secundum se est ilia que est vera et necessaria, ita
quod addit prime et secunde necessitatem.Et est communis non
solum modis dicendi per se, sed etiam omnibus propositionibus
necessariis.
Propositio per se est ilia que reperiturin aliquo5 quatuor modorum dicendi per se, et maxime in primo et secundo.
Propositio per se nota est illa quam describitScotus in textu;
de qua semper infraloquemur.6
Propositio immediata est ilia que ultra propositionemper se
notam addit inclusionem essentialem, scilicet quod subiectum
includat essentialiterpredicatum, vel in secundo modo. Quod

1 Litteram
"P" pingendam
rubricator.
capitalem
reliquit
2 propterlixitatem
(sic)P.
3Johannes
DunsScotus,Ordinatio
I, dist.2, pars1,qu. 2, ed. Vaticana,vol.II, pp.
128-148.
4 In
aliamanus
hecsexgenera
notavit.
margine
propositionum
5 alico,
sicsepeP.
6 videinfra
, 1. 207-209.
205

20:16:54 PM

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

non requiriturin omni propositioneper se nota, ut statimvidebitur.7Et loquor de propositioneimmediata immediationecause et etiam demonstrationis.
Ille tamen quinqu propositionesprimo posite habent se secundum superius et inferius,8ita quod incipiendo ab ultima, illa
est infima,et prima est communissima, et hoc loquendo de propositione per se nota propriissime,qualiter9facitScotus, ut statim dicam.10
<De ventate, necessitate et evidentia propositionis>
Ulterius11est notandum quod aliud est loqui de veritatepropositionis, necessitate et evidentia. Que tria etiam se habent per
ordinein, quia multe sunt vere que non sunt necessarie, ut patet
de propositionibus contingentibusveris, ut "homo est albus,
sciens" etc. Et multe sunt necessarie que non sunt evidentes,sicut notum est de omnibus propositionibusnon per se notis, tamen demonstrabilibus.Et loquor de evidentia originalitantum,
ut infrapatebit.12Omnis ergo propositioper se nota et evidens
est necessaria, et non econverso. Et loquor de propositioneper
se nota solum in notitiaabstractivaquemadmodum [f. 121v] loquitur Scotus, ut patebit.13Et patet hoc quia propositionesdemonstrabiles sunt necessarie, non tamen evidentes. Et omnis
propositio necessaria est vera, non tamen econverso, ut patuit.
Igitur propositio evidens, necessaria, et vera habent etiam se
per14ordinem.
Veritas autem propositionisconsistitin hoc quod scilicet ita
sit in re aut in unione extremorumvel inherentiasicut illa significai, ita quod vere et non falseunum extremuminsitalteri. Necessitas autem consistit in indissolubili extremorum coniunctione, ita quod separari per nullam valeant potentiam.
Et loquor de necessitatesimpliciteret non secundum quid. Evidentia autem est duplex, scilicet formaliset originalis, secundum quod etiam distinguitFranciscus distinctione,2a Conflatus
,

7 videinfra
, 1. 100-112.
8 correctum
et superius.
inP exinferius
9 nonadd. P.
10videinfra,
1. 113s.
11mg,aliamanu
evidentia.
: ventas,necessitas,
12videinfra
, 1. 73 s.
13videinfra
, 1. 119.
14propter
P.
206

20:16:54 PM

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

questione Ia15 salternin forma. Prima est in omni propositione

vera, quia nulla propositiovera est que non habeat in se formaliter suam evidentiam tamquam eius perfectionemet formam,
quia evidentia est perfectioet formapropositionisvere, et est in
illa ut in subiecto et intrinsececausa perficiens;non tamen semper habetur ab intrinseco,sed solum in propositioneper se nota. Et ideo est alia evidentia que dicitur originalis, scilicet que
habetur intrinseceet etiam ab intrinseco,scilicet ex rationibus
formalibusvel natura suorum terminorumqui sunt intrinseci
cuilibet propositionisicut partes eius integrales.Unde quia termini propositionisex quibus propositio integratur,sunt partes
integraleseius et ita sibi intrinseci,ideo quicquid convenit sibi
ratione terminorum,dicitur convenire sibi per se ab intrinseco
et non per aliud nec ab extrnseco.Et ideo dicit Scotus signanter
quod propositioper se nota est que ex terminispropriisqui sunt
aliquid eius, habet evidentemveritatem.Et ita etiam Franciscus
non vult quod propositioper se nota sit ista que habet in se formaliterevidentiam suorum terminorum,quia sic omnis propositio vera, quandocumque15a etiam demonstrabilis,esset per se
nota, eo quod, ut dixi, omnis talis propositio est subiectum sue
evidentie, que dicitur forma et perfectioipsius propositionis.
Sed secundum eum propositio originaliterper se nota non solum requirithabere in se et intrinsecetalem notitiamet evidentiam tamquam suam formam, sed etiam requirit quod talis
evidentia ac notitia non originetursive16causetur aliunde sive
ab aliquo extrnsecoquod non contineturin illa propositione. Et
ideo li "per se" non dicit habitudinem cause formalisvel circumstantiameius, sed cause efficientisvel originalis intrinsece,
quales origines vel principia originalia evidentie sunt termini
propositionisper se note. Cur autem Scotus addit illam particulam, scilicet "ut sui sunt", infra dicam.17
<De variis acceptionibus propositionisper se note>
Ulterius est notandum quod Scotus non loquitur de omni condi-

15Franciscus
Sententiarum
nominatum.
de Maronis,In IV Libros
, Conflatus
scriptum
am
Nachdruck
Frankfurt
LiberI, dist.2, qu. 1, ed. Venetiis1520(unvernderter
Main 1966),f 16vb(P).
15aquamcumque
P.
16correctum
exac P.
17videinfra
, 1. 247.
207

20:16:54 PM

105

110

115

120

125

130

tione sive manerie propositionisper se note, nec ita universaliter aut generalitersicut Franciscus et multi alii, sed plurimum
stricteac proprie, quia multe dicuntur a diversis autoribus et
autenticispropositionesper se note quibus non potestcompetere diffinitiodata a Scoto de propositioneper se nota, et specialiter tales que apprehendunturnotitia intuitiva; ut scilicet quod
"celum movetur" est per se notum, et "grave descendit";
<vel> hec "nix est alba", "sol lucet", "terra est", "ammalia
moventur", "arbores crescunt" et innumerabiles huiusmodi
propositiones,et etiam in notitia abstractiva ac intellectiva,ut
"omne totum est maius sua parte" et hec similitersecundum
Augustinum18 "viventia non-viventibus preferuntur", "bonm malo est preeligendum" et huiusmodi.
Sed Scotus, ut dixi, non ita large loquitur. Et ideo non debebat eum mordere Franciscus ubi supra- male impugnando
eum, dicendo diffinitionemScoti [f. 122r] quam primo rcitt
ibi Franciscus, non esse veram in notitiaintuitiva- quia Scotus
non intendebatloqui de huiusmodi conditione et genere propositionumper se notarum(que scilicetcognoscuntursolum in notitia intuitiva sensitiva), sed tantum in notitia abstractiva. Et
utique non videnturpropriissimedici propositionesper se note
que solum sensu et per notitiam intuitivamsensitivmcognoscuntur vel huiusmodi cognitionem experimentalemcuiuscumque sensus, ut quod "lapis est durus", "ignis est calidus" et
huiusmodi, que cognoscuntur per experientiam tactus; aut
quod "mel", "lac", "ficus" et huiusmodi sintdulcia, que cognoscunturexperientia gustus, et sic "rosam redolere per olfactum", et "cantum esse suavem et harmonicum per auditum".
Omnis enim notitia experimentalispotest dici aliquo modo intuitiva, et hoc secundum modum loquendi sancti Augustini in
19
Libro de Trinitate
sepe, ubi omnem notitiam sensitivmvocat
intuitivam. Franciscus autem in Conflatu
, distinctione 2a,
Ia20
dicit
omnem
notitiam
questione
experimentalemesse per
se notam, sed multum extense loquitur. Simili etiam ex ratione
calumpniatur Scotum discipulus eius, sed ingratissimus et

18Augustinus,
De Civitate
Dei XI, 16, 2: "praeponuntur
viventia
nonviventibus".
19Augustinus,
De Trinitate
IX, 6, 72.
20Franciscus
de Maronis,In IV Libros
Sententiarum
nominatum.
, Conflatus
scriptum
LiberI, dist.2, qu. 1, ed. Venetiis1520,f. 15v(Q).
208

20:16:54 PM

135

140

145

150

155

160

165

maximus eius emulus, scilicetAureolus, ac alii nonnulli, sed, ut

dixi, non videntur iste prenominate propositiones debere dici
per se note. Et ideo nec ista "celum est", "motus est", "natura
est", "corvus est niger", "nix est alba" et huiusmodi sunt proprie loquendo propositiones per se note, quia nec ex terminis
suis propriishabitis per experientiam,nec ex aliqua sillogistica
deductione aut causa aliqua intrinsecaest evidens predicata earum inesse subiectis.
Verumptamen, quia videmus eas ad sensum aut per aliquam
experientiamsensitivmillas et alias huiuscemodi accipimus et
percipimus, dum actualiter sunt presentes, non possumus eas
negare. Unde, quamvis, cum videmus occulta fide solem lucentem, non possimus21ipsum negare esse lucidum, hec tarnen22
propositio "sol est lucidus" non est per se nota. Potest enim,
manente substantiasolis, Deus destruerelucem eius. Et ideo lux
nec est de essentia, nec de secundo modo, corporisluminosi, ut
vult Scotus sepe, et specialiterin secundo libro Sententiarum
, distinzione 13a, questione Ia, ubi ponit lucem esse accidens et
non substantiam, et sic etiam lumen. Proprie ergo loquendo,
possunt huiusmodi propositionesdici recte et vere, sed non per
se note. Sensus enim non habet, sicut nec componere propositiones, sic nec percipereevidentiamet formampropositionumvel
Et ideo non ex parte senvel imperfectionem.24
perfectionem23
vel
sus, sed solum intellectusprovenit
compositio propositionum vel perceptio suarum evidentiarumvel non evidentiarum.
Et si allegaveris Philosophum dicentem25quod "qui negant nturmaut motum, sunt male dispositi"; et in primo Topicorum26
dicit quod "qui negat nivem esse albam, caret sensu", dico
quod verum est secundum intentum Philosophi, scilicet quia
negant sensum et eius perceptionemac obiectum, sed non quia
negant hanc propositionemesse per se notam, scilicet "natura
est" vel "nix est alba". Nam utraque est recta et vera, sed non
per se nota, et hoc, ut dixi,27proprie loquendo.

21poterimus
P.
22tantum
P.
23perfectionum
P.
24imperfectionum
P.
25Aristoteles,
I, ii, 185al.
Physica
26Aristoteles,
TopicaI, xi, 105a5-7.
27videsupra
, 1. 138.
209

20:16:54 PM

<De triplicidistinctionepropositionisper se note>

Pro tamen volentibusevitare lites distinguode propositioneper
170 se nota quantum pronunc sufficit,quia infraamplius dicam.28
Triplex29enim est pronunc propositioper se nota. Prima est illa
que de se est evidentialis,30quia ex terminispropriisut sui sunt,
cognoscibilis,et dans evidentiamcognoscentiterminoseius confuse et distincte; et hanc ponit Scotus.31
Secunda est experimental, 32et ista est per se nota temporali175
ter sive ad tempus aliquod solummodo, et non semperde necessitate, quia non rpugnt predicatum non inesse subiecto,
[f. 122v] sicut de nive alba et lacte dulci et celi motu et huiusmodi est superius dictum.33
180
Tertia est de se assentibilis,idest cui subito et imperceptibiliter ac sine mora datur assensus, ut "omne totumest maius sua
parte".
Simul34 enim loquendo non indiget aliqua alia propositione
qua, vel per quam, causetur apud intellectumassensus illius vel
185 ut assentiat ei,35 ut patet apud geometrm,qui habet earn pro
per se notam, quamvis evidentia eius magis clarescat apud
methaphisicum,qui altiori lumine, scilicetmethaphisicali,eam
perceptibiliterdemonstrat; sed talis diffinitivaac distincta terminorum notitia non est geometro necessaria, ut predicta pro190 posito sit sibi evidens, quia ad eum non pertinetad quod genus
pertineat magnitudo aut pars etc., sed ex sola notitia confusa
terminorumei firmiterassentii et earn pro per se notam habet.
Et dico ultra quod, licet Alacen<us>
in secundo sue Perspeceam
hoc
tive, capitulo 2,36
demonstret,
dico, non facit ut
195 perspectivus, sed ut methaphisicus, qui37 scientiam ultra
28videinfra
, 1. 206 ss.
29triplex
propositio
perse notaPms.
30evidentialis
Pms.
31Ordinatio
I, dist.2, pars1, q. 2, ed. Vaticana,1950,vol.II, p. 133,1.8 - 134,
1.2; cf.P. C. Vier,Evidence
anditsFunction
toJohn
DunsScotus
, St. BonavenAccording
ture1951,p. 71.
32experimentalis
PmS.
33vide
, 1. 137-138.
supra
34similiter
P.
35cui intellectus
assentiiPm.
36Alacenus,
Primum
Librum
Sententiarum
, cf.PetrusAureoli,
Perspectiva
Scriptum
,
super
dist.ii, sect.10,ed. E. Buytaert,
St. Bonaventure
1956,p. 556-7.
37quamP.
210

20:16:54 PM

200

205

210

215

220

225

perspectivamhabet.38Nec minus tarnenante suam demonstrationem illa propositioerat per se nota ex confuso conceptu terminorum,quia, si oporteretcuiuslibet propositionisper se note
nullas tunc haberet geometerminosexplican per diffinitionem,
terpropositionesper se notas, ut quod 'linea est longitudo sine
latitudine" etc., quorum terminorumdiffinitionesignort, sicut nec novit genera eorum nec differentiasaut predicamenta;
quod nullus doctus concederet.
< Declarado diffinitionisposite a Scoto >
Hiis premissisad declarationemdiffinitionis
posite a Scoto accedo. Que diffinitioest talis: "propositio per se nota est ilia que
ex terminispropriis,ut sui sunt, habet evidentemveritatemsue
complexionis".39
Primo tamen, quia in titulo questionis40ponitur "per se notum" et etiam in hac diffinitione,ideo est sciendum quod "per
se notum" potest tripliciterintelligi.
Uno modo pro eo quod non est cum alio notum. Et sic li "per
se" est idem quod "solitarie"; quali modo sumiturin tertiomodo dicendi per se. Hoc modo dicitur quod Sortes per se portt
trabem,idest: omni alio excluso, et sic relativumnon potestesse
per se notum, quia relativa sunt simul intelligibilia,sicut etiam
sunt simul natura, secundum Philosophum in Predicamentis
, case
nota, et
pitulo de relatione.41Tamen substantia est sic per
omne absolutum, ut quantitas et qualitas.
Et secundo modo pro eo quod non est notum per aliud, vel
per accidens, sed per se. Et sic accidentia absoluta sunt per se
nota, substantievero non, quia sunt note per accidentia, ut patet in prologo primi De anima*2 ubi dicitur quod accidentia
magnam partem conferuntad cognoscendum quodquid est, idest
substantiam.Et utique secundum Scotum, Primo Libro, distinctione 3a,43 et etiam in Quarto Libro in materia de eukaristia:44
"nulla substantia cognosciturnaturaliternec cognosci potest a

38habuitP.
39Ordinatio
I, dist.2, pars1, qu. 1-2,ed. Vaticana,1950,vol. II, p. 135,1. 3-5.
40ibidem
, qu. 2, p. 128,1. 10.
41Aristoteles,
VII.
Praedicamenta
42Aristoteles,
De animaI, 1, 402 021-22.
43I, dist.3, p. 1, q. 1-2,ed. Vaticana,1950,voi. Il, p. 46, 1-2
44Cf.Johannes
DunsScotus,Ordinatio
IV, 12,q. 3, ed. rarisns1893,p. 609b-610a.
211

20:16:54 PM

230

235

240

245

250

255

nobis intuitivenec etiam abstractivein hoc statu, sed tantumarguitiveet per cognitionemaccidentium". Et sic etiam nec Deus
est nobis naturaliternotus pro hoc statu, sed solum arguitiveper
creaturas cognitas, que sunt effectuseius.
Tertio modo pro eo quod non est notum per aliud ut per causam vel principium. Et sic sunt prima principia per se nota, et
multe alie propositiones evidentes ex suis terminis,de quibus
nunc loquimur. Conclusiones autem demonstrabilesnon sunt
sic per se note, quia cognoscunturper premissas et principia45
prima.
Scotus autem in diffinitionesua loquitur conformiterdictis
sancii Augustini in libro De verareligione
,46ubi loquitur de regulis eterniset evidentibus,et etiam dictis [f. 123r] Lincolniensis47
in primo Posteriorum
;48quia ambo dicunt quod propositioper se
nota est ilia que non habet causam comparticipem,49idest extrinsecam, extraneam et a sua intrinseca ratione alienam. Et
ideo dicit signanter"ex suis terminis,,)ut iam superius expositum est sufficienter.50
Additur autem "ut sui sunt",51 quia aliquando contingit
quod aliqui terminisunt omnino idem realiter,cuiusmodi sunt
et "passio" (ut probat Franciscus,
"diffinitum", ttdiffinitio,,
distinctione2a Conflatus
, questione 2a,52et distinctione43a53et
44a,54questione 3a), et tamen, non obstante ista vera ydemptitate reali, aliquis illorumtriumeritper se notus de uno reliquorum duorum et de altero nequaquam, ita scilicet quod propria
passio, que est una illarum trium, sit in vinculo fortissimoac
per nullam potentiam dissolubili ydemptitatis realis <et>
faciat55propositionemper se notam cum diffinitione,et tamen

45sua add.sedexp.P.
46Augustinus,
De verareligione
, e.g. XXX, 56.
47sicsember
P.
48Robertus
In Posteriorum
libros
Grosseteste
I, 4, ed. P.
(Lincolniensis),
Analyticorum
Rossi,p. Ill, 1. 46-47.
49Robertus
In Posteriorum
libros
Grosseteste
I, 4, ed. P.
Analyticorum
(Lincolniensis),
Rossi,p. Ill, 1. 46-47.
50for"comparticeps"
cf.e.g. ThomasAquinas,Summa
Contra
Gentiles
III, 132/133.
51videsupra
, 1. 208.
52ut sui suntPmsam.
53Franciscus
nominatum.
de Maronis,In IV Libros
Sententiarum
, Conflatus
scriptum
3a.
LiberI, f. 17vb(P), conclusio
54L. I, d. 43, q. 3, p. 218 va.
55Franciscus
de Maronis,In IV Libros
Sententiarum
nominatum.
, Conflatus
scriptum
LiberI, d. 44, q. 3, p. 219v(K).
212

20:16:54 PM

non cum diffinito,sed demonstrabilem. Sicut patet in demonstratione56potissima, ubi propria passio concluditurde diffnito
per diffinitionem,dicendo sic:
260

265

270

275

280

285

omneanimalrationale
estrisibile,
omnishomoestanimairationale,
ergoomnishomoestrisibilis.
Ecce propositioin qua predicatur57propria et convertibilispassio de diffnitoin conclusione, non est per se nota nec est nota
ex terminis suis, sed notificaturex premissis positis in demonstratione. Sed maior propositio, in qua58 propria passio
est propositioper se nota, quia notifipredicaturde diffinitione,
catur ex evidentia terminorum,et ita ex terminissuis propriis
et intrinsecis.Quia, licet excludat omnem aliam causalitatem
respectu sue notitie,- et hoc dico "per se et immediate", quia
sensus faciuntper accidens et mediate ad notitiammaioris propositions, quia conferuntad notitiam terminorumeo quod ex
multis sensationibus fit una memoria etc., ut patet secundo
Posteriorumin fine.59 Et Scotus bene hoc tractat primo
- et licet etiam excludat omnem aliam deductioMetaphysice60
nem sylogisticam,61non tamen excludit notitiam terminorum
intrinsecorumex quibus propositio integratur,sicut nec ipsa
prima principia excluduntnotitiamterminorum,quantumcumque dicanturnaturaliternobis nota, et sicut ianua in domo etc.,
secundo Metaphysice62.
Er ita patet quod differentiasola ex natura rei, vel quecumque citra distinctionemaut differentiamrealem, sufficitad hoc
quod predicatumquod est propria passio, faciatcum una extremitate premissarum propositionem per se notam, et cum alia
non. Et ideo si debeat dari completa diffinitiopropositionisper
se note, oportetquod dicatur quod sit nota ex evidentia terminorum suorum inquantum sunt terminisui, ut excludatur diffi-

56facietP.
57diffinitione
P.
58ponitur
P (sicpassim).
59proponitur
add.sedexp.P. Aristoteles,
Posteriora
II, 19.
Analytica
60Johannes
DunsScotus,Quaestiones
subtilissimae
libros
Aristotelis
,
super
Metaphysicorum
Parisiis1893,p. 93a.
I, q. 3, OperaOmnia,
61deductionem
P.
, sylogisticam
sylogisticam
(sic)P postcorrecturam
(sic)deduetionem
62Johannes
DunsScotus,Quaestiones
subtilissimae
libros
Aristotelis
,
super
Metaphysicorum
II, q. 1, OperaOmnia
, Parisiis1893,p. 96b-97a.
213

20:16:54 PM

290

295

300

305

310

315

nitio a diffinito.Quia ista propositio"omne animal rationale est

risibile" est nota ex evidentia suorum terminoruminquantum
sunt terminisui, scilicet "animalis rationalis", que est diffnitum,63et "risibilis", que est passio, que de ea immediatepredicatur. Que quidem propria passio non faceretpropositionem
per se notam, si predicareturde eadem re ut significatursub
conceptu diffinitiet inquantum est diffnitum.
Sed nota tamen quod, ut ista diffinitiopossit magis verificari
et ad plures propositionesse extendere,est sciendum quod ^diffinitio" et "diffinitum'' possunt dupliciteraccipi: unomodolarge, et sic quelibet quiditas declarativa et manifestativaalterius
conceptus, sive fueritin genere aliquo sive predicamento, aut
et quodlibet
transcendens,diciturdiffinitiovel pars diffinitionis
declaratum potest dici diffnitum.
Et huic consonai Bonetus in primo libro Theologie
sue, capitulo 4 [f. 123v] in fine64dicens Primam Intelligentiam,quam
semper dicat esse Deum, habere diffinitionem.Nec ex hoc seconstatex
quitur Ipsum esse in genere, eo quod omnis diffinitio
et
genere differentia,ut communiterdicitur. Hoc autem negat,
et bene, quia, ut inquit, ad veram diffinitionem
sufficitquod illud quod diffinitur,resolvatur in conceptum quiditativum et
conceptum65qualificativum essentialem. Sed quod conceptus
quiditativus habeat rationem generis et < conceptus> qualificativus essentialis rationem differentie,hoc accidit. Hec ille in
Terminis.
Et si contra Bonetum obieceris
quod Philosophus, septimoMeet
, secundo
taphysice,66 primo,67quarto68 et sexto69 Topicorum
Posteriorum70
et multotiensalibi, dicit diffinitionemconstare ex
et esse orationemlongam, et istud ut mategenere et differentia
et
illud
forma
ut
ria,
etc., similiter et Porphirius in suis
71et Commentator72et alii multi etcetera- defenUniuersalibus

63diffinitio
P.
64NicolausBonetus,
Theologia
(locusnondum
inventus).
65compositum
(?) P
66Aristoteles,
VII, vi, 1030b8.
Metaphysica
67Aristoteles,
TopicaI, v, 102a4-5.
68Aristoteles,
TopicaIV, i, 120b30-32.
69Aristoteles,
TopicaVI, i, 139a29-31.
70Aristoteles,
Posteriora
II, iii,90 b30-31.
Analyiica
71Porphyrius,
, ed. L. Minio-Paluello,
1956,p. 5, 1. 5.
Isagoge
Bruges-Paris
72Averroes,
cumAverrois
commentariis
VIII, comm.3, inAristotelis
,
Metaphysica
Opera
vol. IV, VenetiisapudJuncias,1562-7,f. 210 (H). Cf. In Metaphysicam
VII, ed.
Venetiis1560,ff.198v-199r.
214

20:16:54 PM

320

325

330

335

340

345

350

dendo Bonetum respondeo

quod omnes loquuntur de diffinitionibus rerum aut conceptuum predicamentalium,de quibus quasi
semper in illislocis tractatPhilosophus. Et ideo loquitur Aristotiles de diffinitionepredicamentali ac generica < rerum> , et
conceptuumvel rationumgenericarum,de quibus dat diffinitiones; et ideo de talibus tradii artem inveniendi ac investigandi
diffinitionesin secundo Posteriorum73
inquantum sunt media in
demonstrationibus,de quibus ibi tractat. Sed de diffnitionibus
transcendentibusac conceptuum transcendentiumet extra ac
supra74predicamenta existentiumnon loquitur in speciali.
Sed per viam diffinitivamquam tradii de conceptibus predicamentalibus, satis nos instruitqualiter debemus consimiliter
diffinireconceptus transcendentes, idest singulas rationes et
conceptusextra predicamentaexistentes,si non fueruntconceptus communissimi,ut "entis" et suarum passionum secum convertibiliumvel differentiarumquarumcumque.
Omnes autem conceptus qui ad divina in speciali ac singulari
ratione pertinent,sunt conceptus non communissimi in predicatione, licet in virtutealiqui sint communissimi,quamvis non
omnes. Quod dico pro relationibusdivinis, que nullam habent
virtualemcontinentiamaut communitatem,ut alias videbitur.75
Scotus tamen distinctissimeponit sepe et maxime questione 5a
. 76Tales, dico, omnes <relationes> sunt resolubilesin
Quodlibet
conceptum determinativmet determinabilem,licet utrumque
infinitum;et ideo in conceptus refutantesrationem generis et
differentie,ac omnes limitationespotentialitatiscompositionis,
ac breviter:universe imperfectionis,que predicamentalibusadherentac conveniuntconceptibus. Et ideo remanentpure ac denudate a similibus rationes divinorum conceptuum diffinitive,
declarative ac expansive, eo quod, licet omnes sint simplices,
non tamen sunt omnes simpliciter simplices, quicquid dicat
sepissime77Franciscus, cum quo in hac parte nullatenus concordor.

73Aristoteles,
Posteriora
II, e.g. ch. iii.
74ac supraPc.Analytica
75videinfra
1. 376.
76Johannes
DunsScotus,Quodlibeta,
DunsScotiOpera
T. 25,
omnia
q. 5 inJohannis
Parisius1895,p. 199a(locusincertus).
77sepissimus
P.
215

20:16:54 PM

355

360

365

370

375

380

Sed quia hec singula declarare non parvum expostularettractatum, et hec in loco solum incidentaliteret preteromnino primum intentum hec occurrebat materia ratione declarationis
dictorumScoti, ideo usque alias est necessario omnino supersedendum, et maxime usque ad tertiamdistinctionem,ubi hec locum habent, ubi, volente Deo, quid sentio expandam. Interim
78 et
Bonetum primo Metaphysice
primo Theologiesue capitulo
379 et 4o80 videas diligenter.- Et si dixeris quod Aristotiles
transcendenti,memineris
numquam de tali loquitur diffinitione
81 nullibi tenere
locumab auctoritate
negative.
Secundo modo, et proprie, saltem ut communiterutunturartiste,diffinitiodiciturilia que constat ex genere et differentiaet
[f. 124r] que82 est in genere, et eorum que in genere collocantur. Et sic, conformiter,diffinitumest illud quod rsultat ex
huiusmodi diffnitionispartibus, sive sint transcendentessive
predicamentales,ita ut proportionabiliterdicatur de diffinitoin
sensu duplici quemadmodum per omnia de diffinitioneest declaratum.
Capiuntur igiturad propositum "diffinitio'' et ^diffinitum"
in illa descriptione Scoti ac sequenti sententia, utroque modo
hic superius exposito, et non precise primo aut precise secundo,
sed indifferenti
secundum materie congruentiam.Et ratio huius
dicti mei est ista: quia non solum in creaturiset de creaturis,sed
in divinis ac de divinis sunt ac formanturpropositionesper se
note, ut statimpatebit83de ista propositione"Deus est" ac multis aliis propositionibus habentibus terminos nullo modo sub
predicamentiscollocatos. Et hoc sive illi terminisint transcendentes et communissimi,cum constetde ipso ente communissi-

78Cf. Nicolaus Bonetus(?), In

, in MS Mnchen,Bayerische
Metaphysicam
Staatsbibliothek
ff.lra-80rb
, Clm26867(August.)
adscriptus
( = VI 2389),f.2ra(textus
est(manuseculifereXVIIi) cuidemHenricoBoneto.F. 8Ira: ad hunetextum
referturmanupauloposteriori
Boneti
cumtitulo:"Metaphysica
textum,
quamquiscripsit
vel Franciscide Maronis". In colophonelegitur:1460). In catalogolegitur:
BonetisequensmodumScotisiveFrancisci
de Mayronis",sed non
"Metaphysica
refertur
ad foliamanuscripti.
codicum
Bibliothecae
latinorum
Regiae
(Cf. Catalogus
Monacensis
Wiesbaden
(...) edd. C. Halm et G. Meyer,Mnchen1883(reprint
1969)).
79NicolausBonetus,Theologia,
locusnonduminventus.
80NicolausBonetus,Theologia
, locusnonduminventus.
81Aristotile
P.
82et que P. exp.
83videinfra
, 11.401-407.
216

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385

390

395

400

405

410

415

mo formari propositiones per se notas, ut patet de primo

principio complexo et aliis principiis,ac etiam propositionibus
formatisde ipso et quibusdam suis passionibus ac differentiis
vel
modis intrinsecis.Reperiuntur etiam de aliis conceptibus simplicitersimplicibuspropositionesper se note, quorum nulla omnino penitus est diffinitio,nec primo modo nec secundo modo
sumpta.
Et ideo est ulteriuspredictisaddendum quod Scotus determinando de propositione per se nota in hoc loco, licet specialem
feceritmensionem84in sua expositione de diffinitioneet diffinito, non tarnenartaviteam ad illos precise conceptus vel ad propositiones huiusmodi conceptus precise habentes, cum nec hoc
ex sua litterahabeatur neque ex data descriptionepropositionis
per se note, sed de illis loquendo non solum de illis sed aliis quibuscumque terminisin quibus aut ex quibus possibile est formare propositionesper se notas intellexitac tradiditdoctrinam.
Non ergo excluduntur ab eo quicumque conceptus, cuiuscumque fuerintconditionisaut nature, super quos iustumest erigere
propositionesper se notas, ut evidenterclaretintelligentiDoctoris processum.
Sufficitigitursecundum eum ad hoc quod propositio sit per
se nota, generaliterloquendo, quod sit evidens ex terminispropriis illius propositionisut sui sunt, predicatum inesse subiecto,
sive subiectum et predicatum distinctesive indistincteconcipiantur, sive sint diffinitioneset diffinita,sive transcendentiaet
simpliciterSimplicia,sive in genere sive extra genus et ita de aliis. Sed statim clarius etiam dicam intentumScoti.
<Ad litteramScoti >
ad
Igitur revertendo textmet litteramScoti dico quod pro eodem habet dicere illud quod primo dicit in principio,85scilicet
'
quod 'propositio per se nota est ilia que ex terminispropriis
qui86sunt aliquid eius, habet evidentemveritatem," et quod dicit infraquod "omnis et sola illa propositio est per se nota que
ex terminissic conceptisut sunt termini87eius, habet evidentem

84SicP.
85Johannes
Duns Scotus,Ordinatio
(...), p. 131,1. 13-5.
86que P.
87h add.sedexp.P.
217

20:16:54 PM

420

425

430

435

440

445

veritatemcomplexionis", ita quod idem est dicere "ex terminis

propriis" et dicere "ex terminissuis" et dicere "qui sunt aliquid eius" et dicere "ut sunt terminieius". Et statim,quando
dicit ulterius: "qui sunt illi terminietc.", hoc iam superius deet
claravi,88quia intenditdare distinctioneminterdiffinitionem
diffinitum,hac intentione ut, quamvis diffnitioet difflnitum
sint89idem realiter, tarnenpropria passio aliqua que etiam est
idem cum utroque realiter,facitsepe propositionemper se notam cum diffnitionetamquam cum conceptu magis expanso et
claro, quam non facit cum diffinito,eo quod idem conceptus
realiterqui significaturtam per diffinitionem
quam per diffiniet
obscurius
confuse
tum,
significaturper diffinitum,et clarius
Et ideo non immerito
ac distinctesignificaturper diffinitionem.
aliqua passio potest facere propositionem per se notam cum
conceptu clare ac [f. 124v] distinctesignificato,et ita cum diffnitione que sic illum conceptum significai,que non faceretpropositionemper se notam cum eodem conceptu significatoobscure
et confuse, et ita nec cum diffinitoquod taliterillum conceptum
significai,quia confuseet involute. Nam secundum Lincolniendiffinitioet diffinitumdifferuntsicut
sem, primo Posteriorum90
et
involutum.
expansum
Statim, quando dicit91"sive accipiantur terminipro vocibus
significantibussive pro conceptibus significatisi, "voces significantes" vocat has secundas intentionesque suntdiffinitio
et dif
ut
formaliter
secunde
sunt
intentiones.
, quia,
sumuntur,
finitura
"Conceptus significatos" vocat res prime intentionis,scilicet
"hominem" et "animal rationale" et huiusmodi consimilia, et
sive sumanturprimo modo sive secundo, sunt alii terminiet aliquo modo distincti.
"
Quod quid est alterius extremi",92 idest: diffinitiovel ratio
formalis, est medium in demonstratione. Istud est Aristotilis,
primo93et secundo94Posteriorum.

88videsupra
, 1. 247 ss.
89suntP.
90RobertusGrosseteste,
Commentarius
in Posteriorum
LibrosII, 1, ed.
Analyticorum
Rossi,p. 298,1. 224-5(locusincertus).
91 Johannes
Duns Scotus.Ordinatio
(...), p. 132,1. 3-4.
92Ibid.,p. 132,1. 5
93Aristoteles,
Posteriora
II, ii, 72 a21-22.
Analytica
94Ibid., II, iii,90 b30-31
.
218

20:16:54 PM

" Esset

450

455

460

465

470

475

petitio principii".95 In petitione principii premissa

non differta conclusione; ibi enim idem sumitursub uno nomine ad probationem sui ipsius sub alio nomine sumpti inquantum ad hoc spectatpropositum. Et sic, si diffnitioet diffinitum
essent omnino idem ex natura rei et in conceptu diffrentes
solo
nomine, vel sola facta variatione in vocibus significantibuset
non in conceptibus significatis,cum diffinitioponatur medium
in demonstrationepotissima, et etiam eadem in eodem conceptu esset subictumconclusionis,esset expressissimafallacia petitionisprincipii,et idem esset dicere "omne animal rationale est
risibile" et "omnis homo est risibilis". Qualiter autem ista fallacia fitquinqu modis et quomodo hec fallacia non peccai contra vim illationis,quia bene infert,sed contra vim et efficaciam
probationis, quia male probat, vide in Fallaciis et Elenchisi6 et
etiam satis bene ibi dicit sanctus Thomas.97 Et Philosophus pri98 dicit
mo Elenchorum
quod unus et primus modus petitionis
est
ostendere
aut
principii
aliquid de diffinitoper diffinitionem,
econverso,99eo quod eadem sit entitas et conceptus diffinitionis
et diffiniti.Sed tarnen pro eorum divisione vide Franciscum,
distinctione2a, questione 2a optime.100Et breviterpronunc secundum Scotum < quod > si diffinitioet diffinitumessent omnino idem, tria sequerentur inconvenientia:
Primum est de petitione principii, de quo iam dictum est.
Secundum est quod idem esset Causa sui Ipsius vel saltem
principium, et idem esset causa et effectus,vel principium et
principiatumrespectu sui ipsius. Diffinitioenim posita in premissis est causa conclusionis, vel propositio in qua est ratio101
eius, et posita in conclusione erit effectus,quia diffinitumquod
ponitur in conclusione non est aliud secundum te sed omnino
idem quod diffinitio.Et sic medius terminusingredereturcon. 102
clusionem; quod est contra artem Philosophi, primo Priorm

95Johannes
DunsScotus,
Ordinatio
(...), p. 132,1. 11.
96Aristoteles,
Elenchi
V , 167a37-41.
Sophistici
97ThomasAquinas,De
ad quosdam
nobiles
artistas
fallaciis
, ed. R. Spiazzi,Taurini
1954,p. 237 ss.
98Aristoteles,
Elenchi
V, 167a37 ss. TopicaVIII, xiii. 16235-163al.
99econtraP. Sophistici
100Franciscus
de Maronis,In IV Libros
Sententiarum
nominatum.
, Conflatus
scriptum
LiberI, dist.2, qu. 1, ed. Venetiis1520,f. 16va(K).
101ratione
P.
Priora
Aristoteles,
I, iv, 25 b32-35.
Analytica
219

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480

485

490

495

500

505

510

Tertium inconveniens <est> quod in demonstrationenon

essent nisi duo termini, scilicet passio et subiectum, quod est
omnino idem secundum te cum diffinitione.Nec evadis si dicas
quod distinguunturtantum per intellectum,quia necesse est
tresterminosdemonstrations distinguiex natura rei, si per demonstrationemdebet aliquid concludi in aliqua scientia reali.
Addamus quartum inconveniens. Impossibile est eundem
omnino conceptum esse priorem et posteriorem,haberi et non
haberi de eadem re, esse clarum et distinctum,et non-clarum
et non-distinctum.Sed idem potest prius concipi, ut dicitur et
exprimiturper nomen, et non-concipi,ut exprimiturper diffinitionem. Ergo alius est conceptus expressus per nomen et alius
ut exprimiturper diffnitionem.
Hanc minoremconfirmtibi103Scotus per Philosophum, primo Phisicorum
,104ubi dicitur quod "nomina", idest: diffinita,
"sustinent", idest: faciunt,"ad diffinitionem,,
etc., idest sic se
habet nomen diffinitum
ad diffnitionem
sicut totumse habet ad
partes. Totum enim per comparationem ad partes prius
[f. 125r] cognosciturnotitia confusa quam ipse partes. Eodem
modo prius cognoscitur diffinitumcognitione confusa et indistinctaquam diffinitio."Diffinitio dividit in singula", idest:
in partes essentiales diffiniti,
diffinitum
autem congregai partes.
et
diffinitio
diffinitum,
Distinguuntur ergo
ergo propositionis
per se note est aliud et aliud extremum.
"Ex hoc ultra" etc.105Ibi innuit Doctor tres conclusiones:
Prima106quod propositioper se nota est que ex terminispropriis qui sunt aliquid eius, et non per aliquid aliud quod sitextra
terminosproprios, habet evidentem veritatem. Excludit enim,
ut dictum est,107propositio per se nota quamcumque causalitatem aliam, tam complexam quam incomplexam respectu sue
evidentie et notitieomnium terminorumet propositionumque
sunt extra ipsam et terminoseius, non tarnencausalitatem suorum terminorum,quia terminisui sunt partes eius, sicut et termini uniuscumque alterius propositionis sunt partes eius

103Johannes
Duns Scotus,Ordinatio
(...)> p. 133,1. 1.
104Aristoteles,
I, i, 184a26-184b3.
Physica
105ibidem
, p. 133,1. 8.
106primaconclusio
a m; ordinatio
PmS>
(...), p. 133,1. 8-9.
107videsupra
, 1. 233-238.
220

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515

520

525

530

535

540

545

materiales. Et ideo quod inest sibi a terminissuis, inest sibi a

se et per se et ab intrinseco.
Secunda conclusio:108quod illi terminipropriiex quibus proposito habet evidentemveritatem,sunt diffinitioet diffinitum,
qui sunt terminidistinctiquocumque modo sumantur.
Tertia conclusio:109quod nulla propositio est per se nota de
quiditate confuse concepta que non est per se nota, nisi eadem
quiditas distincte per diffinitionemconcipiatur. Hinc innuit
Doctor obscurissimequod cum propositioper se nota possit formari ubi aliquid predicaturde diffinitioneet etiam ubi aliquid
predicatur de diffinito ita scilicet quod aliquando aliqua est
propositioper se nota ubi propria passio vel aliquid aliud predicatur de diffinitione,et aliquando aliqua est propositio per se
nota ubi propria passio vel aliud predicatum conveniens predi- numquam tamen, ut dicit Doctor, erit illa
catur de diffinito
propositio per se nota ubi aliquid predicaturde diffinitosi eius
evidentia non sit manifestavel per se sit evidens predicatuminesse tali subiecto, scilicetdiffinito,nisi illud diffinitum
expandatur et elucescat per diffinitionem,et ita diffiniatur.Hoc est
breviterdictu: illa propositioque non est nota statimnobis nisi
non est per se
terminieius notificenturper eorum diffinitiones,
nota in terminisconfusis,quia numquam est aliqua propositio
per se nota que est constitutaex terminisconfusissi illa non potesthabere evidentiam sufficientemex illis terminisconfusisvel
confuseacceptis, nisi illi terminiconfusiresolvanturin suos terminos distinctos,scilicetin diffinitiones.Hoc dicit Doctor propter geometriam, perspectivam, arithmeticamet huiusmodi, in
quibus sunt multe propositiones que fiuntin termiisconfuse
et tamen sunt per se note artificiconceptiset de ipsis diffinitis,
bus illarum scientiarum;qui quidem artificesut pure ac precise
tales- idest: si non sint etiam methaphisici110et logicinesciunt resolverediffinitavel terminosillarum propositionum
immediatarum in suas diffinitiones.Ymmo etiam, ut innuit
Doctor consequenterquando dicit:111"hec etiam conclusio probatur, quia alias quelibet propositio esset per se nota", scilicet

108secundaconclusio
P mg,a.m.
109tertiaconclusio
P mg,a.m.
110sicplerumque
P.
111ibidem
, p. 134,1. 3.
221

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555

560

565

570

575

580

geometrico er arismetico112et huiusmodi, "que esset vera primo modo",113 quasi dicati "non". Dico quod ibi innuitet vult
Doctor quod si huiusmodi propositionesque sunt114facte tantum de terminisconfuse conceptis, scilicet ipsis diffnitis,et in
illis terminismanentes, sunt per se note illis artificibuspredictis
non existentibusmethaphisicis- si, dico, ille eedem propositiones, idest earum termini,resolverenturin suos terminosdistincnon essent aliquando note illis
tos, scilicetterminosdiffinitionis,
artificibus,quia nec intelliguntnec intelligerentgenera et differentias illorum terminorumnisi essent methaphisica et logica
imbuti, que scientietraduntquid sit genus et differentiaet que
sint et quomodo, et huiusmodi. Et ita propositionesde terminis
con-[f. 125v]-fuseconceptissunt sepe ipsis per se note et tamen
non ille de diffnitionibus
ac terminisdiffinitionum.Multi enim
ut
simplices contendunt, sepius audivi, Petrm, vel Thomam115
esse animai et negant ipsum esse hominem, eo quod non intelligunt quod animai sit genus hominis,et quid sit genus et quomodo includiturquiditative in essentia hominis, et huiusmodi, et
sic de differentiis.
Et ratio est manifesta,quia notiorest eis notitia terminorumconfusa quam distinctaet prius est eis naturali:116"innata est nobis via
teroccurrens,ut patet primo Phisicorum
a confusis etc." Geometer enim habens istam propositionem,
scilicet"omne totumest maius sua parte" pro propositioneper
se nota, et similiteristam: "linea est longitudo sine latitudine"
et huiusmodi, nichil seit de horum terminorumdiffnitionibus,
quia nec quantitatem aut dimensiones quantitatis novit et huide distinctaterminorumratione
usmodi, et ideo nichil sciret117
et diffinitione,nec sciretdicere cuius generis aut predicamenti
sint.
Et ideo dicit Doctor118quod alias quelibet propositioesset per
se nota que esset vera per se primo modo. Quod iam negatum
est, quia multisartificibusnon sunt propositionesille < per se >
note que sunt in primo modo. Et Doctor hic loqui intenditindif-

112sicP.
113ibidem
, p. 134,1. 4.
114factaadd.sedexp.P.
115anconfuse
ad Petrum
sedvidenostram
Thome?,
introductionem,
rejertur
p. 199.
116Aristoteles,
I, i, 184al6-18,23-24.
Physica
117sibi?P.
118ibidem
, p. 134,3-4.
222

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585

590

595

600

605

610

ferenterin omni scientia et de quocumque sciente vel artifice,

non tarnen,ut dixi superbis,119de omni genere propositionum
que apud muitos vocantur propositionesper se note, sed tarnen
non sunt sic. Unde, quando subdit Doctor ponendo
secundam120rationemsuam, dum dicit: ' 'Similiter, alias quelibet propositio esset per se nota in scientiis specialibus etc.",
20adicere sic quod propositiones que sunt per se note
intendit1
in scientiisspecialibus, sunt ille quas methaphisicusresolvitin
sive diffnitiones
extremorum,et non sunt eis
partes diffinitivas,
alie note nisi tales. Quod dicit Doctor esse falsum, quia121geometerut geometernescitresolvereterminospropositionumquibus innititurut per se notis sibi in eorum rationes quiditativas
et diffinitivas.Et absurdissimum est dicere quod geometer,
arismeticus,musicus et huiusmodi artificesnullas habeant propositiones in arte sua eis per se notas, cum secundum Philoso,122diffnientemibi propositionemper
phum, primo Posteriorum
se notam, vel maximam, aut dignitatem:123' propositio per se
est illa quam necesse est quemlibet docendum in aliqua scientia
habere". Unde patet quod non indigetdoctore, sed quilibet capit earn per se < notam >, notis terminisconfuse solum, ita
quod quilibet artifexdocendus in aliqua scientia, vel addisciturus eam, habet in principio multas propositiones per se notas,
quibus sine aliquo instructoreper seipsum assentii, et hoc notis
terminissolum confuse et indistincte.124
Quibus acquiescendo
potestpostea per magistrmprovocan a illa difficiliaet magis
obscura, ad que attingere, etiam per magisti instructionem,
non posset nisi prius sine magistro per seipsum illis prioribus
per se notis acquievisset.
< Franciscus de Maronis contra opinionem Petri Aureoli >
Franciscus autem redarguit Aureolum in 2a distinctione,
questione Ia,125ponentem hoc modo iam supradictopropositionem per se notam, dicens contra Aureolum quod licet hoc sit

119videsupra,
1. 100-101.
120Johannes
DunsScotus,Ordinatio
, (...), p. 134,1. 8-9.
120a
iintelligit
P.
121geoadd.sedexp.P.
122Aristoteles,
Posteriora
I, iv, 72 a35-40.
Analytica
123dicitadd.P.
124et add. P.
125Franciscus
de Maronis,
InIV Libros
Sententiar
umI, dist.2, qu. 1,(...), f.15vb(N).
223

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620

625

630

635

640

645

650

verum in scientiissubalternantibus,non tarnenin suis subalternatis, volens dicere quod licet in scientiis subalternantibussit
verum quod quilibet in eis docendus habeat de necessitate in
principio aliquas propositionesper se notas, quibus per se, sine
instructore,adheret vel assentii, per quas postmodum quasi per
claves manuducitur a magistro in sublimiora illius scientie et
subtiliora- non tarnenest hoc verum in scientiissubalternatis,
eo quod in eis numquam reperiunturalique propositionesper
se note, cum sint omnes demonstratein scientiissubalternantibus, sicut et omnia principia scientie sub-[f. 126r]-alternate;et
quanto magis omnes alie propositiones scientie subalternate
sunt demonstrateet habentes evidentiam mendicatam et lumen
a lumine scientie subalternantis!
Et ideo nullus docendus in scientia subalternata reperirepotest in illa aliquas propositionesper se notas quibus per se, sine
magistro, adhereat, cum nulle tales sint ibi, sed omnes sunt demonstratein scientia subalternante.Et non est possibile, secundum muitos, quod aliqua propositiodemonstratasitper se nota.
Et hoc maxime est verum secundum Franciscum et etiam Aureolum, eo quod eis videtur inclusio incompossibilitatisdicere
quod aliqua propositio sit per se nota et etiam demonstrata,eo
quod esset a se notum et ab alio, et ab intrinsecoet a propriis
terminis,et ab extrinsecoet terminisalienis. Quidquid tarnen
sit de impugnatione Francisci contra Aureolum: qui esset amicus Aureoli diceretquod Aureolus intelligebatsolum in scientiis
in scientiissubalternantisubalternantibus,et non indifferenter
bus et etiam subalternatis; et tunc cadit impugnatio Francisci
tam in
contra eum. Si tarnenAureolus intellexeritindifferenter
scientiissubalternantibusquam subalternatis(et hoc possit probari ex dictis Aureoli), tunc optime procedit Franciscus contra
eum.
<Continuatio opinionis auctoris>
Sed ad rem nostram revertendodico quod inconvenitdicere in
illis scientiis superius recitatis nullas esse propositiones per se
notas earum artificibus,et iam probavi ex Philosopho. Cum igitur sic sit et constat quod huiusmodi artificesnon habent nisi
notitiam confusam terminorum,claret Veritas dictorum Scoti
quod in terminisconfuse conceptis sunt multe propositionesper
se note nec oportet terminosvel diffinitaresolvi semper in ter-

224

20:16:54 PM

655

660

665

670

675

680

685

690

minos diffinitionisad hoc ut habeatur propositio per se nota.

'
Unde statim concludit ibi:126 'Alias autem propositionesquas
methaphisicusposset cognoscere etc.", ubi confirmtdeclarationem meam superiuspositam, quod scilicetgeometernon habet
pro propositionibusper se notis illas quarum terminiresolvunturin diffinitiones
eorum, sed sufficitquod propositioper se nota sit in terminisconfusecognitis,ita quod non requiriturlumen
vel evidentia methaphisicalis,eo quod, ut dixi, multe sunt propositionesper se note geometroet musico et huiusmodi quas nesciunt in tale lumen methaphisicale aliquo modo deducere.
Et ideo propositionesper se note illorum exigunturprecise et
sufficientersuper quiditatibus cognitis confuse et indistincte.
Unde hanc propositionem oblatam sibi sub terminis confuse
cognitis,scilicet"omne totum est maius sua parte" sub notitia
confusa "totius" et etiam "partis", que sibi est per se nota, nescit ipse demonstrare ut facit methaphisicus, sic: "quicquid
continet tantumdem sicut sua pars et amplius, est maius sua
parte; omne totum est huiusmodi; igituretc." Geometer enim
non resolvit hune terminm "totum" in hanc diffinitionem,
scilicet "continere tantumdemetc.", sicut facitmethaphisicus.
Tamen quecumque propositioest talis quod illa non potest esse
per se nota et clare cognosci nisi terminieius resolvanturin conet distinctos,numquam erit talis per se nota
ceptus diffinitivos
in eisdem terminisconfuse cognitis et indistinctis.
Et hoc sonat clavis ista Scoti ad cognoscendum propositionem
per se notam, circa quam tantum insurdavi. Et claruit quod
manifestesunt propositionesper se note in terminisconfuse solummodo cognitisquarum terminossic resolverenon oportetut
ille propositionessint per se note. Unde notandum quod, cum
dico "propositio per se nota", li "per se", que est una determinatio, aliqua excludit a propositioneper se nota et aliqua non.
Dixi superius127 quod non excludit evidentiam formalem,
[f. 126v] sed originalem, idest quod non origineturevidentia
sua aliunde. Excludit etiam, generaliterloquendo de propositione per se nota et large, non solum evidentiamquam mendicaret
ab aliis propositionibus< constitutis> ex terminisextrinseciset
sibi extraneis, sed etiam excludit notitiam clariorem intrinse-

126
Duns Scotus,Ordinatio
, (...), p. 134,1. 16-17.
127Johannes
Videsupra
, 1.93.
225

20:16:54 PM

695

700

705

710

715

720

cam in suis terminispropriisvirtualitercontentam,scilicetnotitiam distinctam,ciaram et diffinitivam,

qua nullo modo indiget
causanda vel hanotitia
aut
sui
evidentia
manifestanda,128
pro
sibi sufficientem
evidentiam
et
notitiam
habeat
benda, eo quod
ex terminissuis confuseconceptis,ut sunt terminiillius propositionis.
Ex quibus dictis colligunt aliqui quod non est inconveniens
eandem propositionemesse per se notam et tarnendemonstrabilem. Nam secundum magistrm Adam Wodam129 in primo
130hec
Sententiarum
propositio "omne totum est maius etc." demonstrate levi dyaletica. Et intelligo eum sic, idest: demonstration festiva et deductione imperceptibili, et hoc
propterproximitatemet vicinitatemprincipiorumad conclusiones, quia in evidentia valde conveniunt. Dico tamen quod hoc
non erit, habendo respectum ad eundem artificem,quia quod
eadem propositio numero et formalitersumpta, et non tantum
materialiter,sit in una et eadem scientia et ita eidem artificiper
se nota et etiam demonstrabilis,est tantum dicere quod est a se
nota et ab intrinseco,et ab alio nota et ab extrnseco,et ita a
se et non a se, ab alio et non ab alio, que sunt extrema contradictions . Etiam impossibile est quod intellectusunus numero
determineturper aliquid131 aliud ad aliquam veritatem, quo
non existentenichil< o > minus determinareturad illam. Propositio autem per se nota est talis quod intellectusdeterminatur
ad earn ex terminisillius vel per terminossuos proprios,et non
ex demonstrationevel per aliquas alias premissas et principia.
Ergo per huiusrrodinullo modo determinaturintellectusad evidentiam et ad assensum illius propositionis. Tamen habendo
respectumad diversos artificesnon inconvenit,quia habenti notitiamterminorumpropositionisper se note solum indistincteet
confuse, sicut habet geometerut geometer,erit aliqua propositio per se nota, ut ista: "linea est longitudo sine latitudineetc.",

128manifestaiadd.seddel.)tioneP.
129toutum(sic)P.
130AdamWodeham,
etdistinclibrum
Sententiarum.
inprimm
Lectura
secunda
Prologus
tioprima,ed. R. Woodassisted
1990,dist.I, qu. 3, pp.
byG. Gi,St. Bonaventure
Adamof
in G.
to theSentences
's Commentary
238-240.Cf. Adam Wodeham
" as theimmediateGi,
on the"complexe
s Question
Wodeham'
object
oj scientific
significabile
in: Franciscan
Studies,vol. 37, XV (1977),66-102(100 (n. 106).
knowledge
131inv.P
226

20:16:54 PM

725

730

735

740

745

750

755

que tarnenmethaphisiconon erit per se nota sed demonstrabilis, quia per rationemformalemlinee demonstrattamquam per
causam et a priori longitudinem sine latitudine tamquam passionem.
Et ideo est hic adminus triplex132
diversitas,quia estprimodiversitasscientiarumet artificum,et secundoterminorumet conceptuum, ac tertiodiversorumluminum.
De primapatet, et de secundaetiam diversitate,quia, ut vult
et etiDoctor, alius et alius terminusest diffinitiet diffinitionis,
am alius et alius conceptus. Non dico: alia et alia quiditas vel
ratio formalis,sed eadem quiditas sub alio et alio termino vel
nomine significata,ac sub alio et alio conceptu intellectaac considerata. Que diversitasduplex circa eandem quiditatem sufficit
ad diversificandumpropositiones formaliter,in quibus reperiuntur iste due diversitatescirca eandem quiditatem ita quod
una propositioin qua subicietureadem quiditas sub uno termino vel nomine, scilicetsub nomine diffiniti,et sub uno conceptu, idest sub conceptu indistinctoet confuso qui correspondet
predicto terminoet nomini diffiniti,erit propositio per se nota
uni artifici,utputa geometro,gratia exempli, et tarnennon methaphisico; et alia propositio in qua subicitur eadem quiditas
numero et re sub alio terminovel nomine, idest sub nomine diffinitionis,et sub alio conceptu, scilicetsub conceptu distinctoet
claro, qui conceptus distinctuscorrespondetpredictoterminoet
nomini diffinitionis,[f. 127r] erit per se nota methaphisico et
non demonstrabilis,et tamen ista eadem numero et forma non
erit per se nota geometro propter ignorantiam terminorum.
Omnino enim presupponiturnotitiaterminorumad omnem notitiam propositionisper se note, saltem confusa et indistincta.
Sed ipse nullam habet de illis terminisdistinctiset expansis notitiam, cum non sit methaphisicus, ut supponitur.
De tertiadiversitate,scilicet luminum, etiam patet, quia lumen obscurum, quale est illud geometri,idest notitiaindistincta
et confusa terminorum,et lumen clarum, quale est illud meut
thaphisici,scilicetnotitiadistinctaet clara, multumdifferunt,
patet.
Et ideo, ut dixi,133non inconvenitquod una et eadem propo-

132Pc: duplexP.
133videsupra,
1. 718-726.
227

20:16:54 PM

760

765

770

775

780

785

sitio sit per se nota et etiam demonstrabilis,sed non respectu

eiusdem scientie et artifcis,sed diversorum,et hoc proptertriplicem diversitatemiam positam. Et ita verisimileest intellexisse Franciscum de Maronis tam in 2a distinctioneConflatus,13*
questione Ia, quam etiam in 2a distinctione,questione Ia primi
ubi dicit se non posse capere
libri De summa135simplicitate,136
quod unum et idem sit per se notum et demonstrabile.Intellige
eum, ut iam dixi,137scilicet respectuunius et eiusdem artificis;
sed respectu diversorum est necessarium.
Infra tunc in litteraDoctoris, ubi dicitur: "Ex hoc patet quod
non est distinguereetc."138sta dicituresse opinio Henrici139et
in primo suo, distinctioetiam Hervei Ordinis Predicatorum,140
ne 3a, articulo 2, ubi dicit quod quedam est propositio per se
nota actualiter, et est ilia que ab intellectuactualiter cognoscitur; quedam est per se noscibilis, sicut ilia que non actualiter
cognoscitur, sed est apta nata cognosci.
Hec satis clare reprobatura Doctore et ideo immemorarinon
oportet. Non enim propteractualem cognitionemet non actualem que accidunt propositioni, variatur natura propositionis,
quia aliter, omnibus hominibus dormientibus,que eis vigilantibus fueritnota, esset non nota, et omni hora et momento variaretur, quia ad intellectionem et non-intellectionem cuiuscumque.
"Et hoc patet quod nulla est distinctioetc.".141 sta regula est
sancii Thome, Parteprima,questione 2a, articulo lo,142ubi dicit
quod duplex est propositioper se nota: una quidem in se et simpliciterac absoluta, alia vero quoad nos vel quoad intellectum
nostrum. Primo modo dicitur omnis propositio ilia per se nota

134Franciscus
nominatum
de Maronis,In IV LibrosSententiarum
,
f Conflatus
scriptum
LiberI, dist.2a, qu. la, ed. Venetiis1520,f. 16va(K).
135felicitate
add.sedexp.P.
136Franciscus
de Maronis,De summa
, locusnonduminventus.
simplicitate
137videsupra
, 1. 706.
138Johannes
Duns Scotus,Ordinatio
, (...), p. 136,1. 1-2.
139Henricusde Gandavo,Summa
ordinanarum
, ed. rars IdzUa. , qu.
quaestionum
2 in corp.(I, f. 130S).
140HerveusNatalis,In quatuor
commentaria
libros
Sententiarum
, LiberI, dist.3, art.2,
ed. Parisiis1647(reprinted
Gregg,1966),p. 37a.
141Johannes
Duns Scotus,Ordinatio
, (...)> p. 136,1. 11.
142ThomasAquinas,Summa
, I, qu. 2, art.1, in corp.;I-II, qu. 94, a. 2,
Theologiae
in corp.
228

20:16:54 PM

790

795

800

805

810

815

in qua predicatum clauditur essentialiterin143subiecto, ut dicendo "homo est animar', vel "Deus est", quia esse est de essentia et intrinseca quiditate Dei. Sed propositio per se nota
quoad nos non solum requiritquod predicatum sit de intrinseca
ratione subiecti, sed ultra hoc etiam requirit quod quiditativa
ratio subiecti sit nobis nota per proprium et quiditativum conceptum eius. Et tunc, applicando ad propositum,dicit quod ista
propositio "Deus est" vel Deum esseest per se nota in se, quia
predicatum eius, scilicet esse, est de ratione subiecti, scilicet
Dei. Sed non est per se nota quoad nos, quia quiditativa ratio
Dei, qui est subiectum in hac propositione,non est nobis nota.
Hec opinio clare reprobatura Doctore in littera. Et
arguissem144contra hanc opinionem nisi propternimiam festinationem et temporisdefectum,sed alias. Tarnen ratio Thome
nulla est, quia propositio,si est per se nota in uno intellectu,ipsa est per se nota apud quemcumque intellectumconcipientem
terminossub propriis rationibus, licet indistincteet confuse.
"Propter idem non valet distinctioetc.".145 Hic est distinctio
Boetii146in Libro de hebdomadibus
,147ubi dicit148quod quedam
sunt
se
note
propositiones
per
sapientibuset insipientibus,idest:
non doctis, et quedam solis sapientibus.
149
Doctor dat in virtute tres
ad istam: prima est
responsiones
quod communis150conceptio et propositio per se nota non sunt
idem, et ideo potuit Boethius151ibi distinguerecommunem152
conceptionem, [f. 127v] quia demonstran potest, saltem sillogismo imperceptibili;et non distinguitibi propositionemper se
notam que cognoscenti terminos eius non demonstratur.
Secunda responsio < est > quod ipse loquitur de propositione
per se nota actualiterconcepta et cognita, sive existentisub ac-

143ut P.
144Pc: arguisset
P.
145Op.cit.,p. 136,1. 18 - 137,1. 19 extus
a DunsScoto
.
(
cancellatus)
146Boethius
P.
147ebdomadibus
P.
148Boethius,
De hebdomadibus
, PL 64, 1311B (ed. Peiper,Lipsiae1871,pp. 17-23).
149duasP.
150cumadd.P
151Cf.PetriAureoliScriptum
St. Bonaventure,
I, dist.ii, sect.10,ed. E. Buytaert,
1951,- 129,p. 559.
152cumadd.P.
229

20:16:54 PM

820

825

830

835

840

845

tuali cognitioneet consideration^ quia actualiterest solum nota

sapientibus.
Tertia responsio est quod ipse loquitur de propositioneper se
nota cuius terminiconcipiuntursub rationedistincta,et talis est
nota solis sapientibus. Vide litteram illam "de concepta'',153
scilicetde propositioneper se nota actualiterconcepta vel cognita, qualiter concipitura solis sapientibus, "et non de concepibili^,1 54 scilicet inquantum est apta nata cognosci et concipi,
quia sic etiam pertinentad insipientes,"vel de ratione terminorum distincte".155Ista est tertia responsio quod intelligiturde
propositione per se nota cuius terminosoportet <concipere>
distincteet clare, qualiter non concipiunt eos insipientes,quia
non sunt docti.
"Nec valet illa distinctio quod alique sunt propositiones
etc.".156 Ista quarta distinctioest Guillelmi Guaronis Anglici,
, distinctione 2a, questione
maistri Scoti, primo Sententiarum
8a,157ubi dicit quod "sicut in contingentibusuna est magis
contingensquam alia, sicut ista: "homo currit" est magis contingens quam ista "homo est albus", et sicut in impossibilibus
una propositio est magis impossibilis quam alia, sicut ista
"substantia est quantitas" est magis impossibilis quam ista
"homo est asinus", cum extrema in nullo genere generalissimo
conveniant, extrema autem secunde propositionisita conveniunt (conveniuntenim in animali vivente,corporeet substantia);
et sicut in necessariis una est magis necessaria quam alia, sicut
ista "Deus est substantia et ens" est magis necessaria quam
ista: "homo, vel asinus, est substantia,vel ens"; et sicut in propositionibus per se, una est magis per se quam alia, sicut ista
"homo est animai rationale" est magis per se quam ista "homo
est risibilis" quia prima est in primo modo dicendi per se, et secunda est in secundo modo - ita pariformiter
est in propositionibus per se notis: aliqua est magis per se nota quam alia. Illa

153Op. cit.,p. 137,1. 14 (textus

a DunsScoto
cancellatus).
154Op.cit.,p. 137,1. 14 (textus
a DunsScoto
cancellatus).
155Op.cit.,p. 137,1. 14 {textus
a DunsScoto
cancellatus).
156Op. cit.,p. 137,1. 1-2.
157WilliamofWare,Quaestiones
IV Libros
Sententiarum
Biblioteca
, cod. Florence,
super
Plut.33,dextr.1 (S. Croce384),dist.III, q. 3 ("UtrumDeumessesit
Laurenziana,
de conperse notum"),f. 20ra: "Ideo dicitursic quod sicutinterpropositiones
estaliamagiscontingens
etalia minus,v.g.hecestmagiscontingens
"homo
tingenti
curri'quamhec"homoestalbus",quiapredicatum
minime
inheret
subiecto
(. .
230

20:16:54 PM

autem que est magis per se nota, est primi ordinis, illa vero que
850 minus est, secundi ordinis. Ilia que est magis per se nota et primi ordinis, est ilia cuius terminiexperimentaliterconcipiuntur
et sine magno labore, ymmo statimimperceptibiliter,
ut "omne
totumest maius sua parte"; illa vero que est secundi ordinis et
minus per se nota est ilia cuius termininon concipiunturexperi855 mentaliter,sed cum magno labore, ut est illa 4'Deus est"."
158
Aliqui etiam dicunt quod mathematicalia159sunt primi ordinis, quia sunt in primo gradu certitudinissecundum Comsed methaphisicalia sunt secundi ordinis.
mentatorem,160
Sed Doctor reprobat
distinctionemGuaronis, quia non refert
860 cuiuscumque ordinis sint propositiones. Si in eis sit per se notum et evidens terminosconiungi, et hoc ex intrinsecoet terminis propositionis,omnes ille sunt propositionesper se note.
"Ex hiis ad questionem dico etc.".161 Ubi, ut breviterdicam,
Doctor dicit quod ista propositio "Deus est", in qua coniun865 gunturhii duo termini,scilicet"Deus" ex parte subiecti(et hoc
capiendo "Deum" pro ipsa Divinitate et Essentia Divina, et
hec sub sua propriissimaratione) et "esse" (sive "existentia"162
quod idem est in proposito, et est modus intrinsecus),li "esse",
dico, ex parte predicati, et hoc si sit esse Dei proprium et nulli
870 alteri conveniens,- qualis Deitas ex parte subiecti non potest a
nobis naturalitercognosci nec per media naturalia, scilicetfantasmata et intellectumagentem, nec etiam tale esse Dei speciale
ex parte predicati,- dico, quod talis propositio est per se nota
Deo et etiam beatis, sed non nobis pro hoc statu, quia non pos875 sumus, ut dixi, apprehenderenaturaliterextrema illius propositionis, scilicet subiectum et predicatum, distincte, clare,
perfecte,et sub propriis rationibus. Sed si possemus, esset illa
propositio per se nota nobis [f. 128r] sicut Deo et beatis.
Sed si petasa me qualis propositioest ista, scilicet"Deus est",
880 quam nos credimus per fidemet Scripturesacre doctrinam,vel
quam habemus per demonstrationem, si tamen demonstran
158Nscio
ad quosreferatur.
159Pc:
P.
methaphisicalia
160Averroes,
inAristotelis
Omnia
Cordubensis
Stagiritae
queextant
opera
(...) Auerrois
(...
commentarii
ad Junctas1560,In Metaphysicam
8v.
Venetiis,
...),
,
I,
p.
161Op.cit.,p. 137,1. 5.
162existentiam
P.
231

20:16:54 PM

885

890

895

900

905

910

915

possit,- dicoquod non <est> eadem propositio in speciali nec

de eisdem extremissub eadem ratione formalipropria et specialissima, et hoc quantum ad specialissimas rationesterminorum,
licet sint idem terminivel extrema quoad vocem et quoad conceptus generales. Et ideo Deumesseest propositioper se nota uni
intellectui,ut divino ac etiam beato, et non alteri, scilicetviatoris, quia illi concipiunt terminossub propriisrationibus et viator non. Ideo ista propositio 4' Deus est" quam habent ipsi, et
ista propositio "Deus est" quam habemus nos, sunt diverse
propositiones, cum sint ibi diversi termini propositionum, ut
dixi, quia speciales et generales, et, mutatisaut variatisterminis
qui sunt partes integrales propositionis, variantur propositiones, que sunt quedam tota.
Et si attenderis qualiter Philosophus, sexto Methaphisice,163
distinguitmethaphisicam realiter ab aliis scientiisspeculativis,
scilicetphisica et mathematica, non obstante communitateeius
et terminorumsuorum ad alias scientiaset earum terminossive
quiditates, percipies clare qualiter sunt alie et alie propositiones
que formanturde conceptibus generalibus et conceptibus specialibus, sicut in proposito. Et hoc claret per Scotum in tertioLibro, distinctione 24a, in fine, et maxime in tertio Libro sue
ubi dicit de hac propositione "Deus
iuventutis,loco prefato,164
est trinuset unus" quod habet alios et alios terminosut est nota
beatis et ut est cognita a nobis per fidem, et sic est alia et alia
propositio.
Etiam, ne mireris,do tibi exemplum de triangulo, quod dat
Bonetus in secundo libro Metaphisicesue, capitulo 3, 165qui ibidem assentitdictismeis. Petit enim ibi "utrum de ista propositione "triangulus habet tres" possit unus et idem intellectus
habere primo opinionem eo quod ad hoc habet precise medium
dyaleticumsive probabile et topicum, et postea, adveniente sibi
medio demonstrativo,potest habere de eadem propositionedemonstrationem facientem scire, quod videtur sepe. Videmus
<enim> per experientiamquod prius novimus aliquid proba-

163Aristoteles,
VI, 1, 1025al8-19.
Metaphysica
164Johannes
DunsScotus,Reportatio
Parisiensis
DunsScotiOperaomnia,
, inJohannis
T. 23, Parisiis1894,p. 459b.
165Cf. Nicolaus Bonetus(?), In Metaphysicam
, in MS Mnchen,Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek
, Clm 26867,f. 17v(cf.supra,notam78).
232

20:16:54 PM

920

925

930

935

940

945

950

955

biliteret postea illud idem demonstrative. Et sic videtur quod

de eodem habebitur simul opinio et scientia, quia nox precessit
et dies appropinquai et etiam erit lumen de lumine etc."
RespondetBonetus ibi quod non est idem subiectum sub eadem rationeformalipropria quantum ad rem, idest quantum ad
quiditatem specialem se tenentemex parte rei significateper vocem, licet sit idem subiectumquantum ad vocem significantem,
vel melius quantum ad apparentiam et similitudinemvocis significantis.Et causa quare non est idem subiectum est quia non
sunt ibi idem terminiconcepti et significati.Nam notitiaopinativa quod "triangulus habet tres" adit super terminos alios,
quia super terminos"trianguli" in communi, quibus convenit
et inestper accidens 4'habere tres", sicut omnis passio inferioris
accidit superiori,ut risibile
: animali.Sed notitia scientificatrianguli quod triangulushabet tres,adit super terminosalios, quia
'
super "triangulum" et super 'habere tres" sub propriiset specialibus rationibusquos terminosin speciali si primo intellexisset, numquam opinionem sed solum scientiam de illa
propositionehabuisset. Et ideo quia sunt terminialii et alii, ideo
non est ibi eadem ratio formalissubiective et obiective concepta. Et ideo non est de eadem ratione obiectivali et de eodem subiecto in speciali sillogismus dyaleticus et demonstrativus. Et
esse, idest:
exemplificai ibi dicens: sicut PrimamIntellgentiam
est
se
nota
uni
et
non
Deum,
alteri, quia unus
propositio per
terminos
sub
rationibus
et
alius
non, et ideo
concipit
propriis
sunt diverse propositiones,cum sint diversi terminipropositionum. Sed si quilibet conciperetterminosper se sub propriisrationibus et specialibus, tunc esset eadem propositio et per se
nota uni sicut et alteri. Hec Bonetus in Terminiscum modica
mea declaratione ipsius. De eisdem igiturterminissub speciali
ratione conceptis non potest esse propositio per se nota et non
per se nota sive demonstrabilis, sicut nec notitia opinativa et
scientificapossunt esse de eisdem terminisspecialibus.
Et ita concludo quod hec propositio "Deus est" que est per
se nota intellectuidivino et beato, non est illa eadem formaliter
et in speciali quam nos credimus aut demonstramus,sed est alia
et alia propositio formaliter,licet in vocibus sit similitudo.
Amplius non expono textmScoti, quia ultra primum intentum
processi et feci argumenta. Utique alia dixissem valde utilia de
233

20:16:54 PM

propositioneper se nota, si tempus michi favissetet legentibus

non timerem fastidiumgenerare.
Explicit tractatusde propositione per se nota.
Leiden
R ijksuniversiteit
Instituut
Filosofisch

234

20:16:54 PM

Andrew Wanszyk O.P. ( Andrzej Wiyk) alias Magister Serpens

and WorksAttributedto His Authorship
TADEUSZ GRZESIK

Andrew Wanszyk O.P. (Andrzej Wzyk) was born around the year
1377 in Giebufrw,Poland. Having firststudied in Prague where he
graduated as Bachelor of Arts in 1397, he continued his studies in
Cracow and was promoted as Master of Arts in 1403. Before 1408
Wanszyk enteredthe Dominican Order in Cracow. He then returned
to Prague to lecture in the Arts facultyand to read theology (14081409). For some time Wanszyk was engaged in missionary work
amongst the Samogitians of North West Lithuania. He seems to have
been present there not only as missionary, but also in his own right
as courtpreacherof king Ladislaus Jagielio of Poland, who supervised
and promotedthismission. In 1414 we findWanszyk back in Cracow
lecturing in theology at the StudiumGenerale.As far as we know,
Wanszyk never held a lecturingpost at Cracow University. The terminuspostquernof his death is the 21st of April 1430.
Of the two worksattributedto Wanszyk' s authorship,only the ExercitiumPhysicorum
gives us some idea as to his philosophical orientation.
This commentaryto Aristotle'sPhysicsis writtenin the formof quaestionesdisputatae.It is the only copy of the work that we know to exist
and was writtenin Prague towards the end of the 14th cent. As many
works of that period which commented Aristotle, the Exercitium
was under the stronginfluenceofJohn Buridan and could
Physicorum
be classed as belonging to the "secundum Joannem Buridanum"
type. Most of the titles of the quaestionesare taken verbatimfrom
What is howeverworthnoting
Buridan, as are many of theconclusiones.
in the case of the Exercitium
is the fact that, on occasion,
Physicorum
theirauthor disagrees with Buridan and submits what he thinksare
bettersolutions to a given problem: Marsilius of Inghen serves him
well in this respect, as well as Walter Burley. It is also worth noting
that Averroes is held in high esteem and is quoted in the Exercitium
as often as John Buridan.
Physicorum
235
E.J.Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:17:21 PM

In all, the prevalent attitudeof the Exercitium

is the corPhysicorum
rection of Aristotle's thought- not to disqualify it, but, to use the
author's own words: "ad salvanda verba Aristotelis".
Neitherof the worksattributedto Wanszyk's authorshiphave as yet
been edited.1
There are at presentat least seven catalogues2whereworksby Andrew
Wanszyk are listed. These catalogues do not however agree as to the
works they attributeto his authorship. The oldest of these, published
in 1875, is the catalogue of manuscriptsof theJagellonian Library in
Cracow. Its author, W. Wislocki, lists an Exercitium
mgri
Physicorum
contained in ms. BJ 688, ff.2r-83r.3This work has been conSerpentis
sidered as having been writtenby Wanszyk, ever since the renowned
Konstanty Michalski pointed out the fact that Andrew Wanszyk and
Magister Serpens, whose name appears in the heading of this work,
are one and the same person.4 The text of this heading runs: Exercitium librorum Physicorum
magisti Serpentis editionis per titulos et
Almae Universitatis Studii Cracoconclusiones
iuxta
cursum
per
viensis".
Another catalogue, this time of manuscripts belonging to the
BibliothecaOssolinianain Lww (this institutionis now based in Wroclaw),5 lists two works linking them with Wanszyk.
in ms. 376, ff.lrThe firstof these is GlossaS. ThomaesuperMattheum
1 I havepresently
theedition
ofbooksI-IV oftheExercitium
for
completed
Physicorum
fourbooksIV-VIII I intendto publish
thesis,theseandtheremaining
mydoctoral
in 1996/1997.
2 1. W. Wisocki,
Biblioteki
Katalog
rkopisw
Uniwersytetu
of
Jagielloriskiego
(A Catalogue
Manuscripts
oftheLibrary
ofthe
Jagellonian
University
), PartI, Cracow1875,p. 208.
2. W. Ktrzynski,
Biblioteki
Zakladu
im.Ossoliskich,
Katalog
rkopisw
(A Catalogue
of
vol. II, Lww1886,p. 436; vol.
Manuscripts
oftheLibrary
oftheOssolinski
Institute)
III, Lww1898,p. 270.
3. T. KaeppeliO.P., Scriptores
Ordinis
Praedicatorum
MediiAevi,vol.I: A-F,Romae
ad S.Sabinae1970,p. 73.
4. Ch.H. Lohr S.J., MedievalLatinAristotle
Commentaries
. Authors:
Robertus, in: Traditio,xxix(1973),p. 125.
Wilgelmus
5. M. Markowski
& Z. Wodek,
Commentatorum
MediiAeviinAristotelem
Repertorium
Latinorum
asservantur
Cracoviae
, Wroclaw1974,p. 37-8.
quaeinBibliotheca
Iagellonica
6. L.A.
Houston1987,p. 57.
C.S.B.,, A Catalogue
1270-1900,
ofThomists
3 Cf. n. 2 Kennedy
no. 1, p. 208.
4 K. MichalskiC.M., Prqdy
na Uniwersytecie
w
filozof
iczno-teologiczne
Jagiellonskim
istnienia
andTheological
Currents
atthe
pierwszej
dobiejego
(Philosophical
University
Jagellonian
inthe years
in: Nasza MyilTeologiczna,
2 (1935),p. 32.
ofitsexistence),
5 Cf.first
n. 2 no 2.
236

20:17:21 PM

232v.6 There are two notes to be found in this work, one on f.lr, proclaiming: "Iste est liber fratrisAndreae Wanszyk"; the other on
f.232v, informingus where, when, and at what expense Wanszyk
bought it. On the basis of this, we may safelyassume that the Glossa
is not a work which Wanszyk wrote, but one which he purchased.
Both these notes were writtenin Wanszyk's hand.7
The otherwork in this catalogue is the TabulatiolibribeatiAugustini
de lapsu mundiin ms. 818, ff.139r-149v.8In the explicitof this work we
read: "Explicit tabulatio libri beati Augustinus [!] de lapsu mundi per
fratrem Andrem Wanszyk ordinis praedicatorum. Benedictus
Deus". There doesn't seem to be any reason why thiswork should not
be attributedto Wanszyk's authorship.
The handwritingof the Tabulatioand that of the notes at the beginning and end of the Glossa seem to be identical.
In the lightof what has been said, it is necessaryto correctLeonard
A. Kennedy who, in his Catalogueof Thomists1270-19009 associates
Wanszyk withjust one work: the GlossaS. ThomaesuperMattheum.By
listinga certainwork next to Wanszyk's name, Kennedy would have
us believe thatWanszyk is its author, but what should reallybe made
clear is thatWanszyk is not so much the Glossa'sauthor, as rathertheir
owner. It seems a pitythat Kennedy, who published his work in 1987,
did not take into account an earlier work: the ScriptoresOrdinis
Medii Aevi by T. Kaeppeli, where the whole matter is
Praedicatorum
explained and correctlypresented.10
Of the three works associated with Wanszyk, the one which raises
the most doubts as far as authorship is concerned, is the Exercitium
Neither Kennedy nor Kaeppeli include this work in their
Physicorum.
catalogues. This mightwell be because Michalski, as far as we know,
never really explained in any work of his, how he arrived at the conclusion that the MagisterSerpensmentioned in the adscription of this
workand Andrew Wanszyk, are one and the same person. I therefore
thoughtit commendable to study the matterand to verifyMichalski.
6 Cf. n. 2 no 2, vol. II, p. 436.
7 Cf.J.N. Fijalek,Studia
ijegowydzialu
dodziejw
teologicznego
Krakowskiego
Uniwersytetu
intheXV
anditstheological
wXVw.,(Studies
faculty
ofCracow
ofthehistory
oftheUniversity
Krakw
series
vol.
Akademii
1899,p.
XIV,
II,
Umiejtnosci",
cent.)"Rozprawy
113,note7.
8 Cf. n. 2 no 2, vol. Ill, p. 270.
9 Cf. n. 2 no 6.
10Cf. n. 2, no 3.
237

20:17:21 PM

Despite the fact that my research proved Michalski rightin what he

maintains about MagisterSerpens'identity,I have difficultiesin agreeing with Michalski as regards attributingthis work to Wanszyk's
authorship.11My reasons forthisare the following:Firstly,thereis the
question of the title of this work. The text of the heading which
Michalski etal. treatas its title,does not correspondwiththe information given in the explicitof the work. The heading calls this work an
it is called: Disputationes.
Exercitium
, whereas in the explicit
(This in itself
has resulted in the work being known by no less than five different
titles, depending on whether the heading or explicitwas used as a
guideline).12 One also notices that this text was not writtenby the
same hand as that which wrote the rest of the work. Certainly, the
explicitdoes not raise doubts as to its authenticity:it does not appear
to be an interpolationand is writtenby the same hand as the rest of
the work; it states: "Et sic est finisdisputatum [!] librorumomnium
Physicorum".13 As in the case of otherworkslinked withWanszyk it
was clearly stated when one of these was writtenby him or bought by
him, in this case, however, one is not too sure as to the type of relaIf he were
tionship linking Wanszyk with the Exercitium
Physicorum.
their author, one asks: why did he not state the fact in the explicitof
this work, as was his custom in the Tabulation
11Cf.T. Grzesik,Uwaginatemat
orazautorstwa
miejsca
powstania
'Quaestiones
disputatae
'
octolibros
w rkp.BJ688(Newpropositions
Aristotelis
super
Physicorum
zawartych
concerning
'
theplaceoforigin
andtheauthorship
octolibros
disputatae
super
oftheQuaestiones
Physicorum
' contained
Aristotelis
inms.BJ688),in: RocznikiFilozoficzne
KUL, vol.37/38,no 1
in thispaperis basedon a striking
(1989/90),145-52.(The evidencesubmitted
resemblance
ofthesampleofWanszyk's
contained
inms.B. Ossol.376
handwriting
ofthetitleofms.BJ688(f.2r)inwhichMagister
(f. lr) andthatofthehandwriting
Sincethen,I havefoundnewevidence
indocuments
contemSerpensis mentioned.
toWanszyk
whereitis statedthatAndrew
wasa nobleman
whose
porary
Wanszyk
coatof armsshoweda serpent:"nobilisde clenodioSerpentum".
I also referto
a recent
Herbarz
publication:
J. Szymaski,
sredniowiecznego
rycerstwa
polskiego
(Coatsof
armsof medieval
Polishknights
), Warszawa1993, pp. 288-9,wherethe Wzyk
coatofarmsis presented
anddocumented;
thisin all wouldseemtocon(Wanszyk)
firm
Michalski's
claimthatMagister
areoneandthe
SerpensandAndrew
Wanszyk
samepersonbyexplaining
ina satisfactory
manner
thelinkbetween
thetwonames.
It is alsoworth
forthebenefit
ofthosewhoarenotfamiliar
withPolish,
mentioning,
that"Wzyk"or itsolderform"Wanszyk"means"littleserpent"in Polish).
12Theworkcontained
inms.BJ688,onff.2r-83r
isknown
underthefollowing
titles:
Disputationes
'Physicorum'
Exercitium
'Physicorum'
Exercitia
sivecursusPhilosophiae
Naturalis
Quaestiones
superoctolibros'Physicorum'
Aristotelis
Quaestiones
disputatae
superoctolibros'Physicorum'
13Ms. BJ688,f.83ra.
238

20:17:21 PM

Physicorum
Secondly, the text writtenat the head of the Exercitium
was declared to be a later addition by W. Wisocki,14K. Wjcik, R.
Dudak & M. Zwiercan,15in descriptionsof ms. BJ 688 which contains
this work. If one thereforedisregards later adscriptions to the work,
one would have reason enough to believe thatthe Exercitium
Physicorum
is an anonymous work.
Although one may feel stronglyinclined to accept these reasons,
there still remains the problem of the heading: why was it added on
later, and how are we to interpretthe informationit carries?
M. Markowski forone, does not seem to share our doubts regarding
the authorshipof the Exercitium
; he firmlybelieves that it
Physicorum
was Andrew Wanszyk who wrote this work, and that he composed it
takinginto account the programof studiesprevailingat the time in the
Arts Faculty of the Universityof Cracow.16 The heading does indeed
mention such matters: "() editionis per titulos et per conclusiones
iuxta cursum Almae Universitatis Studii Cracoviensis,' Although
this would seem to satisfy,therewas stillanother doubt haunting the
whole matter:neitherSerpens nor Cracow, mentionedin the heading,
are to be found anywhere else in the work. This seems somewhat
unusual ifone takes into account the factthat it was common practice
at the time to referto local landmarks when wishing to exemplifya
does indeed
point in the work. The author of the Exercitium
Physicorum
manifestsuch a habit, and makes use of examples taken not fromthe
sceneryof Cracow, but of Prague. The text of the work supplies the
following,used as illustrationsby its author: the riverVltava is quoted
on ff.8vb,38rb, 48va of ms. BJ 688. In addition " Castrumpragense"
appears on f.48va, and the towersof St. Gall's church(another Prague
landmark built in the year 1234) are mentioned on f.47va.
As a matterof fact, we are only too glad to use Prague yet again
forour own purpose: to show that it seems very likely that the ExercitiumPhysicorum
was writtenin Prague and not in Cracow, as one
mightbelieve, were one just to read the heading of the work. It was
common practice in Prague, as Jan Pinborg points out, that the
was not obliged to writehis own quaestiones
forclass, but could
magister
14Cf. n. 2 no 1, 208.
15Cf. n. 2 no 7, p.
p. 57.
*
16M. Markowski,
Krakow
skieKomentr
ze do 'Fizyki
zachowane
w redArystotelesa
Biblioteki
Commentaries
tothe'Physics'
niowiecznych
rkopisach
Jagiellonskiej
(Cracovian
of
Aristotle
contained
in medieval
manuscripts
of theJagellonian
), in: Studia
Library
7 (1966),p. 114.
Mediewistyczne,
239

20:17:21 PM

read quaestioneswritten "by renowned authors in more or less

rephrased forms", and that "lectures of this kind were termed exercitia". 17This practice mighthave well been in forcein Cracow where,
& magisti
of the restoredUniversity
one hastens to add, the firstdoctores
(Cracow Universityfounded in 1364, was restoredwith the addition
of a facultyof theologyin 1400) were all graduates of the University
of Prague; theirPrague habits therefore,mightwell have served them
as pioneers of universitytraditionin Cracow.
The Exercitium
contained in ms. BJ 688 and attributedto
Physicorum
the authorship of Andrew Wanszyk, seems to be a good example of
an anonymous Quaestiones
disputatae
being used by a later master as a
foundation for his exercitia
when
,
commenting on Aristotle's Physics.
Wanszyk had himselfstudied in Prague and continued his studiesat
Cracow University. It would thereforeseem probable that Andrew
Wanszyk, alias Magister Serpens, made use of the work in Cracow,
where he later taught,having at some time broughtthese anonymous
over to Cracow with him forthis purpose and "labelling"
Quaestiones
This would also seem to account
them as "his" Exercitium
Physicorum.
forthe fact of the heading being a later addition by his hand, as well
as forthe factof the informationof the explicitnot agreeing withwhat
is contained in the heading, and for the reason why Wanszyk could
not mention himselfin the explicitof the work.
It should also be noted thatthe workcontains editorialmarks,many
writtenin rubro(of whichWanszyk seems to have been quite fondof18),
from
corrections,as well as a fewglossaelmarginaliaby a hand different
thatof the author. This mightwell be a clue as to how we should interpret the term: "Magisti Serpentiseditionis", found in the textof the
heading of the work.
Of the threeworkslinked withAndrew Wanszyk, only the Tabulatio
librib. AugustiniDe lapsu mundiseems to have really been writtenby
him. The Glossa S. ThomaesuperMatthaeumwas bought by Wanszyk
whilststudyingin Prague. It seems to be quite certain that Wanszyk
was not the author of the Exercitium
contained in ms. BJ
Physicorum
688, although it would appear that these anonymous Quaestiones
17N. Kretzmann,
A. Kenny,
Medieval
J. Pinborg
(eds),TheCambridge
ofLater
History
, Cambridge
1990,4 p. 21.
Philosophy
18Thisbecameevident
whenlooking
at hisadscriptions
inms.376oftheBibliotheca
Ossoliniana
whichcodexat onetimebelonged
toWanszyk.
Bothadscriptions
onf.lr
and on f.232vwerewritten
in rubro.
byWanszyk
240

20:17:21 PM

were used by him as exercitia.I would thereforerecommend

disputatae
thatone refrainfromusing the adscriptionon f.2r as its title,and not
attributethis work to Wanszyk's authorship. Until more data are
available regardingthe real author of thiswork, I suggestit be known
'
as the Quaestiones
disputataesuperoctolibros 'Physicorumquae Magisti
.
attribuuntur
Serpenti
Lublin (Poland)
Marie Curie-Sklodowska
University

241

20:17:21 PM

Reviews
Catherine
Atherton
TheStoics
onAmbiguity
ClassicalStudies,
, Cambridge
Cambridge
Press,1993,xix + 563 pp. ISBN 0 521 441390 (hardback).
University
Atherton
has producedthefirstbook-length
to
studyof Stoictheories
relating
The Stoicsprovided
muchofwhatbecamestandard
ambiguity.
logicin Hellenistic
anditisevident
thatmanygenuine
oradulterated
times,
piecesofStoicclassifications
survived
thedeathofStoicism
itself
aboutAD 200,andfinally
an influence
exerted
on theMiddleAges.Forinstance,
itis generally
discussion
agreedthatAugustine's
ofambiguity
inDe dialctica
owesa debttotheStoics,andthough
De dialctica
wasnot
to be Augustine's
mostinfluential
thelikesofRogerBacon.
work,it did influence
takean interest
in
Hence, even medievalists
qua medievalists
may reasonably
reconstructions
ofStoicthought
likeambiguity.
on subjects
The problem
withsuchreconstructions
is thatthereis verylittleon whichtobase
them.Somecasualreferences,
Galen'slistofwhathe claimsto be thebestStoics'
to Aristotle's
in speech,twoclassifications
fallacies
of ambiguity
counterpart
(by
Theontherhetorician
andbyAugustine)
thatseemtohavesomeStoicbackground
that'saboutit. Atherton
to
information
out
of
the
fights
valiantly squeeze
meagre
butsheisa conscientious
whodoesnotallowherimagination
scholar
totake
sources,
fantastic
notwarranted
flights
by thesources.The resultis thatherconclusions
resemble
theverymeagreonesthatthepresent
reviewer
reachedin 1981
strongly
whenhe covered
thesameground
insomethirty
essentially
pages.1I oughttobe the
first
torejoicethata fresh
examination
oftheevidence
all my
didnotquiteoverturn
butwasitreallynecessary
towriteanother
fivehundred
andsixty-three
conclusions,
pageson thesubject?
It takesa twenty-seven-page
introduction
called"The scopeofthisbook",eleven
of"Sourcesandmaterials",
andsomeninety
pagesofpresentation
pagesabout"the
andlimitsofStoicinterest
in ambiguity"
before
we gettothecoresections
origins
ofthebook,"The Stoicdefinition
ofambiguity",
"The Stoicclassifications"
and
and thefallacy."At page471 we reachchapter
of
8, "The influence
"Ambiguity
Stoicteaching",
whichis followed
an
ofconclusions",
bya shortch. 9 "A survey
indictione
indexlocorum,
anda
, bibliography,
appendixon theAristotelian
fallaciae
generalindex.
Partof thereasonforthebook'slengthis an attempt
to confront
ancientand
It is hardtosaywhy,butthecomparisons
modern
me.They
didnotsatisfy
theory.
feltlikenotveryinformative
fromthemaintheme,and mademe lose
digressions
sightoftheauthor'sactualconclusions.
Another
reasonforlength
thatno readeroughttocomplain
ofis thepresentation
ofthecentral
textsbothin theiroriginal
and in
Greek,critical
included,
apparatus
translation.
Thekeytexts
are:(1) DiogenesLaertius
a Stoicdeficontains
7.62,which
nitionof ambiguity.
Atherton
devotesherch. 4 to a carefulanalysisof thistext.
observation
is thatby makingXei
the bearerof
Perhapsher mostimportant
theStoicsallowedambiguity
toapplytostrings
ofletters/sounds
ambiguity
priorto
theirbeinganalyzedas wordsorcomplexes
ofwords.(2) Galen,De captionibus
ch.4,
andTheon,Progymnasmata
80-81Spengel,whichcontain
versions
ofa StoicclassificainAtherton's
Thisclassification
is studied
ch.5-6before
shepasses
tionofambiguity.
inch.7 tothequestion
oftherelations
between
andfallacy.
Therearefine
ambiguity
makestoomuchoftheinadequacies
butI feelAtherton
oftheStoic
piecesofanalysis,
classification.
After
neither
in a propercontext
norin a
all, ithas beentransmitted
propershape.
NowI wouldliketo takeup somepointsofdetail.
242
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:17:35 PM

ofhowan ancientGreekcouldfailto hearthedifPp.229f.containa discussion

ifbothwereproperly
The occaference
between
auXrj
xpandocXrjxp
pronounced.
= (1) "a hallthathasfallen
sionis thefamous
rceaouaa
eaxco
Srjpioata
example
ocuXrjxpi
whohasfallen
three
timesshallbe public[property]",
shallbe public
(2) "a flute-girl
fromthepointof viewof
's dicussionis unsatisfactory
[property
(?)]." Atherton
interalia it disregards
are proclitic
the factthatGreekprepositions
phonetics;
ourstandard
rulethatdisyllabic
has thefunny
orthography
although
prepositions
an accentontheultimate.
theconjunction
xatis,andnodoubtalways
carry
Similarly
inmostcontexts.
Henceitis irrelevant
forthequestion
ofauXrj
was,proclitic
xpand
thatthereis goodancientevidencethatxocTO^povxo
and xaivocouldbe
aXrjxpt
from
xaxcpepovxo
andxatvo.Anyhow,
I havenodifphonetically
indistinguishable
in imagining
a situation
in whichitwouldbe OK to pronounce
ocXrj
ficulty
xpas
onewordstressed
ontheultimate;
a contrastive
forinstance,
stress
onxpmight
sufficetodeleteanyfinalaccentuation
ofauXrj
as wellas anyotherphonetic
of
marking
wordboundary.
a clearpersonalstandpoint,
Insteadoftaking
Atherton
concludes
herdiscussion
withtheremark
that"a pitchdifferentiation
ofsomesortwouldbe countedmore
ofscholars
in thefieldthana totalneutralisation."
Never
probable
bythemajority
believein themajority
ofclassicalscholars
whenitcomesto phonetics!
Thismajority
to consider
thepossibility
thattheexample
opinionleadsAtherton
wasnotmeanttobe oneofhomophony
butofhomography
so,
only.I do notthink
butI wouldliketo mention
an argument
in favourofthehomography
view.The
in thecontext
ofrhetorical
The student
examplelookslikeitwasinvented
training.
wastoimagine
thathewasoneoftheparties
ina law-suit
wheretherelevant
lawtext
wastheambiguous
etc."
"auXr]xpi
Thepoorflute-girl
onp. 270whereAtherton
refers
to"Quintilian's
conreappears
allusion"to theexample"as 'ilia vulgata'",and explainsthat" vulgata
temptuous
meansboth"overfamiliar"
presumably
[...] and "crude,implausible"."Yes, but
there
is alsoa joke. Vulgri
is onepossible
translation
of87)[iocrtocv
whichcanyevoGai,
notonlymean"becomestateproperty"
butalso"becomea publicgirl(prostitute)".
afterwards
whichis as ambiguous
as the
Immediately
Quintilian
(7.9.4)usespublicaria
Greekoriginal.
On p. 282f.Atherton
dealswiththevexedquestion
ofwhata Stoic7cx>at
was. It
isdifficult
tothink
withalltheproperties
thesources
seemtoascribe
upa sortofthing
toa 7rc>at.
Atherton
triestocuttheGordianknotbysacrificing
theexplicitly
attested
of7tx<aet.
Thisallowsthemtobe a specialsortofsounds(<po)vai),
and
incorporeality
tobe "uttered"(7tpocppea0ai)
rather
than"said" (Xeyeaai).
Confirmation
seemsto
= HlserF.3162):
comefromStobaeus1.12.3( = SVF 1.65/30A
Ax(i.e. xtSea)Se o Exanxot
eivai,xa xvjxv
cptXaoqxu
aatvvu7rpxxou
xcov
hi 7cxcaecov
a 8rrcpoariYopa
xaXoat
evvor)(xxG)v
[xexexeiv
r)(Ji,
xuyx^vetv.
Atherton
translates:
The Stoicphilosophers
and that
saythese[i.e. theForms]arenon-subsistent,
we sharein theconcepts,
butgetthecaseswhichtheycallappellatives.
and drawstheconclusion
that"at leastsomecases,then,wereappellatives
forthe
Stoa." Unknown
toAtherton,
thisconclusion
receives
from
a second-century
support
A.D. papyrus
ofa Greek-Latin
in whichwe
fragment
glossary
(P.Oxy.49.342)3,
find"7txcoatov
'Vocabulum'wasVarro'stranslation
of7cpoar)yopta.
ouoxaouXcopoufji".
I thinkAtherton's
translation
ofStobaeusis wrong,thoughgramNonetheless,
matically
possible.I thinkthetextsaysthat
243

20:17:35 PM

and
The Stoicphilosophers
saythatthese[i.e. theForms]arenon-subsistent,
thatweshareintheconcepts,
theappellatives
whereas
(as theycallthem)obtain
thecases.
Cat. 209 ( = HlserF. 860; notice
theStobaeustextwithSimplicius
Comparing
whichHlseraccepts),
attractive
Mansfeld's
inversion
of'Stoics'and 'Academics',
ofthemessageis:
it seemsclearto me thatthestructure
Men
sharein
concepts
cases
Appellatives obtain
mennorappellatives
Neither
sharein ideas,theStoicssaid,forthereare no such
universal
butthere
areuniversal
toparthings,
quasi-things,
concepts,
corresponding
ticular
statesofmind(9avTaaiai),
to
andtherearequasi-things,
cases,corresponding
words.The relation
between
menina certain
stateofmindandthecorreparticular
is called"sharingin (participation,
a certhatbetween
sponding
concept
iieTex&tv)"
tainappellative
wordand thecorresponding
caseis called"obtaining
(xu-fx^veiv)".
The Platonist
mistake
in conflating
thetwosortsofquasi-entities
consisted
intoone
theidea,in whichbothparticular
statesofmindandparticular
hypostatized
entity,
word-forms
and extra-mental
couldsup(and particular
extra-linguistic
entities)
posedlyparticipate.
theambiguity
On pp. 38IffAtherton
discusses
of"reference"
described
byGalen
and TheonRhetoricus.
in a bad shape,it is not
Galen'stexthas beentransmitted
evenclearwhathisexampleofthistypeofambiguity
is. The oneandonlymshas
0G)v
Thiswaslongagoemended
into<I)ivtohAcov
g)v
cjtv.
d)vtohAcov
eupco.
Galen explainsthatin thisexampleit is unclearereini ttjvfxoxpcov
ucaptv
eireltitoiotov
otov Atcov
axtv
0<ov
Thisseemsto meanthat
vapetai
rjrcXtv.
thereare threepossibleinterpretations,
viz. (1) Dion is and Theonis, (2) Dion is
toseehow
Theon,(3) Theonis Dion.Atherton
pointsoutthatitis difficult
correctly
theexamplecouldhave sense(1). This and otherdifficulties
lead herto accept
of theexampleintoa>vxkAgjv<eaxtxat> 0coveupoi
Sedley'semendation
of removing
is attractive,
but has thedisadvantage
<av>. Sedley'sconjecture
Thisdoes
Galen's"reference"
thatdescribed
from
byTheonRhetoricus.
ambiguity
not botherAtherton
of Theon
too much,and so she rejectsmy emendation
t etc
Rhetoricus'
to rc
Tvacpepeaat
intoa^ioXovyapytve-rat
a^ioXovyapyivexat
t <>va9epTat,
intolinewithGalen'sjatjSrjXouaa
whichwouldbring
hisdescription
the
t (5.t.] BtjXovti
considers
Finally,Atherton
rejecting
ms.) Ircit vapeTOti.
etr'"notclear
t for(jltj
andproposes
SfjXov
SrjXoaoc
StjXovti
(xrj
jxrj
elegant
conjecture
for
Thereis no corresponding
Etre
whether".
Thisproposalcanbe safely
discarded.
Atherton
herelVtoform
a couplewith.Asforherrejection
oftinit <<x>va<pepT0ct,
inadding<ava> , butinthe
thatitdoesnotconsist
p. 391n. 149seemstooverlook
muchmoreinnocent
addition
ofan alpha,changeofto intot and
paleographically
of-aOaiinto-Tat.She also forgets
aboutpaleography
whensheclaims(p. 388) that
v accountsfor the peculiarMS readingeupw." It doesn't.
Sedley'setfpot
theemendation
israther
moreplausible.
toe<ruiv
Besides,Galendoes
Paleographically
notuse theformula
otherexamplesin his sectionon Stoic
ocvto introduce
eupot
whereas
thebarecovtc5ioccursintheimmediately
example.
preceding
ambiguity,
It wasonlytobe expected
witha number
ofthings
thatAtherton
woulddisagree
I havewritten.
meI waswrong,butthatmayonly
failsto convince
She generally
forshedoeshavesomeinteresting
points,as whenshe
provethatI am a stiff-neck,
thanmineof
tries(pp. 419-20)to providea moresatisfactory
interpretation
itsaysthatifwehave
is thatas thetextstands,
Cat.24.13-20.Theproblem
Simplicius
a syllogism
advise
SM MP SP, in whichM is an ambiguous
term,thedialecticians
eachon a different
iftheyaretrue,though
theopponent
tograntthetwopremisses
244

20:17:35 PM

of M' he oughtnot raisehis voicein protestuntilthequestioner

interpretation
transfers
M from
onemeaning
to another;
he oughtto protest
whentheconclusion
is drawn.On thisreadingthetransfer
occursonlywhentheconclusion
is being
butthatmayseemstrange.
Doesn'tthetransfer
takeplacewhenpremiss
two
drawn,
is putforward?
Atherton
triestomakethetextsayjustthatbychoosing
a different
av fxexayr)i)
from
thatselected
reading
(e'co
bytheeditorandaccepted
byme(ecov
She thentranslates
"thedialecticians
recommend
(xexayyrjt).
keeping
quiet,as long
" I am not
as thequestioner
transfers
thewordto another
convinced,
signification.
foritdoesnotstrike
meas plausible
thatSimplicius
sourceofhis)
(oranyimaginable
woulduseG)
av[xexyrii
in thesenseof"as longas... transfers".
It wouldtakesome
toconvert
me.Butatleast,Atherton
hasputherfinger
ona genconvincing
parallels
uineproblem.
Atherton
andI disagree
on onefundamental
issue.I believetheearlyStoicswere
wellacquainted
withAristotle's
andprobably
evenwitha gooddealofthe
thought,
esoteric
influenced
themverymuch,be itoften
in the
works;andI believeAristotle
form
ofproviding
themwithdoctrines
whichtheyfeltmustbe replaced
withbetter
ones.So I ampronetoseesimilarities
between
Aristotelian
andStoicpiecesofdoctrine.
Atherton
showslittle
toacceptpossible
Aristotelian
influence
onthe
willingness
Stoa.A smallexample
ofourdisagreement:
In 1981I suggested
thattheStoicdivision
of sophisms
intofourtypesaccording
to thestatusof theconclusion
(1. false,2.
whatis false,3. non-evident,
4. otherwise
owea debt
resembling
unacceptable)
might
tothefivemetae
ofsophists
thatAristotle
within theElenchi
, viz. A. refutaoperates
C. not-in-accordance-with
belief(rcapaBoov),
D. soloecism,
E.
tion,B. false(hood),
I linked1 toB, 2 toC, and4 toD. Atherton
on p. 432in note15 rejects
nugation.
becausethereis neither
totalisomorphy
noridentity
ofaims
mysuggestion,
partly
between
thetwoclassifications,
andin thissheis right,
ofcourse;butalsobecause
shedoesnotseethesimilarity
I sawbetween
2 andC. Shesays:"paradoxical
does
notmean"resembling
thefalse",as Ebbesenclaims."I neverclaimedthat.What
I didclaimwasa roughcorrespondence
between
andrcapaBoov.
I will
fxotov
<]>eu8et
continue
toclaimthat,forthepointin theAristotelian
to makehis
sophist's
trying
is exactly
to makehimsaysomething
thatlooks
opponent
saysomething
rcapSoov
falseto theaudience,no matter
whatitsrealtruth-value
is. I willnotclaimthatit
follows
thattheStoicswereinfluenced
Elenchi
can, butthepossibility
bytheSophistici
notbe as easilydismissed
as Atherton
thinks.
errors
andmisspellings
arefewandgenerally
notimportant,
Typographical
though
itannoys
a DanetofindOttoJespersen's
namespelt'Jespenorc'.
Thereis one
family
seriouserrorin thelastlineofp. 381 wherea definite
article() has droppedout
before
Aicov.
I findtwo surprising
I mis KarlheinzHlser's
bibliographical
oversights.
monumental
Die Fragmente
zurDialektik
derStoiker
Cannstatt:
I-IV, Stuttgart-Bad
1987-88.On a numberof occasionsAtherton
refersto
Frommann-Holzboog,
Hlser'spre-print
from1982butstrangely
overlooks
thefinaledition,
whichdiffers
from
thepre-print.
a reference,
at least,
significantly
Also,onewouldhaveexpected
toIrneRosier(ed.),L 'ambiguit.
de Lille,
, PressesUniversitaires
Cinqtudes
historiques
1988.
A littlesighat theend.Whenwillstudents
ofancientphilosophy
starttotakethe
MiddleAgesseriously?
Atherton
showshergoodwilla coupleoftimes,
thusbymenthe"obligation
on p. 418. Apparently
shehasmetthe
tioning
game"in a footnote
inC.L. Hamblin'spioneering,
butnowoutdated,
Fallacies
from1970,
phenomenon
towhichsherefers
thereader,addinga reference
toa well-known
paperbyL.M. de
Rijk publishedin thisjournalin 1974. That's unprofessional.
Any studentof
medieval
todo is torefer
toE. StumpandP. Spade's
logicknowsthattheright
thing
in TheCambridge
Medieval
from1982,possibly
Obligations
History
ofLater
Philosophy
sup245

20:17:35 PM

forinstance)
witha reference
to somerecentarticle(byE.J. Ashworth,
plemented
andliterature.
introduce
thereaderto thelatestdiscussions
thatmight
It wouldhavecostMrs
Anda bigsigh!Whenwillscholars
learnto co-operate?
togetintocontact
withhermostrecent
Atherton
no morethana letter
predecessor
havehad
onthebook,I might
inherfieldofstudy.Ifshehaddoneso whileworking
no occasionat all forsighing.
Sten Ebbesen
Copenhagen
1 S. Ebbesen,
A Study
Elenchi.
andCommentaries
onAristotle's
Commentators
ofPostSophistici
in
1-111=
Latinum
Commentariorum
Ancient
andMedieval
onFallacies
Aristotelian
, vols.
Writings
Corpus
Graecorum
VII.1-3,Leiden1981;seevol.I, esp.p. 21-51.
Aristotelem
2 Karlheinz
1987Cannstatt
der
zurDialektik
Stoiker
DieFragmente
I-IV,Stuttgart-Bad
Hlser,
Veterum
88.(SVF= v. Arnim,
Stoicorum
).
Fragmenta
1 Edited
in TheOxyrhynchus
1982,p. 93-5.
XLIX,London
byJ.E.G.Whitehorne
Papyri,
andIslamicPractice
and.Aristotelian
Greek
,
Joep Lameer,Al-Frabi
Syllogistic:
Theory
Leiden-New
York-Kln
(E.J. Brill)1994,xx + 351 p. ISBN 90-04-09884-4.
in being
In general,
thisbookhasitsgoodanditsbad side.Itsgoodsideconsists
a solidpieceofscholarship
in Islamicstudies.Itsbadsideliesinitsclaiming
tooffer
ofthematerial.
Letmebeginwiththegoodside.
analyses
logicalandphilosophical
Thisbookdealswiththesyllogistic
ofAlfarabi,
withspecialattention
paidto his
theuses to whichAlfarabi
Greekand Islamicsources.Lameersurveys
putsthe
and
both assertorie
and modal, in philosophy,
rhetoric,
theology,
syllogistic,
butalsooffers
on therelevant
He notonlycollatesandreports
texts,
jurisprudence.
Lameerdealswithhow
and historical
importance.
analysesof theirphilosophical
forms
ofsyllogisms
and theotherargument
Alfarabi
structure
analyzestheformal
andlegal
inthePrior
treated
, andhowheappliesthemtoIslamictheological
Analytics
reasoning.
Lameerhaswritten
a wellorganized
andclearbook.The chapters
divideup well,
he offers
a summary
at theendofeach.He doesthecrossand,at riskofrepetition,
well.
indices,and citations
referencing,
available
Lameerperforms
theconcernsof Orientalists:
bestwhendiscussing
ofArabicto Greektertherelation
variants,
manuscripts,
possiblesources,textual
He goesonatlength;
andtransmission.
ofeditions,
translations,
minology,
problems
I finditdistracting
in thebodyofthetext.[23ff.;
tohavesomeofthesediscussions
55ff.
; 8Iff.;155ff.;
235ff.]
in thisbook.For
containmostof thevaluablematerial
Still,thesediscussions
and later
was understood
Lameerdiscusseshow'syllogism'
instance,
byAristotle
intoArabic,and understood
Greeklogicians,
and howthenit was translated
by
like
andhispredecessors.
he discusses
thehistory
ofterms
Alfarabi
[42-4]Likewise
and 'hypothetical
syllogism'.
'categorical
syllogism'
[44-7](Lameercallstheformer
thebook.
He has similardiscussions
throughout
'predicative'.)
s
of Alfarabi'
Lameerjudgesthecorrectness
In themidstof thesediscussions,
anddoctrines
aboutthesyllogistic.
distinctions
So, e.g., he claims,whilediscussing
thatAlfarabi
thedistinction
ofdirectandindirect
syllogistic,
proofin thecategorical
thisduetowhat
bothunderthepredicative
"waswrong
whenhesubsumed
syllogism,
between
oftheinterrelation
theadjectives
appearsto be hislackofunderstanding
would
thatAlfarabi
and'direct'inthisspecific
context.'
'predicative'
[54]He admits
areusedinproofs
ofvariousmoods
be ledtodo thisbecausedirectandindirect
proof
Alfarabi's
ofthecategorical
motives,
Still,Lameersays,"But whatever
syllogistic.
246
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:17:35 PM

thecorrect
wouldhavebeentoidentify
thepredicative
withthedirect
interpretation
and subsumethetwo" so thatthesimplesyllogism
has threetypes:
syllogism,
or direct,
indirect
to theimpossible,
and conditional.
predicative
byreduction
[54]
concerns
notekthetic
ofcategorical
butsyllogisms
(Theconditional
proofs
syllogisms,
whosepremises
arehypothetical.
Lameerseemstohaveleftoutekthetic
here,
proofs
hedoesmention
themlater.[67; 75]) LameersaysthatAlfarabi
wasledto
although
thismistakeby following
Alexanderof Aphrodisias,
who uses 'categorical'as
to 'deictic'(ordirectproof).[53]ButAlfarabi
uses'categorical'
alsoas a
equivalent
for'simple,
so thata syllogism
issimpleifithasnomorethantwopremises.
synonym
to sectionII. 3 [44-7].
[44]At thispointLameerrefers
ofthispointmayappeartruncated
andconfusing.
Butmypointis:
Mydiscussion
itis not!Thisis allthedetailthatLameergives.Moreover,
I cannotfindhelpinsectionII. 3. I do notsaythatLameererrs,merely
thatI findhimhardtofollow.
I find
ittortuous
tofindandlayouthisreasoning
formanyofhisevaluative
claims,mostly
due to hisbrevity.
Lameerhasa similar
othersuchclaims.Instances
include
hisclaim
styleinmaking
thatAlfarabimisunderstands
therelationbetweeninduction
and demonstration
differs
frominduction
or imperfect
[151];thatabduction
[168],be it perfect
[172;
169],andalsocannotbe understood
deductively
(as withRoss)orspecially
(as with
commits
a formalfallacy,in takinga proposition
withthe
Peirce);thatAlfarabi
definite
article
as opposedtoparticularly
universally
[188;191]- hereLameerignores
a longtradition
withthePrior
itself
thatdoesthis-; thatAlfarabi
starting
Analytics
takestheological
a posteriori
tobe neither
nordeducargument
abductive,
analogical,
tivebuttobe "an inductive
on thebasisofa, logically
syllogism
speaking,
improper
useofthedefinite
article"[229];thatAlfarabi
is correct
in relating
Islamicjudicial
to therhetorical
reasoning
syllogism
[289],butis wrongin takingit non-modally,
becauseofthepresence
of'ought'[270-5];thatAlfarabi
"mindlessly
lumpstogether"
s account,
differ
ornotthe
that,on Lameer'
typesoflegalreasoning
onlyin whether
is statedexplicitly
orinwheter
themajortermisusedinthesenseused
majorpremise
in theQu'ran[243].All thislooksinteresting,
butleavesme unsatisfied.
AlsoI havedifficulty
in
what
senseLameerisjudgingAlfarabi
not
understanding
to be "correct".Does Alfarabicommita logical(syntactic)
mistake?
Or, is the
mistake
theoretical
thatAlfarabi
has
Or, is themistake
(metalogical)?
philologicalnotfaithfully
Aristotle's
and distinctions?
I do not
reproduced
original
terminology
findLameerclearly
theseissues.Yethestateshisproject
as oneofexaminseparating
borrows
from
andassessing
howhisowntheory
differs
ingofhowAlfarabi
Aristotle,
and faresin comparison,
[xix;99]
and discussion
Thus,I findthatLameerhas muchvaluabletextualmaterial
of
sources.
ButI findhisassessments
andevaluations
ofthismaterial
andtortruncated
I think
thatthisflawstemsfrom
Lameer'smishandling
oflogical
tuous,ifnotflawed.
and philosophical
issues.So thenletme turnto this,thebad side.
To beginwith,I findthesecondary
literature
citedby Lameerto offer
a good
instance
ofwhymanywillfindthisbookfrustrating.
Despitehisownuseofpredicate
structures
inanalyzing
thesyllogistic,
Lameerdoesnotmenlogicandotherformal
tionotherattempts
the
by suchas I. Angelelliand J. Corcoran.In discussing
ofthePrior
andinduction,
hedoesnotmention
theworkofsuch
metatheory
Analytics
asJ. BarnesandR. Smith.In discussing
therelation
ofdialectic
tologic,he failsto
discusstheviewsofG.E.L. Owen,T. Irwinet al. [145-]
One maytakemycomplaints
as merepedanticquibbling.Yet theyaffect
the
substance
ofthebook.BelowI givea pairofexamples;I do notsayso muchthat
Lameerhas wrongconclusions
as thathe does notarriveat themwithadequate
discussion.
foundthecategorical
to have
Thus,Lameerrightly
saysthatAlfarabi
syllogistic
247

20:18:24 PM

into
andinAristotle,
central
distinguishes
syllogisms
placeinsyllogistic
[xvi]Alfarabi
on
andpoetical.LikeAristotle,
he focuses
thedemonstrative,
rhetorical,
sophistical,
arenecessary.
wherethepremises
thedemonstrative,
Yet,Lameernotes,bothAristoLameer
andnotmodalsyllogisms
in demonstration.
usecategorical
tleandAlfarabi
andthemodalsyllogisms
differ
claimsthatthecategorical
being
onlyinthemodality
is
affirmation
attached.
dubious,e.g., becausea contingent
(I findthisclaimitself
to the
can be attached
to itsdenial,and becausethemodality
variously
equivalent
of mixed
Lameerthenis inclinedto admitpropositions
categorical
statement).
hethennotesthatinpractice
intodemonstration,
onlycategorical
although
modality
on the categorical
wereused. He says thatAlfarabiconcentrates
propositions
common
toall [non-hypothetical]
becauseitgivesthestructure
syllogisms.
syllogistic
Lameerthenconcludes:
with
the
...Andthis,
that
hisstatement...
that
thePrior
isconcerned
implies
again,
Analytics
oftheassertorie
in a general,
absolute
to thetheory
sense,canonlyrefer
syllogism
totheexclusion
ofAristotle
modalsyllogisms,
syllogism,
[xvii]
butcontradicts
whatLameerhasjust
notonlydoesnotfollow,
First,thisconclusion
ofthemodalto thecategorical
saidabouttherelation
Second,I suspect
syllogistic.
he wouldnot
ofdemonstration
thatifLameerweremorefamiliar
withthefunction
has
thatdemonstrations
mustincludemodalpremises,
conclude
as,e.g.,M. Ferejohn
and
confirmed
that,forAristotle
byhislaterremark,
argued.I findmysuspicions
theminorto the
Alfarabi
themiddletermin a demonstration
functions
to connect
ofthemajorterm.[223]Formanyofthe
majortermand "ideally"is thedefinition
the
in thePosterior
demonstrations
do nothavethemiddletermdefining
Analytics
minorterm.
Again,I do notsayso muchthatLameeris wrongas that,at best,hisviewsare
so compressed
so as to becomeunintelligible.
I shallnowgivea moreserious,secondexample.In discussing
Alfarabi'
s theory
for
usedbyAlfarabi
ofpredication,
Lameerdistinguishes
threeclassesofexpressions
'P is existent
or
in S', T is saidofS', and 'S is P' (nominal
statements:
categorical
distincverbalinArabic).[89-90]Allthisis fine.ButLameerthenmakes"a formal
themdifferently.
tion"between
class-one
andclass-two
andsymbolizes
expressions,
inpresenting
s
andanalyzing
Alfarabi'
extensively
[90-1]He thenusesthissymbolism
syllogistic.
[99 adfinem
]
I donotseethepointofthissymbolism:
Lameerseemstohavetakena grammatical
a
variation
tohavelogicalsignificance.
he merely
usesittoabbreviate
Or, perhaps,
s texts.Butthenhe offers
oranalysis
thatwill
ofAlfarabi'
no assessment
paraphrase
uses
a logicianor philosopher.
notesthatAlfarabi
satisfy
(So tooLameerregularly
the
whether
variousexpressions
forthesamenotioninAristotle
without
determining
in Ch. 3.)
variation
haslogicalsignificance,
especially
He doesso when
Oddly,Lameerdoesuse modernpredicate
logicoccasionally.
theproof
ofa paradigm,
wherea singular
follows
from
a univerconclusion
analyzing
sal Barbarasyllogism
thatthe
(everyB is C; everyA is B), withtheaddedpremise
minortermappliestoa certain
individual
('s': 's is A'). [196-7]The proofis easyin
andlogicalmachinery.
Anyway,
anycase,anddoesnotrequireso muchexposition
whythendid notLameeruse predicate
logicbefore?(He also uses a versionof
forpredicate
Hypothetical
Syllogism
(withquantifiers)
logic,insteadofusingthe
usualrulesforpredicate
Alfarabi's
statements
logic.)Again,he usesit to present
aboutthefallacies
ofdenying
theantecedent
and affirming
theconsequent.
[220]
NotethatLameerdoesnotusethelatterterminology,
whichis muchclearer;hehas
no needforpredicate
logichere.
So, I claim,thebadsideofthebookliesinitslogicalandphilosophical
pretensions.
andlogicians
canlearnfrom
thebookas a report
ofAlfarabi's
materials,
Philosophers
248

20:18:24 PM

assessment
ofAlfarabi's
in thehistory
butnotas a critical
oflogic.For
significance
I neverdo becomeclearerabouthowAlfarabi
differs
fromAristotle
in hislogical
make logicalprogress.Islamicists
theoryand whetherthesedifferences
may
workofthebook,butwilltooprobably
thetextual
becomeconfused
appreciate
by
theanalyses.
The bookis wellproduced,
withrelatively
fewmistakes,
givenitstypographical
complexities.
[3.24; 143.19;163.11]
itdoesnotpresent
Aristotle's
Thus,I findthetitleofthebookmisleading:
theory
or Al-Farabi's
ofthesyllogistic
extension
and usesofit in sucha waythatwould
a modernlogicianor philosopher.
satisfy
Perhapsthebookhas as its intended
audienceOrientalists,
albeittraditional
ones.Atanyrate,itreadslikea dissertation
inOriental
inneedofa revision
witha broader
focus.Nevertheless,
Lameer's
studies,
bookhaspositive
worth
as a resource
forfurther
studies
ofAlfarabi's
logicanditsrelationto philosophy
and Islamicculture.
Kutztown

Allan Bck

StenEbbesen(ed.),Sprachtheorien
inSptantike
undMittelalter
, Tbingen
(Gunter
Narr)
derSprachtheorie).
1995,408 pp., ISBN 3 87808673 3. (Geschichte
TheimageofGrammar
Martianus
CapellahadpassedontotheMiddleAgeswas
shewasthenurse,andevenmother
oftheLiberalArts.BytheCarolingian
powerful:
herposition
as thestepmother
oftheology,
and from
periodshewas consolidating
thenonuntilabout1500a closesymbiotic
between
relationship
developed
language
and theology.
The forward
to thebookbyPeterSchmitter,
the
study,philosophy
editoroftheseries,andStenEbbesen
's introduction
reflect
thediversity
of
general
from1200to 1500andprovide
a roadmapofthebookandits
languagescholarship
The bodyofthebookhas foursections:
concerns.
on languagetheory
in Biblical
on philosophical
aboutlanguage,
on description
andteaching
of
exegesis,
theorising
andonlanguage
inuse.Thebookcloseswithan indextothepersons
menlanguages,
tionedin thearticles.
wasoften
defined
as a scienceofsigns,thefirst
section
ofthe
Seeingthattheology
bookisconcerned
withtheexploitation
ofancient
It starts
signtheory
bytheologians.
withAugustine.
HansRuefpresents
hisDe dialctica
as a discussion
of
appropriately
thesemantics
ofthelinguistic
wouldrecognise
himself
sign.I expectthatAugustine
and his concerns
withtruthin languageand argument
in theclosephilosophical
ofRuefs discussion,
and he wouldbe flattered.
ButAugustine,
a
argumentation
rhetorician
intheCiceronian
muchofhisdialectic
from
thegame
mould,hadderived
Cicerohad playedin arriving
at a philosophical
rhetoric.
I foundit informative
to
thedialectic
ofthisexcellent
article
withclassicalRomanrhetorical
doccounterpoint
trine
andpractice,
andtoseehowthelegacyAugustine
hadpassedonwashighlighted
bytheexperience.
The otherarticles
in thesectionflownaturally
fromthisAugustinin
beginning.
LuisaValente'
s twoarticles
on languageand twelfth-century
exegesisand theology
showhowthequestion
ofhowonespeaksaboutthedivinehaddeveloped
from
some
scattered
remarks
intoa mystical
withfruitful
amongtheFathers
problem
repercussionsontheintellectual
between
andtheology.
The
relationships
language
disciplines
first
ofthesearticles
themarktherhetorician's
discusses
concern
withsignsandtheir
hadlefton Biblicalexegesis:itis particularly
interpretation
goodon thedistinction
between
rerum
and significatio
verborum
, and on howexegetes
significado
appliedthis
distinction
tothesensus
litteralis
andthesensus
andtoallegory
infactis
etinverbis.
mysticus
Thesecondreflects
thepassagefrom
biblicalexegesis
totheology
andthefurproper,
249
E.J.Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:18:34 PM

ofcertain
ofAlain
ofrhetoric
in thefaceofgrammar.
Valente'
s analysis
therretreat
to theparadoxat theheartofthesermo
bearswitness
de Lille'srulesoftheology
wasanalysed
in grammatical
terms
: God'slackofsubjection
to grammar
theologicus
bydialecticians.
sharpened
The finalarticle
DahanonGenesis2.19- 20,dealswithoneofthe
inthesection,
ofnames.InGenesis2 Godparadestheanimals
of
mostfamous
examples assignment
suis(by
in front
ofAdamso thathe cannamethem,andAdamcallsthemnominibus
in interaccountoftheproblems
involved
theirownnames).Dahan's wide-ranging
oforigin
oflanguage,
raisesthequestions
Adam'sactofimpositio
etymology,
preting
or
abstract
andthenatureofnames,whether
thenatureorconvention
controversy,
notunlikely
Dahan also raisesthequestionofpossible
concrete.
Jewishinfluence,
cordialrelacommunities
in Europeandsomerelatively
giventheimportant
Jewish
on thehistory
ofthis
andJewish
His conclusions
tionsbetween
Christian
scholars.
but it is clearfromhis accountthatBiblical
dilemmaare necessarily
tentative;
workon languagewithkidgloves,andthattheydo
handledcontemporary
exegetes
modelofanalysis
thatcouldhandlethis
senseofa coherent
notseemtohaveanyfirm
setofcircumstances.
exceptional
Itopenswitha second
Thesecondsection
oflanguage
behaviour.
dealswithmodels
the
thistimebyKlausJacobi,ofthebasicproblem
ofresetverba
treatment,
, butfrom
As KlausJacobiseesit,the
ofhowa termrepresents
instrumental
reality.
question
between
wordandthingwasgivennewurgency
bythe
questionoftherelationship
roleofBiblicalexegesis
thatwasabandoning
itstraditional
ofa theology
development
andbecoming
speculative.
Thoughthenexusbetween
languagestudyandtheology
thestarplayers
anddeveloped
hadbeenpioneered
byBoethius
byPseudo-Dionysius,
twoofthemoriginal
inthisarticle
arePeterAbelard,
Anselm
andGilbertus
Porreta:
howmany
Jacobishowsconvincingly
enoughto havefallenfouloftheauthorities.
wererootedin the
grammatica
speculativa
productive
aspectsof thirteenth-century
in
fromPriscianand the progression
need to rethink
definitions
theologians'
- intellectus
- verbum
worksof
s sequence,res
Boethius'
throughnewlydiscovered
hasa certain
aboutit,which
Forwheretheresis God,theverbum
Aristotle.
unreality
ofaction.
ifthemindis alloweda certain
freedom
can onlybe resolved
ondifferent
thebookpassestoMarySirridge
FromJacobi'sfocusonterms
percepinRobertKilwardy
andJohnofDenmark.
Sheplays
tionsoftheobjectofgrammar
in thecharacterisation
offKilwardby's
threeelements
ofa science:subject,
purpose
thequestions
askedby
and definition
between
parallels
againstilluminating
(finis),
convenandthirteenth-century
aboutuniversais,
bothmodern
grammarians
linguists
andJohnof Denmark
Her discussion
of RobertKilwardby
tionand knowledge.
ofrevered
authorities
couldbe,even
showsinironicdetailhowdiverse
interpretations
thesignificative
and
and Boethius.
ifthoseauthorities
wereAristotle
By focussing
as
as thesubject
ofgrammar,
communicative
Kilwardby
emerges
aspectoflanguage
whois
intentionnaliste
whatIrneRosiercallsungrammarien
, whileJohnofDenmark
invariant
context-free
formalist.
Giventhedifrules,is extremely
definitely
seeking
in theagesandsphereofinfluence
ofthetwomen,I wouldseea generation
ference
andChomsky.
Is thisdebatebetween
sayHockett
gapherenotunlikethatbetween
modelsofgrammar
thefinalparallel
between
themidandformalist
semi-pragmatic
and theearlydaysof Transformational-Generative
dle of thethirteenth
century
Grammar?
betweenressignificata
and modus
The usefuland pithysketchof thedistinction
articlebyIrneRosieragaintakesus backto
thatbeginsthefollowing
significant
how
Boethius.RosiercarriesValente'sstoryintothethirteenth
century,
showing
Albertus
of Hales, Bonaventure,
Alexander
Magnusand Aquinasappliednormal
theinsights
ofthe
anddeveloped
to an abnormal
situation
techniques
philosophical
inDonatusandPrismodified
realist
ofterms
intoa coherent
twelfth
exegesis
century
250

20:18:34 PM

cian.Bythenatureofthings
shedoesnotcarrythestory
beyondthe1280s:neither
ofgrammarians,
a telling
is there
treatment
muchdirect
pointwhichshows
justhow
awareand innovative
our theologians
were.Particularly
whenthe
grammatically
inPart1, thecasefortaking
s twoarticles
hasbeenprepared
modus
ground
byValente'
as beingadoptedby grammar
fromtheology
insteadoftheotherway
significant
roundis considerably
bythisarticle.
strengthened
of the roleof pragmatics
The nextarticle,Marmo'sfruitful
in
investigation
modistic
illustration
ofhowa modelofanalysis
theory,
givesthereaderan excellent
bothopensup thedataandclosesit. The medieval
situation
Marmodescribes
has
ironicparallels
withthecontext-free
treatment
oflanguagebygenerative
grammar.
Becausethephysical
modelofmatter
and formfocussed
on theword,its
attention
anditslinguistic
bothmodistae
andgenerativists
founditdifficult
genesis
operations,
toprogress
thesentence
totheutterance
andtofinda placein theirthinking
beyond
forcommunicative
intentand interpretation.
In tracing
thecontroversial
placeof
in languagetheory
fromthefirstgeneration
ofmodistae
pragmatics
up to Scotus,
Marmodiscusses
on theformalisation
oflanguage
perennial
problems
consequent
modelsofgeneration.
To methemostinteresting
theory
philosophical
through
aspect
of thisarticleis treating
as an aspectof semiotics,
and in particular
pragmatics
Marmo'sfinalcomparison
oftheearlymodistae
totherecent
ofUmberto
Eco,
position
who has abandonedany divisionbetweensemantics
and pragmatics.
Did the
sacramental
beforethemodistae
assumethatpragmatic
considerations
theologians
werean essential
partoftheirtheorising?
All ofthisappearsverydifferently
in ClaudePanaccioon WilliamofOckham.
Panacciois at painstopointoutthatOckhamwasnota grammarian,
buta logician
andtheologian
whotreated
theauthority
ofBoethius
andAugustine
verydifferently
from
hismoderate
realistpredecessors
and rivals.Without
thegameoffinplaying
and philosophers,
PanacciogivesOckhama
dingparallels
amongmodern
linguists
modern
Ockham'
s viewoftheAugustinin
mentis
air,forexample
surprisingly
lingua
as a structure
ofperception
andconception
withitsownsemantic
and grammatical
ofl'arbitraire
dusigne
and itsintentionality;
and
rules;theunquestioning
acceptance
thecontextualist
viewofsuppositio.
Allthismakesforoneofthebestdescriptions
of
thecontentious
I haveseen.
pointsofnominalist
languagetheory
The worldoffifteenth-century
nominalism
had itslikenesses
withthethirteenth
- itsAristotelian
itsreliance
ontraditional
handbooks
liketheDoctraditions,
century
trinale
andtheological
element.
Thiswasa transitional
',anditsstrong
religious
period
between
theMiddleAgesand theRenaissance.
All thesethemescometogether
in
Kaczmarek's
article
on GabrielBielandFlorentius
Diel,twoprominent
Heidelberg
activein logicandgrammar.
Formeas a newcomer
to thisperiod,two
theologians
markKaczmarek's
article:itssenseoftheintellectual
turmoil
oftheperiod,
things
anditscareful
ofthegrammatical
handbooks
written
description
byourtwoauthors.
Theessentially
focusofthisarticle
isenriched
tofigures
who
synchronic
byreferences
likePierred'AillyandJeanGerson,and thosehumanists
builtthetradition,
like
AldusManutiuswhofinally
replacedit. Thoughthespaceof thearticleand the
richness
ofthematerial
allowforlittlemorethanrefined
thisis an
name-dropping,
excellent
introduction
toan important
periodinlatemedieval
languagescholarship.
Thedevelopments
detailed
inthefirst
twosections
ofthebookfollowed
thegradual
oftheDonatus
Institutiones
as an advanced
supplanting
byPriscian's
major
grammaticae
text.The thirdsectionopenswithKneepkens's
articleon thefortunes
of
grammar
thesixthtothefifteenth
Priscian
from
centuries.
Thischapter
is nota merechronoaccount
ofthegradualtransformation
ofPriscian
from
a classical
logy,buta coherent
schoolgrammarian
intoa fountainhead
ofintellectual
a universal
Master
authority,
on bothlogicand theology.
withinfluence
theauthority
thatwascopied,
Priscian,
and industriously
commented
on probablywouldhave been almost
epitomised
251

20:18:34 PM

toPriscian's
The readershouldponderthestingin
unrecognisable
contemporaries.
thetailof thisarticle:Kneepkens
writesthat' 'Priscian'sdeficiencies
contributed
tohissuccessin theMiddleAges".A pitythisis notfurther
but
elaborated,
highly
ancientand modern,
it is a perceptive
remark
besides
thatappliesto manyothers,
Priscian.
Thischapter
leadsnaturally
intothequestions
ofteaching
andtranslation,
notonly
This
of Latin,butalso ofGreek,Hebrew,Arabicand theEuropeanvernaculars.
hasthreeauthors.
oftheLatin
The first
chapter
partbyLuisaValente,a discussion
West'ssensethatLatinlackedthepowersofGreek,Hebrewand Arab,bringsto
mindCicero'slamentaboutthepatrii
sermonis
Heraccountofthefoundation
egestas.
ofthestudia
meverymuchofthesuddeninterest
reminds
theSecond
linguarum
during
Dahan's sectionofthischapter
WorldWar in foreign
doesan
languageteaching.
excellent
translation
as a cultural
andadministrative
He gives
job ofsituating
activity.
whichallowsthe
us a nicemixbetweenpractitioners
and would-betheoreticians
ofPisaagainst
readertobalancetranslators
likeBurgundio
likeAquinas
philosophers
whoweretrying
oftheory
inage-oldprinciples
tofindsomebeginnings
andin their
onvernacular
wascontributed
ownobservation.
Thelastsection,
byIrne
grammars,
Rosier.Shedemonstrates
thatsuchgrammatical
is usually
ledbytheneeds
analysis
oftheclassroom;
and thattheclassroom
froman ill-defined
mix
getsitsmotivation
of socialimperatives.
Full as its accounting
is, thisexcellent
chaptercouldhave
in modern
benefited
fromincorporating
someoftheframeworks
sociolcustomary
CharlesFerguson's
nowclassical
workondiglossia
attention
onthe
focussed
inguistics.
Latin,thestandardised
shapesand usagesof bilingualism:
language,obviously
work,
playedthepartofhighlanguagetothelowvernaculars.
Amongmorerecent
thereis MarkAmsler'son thesociolinguistic
between
Latin,theverrelationships
nacularsand foreign
languages.
The lastsection
ofthebookfocusses
itsattention
onlanguageinuse.KarinFredofthetheunityand coherence
ofthetrivium
as it was in the
borg's investigation
twelfth
worksfrom
accounts
ofcurricula,
student
reactions
to
century
contemporary
their
accounts
ofindividual
andinterdisciplinary
intextdiscussions
studies,
masters,
books.Nobodywhohasevertaught
shouldbe surprised
thatthisarticleis a record
ofaspirations
thanachievement.
rather
Interdisciplinarity
mayhavebeena valued
itwasnotfully
norcoulditbe. The article
achieved,
goal,buton theevidence
rings
verytrue,and shouldbe readnotonlyforthefineaccountit givesofelementary
taleaboutlongdeadcolleagues.
schools,butalsoas a cautionary
Giventhethrust
of Fredborg's
thatrhetoric
article,I am notsurprised
playsa
ratherequivocalpartin thenext,Morenzoni's
articleon theartes
, an
praedicandi
accountofthemedievalpassionforsystmatisation.
He impliesa certaindivided
inthewriters
oftheartes
whichrecallssomeofthetwelfth-century
difficulties
loyalty
withbalancing
Priscian
andtheology.
isa bodyofpastoral
On onehandthere
precept
andexamplegoingbacktoAugustine
atleast;ontheothertheRhetorica
vetus
, neither
of themtheoretical
in tone.The notinconsiderable
of Morenzoni's
achievement
accountis thelayingoffoundations
forfurther
interesting
study.It leavesa large
numberof questionsto be answered.Whatwas the targetreadership
of these
manuals?Howdidthisfitintothetraining
oftheclergy,
suchas itwas?Werethey
reallymeantfortheparishpriest?
Liketheprevious
writers
showsthattheMiddleAgeswasan age of
Friis-Jensen
whoveryobstinately
remadethepastin theirown image.I doubt
popularisers
whether
Horacewouldrecognise
in thisexcellent
himself
oftheHoratian
discussion
Here we are offered
an accountof how medieval
poetsof the twelfth
century.
- whowerenotshyin demonstrating
theoreticians
theirownpoeticcompetence
withHorace'sseeming
lackoforderandmadea teacher
cametoterms
ofhim.The
oftheinterplay
between
Horace'sArspotica
on it,and
, thecommentaries
picture
252

20:18:34 PM

medieval
is a veryfullone,withmanycasualreferences
tothemixedclassical
poetics
andmedieval
ofthetwelfth
background
typical
century.
Thisis mostemphatically
nota bookaboutgrammar,
butoneaboutthelanguage
- it
of theMiddleAges.The majorthrust
of thebookis theological
scholarship
s
dictum
that
he
who
would
medieval
must
exemplifies
Jacobi'
study
grammar proceedthrough
themedieval
textsontheology
andChristology
theCarol(p. 82). After
couldbe calledan appliedlinguistics,
and theadventof
ingianperiod,theology
dialectic
overtheeleventh
andtwelfth
subordinated
andredirected
the
century
merely
- itdidnoteliminate
them.Diverseas thisbookis,itis
linguistic
aspectsofenquiry
unified
aroundtwothemes
we can expressas questions
fromMichelFoucault:the
archive
medieval
andthequestions
askedofbotharchive
study
language
presupposes,
and material
investigated.
from
whichcamebasicideasandattitudes.
It beginswith
First,thearchive
itself,
theBible:whichis bothobjectofstudyanda studyhandbook.
After
theBibleranks
in particular
theDe dialctica
and De doctrina
Christiana.
After1100his
Augustine,
discussions
on languagewereoftenhiddenbehindBoethius
and Pseudo-Dionysius.
- ofwhomthe
Thesecularpartofthearchive
wasmadeup ofLatinclassicalauthors
mostimportant
wereCicero,Ovidand Vergiland,forourpurposes,
Horace,the
Donatusand Priscian,
and theLatinversions
ofPlatoand Aristotle.
grammarians
Archives
areneverstatic:thisbookdemonstrates
howthearchive
toinclude
expanded
suchas Alainde Lille,Gilbert
ofPoitiers,
ofOckham,toname
AquinasandWilliam
here.Andwithdiversity
inthearchive
camediversity
onlysomeofthoseprominent
in theory.
Second,thequestionsasked,thatis the balanceachievedbetweenanalytical
andarchive.
In thematter
oflanguageanalysis
thebookdoesnotpaymuch
problem
directattention
to therelationship
between
and language.Eventhough
philosophy
itis stillfruitful,
thisquestion
hasbeenwellworked
overthelastseventy
years.But
theLatintranslations
of Pseudo-Dionysius
had set beforetheMiddleAges the
andthatdoesnotprevent
humansfrom
to
paradoxthatGodwasineffable,
speaking
himorabouthim.Thefirst
twosections
ofthebookshowhowthemedievais
setabout
thereligious
andsecularpartsofthearchivein orderto settlethisbasic
reconciling
As we see,evenwherethesecularscienceofgrammar
is bentbysuchas
problem.
Alainde Lille,theintellectual
ofthemedieval
scholar
demanded
thatthebenprobity
ofgrammar.
Hencetheexploitation
andanalysis
dingbe analysable
bytheprinciples
ofPriscian's
ofthenounbyGilbert
definition
ofPoitiers
andAlainde Lille'sdistinctionbetween
theexistential
and copulative
usesoftheverbesse.Theseinstances,
withRosier'
s case-study
of theevolution
of themodus
together
, which
significandi
termundertheprompting
ofdialectic,
that
beganas a theological
amplyconfirm
essentialaspectsof medievallanguagetheorydevelopedoutsidegrammar.
Such
didnotremainconfined
to theology.
The consequence
essential
tous
developments
wasthatgrammar
wasseton theroadtobecoming
a sciencein thestrict
thirteenthterms.
It seemsclearthatthetheologian's
withthemechanisms
of
century
problems
in thematter
ofGod,brought
a much-needed
to
signification,
particulary
elasticity
theRealistdoctrines
ofmeaningtakenliterally
fromAristotle.
Andin return,
the
of the thirteenth
further
to theological
perfected
grammar
centurycontributed
analysis.
is atthecentre
ofthelastsection
ofthebook,itwastheCinderella
Thoughrhetoric
ofmedieval
intellectual
howmuchourconcentration
on
life,orso itseems.I wonder
rather
thanpractical
ofmedieval
distorts
thepicphilosophical
aspects
language
study
ture.Apartfromthe flourishing
art of poeticsand the ratherambiguousartes
described
likeHenrid'Andeli'sLa bataille
des
here,contemporary
praedicandi
evidence,
arts
a littlemoreinterdisciplinary
turmoil
thanwehavebeenled
, wouldindicate
sept
toexpect.Thisbookimpliesthatrhetoric
wastheghostat thefeast,particularly
in
253

20:18:34 PM

inwhichtheclassicalcopiarerum
etverborum
is thebasisofa lotoftheorising
theology
ofHalesearlyinthethirteenth
andmodel-building:
Alexander
centake,forinstance,
and enlarged
tury.The archivewas maintained
by themedievalmaniaforcommented
texts.One oftheimportant
lessonsthisbookhas to teachis thatevolution
intheory
Partandparcelofcomcomethrough
theintegumento,
andthecommentary.
makeit abundantly
ofauthorities.
Allofourauthors
is theinterpretation
mentary
interunanimous
clearthatcanonicity
ofa textisnoguarantee
thatitwillbeaccorded
evoluwouldcertainly
haveprecluded
Indeed,unanimous
interpretation
pretation.
werealtered
tionoftheory,
andthevaluesplacedonpartsofthearchive
bytheinterit was madeto bear.On thisissuetherewouldhavebeenconsiderable
pretation
on theworkofliterary
sourcesby drawing
advantagein amplifying
philosophical
andsociety,
likeA.J.MinnisandJacques
scholars
andhistorians
ofmedieval
learning
Le Goff.A pitythatthereis so muchacademicwriting
thesedaysthatonetendsto
ofthebibliographies.
one'sownorbit.YetI canonlyadmiretherichness
staywithin
I feelthe
ofindexes:difficult
as itis tocompile,
Myonlyotherquibbleis thematter
absenceofa subjectindex.
of
In essencethebookis an accounting
of wherewe standin our knowledge
of
I am notsurethatthethrust
medieval
anditsramifications.
languagescholarship
: one of its
thebookdemandsan introduction
speculativa
foregrounding
grammatica
academiclife.
inmedieval
is thesenseitgivesofpeopleandargument
majorvirtues
intellectual
toapproach
theMiddleAgesas iftheir
Itisa reminder
thatitisdangerous
as ours.The
and academiclifeoperatedwithinthesame compartmentalisation
floweasily,and
itsthemes
musthavetakenmuchthought:
sequenceofthearticles
it givesan excellent
studyof language
pictureof diverseand interdisciplinary
It turnsthereader'sattention
and faculty
boundaries.
away
discipline
transcending
in
fromgrammar
tolanguage.In all a bookthatplacesmedieval
languagetheories
perspective.
References
Middle
andDiscourse
inLateAntiquity
andtheEarly
Mark.1989Etymology
Amsler,
Ages.
Ben44. Amsterdam/Philadelphia:
intheHistory
Sciences
Studies
oftheLanguage
jamins.
Charles.A., Diglossia
, in: Word,15 (1959)325-40.
Ferguson,
L.G. Kelly

Ottawa

Pronomina.
scholastischer
C. Reinhard
Hlsen,ZurSemantik
Untersuchungen
anaphorischer
&moderner
Theorien
York-Kln
, Leiden-New
(E J. Brill)1994,xii + 470S. ISBN
Bd. 41).
desMittelalters
90 04098321(Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
Es gibtphilosophische
die aufdenerstenBlickgarnichtals Probleme
Probleme,
die
scheinen.
Zu diesenProblemen
werdenoderirrelevant
gehrt
wahrgenommen
Dennfragt
Pronomina.
man,wie
Verwendung
anaphorischer
( = rckbezglicher)
allen
Buchgeschrieben;
im Satz 'C.R. Hlsenhat ein spannendes
beispielsweise
'es' verwendet
Lesernistes zu empfehlen'
dasPronomen
interessierten
wird,scheint
ausreiner
dasPronomen
zu sein:Wirverwenden
zunchst
dieAntwort
ganzeinfach
nichtwiederholen
aufdeneszurckverweist,
weilwirdenAusdruck,
Bequemlichkeit,
Ausdruck
durchdenvorangehenden
kannaberjederzeit
wollen.Das Pronomen
(das
sie
hateinelangeTradition;
ersetzt
werden.EinesolcheAntwort
sog.Antezedens)
Grammatikbundwirdauchinmodernen
findet
sichinderPortRoyalGrammatik
ist.
chernzitiert.
DochdieProbeaufsExempelzeigt,da dieAntwort
unzulnglich
254
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:18:34 PM

alleninteresBuchgeschrieben;
Wennwirnmlich
'C.R. Hlsenhateinspannendes
Buchzu empfehlen'
sierten
Lesernisteinspannendes
sagen,istnichtklar,daallen
interessierten
LeserngenaujenesBuchzu empfehlen
ist,das C.R. Hlsengeschriebenhat,undnichtirgendein
Buch.Obwohl'es' aufeinenbestimmten
spannendes
nichteinfach
durchdiesen
Ausdruck
istdasPronomen
offensichtlich
zurckverweist,
Pronomens
zu
Ausdruck
ersetzbar.
WieistdanndieVerwendung
desanaphorischen
referiert
es?Was
verstehen?
Hates einereferierende
undwennja, worauf
Funktion,
sichbei nherer
als einernstzu
zunchst
schien,erweist
ganzeinfach
Betrachtung
undderphilosophischen
nehmendes
Problem
derGrammatik
Semantik.
Buch(esistinderTat alleninteressierten
C.R. Hlsenzeigtinseinem
spannenden
Lesernzu empfehlen!),
da die mittelalterlichen
dieses
LogikerundGrammatiker
Problem
erkannten
undscharfsinnige
anboten.
Hlsenbeschrnkt
sichaber
Analysen
nicht
diescholastischen
diemeistens
unterdemStichwort
darauf,
Debatten,
suppositio
Er rekonstruiert
relativorum
aufzuarbeiten.
wurden,historisch-philologisch
gefhrt
dieseDebattenuntersystematischen
indemer sie mitmodernen
Gesichtspunkten,
Positionen
undkritisch
(vorallemmitjenenvonP. GeachundG. Evans)vergleicht
Die Verbindung
auswertet.
vonhistorischem
undsystematischem
Ansatz,dieja stets
einmethodisches
Risikodarstellt,
mirsehrgeglckt
scheint
zu sein.Sie gelingt
dem
Autorvorallemdurchzweimethodische
Schachzge:
Einerseits
HlsenderGefahr
einerberstrzten
scholastientgeht
Modernisierung
scherTheorien,
indemer sorgfltig
denspezifisch
mittelalterlichen
Diskussionskontextaufarbeitet
unddieTexteindiesemKontext
Imersten
situiert.
Kapitelskizziert
erdas Verhltnis
vonLogik,Sprachphilosophie
undGrammatik,
wobeier sichvor
allemaufAutoren
des 13.Jhs.konzentriert.
Im zweitenKapitelanalysiert
er den
desPronomens
undgehtdafraufdieGrundlagen
dersptantiken
GrammaBegriff
tikzurck.Imvierten
erdieverschiedenen
scholastischen
BestimKapiteluntersucht
und bercksichtigt
dafrTextederGrammatik
mungendes relativum
grammaticale
ebensowiesolchederlogischen
Tradition.
Da dieent(insbesondere
terministischen)
scheidende
Funktion
einrelativum
hat(und
Fragedaraufabzielt,welchesemantische
einrelativum
istwohlgemerkt
nichteinfach
einRelativpronomen,
wiederAutorbersondern
derrelativisch
aufanderes
verweist
bzw.
nachweist,
zeugend
jederAusdruck,
inErinnerung
bissiebenausfhrlich
anderes
ruft),
gehtHlsenindenKapitelnfnf
aufdie Suppositionslehre
Von diesenKapitelnmit
ein,die dieseFragebehandelt.
Charakter
methodisch
saubergetrennt
istdasdritte
berwiegend
exegetischem
KapiAnstzezurAnalyseanaphorischer
Pronomina
wertel,indemmoderne
dargestellt
achteKapitel,das die mittelalterlichen
undmodernen
den,sowiedas abschlieende
Anstzein Verbindung
bringt.
Andererseits
Hlsenaber auch der Gefahr,die mittelalterlichen
und
entgeht
modernen
Diskussionen
einfach
nebeneinander
zu stellen,
indem
zusammenhanglos
erindenexegetischen
immer
wieder
Parallelen
zwischen
denbeidenDiskusKapiteln
er im erstenKapitel,da der moderne
sionskontexten
aufzeigt.So verdeutlicht
Grammatiker
Cook-Wilson
ebensowieRobertKilwardby
undSigervonBrabant
die
Grammatik
"intellektualisiert"
dasichdieGrammatik
(S. 18),indemerbehauptet,
nichteinfach
mitWrtern
oderWortklassen
mitsprachlichen
sondern
beschftigt,
desDenkens.Oderimzweiten
Symbolen
Kapitelweisternach,da sichinderanoArsLaureshamensis
ebensowiebeimodernen
Grammatikern
undSemantikern
nymen
dieAuffassung
wrden
zurVermeidung
Pronomina
vonWiederholungen
verfindet,
wendet
wirdaufanschauliche
da
Weisedeutlich,
(S. 63ff).DurchdieseVergleiche
sichmittelalterliche
undmoderne
Autoren
trotzterminologischer
mit
Divergenzen
denselbenProblemen
und teilweiseauch zu hnlichenLsungen
beschftigten
gelangten.
Die umfangreiche
nebeneinerkonzisen
Studieenthlt
vonBekanntem
Darstellung
auchzahlreiche
Elemente.
Ichbeschrnke
michdarauf,
aufjeneaufmerkinnovative
samzu machen,
die miram bedeutsamsten
scheinen.
255

20:18:39 PM

da einederoriginellsten
istHlsensNachweis,
In historischer
innovativ
Hinsicht
von
Pronomina
deranaphorischen
mittelalterlichen
und einflureichsten
Analysen
ein
In seiner"universellen"
Buridanstammt.
Buridan,
behauptet
Regel(S. 220ff.)
nurfr
sondern
stehenichtfralle Suppositades Antezedens,
solchesPronomen
heit
wird.Konkret
verifiziert
steht,
jene,frdiederTeilsatz,indemdasAntezedens
es istalleninteressierten
Buchgeschrieben;
dies:In 'R.C. Hlsenhateinspannendes
nur
sondern
'es' nichtfrallespannenden
Lesernzu empfehlen'
Bcher,
supponiert
wahr
Buchgeschrieben'
frjenes,dasdenTeilsatz'R.C. Hlsenhateinspannendes
macht.DerAutorweistnach,dadieseuniverselle
RegelinParisundindenmittewurde.Im ausfhrlichen
Wien
und
Universitten
rege
rezipiert
Prag
leuropischen
ausdiesemMilieu(Wende14./15.Jh.)
TextevonAutoren
druckt
erfnf
Appendix
da die
ab. Damitbelegter berzeugend,
in Editionund deutscher
bersetzung
- wieein
DebattennachOckhamundBuridankeineswegs
sprachphilosophischen
- erlahmten
odersichinRepetitionen
weitverbreitetes
Vorurteil
erschpfnahelegt
Autoren
ten.Es istzu hoffen,
dadievonHlsenbercksichtigten
Berwart,
(Bernard
werden.
erforscht
undzweiAnonymi)
nochweiter
HugoKym,LudolfLeistermann
Ansatz
da Buridans
Hinsicht
bedeutsam
istHlsensNachweis,
In systematischer
besitzt.NachAktualitt
Pronomina-Theorien
dergegenwrtigen
auchimKontext
dieTheorieentwickelt
demP. Geachindenfrhen
hatte,da Prosechziger
Jahren
haben(S. 78undkeineReferenz
Variablenfunktionieren
nominawiegebundene
Koreferenztheorie
diesogenannte
G. Evansindensiebziger
Jahren
81),rehabilitierte
Pronomina
E-Pronomina)
(in Evans'Terminologie:
(S. 81-87).Auchanaphorische
diedenSatz,indemseinAntezeundzwaraufdiejenigen
referieren,
Gegenstnde,
mit
hnlichkeit
weisteineverblffende
DieseErklrung
verifizieren.
densvorliegt,
universeller
Buridans
Regelauf,undHlsennenntBuridandaherzu Recht(wenn
Evans"
desOxforder
einen"PariserVorlufer
auchmiteinigenEinschrnkungen)
(S. 220).
auchdieseseinigePunkte,die zu
Buchenthlt
innovative
Wiejedes anregende,
ehergrundstzliAnlageben.Einerster,
oderkritischen
Bemerkungen
ergnzenden
derBezeichnung
unddenStellenwert
die Funktion
cherPunktbetrifft
).
(significatio
ihrerEntaufdieSuppositionslehre
Hlsengehtzwarausfhrlich
ein,einschlielich
die Bezeichnungslehre
aber nur kursorisch
behandelt
(einige
stehungsgeschichte,
zu sein,weilnichtklar
mirproblematisch
S. 134-139).Dies scheint
Ausfhrungen
Hlist.AufS. 139schreibt
Relation
dieBezeichnung
wird,wasfreinesemantische
eine"prides14.Jhs.seisignificatio
undanderen
Buridan
sen,beiOckham,
Logikern
zu verererklrt
abernicht,
wiedieseBeziehung
mrgegenstndliche
Beziehung",
auch
zurSupposition
oderDenotation
stehenist.Istsieals Referenz
(imGegensatz
Wohlkaum,wieHlsen
zu verstehen?
auerhalb
einespropositionalen
Kontextes)
DieseFragebleibt,
Aberwieistsiedannzu verstehen?
aufS. 115zu Rechtfesthlt.
zu
mirabervonzentraler
Sie scheint
so weitichsehe,unbeantwortet.
Bedeutung
- kannnurdanneinepersonale
- auchein Pronomen
sein.DenneinAusdruck
hat.1AlsomuzurBeantwortung
haben,wenneraucheineBezeichnung
Supposition
dieFragegeklrt
derFrage,wieeinPronomen
kann,zunchst
personal
supponieren
dieserFrage
bezeichnen
kann.Und zur Beantwortung
werden,wie es berhaupt
mssendie erkenntnistheoretisch-psychologischen
Aspekteder Bezeichnungslehre
hatinderTat eine"gegenderetwasbezeichnet,
EinAusdruck,
werden:
analysiert
in einer
stndliche
Beziehung"zu etwas,aber nur weil der Sprachverwender
mu
steht.Das heit,derSprachverwender
zu demBezeichneten
Erkenntnisrelation
vomBezeichneten
odereinenBegriff
einementale
haben,andernfalls
Vorstellung
Dies
herstellen.2
kanner mitdemAusdruck
Beziehung
garkeinegegenstndliche
zu
entscheidend
vonPronomina
aufdieVerwendung
mirauchimHinblick
scheint
dieSupposition
sein.Dieseknnen
erstdannfretwassupponieren
(wieauchimmer
vondemgebildet
zuersteineVorstellung
erklrt
wird),wennderSprachverwender
256

20:18:39 PM

dasPronomen
ist
soll.UndfrdieBildung
einerVorstellung
hat,wofr
supponieren
einErkenntnisproze
erforderlich.
Einezweitekritische
betrifft
HlsensInterpretation
dermodisignifiBemerkung
candi.Er wendetsichzu Rechtgegendie Auffassung,
dieseModi seienmitFreges
Sinnidentisch,
dannaber:"Die modi
habensomitmehrmitder
behauptet
significandi
erlernbaren
einesAusdrucks,
mitderkonstanten
zu
Bedeutung
Anwendungsregel
tun."(S. 55-6)DieseErklrung
halteichimHinblick
aufdie Modisten
des spten
13.Jhs.frwenighilfreich.
ImRahmenihresModellshabendiemodi
eher
significandi
etwasmitdenmodi
essendi
zu tun:Zwischen
bezeichnenden
Ausdrcken
undbezeichnetenGegenstnden
besteht
einederartige
dajedemmodus
Ubereinstimmung,
signiaucheinbestimmter
modus
essendi
Die LehrevondenBezeichnungsficandi
entspricht.
modigehtdahernichtvon sprachpragmatischen
hinsichtlich
der
berlegungen
erlernbaren
von metaphysischen
Annahmen.
Bedeutungaus, sondernvielmehr
so lautetderGrundtenor
dieserAnnahmen,
kannetwas
JedemBezeichnungsmodus,
in derbezeichneten
Sacheselbstzugeordnet
werden.3
Meinedritte
diesicheheraufdie Sacheselbstals aufHlsensInterBemerkung,
betrifft
derdemonstratio
das Problem
ad intellectum.
DiesesProblem
bezieht,
pretation
beziehtmansichmiteinemPronomen,
wenn
gehtvonfolgender
Frageaus: Worauf
derGegenstand,
aufdenmansichbeziehenmchte,
garnichtmehrwahrnehmbar
istodersogarnichtmehrexistiert?
EineAntwort,
dieThomasvonErfurt
undandere
mittelalterliche
Autoren
In einemsolchen
geben(S. 35-41),lautetfolgendermaen:
Fallbeziehtmansichlediglich
aufeinengemeinten
nichtetwaaufeinen
Gegenstand,
unmittelbar
DocheinesolcheLsungscheint
mirunbefriediprsenten
Gegenstand.
manmitihrdasProblem
derleerenReferenz,
wieHlgendzu sein.Zwarvermeidet
senkorrekt
bemerkt
aberdafrhandelt
mansichdasnichtweniger
tcken(S. 36ff.),
reicheProblem
zweiArtenvonGegenstnden
unterscheiden
ein,da manzwischen
mu.Dennwasistderblogemeinte
imGegensatz
zumwahrgenommeGegenstand
EinGegenstand
miteinerbesonderen
intentionalen
Existenz?
Und
nen,prsenten?
wieverhlt
sichdiesebesondere
zurrealenExistenz?
Existenz
Die regenDiskussionen
zumesseintentionale
imfrhen
14.Jh.(besonders
beiOckhamundAdamWodeham)
eines"gemeinten"
einenRattenschwanz
zeigen,da die Einfhrung
Gegenstandes
vonontologischen
Problemen
nachsichzieht.4
Meinekritischen
betreffen
eherDetailprobleme,
undsie verdeutliBemerkungen
kenntnisreiche
Studiezu weiteren
ich,daHlsensuerst
chen,sohoffe
Fragenund
Es istzu hoffen,
dasiesowohlvonPhilosophiehistorikern
alsauch
Analysen
anregt.
vonsystematisch
arbeitenden
wird.
Sprachphilosophen
rezipiert
Gttingen

DominikPerler

1 OckhamhltdiesinSumma
I, cap.63(OperaPhilosophica
Logicae
I, S. 193)unmiverstndlich
fest.
2 P.V. Spadesagtdaher
is a psychologico-causal
prgnant:
"Signification
property
ofterms"( TheSemantics
Medieval
, in: TheCambridge
ofTerms
,
History
ofLater
Philosophy
etalii,Cambridge
1982,188).Zurerkenntnistheoretischen
hrsg.vonN. Kretzmann
Dimension
Sein
undErkenntnis
beiWilhelm
vonOck, Signifikation
vgl.auchP. Schulthess,
ham
, Berlin1992.
3 Vgl.dazudieumfassende
inC. Marmo,Semiotica
e linguaggio
nella
scolaDarstellung
stica:
1270-1330.
La semiotica
deiModisti,
Roma1994(besonders
Parigi,
Bologna,
Erfurt
Kap.
4 Ich4.1).
diskutiere
dieseProbleme
in Intentionale
undreale
Existenz:
einesptmittelalterliche
Kontroverse
102(1995),imDruck.
, in: Philosophisches
Jahrbuch,
257

20:18:39 PM

G. Binding& A. Speer,(eds.),Mittelalterliches
Kunsterleben
nachQuellen
des11. bis13.
Fromman
, Friedrich
Jahrhunderts
Verlag- Gnther
HolzboogGmbH& Co.,
Cannstatt
1993,346 p. ISBN 3 772815383
Stuttgart-Bad
of "aesthetics"
in medieval
Againand againone has triedto findformulations
treatises
onthebeautiful.
known
thataesthetics
as suchdidnot
Thoughitis generally
existin theMiddleAges,Panofsky
Architecture
andScholasticism;
Abbot
on
( Gothic
Suger
theAbbey
Church
anditsArtTreasures
intheMiddle
ofSt.-Denis
), Eco(ArtandBeauty
Ages)
andAssunto
desSchnen
imMittelalter
suc(Die Theorie
), tonameonlythreeauthors,
ceededin finding
somesentences
or wordsthat,in theiropinion,couldprovethat
aesthetic
existed
atthetime.To judgefrom
theseveral
editions
thesebooks
something
theideaofmedieval
aesthetics
havestayed
inthemindsofthegeneral
enjoyed
public.
Yetmorespecialistic
medievalists
havealwaysfeltsomewhat
aboutthis,stressuneasy
thetheological
andontological
ofmedieval
artobjectsinthe
inginstead
interpretation
MiddleAges.
The bookhereannouncedcontainseightessayson medievalauthors,mostly
cometospeakofobjectsofartand
that,inthecourseoftheirtreatises,
philosophers,
architecture.
Two of thechapters
also containnewtranslations
of an important
text.A general
ontheunderstanding
ofmedieval
artopensthebook.
specific
chapter
Itistheresult
ofa symposium
heldin1990/1
atCologneUniversity
between
members
ofthePhilosophical
and Architectural
Institutes
there.Theiruneasiness
concerned
thefactthatrelevant
medieval
sourcesaremostly
notreadand interpreted
in their
actualcontext.
notjustin
Theystresstheneedto readthetextsin theirintegrity,
orderto findsomething
on aesthetics.
Suchan approach
asksforphilosophical
and
and also a greatexpertise
in textualinterpretation.
Andthatis
theological
insight
whatis offered
here.In mostchapters
it is concluded
somewhere
thata medieval
aesthetic
doesnotexistand thattherealmeaning
oftherelevant
textsmust
theory
be soughtsomewhere
else.Thusalso theword"aesthetic(s)"
is leftoutofthetitle
ofthebook,in itsplacewe find' 4Kunsterleben",
like"art reception".
something
The twolastchapters
dealwithlessphilosophical
of
texts,Gervasius'
description
thefireandrestoration
ofCanterbury
Cathedral
andthe11th-century
of
description
thenewly
finished
ofSaint-Benigne.
Wehavehereexceptional
texts
and
abbeychurch
themoststriking
havegreatdifficulties
thingaboutthemis thefactthattheauthors
in finding
wordsandphrasesforthenewthings
theysaw.It is in suchtexts,rather
thaninphilosophical
treatises
thatwemaybegintofindsomething
peopleintheMiddleAgesexperienced
whentheysawman-made
werebeautiful.
objectstheythought
In thefieldoffineartthishasrecently
beenconfirmed
thestimulating
articleby
by
" 'Thereis neither
AndrewMartindale,
speechnorlanguagebuttheirvoicesare
heardamongthem'(Psalm19, Verse3, 16thcentury
translation
fromtheEnglish
BookofCommonPrayer).
The enigmaofdiscourse
artandartists
inthe
concerning
12thand 13thcenturies",
in: H. Beck& K. Hengevoss-Drkop,
Studien
zurGeschichte
1
dereuropischen
im12./13.Jahrhundert
am Main 1994,205-18.
, Frankfurt
Skulptur
Thebookherereviewed
is certainly
tobe recommended.
Itis a collection
ofclosely
and in theendconvincing
textsthatdeal
argued,intricate,
essayson philosophical
withthebeautiful.
The besta reviewer
can do in thiscase is to givetheseparate
A. Speer,"Vom Verstehen
mittelalterlicher
chapter
Kunst";N. Senger,
headings:
"Der Ortder'Kunst'imDidascalicon
desHugovonSt. Viktor";R. Kmmerlings,
"
arca.Zur Erkenntnislehre
Richardsvon St. Viktorin De gratia
Mystica
contemplations'' followed
ofDe gratia
sive:Benjamin
maior
I, 3-6;
bya translation
contemplationis
H.P. Neuheuser,"Die Kirchenweihbeschreibungen
von Saint-Denisund ihre
frdas Schnheitsempfinden
des AbtesSuger"; G. Binding
Aussagefahigkeit
beiAbtSugervonSaint-Denis";
N. Senger,
"BeitrgezumArchitekturverstndnis
"Der Begriff'architector'
bei Thomas von Aquin"; F. Hentschel,"Robert
258
E.J. Brill,Leiden,1995

Vivarium
XXXIII, 2

20:18:47 PM

BriefDe unica
im Spiegelkunsttheoretischer
Grossetestes
omnium
forma
'Interpretationen"followed
ofDe unica
omnium
; B. Tammen,'Gervasius
bya translation
forma
vonCanterbury
undseinTractatus
decombustione
etreparatione
Cantuariensis
ecclesiae
and L. Keller,"Die Abteikirche
in Dijon. Untersuchung
der
Saint-Benigne
aus dem11.Jahrhundert".
Baubeschreibung
H. Tummers

Nijmegen

1 Seealsoveryrecently,
ofmedieval
Gesta
on "The history
, 34(1995)withsixarticles
artwithout
'Art'?".

259

20:18:47 PM